The notion of a circle of “elites” who exercise influence over politics, legislation, and public life has motivated both academic and public discussion. How can we verify the existence of such a circle of board directors of large corporations? Gerald F. Davis and Johan Chu’s 2016 study “Who Killed the Inner Circle? The Decline of the American Corporate Interlock Network” finds that the degree of corporate board interlocking declined from 1997 to 2010 and presents several plausible socio-economic reasons for this decline. My thesis replicates and extends Chu and Davis’ methods to trends in board interlocking after 2010: I find increases in the connectivity of female and non-American directors, strong declines in corporate interlocks in the early 2000s and weaker declines after 2010. These results yield fruitful questions for future discussions on how changes in the “inner circle” have manifested.