Soft Shareholder Activism

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Penn collection
Finance Papers
Degree type
Discipline
Subject
cheap-talk
communication
corporate governance
exit
shareholder activism
voice
Finance and Financial Management
Funder
Grant number
License
Copyright date
Distributor
Related resources
Author
Levit, Doron
Contributor
Abstract

This paper studies communications between investors and firms as a form of corporate governance. The main premise is that activist investors cannot force their ideas on companies; they must persuade the board or other shareholders that implementing these ideas is in the best interest of the firm. In this framework, I show that voice (launching a public campaign) and exit (selling shares) enhance the ability of activists to govern through communication. The analysis identifies the factors that contribute to successful dialogues between investors and firms. It also shows that public communications are likely to be ineffective, justifying the prevalence of behind-the-scenes communications.

Advisor
Date Range for Data Collection (Start Date)
Date Range for Data Collection (End Date)
Digital Object Identifier
Series name and number
Publication date
2017-05-31
Volume number
Issue number
Publisher
Publisher DOI
Journal Issue
Comments
Recommended citation
Collection