Thesis or dissertation
Date of this Version
This study provides unique evidence for the potential use of the implementation of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) as an indication of managerial influence in compensation setting processes within publicly traded firms. While many firms utilize anti-takeover provisions to protect their ability to adhere to its corporate strategy and policy, the imposition of an anti-takeover provision distinctly predicts both a structural and aggregate change in the compensation packages of CEOs in S&P 500 firms. In the three years following a firm’s implementation of an anti-takeover provision, the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of total executive compensation increases by 42% relative to the CAGR across all S&P 500 firms. Moreover, these altered compensation plans more heavily favor increasing levels of stock-based and bonus-based compensation than the average packages of S&P 500 CEOs. Thus, this study provides principal evidence of managerial influence in the compensation setting processes within by publicly traded firms.
Executive compensation, managerial influence, anti-takeover provision, principal-agent problem, S&P 500, stock-based compensation, corporate governance
Zenkich, E. R. (2019). "Misaligned Incentives: An Analysis of Executive Compensation as an Indicator of Managerial Influence," Joseph Wharton Scholars. Available at https://repository.upenn.edu/joseph_wharton_scholars/73
Date Posted: 13 November 2019