Departmental Papers (CIS)

Date of this Version


Document Type

Conference Paper


Brautbar, M., Kearns, M., & Syed, U., Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts, 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, July 2010,

© 1995–2011 Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence.


We consider risk-sensitive generalizations of Nash and correlated equilibria in noncooperative games. We prove that, except for a class of degenerate games, unless a two-player game has a pure Nash equilibrium, it does not have a risksensitive Nash equilibrium. We also show that every game has a risk-sensitive correlated equilibrium. The striking contrast between these existence results is due to the different sources of randomization in Nash (private randomization) and correlated equilibria (third-party randomization).



Date Posted: 24 July 2012