Vasserman, Eugene
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Publication Functional Alarms for Systems of Interoperable Medical Devices(2014-01-09) Venkatasubramanian, Krishna; Vasserman, Eugene; Sokolsky, Oleg; Lee, InsupAlarms are essential for medical systems in order to ensure patient safety during deteriorating clinical situations and inevitable device malfunction. As medical devices are connected together to become interoperable, alarms become crucial part in making them high-assurance, in nature. Traditional alarm systems for interoperable medical devices have been patient-centric. In this paper, we introduce the need for an alarm system that focuses on the correct functionality of the interoperability architecture itself, along with several considerations and design challenges in enabling them.Publication Security and Interoperable Medical Device Systems: Part 1(2012-09-01) Venkatasubramanian, Krishna K.; Vasserman, Eugene; Sokolsky, Oleg; Lee, InsupInteroperable medical devices (IMDs) face threats due to the increased attack surface presented by interoperability and the corresponding infrastructure. Introducing networking and coordination functionalities fundamentally alters medical systems' security properties. Understanding the threats is an important first step in eventually designing security solutions for such systems. Part 1 of this two-part article provides an overview of the IMD environment and the attacks that can be mounted on it.Publication Security and Interoperable Medical Device Systems, Part 2: Failures, Consequences and Classifications(2012-11-01) Vasserman, Eugene; Venkatasubramanian, Krishna; Sokolsky, Oleg; Lee, InsupInteroperable medical devices (IMDs) face threats due to the increased attack surface presented by interoperability and the corresponding infrastructure. Introducing networking and coordination functionalities fundamentally alters medical systems' security properties. Understanding the threats is an important first step in eventually designing security solutions for such systems. Part 2 of this two-part article defines a failure model, or the specific ways in which IMD environments might fail when attacked. An attack-consequences model expresses the combination of failures experienced by IMD environments for each attack vector. This analysis leads to interesting conclusions about regulatory classes of medical devices in IMD environments subject to attacks.