Verifying Safety of a Token Coherence Implementation by Parametric Compositional Refinement

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dc.contributor.authorAlur, Rajeev
dc.contributor.authorBurckhardt, Sebastian
dc.contributor.authorMartin, Milo M.K.
dc.date2023-05-16T22:31:45.000
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-22T12:46:26Z
dc.date.available2023-05-22T12:46:26Z
dc.date.issued2005-01-17
dc.date.submitted2005-06-30T13:30:15-07:00
dc.description.abstractWe combine compositional reasoning and reachability analysis to formally verify the safety of a recent cache coherence protocol. The protocol is a detailed implementation of token coherence, an approach that decouples correctness and performance. First, we present a formal and abstract specification that captures the safety substrate of token coherence, and highlights the symmetry in states of the cache controllers and contents of the messages they exchange. Then, we prove that this abstract specification is coherent, and check whether the implementation proposed by the protocol designers is a refinement of the abstract specification. Our refinement proof is parametric in the number of cache controllers, and is compositional as it reduces the refinement checks to individual controllers using a specialized form of assume-guarantee reasoning. The individual refinement obligations are discharged using refinement maps and reachability analysis. While the formal proof justifies the intuitive claim by the designers about the ease of verifiability of token coherence, we report on several bugs in the implementation, and accompanying modifications, that were missed by extensive prior simulations.
dc.description.commentsFrom the 6th International Conference, VMCAI 2005, Paris, France, January 17-19, 2005.
dc.description.commentsExtended version of paper published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 3385, Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation, 2005, pages 130-145. Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/b105073
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.upenn.edu/handle/20.500.14332/6205
dc.legacy.articleid1200
dc.legacy.fields10.1007/978-3-540-30579-8_9
dc.legacy.fulltexturlhttps://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1200&context=cis_papers&unstamped=1
dc.rightsThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
dc.source.beginpage130
dc.source.endpage145
dc.source.issue174
dc.source.journalDepartmental Papers (CIS)
dc.source.journaltitleLecture Notes in Computer Science: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation
dc.source.statuspublished
dc.source.volume3385
dc.subject.otherCPS Formal Methods
dc.titleVerifying Safety of a Token Coherence Implementation by Parametric Compositional Refinement
dc.typePresentation
digcom.contributor.authorBurckhardt, Sebastian
digcom.contributor.authorisAuthorOfPublication|email:alur@cis.upenn.edu|institution:University of Pennsylvania|Alur, Rajeev
digcom.contributor.authorisAuthorOfPublication|email:milom@cis.upenn.edu|institution:University of Pennsylvania|Martin, Milo M.K.
digcom.identifiercis_papers/174
digcom.identifier.contextkey82009
digcom.identifier.submissionpathcis_papers/174
digcom.typeconference
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication0277bab3-1be2-4f99-9964-92e0ea36014e
relation.isAuthorOfPublication77277168-ae34-46e9-b324-e3717ade5622
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery0277bab3-1be2-4f99-9964-92e0ea36014e
upenn.schoolDepartmentCenterDepartmental Papers (CIS)
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