Document Type

Thesis or dissertation

Date of this Version



Eric Orts


This study provides unique evidence for the potential use of the implementation of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) as an indication of managerial influence in compensation setting processes within publicly traded firms. While many firms utilize anti-takeover provisions to protect their ability to adhere to its corporate strategy and policy, the imposition of an anti-takeover provision distinctly predicts both a structural and aggregate change in the compensation packages of CEOs in S&P 500 firms. In the three years following a firm’s implementation of an anti-takeover provision, the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of total executive compensation increases by 42% relative to the CAGR across all S&P 500 firms. Moreover, these altered compensation plans more heavily favor increasing levels of stock-based and bonus-based compensation than the average packages of S&P 500 CEOs. Thus, this study provides principal evidence of managerial influence in the compensation setting processes within by publicly traded firms.


Executive compensation, managerial influence, anti-takeover provision, principal-agent problem, S&P 500, stock-based compensation, corporate governance

Additional Files

Elias Zenkich.xlsx (19717 kB)
Data tables

Included in

Business Commons



Date Posted: 13 November 2019


To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.