Hidden Regret and Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets

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PARC Working Paper Series
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Insurance markets
Pooling
Separating equilibria
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Optimal choice
Demography, Population, and Ecology
Family, Life Course, and Society
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Sociology
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Huang, Rachel J
Muermann, Alexander
Tzeng, Larry Y
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We examine insurance markets in which there are two types of customers: those who regret suboptimal decisions and those who don't. In this setting, we characterize the equilibria under hidden information about the type of customers and hidden action. We show that both pooling and separating equilibria can exist. Furthermore, there exist separating equilibria that predict a positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, i.e. advantageous selection. Since optimal choice of regretful customers depends on foregone alternatives, any equilibrium includes a contract which is not purchased.

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2007-01-01
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Huang, Rachel J., Alexander Muermann and Larry Y. Tzeng. "Hidden Regret and Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets." "PARC Working Paper Series, WPS 07-09.
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