Loo, Boon Thau
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Publication Declarative Network Verification(2008-12-23) Wang, Anduo; Basu, Prithwish; Loo, Boon Thau; Sokolsky, OlegIn this paper, we present our initial design and implementation of a declarative network verifier (DNV). DNV utilizes theorem proving, a well established verification technique where logic-based axioms that automatically capture network semantics are generated, and a user-driven proof process is used to establish network correctness properties. DNV takes as input declarative networking specifications written in the Network Datalog (NDlog) query language, and maps that automatically into logical axioms that can be directly used in existing theorem provers to validate protocol correctness. DNV is a significant improvement compared to existing use case of theorem proving which typically require several man-months to construct the system specifications. Moreover, NDlog, a high-level specification, whose semantics are precisely compiled into DNV without loss, can be directly executed as implementations, hence bridging specifications, verification, and implementation. To validate the use of DNV, we present case studies using DNV in conjunction with the PVS theorem prover to verify routing protocols, including eventual properties of protocols in dynamic settings.Publication Formally Verifiable Networking(2009-10-01) Wang, Anduo; Jia, Limin; Liu, Changbin; Loo, Boon Thau; Sokolsky, Oleg; Basu, PrithwishThis paper proposes Formally Verifiable Networking (FVN), a novel approach towards unifying the design, specification, implementation, and verification of networking protocols within a logic-based framework. In FVN, formal logical statements are used to specify the behavior and the properties of the protocol. FVN uses declarative networking as an intermediary layer between high-level logical specifications of the network model and low-level implementations. A theorem prover is used to statically verify the properties of declarative network protocols. Moreover, a property preserving translation exists for generating declarative networking implementations from verified formal specifications. We further demonstrate the possibility of designing and specifying well-behaved network protocols with correctness guarantees in FVN using meta-models in a systematic and compositional way.Publication A Theorem Proving Approach Towards Declarative Networking(2009-08-01) Wang, Anduo; Loo, Boon Thau; Liu, Changbin; Sokolsky, Oleg; Basu, PrithwishWe present the DRIVER system for designing, analyzing and implementing network protocols. DRIVER leverages declarative networking, a recent innovation that enables network protocols to be concisely specified and implemented using declarative languages. DRIVER takes as input declarative networking specifications written in the Network Datalog (NDlog) query language, and maps that automatically into logical specifications that can be directly used in existing theorem provers to validate protocol correctness. As an alternative approach, network designer can supply a component-based model of their routing design, automatically generate PVS specifications for verification and subsequent compilation into veriffied declarative network implementations. We demonstrate the use of DRIVER for synthesizing and verifying a variety of well-known network routing protocols.Publication FSR: Formal Analysis and Implementation Toolkit for Safe Inter-Domain Routing(2011-01-01) Wang, Anduo; Jia, Limin; Zhou, Wenchao; Loo, Boon Thau; Ren, Yiqing; Rexford, Jennifer; Scedrov, Andre; Nigam, Vivek; Talcott, CarolynInter-domain routing stitches the disparate parts of the Internet together, making protocol stability a critical issue to both researchers and practitioners. Yet, researchers create safety proofs and counter-examples by hand, and build simulators and prototypes to explore protocol dynamics. Similarly, network operators analyze their router configurations manually, or using home-grown tools. In this paper, we present a comprehensive toolkit for analyzing and implementing routing policies, ranging from high-level guidelines to specific router configurations. Our Formally Safe Routing (FSR) toolkit performs all of these functions from the same algebraic representation of routing policy. We show that routing algebra has a natural translation to both integer constraints (to perform safety analysis with SMT solvers) and declarative programs (to generate distributed implementations). Our extensive experiments with realistic topologies and policies show how FSR can detect problems in an AS's iBGP configuration, prove sufficient conditions for BGP safety, and empirically evaluate convergence time.