A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Penn collection
Marketing Papers
Degree type
Discipline
Subject
dynamic stochastic games
Markov perfect equilibria
regularity
genericity
finiteness
strong stability
essentiality
purifiability
estimation
computation
repeated games
Behavioral Economics
Business
Econometrics
Marketing
Funder
Grant number
License
Copyright date
Distributor
Related resources
Author
Doraszelski, Ulrich
Escobar, Juan F
Contributor
Abstract

This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification. To establish these results, we introduce a notion of regularity for dynamic stochastic games and exploit a simple connection between normal form and dynamic stochastic games.

Advisor
Date Range for Data Collection (Start Date)
Date Range for Data Collection (End Date)
Digital Object Identifier
Series name and number
Publication date
2010-01-01
Volume number
Issue number
Publisher
Publisher DOI
Journal Issue
Comments
Recommended citation
Collection