This dissertation explores institutional economic justice by examining the United States central bank and large, systemically important financial institutions and their regulatory and supervisory frameworks. In the wake of recurring financial crises and persistent economic inequality, existing frameworks inadequately address the fundamental question of what responsibilities banks and their regulators bear toward society. Drawing on philosophy, law, history, and policy, I construct a normative framework for institutional economic justice in modern finance through three interconnected chapters. First, I apply Rawlsian institutionalism to argue that the Federal Reserve, as the primary economic institution, is subject to the principles of justice and, thus, is responsible for distributing economic justice. As such, it should interpret its dual mandate to prioritize maximum employment for the least advantaged, necessitating a “least-advantaged corollary” to its statutory obligations. Because the principles of justice only apply to principal institutions such as the Federal Reserve, public rules, i.e., laws and policies, must extend economic justice requirements to the most important financial institutions. As a result, the second chapter reconceptualizes banks’ responsibilities through the concession theory to argue that systemically important financial institutions must promote economic justice. I demonstrate that the concession theory provides the appropriate legal foundation for understanding large financial institutions’ public economic responsibilities, as their chartered status creates an implicit social contract requiring them to serve broader societal interests beyond shareholder value maximization. While the prior chapter focuses on the role of the central bank during “peacetime,” the third chapter delves into the Federal Reserve’s evolving role as lender of last resort during economic crises and its obligation therein. It introduces the “Geithner Doctrine” as a new crisis management paradigm. This doctrine adapts the traditional lender-of-last-resort crisis management playbook to meet the emergency needs of modern complex financial markets through innovative, flexible, and rapid interventions. My analysis reveals that financial institutions must be reconceptualized as bearers of economic justice obligations flowing from institutional principles. This work contributes to literatures on financial regulation, corporate responsibility, and economic justice by forging connections between philosophical principles and practical financial policy, ultimately providing a framework for how justice might be more effectively realized through the monetary authority and banking system.