How are U.S. Family Firms Controlled?

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Management Papers
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Business Administration, Management, and Operations
Business and Corporate Communications
Business Intelligence
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Management Information Systems
Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods
Organizational Behavior and Theory
Strategic Management Policy
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Villalonga, Belén
Amit, Raphael
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In large U.S. corporations, founding families are the only blockholders whose control rights on average exceed their cash-flow rights. We analyze how they achieve this wedge, and at what cost. Indirect ownership through trusts, foundations, limited partnerships, and other corporations is prevalent but rarely creates a wedge (a pyramid). The primary sources of the wedge are dual-class stock, disproportionate board representation, and voting agreements. Each control-enhancing mechanism has a different impact on value. Our findings suggest that the potential agency conflict between large shareholders and public shareholders in the United States is as relevant as elsewhere in the world.

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2009-08-01
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