Management Papers
Document Type
Technical Report
Date of this Version
8-2009
Publication Source
The Review of Financial Studies
Volume
22
Issue
8
Start Page
3047
Last Page
3091
DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhn080
Abstract
In large U.S. corporations, founding families are the only blockholders whose control rights on average exceed their cash-flow rights. We analyze how they achieve this wedge, and at what cost. Indirect ownership through trusts, foundations, limited partnerships, and other corporations is prevalent but rarely creates a wedge (a pyramid). The primary sources of the wedge are dual-class stock, disproportionate board representation, and voting agreements. Each control-enhancing mechanism has a different impact on value. Our findings suggest that the potential agency conflict between large shareholders and public shareholders in the United States is as relevant as elsewhere in the world.
Copyright/Permission Statement
This article has been accepted for publication in The Review of Financial Studies Published by Oxford University Press. The final version is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn080
Recommended Citation
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2009). How are U.S. Family Firms Controlled?. The Review of Financial Studies, 22 (8), 3047-3091. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn080
Included in
Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business and Corporate Communications Commons, Business Intelligence Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Management Information Systems Commons, Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons, Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons, Strategic Management Policy Commons
Date Posted: 25 October 2018
This document has been peer reviewed.