Document Type
Working Paper
Date of this Version
9-1-2012
Abstract
Drawing on the growing academic literature on financial advice to retail investors, we document both its potential in the light of complex decision making and limited financial sophistication as well as its current shortcomings. Policies mandating more disclosure, both on products and on conflicts of interest, can create benefits to consumers, but they fall short of releasing the full potential of advice, as this should be insufficient to ensure competition for high quality advice as well as better adherence to good advice. A main task for regulators and researchers is to create tools and policies to enhance such transparency.
Keywords
Financial Advice; Performance Transparency; Disclosure
Working Paper Number
WP2012-14
Copyright/Permission Statement
All findings, interpretations, and conclusions of this paper represent the views of the authors and not those of the Wharton School or the Pension Research Council. © 2012 Pension Research Council of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. All rights reserved.
Date Posted: 28 June 2019
Comments
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2013 publication: The Market for Retirement Financial Advice.