Much of the integration of the global economy is credited to "embedded liberalism," (Ruggie 1982) which contends that states can secure support for openness by mitigating globalization-induced economic insecurity with social welfare. However, the contemporary globalization backlash has led some observers to conclude that embedded liberalism is fraying. While the micro-foundations of this theory are usually imagined as an instrumental process, a growing body of research finds that attitudes toward globalization are better explained by psychosocial factors. This dissertation adds to that literature by examining the role of group identity in the practice and politics of embedded liberalism in the United States. In the first part, I focus on workers' decisions to accept government aid after a trade-related job loss using semi-structured interviews with workers in a post-industrial region of Pennsylvania. Especially for white working-class people, the loss of a job and accepting welfare can threaten group membership, and this is the context in which workers decide whether to retrain through the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. In the second part, I consider the effect of racial in-group favoritism on attitudes toward trade and compensation. Since most people do not experience globalization-related risks to their own employment, citizens evaluate the impact of trade on others "like them." White working-class people receive messages from the media and politicians that they are relatively worse off due to globalization, activating in-group favoritism. I test this theory using an experiment embedded in a survey of white Americans and original coding of anti-globalization campaign ads for the presence of white working-class identity themes. Ultimately, I do not find evidence for the role of identity in embedded liberalism. Trade-displaced workers are primarily motivated by instrumental concerns around employability and/or short-term finances in deciding whether to retrain, and white survey respondents do not condition their support for trade on other whites receiving government aid. However, Congressional candidates running in districts with a greater white share of the population are more likely to reference white identity themes in anti-trade ads.