Operations, Information and Decisions Papers

Document Type

Working Paper

Date of this Version

6-2006

Publication Source

NBER Working Paper Series

Start Page

1

Last Page

28

DOI

10.3386/w12281

Abstract

We model tipping as a game-theoretic phenomenon and investigate the connection between supermodular games, tipping of equilibria and cascading, and apply the results to issues that arise in the context of homeland security and computer security. We show that tipping and cascading can occur in supermodular games and that "increasing differences"is a sufficient condition for tipping. Supermodularity and tipping of equilibria are closely related. We relate our results to Schelling’s early work on tipping.

Comments

NBER Working Paper 12281, accessible at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12281

Share

COinS
 

Date Posted: 27 November 2017