ScholarlyCommons

Title

Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts

Author(s)

Michael Brautbar, University of Pennsylvania
Michael J. Kearns, University of PennsylvaniaFollow
Umar Syed, University of Pennsylvania

Date of this Version

7-2010

Document Type

Conference Paper

Recommended Citation

Michael Brautbar, Michael J. Kearns, and Umar Syed, "Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts", . July 2010.

Comments

Brautbar, M., Kearns, M., & Syed, U., Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts, 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, July 2010, http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI10/paper/view/1847

© 1995–2011 Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence.

Abstract

We consider risk-sensitive generalizations of Nash and correlated equilibria in noncooperative games. We prove that, except for a class of degenerate games, unless a two-player game has a pure Nash equilibrium, it does not have a risksensitive Nash equilibrium. We also show that every game has a risk-sensitive correlated equilibrium. The striking contrast between these existence results is due to the different sources of randomization in Nash (private randomization) and correlated equilibria (third-party randomization).