The first chapter studies the effects of government price regulation in a college market with centralized admissions. I analyze a policy change in a large Indian state that increased tuition ceilings at private engineering colleges by an average of 20%, leaving tuition subsidies for most marginalized students unchanged. Using administrative data on students' rank-ordered program preferences, enrollment outcomes, and college characteristics, I document that the policy raised out-of-pocket expenses for 80% of students, triggered enrollment declines among wealthier, high-ability students, and led to a deterioration in peer quality and increased socioeconomic segregation. Colleges with greater pre-policy market share passed through price increases with minimal quality improvements, while less dominant colleges upgraded quality more aggressively. To quantify equilibrium impacts, I estimate a structural model of student college choice and college quality investment under fixed prices. Structural estimates reveal substantial quality markdowns among colleges with greater historical market share and net welfare losses concentrated among students directly affected by the price-setting policy. Price and quality changes have opposing effects on enrollment but the price effect dominates causing overall enrollment declines. Compensating variation estimates indicate the policy caused net losses in welfare with modest redistribution of surplus to the poorest students. The findings highlight how government price setting interacts with market power and centralized admissions to reshape competition, access, and welfare in higher education markets. The second chapter is coauthored with Gaurav Khanna, Naveen Kumar, and Karthik Muralidharan. We develop an objective measure of college quality and decompose this effect into its constituent parts. We study the engineering college market in a Indian state that uses a centralized admissions process to match students to programs. In addition to a common entrance exam, this state mandates uniform college semester exams for all colleges in the state. This allows for a unique opportunity to compare cross-college performance. Using a regression discontinuity design, we estimate program-level outcomes in the neighborhood of program admission cutoffs. We find that marginally admitted students who clear a cutoff experience an increase in peer quality, and a decrease in relative percentile rank upon admission. To objectively gauge college quality, we construct individual program value-added measures. Subsequently, we decompose program value-added into distinct components: college quality, peer quality, and relative rank effects. A unique feature of our study setting is that affirmative action policies generate multiple cutoffs within a single program. We leverage this setting to delineate relative rank effects and isolate this from the value-added due to college inputs and peer quality. Understanding the contributions of college inputs, peer quality, and relative positions within the classroom to overall value-added is crucial for both academic researchers and policymakers. Such insights are essential for informed decision-making regarding investment strategies and resource allocation within the higher education sector. The third chapter empirically examines the consequences of tuition price regulation on access, equity, and education quality in centralized higher education systems. I study a 2012-13 tuition price reform that affected the engineering college market in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The policy led the government to abolish previously uniform prices across all colleges and instead fix individual, cost-based, sticker prices for each college. Leveraging variation in prices created by the policy using a difference-in-differences framework, I quantify changes in enrollment, student cohort composition, and college quality measured by graduation rates. I find that despite parallel pre-trends in these outcomes before the policy, colleges that received higher sticker prices as a result of the policy, have less female and affirmative action students. These colleges also experienced gains in graduation rates, suggesting that improvements in academic performance may have been driven by a recomposition in the student body rather than institutional quality upgrades. These findings underscore the distributional trade-offs inherent in tuition regulation. While cost-based pricing may improve internal efficiency and transparency, it can reduce equity by eroding access for students with lower ability to pay. The paper contributes to broader debates on how pricing and voucher policies interact with affirmative action and centralized admissions to shape access and quality in higher education markets.