Date of this Version
Monitoring changes the behavior of those who are monitored and those who monitor others. We studied behavior under different monitoring regimes in repeated trust games. We found that trustees behaved opportunistically when they anticipated monitoring—they were compliant when they knew in advance that they would be monitored, but exploited trustors when they knew in advance that they would not be monitored. Interestingly, trustors failed to anticipate how strategically their counterparts would behave. Trustors misattributed the strategic, compliant behavior they observed as signals of trustees’ trustworthiness. As a result, trustors misplaced their trust when they were unable to monitor their counterparts. We discuss the managerial implications of our results for designing and implementing monitoring systems.
Originally published in Management Science © 2018 INFORMS
This is a pre-publication version. The final version is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2586
trust, compliance, monitoring, strategic behavior
Schweitzer, M. E., Ho, T., & Zhang, X. (2018). How Monitoring Influences Trust: A Tale of Two Faces. Management Science, 64 (1), 253-270. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2586
Cognition and Perception Commons, Cognitive Psychology Commons, Experimental Analysis of Behavior Commons, Industrial and Organizational Psychology Commons, Interpersonal and Small Group Communication Commons, Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons, Personality and Social Contexts Commons, Social Psychology Commons
Date Posted: 25 October 2018
This document has been peer reviewed.