This discussion of values has led to a standoff between two broad perspectives on the nature of scientific inquiry: the Value-Free Ideal of science (VFI) and the Value-Laden Ideal of science (VLI). The VFI perspective holds that the scientific enterprise can, at least in principle, be free from human biases. In contrast, VLI, abandons the attempt to eliminate human biases in science and instead embraces the potential contributions of non-epistemic values or, at the very least, acknowledges the inevitability of their pervasive existence in science. In this dissertation I will argue for a rapprochement of sorts between the VFI and VLI perspectives. I call the Sophisticated Value-Free Ideal (SVFI). This framework aims to integrate the VFI, which sets the goals for science, with the VLI, which provisionally guides aspects of scientific practice. The SVFI model is composed of two components. The first concerns the overarching objective of science—achieving objective knowledge—which sets the stage for the second component, the practice of science, which the SVFI holds should be as free from non-epistemic values as possible. In Chapter One, I examine various philosophical perspectives concerning the value dynamics within scientific practices. I then introduce the differentiation between epistemic or cognitive and non-epistemic or contextual values, raising questions regarding both the validity and necessity of this distinction. In Chapter Two, I establish the connection between the demarcation issue and the issue of values in science (VIS). I argue that both the VIS question and the demarcation problem revolve around our desire to discover trustworthy knowledge, and it is thus illogical to apply different value sets to distinguish science from non-science and to assure its epistemic reliability. I introduce a new approach, a multi-dimensional criterion for demarcation, where methodology, history, and epistemic values are interrelated. Under this framework, the VFI of science is required to establish science’s aspirational goal and define its purpose and practice from the outset. In the final chapter, I extend this argument and promote a new account, namely the temporary roles of values, to understand the role of values in science. According to this perspective, as science advances and matures, the influence and function of non-epistemic values should gradually diminish, giving way to the overarching epistemic goals that science aims to achieve. This view reflects a dynamic understanding of science wherein values are intertwined yet temporary, guiding the practice but not altering the fundamental, objective quest for truth.