Document Type
Working Paper
Date of this Version
12-1-2018
Abstract
Insurers are rapidly gaining access to consumers’ genetic information. In the US, federal law bars using genetic information in health insurance, but not in life, disability, or long-term care insurance. Accordingly, insurers may fear adverse selection: individuals could undergo testing, learn they have risky genes, and purchase insurance without revealing test results. While other countries have established moratoria on insurers’ use of genetic information, there is no consensus in the U.S. regarding how to avoid ‘unfair discrimination.’ The chapter discusses alternative solutions, including government bans of insurers’ use of genetic information, or limiting insurer information to only high-risk genes.
Keywords
Insurance, risk-management, genetic testing, healthcare, Genetic Information NonDiscrimination Act
Working Paper Number
WP2018-15
Copyright/Permission Statement
All findings, interpretations, and conclusions of this paper represent the views of the author(s) and not those of the Wharton School or the Pension Research Council. © 2018 Pension Research Council of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. All rights reserved.
Date Posted: 30 January 2019
Comments
The published version of this working paper may be found in the 2019 publication: The Disruptive Impact of FinTech on Retirement Systems.