This paper presents an analysis of the role of private equity (PE) and lender dynamics in financial distress. Employing a dataset of leveraged loans from 2011 to 2019, this study explores relationships between PE sponsors and creditors in corporate restructurings and updates prior literature from previous periods. Preliminary findings suggest that PE sponsors not only increase the propensity of default but also manage to decelerate the default process. In doing so, they preserve equity value. Comparably, institutional loans, which are predominantly covenant-lite, intensify default risk yet delay default timing. Enhanced sponsor reputation and greater lender concentration are both associated with slower default times, possibly the product of more favorable financing and decreased coordination costs. These dynamics promote more efficient restructuring outcomes, driven by a higher tendency for out-of-court solutions over Chapter 11 bankruptcies. This paper thus indicates that the interplay of sponsor and creditor characteristics leads to heterogeneous default outcomes.