Community Consumed: Sunbelt Capitalism, A Praxis For Community Control, And The (dis) Integration Of Civic Life In Maryvale, Arizona

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Community Consumed: Sunbelt Capitalism, A Praxis For Community Control, And The (dis) Integration Of Civic Life In Maryvale, Arizona

Abstract
Civic activists have worked to embed community institutions in the Phoenix area from the time of initial Anglo settlement in the Salt River valley. Civic elites sought to monopolize control over regional development via municipal governance in the period after the Second World War. This dissertation places qualitative sources on community life in conversation with quantitative sources on political economy to explain how civic elites, as manifest in the civic organization of Charter government, worked with suburban activists to maintain spatial racialization in Phoenix. This process reveals that the socio-political value of civic life has waned in metropolitan Phoenix after the political ascent of Charter government. The outcome of this change is that marginalized Anglo communities like Maryvale, the first master-planned community built in Phoenix after World War II, were consumed by racial transition once local civic activists lost control over neighborhood economies. John F. Long began to construct Maryvale atop cotton and cantaloupe fields on the rural periphery of metropolitan Phoenix in the mid-fifties. The sweat equity of civic participation helped Long provide residents with access to affordable community amenities. He hoped that annexation into Phoenix would benefit Maryvale, but continued political marginalization hindered local efforts to provide civic services, like community healthcare, without burdensome debt. Soon, political engagement declined and outside investors acquired operational ownership of civic institutions; moreover, the social capital which traditionally remunerated civic activity declined in value as racial minorities challenged Anglo hegemony over local civic life. By the late seventies, when racial tensions among local youth boiled over into overt violence, civic leaders lacked the social capital to ameliorate racial conflict, and Anglos abdicated civic authority to law enforcement to pacify hostilities. This shift in community praxis, from civic participation to private consumption, transformed local patterns of racial integration into regional patterns of social segregation.

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COMMUNITY CONSUMED: SUNBELT CAPITALISM, A PRAXIS FOR COMMUNITY CONTROL, AND THE (DIS)INTEGRATION OF CIVIC LIFE IN MARYVALE, ARIZONA

Anthony Charles Pratcher II

A DISSERTATION

in

History

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the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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COMMUNITY CONSUMED: SUNBELT CAPITALISM, A PRAXIS FOR COMMUNITY FORMATION, AND THE (DIS)INTEGRATION OF CIVIC LIFE IN MARYVALE, ARIZONA

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For my parents, from your son
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Before entering graduate school, I was told that dissertation deposit is like the sprint at the end of a marathon. I hoped that might be able to avoid the sprint if I deposited my dissertation in summer—a false hope if there ever was one. So here I am, with days left ‘til deposit, looking to finish my acknowledgements for a project my lifetime has been spent making.

I must begin by thanking the supreme power in the universe for setting me down this path. My initial understanding of institutional life came from childhood experiences at Prayer Assembly COGIC, Azusa World Ministries, and Word of Abundant Life Christian Center. My time at these churches provided me with a facsimile of Black liturgical traditions my parents learned in our familial home of Memphis, TN. Additionally, there were numerous families, including the Harris family, the Liggins family, the Mitchell family, the Parris family, the Smith family, the Spell family, and the Teasley family, who helped ensconce me in a community of black Phoenicians.

My teachers in Glendale Elementary School District, particularly Mrs. Nancy Pape, Mrs. Cheryl Thomas, and Mrs. Kitty Kazcmarek helped instill a life-long love of learning in me. Also, the Black Theatre Troupe helped me learn to express myself creatively and Khalid’s Martial Arts Academy helped me learn to defend myself physically. My early childhood was far from halcyon, as the Bicentennial neighborhood of Glendale could be caustic and cruel, but my family and friends introduced me to institutional actors with the ability to help navigate such an environment.

My adolescence, spent in the Deer Valley Unified School District, was far more fraught. I was spatially separated from the community which helped nurture me and underperformed both socially and academically until I came under the tutelage of Mrs. Kellie Allen, Ms. Beth Eyres, and Coach Eric Bolus. Additionally, my colleagues in the Honors/AP curriculum and my teammates in the Basketball, Track, and Academic Decathlon programs provided the camaraderie necessary to make high school palatable. Their support helped me earn a chance to attend Howard University.

The History Department at Howard University, particularly professors Ana Lucia Araujo, Margaret Crosby-Arnold, Jeffery Kerr-Ritchie, and Daryl Scott, helped encouraged me to pursue an academic career. The initial labor for this dissertation began in their research seminars. Shem
Franklin, Misty Major, Devin Parrish, Jarrid Reed, and Brian Roberts, among other students, helped develop my racial consciousness and helped refine my personal politics in preparation for professional life. My educational experience at Howard helped provide me with the confidence to enter a graduate program immediately after my undergraduate program.

I was blessed that I entered Penn with a cohort of intellectually curious colleagues. Cameron Brickhouse, Alexis Broderick-Neumann, Sam Casper, Katie Hickerson, Sheng Mao, Salar Mohandesi, Claire Pogue-Kaiser, Alex Ponsen, Kathryn Taylor, and C. Luke Victor, among others, helped make my first year uniquely pleasant. Senior student cohorts, including Abby Cooper, Lori Dagger, Jeremy Dell, Elizabeth Della Zazzeria, Jack Dwiggins, Anne Fleming, Julius Fleming, Rachel Guberman, Clemmie Harris, Dani Holtz, Matt Krueer, Hope McGrath, Justin Simard, Maryan Soliman, Annie Schatz, Khadijah White, and Noor Zaidi helped me navigate the transition to Penn. As I prepared for my comprehensive exams, Robert Hegwood, Yakov Feygin, Dan Fryer, Smita Ghosh, Janine Knedlik, Colin McGrath, Rasul Miller, Zach Mondesire, Nichole Nelson, Kelsey Rice, Courtney Ring, Jim Ryan, Celina de Sá, Natalie Shibley, Iuliia Skubytska, Holly Stephens, Camille Suarez, and Kevin Waite gave me energy to push through. Ema Yamamoto taught me more than just ArcGIS; her valuable lessons remain with me. Colleagues in the Race and Space in Africana Studies NEH/ODH Institute refined my discourse in later years.

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Academic professionals throughout the Valley have helped me with my research over the span of this project. Archivists at the Arizona Historical Society-Tempe (as well as at the Arizona Historical Foundation), the Arizona State Archives, the Cline Library at Northern Arizona University, and the Hayden Library at Arizona State University, particularly Rob Spindler, for their assistance in locating archival materials. Jean Berry and her team of librarians in the Arizona Room at Burton Barr Public Library proved integral to the development of this project—their newspaper clippings are the first site historians should visit in Phoenix. Carol St. Clair and Martha Dennis provided access to unpublished records at the Glendale-Arizona Historical Society. Additionally, the ever-patient Michele Simms-Burton helped edit my final dissertation draft.

I have been fortunate enough to have mentors both inside and outside of the academy aid my development as a historian. Walter Greason encouraged me to expand my professional network at national conferences. Ellie Shermer explained dissertation research to me at an archive in Phoenix before I matriculated into Penn. Jennifer Dorsey introduced me to academic research as an unpaid Research Assistant the first summer of undergraduate school. Donna
Reiner hired me for my first history gig when she allowed me to volunteer at the Phoenix Museum of History as an intern my second summer of high school. I appreciate these early encounters.

My friends and family have carried me through this journey. My unceremonious return to Phoenix post-comprehensive exams left me again feeling unmoored and their love has helped keep me sane during the extremes of my dissertation experience. Rheanna Anderson-Soto, AJ Givens, Nitara Jones, Michael McBride, and Reggie Relf helped me disengage from academic politics. The parents, faculty and staff at Augustus H. Shaw Montessori have helped create a welcoming environment for my family. Patricia Levy has shown me how consistency, in both practice and instruction, make for exceptional teaching. The descendants of Samuel and Beatrice Hardaway, and especially those raised on Outlet Road, have integrated me into their social support network now that I am an adult. The shadows of Earnestine Hardaway-Anderson and Andre Anderson shielded me as I drove throughout Maricopa County. Tameka Spence has always been there to help my thoughts make sense. Antonita Pratcher has kept me humble while I follow her international exploits. Amber and Jordan Mitchell have enriched my life beyond words through Jaylen. Alicia and Patricia Nader have enriched my life as they help me raise Domingue. He is now my oldest, as well as most precious, valuable, and important, passion project.

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I received another bit of advice before entering graduate schools—a PhD program is long enough to fall in love, get married, and divorce your spouse. I haven’t had anything that dramatic occur, but it has been long enough that I will not be able to properly thank all the people who helped me accomplish this task. I truly appreciate all the lessons people helped me learn over the past seven years. Omissions or shortcomings in this project are regrettable and arise from my imperfection alone. I’ll improve upon them in the monograph. With peace.
COMMUNITY CONSUMED: SUNBELT CAPITALSIM, A PRAXIS FOR COMMUNITY
CONTROL, AND THE (DIS) INTEGRATION OF CIVIC LIFE IN MARYVALE, ARIZONA

Anthony Charles Pratcher II
Dr. Mary Frances Berry

Civic activists have worked to embed community institutions in the Phoenix area from the time of initial Anglo settlement in the Salt River valley. Civic elites sought to monopolize control over regional development via municipal governance in the period after the Second World War. This dissertation places qualitative sources on community life in conversation with quantitative sources on political economy to explain how civic elites, as manifest in the civic organization of Charter government, worked with suburban activists to maintain spatial racialization in Phoenix. This process reveals that the socio-political value of civic life has waned in metropolitan Phoenix after the political ascent of Charter government. The outcome of this change is that marginalized Anglo communities like Maryvale, the first master-planned community built in Phoenix after World War II, were consumed by racial transition once local civic activists lost control over neighborhood economies. John F. Long began to construct Maryvale atop cotton and cantaloupe fields on the rural periphery of metropolitan Phoenix in the mid-fifties. The sweat equity of civic participation helped Long provide residents with access to affordable community amenities. He hoped that annexation into Phoenix would benefit Maryvale, but continued political marginalization hindered local efforts to provide civic services, like community healthcare, without burdensome debt. Soon, political engagement declined and outside investors acquired operational ownership of civic institutions; moreover, the social capital which traditionally remunerated civic activity declined in value as racial minorities challenged Anglo hegemony over local civic life. By the late seventies, when racial tensions among local youth boiled over into overt violence, civic leaders lacked the social capital to ameliorate racial conflict, and Anglos abdicated civic authority to law enforcement to pacify hostilities. This shift in community praxis, from civic participation to private consumption, transformed local patterns of racial integration into regional patterns of social segregation.
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PREFACE
On June 24, 1976, Barry Goldwater wrote a personal letter to Nina Pulliam, then-publisher of the Arizona Republic and Phoenix Gazette, about what he described as one of the most traumatic experiences of his life. One of her papers had run an article that accused Goldwater and other prominent state politicians of, in his words, "being part of some under-world effort that resulted in the killing of a good friend of mine and inferred that the three of us had participated in some nefarious land scheme."

The good friend about whom Goldwater was talking was Don Bolles. Goldwater had been vehemently denying that he had any connection with either organized crime or land fraud after Bolles was assassinated earlier in the month. Goldwater asserted that he had been warning Arizona politicians about fraud schemes for years and that any business he had conducted with organized crime was accidental. He concluded his letter by writing that he planned to, "carefully file all of these things so that in the event my grandchildren are told that their grandfather was a dishonest man these can be used to disuade [sic] them. I am probably not the brightest guy … but I have tried to be honest."

Goldwater was not the only prominent civic elite who had their scruples investigated by reporters. The Investigative Reporters and Editors sent a team to uncover corruption among civic elites in Phoenix to better understand the environment of a community where a reporter could be assassinated. The journalists reported on the dark side of Phoenician society. One particular investigation revealed that the Goldwater family maintained business relationships centered upon the exploitation of undocumented Mexican laborers smuggled to the United States to work at Arrowhead Ranch—the family citrus farm. Robert Goldwater, brother to Barry, had allegedly purchased the ranch at a below-market price from prominent developer and fellow civic enthusiast Del Webb—who had previously been reported to have purchased members of the

1 Barry Goldwater to Nina Pulliam, June 24, 1976, FM MSS 119, Box 2 Folder 9, Newton Rosenzweig Papers, Arizona Collection, Arizona State University Libraries, Tempe, AZ.
2 Barry Goldwater to Nina Pulliam, June 24, 1976, FM MSS 119, Box 2 Folder 9, Newton Rosenzweig Papers, Arizona Collection, Arizona State University Libraries, Tempe, AZ.
Detroit Mafia. The character in question was not just that of Goldwater—it was an indictment of the civic elites who had ingratiated criminals in their midst. No matter how vehemently Goldwater tried to distance himself from the appearance of corruption, he could not absolve himself of his disreputable collaborations with unscrupulous investors known primarily through civic life.

Civic elites, known locally as the Charter class, had long been touting the advantages of Phoenix to any investor who would listen. They claimed that business climate for outside investors was much like the weather in the Sonoran Desert: warm, sunny, and inviting. A prominent homebuilder recalled how corporate partners helped promote Maryvale on national broadcasting during winter months: "At that time we had swimming pools with our homes...we had models, girls, swimming in the swimming pool and this was in November...I don’t know how many people that would come in, into the models, saying that they had seen that on TV and they wanted to move out, wanted to get away from the snow, these kind of things." But rumors of fraud and deceit soon began to overshadow the optimistic boasts of civic boosters. One outside investor argued, "[i]f you have any money, don’t ever go to Arizona, because when you leave, you’ll leave without it...there are some pretty powerful and ruthless people out there that you’ll be looking into. You can get your heads blown off if you go too far."

The Bolles’ assassination revealed the impractical fantasies of civic boosters—yes, it was possible to live in a place with low taxes, affordable labor, and great weather—but at what price? David Murdock, primary developer of the Guaranty (later Meridian) Bank Building, came to Phoenix looking to make money. By hook and crook, he negotiated several smaller land deals until he became a millionaire. In a Saturday Evening Post article, he claimed:

I am going to be the biggest real estate operating company in the United States...the biggest sole proprietorship. There are lots of big companies, but they are owned by skeentillion stockholders. I’m a loner. I can’t run with the crowd. I want to build an empire like J. Paul Getty, the oil man, built. I’ll do it too. Ten years from now I’ll be worth 100

---


million dollars. Does that make me sound like an egotistical ass? I don’t mean it that way. It’s just something I’ve got to do.⁶

Murdock would eventually become a billionaire—but by drawing more value out of Phoenix than he brought into it. He left Phoenix in the early sixties after an implosion of the real estate market threatened his local holdings. He relocated to California to seek more fruitful ventures. But Phoenix residents would remain on the hook for his real estate boondoggles long after he left.

Land speculation remains an alchemy that can embed capital into the desert sand or make investors appear out of the dry, hot air. After World War II, local voters threw their political support to political candidates who promoted rapid and continuous growth. These politicians often resisted calls for state regulations on unethical business practices or civic investment in more sustainable economic activities. The continual growth that their practices encouraged allowed local speculators to sell land and real estate to outside investors at a higher value than it would have tendered in a static economy. Indeed, the commodity value of real estate in metropolitan Phoenix ascended to heights that longtime residents could have never fathomed.

But this was the trade-off: in Phoenix, you could afford to purchase your fantasies, but someone could also defraud you of your dreams. The lack of state regulations made it possible for people, particularly those who could escape state scrutiny, to band together and impose their reality upon the desert sand. But the corruption discursively hidden by civic boosters cannot help but disprove the colonial myths that inspired migrants to relocate to the undeveloped desert. It takes collective community effort for desert visions to come to fruition; instead, the marginal relationship of Arizona to the rest of the United States has consigned Phoenix to exist as a site for fast hustles by millionaires on the make. Civic elites, entranced by the wealth of Anglo America, have created a political economy where collective resources are constantly for sale. Communities that do not control their means of (re)production become pawns of powerful people in pursuit of personal gain. In Phoenix, consumption impoverishes communities to the benefit of outsiders because of the honest belief that individual independence is the path to collective liberation.

INTRODUCTION

Community Consumed: Sunbelt Capitalism and a Praxis for Community Formation in Maryvale

Community Formation in Maryvale, Arizona

On August 18, 1978, Justine Spitalny, the “self-appointed mother of Maryvale,” sat down with the Phoenix History Project for an interview on her life in Phoenix, Arizona.7 Spitalny had risen to prominence in the late 1950s as an elected official on the Cartwright School District Board. Prior to joining the board, Spitalny had helped organize the Cartwright Parent-Teacher Association to improve education conditions in rapidly-suburbanizing Cartwright. She also served as den mother for the local boy scouts; moreover, she used her political connections to publicly finance baseball fields for the Little League at Cartwright schools. Her civic service added value to the lives and properties of residents in Maryvale—a master-planned suburb constructed on what had only recently been cantaloupe fields. The next logical step was to run for political office. So, in due time, Spitalny won the election to serve on the Cartwright School Board.

As Spitalny recalled, “the school was at the center of everybody’s interest there. It was the only local form of government; there was no other.”8 Spitalny spurred changes in state policies that protected Cartwright; her most popular prohibition limited the ability of affluent property owners from seceding from less affluent school districts. She became so prominent in Maryvale that she had a school named after her while serving on the board. But this success led to her downfall: a group of citizens recalled her after the school naming debacle; she claimed that they wanted her removed because she would not award no-bid contracts to build a school, in her words, with “two to seven thousand children with seven exits.”9 Still, in 1960, she soon wound up

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8 Ibid., 17.

9 Ibid., 16.
on the losing side of an election recall—in no small part due to her position for increased district expenses. Nevertheless, she held pride in her long-tenured civic activism. When asked about the development of Maryvale, she responded:

The first people who came to Maryvale were people who, prior to World War II, had been either factory workers or farm laborers…. World War II opened up the world for them; they had always seen people with things—material things—and they seemed to go with people who had self-respect and respect of the neighbors, and they seemed to associate with that, with saying, ‘[i]f I just had those things.’ They got the things; they didn’t achieve what they wanted to, you know…. These people had—didn’t really have it, you know…. Many of them were engineers who were strictly GI educated—specialty—specialized education—and, they came there and they thought that they were coming to Arizona where we still had Indians and cowboys … they were going to be important come hell or high water; if they had to destroy to be important, they were going to do it, although I don’t think it was a conscious thought of theirs. I think they were just striving for recognition, and being constructive building or destroying—it just never occurred to them.10

Spitalny frowned upon the materialism of her neighbors; but moreover, she derided their training as indicative of their low social origins. Her aspersions, despite her continual service to the community, belies the low regard that civic leaders in held for their constituents in Maryvale.

Her dim view of the population colored her recollection of suburbanization; per Spitalny, “[w]e had a great many problems. I think they were natural problems of a growth area in our particular times. I don’t think that they were unusual at all.”11 Her candid appraisal concedes an important truth: that from the beginning, many post-World War II suburbs experienced social “problems” traditionally associated with marginalized communities.12 While her perspective would be largely validated in academic scholarship on post-World War II suburbia, it runs counter to common representations of “middle-class” suburban communities in popular culture. Additionally, this interview took place at a low point in local history; many residents had grown to resent the political economy that had allowed metropolitan Phoenix to so rapidly sprawl across central Arizona. But when asked if an independent municipality instead of being annexed into Phoenix would have better served Maryvale, she argued:

10 Ibid., 11-13.
11 Ibid.
12 For more, see the literature review later in this chapter.
Those homes were built under the four year federal slum clearance program after World War II. They sold for sixty-four hundred dollars, sixty-four dollars down, and sixty-four dollars a month. I really don’t believe that those people could have afforded to have had police, fire protection, sewer, as we eventually got, and the other things. I think it would have been about as stupid a thing as anybody could have done.13

Spitalny correlated economic marginality with social marginalization—the residents of Maryvale would not have had the opportunity to access suburban amenities if they had not been part of the destructive sprawl unleashed by civic leaders in Phoenix. Whatever costs the community had borne after annexation were an unfortunate, but necessary, expense paid for access to all that Phoenix could offer—to what Maryvale residents could not independently afford.

Indeed, Spitalny saw how short-sighted contemporary civic activists had become. Many argued that the rapid expansion of metropolitan Phoenix had poisoned civic affairs in Maryvale. Spitalny argued that the current collection of civic leaders had not been involved long enough to have the best interest of Maryvale at heart. Her appraisal, grounded by decades of experience, valued the opportunities that metropolitan expansion had provided residents. She claimed, “[t]here’ve been so many people that have been active for a short time. Maryvale has been a mobile population.”14 Despite population churn, she felt that “the people…have [not] lost interest in [the civic affairs of] Maryvale.”15 Metropolitan growth had not brought alienation but opportunity. “[Migrants] have brought economic prosperity. In the old days we lived off of each other. When the growth started, I was one of the very stupid people who says, ‘[w]ell, everybody’s gonna live off of each other still,’ you know. How are we gonna do it with these new people?”16 The eventual praxis of community formation in Maryvale would resolve her query.

13 Ibid., 10.
14 Ibid., 14.
15 Ibid., 21.
16 Ibid., 22.
Sunbelt Capitalism as a Political Praxis

While suburban Maryvale would not have come into existence without new people, incoming civic activists wanted to forget the contributions that older residents had brought to the community. As Spitalny said about one civic leader, “[w]here was [he] when we were organizing the…YMCA and getting it going? Where was [he] when we were doing all of those things? Sitting back and bitching.” But the contrasting visions which alienated Spitalny from less-tenured civic leaders had as much to do with place than with people. Contemporary residents did not control the environment; instead, they were subject to the whims of residents who migrated to the community to consume resources constructed to attract them there in the first place. This erasure of civic equity alienated older residents from newer migrants as endless cycles of destructive consumption reshaped the built environment without consent of the original investors.

Labor alienation is, by no means, a new theory or theme in American history. However, it helps to look at the local political economy to understand why civic labor was alienated from civic activists in Maryvale. Sunbelt Capitalism, originally termed by historian Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, is one way by which to understand the broad contours of the political economy in Arizona.\footnote{Ibid., 25.}

capital. A cabal of civic elites promoted the possibilities of a leisure lifestyle Arizona to private
investors interested in reshaping the local landscape. Those same elites encouraged public
officials to sponsor policy de-regulations to ensure investment expenses remained minimal;
moreover, right-to-work laws kept labor pliable. Voter suppression suppressed local opposition
while media propaganda normalized these political conditions for residents. While, in my
research, none verbally identified racial sovereignty as a goal, Sunbelt Capitalism cultivated an
economic environment that limited the civic mobility of racial minorities. In doing so, it freed white
(Anglo) men to make decisions on behalf of the broader community without consulting all
impacted groups. Fundamentally, Sunbelt Capitalism allowed local elites and outside investors to
develop profitable gambits unconstrained by the concerns of democratic deliberation.

While many residents despised the civic elites, who restructured the political economy,
civic activists like Spitalny became deeply invested in the success of civic elites. Even for those
on the periphery of civic life, pride and profit were gained from activities that helped attract Anglo
investors. Moreover, tenured activists like Spitalny had seen how Sunbelt Capitalism initiated
investment untenable under the Progressive-Era political economy which had long dominated the
state. The pro-labor policies of that period had attempted to empower the average Arizonan, but
they also did little to develop a more advanced future for residents of the state. Sunbelt
Capitalism delivered on its promise to attract additional patrons to provide shield civic activists
from the collective penury kept everyone impoverished.

For all the talk of independence, civic communities required competent leadership to
create a verdant environment for residents. In many cases, this would not be forthcoming. A flaw
of Sunbelt Capitalism: it allowed inept, ineffectual, and ignorant men to determine the fate of
entire communities. However, it also empowered visionaries to create institutions where civic
activity could flourish. There was one person in Maryvale who had ability to perform this role:
John F. Long—founder and primary builder of Maryvale. In many ways, he was responsible for
creating the environment that contemporary residents complained about. But Spitalny claimed,
"John has done more for the community that he built ... than any other developer in the United
States," which is why she sympathized with the “impatience” he showed toward contemporary
leadership. Long forged his development praxis during a period of material shortages due to the Korean War. In peacetime, Long used his cost-saving strategies to offer homebuyers greater equity in their property. Spitalny claimed:

Yeah, and [Long] passed those savings on to the buyer. This is where the—came—that—that Maryvale was a slum area. The other developers couldn’t compete with him, so all they could do was start that it was a slum area…. I think it has come down from the beginning, when John Long offered more of a house for the money, or the same house for less money.… It did start with a slum clearance program, but that had nothing to do with the occupants. Those were people who had—couldn’t find homes during World War II and were living anywhere that they could to find a place to live. 20

Long made a commitment to his homebuyers—that their investment in Maryvale could be realized through financial equity as the community matured. Their mutual efforts to develop a valuable community could provide both economic and social value to community residents.

Long created affordable homes at a time when federal policy encouraged homeownership by many moderate-income families. Prospective suburbanites relocated to Maryvale in droves. There were no more than a few thousand residents in Cartwright school district prior to the development of Maryvale; in 1978, after less than a quarter century, the district was home to more than one hundred thousand residents. The rapid growth of the built environment allowed community institutions to create savings through economies of scale; in this sense, Maryvale could not have afforded a slower growth model because many residents lacked the financial capital to pay for suburban improvements. However, this faster growth model meant that Maryvale residents were exposed to market disruptions that altered growth projections and impacted community formation. Despite her earlier gripes, Spitalny resisted urges to segregate contemporary migrants from original transplants:

I think it’s fine. I don’t know how in the hell you could stop people coming into Arizona. I think Maryvale is part of Arizona and we function under the same laws. What are you gonna do? Stop out here at the border of Arizona and say, “You can’t come in?” We are a part of the United States. And, it’s very interesting to me; in fact, it’s disgusting. Your old residents don’t want to stop them. Each wave says… “Well, you’ve got to stop them.” “Well, when did you come here?” “Oh, five years ago.” They think it just started five years

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19 Ibid., 14.

20 Ibid., 19.
ago. They just discovered it, you know. And, why don’t—“I’m here. Why don’t you stop it?”

Spitalny recognized that rapid population expansion had allowed Long to share equity value with individual homeowners because, since he retained ownership over numerous shopping centers and commercial buildings, his profits rose as the Maryvale area matured. But more so, new residents brought valuable capital into the community for the use of long-tenured homeowners and civic participants—those who originally worked with Long to develop Maryvale.

While local household consumption helped ensure the profitability of continual development, by the late 1970s, continual development had minimized the social and economic value that individual households could acquire via residence in Maryvale. Spitalny remembered that Maryvale had originally been a place where people could, “[better] themselves and [move] on to other areas,” but as median appraised home values in the community exceeded thirty thousand dollars, other developments offered homebuyers more prestige, better utilities, or greater home equity—all without the “problems” that historically plagued civic life in Maryvale. And, in classic urban succession, less affluent households found opportunities to relocate into Maryvale as affluent homebuyers realized that there was less risk, and greater value, to be accrued in other suburbs. Maryvale had been spatially marginal in the topography of metropolitan Phoenix, but previous residents had also been socially privileged. Civic leaders faced a dilemma of declining value in their community: not one of lost economic value, at least not for homeowners, but of social value. Civic activism no longer whitened Maryvale in the racialized landscape of metropolitan Phoenix.

Maryvale residents had been emancipated from collective reliance, which pioneer settlers like Spitalny had originally relied upon, to accept the logic of community commoditization. As home prices continued to rise faster than the rate of inflation, and the most affordable housing

21 Ibid., 22.


23 Spitalny, August 18, 1978, 15.
many could find was in Maryvale, the community stopped being a step up and started being a final stop for many working-class families. The largesse of Long gave early homeowners the ability to monetize the equity value of their homes—a value that civic leaders manipulated to incentivize investment into the civic community. For many residents, Maryvale civic life was both a financial investment and a social utility.

But Maryvale had long been typified by the racial exclusion that accompanied Federal Housing Administration financing, and once desegregation restructured expectations for metropolitan housing patterns, many of the local civic leaders fumed about the marginal position of their community within the broader political economy. The social ostracism hinted at by Spitalny, once accompanied by racial integration, gained discursive prominence within local civic circles. While there was still financial value to be derived from homeownership in Maryvale, the social utility that accompanied racial exclusion would become increasingly difficult to maintain. Their nostalgic lamentations for a community consumed by metropolitan expansion rang hollow to Spitalny—she had other conclusions about Maryvale’s marginalization:

We have industry in here I don’t think any of us realize. I think you have to be in a business that is connected with it to realize how much contracting, how much subcontracting for Motorola, for Honeywell, for all of this industry, and it’s [sic] clean industry. We have a labor market here that is absolutely something that the people in the East can’t believe. Our wage scale is low, in comparison, because we’re not a union state. I hope we stay not a union state. And—but this—because this attracts more industry and it attracts more big money. We have investors coming in here from Canada; Canada is pouring in here and investing—anything that they can pick up, to buy. We have [eastern] investors. I don’t—I’m not aware of a great many Arabs coming in here, but we do have a great many of Japanese investing in here. So, I—I think that this future for this country, for sure this area, this valley, is the brightest thing it’s ever been.

The most valuable newcomers that could arrive in Maryvale were corporate capitalists with the ability to finance the transformation of the metropolitan environment. Any capital they could provide was worth the social expenses residents collectively bore.

Maryvale, as is all of Phoenix, is only as valuable as its value to outside investors—this is the market-based logic of Sunbelt Capitalism. Local communities lack the capital to influence development projects; as a result, external investment fuels growth—not community engagement.

24 Spitalny, August 18, 1978, 22-23.
But, for reasons of political tranquility, residents were ensured spaces where they could perform rituals of civic life to help mask outside ownership of the metropolitan landscape. In Maryvale, the civic community did not have to acknowledge its marginality within metropolitan Phoenix—largely because of the marginalization of non-white, or colored, residents in civic life—until their local community was considered colored by outsiders. This dissertation explores the disintegration of civic life in Maryvale as discursive reappraisals helped illuminate stark distinctions between the value civic community offered to residents and the value civic life provided for investors. We will find that structural relationships remain unchanged even as values are reappraised.

Theoretical Review

In Maryvale, racial integration forced civic participants to navigate structural inequalities that were discursively hidden in a putatively-inclusive civic praxis constructed upon social marginalization and racial discrimination. To paraphrase W.E.B. Du Bois, the problem of the twentieth century was the global color line once the ideology of white supremacy swept the globe. The civic culture of Anglophone states reflected their rejection of multiracial democracy as Anglo elites began to systematically exclude non-whites from state-sanctioned privileges. However, after World War II, Anglophone states had to reassess how to maintain racial boundaries in the face of de-colonization, anti-apartheid, and civil rights movements. In this sense, Maryvale was constructed at a transitory point in a longue durée conflict between racial and civic nationalism in the Anglophone world. Settler colonialism has provided a transnational framework for understanding identity formation in metropolitan Phoenix.

Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds argue that this “assertion of whiteness was born in the apprehension of immediate loss” as tens of millions of non-white immigrants and colonial subjects began to assert themselves as autonomous actors.25 As Anglophone nations codified similar policies pertaining to immigration restrictions (Australia and the United States) and racial

segregation (South Africa and the American South) virtually simultaneously, Lake and Reynolds argue that this "imagined community of white men was transnational in reach, but nationalistic in outcomes."\footnote{Ibid., 4.} White supremacy became a paradigmatic as whiteness—and non-whiteness—became inscribed onto the bodies of people across the globe.


The prevailing definitions of whiteness often were constructed in a dialogue between colonial spaces and metropolitan America. According to Paul Kramer, "empire meant exercising sovereignty and power over peoples denied the rights that were increasingly coming to define the modern nation-state … race was an epistemology suited to constructing the political expectations that would qualify and delimit these states’ universalistic claims."\footnote{Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States & the Philippines, (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2006), 4.} Kramer finds that American imperialists argued Filipinos were “perpetually incapable” of self-governance to justify the
exclusion of Filipino elites from high-ranking positions in the colonial state reserved exclusively for white Americans. A racialized “duel-market” justified white monopolization of colonial resources.

Moreover, the settler colonialism of the American West also necessitated the destruction of other non-white intimacies to allow for the acquisition of land by white settlers. Margaret Jacobs argues that settler colonialism “and [its] displacement of indigenous people from their land had even more profound effects on indigenous people than had extractive colonies.” As indigenous people lost the ability to self-govern their territory:

The intimate lives of indigenous people—the way they cared for and raised their children, their dwellings, their sexuality, their marriage practices, their gender relations, even the ways they adorned their bodies and styled their hair—eventually came under the scrutiny and condemnation of their colonizers. [Many whites] deemed these indigenous intimacies to be an impediment to the complete colonization of these peoples and thus designed new policies that included interference into these most intimate aspects of indigenous lives, including the removal and institutionalization of children.

This loss of bodily autonomy reflects the loss of territorial sovereignty for indigenous communities. Moreover, Anglo states used these social policies to control indigenous communities within settler colonies. Social policies within settler state mirrors spatial conquest.

The politics of child removal in settler colonies imposed non-normativity upon the bodies of non-white individuals. Non-normativity authorized the state to further regulate colored communities; moreover, these types of regulations formally marked the subaltern status of targeted populations. White settlers sought to escape the heightened scrutiny focused upon colored populations out of self-preservation—the regulations and services offered colonized communities remained inferior to similar relationships colonial states offered white citizens.

Citizens, as noted by Benedict Anderson, believe that they are all part of the same community if they know one another or not. Rogers Brubaker, in his work on citizenship in

30 Ibid., 5-6.
32 Ibid., 136.
Europe, argues that there are two types of citizenship: “state-centered and assimilationist or ethno-cultural and ‘differentialist’.” In Phoenix, where civic life compensated for limited public funding, private patrons could establish terms of participation in civic affairs and racial exclusion remained high on that list. In fact, municipalities had the leisure to choose whether to enforce racial segregation in public spaces or not. In this sense, the social relationships within each community were specific to the terms set by local civic leaders.

The literature on citizenship and the state has demonstrated the importance that the perception of belonging, through shared cultural practices, can have in helping individuals integrate into a community. Permanent social relationships are a fundamental aspect of community formation. Cultural homogeneity is not paramount, but the ability to craft relationships outside of institutions is fundamental for people to develop a sense of connection to a place. It was imperative for civic leaders to help integrate highly-desirable migrants—white Americans who had access to outside investors—into local civic communities.

In Distinction, Pierre Bourdieu argues that a significant component of class is “taste,” the desire for a set or type of cultural goods. Taste is “the product of upbringing and education,” since all cultural practices and preferences “are closely linked to educational level … and secondarily to social origin.” In this sense, taste, as much as economic status, “classifies the classifier,” as the tastes one has are indicative of the tastes of one’s social class. Taste then operates as a sorting mechanism, because to find the cultural goods refined for personal taste, individuals must move, both socially and physically, into circles and spaces which can meet their needs. This movement is not random, as individuals, “are subject to the forces which structure [social] space.” More so, they are herded, by Pavlovian instinct, toward circles and spaces that can meet their tastes. In this way, the community formation is as much a sorting of different social classes as it is

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35 Bourdieu, Distinction, 110.
establishing institutions to integrate new residents into a community. “Taste” must play a role in the ability, as well as desire, of civic participants to embody the cultural norms necessary to perpetuate the settler colony.

There are other conditions that inform the ability of new suburbanites to create the cultural connections which help them stay in a new community. For example, there must be space for cultural practices to occur for communal connection to happen. The conceptualization of the bourgeois public sphere by Jürgen Habermas is fundamental to understanding how these spaces develop. Habermas argues that, in monarchical and feudal societies, the government was present in all space. The creation of the early capitalist bourgeois created a separation between space the government could directly interject itself within and space controlled by private property holders. Within this private space, two spheres arose: the “public” sphere and the “private” sphere. While there had always been a public sphere in the sense that some space, like a commons, was open to all, the bourgeois public sphere was a government-free space where individuals could come together to participate in discourse. This was a space where people could debate ideas and disseminate them through an inclusionary process of open discussion and free speech. However, private property holders controlled the bourgeois public space who, depending on circumstance, had the ability to circumscribe entry into this space. The public sphere, when not physical, was also literary; so, if one lacked access to privately-controlled bourgeois space, that person could still ingest parts of the discourse through print. The Habermasian public sphere operates as a third-zone between the state and the individual and allowed for the dissemination of ideas necessary for a functioning democracy.  

By the twentieth century, however, while these spaces still existed, external pressures had dramatically curtailed and changed their structure. Few “public,” in the sense of shared, spaces existed. Habermas argues that mass media and mass consumption commercialized and

37 There are libraries where the public can access written material, but as far as public places for overtly political speech or social commentary, those spaces have shrunk over the years.
overtook the public sphere. In one sense, he is right: the privatization of entertainment, especially through television, has made it possible to find entertainment in the private sphere. But the written public sphere of newspapers, leaflets, books, and the like still exist. One could argue that new technology merely represents a new way of disseminating that information; however, another argument is that the high capital investments required to create and widely distribute the printed word, particularly newspapers, or to beam information across television waves is the actual perpetrator that has broken down the access to the public literary world. Furthermore, space that the government had previously publicly controlled, like a market-space, has now been privatized as malls and shopping centers are where most commerce occurs. Gyms, clubs, or bars—other areas for communal gathering—are also privately owned, and the inclusionary free-flowing debate of the Habermasian public sphere cannot exist where commercial pressures restrict the ability of denizens to initiate and engage in contentious public debate. In suburban America, there are few places for individuals to go participate in public discourse—either they were private or too expensive to pursue.

However, while the public sphere does not exist in its traditional form, civic life provides many similar functions. Local business leaders and upwardly striving professionals often led the civic and service organizations such as the Lions, Rotary, and Elks. They lacked the cross-class identity of the fraternal organizations, they still operated as a mechanism to develop relationships and create bonds of affection. Furthermore, their civic public service gave them a platform to act as a counterpoint to governmental authority. These are private organizations with a strict control over membership rolls that can exclude members. Unless ideological diversity is a central theme of the organization, it seems more likely that organizations will be ideologically similar rather than being loci for debate. While not the same as the Habermasian public sphere, positioned between the government and the individual as a medium for political and social expression were fraternal and civic associations.

Also, the exclusion of working-class men from many of these organizations leads to another question—did working-class men join new organizations after the collapse of the fraternal tradition? The work of Michel de Certeau helps to develop a method for studying the public
discourse of non-elites. While Habermas argues that commercialization of public space cut off for non-elites, de Certeau argues that scholars must take the reception of the masses into account—if they choose not to consume, or receive, what is being mass produced, what effect can we quantifiably say it has on their lives? Instead of viewing non-elite actors as empty vessels waiting to be filled, de Certeau argues that they utilize tactics detailed for their specific conditions to construct a more ideal world. He takes this idea as far as looking at routine practices, such as walking, talking, or reading, to resist and reconstruct the oppressive elements of mass consumerism. Even if mass commercialization reduced public space, de Certeau shows that non-elites still will creatively engage in consuming the products of this space to demonstrate their thoughts and ideas—to effectively participate in public discourse.

In summation, this dissertation frames metropolitan Phoenix through a theoretical understanding of the literature. This literature helps situate Arizona, long denied entry into the United States because of racist discrimination against its indigenous people, within a transnational Anglophone political economy discursively predicated upon white supremacy as a justification for imperialism and settler colonialism. The racial nationalism that typified this discourse was both differentialist and assimilationist—it differentiated white and colored people through state regulation of colored bodies and the cultural assimilation of white bodies. In metropolitan Phoenix, cultural assimilation occurred through civic life. This environment produced and transmitted dominant cultural tastes, as described by Bourdieu. Moreover, this milieu allowed colonial elites to hoard resources and privately administer public services. By the end of this dissertation, civic associations and mass media that helped construct the civic environment racially weakened the transformative disruptions to the Anglophone political economy. In many ways, the fate of Maryvale reflects the failures of ethno-racialist civic life to manage residents in settler colonies.

Literature Review

This dissertation is a pivotal addition to the historiography on Phoenix and Arizona. This dissertation is also situated within a broader analysis of identity formation in the American West. Finally, this dissertation is a valuable case study within the comprehensive historical investigation of metropolitan governance and (sub) urban development American history. Finally, several of the discursive terms in the text are indebted to adjacent literature and require additional definition.

Phoenix History

G. Wesley Johnson argues that community history is an integral methodology for studying towns like Phoenix. He was project lead for the "Phoenix History Project" an oral history as well as the edited volume, *Phoenix in the Twentieth Century*. He also categorizes social distinctions within metropolitan Phoenix. He terms the “New City Elite” as the second or third generation of landed Phoenician elites and dates their political ascent from 1935–1960. As little as a generation prior, Phoenicians had not established the local social hierarchy; so, it was not so much national origin that defined this group as it was financial stature. This New City Elite excluded people who did not share its vision of post-World War II Phoenix—when the efforts of racial minorities and social activists threatened the project of modernization, the New City Elite silenced them. New City Elites feared that Phoenix would remain an agricultural outpost; instead, they guided Phoenix toward a metropolitan status. They could do this formally, through the control of city government by the Charter Government Committee, and informally, through the interpersonal relationships between elites who never held office. According to Johnson, it was a time when elites could, “sit down for lunch at the Arizona Club with a few friends and develop either public or private policy for Phoenix…it seemed as if this group had promoted a demographic revolution that would ensure an economic bonanza for the old families.”39 Their influence in civic life ensured their sway over political affairs.

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The New City Elite became a victim of its own success; as the number of Phoenicians grew, the authority of this group came under fire. Local elites had previously been able to meet informally and, “decide the fortunes of the city,” but because of the dramatic population growth, there became too many competing interests for this to continue. Johnson found that the “Metropolitan Elites,” who assumed civic dominance after the descent of the New City Elite, did not exclusively descend from the traditional families; instead, many of them were outsiders who moved to Phoenix to benefit from opportunities opened by the area’s emergence on the national stage. Johnson defined these elites as such: the technicians, who either worked as bureaucrats in city hall or as high-tech engineers at the local branches of national manufacturers; the managers, who were in the upper management of huge corporations that relocated to Phoenix; the new entrepreneurs, who were usually real estate magnates who began to build in Phoenix after it began its rise to prominence; the cultural brokers, who sponsored local cultural institutions that had been underdeveloped by the New City Elite; and finally, the intellectuals, who had moved to the city to participate in the expansion of Arizona State University or retired writers, artists, and professionals who made Phoenix their second home. Nevertheless, whites predominated the Metropolitan Elites. Johnson credits the lack of ethnic enclaves in Phoenix to the integration of early white ethnics into the upper crust of local society, but until the 1980s, the upper strata of the social structure excluded colored communities from anything other than token representation in civic life. Johnson sees the social structure of Phoenix in flux, as native Phoenicians lost control to outsiders and transplants, and he questions whether it will retain its current form.\footnote{Johnson, “Directing Elites,” 27-32.}

Other scholars have examined how race and ethnicity have operated as a barrier into high society in Phoenix. Matthew Whitaker used the life of Lincoln Ragsdale, a prominent black Phoenician, to study the experience of the black community in post-World War II Phoenix in Race Work. Whitaker presents the black community in Phoenix as continuously marginalized. Racial discrimination limited black Phoenicians’ access to anything other than substandard housing, healthcare, education, and job opportunities. Whitaker finds that it took a coalition of black and
white Phoenicians to help advance civil rights activism in the Valley.\textsuperscript{41} However, the focus of his book revolves around Ragsdale, and it makes for a narrative that is emblematic but distinct from the lives of most black Phoenicians. Not only were Mr. and Mrs. Ragsdale professionals, but Eleanor, his wife, could pass for white at a time when racial exclusion was part of professional life. Most black Phoenicians were poor migrants from the rural South who lacked the social and economic advantages of the Ragsdales; as a result, this family had atypical access to public and private resources.\textsuperscript{42}

Whitaker also explores how the conservatism of the Phoenix social structure reinforced white supremacy and racial exclusion. He notes the interconnectedness of different power structures in Phoenix in its formative years. For example, Barry Goldwater sympathized with the aims of the local civil rights movement, even going as far as donating money to the local branch of the NAACP to aid its fight for desegregation, but he remained publicly disinterested in matters of social justice. However, Ragsdale counted Goldwater as “an inspiration” and noted Goldwater’s work to help advance the careers of black military officers while in the U.S. senate.\textsuperscript{43}

Lincoln Ragsdale said that the threats leveled at him by white creditors made him realize how dependent the black community was on white institutions; he came to believe that financial independence was the only way black Phoenicians could overcome the oppression of discrimination. Whitaker quotes a local television reporter who noted that when she moved to Phoenix, realtors would not show her homes in the northern part of the city because “nobody would rent” to her. However, as new residents moved to Phoenix, many of whom could access veterans’ home financing, the black community began to spatially fracture. Upwardly-mobile blacks began to settle in previously racially exclusive areas of metropolitan Phoenix. Individuals could climb the economic ladder and develop some level of financial independence, but the black


\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 104-108, 119-120, 182-185.
community as a whole—particularly those who resided in the traditional black enclaves in South Phoenix—continued to experience poverty and exclusion.\textsuperscript{44}

Additionally, Whitaker finds that local Mexican-American leaders were reticent to ally themselves with Blacks: "[t]hey argued that 'even though they sympathized with the plight of the blacks, they believe 'that the black problem was a black problem'." During the early 1970s, Blacks and Mexican-Americans at Phoenix Union high school campaigned for colored representatives to serve in the administration. However, instead of focusing their attention on the school board, the two groups began to square off and fire threats at one another. Hispanics claimed that the school district did not protect its students from the assaults of black students, while Blacks complained that the Hispanic coalition was trying to take control of the school. Many Latinos in Phoenix are of Mexican descent, and the percentage of Mexican-Americans has grown to dwarf that of black Americans. While both groups have similar struggles, Whitaker wisely notes that the study of Hispanics in Phoenix is for another monograph.\textsuperscript{45}

Political corruption and scandals are also an important topic in the historiography of post-World War II Phoenix. The assassination of Don Bolles was the most prominent scandal in Phoenix after World War II. A car bomb killed Bolles, an investigative reporter for the Arizona Republic, after he met a potential source in June of 1976. Secrecy still shrouds this case, and many of the records pertaining to the case remain sealed from public view. Someone killed Bolles while he sought information concerning Ned Warren, Sr.—a scam artist who made millions of dollars from real estate fraud. He swindled thousands of investors and brought disrepute to the local real estate market; just as importantly, some accused prominent descendants of the New City Elite, such as members of the Goldwater family, of being in business with Warren. This scandal helped cause some people to see Phoenix as, "the most crime-ridden city in America," and precipitated an investigation by the Investigative Reporters and Editors (IRE) Association, entitled, The Arizona Report, to root out the corruption which made it possible for "a reporter [to]
be killed in broad daylight in the middle of town."\textsuperscript{46} Papers across the country carried the report, and this further tarnished the public image of Phoenix.

Michael F. Wendland, one of the lead investigators for the IRE, published his memoirs on The Arizona Report in a project entitled The Arizona Project. Wendland covered much of the same material published in the IRE report. He claimed that the goal of the project was to explore every vein of corruption in that state, whether it related to the Bolles murder or not, to deter other potential assassinations because of the potential investigation that could occur if someone murdered an investigative reporter for doing his or her job. The reporters explored a lot of material not directly connected to the Bolles case.\textsuperscript{47} One of the major revelations of this tactic was just how intertwined corruption was to the practice of business and politics in Phoenix and Arizona. Wendland, like many of his contemporaries, sensationalized the findings of the reports and used them to extrapolate about the culture of Arizona. He and his colleagues wanted to discover what it was, “that made land fraud the state’s biggest business, [sic] that allowed 200 recognized leaders and underlings of organized crime to find exile there, [and] that prompted politicians and businessmen to look the other way.”\textsuperscript{48} Wendland believed that this was a lifestyle unique to Arizona. He presented the area as “a step or two behind the rest of the country,” and found that, “just beneath the surface, much more obvious than in most Eastern cities, is a macho-like respect for the maverick, the man who makes his own rules, lives by his own law.”\textsuperscript{49} He quoted other officials who claimed that the reports changed the local culture: instead of an apathetic response to organized crime, there was now awareness and interest. "What they wrote


\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 15.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 167.
about is something the police have been screaming about for years and no one before would listen." Wendland used the experiences of his fellow investigators to craft an image of Phoenix, and Arizona, as lawless and corrupt.

The local press was unsupportive of the IRE investigators. Wendland insinuates that it was because of a conspiracy amongst local elites to protect themselves from charges of corruption. Several times in his book he cites a source who warned the IRE investigators that the Arizona Republic would never publish the findings of the investigation. According to the informant, "[t]he Arizona Republic won't print a thing. The only reason they're here is to find out what you're doing here and who you're talking to … the people you guys are investigating are the people they've protected over the years." Eugene Pulliam, long-time owner of the Arizona Republic and Phoenix Gazette, was widely considered the most powerful man in Phoenix. Pulliam's "monopolistic" control over local newspapers gave him the ability to help influence local elections—even though he remained registered to vote in Indiana. But moreover, his hegemonic influence limited the range of civic discourse that the regional press covered. His holdings, collectively referred to as the "Pulliam Press," had the power to break or bury a story.

In the end, Republic owner Nina Pulliam—who took over publishing duties from her deceased husband—decided against running the IRE report when it first came out. The Republic questioned the veracity of the reports and disingenuously denied that its association with the report. Investigation chair Bob Greene stated that the actions of the Republic underlined all that was wrong in Phoenix; as a result, the IRE investigators never investigated the impact that the corruption had on residents. While members of the power structure had connections to organized crime and were in business with scam artists, the extent to which vice affected the day-to-day life of most residents was totally overlooked. The only section of the investigation that came close to studying this came during an excursion into Mexico to investigate drug trafficking. The rest of the

50 Ibid, 167.
51 Ibid., 97.
report focused on the elite or the impoverished—businessmen, politicians, judges, scam artists, or, on the other end of the spectrum, exploited illegal aliens.\textsuperscript{53}

Another major character in \textit{The Arizona Project} was Ned Warren, Sr. IRE investigators reported that he epitomized what was wrong with Arizona. Zachary Lazar, a true crime author, has written the best history of Warren and his land fraud schemes in \textit{Evening’s Empire}. Zachary is the son of Ed Lazar—Warren’s accountant and confidante. Someone murdered Lazar on his way to testify before a grand jury about land fraud. He allegedly had information that could have aided criminal prosecution of Warren.\textsuperscript{54}

\textit{Evening’s Empire} provides a clear description on how people conducted land fraud in Arizona. Ned Warren, Sr. duped investors through a litany of techniques. For example, in an early scheme, he sent a lackey to a seedy bar in a depressed part of Phoenix and had him acquire patrons’ signatures to create fraudulent mortgage documents. He would then sell these mortgages to other investors, pocket the profit from those sales, and allow the mortgage payments to lapse after shielding himself from incrimination. This was his \textit{modus operandi}: to fraudulently-inflate the value of a business through dishonest sales, extract as many assets from the business as possible, and then sell the company to other investors before it collapsed. Lazar estimates that the process took about eighteen months.

One of the reasons that it was so hard to trace the fraud committed by Warren was because most of the land he was selling, if he was selling land at all, was land that investors had never seen before. Most of his activities occurred prior to the housing market bust in 1972, and investors who got caught up in the speculation boom were willing to purchase land in Arizona unseen. He utilized his connections to celebrities and politicians to legitimize his land promotions. Goldwater found himself in very hot water when the \textit{Arizona Republic} reported that he had written a letter of endorsement for Warren and Lazar when they sold worthless land to military servicemen in Japan. Phoenix was a place where validation and authenticity came with an ease uncommon in contemporary times; it was a place where the common man could achieve

\textsuperscript{53} Wendland, \textit{The Arizona Project}, 258-259.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 221; Lazar, \textit{Evening’s Empire}, 3-16.
uncommon wealth. Lazar does a fantastic job of exploring how land fraud fit into the social paradigm of the time.\footnote{Lazar, \textit{Evening's Empire}, 32-36, 73, 108.}

\textit{Evening's Empire} does more to describe the society of post-World War II Phoenix than does \textit{The Arizona Project} because it places its actors within the context of space and time. Lazar believes that the reason his father refused police protection was because he didn’t believe that Phoenix was a city where it was necessary. A veneer of respectability glossed over activities that were disreputable. In Phoenix, business circles intertwined with social circles in a way that de-formalized business. The camaraderie of the social world seeped into the business world; Lazar never imagined that his close friends would turn against him. It was after the he the real estate business that Lazar and his wife were at their happiest: “they know they were never going to be rich … but they were glad that they weren’t poor.”\footnote{Ibid., 188.} However, by the time, sinister outside forces had changed the social climate of the business community in Phoenix. \textit{Evening's Empire} concluded that someone killed Lazar “simply to show that they [the mafia] could do it.”\footnote{Ibid., 205.} Once outsiders became aware of the potential for corruption in Arizona, the adolescent gullibility of the Phoenix business community opened the area up for exploitation by more ominous characters.\footnote{Ibid., 148, 197-198.}

The Bolles case was a turning point in post-World War II Arizona history. It publicly revealed that Phoenix was, as described by historian Bradford Luckingham, a land where “unscrupulous operators thrived.”\footnote{Luckingham, \textit{Phoenix}, 209.} However, urban studies of metropolitan Phoenix simply footnote the politically calamitous event. The premier urban history of Phoenix is \textit{Desert Visions} by Phillip VanderMeer. The most important topic in VanderMeer’s book, besides the control of water resources, is that of population growth and municipal annexation. Phoenix, like other western cities such as Dallas and San Jose, remained the dominant city in the metropolitan area
because municipal expansion occurred through liberal annexation.\textsuperscript{60} According to VanderMeer, prior to 1940, agricultural villages, small towns, and fringe subdivisions surrounded Phoenix. The agricultural hamlets would not experience population growth for at least another two generations, and the small towns surrounding Phoenix did not benefit from the metropolitan area population boom until after 1960. Outlying subdivisions in the unincorporated communities surrounding Phoenix experienced the most substantial growth. In 1950, the unincorporated suburban subdivisions surrounding Phoenix contained a population two-thirds the size of Phoenix itself.\textsuperscript{61} Local business leaders and public officials were aware of the inter-regional between Phoenix and other mid-sized western cities for economic capital and investment; they believed that annexation of the suburban fringe would help the city and region compete nationally. Local elites believed that Phoenix needed to annex its suburban fringe to remain relevant in post-World War II America.

However, several different groups had to be assuaged before this growth could occur. First, business elites had to put public officials in place that would help guide voters toward policies that were pro-growth.\textsuperscript{62} VanderMeer does not discuss local opposition to pro-growth policies, but the current residents of the city had to vote on and pay for tax reforms and bond elections—not its potential residents. Without the support of local taxpayers and voters, Phoenix never could have had the money to annex unincorporated areas surrounding it. Secondly, “a genuine distrust of the city” had built up over the years, and property and business owners who resided in the county had to be convinced that incorporation was in their best interest.\textsuperscript{63} Phoenix had to reorient its political culture to assure property owners that the city could provide them with more efficient regulations and more stable services than county or private entities could. Third, neighborhoods such as Sunnyslope and South Phoenix had already developed a sense of


\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 174.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 129-151.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 175.
community identity and had to be annexed before, and sometimes despite, calls for incorporation coalesced.\textsuperscript{64} Finally, Phoenix officials had to cooperate with the small towns surrounding it if it was to avoid annexation battles. In some cases, Phoenix amicably decided boundaries with these towns, but officials would not hesitate to use unscrupulous tactics to prevent rivals from acquiring territory city officials wanted to annex.\textsuperscript{65} City officials were willing to go to great lengths to overcome opposition to their plans for suburban expansion.

VanderMeer finds that city officials mostly used economic arguments to justify their annexation of unincorporated areas. In the 1950s, city manager Ray Wilson argued that "unplanned sprawl" would lead to problems of crime, traffic, substandard buildings, and a lower quality of life for residents—the city was best equipped to prevent these outcomes from occurring because of its zoning ordinances were superior to those of the county.\textsuperscript{66} Furthermore, fragmentation would lead to higher taxes and serious economic damage to the whole community. Another reason that the city had to be invested in annexation was that it stood to lose out on large amounts of economic and social capital if new businesses and civic leaders could move out of the city.\textsuperscript{67} In the end, the physical landscape of Phoenix was much different in 1960 than it had been twenty years earlier. Many of the outlying subdivisions surrounding Phoenix had been annexed into city limits, and the economic growth of the suburbs benefitted the city instead of strangling it.

Suburban architecture and home production in Phoenix mirrored post-World War II trends in other suburban areas. VanderMeer finds that the "affordability" of new homes was an important part of how Phoenix could attract new residents. VanderMeer argues that, unlike in other places, local builders had a goal of producing "good-quality, affordable housing." This coincided with larger community goals since Phoenix booster juxtaposed the city with "crowded eastern cities" comprised primarily of multifamily housing units available only for rent. Home builders were doing more than responding to demand: they were "seeking to stimulate it." Their success allowed the

\textsuperscript{64} VanderMeer, \textit{Desert Visions}, 174-178.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 178-179.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 175.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 174-177.
most prominent of builders to rise into the same strata as local elites and opened opportunities for some to guide Phoenix in the direction which they thought was best.\textsuperscript{68}

VanderMeer claims that local builders were amongst the most prominent home builders in the nation. They created a large supply of spacious homes at a cost that was lower than in many other places around the country. Long became one of the top ten builders in the 1950s by utilizing a fabrication shop to construct house components off-site. He devised equipment to increase efficiency, such as a machine for forming sidewalks, and borrowed ideas, such as a chain conveyor and saw machine, to improve his ability to preassemble his homes.\textsuperscript{69} He and his largest competitors used a “reverse assembly line” in ways like that done by the Levitt family; also, similarly, most builders benefited from Phoenix’s large, non-union labor force. Local builders also benefited from research done during the war on alternative building materials. Locally-based Superlite Builder’s Supply Company became the largest cinder block manufacturer in the nation based off its prominence in the local market—VanderMeer estimates that their material had been used in eighty-five percent of local homes by the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{70} The rectangular, low-slung ranch-style house was complimented using cinder block, and virtually every home built in Phoenix in the 1950s was some variation of this style. As homeowners began to desire more variation, builders would use wood, brick, board and batten, or stucco as façades. Homes built in Phoenix were also larger than those built in other parts of the country—local houses were often several hundred square feet larger than comparable homes elsewhere.\textsuperscript{71} By the 1960s, most houses had two bathrooms, three or more bedrooms, living rooms that were at the front of the house, and a family room or kitchen providing direct access to the backyard. The connection of the backyard to a shared family space championed the “culture of outdoor living” that thrived in Phoenix.\textsuperscript{72} Desert

\textsuperscript{68} VanderMeer, \textit{Desert Visions}, 190-193.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 197.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 199.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 201.

\textsuperscript{72} VanderMeer, \textit{Desert Visions}, 203.
Visions identifies Phoenicians as being at the cutting edge of suburban design because of a local culture of which supported affordable leisure and reflected affluence.

The size of the average subdivision increased dramatically due to these changes in housing production. VanderMeer also finds that local builders moved more swiftly into master-planned community building than their competition elsewhere. The sheer size of some subdivisions—Long eventually built over twenty-five thousand houses in Maryvale—would have necessitated some community-building strategy amongst builders. VanderMeer argues that the bulk of new residents moved to Phoenix from the Midwest, the mid-Atlantic, Texas, or California, and that this created a "shared regional culture" that provided a source of stability for residents.73

However, between 1960 and 1967, nearly two-thirds of local households moved, and nearly half left their neighborhoods.74 Home builders would plot curvilinear streets or open shopping plazas, schools, recreation centers, libraries, churches, and other facilities necessary to form community life. Other home builders, such as Del Webb with his Sun City developments, focused on creating retirement communities that catered exclusively to seniors. Builders would design golf courses, swimming pools, and community centers around modestly priced homes to provide their exclusive senior citizen community with the facilities necessary to develop a self-sustaining enclave geared toward the unique needs of its residents.75 Other builders created "new towns": master-planned communities developed virtually out of thin air. They were constructed far outside of the metropolitan pale, and were designed to be economically and socially independent from Phoenix, but often wound up economically dependent on the Valley and as socially homogenous as the suburban spaces they had tried to improve.76 As the scale of housing subdivisions grew, so did the ambitions of local builders. Phoenix home builders were part of the avant-garde in creating ways to sell homes to residents, and they were as responsible for the bonds of community constructed by residents as the residents themselves were.

73 Ibid., 206.

74 Ibid., 206-207.

75 Ibid., 210-215.

76 Ibid., 215-217.
One final aspect of suburban development in Phoenix is how it affected shopping patterns. VanderMeer asserts that residents in Phoenix went “shopping for community.” Prior to the war, other than the neighborhood grocery store, shopping outlets had been concentrated in downtown Phoenix. However, the availability of automobiles made it so that the condensed, linear development of prewar shopping centers alienated the public. It was more efficient to build shopping plazas at major intersections and for multiple businesses to share parking space. By 1957, Phoenix had the greatest number of shopping centers per capita of any U.S. city. These plazas, often anchored by grocery stores, banks, restaurants, and movie theaters, soon gave birth to “suburban downtowns,” which in turn gave birth to the contemporary mall. Between 1957 and 1963, seven malls had been opened in newly-annexed and newly-developed parts of Phoenix. These malls alone offered four times the amount of commercial space available in downtown Phoenix. VanderMeer views these places as a new area for the creation of community in the newly-developed suburban setting. This case study examines how suburbanization occurred in the urban west. While the methods by which home production began were like that in the East, the social conditions under which it occurred were totally different.

The American West

*Desert Visions* fits neatly with broader historiographical trends on the metropolitan West. In *From Cotton Belt to Sun Belt*, Bruce Schulman advances the Sunbelt synthesis: that New Deal economic programs, the military-industrial complex, a shift from agriculture to industry, and pro-business/anti-union local policies had in the creation of the Sunbelt. Carl Abbott has also written about how the increased capitalization of the Sunbelt real estate market spurred its role as an investment vehicle for both local and outside investors. Other scholars have demonstrated the correlation between the rise of Reagan conservatism in Sunbelt areas, such as Orange County,

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78 Ibid., 226.

C.A., and the migration of white southerners into Southern California.\textsuperscript{80} In \textit{Sunbelt Capitalism}, Elizabeth Shermer re-centers Phoenix as a foundation for post-World War II grassroots conservatism. Her study of the role civic elites had on the political economy of Phoenix leads to new questions concerning the interplay between post-World War II conservatism, business owners, and social identity.\textsuperscript{81} In \textit{Power Lines}, Andrew Needham illuminates the relationship between pollution and colonialism through his study of energy emissions on Navajo reservations produced by energy consumers in Phoenix.\textsuperscript{82} Finally, in \textit{Standing on Common Ground}, Geraldo Cadava outlines the institutional relationships necessary for a “transnational” Sunbelt.\textsuperscript{83}

Additionally, this dissertation lies adjacent to literature on the American West: literature on the colonization process. The metropolitan West is often marginalized in “Western” history, but so many of the forms of colonization policy impact urban populations. For example, immigration policy has gone a long way in racializing many migrants to western cities. Beginning in 1882, various Asian nationalities were significantly restricted from immigrating to the U.S. or earning citizenship. There is a strong legal history surrounding the major Supreme Court cases, \textit{Ozawa v. United States} and \textit{Thind v. United States}, and their legal exclusion of Asian immigrants on the condition that they were not Caucasian or white as recognized by the “common man.” Ian Haney Lopez, Sarah Gualtieri, and Erika Lee, among others, have all discussed the experiences of


Asian immigrants who attempted to elude legal barriers preventing their immigration to the U.S. While Asians were excluded from immigration, many still lived and worked in the U.S. Scholars such as Nayan Shah and Dorothy Fujita-Rony look at the exploitation of South Asian and Filipino workers in the American West. Shah and Fujita-Rony build from the works of other scholars, such as Tómas Almaguar, Evelyn Nakano Glenn, and Linda Gordon, who find that people of color were slotted into an inferior position in a labor hierarchy based upon white supremacy. Despite the fact that many Asian immigrants owned property and worked, Lee, along with Mai Ngai, focuses on the criminalization of Asian immigrants as another way to understand their exclusion from the U.S. Finally, scholars such as Eiichiro Azuma, Scott Kurashige, and Valerie Matsumoto examine the lives of Asian immigrants to the U.S. post-1924 exclusion act—when legal Asian immigration was ended completely.


Here the historiography of Asian immigrant exclusion and oppression intersects with the history of Mexican occupation and Mexican-American exploitation. After the U.S. conquered much of northern Mexico in the Mexican-American War, Mexican citizens in the area became American citizens. Sarah Deutsch and Al Camarillo discuss in their works the downward social mobility of these residents.\(^{89}\) Deutsch and Camarillo argue that Californios and New Mexicans were hurtled into wage labor after white Americans used the law and loans to strip Mexican elites of their land and destroyed the communal lifestyle of rural Mexican Americans. However, it was not until the sanctions on Asian immigration created a need for a new low-wage workforce, along with the chaos created during the Mexican Revolution, that Mexican immigration to the U.S. began in earnest. David Gutierrez, George Sanchez, and Eric Meeks discuss the movement of Mexican workers into California and Arizona to create a new, Mexican-American proletariat.\(^{90}\) Neil Foley, Marc Rodriguez, and Zaragosa Vargas describe the movement of Mexican workers into the American South and Midwest via Texas, and from there, via the railroads.\(^{91}\) Others, such as


Matthew Garcia and Richard Garcia, describe the tensions between Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants during this time.\(^9^2\) Kelly Hernandez has written on the border patrol and its criminalization of Mexican migrant workers—demonstrating that this criminalization of Mexican migrant workers is similar to the criminalization of Asian immigrants.\(^9^3\) While the literature on Asian and Hispanic immigration rarely intersects, save Hernandez, there are clear intersections between the economic and legal conditions of Mexican immigrants and Asian immigrants. As the work on non-white immigration policy shows, the criminalization of Hispanic and Asian immigration occurs simultaneously and in a way that Ngai and Guglielmo show did not affect white immigrants in the nineteenth century—even after the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924.\(^9^4\)

Additionally, the narrative of American imperialism often writes out the conquest of the West. However, it has been seen as an imperial process by scholars who assume the perspective of the indigenous and Mexican residents, as demonstrated by Rodolfo Acuna, rather than by scholars who study this process from the vantage point of white settlers.\(^9^5\) The perspective scholars of ethnic studies has influenced those who do not focus on the indigenous people, such as Steve Aron, Jeremy Adelman, and Patricia Limerick, to argue that the American occupation of the West was indeed an imperial project that, as Aron and Adelman state, moved

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the American West from being a “borderland” to becoming part of the American “border.” The literature on imperialism requires further definitional clarity to make more sense of its relations to this dissertation—for where does imperialism end and settler colonialism begin?

Settler colonialism is an established historiographical trend in Californian studies. Southern California, in the twentieth century, was a place where local white elites were aware that minorities existed but tried to render them invisible. Their aims were similar, yet different, from those of southern white segregationists: white Southern Californians wanted a region that embodied, as Charlotte Brooks describes, the “cult of the Nordic.” This would be a land where racial groups were kept separate and white supremacy reigned supreme through economic and legal control of employment opportunities and spatial development. White elites restricted non-white’s ability to create and access private space so that white elites could reorder the land into that of a white supremacist settler colony. People of color had to be rendered invisible so to make this reconstruction look natural.

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97 Laura Barraclough comes to a similar conclusion that “rurality,” the concept of rural space in the area, is intertwined with the “production [of whiteness] through empire,” Making the San Fernando Valley Rural Landscapes, Urban Development, and White Privilege, (Athens, GA: UGA Press, 2011), 5. On page 9, she approaches Los Angeles as a “white settler society in which urban policy, especially concerning land use, facilitated American conquest on lands acquired from Mexico.” I have pushed this idea further by looking at other areas of Los Angeles and arguing that the “invisibility” of non-white people in these spaces made their racial construction look natural—not the outcome of imperial conquest.

The primary technique used to render people of color invisible during the interwar period was the racial housing covenant. Both Brooks and Scott Kurashige examine the way whites, of all economic classes, used racial housing covenants in the interwar period to create racially homogenous neighborhoods. Brooks and Kurashige find that racial covenants offered a way for whites to create idealized space for white settlers to inhabit. The exclusion of Asians and Blacks, in particular, from these areas were fundamental for creating the veneer of racial homogeneity—the fundamental attraction of white supremacist imperialists who desired virginal lands for the establishment of new settler colonies.

White spaces homogenized the residents who lived within them and allowed them to physically embody the identity of “white American settler.” For immigrants, whose cultural practices brought them scrutiny by native born, Protestant elites, this was a reassuring representation of their assimilation into white American society. For those, both of European and non-European descent, who lived outside of these racially restricted spaces, it cast doubt on their full integration into American society. They were beyond the pale of modern, mainstream, white-American society. The exclusion of non-whites from white neighborhoods rendered them invisible within dominant discourse and space. Housing covenants gave white Americans the ability to order spatial relations that reflected their ideological desire to separate white Californians from non-white Californians.

White supremacy also allowed for white Americans to requisition rural land in Southern California to embody the imperial conquest of the American West. Matthew Garcia argues that white pioneers of the San Gabriel suburbs, which are east of Los Angeles, were midwestern migrants looking to create secluded and culturally homogenous religious colonies. He finds that “these culturally homogenous communities eased the transition into a new environment for many migrants, and perpetuated the illusion that the small town of the Midwest and east could be recreated in Southern California.” To cultivate this land, however, migrants needed cheap labor. They employed Mexican, Filipino, and Japanese laborers, but instead of integrating them

99 Kurashige, The Shifting Grounds of Race, 28; Brooks, Alien Neighbors, 51.

100 Garcia, A World of Its Own, 28.
into their midwestern settler colonies, they excluded non-white workers from their communities on the basis that they were "migrant workers" and did not require permanent housing in the area. Non-white workers appeared only as employees to white colonists—their other needs were invisible because non-whites were not permanent members of the community. In this way, non-whites could exist within Southern California, in roles allowed by the white supremacists that had conquered the land, but were unable to make claims on space that would have made them an indelible part of the landscape.

Laura Barraclough, in her work on rural Southern California, finds that the San Fernando Valley was originally constructed as a playground for elite whites, when the strains of urban life overwhelmed them, to practice farming and ranching, and for Hollywood to use as a backdrop for its lucrative western films. The films created there perpetuated a static representation of the American Indian—the nineteenth century tribesman riding his horse on the warpath to be defeated by white American cowboys. This constant representation of impotency rendered the American Indian, according to Philip Deloria, invisible. He states that, "Indians might not vanish, but they would become invisible, as the very characteristic that once defined them—the potential for violence—was eradicated" on infinite loop in the western films. The representation of American Indians on screen—neutered and extinct—rendered those who remained in the Los Angeles basin, unable to embody that representation, invisible as well. Similarly, to urban constructions of space, the formation of rural land in Southern California excluded people of color to create an ideal settler colony based upon the white supremacy of American imperialism.

In *Popular Culture in the Age of White Flight*, Eric Avila argues the destruction of the multi-ethnic neighborhood in Chavez Ravine and the creation of Disneyland act as attempts of elite whites to restructure increasingly heterogeneous urban space after the removal of restrictive covenants in the post-World War II period. Also, Barraclough finds that white ranchers created regional parks and “horse-keeping districts” attempting to prevent non-whites from accessing the

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101 Barraclough, Making the San Fernando Valley, 19.

San Fernando Valley. These efforts represent the vehement defense of a white supremacist settler colony under attack from internal foes. Southern California was spatially reconstructed to create a society for white settler colonists. However, colored people were always present, and they were included, as well as excluded, from urban and rural space in ways that would make their existence as invisible as possible to white Americans. This was the ultimate manifestation of the settler colonization of American imperialism—to manage spatial relationships. This dissertation is another addition to this historiographical legacy.

In conclusion, there are several prominent historiographies—primarily on metropolitan studies and the history of the American West—where this dissertation will indirectly respond to preexisting arguments. However, this dissertation should be a significant addition to the history of Phoenix and the history of racial integration in metropolitan communities.

Metropolitan Studies

In the broader field of American (sub)urban history, the seminal text is *Crabgrass Frontier* by Kenneth Jackson. It is a history of the suburb in the American imagination from the colonial period to the 1980s. Although his book had predecessors, most notably Gwendolyn Wright’s *Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America*, Jackson’s articulation of suburban development and his definition of suburban space influence the work of every scholar after him. Jackson is a social historian, but he begins by describing suburbia as a cultural phenomenon. He believes that suburbia “symbolizes the fullest, most unadulterated embodiment of contemporary culture” and compares it to other “fundamental characteristics of American society:” conspicuous consumption, dependence on the automobile, upward mobility, the nuclear family, the division between work and leisure, and racial and economic exclusivity. However,

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105 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 4.
Jackson does not want to participate in a conversation on the “myth of suburbia”; while these characteristics and suburbia reify one another, he wants to develop a more substantial definition of the place. Here, he shifts from describing suburbia as “a state of mind” to “a planning type.” However, this too proves problematic because “so many types of places are so often labeled suburban.” In the end, Jackson offers this characterization of an American suburban experience:

Affluent and middle-class Americans live in suburban areas that are far from their work places, in homes that they own, and in the center of yards that by urban standards elsewhere are enormous. This uniqueness thus involves population density, homeownership, residential status, and journey-to-work.

Urban studies, the historiographical antecedent to metropolitan studies, had not firmly established suburbs as home of most Americans until Jackson made this designation. Jackson acknowledges that this description risks overgeneralization, but the “four components” of function, class, density, and separation operate to define the factors that separate suburban from urban living. However, questions of jurisdiction and geography complicate this definition, as seen in questions about the “suburban” status of Maryvale. Also, while the streetcar suburbs of the nineteenth century are uniquely distinct from the post-World War II suburbs, Jackson argues that they advanced antecedents that created a climate for suburbanization in Maryvale: cheap land, high wages, prefabricated homes, taxpayer-supported improvements, sub-dividers and real-estate specialists. These all began in the nineteenth century and would later play a role in the post-World War II housing boom. But the final material precondition for post-World War II suburbia did not come to fruition until the twentieth century—the automobile. The popularity of automobiles changed the way people viewed roads. According to Jackson, when row houses dominated nineteenth-century suburbs, the street was the primary

106 Ibid.
107 Ibid., 5.
108 Ibid., 6.
109 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 4-11.
110 Ibid., 127-137.
open space, and it performed an important recreational function. However, by 1920, urban residents and virtually all highway engineers saw streets primarily as arteries for motor vehicles.\textsuperscript{111}

Jackson also discusses how changes in federal policy interacted with these environmental changes to develop post-World War II suburbia. Jackson quotes a senior FHA official saying that, by 1939, “decentralization … is not a policy, it is a reality—and it is as impossible for us to change this trend as it is to change the desire of birds to migrate.”\textsuperscript{112} However, he blames federal housing and transportation policies for, at the very least, exacerbating the decline of urban areas across the nation—particularly in the largest cities. He argues that federal policies which encouraged movement out of urban areas into suburban areas destroyed the market for urban housing. Many of these polices began out of the desperation of the Great Depression.

The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was created in 1933 to extend financing to prevent urban homeowners from foreclosure. While the success of the HOLC was limited, Jackson claims its historical significance is that it “introduced, perfected, and proved in practice the feasibility of the long-term, self-amortizing mortgage.”\textsuperscript{113} The HOLC systematized appraisal methods across the country, but in doing so, it formalized assumptions that determined the value of a neighborhood based on its demographics. Of the four levels of quality the HOLC assigned to neighborhoods, the highest level (A) was assigned to areas that were “new, homogenous [in racial and ethnic character], and 'in demand as residential locations'.”\textsuperscript{114} Areas that were inhabited by racial minorities, Jews, or immigrants were precluded from this rating. Jackson notes that the HOLC did not create these appraisal techniques, but it applied them with a uniformity and tenacity heretofore unseen.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 164.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 190.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 196.

\textsuperscript{114} Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 197.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 195-203.
The successor of the HOLC was the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Jackson claims that no other federal agency has a “more pervasive and powerful impact on the American people” than the FHA. Another creation of the Depression, this program was intended to “encourage improvement in housing standards ... to facilitate sound home financing ... and to exert a stabilizing influence on the mortgage market.” Backed by “the full weight of the United States Treasury,” the FHA was able to induce lenders to invest in long-term residential mortgages and, due to its volume, was able to induce builders to adopt minimum standards that became informal industry norms. Before the FHA, down payments for homes were regularly as high as thirty percent, but FHA-secured mortgages could be had for as much as ninety-three percent of a property, so the size of down payments around the industry plummeted to below ten percent.

Because there was greater stability, more uniformity, and less risk in the market, the cost of home construction and financing fell precipitously, and Jackson finds that “it became cheaper to buy than to rent.” Jackson argues that this became a death knell for many urban neighborhoods by “stripping them of much of their middle-class constituency.” The standards that the FHA used to determine where to offer loans discriminated against urban areas: single-family, suburban homes were easier to finance than multi-family, urban dwellings; it was easier to purchase a new home than to modernize an old one; and appraisal policies that the FHA inherited from the HOLC were biased against the racial heterogeneity of urban areas. As Wright notes, both the FHA and private banks refused to finance mortgages in racially-diverse, inner-city areas, which led to increased costs of living and a decreased quality of services; developers had a vested interest in creating conditions that met FHA standards for mortgages to increase their

\[116\] Ibid., 203.
\[117\] Ibid.
\[118\] Ibid., 204.
\[119\] Ibid., 204.
\[120\] Ibid., 205.
potential of turning a profit. Builders continually found that it was easiest to build according to FHA standards in undeveloped, unpopulated suburban areas.

The final condition that was necessary for the creation of post-World War II suburbia was a business model that could manufacture homes quickly and on a large scale. According to Jackson, ten percent of the builders built seventy percent of homes. Interestingly, the median single-family builder would construct, at best, a couple dozen homes a year in the post-World War II period and fewer than ten percent of builders built more than five hundred homes in a year. Nevertheless, Jackson uses the experience of large builders such as William Levitt, and his family's ubiquitous Levittown, to typify the post-World War II period. Jackson does not delve into the details surrounding Levittown; moreover, he does not conduct any research on Maryvale despite the size of its development. Still, Jackson does highlight several important characteristics that made mass-produced suburbs a success.

First, the Levitts utilized new technology, such as power tools, and used non-unionized labor to increase the efficiency of their labor. Second, they used inexpensive, preassembled materials as well as an assembly process simplified for a less-skilled labor force to quickly assemble homes. The homes they built were inexpensive enough for former veterans to afford and more attractive than being "squashed in with their in-laws or in tiny apartments where landlords frowned on children." Finally, the Levitts landscaped the community and developed open spaces, recreational areas, and community centers to create places for community bonds to develop. While Levittown was unpopular with critics, it was wildly popular with consumers, who flocked to the area daily by the hundreds to purchase a home in suburbia. Although Jackson spends little time discussing the creation of post-World War II suburbs, the suburban history in Crabgrass Frontier climaxes with the creation of Levittown and the post-World War II suburb.

121 Wright, Building the Dream, 247.
122 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 203-209.
123 Ibid., 233.
124 Ibid., 235.
125 Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 235-238; Wright, Building the Dream, 253.
After all these conditions were in place, the United States was ready for an explosion of homebuilding which would result in post-World War II suburbia. According to Jackson, the residential construction industry had been a non-factor since the Great Depression began, and millions of people had migrated to areas where defense jobs, but not permanent housing, were located. Furthermore, the marriage and birth rate rose across the nation, and new families were looking for a place to live. Finally, the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 created a Veterans Affairs program like the FHA and gave the 16 million members of the military additional support to purchase homes once they left the service.\textsuperscript{126}

Jackson finds five characteristics typical of the post-World War II suburbs that housed the majority of these former servicemen: they were located on the periphery of metropolitan areas; they offered detached single-family homes in low density neighborhoods, usually with lots between one-tenth and one-fifth of an acre, that assumed all residents would have access to an automobile; they mostly offered tract homes, not custom or trailer homes, of similar design and size; they lacked an aura of affluence because of the easy availability of housing due to “mass-production techniques, government financing, high wages, and low interest rates;” and finally, the characteristic, which Jackson identifies as most important to post-World War II suburbia, was its intense economic and racial homogeneity.\textsuperscript{127}

In this sense, Jackson decries the social consequences of suburban development; the isolation of suburban space tore the extended family apart and limited the opportunities women and children had to form relationships outside of their immediate surroundings. Furthermore, it excluded homemakers from employment opportunities unavailable in their neighborhoods and, due to exclusionary zoning, prevented large numbers of Americans from acquiring affordable housing or the economic benefits of homeownership.\textsuperscript{128}

The work of Jackson is incredibly important in the historiography of suburban America; in fact, it is the foundation of all research into the topic. However, his work owes a great debt to

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 231-233.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{128} Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 238-245.
Wright. She highlights the way that the Housing Act of 1949 was abused due to shoddy construction by unscrupulous builders and its inherent bias against inner-city areas. She goes as far as saying that "government officials did not see the Housing Act of 1949 as a way to help families in the cities, since they associated healthy family life with non-urban settings."\(^{129}\) Jackson’s and Wright’s works act as a eulogy for the decline of the inner-city.

Both Jackson and Wright decry the technological advances of the past century and their effects on the American lifestyle. For example, Jackson sees the federal subsidization of highways as integral to the creation of post-World War II suburbs. The Federal Highway Act of 1916 and the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 were important because they emphasized the privately-owned automobile—which, in turn, led to lower transportation costs and made de-concentration more affordable.\(^{130}\) The method of analysis that Wright and Jackson practiced, a deconstruction of social policies that buttressed the post-World War II suburbs, would be utilized by other authors to attack the consequences that they had on America—especially her urban areas. Wright and Jackson laid the foundation for scholars who viewed the post-World War II suburbs as an insidious and destructive development in American culture.

Robert Fishman advances a more radical reconceptualization of suburbia in his text *Bourgeois Utopias* than either that of Jackson or Wright. Fishman utilizes the city of Los Angeles as a case study to show the factors that influenced the development of the twentieth-century suburb. In *Crabgrass Frontier*, Jackson partly blames the sprawl of Los Angeles on the "dispersed location of its oil fields and refineries,"\(^ {131}\) but Fishman believes that wealthy land speculators—along with the advent of the automobile— influenced Angelenos to forsake traditional urban life for the suburban metropolis. As Fishman notes, "the ultimate purpose of suburban transportation lines [was] not to move people; it [was] to increase the value of the land through

\(^{129}\) Wright, *Building the Dream*, 246.


\(^{131}\) Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier*, 250.
which it pass[ed],” and in Los Angeles, the powerful real estate development industry had helped craft the largest mass transit system in the world to augment the land industry in the region.\(^{132}\)

However, Fishman argues that the transit lines were problematic from a business standpoint: the structure of rail transit clustered residents along high-priced corridors and made home construction prohibitively expensive. Los Angeles home builders needed to keep homes accessible to as large of a market as possible because it was the only way that mortgage lenders could continue to sell their highly-profitable, mortgage packages: the ultimate purpose of the real estate market was to “sell money” to new homeowners.\(^{133}\)

Fishman believes that the mass transit system, along with the downtown area, was sacrificed so that the growth industry could continue to operate uninhibited. Instead of improving its mass transit system to decrease congestion, the city instead created a decentralized grid of roads which allowed residents access to every part of the city—and increased the available land which could be utilized for speculation. Fishman concludes that the betrayal of mass transit for the automobile was done so that real estate speculators could increase their market for potential homebuyers and, in turn, set up the stage for twentieth-century suburbanization.

Fishman’s argument on how the paradigm shifts in home building affected suburbia is not particularly unusual; instead, it is his conclusion that these very mechanisms are the things which render suburbia obsolete that is most distinctive. He finds that “financially, organizationally, and technologically,” the housing industry began to streamline itself in the 1930s, and, when combined with FHA loan policies, which increased the scale and speed of projects, this development drastically augmented the number of homes that builders could plot. He writes that “in post-1945 America a massively financed and elaborately organized industry existed to make possible the detached single-family home.”\(^{134}\) Indeed, Wright comes to a similar conclusion, as she asserts that real estate interests wanted the federal government to take the financial risk out


\(^{133}\) Ibid., 162-165.

\(^{134}\) Fishman, *Bourgeois Utopias*, 176, 193.
of residential construction but to retain industry autonomy in selecting regulations, rates, and residents.\textsuperscript{135}

However, to Fishman, this industry is the exact thing that destroyed the “industrial metropolis” and brought about the suburban metropolis and techno burb. The vast production of new homes in the suburban metropolis moved “the center of gravity in the United States from the urban core to the periphery and thus ensured that these vital and expanding areas could no longer remain simply bedroom communities.”\textsuperscript{136} While highways had originally been built to support the bedroom status of suburbs, they eventually became the “main streets” of the techno burb by allowing businesses to leave the urban core for less expensive periphery. Therefore, people no longer live on the urban periphery to distance themselves from their jobs, but to have easy access to them.\textsuperscript{137}

In some ways, Fishman is right: the “distance-to-work” characteristic established by Jackson implies that people continued to work in the urban core during the post-World War II period. This is simply not true. Jackson acknowledges as much when he notes how “the automobile, which was well suited to the flexible requirements of lateral movement to other suburbs,” became increasingly important as businesses and institutions moved out of the urban core and into the suburbs.\textsuperscript{138} The redefinition that Fishman asserts is a welcome addition to the historiography of post-World War II suburbia.

The built landscape of Maryvale also intersects with the urban history of post-World War II America. Tract-homes, office parks, strip malls, and other common post-World War II architectural designs dominate the built landscape of Maryvale. The development of real estate in the area offers a different understanding of the relations between urban core and suburb.\textsuperscript{139} The

\textsuperscript{135} Wright, Building the Dream, 240.
\textsuperscript{136} Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias, 193.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 195.
\textsuperscript{138} Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 182-184.
multi-nodal village planning system of Phoenix helped prompt the concept of an “edge city:” an area where commercial space decentralized along suburban fringes instead of aggregating within the downtown core of a city.\textsuperscript{140} Maryvale is also surrounded by several “boomburbs:” sprawling suburban municipalities with populations of 100,000 or more (as of 2000), which have grown by ten percent per decade since 1950.\textsuperscript{141} Boomburbs often compete with primary metropolitan cities for residents and capital investment and, because of their size, they share similarities to both inner-cities and suburbs. Maryvale challenges this concept in that, if the neighborhood had independently incorporated, it would be a boomburb of Phoenix. In this sense, there is value in contrasting the built environment of Maryvale with independent communities elsewhere.

There have also been valuable case studies written on master-planned communities built in the period shortly after World War II. These studies often look at Levittown to understand how suburbanization impacted the social praxis of residents after relocation. Barbara M. Kelly looks at the value of “sweat equity” as a mechanism for upward suburban mobility for residents living in Levittown, NY—a suburb very much like Maryvale. Kelly brings the working and lower-middle class origins of the early Levitt owners into clear view. Her monograph, \textit{Expanding the American Dream}, views the post-World War II suburbanites as “people who could not afford to build for themselves and were more likely to inherit [the deteriorating] housing abandoned by the classes above them.”\textsuperscript{142} From her perspective, Levittown offered its residents a legitimate chance to own their “dream house.”

There is a tension between the conceptualization of suburbia for the upwardly-mobile working and lower-middle classes and its conceptualization by more affluent pundits and critics. Kelly’s discussion of the historical circumstances which framed post-World War II suburbia brings this friction to light. She states that, when compared to their pre-war counterparts, post-World War II suburbia...


War II suburbs were “aimed at a lower socioeconomic level ... [and] reduced in size and complexity” to expand the market for homeowners.¹⁴³ These homes were built with the idea that they would instill middle-class values in their residents: firstly, by keeping essential elements of the house while removing others that were “expendable or superfluous,” and secondly, by giving residents the “opportunity to earn one’s upward mobility through hard work and dedication.”¹⁴⁴ Even as these homes were being built, critics derided the simplicity of the construction and questioned the quality of home construction and community formation. However, Kelly argues that this design was intentional, and more importantly, it was never meant to be permanent—sweat equity improved both the quality of the home and the ties of community in newly-developed subdivisions. When residents first moved into developments, “the houses dwarfed the sapling fruit trees and evergreens, creating a barren, unfinished look to the rows of house lots,” but as the community matured, the “ticky-tack” houses into which the Levitt owners first moved would give way to a more highly-developed built environment. Most criticisms of post-World War II suburbia miss this aspect of their early development—one must ask what role the social distance of its critics had in this oversight.¹⁴⁵

Kelly does agree with critics who argue Levittown was characterized by intense social conformity and patriarchy. She sees the built environment of Levittown as reinforcing conformity and privatization—the two most significant themes in the initial post-World War II period. Developments such as Levittown were exceptionally homogenous because of the budgetary restrictions under which they were built and the specific market (veterans) for which they were geared. Furthermore, Levitt originally rented his houses to new residents. This allowed him to create a “planned community” with the object of reforming its new residents. Levitt exercised firm control over the actions of his residents to prevent them from continuing behavioral patterns that he deemed as non-middle-class. For example, Kelly finds that Levitt would not allow the use of wash-lines in his neighborhood because he believed it gave the

¹⁴³ Ibid., 52.
¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 12-18, 28-30.
¹⁴⁵ Ibid.
impression of a tenement neighborhood. He went as far as controlling the days when residents could dry clothes. Kelly argues that his injunction discriminated against women who had limited access to laundry equipment because of employment; it assumed that “the wives of Levittown would be home during the week to do their laundry.” The policies of early Levittown reinforced social conformity surrounding middle-class behavior. Although policies such as this were undemocratically imposed, they supported patriarchal concepts such as female domesticity—which created an environment that persuaded permanent residency by many homeowners.146

Wright also notices the way in which the construction of post-World War II suburbs changed the way that people lived. She heavily emphasizes how FHA policies exacerbated racial and ethnic segregation, but more interestingly, she also identifies ways in which the technological advances of suburbia changed the lifestyle of its residents. Despite the small size of the homes, the “built-in” features of the house attracted residents. Refrigerators, washing machines, and televisions, which were included with the sale of the house, attracted residents to Levittown despite the small size of the lots. Other modern technologies, such as radiant-heated concrete foundations, sliding doors and windows, and three-way fireplaces, were made available to in the suburbs to “families who… had been priced out of the market for decent city apartments.”147 Wright argues that the difference in home design and technology changed the way that mothers interacted with their children. For example, the glass doors inspired the use of the backyard as an “outdoor living room” where parents could place jungle gyms and barbeque pits, or grow gardens for the entertainment of their children.148

Even in moderate-cost homes, some of which were as small as six hundred and fifty square feet, parents could create space for their children’s leisure activities. Wright suggests that the belief in these technological advances in childrearing were identified with suburban living and millions of insecure parents bought into the idea that they had to move to the suburbs, with all its technological advances, if they wanted to raise their child properly—urban areas were just too

146 Kelly, Expanding the American Dream, 55, 59, 68, 80.
147 Wright, Building the Dream, 257.
148 Wright, Building the Dream, 252-258.
unsafe for children. Countless residents felt forced to move to the suburbs because they could not find comparable dwellings in urban areas at an affordable price. The technological advances in suburban homes changed the way that parents raised their children; the interplay between cultural and material production accelerated the demand for suburban living.\textsuperscript{149}

Dolores Hayden is another prominent scholar of suburbia. She successfully identifies suburban trends that are overlooked in the earlier studies by Jackson and Fishman because of her emphasis on gender history. In \textit{Building Suburbia: Green Fields and Urban Growth, 1820-2000}, Hayden describes “sitcom suburbs” as a serious break with the suburbanization patterns of the prewar period. The culture of post-World War II suburbs was that of mass consumption. In fact, Hayden states that post-World War II suburbs “were deliberately planned to maximize consumption of mass-produced goods and minimize the responsibility of developers to create public space and public services … definitions of public and private were reshaped.”\textsuperscript{150} She comes to similar conclusions to that of Fishman: that the post-World War II housing and mortgage industry was a financial racket created to integrate people into system of mass-consumption. She finds that American Community Builders, the primary developers of Park Forest, Illinois, moved:

\begin{quote}
Downmarket…to avoid slow home sales. [The] elegant planning for small residential neighborhoods with a hierarchy of streets, parks, and pedestrian circulation was discarded in favor of through streets with no connecting greenbelts and fewer landscape buffers. Although [the developer’s] approach to the residential neighborhood was in all the planning textbooks as a model of good design, it was challenged in Park Forest by those who thought that Levitt and Sons was making more money by building cheaply.\textsuperscript{151}
\end{quote}

Real estate interests sought to expand opportunities for American homebuyers to ensure that they could maximize the economic value obtained from the domestic consumer market.

While post-World War II suburbs were built cheaply enough for working-class Americans to purchase homes there, Hayden sees this action done primarily to expand the market of consumers and to make more money through mass-production techniques. The culture of consumption that Hayden describes also correlates with the mass-production of post-World War

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{150} Hayden, \textit{Building Suburbia}, 128-129.

\textsuperscript{151} Hayden, Building Suburbia, 145.
II suburban tracts. She cites arguments made by William Whyte and Herbert Gans to prove that working-class families who moved into the suburbs “moved into a ‘culture of consumption’ and became dependent on cars. Rituals such as backyard barbeques and parents’ parties in totlots [sic] may have seemed novel but were not defining.” ¹⁵² Part of the reason for this lack of important rituals was because of how suburbia split the three-generation family. She finds that “older members remained in inner-city neighborhoods as adult children were scattered into new suburbs.” ¹⁵³ This lack of social capital enhanced the pressure on breadwinners to maintain high rates of expenses and consumption. This culture was perpetuated by tax deductions on mortgage interest, which rose with the size and cost of a home: a “mansion subsidy.” In the end, American consumers had little choice but to move to suburbia as FHA programs “were effectively a developer subsidy.” ¹⁵⁴ And, of course, these new areas were designed entirely for white Americans—people of color had a more difficult time participating in the post-World War II suburban culture of consumption. ¹⁵⁵ However, as Hayden shows, this culture of consumption was not limited to suburbs built in the post-World War II period; similar patterns emerged in suburban areas built in the prewar period as well.

Hayden’s interpretation of a place where cultural ideas are expressed or practiced makes suburbia seem much less affluent than as imagined. Where Fishman saw the streetcar suburbs as orderly and hierarchical, Hayden describes a chaotic scramble for decent housing. She finds that “residents were never as separated from paid and unpaid work as the owners of houses in picturesque enclaves pretended to be … in most parts of the country, they consisted of dwellings for skilled workers and people of modest middle-class status.” ¹⁵⁶ She also classifies prewar mortgage schemes as a racket. While “why-pay-rent” campaigns “tantalized Americans who had only know the tenements,” most workers struggled to pay off purchased homes due to non-self-
amortizing mortgages.\textsuperscript{157} Home salesmen were often sharpers and many found the time commitment of home upkeep overwhelming.\textsuperscript{158} This is a much bleaker interpretation of suburbia than that in the work of Fishman. Hayden certainly finds that the post-World War II suburbs were culturally bankrupt, but she also identifies a suburban environment that includes the less affluent, and other scholars can make interjections based on this premise.

One important aspect of pre-war suburbia Hayden explores, which is understudied in the works of Jackson and Fishman, is mail-order or self-built suburbs. These areas are important for the post-World War II period because of how they create an alternative conceptualization of what suburbia represented to people. Whereas the main thrust of suburban historiography focuses on residents moving from the crowded inner-city to less dense suburbs, in \textit{My Blue Heaven}, Becky Nicolaides writes about South Gate, California, a suburb of Los Angeles, and describes the residents as rural migrants who self-built homes from scratch or ordered kits to build their homes. Every home had a garden or chickens.\textsuperscript{159} However, in the post-World War II period, Nicolaides finds that “the working-class desperation that so powerfully defined prewar South Gate dissolved into a new sense of security.”\textsuperscript{160}

Nicolaides uses the example of “use value” vs. “commodity value” to represent the cultural shift. She finds that the “use value” of land declined as people stopped using land for agricultural purposes and began to invest in the “commodity value” of property through landscaping or by contracting professional homebuilders. She argues that working-class Americans began to self-identify “with the needs and values of the prewar middle class.”\textsuperscript{161} This had nothing to do with suburbanization or homeownership; instead, the culture in which suburbanization occurred changed and the values of suburbanites changed with it. Work such as

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 88.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 88-92.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 226.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 230.
Nicolaides’ suggests that suburbia changes as an idea more than as a place in the post-World War II period; it is a place where cultural change manifested itself as opposed to a place that created change.

One final series of historical actors is covered in the metropolitan historiography. A broad coalition of developers and realtors, architects and builders, government officials and sociologists, interior decorators and housewives, union leaders and urban reformers engineered the residential patterns of the 1920s. Each sought a way to preserve the nuclear family, bolster the economy, provide more affordable houses, or encourage community participation. And all believed in more tightly-organized planning. Community planning gave order to a potentially chaotic real estate market. The way that homes were produced made an undesirable outcome highly possible:

Developers or subdividers purchased large areas of undeveloped land. They platted future lots, installed streets and sewers, and then usually sold all or most of the land to small builders, who took a few blocks, or to individual clients, who hired their own builder or architect.

The actions of these developers helped rationalize a home construction industry that had previously been buffeted by the rising and falling economy.

According to Robert M. Hardaway, a significant proportion of homebuyers in this period were speculators who hoped that their homes would increase enough in value so that they could afford the balloon-payment that would occur when their non-self-amortizing mortgage became due. A logistical or financial failure by a developer, sub-divider, or builder could cause property prices in the entire area to plummet; therefore, it was in the interest of homebuyers to invest in a community with a stabilized real estate market. Community planning provided this opportunity. Furthermore, community planning could also operate to keep undesirable residents out of a community. In upper-middle-class communities, zoning policies created regulations to regulate community homogeneity while excluding properties that could lead to undesirable elements from

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162 Wright, Building the Dream, 194.

163 Ibid., 248.

entering the area. According to Wright, the suburban architecture of the time period suggested "deep racial and ethnic sentiments" around the conceptualization of the French chateaux, the Spanish hacienda, the Old English cottage, and other cultural references by families "trying to establish their heritage and place in the world." The planning principles established in these interwar suburbs would influence the development of the massive planned, yet affordable, subdivisions made popular in the post-World War II period.

In Marc Weiss’ *Rise of the Community Builders*, he explains the origin of community planning and how it developed the post-World War II suburbs. According to Weiss:

Creating residential subdivisions for builders and purchasers of expensive single-family homes represented the first phase of the modern transformation of urban land development by private real estate entrepreneurs. I call this phase “changes at the high end,” which reach maturity during the 1920s. The second phase, “changes at the moderate end,” completed the revolution in community building by the 1940s...what the average customer was now purchasing or renting was a new dwelling in a new district of completed dwellings, rather than a vacant lot in an undeveloped area with an uncertain future.

Private planners introduced many planning concepts and forms—such as the cul-de-sac, underground utilities, and zoning restrictions—before public agencies applied them. Private planners made homebuyers sign deed restrictions to prevent a property owner from undoing the work of the planner; homebuyers were willing to abridge their rights as homeowners to gain access to the properties in these communities. In this sense, developers who engaged in “full-scale community development” operated as private planners for cities and towns before these professional employees became integral agents in real estate management.

Weiss identifies the National Association of Real Estates Boards (NAREB) as the main organizational voice for community builders. NAREB was an organization for real estate brokers, realtors, and builders who desired to regulate and professionalize the real estate industry. The organization lobbied for many of the planning principles that were later implemented as FHA

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167 Ibid., 3.
regulations—the "long march toward achieving ‘public control of private real estate.’"¹⁶⁸ Weiss argues that NAREB vehemently supported the FHA standards and restrictions in part because it feared the potential for planning abuses by local public officials; the standardization and professionalization of the real estate industry was the organization’s prime goal—not to empower local residents to spatially organize their communities.¹⁶⁹

Weiss argues that the initial push for standardization of the real estate profession was done to assure prospective buyers of the trustworthiness of real estate brokers, but eventually, NAREB began to argue that planning principles “attracted greater amounts of longer-term and higher loan-to-value mortgage lending … saved money in land development costs (particularly on street layout), and generally brought much higher and more enduring property values and sales prices.”¹⁷⁰ Planning principles such as zoning policies were regarded as more than regulations to protect residents’ quality of life; instead, they were seen as “an exercise in land economics.”¹⁷¹

The advent of community planning physically reshaped spatial relationships within metropolitan communities.¹⁷² Interestingly, Political scientists and sociologists interested in "social capital" point to suburban space developed during the post-World War II period as a place where the bonds of community are especially weak and the authority of community institutions has declined. Robert Putnam, author of Bowling Alone, argues that civic participation, civic trust, and shared communal norms—key aspects that make up social capital—all have declined due to the public’s disengagement from civic and/or service organizations, political scandal and

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 17-52, 69.
¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 157.
¹⁷⁰ Weiss, Rise of the Community Builders, 65.
¹⁷¹ Ibid., 102.
mismanagement, and the secularization of American life. Some scholars, such as Thad Williamson, have found that there is a direct correlation between sprawl and a decrease in civic community engagement. John Freie goes as far as arguing that suburban neighborhoods are incubators of “counterfeit community” because of their existence as a simulacra—the imitation of a fantasy. He defines “counterfeit community” as “images, symbols, structures, and suggestions of association and connectedness that are false and ultimately exploitative … more spectacle than substance.” This interpretation of suburban space directly opposes the arguments of community planners that their suburban developments are places where the bonds of community will flourish. This dissertation will address concerns raised by both urban planners and urban sociologists about community formation in American suburbs built after World War II.

Terminology

In this text, I distinguish “community” as a series of connections distinct from “neighborhood” as a spatial district. Communities are not always physical entities; indeed, there is rich literature on the “symbolic” construction or use of the term. Barbara Arneil counters this by arguing successful civic and social institutions in the late twentieth-century were new, inclusive, non-traditional associations. See Barbara Arneil, Diverse Communities: The Problem with Social Capital, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).


Ibid., 5.

am referring to “civic” communities—voluntary participation in unelected service to local
governance. This is a loose, but important, definition: the charitable donation of labor toward the
betterment of public amenities unites grassroots leaders and activists within a social network
reflective of a spatial neighborhood. Activists, those who participate in civic activities, are more
likely to participate in electoral proceedings than those who do not. Their heightened
involvement in political activity grants civic activists an outsized voice in spatial development—at
least in comparison to the average citizen. Their involvement in spatial development often
provides the veneer of democratic participation in the renewal of metropolitan space; in this
sense, their volunteer activity facilitates the commoditization of community space. Just civic
engagement provides economic value for developers, “community” agency in development
heightens the non-commodity value of civic amenities for highly-engaged residents. In the end,
the built environment reflects the economic interest of investors and the social interests of civic
activists. In this way, civic community creates spatial manifestations of what residents value.\footnote{179}

Additionally, to approach an objective vision of the ecological terrain as independent
from state sovereignty, as well as to symbolize the hegemony of white Anglo-Saxon protestant
civic culture, I have chosen to distinguish between “white” as a political identity and “Anglo” as a


cultural praxis. Not all white Americans are ethnically Anglo; however, in civic life, white American cultural reproduction is coded as “Anglo” unless it actively represents an ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{180} I use the term “Latinx” to describe contemporary census-designated “Hispanics” but use the term “Mexican-American” to describe the historical “Hispanic” population of Phoenix. It lacks the political urgency of “Chicano,” but is a term which describes native-born and immigrant Latinx communities in metropolitan Phoenix across time and space. Additionally, I capitalize “Black” in reference to black Americans as an ethnic group.

More importantly, I use the term “colored” to describe collectives or communities that are not categorized as Anglo. This is not the historic application of the term; when necessary, I will clarify between my use and its historic description of Black Americans. However, for the goals of this dissertation, this term allows for succinct reference to the diverse, multiethnic neighborhoods where underprivileged, immigrant, and minority communities reside within metropolitan Phoenix. To be specific, I use the term “colored” to describe the spatial racialization of Black and Mexican-American residents in metropolitan Phoenix—for it is the relational distance from sites used to socially reproduce white American communities that characterizes spaces as colored or Anglo.

Phoenicians co-equally refer to metropolitan Phoenix as the “Valley of the Sun.” Directional indicators are often used to describe in what part of “the valley” one is at. “West Valley,” where Maryvale is located, is a local descriptor for land in the western sections of metropolitan Phoenix—most easily identified as land west of the I-17. The “Northwest Valley” includes territories north of Camelback Road—the boundary line between the municipalities of Glendale and Phoenix. The “East Valley” is used to describe territories in the eastern sections of

metropolitan Phoenix—with the “Northeast” and “Southeast” bifurcated by the Salt River. “Paradise Valley” happens to be both a city and a community in Phoenix adjacent to the city in the Northeast Valley. The “Central Valley” includes downtown, uptown, and North-Central Phoenix. It also includes the Biltmore area. The “North Valley” proceeds north from the Phoenix Mountains and, finally, “South Phoenix” and “Laveen” include all the territory between downtown Phoenix and the South Mountains.

Dissertation Overview

This dissertation is composed of an introduction, conclusion, and eight research chapters. The initial chapter includes a literature review and notes on terminology. The second chapter explores the early development of Phoenix to establish the role of civic life in cultural reproduction and spatial relations along with the origins of the Maryvale community. The third chapter covers the political machinations of civic elites and their logic for metropolitan expansion. The fourth chapter investigates resistance to municipal annexation in unincorporated suburban communities surrounding Phoenix. The fifth chapter focuses on the bankruptcy of the Maryvale Community Hospital to identify the roots of civic instability in Maryvale. The sixth chapter reports how the regional civic community responded to corruption allegations in the wake of Don Bolles’ assassination. The seventh chapter looks at how Maryvale residents, inspired by civic activists, organized to acquire public funding to fight juvenile delinquency. The eighth chapter recounts the financial damage that the development of Westridge Mall did to the civic community in Maryvale. The ninth chapter explains how violence in Maryvale schools reflected the (dis) integration of local civic life. The final chapter places the rise and decline of Maryvale in a larger continuum of racial integration suburban (re) development in metropolitan Phoenix.
CHAPTER 1
The Color of Debt: Settler Colonialism, Civic Life, and the Origins of Sunbelt Capitalism

Introduction

One of the oldest Anglo proverbs that originated in the parched climate of the American West is that, against the laws of nature, water flows uphill toward money. This quip reflects the magnetic influence of American capital investment on the landscape of the American West. In few areas is this truer than in the Sonoran Desert: an area initially colonized in the early 17th century by Jesuit priests and part of an independent Republic of Mexico prior to the Mexican-American War in 1848 and Gadsden Purchase of 1853. These events bifurcated this unspoiled territory and encouraged private Anglo investors to claim natural resources to finance American territorial expansion of the high Sonoran Desert. While railroad corporations, mining interests, and military operations drove state priorities, land speculation offered investors opportunities to make spectacular profits—or to fail spectacularly—in attempts to market western land to investors. Speculators actively reshaped western land to develop ventures that attracted investors. The appropriation of natural resources by these speculators and investors would tax the American West, and particularly its desert terrain, to an extent previously unmatched.

Global capitalism did not soil the Salt River Valley until after the conclusion of the American Civil War. The Hohokam, ancestors to several of nearby indigenous communities, abandoned prehistoric irrigation canals built along the valley floor around AD 1450. It took over 400 years for Anglo-American speculators to reclaim the irrigation canals, but once they did, migrants from across the globe began to settle in the surprisingly fertile “Valley of the Sun” to grow cash crops for export to locales around the globe. Anglo speculators established town sites on both sides of the Salt River. The Phoenix town site, on the north bank of the Salt River, was
created through the imagination of Anglo agricultural interests who, unlike land speculators, sought this land for its use value; they had come to expropriate local resources to raise produce.

Migrants had to establish relationships with Anglo capital repositories to obtain access financial and cultural resources necessary to transform the Salt River Valley into a node of global capitalism. Well-connected speculators prospered as their efforts to facilitate American capital investment helped develop a lucrative economy based on resource extraction; this early cabal came to dominate the regional political economy. Their interests remained paramount, in no small part, because Anglos sought to marginalize colored residents in political life as thoroughly as they had been marginalized in economic life. Local elites hid behind civic organizations that managed operational governance without public oversight.

Local activists had to offer financial or cultural capital to participate in civic life. Those who lacked either form of capital required creditors to access civic life; those who could not acquire patrons would be excluded—a form of civic taxation created via social discrimination. Debt colored social relations in the Salt River Valley. Those who could not access Anglo capital
repositories remained at a permanent disadvantage to those who could; so, to ensure Anglo
hegemony in political life, a small class of Anglo migrants sponsored civic activities for the white
community. The exclusion of racial minorities from private events created color lines that
cordoned off civic capital for the proprietary use of white residents. The hegemony of Anglo elites,
trained in eastern institutions, made it so local civic life reflected their tastes and values—and
white residents of differing religious and ethnic backgrounds had to conform to the culture
constructed by their civic patrons to access the political benefits of civic participation. This
monopolization of civic capital reinforced the legal privileges granted to those who could claim
ownership over private property from those without the currency to participate in civic activities.\footnote{Most importantly, those with currency to access the private activities of Anglo civic life came to
dictate the political trajectory of the entire region.}

While Phoenix was built on the ruins of an indigenous settlement, it was Anglo capital
investment—assisted by indigenous labor—that made it possible for the future metropolis to
ascend from the desert sand. The earliest Anglo settlers came to the area to service military
installations; eventually, when the state capital relocated to Phoenix, when the railroad reached
Maricopa County and when the federal government ensured water allocation, speculators could
liquidate assets at a spectacular profit—making Phoenix a nexus for Anglo capital within a cash-
poor territory.\footnote{Affluent migrants saw—despite their location within an untamed desert populated
by racially, ethnically, and linguistically diverse communities—how potential investors would be
}

\footnote{For more on private property as an imposition of settler colonialism on indigenous
communities, see: https://globalsocialtheory.org/concepts/settler-colonialism/.

\footnote{For more on settler colonialism, see: Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, \textit{An Indigenous Peoples’ History
of the United States}, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2015); Walter L. Hixson, \textit{American Settler
Colonialism: A History}, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 1-22; Jean Dennison,
“Whitewashing Indigenous Oklahoma and Chicano Arizona: 21st-Century Legal Mechanisms of
attracted to sites of potential capital accumulation. So, to deepen reservoirs of social capital between local speculators and American investors, migrants sought to create a cultural milieu that could foster an Anglo metropolis. Anglicization provided the cultural capital necessary to advance beyond the initial stages of settler colonialism.

The Profitability of Civic Life

Like its mythical namesake, the city of Phoenix rapidly rose from the desert sand to become the administrative center for government and business interests in Arizona in the final quarter of the 19th century. The reproduction of Anglo culture helped deepen local economic supremacy over rural hinterlands; in turn, this bolstered the demand for Anglo cultural production in Phoenix. Anglo elites would come from all over the state and marvel at the technological advancement of the small town. Patrick Downey, the first mayor in the nearby town of Paradise Valley, recalled the frequency with which his family would take the 80-mile trek to Phoenix from the mining town of Miami. As a child, his father had the all-important job of developing the water system for one of the mining companies, but once the US-60 made vehicular access to Phoenix more feasible in the early 20th century, the Downey family would visit Phoenix "probably every two weeks." As an engineer’s son, Downey had access to far more cultural capital than many other local children, and his family would visit Phoenix to go shopping for clothing or ride the train to California. His most vivid memory of Phoenix, however, were the streetcars, as he recalled, "I had never seen a streetcar before … and I was quite awed."183 Technological advances that reflected urbane American society were only possible with Anglo capital investment.

Phoenix did not even have a spur on a transnational railroad line for more than a decade after the city was established. Furthermore, many Arizonan citizens and cities lacked the prerequisite credit to purchase modern amenities. Well into the 20th century, streetcars helped out-of-town consumers navigate downtown Phoenix; furthermore, streetcars helped residents traverse as nascent suburban developments expanded metropolitan boundaries during the Great Depression. Anglo capital would draw rural Arizonans into Phoenix as the appearance of these externally-produced industrial manufactures reflected the hegemonic dominance Phoenix developed over its rural hinterland.
The royal jelly of Anglo capital investment nurtured the cosmopolitan nature of Phoenix. John Armer, a long-time school board member, recalled a similar experience about his first childhood visit to Phoenix: “when we came down here, I never saw so many people in my life… the streetcars were fun to ride.” The streetcar made it possible for Phoenicians to access downtown amenities such as the Orpheum Theatre; as civic legend Newton Rosenzweig recalled, at the time the Orpheum “was within a few blocks of just about anyone in Phoenix who wanted to

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Figure 3 J.J. Newberry, Co. Building Exterior, 1941 November 11. This store was located at 36 W. Washington, Phoenix, Arizona, courtesy of McCulloch Brothers Photographs, Herb and Dorothy McLaughlin Collection, Arizona State University Libraries.

go to the theater."\textsuperscript{185} However, the Orpheum refused service to many racial minorities—around one-fifth of all residents in Phoenix—who lived near the theater. Racial exclusion in civic life ensured that, even if colored residents could enunciate what it was they wanted, Anglos had come to view racially-segregated, Phoenix as their private property. And as Anglo denizens of the metropolitan core were more affluent than those of on the rural periphery, Phoenix continued to attract Arizonans of all colors who sought a glimpse of modern American society. Asymmetrical economic development ensured Phoenix retained regional cultural supremacy.

Figure 4 Orpheum Theatre Lobby, 1941, Phoenix, Arizona, courtesy of McCulloch Brothers Photographs, Herb and Dorothy McLaughlin Collection, Arizona State University Libraries.
Indeed, the leading businessmen in early Phoenix made their wealth through resource extraction from the rural hinterland. Edward O'Malley, whose family owned one of the largest lumber companies in the state, recalled the power that the “Old City Elites” accrued through their monopolization of natural resources. The O’Malley clan relocated to Phoenix in the first decade of the 20th century after a Missourian competitor sold their Arizonan interests to the family. The previous owners bet against economic growth in the Valley of the Sun; their error would be the O’Malley’s gain. The O’Malley’s gradually monopolized regional lumber production; not only could their company extend credit to local land developers, but O’Malley’s also bought out undercapitalized firms in surrounding agricultural communities. Dell Trailor, a local homebuilder, explained how lumber merchants cornered the meager market for local real estate: “They would go out and subdivide a piece of land…they would sell you, like me as a builder, they would sell me lots if I agreed to buy all the trim and cabinets and millwork, windows, doors and roofing from
them. That was part of the deal." In Phoenix, producers of raw materials consolidated control over the local economy through monopolization of land development and resource extraction.

However, just as important as businessmen were the bankers who helped finance their projects. Local speculators often eschewed legal formalities, which typically accompanied business agreements to assure contracts are enforceable by the state; they trusted local financiers to facilitate informal contracts. Trailor tells of how an older local investor refused to sign title documents due to their length:

Old Clyde Pierce would be out there puttying windows. Things were different in those days. The last contract I had with Clyde was buying eighty acres of land. I brought him like a 42-page trust agreement, Phoenix Title and Trust Company. They were his people— not mine … he took one look at it and he says, like that, he says, bring it back in two pages or we don’t have any kind of deal…. So I went to the Phoenix Title and Company—they wouldn’t do it. The lawyer there says we’re not going to do that we have to protect him and all this stuff. So, I went to an attorney that we used, Schimel and Hill, and Roland Hill. He said I can’t do that, he says You’re crazy…. I said fine and I went home. I said what did Mr. Pierce say and what did I say. I wrote it and rewrote it about three times. Took it back to Mr. Pierce and he signed it immediately. Took it to the title company. Made them madder than hell but that’s the way we used to do business.  

Local bankers stood to benefit from local land development if they could determine a way to rationalize the unregulated process of land development.

Local bankers heavily relied on the professional reputation and expertise of local developers in determining which projects to finance. Again, this would make for some unusual practices. Trailor recalled an experience when he called and asked a local banker for a three million dollar loan; the banker replied, “Dell, I think you’re a better appraiser of the values of land than we are,” and he received the loan over the phone. In another instance, Trailor needed to quickly acquire financing to buy his business partner’s stake in their company; after some effort, he found a local banker who said, “Dell, I don’t know how we’re going to do it but we’re gonna do it. We’re gonna have the check ready for you in the morning. After that, we’ll work out the details.


on how you’re gonna pay it back and things like that." Local bankers helped facilitate the informal practices of local Anglo land developers.

The legal ambiguity of these informal practices made lawyers the central agents of regional development. As legal representatives of the largest property owners in the state, elite lawyers had a perspective and vision for metropolitan development that helped their leaders pitch a vision for development to their patrons. Local builders recognized the lawyers' value; the social capital that their law firms offered was too good to pass up. Frank Snell, one of the principal partners at Wilmer and Snell, was one of the leading civic luminaries in Phoenix due to his legal influence within land development. On personal retainer for Dwight Heard, one of the first suburban developers in the Valley, Snell helped bring together a wide swath of elite Phoenicians to invest in civic culture to aid land development. Snell led a coterie of lawyers to convince various persons with property interests from across the Valley to contribute to civic life as a means for cultural advancement. Edward “Bud” Jacobson, a civic enthusiast who would eventually serve as an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Arizona, found that among lawyers, “there were a bunch of eager people wanting to make the town better and that sort of rang the dinner bell and we all helped. It wasn’t glamorous, it was great.” Lawyers helped describe a practical future for the development of Phoenix that bankers, builders, and speculators brought into existence.

Since many professionals were migrants to the Valley, they sought to produce a landscape that would continue to attract professional colleagues. The health-conscious perspective of many migrants influenced their opinion of how to develop the built environment.

188 Trailor, April 4, 1997, 7.
Jacobson had migrated to Tucson in 1944 to attend law school after a relapse of rheumatic fever made his attendance at Northwestern University potentially fatal. He would later befriend the prominent Udall family and gain entrée into elite civic society. Margaret Kober, the first woman to serve on the Phoenix city council, wintered in Phoenix to help aid her father’s recovery from illness; she met her future husband and relocated to the desert permanently in 1931. About the trip across the country, she recalled:

I loved it. As I say, we drove across the country and that’s a long drive. This is from Pittsburgh, by the way. I don’t know that I said where we came from. And we came across that long, big, Godforsaken state of Texas, and I couldn’t imagine what we were coming to. Mother and father had been to Phoenix before and thought it was great. And finally we arrived in this irrigated valley, and I saw this lush growth and these beautiful citrus trees—and I’d never seen a citrus tree before. I loved it. I loved every bit of it from the very beginning. I’ve loved it all these years. 191

Affluent migrants migrated to Phoenix to realize the lifestyle benefits that the local environment offered in contrast to other American cities.

Migrants with cultural capital found that the local civic community was receptive to their competencies. Many members of the local professional class had attended elite universities before relocating to Phoenix. Dr. Leslie Kober moved to Phoenix after graduating from Northwestern Medical School. Before World War II, no more than 150 doctors were in Arizona, and intrepid young health professionals would immediately acquire stature in a state that had not developed a self-sustaining healthcare system. Instead of “spending more of [his father’s] money,” Dr. Kober left Chicago and, eschewing a New York internship, migrated to Phoenix to earn a salary staffing the office of a local surgeon. 192 While the state did have a law school in Tucson, competitive appointments often went to candidates like Jacobson—an alumnus of


Carlton College and Harvard Business School—who had access to Anglo cultural capital.¹⁹³ A seemingly endless number of migrants were willing to eschew more prestigious appointments to attain the lifestyle benefits of residing in Phoenix.

Corporate boosters realized that they could use lifestyle benefits to attract outside capital investment. A local energy conglomerate, the Arizona Public Service, hired Downey to promote the benefits of Phoenix to agents of industrial capital. He claimed that, “there were so many people here at that time because of bronchial, respiratory diseases in their children. Their children couldn’t live in—in the Eastern cities.” Local boosters began to seek investors to help finance light “garden-type” industrial development in Phoenix on the premise that the local climate offered investors an advantage over other communities. Boosters argued that if desirable workers were willing to relocate to Phoenix even without employment opportunities, the desert climate would attract skilled workers and then light industrial development would flourish as the desert climate attracted skilled workers. Downey even argued that the memory of a gas station clerk who had abandoned his career as an engineer so that his children could live in an environment beneficial to their health motivated his publicity campaign.¹⁹⁴ The professional migrants who comprised elite civic circles imagined a future for Phoenix centered upon their vision of how the desert oasis could benefit their eastern peers. In turn, civic life revolved around projects designed to develop an environment hospitable for an urbane Anglo community.

Metropolitan Phoenix had long served as a site for speculative investment by affluent Anglos. For example, the National Life Insurance Company (NLIC) of Montpelier, Vermont financed the first major job for prominent local architect Ralph Haver. Local speculators could find significant gain from relationships with outside investors; for example, the local brokers who helped facilitate financing the Haver building for the NLIC would eventually open their own bank in Phoenix. Sam Mardian, an eventual mayor of Phoenix, shifted his family’s construction firm to

¹⁹³ Jacobson, December 17, 1992, 2.
¹⁹⁴ Downey, July 8, 1978, 7-8.
commercial real estate to avoid the downturns that plagued local residential construction—outside wealth was more valuable than local trade. Access to external investment was necessary to manifest the vision of the professional class.\textsuperscript{195}

But just as importantly, speculators stood to make a stupendous profit on real estate financed by eastern capitalists. N. Clyde Peirce, the largest shareholder in O’Malley Lumber unrelated to the family, owned and developed parcels of land throughout the state. As one of the earliest speculators in Phoenix, his work within the lumber business helped provide opportunities to develop his parcels, and he eventually sold land to be developed into Thomas Mall in East Phoenix. But moreover, he had been able to purchase land for a dollar an acre in what eventually became North Scottsdale. Per O’Malley, Peirce would plead penury in his old age, but his undeveloped land in Scottsdale alone was worth four to five thousand times its original purchase price—let alone what the value of his other holdings might be.\textsuperscript{196} Anglo capital investment in the Valley of the Sun ensured that landowners could hedge their exposure to downswings in the local economy from the equity of their investments.

The opportunities affluent Anglos found in Phoenix stood in stark contrast to property-less residents in the community. Local employers regarded landless workers seeking semi-or-unskilled labor with miserly disdain; residents who lacked the cultural competencies necessary to gain employment within the professional sector—or the financial resources to establish a business—continued to toil at penurious wages. Since investors with access to eastern capital could offer higher wages for local labor and improve land to raise property values, it was in the collective financial interest of residents to transform the multi-hued Valley of the Sun into an

\textsuperscript{195} Mardian, July 20, 1976, 4-5.

Anglo metropolis.\textsuperscript{197} Civic elites concluded that spatial marginalization of those seen as inassimilable to Anglo cultural life was necessary to achieve this goal.

The Privatization of Civic Life

Affluent Anglos devised civic habits to address collective failures in Anglo development. In the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, refrigeration, let alone air conditioning, remained difficult to maintain in the inhospitable summer months. When local infrastructure was not built to enrich councilmembers, it often wilted before the continuing heat of the desert sun. The civic environment similarly sagged from the duress of demands placed upon it. The charitable thrust of civic life in Phoenix stemmed from the health crisis that afflicted so many migrants. The small medical community remained disorganized through the Great Depression. Unlike Tucson, where doctors had already begun to organize multi-specialist health clinics, the doctors in Phoenix had barely organized a Maricopa County Medical Board. This lack of organization allowed public health epidemics to overwhelm landless migrant communities. Dr. Kober began to volunteer among migrant farmers when a “sore throat epidemic” ripped through downtown Phoenix in 1931:

There were about ten thousand transient men that were housed out at the Fairgrounds … [they] asked me if I would check these men and see if they were free of contagious disease so they could transfer them out of the Fairgrounds, and I did, and from that it developed into this massive thing of ten thousand men … [and] quite a few families housed in motels on Grand Avenue.\textsuperscript{198}

Dr. Kober participated in a program where doctors served indigent migrants. He recalled:

A lot of those men and people would skip from El Paso where they had very poor accommodations to Arizona where the accommodations were much better and they were better taken care of … some of the younger doctors managed to pay their rent with the [money] that was paid to them from the government for taking care of those migrants.


\textsuperscript{198} Dr. Leslie Kober, June 30, 1977, 7.
Healthcare professionals lacked this enthusiasm to serve indigent migrants when the government did not subsidize their civic service. Many indigent migrants remained in Phoenix to help ameliorate chronic health ailments. However, aside from volunteer service at tubercular sanitariums, local doctors declined to donate skilled labor to the indigent health seekers.199

Figure 6 Tuberculosis Sanatorium near Papago Park, Phoenix, Arizona, circa 1930, courtesy of McCulloch Brothers Photographs, Herb and Dorothy McLaughlin Collection, Arizona State University Libraries.

The wives of these professionals wielded social capital in ways that mirrored the economic ambitions of their spouses. They also sought to engender a civic world that would reproduce the cultural milieu of which so many elite families were accustomed. Upon her arrival in Phoenix, the Welfare League of Phoenix—a local civic organization for clubwomen interested in volunteer service—invited Mrs. Margaret Kober to join. The women of the Welfare League were sorely disappointed when the Junior League denied their application because it regarded Phoenix as “too small” of a city to maintain a chartered office.

199 Dr. Leslie Kober, June 30, 1977, 8.
However, within a couple years, the population of Phoenix had grown to a point where the national office approved the charter. Mrs. Kober claimed that her time in the Junior League was “the greatest education” she ever had:

> When you’re an active member, you learn your community; you learn the various agencies and welfare, arts and all angles; you learn what is expected of a volunteer and how valuable trained volunteers are … you really are trained to make a real contribution to your community.\(^\text{200}\)

Volunteer organizations, such as the Junior League, embodied a participatory ethos that came to characterize civic life in Phoenix. The cultural consumption of Anglo elites was whatever local activists could produce within civic life. Their efforts operated in conjunction with activities organized by Anglo professionals who participated in local civic life for social leisure—and occasionally pecuniary gain.

Civic leaders sought to develop a civic culture that reflected the participatory ethos in which so many of the professional class had been raised. Blanche Korrick, the young wife of prominent grocer Charles Korrick, found Phoenix to be dreadfully staid upon her arrival in the early 1920s. “Music was not the thing. We didn’t have radio … we didn’t have any—musically, Phoenix wasn’t up to the minute.” So, she took it upon herself to help develop musical showcases as social events for under-stimulated social elite. “We started a Musicians Club … [local patrons] liked it. And, I liked the people who were musical, you know, so I used to give little musicals…just a little supper and music after. And that’s how we started.” The Musicians Club would eventually gain a weekly spot on local radio and cultivated a fan base from across the region. Korrick and her peers realized that community leaders needed to cultivate their social environment to support the types of cultural activities sought by civic elites.\(^\text{201}\)

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\(^{200}\) Mrs. Leslie Kober, June 18, 1976, 3-7.

As the wife of one of the leading grocers in the state, as well as a professionally trained vocalist, Korrick was in a unique position to change local cultural habits. Korrick organized talent competitions for local artists for a Californian radio agent who hired her as a talent scout. Her patron would sponsor the most successful acts; she soon began to do the same. Korrick claimed to sponsor, “just about three or four girls. And one boy … I bought him a piano.” However, local artists often lacked the means to “struggle” as a musician. Korrick went as far as paying for one local musician to attend school in Rome. But after the young woman finished her training, she married and, within two years, died and took her training to the grave with her. Korrick’s loss reflects the risk of investing in human capital—skilled artists often left and, moreover, cost less to replace than to train.\(^{202}\) To create a climate hospitable for cultural reproduction, Korrick would seek private investment for her civic activities.

Local businessmen had no interest in funding cultural productions. By the mid-1940s, Korrick and her peers had developed enough social clout to petition local businessmen to donate capital investment for a symphony. When she asked one banker for one thousand dollars, she claims he told her, “what do you want a symphony for? All you have to do is turn on the radio and you can hear,” and instead began to write her a check for twenty-five dollars. Many businessmen, like Rosenzweig, felt that, “only about five percent of the community have [sic] an interest in [the symphony.] I don’t think it would be something that the many residents in the community who have little or no interest should be asked to pay…that is a personal activity.”\(^{203}\) However, the Phoenix Symphony was eventually able to accrue twenty-five thousand dollars in fundraising and hired an assistant conductor from the Los Angeles Symphony to head the orchestra. As Korrick remembered, “quite a few young people—young men—wanted to come to Phoenix,” but the politics of the symphony reduced aggregate interest. The inaugural conductor kept his job in Los Angeles and commuted between the two cities. His family never bought a house; instead, his wife

\(^{202}\) Mrs. Korrick, July 18, 1977, 15-17.

and child lived at the Korrick mansion. Anglo capital would not sufficiently patronize local cultural reproduction.

Instead, cultural entertainment would depend on the participation of amateurs in the local community. During the Great Depression, “The Masque of the Yellow Moon” was an annual production made possible, “with genuine cooperation and true spirit of good fellowship, symbolic of the League of the Yellow Moon,” and financial sponsorships from leading business firms across the Valley. It was also the highlight of the local civic calendar. From the first production at the Orpheus Club in 1932, the “Masque of the Yellow Moon” rallied activists from across the civic community to donate financial resources or participatory labor in putting on one of the largest entertainment productions of the year. Local civic activists had the ability to create a local civic praxis around participation. Talented migrants, or even migrants who lacked talent, could participate in a robust civic community seeking participation in local productions. Jacobson gleefully reminisced on how local civic life had aided his transition to the desert:

I saw [Phoenix] as a very warm place that you could really feel was home. Chicago was pretty big and everything that basically needed doing had been done long ago. Here, it was a sort of you all come and if anything needed doing, that’s the way it was done. I had the pleasure of helping found the Phoenix Symphony. A group of people got together and thought we ought to have one...you can’t do that in a big city. You can add polish to it, you can add a wing to it maybe, you can maybe raise money...but you can’t really work in the building of the town as we were all given an opportunity to do here.

Civic involvement was central to the lifestyle benefits that enticed elite migrants to Phoenix. As metropolitan Phoenix blossomed, civic activists had the opportunity to develop nascent institutions and eventually, garner leadership positions from the equity of their civic involvement in the rapidly-expanding civic community. There was property to be homesteaded on the civic frontier.

204 Mrs. Korrick, July 18, 1977, 7-8.
205 Mrs. Korrick, July 18, 1977, 10-12.
206 Jacobson, December 17, 1992, 15.
The relationship between local patrons and civic professionals reflected the financial monopolies present in the local economy. The most prominent civic activists were the men and women who represented the interests of the largest property-owners in the state. Frank Snell, for example, was the personal lawyer of Maie Bartlett Heard. According to Jacobson, the Heard Museum, home to innumerable treasures of the Southwest, originally began as a private museum for land developer Dwight Heard. As it grew, his wife held tea parties at the museum, but the Heard family invited guests through personal requests. Finally, when the museum did open to the public, the board served at the leisure of Mrs. Heard.\footnote{Jacobson, December 17, 1992, 24-25.} The personal nature of civic life ensured that, as noted by historian Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, “men of position” could use civic institutions as sites of secular engagement for the pluralistic local business community. As Snell long claimed, “the Rotary Club owned the town, the Kiwanians ran it and the Lions enjoyed it. You walk down the street…and you couldn’t go two blocks without meeting ten people that you knew.
Moreover, the private nature of institutional ownership ensured that the business community could police civic activists to maintain social distinctions without state enforcement. Affluent Anglos operated as a cartel that pushed marginalized residents to the fringes of civic life; the metropolitan landscape remains a spatial monument to this hierarchy.

Discrimination and Segregation

Phoenix has long touted itself as a tolerant city devoid of ethnic tensions that colored older American cities. For example, in 1962, Mayor Sam Mardian would boast to the Federal Commission on Civil Rights about racial progress in Phoenix—he claimed that there was “no discrimination toward any minority group” in voting rights, legal justice, public employment, or public facilities. However, Phoenix long had a history of inequitable access to public facilities; in fact, secondary education was the primary public arena where racial segregation had been legally enforced. Prior to the World War II, private business-owners had carte blanche to discriminate against whom they would provide services and theaters, restaurants, barbershops, and hotel lodgings only began to voluntarily end discriminatory service in the fifties. While stores such as Korrick’s had traditionally been open to all consumers, the department store “had a basement that catered to—to the Mexicans,” during the interwar period. Racial segregation existed separate of racial tension.

Public space remained formally un-segregated, but discrimination reigned supreme in private life. The racial and ethnic discrimination that typified civic life in Phoenix stood in stark contrast to the religious diversity that disparate immigrant groups brought to civic affairs. The

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Korrick family, for example, had immigrated to Phoenix from Poland before opening its department store; similarly, the Goldwater (Goldwasser) family had emigrated from Poland and lived in England before opening its eponymous department store. Unlike the Rosenzweig family, who continued to practice Judaism upon relocation to Phoenix, Barry Goldwater was Episcopalian.\textsuperscript{210} The primary feature that decided social distinction in Phoenix was economic involvement with civic leadership.

Just as important, however, was assimilability toward ethno-racial whiteness. Toward the end of the post-war period, local luminaries would decry their difficulties in recruiting prestigious migrants to lead civic projects; but prior to this time, the personal relationships formed within civic life were essential to the operation of the local economy. The Mardian family moved to Phoenix from California to work with extended family-members in local real estate development; Snell, who became the Mardian family lawyer, helped integrate the middle-eastern family into local civic activities in complete disregard to their ethnic differences. As Newton Rosenzweig noted:

\begin{quote}
Personally, I would, so to speak, rather do business with someone I've known for a long while … and someone you know who—maybe there's no question about their integrity and the desire to do the right thing and all that, but still they're a relatively unknown factor … Sam Mardian—actually, when we asked him to run as mayor, had only been here like ten years, but the Mardian Family were the kind of people who wanted to be a part of the community and they, almost from the first year they arrived, they were involved in, I don't know, a cross-section of a number of things here.\textsuperscript{211}
\end{quote}

Civic life created community bonds between different shades of white folks. In many ways, the distinguishing factor between colored and white residents was the exclusion of the former from Anglo civic life and the undistinguishable assimilation of the latter into civic leadership.

The spatial landscape of Phoenix reflected the unequal access residents had to civic life; social isolation excluded many longstanding citizens from civic. The only places where Black Americans could rent or buy homes prior to World War II was south of the US-60 highway. Black

\textsuperscript{210} Mrs. Korrick, July 18, 1977, 22-23.

\textsuperscript{211} Newton Rosenzweig, Interviewed by Dr. G.W. Johnson, Phoenix History Project, Arizona Historical Society, October 5, 1978, 68-69; Mardian, July 20, 1976, 1-2.
Americans were not the only group to experience housing discrimination. Mexican-Americans were prevented from purchasing properties north of US-60 prior to World War II, and Asian Americans could not purchase new homes—because of the Alien Land Acts, which blocked their ownership of property.  

Colored residents had to relocate to places where Anglo elites would concede to their right of land ownership; many minorities found that the agricultural periphery of the West Valley, provided opportunities for property acquisition that Anglos prohibited in other parts of metropolitan Phoenix.

The West Valley was too distant from the historic canals originally appropriated by Anglos to endure intense capital investment until the 1880s. Territorial elites hired William J. Murphy, a railroad contractor to develop an irrigation project, the Arizona Canal, that would carry water westward from the Salt River to the Agua Fria River. Canal developers paid Murphy in company stock because the local dearth of currency made it impossible for them to pay him in cash; after his successful completion of the project, he incorporated a promotional company to sell land in areas where the Arizona Canal had senior water rights. In distinction to speculators like A. J. Chandler, who pioneered his eponymously-named town through a manipulation of the Desert Land Act of 1877, Murphy undertook the strenuous labor of promoting his venture to religious minorities seeking to pioneer temperance communities. Members of the German Baptist Church, also known as the Brethren, established a colony in the West Valley town of Glendale during the early 1890s; but, to ensure the profitability of his land speculation, Murphy would soon open Glendale to adherents of other Protestant sects. This plethora of congregations would help the temperance colony grow into the largest town in the West Valley.  

212 Alien Land Acts prohibited resident aliens ineligible for citizenship (primarily Asian immigrants) from formally owning land in the early 20th century American West.  
West Valley residents would have to successfully ride the waves of economic boom and bust without the corporate relationships that civic elites had developed in Phoenix. An 1895 flood that destroyed the Arizona Canal—during the middle of a drought, no less—helped bankrupt the Brethren who had originally relocated to Glendale. Rail infrastructure helped West Valley residents access global markets, and despite the economic hardship residents faced, waves of optimistic migrants sought opportunity where the Brethren had failed. In 1906, outside investors opened a factory to produce beet sugar; they also enticed local farmers to grow beets for production and promised wage labor for those foreclosed from property ownership. However, the local soil was not conducive for beet production and the factory failed. In 1915, Cave Creek overflowed and flooded the main street in Glendale—bankrupting many members of the West Valley merchant class. Indeed, the O’Malley lumber family, who had a competitive advantage over competitors hobbled by the incessant flooding in the West Valley, had been able to purchase undercapitalized businesses located in Glendale.²¹⁴ While the economically unstable West Valley offered opportunities for property ownership, there was greater risk for investment, and Anglo elites pitilessly consolidated ownership from overleveraged West Valley property-owners.

²¹⁴ Edward V. O’Malley, July 12, 1976, 4; Dean Smith and Paula Ilardo, Glendale: Century of Diversity, 51.
Many of the property-seeking migrants to the West Valley would have been driven to the margins of social life in other parts of Maricopa County. In the southeast, Mesa was a Mormon settlement; in the northeast, Scottsdale was a sun-down town; and at the center of it all, Phoenix had already established economic dominance over the state. The indebted West Valley cultivated a more inclusive social environment than other parts of Maricopa County. Basque, Lebanese, and Indian immigrants all came to acquire significant property holdings in the West Valley. The Molokans, a group of dissidents from the Russian Eastern Orthodox Church, would eventually prove prominent in the development of Maryvale. Just like in Phoenix, these dissidents’ eventual integration into local civic life revealed that white-ethnic immigrants could assimilate within the broader tapestry of protestant religious communities in the West Valley.\(^{215}\)

But even in the West Valley, racial minorities continued to reside at the periphery of social life. The few Black Americans who lived in the West Valley often worked alongside Mexican Americans as agricultural laborers who, as the largest ethnic minority in the labor force,

were found in both segregated ethnic settlements and integrated among other residents. Mexican-American businessmen achieved success in limited areas, but colored communities faced marginalization in economic ventures. Tom Kadamoto recalled how as a child he learned to speak Spanish before he learned English because of his interactions with Mexican migrant workers at his family’s farm. Disparate colored communities, while distinct in their identities, all experienced degrees of discrimination from Anglo communities. The West Valley offered colored residents, along with white immigrants from across the globe, economic opportunities deemed undesirable by Anglo majorities.

Figure 9 Workers in a Strawberry Field; Glendale, Arizona, 1933 May 1, courtesy of McCulloch Brothers Photographs, Herb and Dorothy McLaughlin Collection, Arizona State University Libraries.

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There were civic areas where members of different racial and ethnic communities would come together. Glendale high school was open to all students in the district, so local pupils met people from outside their immediate communities in the student body. Moreover, as ethnic communities grew in prosperity, their traditions took a more prominent place within communal space. *Fiestas Patrias*, held to mark Mexican Independence Day, became seminal events in West Valley civic life. The uneasy diversity that had come to typify the West Valley would be tested at civic sites where youth sports and performances forced members of different West Valley communities to share in the spoils of civic activity. These interactions increased commerce among white residents as, for example, athletes of different ethnic backgrounds could meet potential spousal partners at sporting events organized by local business-owners. Symbiotic

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relationships between ethnic communities flourished at civic events in public spaces during the Great Depression. These relationships deepened community interconnectedness in public life.

The collective diversity of West Valley debtors gave Anglo landowners incentives to practice racial segregation and social discrimination in a different fashion than in other parts of the Valley. The Anglo community ambivalently accepted the Chinese merchants and Japanese farmers who acquired West Valley properties. Within these colored communities, life revolved around land development—for example, the Japanese residents pooled the profits of their labor on corporate farms to acquire land for the Japanese Association. While many Anglos resented the collective success of the Japanese community, others sought to include these successful farmers in local civic organizations. Anglos treated anti-Japanese racism like a personal decision to be navigated via social discrimination. During her oral history interviews, Spitalny remembered that a West Valley Women’s Club had closed itself to new membership after it rejected the application of several women from Japanese farming families. She recalled:

There were some lovely, highly educated Japanese families out there and they were proposed for membership in the Woman’s Club and there was a big fight and we were at a Farm Bureau meeting … and one woman sat and said, well, she didn’t mind the Japanese women, but she didn’t think—they did have dinners, and she didn’t think she could eat with the Japanese men. Well, while she was doing that, her husband had his false teeth out on the table cleaning them—laid them—I’ve lost my train of thought.219

Spitalny would continue, “oh, so we felt that the Womans [sic] Club should be—should maintain its character as it was; it was enjoyed as it was; it was useful; and it was certainly entertaining for the members, and we decided we would organize a PTA [and include the Japanese women].”220

219 Spitalny, August 18, 1978, 6-7.
220 Ibid.
Figure 11 Workers in a Strawberry Field; Location Unknown, 1934 April 18, courtesy of McCulloch Brothers Photographs, Herb and Dorothy McLaughlin Collection, Arizona State University Libraries.
Figure 12 Japanese Workers in a Strawberry Field; Location Unknown, 1934 April 18, courtesy of McCulloch Brothers Photographs, Herb and Dorothy McLaughlin Collection, Arizona State University Libraries.

Civic life in the West Valley stood in alignment with the racially-exclusionary practices that typified the rest of Maricopa County; however, economic distress encouraged spatial integration and, more than anywhere else, the West Valley fostered a civic milieu that accommodated marginalized communities. The spatial fluidity of this environment reflects the relationship between debt and color.

The Life and Times of John F. Long

It is this unstable—and racially integrated—economic environment that the humble birth of John Frederick Long occurred in 1920. Before he became the largest homebuilder in Arizona, Long was born to German immigrants who had relocated to Phoenix for opportunities unavailable in Germany. He and his family experienced the typical blessings and curses that accompanied life in the West Valley. Long recalled that his father relocated to help improve his health while his mother worked as a housekeeper. Long’s parents had connected through the close-knit
community of German farmers who had made the West Valley their home. In fact, despite his
birth on Arizonan soil, German, rather than English, was Long’s first language. Long’s father
managed a grocery store he had inherited from an older family member until his death from a
stroke in 1922. After losing the family business, Long’s mother then moved to the West Valley
town of Peoria to work as a housekeeper for prominent German ranchers until she remarried in
1925.221 Ethnic communities supported marginalized members who lost their fragile financial
footing in the debt-ridden West Valley.

Long quickly grew accustomed to a life of labor. While his stepfather travelled to seek
employment opportunities in the construction industry, at the age of eight Long acquired a job
hawking newspapers in downtown Phoenix. Despite wages so low that he could not afford to ride
public transit in the city, Long achieved a measure of economic self-sufficiency by the time he
was ten years old. As the Great Depression worsened, Long and his family moved to a West
Valley farm where he purchased a cow with one hundred dollars in savings. While the family
lacked modern amenities like electricity, the farm offered an opportunity for economic
independence. As he remembers, “later, when the Depression really hit Arizona, I think it was in
1932 that I sold the cow for $20, so I lost $80. I never forgot that, one of my uncles said, that I
was young and that I would have an opportunity to earn it back and that...he probably wouldn’t be
able to regain what he had lost.”222 Long would eventually benefit from his work ethic despite his
darkened youth; not all of his peers were as privileged.

Long would later describe the poverty that accompanied the Depression as “something
that you lived with,” but that extended period of economic contraction destabilized patterns of
social integration that had accompanied life in the West Valley as Unemployed Mexican-
American miners flooded into the West Valley looking for work in local agricultural fields.

Additionally, while White nationalists had long pursued anti-Japanese policies, terrorism accompanied the traditional legal oppression in the mid-thirties. White supremacists attacked Japanese farmers and their properties. They sought to remove Japanese farmers who had escaped previous laws designed to drive them from the land. Kadamoto blamed “Okies” who sought to claim Japanese farms for their own, but regardless of where these outside agents had originated, they made life appreciably more difficult for Japanese-Americans.\(^{223}\) Racial tensions heightened in West Valley communities during the Depression years.

State suppression of minority groups would heighten in World War II. In Glendale, until after the conclusion of the war efforts, state authorities prohibited the *Fiesta Patrias*. In South Phoenix, police officers used military-grade weapons to destroy properties of residents that they suspected abetted fugitive Black soldiers.\(^{224}\) And after the attack on Pearl Harbor, all Japanese-Americans living south of the US-60—including many in the West Valley—were forcibly relocated to internment camps; moreover, the state imposed legal restrictions on the sale of goods to Japanese-Americans. As Kadamoto recalled:

I came back on furlough one time, and just before I came back or a few months before, they... enacted a law where by its illegal to sell anything to Japanese, other than food or medicine, or clothing. So, when I came back on a furlough, I went to a small grocery store and I asked a lady to give me some gasoline, and she was... "I'm not supposed to sell to the Japanese" ... she was shaking ... I feel sorry for her now, but I told her, "Look, I'm wearing a uniform, going overseas, I'm on a furlough, I want gasoline, put it in." She said, "I'm not supposed to sell it, and I might get fined, and this and that, but she filled it anyway...poor lady. Because there were incidents just before that or after that, where they got fined a thousand dollars or so for selling gasoline.\(^{225}\)

\(^{223}\) Dean Smith and Paula Ilardo, *Glendale: Century of Diversity*, 75; Thomas Kadamoto, December 5, 1975, 6-8.


\(^{225}\) Thomas Kadamoto, December 5, 1975, 7.
The economic insecurity of the Great Depression and the exigencies of war-time encouraged an outpouring of social discrimination among the Anglo community; in turn, racial segregation sprouted in communities where it had previously been difficult to take root.

This intensified segregation more clearly demarcated opportunities available for white ethnic communities of the West Valley. Before the war broke out, Long left Arizona and travelled the West looking for work. He had not considered college an option, but fortunately, the poor grades he received at eight different public schools were no impediment to earning higher wages as a construction worker in San Diego than as an agricultural laborer in Phoenix. Next, Long migrated to Denver in pursuit of additional construction opportunities but suffered an unfortunate appendix attack soon after arrival. Once he recovered and the hospital discharged him, Long relocated to Salt Lake City to work at a munitions plant, but instead the Army drafted him into the field artillery. He would transfer into the air corps and serve as an airplane mechanic during the invasion of Italy. When asked about his wartime experience, he stated, “I’d just as soon not talk about it.” However, he and his siblings would survive the war and return to the West Valley to pursue farming life. When he returned to wed Mary Tolmachoff, a daughter of Molokan immigrants, he found that “most of the farmland had been leased by large vegetable owners,” and he had to occupy his time with wage labor to provide for his family. But in the meanwhile, Long and his wife took out a GI loan to build a home. Although it took them six months to finish it, a buyer offered them more than double what their home had cost to build upon completion—they sold that property for four thousand and five hundred dollars in profit and entered the homebuilding business shortly thereafter. Long would be at the forefront of the suburban

226 John F. Long, August 29, 2000, 4-10.


revolution in the economic vacuum of the post-war West Valley—a revolution established by the racial privileges white immigrants had acquired during the Great Depression and World War II.

The Origins of Sunbelt Capitalism

Virtually nobody predicted how quickly the housing industry would transform the West Valley. While real estate development had always been part of the local economy, most builders were still small operators at the end of the war. Long could afford to hire labor after he built his first house; he picked up his pace of production and built a dozen homes between 1947 and 1949. His previous experience in construction aided his efforts at accelerating production methods; soon, he could complete a home in 30 days. This experience would prove foundational to the rest of his career. Long recalled: “it was a real learning experience. That was the advantage we had at that time of doing all the work, buying materials and that gave me an advantage as we moved along of knowing what materials cost and how much time it took to do a certain job.”

Long quickly developed a profile in the local construction industry. While he had built his first home from frame stucco, he built his later homes with block produced by a local firm. Long remembered that:

At that time I met, Coach Thomas, who started SuperLite Block. And Coach used to be coach at Creighton Elementary school. And we played, when I went to Osborn School, we played against them. And that was where I met originally. And then, when, I started building, I don’t remember exactly how we got back together but, I tried out his blocks and from then on, I used their block.

He leveraged his personal relationships with local leaders in the construction industry to ensure access to necessary supplies.

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Long soon moved into developing subdivisions using the traditional methods of real estate speculation in the Valley. As he remembered, “I made a deal with a fellow that owned the land, and he put in the streets. And then I bought the lots from him and paid for him as we closed escrow.” Long sold all thirty-two homes in Glenwood Terrace by himself; he started another subdivision of ninety upscale properties soon after, but with the advent of the Korean War, he had to negotiate unexpected hikes in supply prices that bankrupted many of his competitors. An even larger community of 180 homes in three subdivisions followed this. Long stated:

I finished there just as the Korean War ended and FHA had a special program. During the Korean War financing was much more difficult, and more expensive, or a higher down payment I should say required. Then when the Korean War ended, FHA relaxed their terms and, as I remember, if the home sold for $7,000 or less, then you could sell if for 10 percent down [payment]. That was FHA. No down [payment] VA. But, then I bought, a 40-acre parcel and had a three bedroom, bath and a half home for $7,000. And they sold like hotcakes.

Long was rapidly becoming one of the most successful builders in the Valley; he would soon become one of the largest builders in the nation. The value homeowners gained from his properties reflected the equity civic activists acquired from participation in civic life—rapid growth made early investments, no matter how small, lucrative in the long run.

Even once he had proven himself capable of managing large-scale development, Long remained limited by the traditional methods of development finance in Phoenix. His economic ascension possible through his ability to access local finance in ways marginalized investors could not. As he recalled in an oral history interview:

Well, at that time the banks and title companies and so forth were all privately owned, like the Valley [National] Bank was Bimsons, Western Savings was the Driggs family. First Federal was the Rice family. And it was much easier to deal with local people rather than as it is today. Most of our—well, banks and title companies and the larger businesses are all – the main office is somewhere else other than Phoenix. So, I think that it was a tremendous help in being able to deal directly with the local people. I remember…asking Valley bank for a loan on the first subdivision. And my request went before their loan committee and anyway, my financial statement certainly didn’t justify the kind of a loan...
that I was asking for. Walter Bimson made the comment, and I was told this later, that my financial statement didn’t warrant that kind of a loan but he thought I had definitely had something on the ball and so they went ahead with the loan. 233

Long, with other local actors in the construction industry, had toiled the dry desert landscape for decades hoping to scratch out some means of survival. The war permanently altered patterns of human migration and capital investment in the United States. A community that had long been a cultural backwater for the rich and a site of last resort for the sick lay directly in the path of military-industrial investment. Anglo landowners had been waiting for a moment like this—so that they could cash in. Those who had been in Arizona the longest, or at least had the rights to long-tenured land, would be the ones who to profit most from coming transformations.

Conclusion

Capital investments of the post-war period radically altered the West. The community Long would develop was unrecognizable from the one that he had inherited. The spatial landscape of Phoenix would change as land formerly designated for agricultural uses would transition to suburban development. The political landscape would also change as the Republican Party gained ascendance over the Democratic Party at every level of governance. However, Sunbelt Capitalism would ensure that these changes occurred in a fashion that benefited initial investors—even if it increased risk to those who assumed future liabilities. This ensured that access to capital, including the immaterial property of whiteness, would remain central to future development—keeping the West Valley at a perpetual disadvantage. As we will see, suburban residents who purchased West Valley homes from Long would happily surrender political autonomy for political proximity to Anglo capital in Phoenix. Their hopes that annexation could blanche debts that tinted the West Valley would prove shortsighted as, in the end, a quasi-colonial relationship would remain between the affluent metropole and indebted periphery.

Identity Politics: Charter Government and the Civil Supremacy of Whiteness in Maryvale

Introduction

The collective experience of World War II had demonstrated to civic elites that Phoenix, if appropriately developed, could become a site for stupendous economic growth. The sudden demand for real estate during wartime encouraged speculators to agitate for increased housing production. Local investors divined that suburbanization could prove more lucrative than agricultural development. However, civic elites faced a lack of municipal control over suburban development. Phoenix was smaller in landmass than similarly populated American cities. Additionally, less than half of the metropolitan population in Maricopa County lived within the city. Phoenix had become a white speck of Anglo capital surrounded by agricultural fields of colored labor and indebted property. Civic elites continued to see their desire to turn the metropolitan landscape into a suburban play scape for white-collar Anglos as the key to both social and economic progress. But to do so, civic elites would need to convince communities marginalized within their contemporary economy to offer democratic consent to development.

Phoenix has long touted itself as a tolerant city devoid of the ethnic tensions that have colored older American cities. However, a more nuanced description of ethnic relations will recognize that metropolitan development has spatially segregated residents in accordance to their ability to access Anglo capital. A multitude of ways manifested an “ability” to access Anglo capital; but fundamentally, access reflected assimilability to Anglo cultural norms imported to the area from more developed regions of the United States. Nowhere is this fact displayed more

prominently than in local political culture—where midwestern policies and southern practices intertwined to moderate situations where electoral democracy challenged Anglo control over community development. In the fifties, civic elites were finally able to compel residents on the metropolitan periphery into abdicating political autonomy to afford access to Anglo capital possessed by the city. This group of civic elites, which would come to be known as the Charter class, would maintain political supremacy in Phoenix through an identity politics that minimized class struggle in favor of cultural hegemony. The political fortunes of the Charter class would reflect the faith that the Anglo community of Maryvale had in its leadership.

The Civil Supremacy of Whiteness

An acceptance of “different shades of whiteness” in civic life helped ensure Anglo hegemony over local economic development. This strategy shielded Anglo capital from claims by indigenous communities and racial minorities seeking economic opportunities. For example, among subaltern racial groups, municipal officials reported that Black Americans had the toughest time acquiring either public or private employment. The Phoenix police department designated “White” or “Negro” when seeking new officers well into the 1950s and, despite passing a non-discrimination ordinance for municipal hires, most Black and Mexican-Americans employed by the city worked in menial laborers. Colored individuals, when in a position of authority, were placed in charge of facilities operated for colored communities, and colored professionals on municipal staffs were still accountable to goals set by Anglo management. Colored advocates risked their livelihoods to advocate for municipal hiring practices that ameliorated collective inequality as private employment offered even fewer opportunities for

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Anglo hegemony encouraged individuals to blanch their civic identities to obtain the greatest degree of access to Anglo capital. 

Spatial location represented social distance. While only a handful of Black homebuyers could purchase properties north of the US-60 after World War II, there were successful suburban developments produced for black families in South Phoenix. Alton Thomas, a local Black author, found that a new housing alternative for black families emerged in the formerly segregated communities in West Phoenix. He found that:

The first Negro to move west experienced considerable hostility with garbage being dropped in his back yard every night, and with some physical threats and also the general procedure of a neighborhood petition. The second Negro family experienced only coldness. The third Negro family was threatened with a petition but the originator of the petition—a Texan—dropped the whole idea when he discovered what wonderful neighbors they were. From this point on the west side of Phoenix, roughly from 18th Avenue to 25th Avenue, became well integrated.²³⁷

Black families were still limited in where they could acquire housing, but white vigilantes did not have the support to expel colored property-owners from West Valley neighborhoods after the end of World War II.

In fact, Anglos grew to appreciate the potential for economic development in de-segregated suburban housing. The Phoenix Urban League had influenced businesses to reassess how their policies impacted housing access, and thus, “Negroes have selected homes in scattered areas of the City; there have been light to moderate reactions; the reactions have died down, and Negroes have been accepted into their neighborhoods.”²³⁸ Still, Anglo realtors continued to steer Black homebuyers toward Black real estate agents and Black homebuyers who sought properties in Anglo neighborhoods often bought homes directly from property owners.

²³⁶ Sam Mardian, “Letter to the Commission on Civil Rights,” February 2, 1962, MS 9, Box 1, File 6, Phoenix City Records, Arizona Historical Society-Tempe, 4.
²³⁷ Sam Mardian, “Letter to the Commission on Civil Rights,” February 2, 1962, 3-4
²³⁸ Ibid.
The "black tax" imposed on these prospective homebuyers could add thousands to the net profit of a sale. Even as this type of "soft exclusion" brightened prospects for housing integration, financial limitations would prevent wholesale community transformation as many Black Phoenicians could not "afford the down payment or monthly payment" in most suburban neighborhoods. However, real estate professionals concluded that "the more expensive the house purchased...the less likelihood there is trouble from the neighbors."239

Other racial minorities experienced even less housing discrimination as civic support for housing segregation diminished as Anglo elites began to manage racial integration through the "soft exclusion" of less affluent colored homebuyers.240 In this sense, civic elites spatially regulated the placement of colored communities. For example, despite a non-discrimination ordinance for tenant placement in local municipal housing, there were still municipal housing complexes that exclusively housed Black Americans. Additionally, racial integration of affluent Black American coincided with the continued isolation of Black Americans in civic life as civic culture reinforced social stigmas that justified social distance. In another case, local hospitals, the largest engines of civic activity in the Valley, denied Black patients beds until the middle of World

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239 Junius E. Driggs, Chairman of the Phoenix Human Relations Commission, Hearing Before Committee on Housing and Education Minutes, October 24, 1963, MS 9, Phoenix City Records, Box 3, Folder 19, Arizona Historical Society-Tempe, 1-2.

War II.\textsuperscript{241} Civic elites supported integration once they realized potential profits from desegregated development would outpace potential displeasure from Anglo residents—especially when integration occurred in marginalized areas like the West Valley. For colored communities, the tax that "soft exclusion" imposed on property acquisition was lower in the West Valley than anywhere in Maricopa County.

Civic leaders made sure that policy decisions regarding racial integration in public education would not antagonize Anglo sensibilities. In Phoenix, spatial segregation among residents made it possible for many elementary school districts to avoid discussion on racial integration while Phoenix Union High School District (PUHSD) remained racially segregated until 1953. After 1953, PUHSD officials had to determine new strategies to accommodate racial integration among incoming students accustomed to social segregation. John Armer, a former PUHSD board member, recalled dynamics that decided the praxis of racial integration followed at South Mountain High School:

"Well, South Phoenix, the east side of it, is practically all colored. The west side is pretty much divided between the three; the colored, the Mexican and the white.\textsuperscript{242} We were looking at the center of the student population was, oh, somewhere around 16th or 20th street—in that area. If we had gone in there where we thought we ought to build a school, then it’d have been all black and, then if we’d gone on the west side and built a school so we—to keep the image—and South Mountain has always been a good school We decided to expand that beyond the 2500 student population we were working at tin those days. And, so we expanded that, and then some of the youngsters, quite a few of them go up to East High, and quite a few of them go into Carl Hayden. So, I don’t know—


\textsuperscript{242} In this quote, Armer uses “colored” exclusively to describe black Americans and “white” to describe Anglos.
they’ve never build another high school down there, maybe they’ll—I don’t know what the growth is, but it’s no doubt they’re needing ‘em down there now.”

In the 1950s, civic leaders understood that legal desegregation needed to accommodate preexisting spatial relationships, white vigilantes more likely to be torpedoed by white vigilantes. This accommodation came at a high social cost to colored students. Indeed, Black students remained far more I racially segregation in South Phoenix than at West Valley schools. Civil rights leaders remained concerned that students attending “wholly colored grammar school[s]” were detrimentally impacted by their transition to racially integrated high schools; as late as 1963, 80 percent of Black American students dropped out of Phoenix Union schools before graduation. South Mountain, with over 2,500 students, only had twenty-one black graduates in its class of 1962. Municipal officials organized a multi-racial coalition of civil rights activists to help marginalized Black students find local employment, but policy disagreements among different racial communities soured civic elites on racial inclusion in civic activism. For Anglo elites, racial isolation in the wake of racial integration remained a more practical resolution. As an example, after school desegregation, Phoenix Elementary School District dispersed Black teachers throughout the district so that there would be at least two Black teachers at each school. While “no incidents occurred,” this praxis minimized the capacity of Black faculty to reclaim public resources for civic activities. Racial integration abetted Anglo hegemony over civic resources.

However, Anglo hegemony did not lead to Anglo harmony. Competing factions with the Anglo community continued to fight over control of metropolitan services—especially in matters

243 Armer, April 30, 1976, 9. PUHSD did not build a second high school south of the Salt River until the turn of the 21st century.

244 Junius E. Driggs, Hearing Before Committee on Housing and Education Minutes, October 24, 1963, 3.

245 Armer, April 30, 1976, 10-11.

that pertained to political spoils. Kickbacks highlighted the perks political life offered to municipal officials who ignored vice within city limits. Harry Rosenzweig, who eventually became leader of the Arizona Republican Party, recalled that, before World War II, city commissioners accepted bribes from madams who, “would be arrested once a month…and they just automatically went down and paid the fine, only the fines went in a bag, and every month the council cut it up.”  

Political disagreements among municipal officials rarely were predicated upon policy concerns; instead, they had more to do with collecting illicit revenues from unregulated vice industries.

Provisions proposed by the wartime military would create new incentives for change among civic leaders. In November 1942, after a nasty firefight between black troops, military police, and local law enforcement enveloped South Phoenix, the armed forces declared Phoenix off-limits for troops unless elected officials agreed to “follow implicitly” the civil orders of military brass—who argued that Phoenix needed to end prostitution as a fact of daily life. Civic elites had concerns that their business interests would suffer if soldiers were no longer allowed to enter town. When elected officials balked at the efforts necessary to make this happen, Frank Snell—who was also chairman of the local United Service Organizations (USO)—met with the chamber of commerce to devise a strategy that forced public officials to meet military demands.

In what would become known as the “Card Room Putsch,” the chamber-men successfully pushed for removal of the city clerk, city manager, and police chief to appease military leadership. Their political efforts helped open Phoenix back to military consumers in time to capture holiday spending. However, within a month after the “Putsch,” the city council had reinstated the officials they had removed. According to historian Philip VanderMeer, “the newly politicized chamber leaders were furious, viewing this as duplicity and a weakness on moral issues, and they

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248 Ibid.
determined to pursue larger political changes." Civic leaders had avoided municipal politics prior to this point; afterward, the business class would consolidate control under the Charter Government Committee.

Charter Class Warfare

The Charter Government Committee (Charter) sought to garner influence over municipal elections to ensure that professional business interests had more (as in all) control over electoral outcomes in local governance. Charter began after World War II as a private organization of lawyers and businessmen who, after being fed up with years of alleged "corruption and inefficiency," endorsed a bi-partisan slate of civic elites to govern the city in the way Charter class deemed best. Its candidates promised to run a clean ship, keep tax rates low, and limit government expenditures—three key aspects that Charter believed would sustain the phenomenal growth of post-war Phoenix. Charter selected virtually every single councilmember who served on the Phoenix city council from 1950 until it disbanded in 1977. This type of dominance occurred because Charter developed a political praxis that

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accommodated social justice while it maintained Anglo hegemony in civil life. Anglo elites sought to squelch political alternatives to their ambitions for a modern Anglo metropolis; Charter would give them complete control over municipal governance in Phoenix for a generation.

The primary reason for Charter’s success was its consistent support from the Pulliam Press. Eugene Pulliam, owner of the Arizona Republic and Phoenix Gazette, did more than anyone else in Phoenix to affect the outcome of public debates. Pulliam’s “monopolistic” control over local newspapers gave him the ability to help influence local elections—even though he remained registered to vote in Indiana. His views aligned with those of the business and professional leadership class; his newspapers often presented news in a fashion that championed the positions of the business and professional leadership class while ignoring or deriding the opposition. Pulliam aggressively controlled the flow of information in the area. In 1943, when the editor of the Arizona Labor Journal asked the editor at the Arizona Republic why it had exclusive rights to liberal syndicated columns if the Republic had no intention of running them, the response was “so that you can’t use them.” Pulliam virtually had more power over public perception than the rest of the Charter class; in fact, many Charter proposals stood no chance of success without support from the newspapers. But of course, Pulliam generally gave his whole-hearted support to the political conservatives that comprised Charter government, And


254 Ibid.

255 Ibid.


the Republic and the Gazette gave their resolute support to the “dependable men and women” of the first Charter slate. The local government and local media became intimately connected in Phoenix under Charter government.

Charter allowed Anglo elites to entomb their civic aspirations within the corpus of municipal governance under the guise of democratic consent. There was no form of public oversight that governed the actions of a private civic organization. A series of investigative reporters found that compared to the Phoenician work force, the fields of finance, construction, and law over-represented Charter members. Moreover, while there had been nascent attempts to get in office councilmen more representative of the business class, the decidedly white-collar composition of Charter stood in shocking contrast to the traditional composition of local politicians. In its inaugural slate of city council candidates, Charter endorsed a department store owner, a lawyer, a bottling company owner, a jewelry store owner, and a life insurance salesman, while the men on the slate who opposed them labored as a used car dealer, a refrigerator

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salesman, a paint store owner, a member of the plumbers’ union, a former railroad conductor, and a body shop owner. Charter had nominated a labor representative, but allegedly, he withdrew from the slate after “being pressured by other labor leaders.” To replace the labor representative, Charter nominated future senator and Presidential nominee Barry Goldwater to his first elected public position. “Mr. Conservative” led municipal officials to act as though what was in the best interest of the Charter members was in the best interest of all Phoenicians—even those from communities that lacked representation in Charter.

Anglo women helped Charter make quality of life a central component of its agenda. On economic issues, opponents argued that Charter represented “big business” and that Phoenix was “being ruled and dictated to by people from the Country Club.” These criticisms were completely accurate, as the core leaders of Charter were descended from, or professionally employed by, the Anglo pioneers who had comprised the “Old City Elite.” However, Charter’s inclusion of clubwomen on its political slates helped shift the focus of public discourse from the class warfare argued by its opponents toward social inclusion of marginalized communities. Margaret Kober, the first Anglo woman elected to serve on the Phoenix city council, was nominated because of her extensive civic service in the Junior League and on the medical auxiliaries at local hospitals. Kober’s nomination initially shocked her, but she learned that it did not “take qualifications” to serve on the city council: “All it [took was] good common sense and a


willingness to do your homework...and try to make an honest decision." Inaccurate claims that Charter had eliminated vice activities that plagued the city during World War II were roundly accepted due, in no small part, to the moral capital that accompanied clubwomen. As Kober remembers, upon taking office, her fellow councilmen told members of the Phoenix police department:

"Look...you're good men. Enforce the law. This is what we expect of you. Nobody's going to tell—none of us is gonna tell you what to do. You're working for your chief of police. The chief of police has been told by us that he's to enforce the law and this is what we expect.' And we never had one bit of trouble. They cracked down on everything...and then they weren't getting slipped something to be crooked, you see. So, we've had darn good city government.... Sure there's—there'll always be some prostitution, I suppose. It's the oldest profession in the world, isn't it, they claim. But most if it was run out of the city limits, believe me, then, while we were—while we were in office." 

So, while prostitution continued to occur outside of municipal boundaries, under the protective guise of Charter government, Kober could confidently tell other clubwomen that she had helped eliminate vice within the city.

The shoddy salary of municipal governance (councilmembers were paid three thousand dollars for their activities) made clubwomen like Kober even more valuable to Charter—they could do the same political labor of an employed professional or a business owner without sacrificing energies primarily directed toward private economic development. Civic elites recognized, as Jacobson argued, that extensive cooperation was necessary to maintain local control over the natural resources private investors exploited to spur economic development. In the early days, Anglo pioneers had been unable to build more extensive developments because "there wasn't very much water" for early pioneers to share. Moreover, Arizonans lacked the technological

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265 Mrs. Leslie Kober, June 18, 1976, 10-11.

266 Mrs. Leslie Kober, June 18, 1976, 13.
prowess in well digging, the legal right to Colorado River water, and the legal structure necessary to develop a major metropolitan area. “These people had just come out here. Most of them had lived here when it was a territory. There was no influx of people from the Midwest or East, that had not yet arrived. No building boom. The people who here were, in fact, really pioneers.” The political “homogeneity” of Charter stemmed from its staunch support among Anglo pioneer families; their collective consciousness made sure that the Charter candidates would “instinctively make the decisions which would be right for the group.” Clubwomen helped augment the potential labor pool upon which civic elites could call to undertake political conflict. Jacobson recalled after World War II:

The issues of the day were how to make the city grow. The issues of the day had to do with the train limit law, should the size of trains be limited so that more people could be employed to run the trains; labor issues.... The issues of the day were farming issues and rights to water.

Charter would not have been able to redirect political discourse away from the frontier and toward concerns of metropolitan development without the assistance of unheralded clubwomen.

In many ways, the Charter class realized that it would take a political revolution to leave behind the penury of its pioneer history and move Phoenix into the major metropolitan competition. However, the revolution these elites sought required the reversal of political relations normalized during the New Deal. The Republican Party broke two consecutive decades of


Democratic governors in 1950 when political stalwart Ana Frohmiller lost the governor’s race to Howard Pyle. As Jacobson remembered, “the state was almost totally Democratic, there were no Republicans,” and the political opportunities that the Republican Party could offer intrigued local elites. Civic elites sought to neutralize the Democratic Party, who they argued labor and rural interests had captured, to create a political climate that could attract businesses that would help drive economic growth. The shallow inclusiveness of Charter helped mobilize suburban warriors to assist Anglo elites in garnering political capital through their efforts to pass reforms.

In the name of bipartisanship, Charter sought to create a political climate that could include a broad range of civic participants. Kober recalled the lengths her colleagues went to make her feel as part of their community:

The boys were darling to me. They really were. The first meeting I walked into the mayor’s office (that’s where we used to gather before we went to the formal meeting) the boys were all sitting around and Barry [Goldwater] was sitting with his feet up on the desk. And all of the boys stood up. Barry didn’t stand up. And he said, ‘Look,’ to the guys, ‘that’s the last time you stand up when Maggie [Kober] enters the room. Now, she’s one of us and we’re gonna treat her as one of us.’ And I loved that because that’s the way I wanted to be treated, you see.

Her inclusion reveals the implicit assumption of social equality predicated upon the fraternal brotherhood that has long defined Anglo civic culture.

Moreover, civil equality did not negate social relationships. Kober would go on to claim that the following conversation with Goldwater convinced her to run:

“Barry always called me Maggie. We were dear, dear friends. But—and he’s the one who talked me into serving on the council. He came over one evening and talked to us, and I wanted him to talk to [my husband] Les and me, and then I had Les leave the room

269 Ibid.


271 Mrs. Kober, June 18, 1976, 14.
and—I don’t know whether this needs to go down here or not, but—and I said to Barry, ‘Okay. Les says that it’s all right with him, but this is what I want you to tell me: What will it do to Les? Because,’ I said, ‘I think the meanest that a woman can do to a man she loves is to be in the limelight and overshadow him, and when you’re an elected official you can’t help but be.’ And I said, ‘This is something that I do not want to happen under any circumstances.’ And Barry assured me that Les had been here long enough … and was well-enough known and well-enough established, and Les has been chief of medicine at most of the hospitals at some time in his life, that he—Barry felt that it couldn’t hurt him at all, and that was the convincing that he had to do.”

Kober had to ensure that her participation in political life would not impact the social standing of her family before agreeing to run for municipal office. The clubwomen’s social conservatism outside of politics upheld the social capital that they brought to Charter.

Charter included those who had established roles within the broader terrain of the local civil landscape. Once in power, Charter sought to reduce the political participation of marginalized people. City boosters wanted to promote an image of “clean environment, healthful living, progressive government, and prosperity” to make the city more attractive to new investors seeking to attract “the desired personnel.” They argued that people who came to Phoenix did not want the issues of the eastern United States to follow them to their suburban oasis. Since Anglo capital investment determined economic growth, municipal officials should promote Anglo migration to the Valley. Boosters hoped that wealthy tourists, attracted to the “ultra-suburban, don’t-tread-on-me” culture developed by the Anglo elites, would invest in Phoenix so that they could access the local “laid-back lifestyle” at their leisure. Those who challenged cultural norms were marginalized in political life.

Political consensus required elected officials to share a similar perspective on best practices for municipal governance. Boosters defended the more exclusionary aspects of Charter

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272 Mrs. Kober, June 18, 1976, 15.

273 Collins, The Emerging Metropolis, 334; Luckingham, Phoenix, 155.

274 Luckingham, Phoenix, 191.

275 Luckingham, Phoenix, 191.
on the basis that they had exhausted all other options to fairly determine political representation. Civic elites claimed that they merely sought to find qualified candidates for election, as Kober argued and that there was no alternative to the undemocratic Charter system:

"I don’t know any better way of selecting a slate than we do it. And if you or anybody else can come up with a better way, I wish you’d tell us because we don’t like the criticism we get every year. We don’t like the fact that we’re criticized and you know we are unmercifully, that a little group of people get in a closed room … and select a handful of people and they put them up. But I don’t know any better way. We solicit suggestions for names from the public—we—through the press, through the radio, through word of mouth …. It’s not always easy to find somebody that lives in all these geographical sections."{276}

Still, spatial segregation made it difficult to claim that social elites fairly represented the entire city, as those deemed acceptable as political representatives could only be found in certain neighborhoods across town. To increase geographical representation, Charter endorsed its first Mexican-American candidate, Adam Diaz, in 1953, and soon followed with a Chinese-American candidate. Incidentally, it was not until 1965 that Charter endorsed Morrison Warren as its first Black council-member.{277} Nevertheless, gross spatial inequalities persisted. At one point, seven councilmembers nominated by Charter lived in just two wealthy census tracts in northern Phoenix, which accounted for .8% of the entire city population.{278} Policies that may have benefited less affluent citizens, such as federally-subsidized housing and improved public transit, lacked support amongst council-members largely because candidates whose perspectives did not align with Charter had no chance to win office.{279} This self-perpetuating loop of social homogeneity and spatial proximity left Charter completely unresponsive to the concerns of most

{276} Mrs. Kober, June 18, 1976, 16-17.
{277} Collins, The Emerging Metropolis, 63, 67.
{279} Collins, The Emerging Metropolis, 59.
citizens. Consensus politics allowed civic elites to present an image of Phoenix to tourists that did not fairly represent the local experience.

In this way, Anglo supremacy in Phoenix was predicated on the marginalization of racially integrated neighborhoods within the broader metropolitan community. Charter, as Kober concluded, “ought to be as representative as [it] can, but I don’t believe in going down to a geographical area and just picking out somebody just because that’s where they live. I think you’ve got to pick qualified people. That’s the most important thing.” Kober and her fellow civic participants paused at politics that would have damaged the brand of Phoenix. All her civic activism, even when done in the name of environmental preservation, had helped improve local amenities that had been available for civic use. While access to these amenities would continue to be filtered through the screen of “soft exclusion,” public ownership of these sites would be controlled by civic elites who cycled on and off the city council every couple of years. While some colored residents familiar to the Charter class would have the opportunity to represent spatially marginalized communities in Phoenix, all elected officials had been ingratiated into the civic culture established by Anglo elites.

Taking Stock of Public Debt

The electoral success of Charter gave civic elites public authority to transform Phoenix into an Anglo metropolis. Their vision of what this metropolis would look like, unsurprisingly, stood to financially enrich the “Old City Elites” who patronized local civic life. They sought control of public infrastructure to further their ability to profit from economic development. As explored by Andrew Needham, investment in utilities provided regional elites with an incentive to accelerate development along the suburban fringe. Edward O’Malley recalled the excitement he and other

280 Mrs. Kober, June 18, 1976, 17.

281 Mrs. Kober, June 18, 1976, 21-22.
prominent Phoenicians, led by Frank Snell, felt as they purchased majority control of the Central Arizona Light and Power Company (CALAPCO). They soon hand-selected a new board of directors to ensure local control over power production. CALAPCO, which would eventually become Arizona Public Services (APS), was soon monopolizing energy provision across wide swaths of the state.

Phoenix radiated from the civic energy APS unleashed upon the metropolis. Energy investors in the Charter cartel were protected from financial loss within the local economy after acquiring majority control over energy utilities. However, to perfect their hustle, they would have to operate business in a fashion to which would cut against everything these traditional investors had originally been accustomed. O’Malley found: “the thing that impressed me most on it was the very fact that it was a different type of business than I was used to. It was a business that had to—to—live off of debt.” Power production made sense to local elites once they learned how to stretch their “leverage” with bondholders. According to O’Malley, “they stretch their debt as far as they can because it—it’s their leverage in being able to make money in the power business.”

Many of the Phoenician energy investors were also invested in local resource extraction or land development—sectors that would see increased economic activity with increased energy consumption. Moreover, suburban development stood to protect investment in energy utilities, for additional energy consumers meant additional leverage for the company. Regional elites were fully invested in suburban production.

Charter also learned to use public debt as leverage to develop infrastructure for Anglo cultural practices. This infrastructure actualized the municipal image presented by city boosters to

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283 Ibid.

284 Ibid.
Anglo tourists and migrants at the cost of opportunities to invest public resources in racially integrated neighborhoods in older sections of Phoenix. For example, in 1950 the city council voted to have all city taxpayers pay for water infrastructure improvements—not just the newly annexed areas where the improvements were required. Three years later, the city council forced South Phoenix property owners to pay for a truck route built in the community over objections from local property-owners. In 1958, the city council placed a referendum on the ballot to reverse a voter-approved pay increase for the city firemen to assure soon-to-be annexed business and homeowners that their property taxes would remain stable and low. Charter was willing to spend more on infrastructure in new, affluent neighborhoods than the older ones. Not only did; inner-city communities received a disproportionately small amount of the park funding, but the city council sought out federal grants to purchase large parks in suburban areas or to preserve scenic views in affluent communities. This bias toward the newer areas, particularly to the north and east of the city, benefited Charter government and the white-collar conservatives who migrated to Phoenix and helped transform the Valley into a suburban Anglo paradise.

This pattern of public investment was only possible if Anglo elites blocked representatives from marginalized communities from participating in decisions on how to utilize public debt. So, while Charter said that they sought input from qualified citizens, their practices actively limited opportunities for marginalized communities to participate in municipal governance. As Vice-

286 Ibid., 112.
287 Ibid., 98.
288 Ibid., 149.
Mayor, Barry Goldwater rejected a district-based electoral system in favor of at-large nominations, as he believed it would pit "class against class." Spatial representation would have ended Anglo supremacy in political life; more certainly, it would have limited Charter’s dominance of elected positions. The Charter class would have a far more difficult time maintaining political hegemony if socially marginalized communities within Phoenix achieved a modicum of political autonomy. Public debt was only acceptable to the Charter class when wielded by Charter members who stood to financially benefit from its use; in contrast, public debt would be derided when wielded in ways that weakened Anglo supremacy.

In many ways, the opposition of APS toward public utilities reflects similar dynamics. While APS soon came to dominate power production throughout the state, there remained public competition in parts of Maricopa County because of the Salt River Valley Water Users Association (SRVWUA). While the SRVWUA only competed with APS in electricity sales, as a quasi-public entity, it avoided taxation for all its services. Moreover, as a utility co-op, it disproved ideological dogmas about the inefficacy of collective ownership. It gave local property-owners an opportunity to own natural resources. But it provided an alternative to resources provided by the Charter class. While the SRVWUA made payments in lieu of taxes, the Arizona Corporation Commission also did not manage it, so it could set rates more independently than APS could. Regional elites would argue that private business would provide greater public benefit in taxation than the SRVWUA; in fact, some would go as far as to claim the SRVWUA was a burden on taxpayers. In many ways, the SRVWUA challenged the idea that local utilities operated better under private ownership.

290 Collins, The Emerging Metropolis, 62.

291 Ibid.
Figure 14. Service Area of the Salt River Power District, courtesy of Northern Arizona University, Cline Library, Colorado Plateau Archives.

But both public and private models of energy production would have ensured that Anglo investors would reap the potential profits of suburban development. Landholders who collectively borrowed federal monies against their land to build the Roosevelt Dam—the first federally water reclamation project of the 20th century—owned the SRVWUA. Moreover, the SRVWUA had limited the amount of power any individual property-owner could have in the organization by limiting the number of shares of land an investor could provide as collateral. Finally, unlike APS, the water and power produced by the SRVWUA could not be alienated from the land that had been used as collateral to develop its resources. Some in the Charter class worried that the federal government would collect “any surplus funds” created by the quasi-public SRVWUA; but instead, the Salt River Project reinvested its profits into its properties. The landowners, many of
whom were descendants of the original settlers, would encounter a financial windfall if suburban growth came fast enough. Suburbanization offered opportunities for land owners and investors.\footnote{John Armer, April 30, 1976, 12-14.}

The Metropolitan Fringe

The Charter class had successfully gained political supremacy within Phoenix; now, its goal was to consolidate its political influence across Maricopa County. While Charter had allies in county governance, the most effective means at their disposal would be the annexation of unincorporated communities into the city of Phoenix. In 1951, after city planners found that Phoenix was glaringly undercapitalized in comparison with competing cities, municipal officials argued that the annexation of unincorporated suburbs was the best way to spur economic development in metropolitan Phoenix. The city lacked the land mass associated with other cities that had 100,000 residents—for example, Corpus Christi, Texas, was slightly larger than Phoenix in both population and land mass—and, of all 157 metropolitan areas counted in the 1950 census, only five core cities housed a smaller percentage of the overall metropolitan population. At a shade under 50 percent of the overall metropolitan population, Phoenix fell twenty percentage points behind the average metropolitan core city. Many business and property owners in Phoenix had built homes outside of the city to evade costs associated with municipal life. Planning officials argued that these owners’ absence in “municipal affairs” hurt the entire metropolitan area: “since all residents of these areas are economically dependent upon Phoenix, the future of all of us may depend in part on our solution of the expansion problem.”\footnote{Planning Department for the Committee on City Expansion, “The Facts on City Expansion,” 2.} But annexation would not just help Phoenix—it was also in the political and economic interest of the Charter cartel. That is, except in the places where it was not.
The vast agricultural hinterland surrounding Phoenix abruptly ended at the Arizona Canal. North of this point, there was no available irrigation water—only raw desert. The area offered ownership alternatives for those not seeking agricultural or irrigated properties. Dell Trailor, a local builder, remembered, "we didn’t have utilities on raw desert. Until we got into the 60s, I never ever looked at a piece of land that wasn’t farmland. There were no utilities and it was too far on the periphery." Untamed desert served as a neo-colonial frontier after statehood.

Figure 15 Map of the Greater Phoenix Area, 1947, courtesy of Northern Arizona University, Cline Library, Urban Map Collection.

A colonial imagination lingered among public officials when envisioning uses for desert lands. On the one hand, unincorporated land was saddled with very little public debt since the county refused to raise taxes necessary to provide metropolitan services. On the other hand, the county completely disregarded planning and zoning norms, and county landowners could use their land as they saw fit. This land remained affordable enough for small investors to purchase—so civic participants bought it by the acre. Out here, beyond the pale of municipal governance, Anglo settlers could create whatever private landscape they had the capital to develop. But as metropolitan expansion began to alter the constructed environment, affluent desert dwellers realized the need for politically organization to prevent keep unwanted investment away.

Patrick Downey, the first mayor in the town of Paradise Valley, recalled his horror when he discovered plans to build a suburban subdivision across the street from his desert home:

I got in touch with Del [Trailor] and said, “I’d sure like to buy an acre [of the orange grove] next door to me.” He said, “No, I’m gonna subdivide that,” and his plans were—I think there was possibly forty acres and he was thinking of building sixty or eighty homes and a high-density thing and this upset me because I owned an acre and a quarter right next to the thing. And so … [my neighbor] Sid and I became quite upset about this and we started going to the zoning meetings, which were the county zoning at the time, and trying to prevent such a high-density building. Well, we were successful.295

Downey soon joined the Paradise Valley Homeowners Association, which he described as “a little organization that was designed to protect and to keep the area in the same low-density grouping of an acre-plus.” But, for those who resolutely sought separation from suburban masses, it soon became clear that only incorporation could keep subdividers out of Paradise Valley.

Downey helped lead an incorporation drive which won over residents whose longstanding resistance to incorporation stemmed from disdain for taxation:

The people there, oh, had a horrible fear of taxes, which they still have, and probably rightly so, and we develop a theory that we could operate a town successfully without a tax base at all; we could operate on a participation of the gas tax and sales tax from the

state. So, with that in mind, we probably conducted the most successful political campaign in which we really carried out our promises. We promised nothing and that’s exactly what they got … our whole campaign was, “We want to keep it the way it is and if you want to pave a road, that’s perfectly fine, you may go out and do it, but you pay for it yourself.”

Civic elites incorporated Paradise Valley to ensure that they could preserve properties that they did not want to make available for metropolitan development. However, residents made municipal boosters promise minimal governance before they would grant political authority to a city council. Political sovereignty operated differently in an Anglo paradise than in the Anglo metropolis.

Figure 16 New Subdivision on the Desert Near Phoenix Called Mountain Shadows, courtesy of Herb and Dorothy McLaughlin Collection, Arizona State University Libraries.

The incorporation of the Town of Paradise Valley could offer little solace to other residents on the metropolitan fringe seeking political autonomy from Phoenix. By the time

296 Downey, July 8, 1978, 14.
Paradise Valley was incorporated, Phoenix had ingested acre upon acre of formerly agricultural lands ripened for suburban development. Civic elites protected frontier properties from unwanted development through incorporation. The rest of the metropolitan landscape would anxiously await additional investment. Charter had to devise a strategy that showed how annexation would be in the best interest of unincorporated residents. Many county residents claimed that concerns about municipal taxation rates cooled their interest in annexation. Others were concerned that annexation would force residents to comply with undesirable municipal regulations. And some hoped to incorporate fringe communities to have a modicum of civil autonomy in political affairs. But all realized that the Charter could offer its community more benefits than county governance. So, when Phoenix offered city amenities in exchange for annexation, what officials also offered unincorporated residents was an opportunity to join in a rising metropolis. It proved difficult for Anglo residents in the multi-hued West Valley to decline a similar opportunity.

In 1950, Phoenix was less than twenty square miles. Its city limits stopped at the Grand Canal. Numerous fringe communities orbited Phoenix with little state support to maintain public health and safety. In 1951, the Phoenix planning department published a study, the "Fringe Report" about the metropolitan periphery to justify further annexation efforts "to the south and northwest" of the city limits. But in practice, these would be some of the last communities annexed into Phoenix, and for reasons noted in the "Fringe Report." The most desired annexations would occur to the northeast of Phoenix—home to the "intelligent leadership" of civic life. The rest of the metropolitan fringe would follow the lead of these affluent suburbs.

Physically, annexation would prove to be a seamless process in the Phoenix "metropolitan district." Almost all streets in Maricopa County had been platted in accordance with


298 Planning Department for the Committee on City Expansion, “The Facts on City Expansion,” 2.
territorial survey lines; arterial streets, with the distinct exception of Grand Avenue, perpendicularly intersect in cardinal directions every mile. North of the Salt River, at least where there are not mountains rising from the Valley floor, the terrain gradually slopes toward the southwest—creating ideal conditions for irrigation and real estate construction. Most of the industrial or wholesale infrastructure, which currently existed in Maricopa County, was concentrated along railroad lines immediately south and west of the city limits. Additionally, retail and commercial activity was available in both the central business district and along arterial roads that traversed the county.\(^{299}\) Sans natural barriers, the only barrier to annexation was democracy.

County governance had ill-prepared less affluent fringe communities for contemporary suburban development. While the preponderance of suburban residential development in the metropolitan periphery had occurred north of the city limits—which, by design, was exclusively inhabited by affluent Anglos—problematic living situations proliferated throughout fringe communities. Moderate income Anglo communities could be found near the rail and canal infrastructures to the east of Phoenix while Black and Mexican-American residents lived in integrated communities south of the city limits. Moreover, to the southwest, working-class whites lived in communities recently integrated by racial minorities.\(^{300}\) Community demography would help guide annexation targets for city officials.

Municipal officials found systemic shortcomings on the metropolitan periphery: “juvenile delinquents” ran amok due to a “lack of proper police protection and recreation facilities”; inadequate fire service allowed dangerous fires to damage multiple properties and raise insurance costs; the county had not inspected sanitary conditions in fringe communities; and, particularly in Black and Mexican-American neighborhoods, residential and commercial properties

\(^{299}\) Phoenix Planning Department, “A Fringe Area Study for the Phoenix Urban Area,” 1-17.  
\(^{300}\) Ibid.
abutted to the “destruction of excellent residential areas and property values.” Officials argued these concerns needed mitigation irrespective of annexation; however, they also felt certain that the city could improve such concerns at a cost agreeable to all.

Youth services, among other amenities, lagged on the metropolitan periphery; as county commissioners refused to treat fringe communities as suburban spaces. Since the end of World War II, the expenses of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office had risen more than 60 percent, but the office was still unable to clear more than half of all offenses. While a disproportionate number of officers patrolled colored communities near the warehouse district south of Phoenix, there were too few officers on the force to patrol the entire metropolitan periphery, and offenders, particularly juvenile delinquents, would abscond to fringe communities to avoid law enforcement. The city had already begun to build park facilities at public schools in colored communities south of Phoenix. Park facilities also offered a litany of recreational opportunities for adults seeking structured engagement. In contrast with the penurious county, city voters had approved a one million dollar bond to build additional park and library facilities in 1949. Annexation would bring juvenile delinquents from across the county under municipal surveillance.

Fringe communities lacked fire and health infrastructure. Since there was no public fire protection in Maricopa County, fringe residents had to hire private protection from the Rural Fire Protection Company. This protection was unavailable in colored communities to the south of Phoenix. In fact, not even all the predominantly Anglo communities could claim valuable infrastructure such as fire hydrants. Fire insurance in unprotected neighborhoods could approach three times the cost of insurance in neighborhoods with modern municipal infrastructure.

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303 Phoenix Planning Department, “A Fringe Area Study for the Phoenix Urban Area,” 80-89.
304 Phoenix Planning Department, “A Fringe Area Study for the Phoenix Urban Area,” 45.
health facilities also impacted insurance costs since, although a quarter of tuberculosis patients in Maricopa County lived in the metropolitan fringe, the state refused to fund public health facilities in these areas. While county inspectors visited auto courts, rest homes, sanitariums, and nurseries to ensure water sanitation, they did not inspect buildings to ensure their safety.Officials hoped annexation would let Phoenix modernize surrounding areas.

Modernization through annexation had only been made possible once the Charter class came to embrace public debt. Private solutions to pioneer conditions had arisen in the absence of public infrastructure. City water, much of which was irrigation water, was softened and chlorinated while private utility providers offered dank well water. However, distinctions between residential, commercial, and industrial water usage helped make it possible for at least eight private utilities to compete with the City of Phoenix for water provision in these outlying areas. Public debt would be necessary to acquire private water utilities that had rooted in the surrounding periphery.

Public debt would also be necessary to build suburban infrastructure. Most sewerage and industrial waste produced in fringe areas was disposed through insalubrious means like septic tanks, cesspools, privies, or ponds. These areas would need access to sewer lines if they were to be made habitable for Anglo suburbanization. In addition, the City of Phoenix charged an annual fee of thirty dollars to single-family homes in fringe areas attached to its sewer lines. Municipal monopolies over public utilities would, at least in the interim, prove profitable. Anglo suburbanization, whether within city limits or beyond, would provide more in municipal revenue than the public debts residents accrued to invest in metropolitan infrastructure.

As a nexus for Anglo capital, Phoenix had a greater concentration of affluent residents than anywhere else in the Valley; so, it had heretofore been able to acquire more bonded debt

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305 Phoenix Planning Department, “A Fringe Area Study for the Phoenix Urban Area,” 72-79.
306 Phoenix Planning Department, “A Fringe Area Study for the Phoenix Urban Area,” 51-54.
than other municipalities. The ability of the city to collectively pool resources provided opportunities for a more superior infrastructure than what unincorporated communities could autonomously afford. County residents could establish special districts to provide public infrastructure; however, the diminutive scale of these districts raised individual expenses for improvements past the point of viability for less affluent households. At a basic level, incorporation was more efficient than special districts ever could be at developing the infrastructure necessary to transform the Salt River Valley into an Anglo metropolis.

There was little that the Charter cartel was more resistant to than the idea that marginalized communities could participate as equal partners in civil life. Therefore, since independent incorporation would empower fringe communities to operate as autonomous political actors, incorporation would have to occur through annexation into Phoenix. In 1947, when a group of residents sought to incorporate the community of West Phoenix, the county attorney argued that the area “did not constitute a city or town as prescribed in the governing statute,” and the county board of supervisors denied the petition. Before “Southgate,” a proposed incorporated community in South Phoenix, could get off the ground, a Maricopa County Superior Court judge ruled that:

The area set forth in the complaint herein, being in part adjacent to the present city limits, has no local and peculiar interests and wants not common to adjoining regions, but, to the contrary, it has the same interest in police protection, fire protection, and the like as the present incorporated City of Phoenix and can obtain the needs for annexation to the City of Phoenix under proper statutory procedure.

This ruling helped cool incorporation efforts throughout Maricopa County as the specter of annexation loomed over every incorporation election.

Annexation made sense for local homeowners seeking public access to Anglo civic life. City departments, like planning and zoning, provided services that maximized the economic value


309 Phoenix Planning Department, “A Fringe Area Study for the Phoenix Urban Area,” 94-95.
of real estate in ways that Maricopa County simply did not. In another example, while the county
would maintain streets “owned by the state,” state law limited its maintenance of collector streets.
Annexation ensured these services were provided because Phoenix had already acquired public
debt to finance infrastructure for Anglo suburbanization.

There were many who would never be happy with this arrangement. Municipal officials
assumed that prospective residents were comfortable with paying taxes for metropolitan
services—such as trash collection or bus service—even if annexation would not offer cheaper or
superior service. On the contrary, those who sought to avoid metropolitan expansion would
now be forced to finance it. There were many on the metropolitan fringe that had declined to pay
for suburban utilities because they deemed it unnecessary or unaffordable. City officials
contended that residents of fringe communities would not be “forced” to pay for utilities, such as
sewer, if their pre-existing infrastructure met code. However, even those who declined usage
of public amenities would be compelled to pay municipal taxes. Many on the fringe could never
be compelled to seek annexation.

On the other hand, annexation offered Anglo residents the best cultural experience their
currency could acquire. For those invested in Anglo cultural production, Phoenix was the central
city in the entire state. Annexation meant that fringe residents would belong to a decidedly Anglo
community. Moreover, so many of the residents who lived in the metropolitan fringe stood to
benefit from their relationship to Phoenix that annexation became a foregone conclusion. The
civic life and economic opportunities that the city offered necessitated acceptance of
annexation—there was not a way to incorporate a competing city. But most importantly, the
Charter cartel had made economic bets on annexation. Phoenix had approved millions in bond

311 Planning Department for the Committee on City Expansion, “The Facts on City Expansion,” 2-5.
sales to finance metropolitan infrastructure. Even in its promotional materials, the city acknowledged that a quarter of tax revenue went toward debt service—twice the next-largest appropriation. Phoenix bleached its metropolitan periphery with public debt in anticipation of suburban development. Anglo supremacy hinged upon this gambit.

Conclusion

The Charter class, aided by the Pulliam Press, effectively privatized municipal governance in post-war Phoenix. Their realization that local practices could inhibit outside capital investment catalyzed the civic community to replace previously elected officials with conservative council-members of their choosing. Moreover, the coalition that civic leaders delivered to the polls would only grow; their efforts to attract Anglo investment would completely reconfigure the landscape of metropolitan Phoenix. Suburban development would enrich many within the Charter class; more so, it would cultivate public spaces for Anglo civic culture. These transformations would require the use of public debt—something that required public consent to acquire. Civic elites muted local discourse that sought to empower residents on the metropolitan fringe; instead, they offered access to the Anglo capital in exchange for political subordination. Unincorporated suburbs would soon have to vote: Anglo identity or political liberty.

CHAPTER 3

The Anglo Metropolis: Annexation and the Foreclosure of Political Autonomy in Maryvale

I firmly believe exactly the way Thomas Jefferson did that in order to be free people, you have to be jealous of your government. In other words, and he further brought out that you cannot vest your freedom and your rights in the confidence of man...I feel that any Charter that Phoenix has in the future, the elected officials should certainly be chained down by that Charter so that the people have the final say in everything. 313

Introduction

Over the course of the 1950s, Phoenix engaged in an annexation binge that brought hundreds of thousands of residents into the city. Phoenix offered suburban access to a higher quality of metropolitan infrastructure than annexed suburbs could independently afford; but, in return, suburban communities would accede political authority to the Charter government. Civic activists in unincorporated communities fiercely debated the value of this exchange. Moreover, competing suburbs like Scottsdale, Tempe, and Glendale would all annex suburban development if possible, so despite creating a landscape that incentivized annexation, Charter still had to convince residents that Phoenix could offer better benefits than surrounding towns. In many ways, annexation debates forced Anglo suburbanites to contend with their fear of public debt as there was no way to gain access to metropolitan infrastructure without it. First the affluent suburbs, then the industrial suburbs, and finally, the unincorporated suburbs all consented as annexation advocates socially blanched public debt in civic discourse. However, these actions would lay the foundation for eventual opposition to Charter government and, more importantly,

313 Aubrey Moore Broadcast, Station KHEP, undated, 3, MS 9, Box 2 Folder 9, Phoenix City Records, Arizona Historical Society-Tempe.
would preclude opportunities for political independence for the civic activists in Maryvale. The time would soon come where political subordination led to civic subjugation.

Public Debt and Municipal Taxes

Cities have long attempted to attract residents with the capacity for taxation, so the affluent Anglo subdivisions in Arcadia, a former citrus colony nestled in the foothills of Camelback Mountain, became site of intense competition between Phoenix and Scottsdale. Arcadia was closer in proximity to Scottsdale, but as a center of Anglo civic life, the dynamism of Phoenix continued to entice Anglo homeowners. Arcadia was home to some of the most active civic participants in the Valley, so annexation there had to proceed subdivision by subdivision to ensure that annexed property owners had opportunities to participate in the democratic process—and to avoid costly litigation from intractable dissidents. In May 1956, the Arizona Republic ran an editorial that claimed that:

> Although we’d hate to see Phoenix expand around a flock of unincorporated areas, we believe very strongly in the right of everyone to protest. In the long run the majority must rule, but that is no excuse to trample on the rights of any minority. If particular groups of property owners can make a good case for being left out of either Phoenix or Scottsdale, we think their requests should be given every consideration.

However, the rest of the article ran down a litany of reasons why annexing Arcadia into Phoenix would prove superior to annexing it into Scottsdale. In typical Pulliam double-talk, this editorial offered the outcome desired by Charter as the only reasonable solution. But if voters in Arcadia

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could be convinced to join Phoenix, their inclusion could help ensure the discursive hegemony of Sunbelt Capitalism—as embodied by Charter government—in municipal politics. Working-class resistance to Charter would cloud all other annexation attempts; it was imperative to the entire metropolitan project that Arcadia voters choose Phoenix and not another community.

Scottsdale lacked municipal taxes and could not finance all the services offered by Phoenix. Scottsdale paid for a rural fire department to serve annexed communities well after incorporation; municipal trash pickup was contracted through one company but paid by the individual household and not through public monies raised via taxation. Scottsdale would only have to patrol all annexed communities—the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office would not serve incorporated communities except to pursue felonious action. Scottsdale demonstrated that political autonomy was possible—but with diminished suburban services.

City officials used Scottsdale as a cautionary tale for fringe residents seeking to incorporate. When residents in Westown, a suburban desert community in the northwest valley, began to petition for incorporation, paid circulators informed residents how difficult it would be to provide municipal services without the taxes Phoenix collected. Eventually, Scottsdale had to adapt both a property and sales tax to fund municipal services; even after incorporation, residents had to finance trash pickup, water service, and street lighting. Residents of other cities would still have to pay Phoenix for the privilege to access municipal sewer lines. Finally, suburban communities lacked the necessary population to acquire state funding sufficient for municipal operations. Phoenix officials estimated that the 4,000 residents of Westown could expect less than twenty dollars per resident in state support if the community incorporated. Only elite Phoenicians could harness public debt; state officials starved other communities via austerity.

316 “Who Lives Where? That’s the $64,000 Question Here,” Arizona Republic, April 7, 1956, Phoenix-Annexation, Arizona Room, Burton Barr Public Library.

As the pace of annexation quickened, local investors exercised even more influence over what taxes private investors could expect to help finance interest payments on public debt. In 1957, Phoenix sought to annex West Valley areas utilized by industrial businesses. City officials advertised that they would not collect a sales tax, a bane of urban existence, on productive activities unrelated to local consumption. Furthermore, retail businesses affected by new taxes would be able to pass costs onto customers—especially as Phoenix gobbled up the available land for retail business. But these arguments would not pacify annexed business owners; they refused to join the city unless taxes were lowered. Municipal officials would have to be proactive in mitigating potential harm to private profits as talks between business owners and city officials dragged on into the next year. When it appeared that there was enough public support for annexation to prevail, the largest business owners threatened to leave the Valley if popular sovereignty forced them into Phoenix against their will.

To prevent capital flight, city officials hammered out a deal where, before the city approved annexation, it would bend the city code to a scale more at the liking of these business owners. One goal for these businesses, whose properties had been improved under non-existent county regulations, was to maintain as much flexibility as possible in future land use. Building, plumbing, electrical, and mechanical codes were altered across the city to accommodate conditions that existed in these areas and, despite the inadequacy of county zoning, land uses would remain as close to the original county plan as possible. The impact that municipal zoning regulations had on the metropolitan landscape would be duly minimized. Finally, the city eliminated a half-dozen taxes that impacted business in the area. Sales taxes were eliminated on contractors, agricultural supplies, component parts, and non-retail manufactures; income

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collected at home offices or for services outside of the city would elude taxation too.\textsuperscript{319} When joined by the lower insurance premiums that accompanied annexation, these industrial businesses would financially benefit from annexation.

The annexation of the West Valley industrial areas was the largest annexation into Phoenix at that time. Nearly thirty-five thousands residents and twelve square miles of land had been claimed in one fell swoop.\textsuperscript{320} This expansion would require hundreds of municipal hires to staff additional trash collection routes, street and building inspections, and law enforcement beats.\textsuperscript{321} The Phoenix annexation drive had even brought local American Federation of Labor (AFL) leadership in alignment with the chamber of commerce as both saw metropolitan integration into Phoenix as a key facet of economic development.\textsuperscript{322} However, labor activists argued that municipal employment policies threatened labor conditions for public servants outside of city limits. Firefighters in the Wilson fire district, an industrial zone to the southeast of Phoenix, sought to keep control over their employment through a special incorporation effort of “Industrial City.” Like so many other incorporation schemes, this one failed to organize a new municipality.


\textsuperscript{320} Roger Lewis, “Northwest Largest Area Ever Added,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, April 22, 1958, Phoenix-Annexation, Arizona Room, Burton Barr Public Library.


\textsuperscript{322} “City Push Favored by Labor,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, May 10, 1956, Phoenix-Annexation, Arizona Room, Burton Barr Public Library.
but the firefighters’ efforts foreshadowed financial pressures that newly-hired public employees would face. As residents, firefighters in Wilson fire district had been able to establish their own salary, but in Phoenix this process was subject to approval by a city council disinterested in ensuring the profitability of labor. When these firefighters even sought aid from the City of Tempe to avoid annexation into Phoenix, but their requests were rebuffed.\textsuperscript{323}

The fact that city officials had depressed their wages in relation to their expected labor concerned Phoenix firefighters; the closure of each competing fire district reduced hiring opportunities for unhappy firefighters. But as city officials devalued firefighters’ labor, it also became less expensive for the city to afford, and city officials mercilessly pushed firefighters’ wages as low as possible to accommodate tax breaks for annexed businesses. In some ways, these efforts hurt plans for annexation in working-class suburbs the city sought to expand—the anti-labor position that the city had taken would reduce opportunities for city employees (who had to live in Phoenix) to garner superior compensation—but these efforts also stabilized tax rates at a time when concerns about taxation fueled resistance to annexation in Sunnyslope: the largest unincorporated Anglo community outside of Phoenix.

The Sunnyslope Incorporation

Sunnyslope had originally been established as a health colony for Anglo migrants seeking relief from tuberculosis and other respiratory ailments. The community existed, as Dr. Leslie Kober recalled, beyond the pale of Anglo civic elites located in Phoenix:

I think St. Luke's [Hospital] had a branch out there, where they examined these people who lived right out there in Sunnyslope in various small homes, and I think they had a branch out there. I never did get associated with them at that time. Some doctors would go out there certain days, certain hours and see these patients.... [It] was just across the canal out there and there was nothing but desert, and it was cheap and people could go out there and put up any old shack and so they could get along very cheaply and it was nice and dry. It was out of the irrigated area. A lot of people just located out there. A lot of nice people.\textsuperscript{324}

No matter how nice these people were, their exclusion had been a matter of public health, as impoverished tubercular patients faced both legal and social difficulties in acquiring housing in Phoenix and other Valley cities prior to World War II.\textsuperscript{325} Sharp class distinctions delineated working-class Sunnyslope from the more affluent Phoenix neighborhoods to the south.

\textsuperscript{324} Dr. Leslie Kober, Interviewed by Harriet Haskell, Phoenix History Project, Arizona Historical Society-Tempe, June 30, 1977, 15.

\textsuperscript{325} Karen Warner, Ed., \textit{Glendale: Our Past, Our Progress, Our People}, (Glendale, AZ: City of Glendale, 2008), 15.
Figure 17 Sunnyslope with Central and Dunlap Street in Foreground, 1946 August 16, courtesy of McCulloch Brothers Photographs, Herb and Dorothy McLauglin Collection, Arizona State University Libraries.
Soon after World War II ended, suburban development began to extend into Sunnyslope, and several local civic organizations sprouted in dry, un-irrigated soil. The Rolla-Caron Improvement District organized road-paving efforts in parts of Sunnyslope; additionally, the Valley Heights Community Club organized dinners for more than forty residents and guests in the community. Activists began to petition the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors to appropriate funding for a park and, in a demonstration of their prowess at fundraising, community members donated outsized contributions to elite organizations such as the Maricopa County Red Cross. 

In 1953, the Sunnyslope Incorporation Group organized a fact-finding committee to help adjudicate the value of incorporation. Incorporation could be a harrowing process, like “a boy and a girl getting married,” and doing so would cost Sunnyslope financial and logistical support from Maricopa County. Incorporation advocates argued that local residents could afford self-

governance if they deliberately managed public resources. For example, all zoning regulations would “die an instant death,” but “subdivision restrictions” that ensured master-planned communities would remain enforceable.327 Moreover, civic activists could volunteer to serve on a zoning board—just like in similarly-sized Glendale. While some municipal positions required professional employees, civic activists would be able to provide many services at little cost to voters.328 Volunteers could not, however, replace county streets maintenance or public safety protection—residents would have to be taxed to acquire these municipal services.

Incorporation advocates claimed that, “community improvement items should come naturally as the town grows, rather than try to attain all, or even a large part of those major items at once.” Maricopa County, however, had not invested resources into street paving, street lights, sewer lines or sidewalks—all amenities must be paid out of the municipal budget. In the first year, the Sunnyslope Incorporation Group estimated that the proposed Town of Sunnyslope would receive one hundred thousand dollars in revenue from several sources, including refunds by the county and state for a privilege sales tax, an auto lieu tax, and a gasoline tax, along with excise taxes, police fines, and building permit fees. While these rebates would be enough to cover initial expenses, such as salaries for essential professional employees, insurance, and initial investments into public safety and street maintenance, they would be insufficient to undertake improvements without capital investment—which came from property taxes and public debt.329

The Sunnyslope Incorporation Group tried to pitch potential tax increases as reasonable and limited by state law:


328 Ibid.

329 Ibid.
As an incorporated community, either town or city, we would be subject to an increase in taxes amounting to a maximum of $2.75 per hundred dollars of valuation, per year. [For a homeowner] who might own a house worth $2,000.00, his valuation for tax purposes would be approximately 20% of the net worth, or a total of $400.00. Multiplying $400.00 time $2.75 per hundred, or 4 X $2.75 we get $11.00 per year in town taxes, which is the MAXIMUM allowable under the laws of the state.\(^{330}\)

Incorporation boosters attempted to ameliorate concerns about exorbitant taxes in the working-class community; however, they faced difficulty in finding additional sources of capital by which to provide anything beyond the most basic municipal services.

Unlike annexation advocates in Phoenix, incorporation advocates in Sunnyslope lacked a vision that could compel residents to assent to additional taxation. Opponents, however, derided the ability of municipal professionals to deliver the utopian advances potentially available with municipal bonds; they also questioned the necessity of additional governance. Bill Hull, an anti-incorporation advocate, wrote an impassioned letter, imploring voters to reject incorporation:

“After two unsuccessful attempts the Incorporation Die-hards are still trying to get the thriving community of Sunnyslope to incorporate. What makes these job seeking politicians think we need a governing body?” Hull feared corruption would immediately follow incorporation and urged voters to, “defeat the political mongers once again, and defeat them so thoroughly that they will never try to use the people of Sunnyslope as a soft touch to easy money.”\(^{331}\) Deep-rooted distrust of political operatives drove much of the intransigence to incorporation in Sunnyslope.

Many Sunnyslope residents were willing to forsake community infrastructure unless other parties paid for it. As Hull argued, one of the best things about Sunnyslope’s unincorporated status was “the County is already planning a park which will far exceed anything we can afford.” A state bill to reassess the valuations of veteran’s and widow’s homes—an act that would increase


\(^{331}\) Bill Hull, 9432 Del Monte Dr., Letter, DTO Sunnyslope, MSM 202, Arizona Collection, Hayden Library, Arizona State University Libraries.
tax payments for those on fixed incomes—concerned anti-incorporation advocate Geo. D. Prescott. In a leaflet, Prescott argued that:

If you are in a low income bracket and can afford no more expense, you should vote NO! If you are living on a pension or annuity or any other fixed income, you should vote NO! If your income is not from a definite source for the next few years and you have no savings or have illness in the family which may take a large part of your income, you should vote NO!332

The discursive resistance to incorporation in Sunnyslope stoked economic fear among financially insecure residents. Incorporation remained beyond the financial capacity of many residents.

While Prescott does not argue in this leaflet that incorporation conflicts cut across class lines, in another, he lambasts the Sunnyslope chamber of commerce for its support for incorporation, snidely remarking, "[s]everal of the members favoring incorporation do not live in Sunnyslope … we have an oversupply of organizations wither too few members. And one small clique but with one thought in mind—incorporation."333 Prescott distrusted granting this clique municipal power. He warned of undemocratically selected council appointees who served as dictators upon the formation of the municipality:

During this time (11 months) the city council can prepare a budget, and if not sufficient income is anticipated, can set a city tax rate up to $2.75 per $100 assessed valuation of real property. It also has the power to set the assessed valuation of real property at any figure up to 100%, if they so wish. The council can also enact ordinances setting a city sales tax, or can install parking meters, ALL WITHOUT A VOTE OF THE PEOPLE.334

Fears of unrepresentative government were pervasive in anti-incorporation discourse. There was a clear influence from John Birch literature, but there are scholarly antecedents that make it


334 Ibid.
appear that these extreme positions also stemmed from Depression-era experiences. Many overleveraged families had lost their entire households during the Depression; anti-incorporation advocates remained leery of government schemes that could bankrupt them again.\textsuperscript{335}

Prescott continued arguing that municipal tax burdens would prove too heavy for families with limited cash assets to finance a municipal government. He reasoned that, “Starting from scratch, with INEXPERIENCED, UNKNOWN would-be politicians …with more taxes coming from the High School bond and the new bond issues for more school expansion in the making…. The small wage earner, the pensioner, and the family man are already paying the limit.”\textsuperscript{336} Prescott questioned the ability of Sunnyslope residents to manage self-governance. Their collective penury made incorporation too challenging for residents to undertake. In contrast to Paradise Valley, where affluent residents sought to incorporate to preserve their lifestyle, residents of Sunnyslope could not afford to protect the social value derived from their community.

Taxation, especially when used to pay bonded debt, drove political sentiment like nothing else. Anti-incorporation advocates would accept political marginalization if left unbothered by state officials; in fact, most anti-incorporation advocates longed for legislative repeals of tax burdens.\textsuperscript{337} This discursive depiction of a world where cash-strapped property owners could lose

\textsuperscript{335} For more on taxation and foreclosure in West Coast suburbs during the Great Depression, see: Becky M. Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in the Working-Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Emily E. Strauss, Death of a Suburban Dream: Race and Schools in Compton, California, (Philadelphia: Penn Press, 2014).


\textsuperscript{337} “Memorandum Re Arizona Tax Structure,” DTO Sunnyslope, MSM 202, Arizona Collection, Hayden Library, Arizona State University Libraries; Geo. D. Prescott, Chairman of the
their homes via tax liens also encouraged residents to reconsider whether Sunnyslope was a place to make long-term investments. Prescott characterized incorporation in terms of family: “THIS IS NOT THE TIME TO MAKE AN IRRREVOCABLE COMMITMENT THAT MAY ONE DAY LOSE YOU YOUR HOME! Incorporation is not like a politician you can vote out of office, or a wife you can divorced. You are “wed” for life to taxes and assessments!” Implicitly, this argument was a rejection of spatial community formation. Incorporation would limit the ability individual households to abscond if community conditions deteriorated and, anti-incorporation advocates questioned how if Sunnyslope residents should formally bind their collective fates. While there were certainly attributes residents wanted to share with their neighbors, anti-incorporation advocates argued residents were individual consumers of public resources.

Anti-incorporation advocates produced propaganda that prophesied the perils of incorporation using common language. The headline of one prominent broadsheet blared, “DON’T BE A SUCKER! Do You Want A Lien Against Your Home?” This plain language clearly elucidates the concerns of anti-incorporation advocates; moreover, on the same sheet, incorporation proponents were called “petty job seeking political schemers” who promised metropolitan improvements as “bait” to entrap residents. Incorporation proponents were never able to offer a compelling alternative discourse.


The most damning argument made by anti-incorporation advocates revolved around financial estimates made by incorporation proponents. Residents of Glendale, the nearest comparable community, paid property taxes to help municipal officials meet the operational obligations; but, industrial investment and rail infrastructure blessed that community. On the other hand, Sunnyslope lacked investment in heavy industry, agriculture, resource extraction, or transportation: all local taxation would fall on home owners. In a *Sunnyslope Star* editorial, Bill Williamson, Sr. argued that by the time residents could directly elect councilmembers, “the indebtedness against your home will be greater than you can ever pay,” and municipal officials would “sell your home for unpaid taxes and you will be homeless.”

But more interestingly, anti-incorporation activists seemed unconcerned that Phoenix may seek to annex Sunnyslope in the future. Prescott argued, “[o]ur small homes and few business buildings cannot begin to compare in assessable valuation with the industrial and residential areas adjoining and surrounding their present city limits.” Anti-incorporation advocates advanced initiatives for improvement districts despite their ineffectiveness in less affluent communities. The contrast, as described by Williamson, was that incorporation gave councilmembers “a blank check on your home.” Even members of the chamber of commerce understood the logistical struggles a newly-incorporated community would encounter in the face of proposed legislation that might abolish property and sales tax in the State.


would be voted down in 1953. Still, by decade's end, residents would live within an incorporated community—just not one where they had direct representation in municipal governance.

The Sunnyslope Annexation

A curious strand in the resistance to incorporation was indifference toward annexation. While a plethora of small towns dot the rural hinterland that primarily comprises Arizona, few of these incorporated communities were in proximity to the Anglo capital as Sunnyslope. Residents could ride the coattails of Phoenix and hide in its metropolitan shade—a fact noted by Prescott as he forewarned the same fate that befell the municipality of South Tucson. He claimed, "It is a notorious fact that South Tucson has had reason to regret its haste in incorporating as a separate community of its mother city [of Tucson]." Allegedly, the Mexican-American community pursued annexation to obtain municipal control over vice regulations. Prescott continued:

South Tucson…should be the most ‘perfect’ example for Sunnyslope comparison. All the other towns…are situated on through highways, have railroads and are members of the rich cotton, cattle, copper and agricultural fraternities. Sunnyslope does not even have an honorary membership in this income group, and no prospect that it ever will.  

Prescott includes Sunnyslope in the same category as South Tucson—discursively racializing the Anglo residents of his community. Prescott’s his anti-incorporation screeds effectively stamped the community in Sunnyslope as undeserving of self-governance.

While homeowners could develop and maintain an individual identity, incorporation would require homeowners to create and share a collective identity, and anti-incorporation advocates were loath to share that responsibility with other homeowners. The conclusion of this logic was that some type of corporate capital was necessary to create community identity, and without the support of big business, Sunnyslope residents would be foolish to assent any form of taxation:

We don’t want to incorporate—We don’t want to pay anymore taxes or assessments. Just let us pay our bills and pay for our homes—and try to keep up with our ever-increasing school tax burden. REMEMBER, that in this area, TAXES MUST BE BORNE ALMOST ENTIRELY BY HOME OWNERS.  

The anti-incorporation advocates were effectively arguing that Sunnyslope could never sustain self-governance without corporate sponsorship—the embodiment of Anglo capital. Unless residents were able to create businesses capable of a similar form of capital accumulation—unlikely in Sunnyslope—then only investment by outside corporate capital could provide residents with the economic support necessary to rationalize incorporation. Homeowners would be bankrupted, and their property values would fall, in the face of taxation necessary to meet the demands of incorporation without the economic support of industry.

Unsurprisingly, many anti-incorporation advocates could not help but envision the future except as guided by Anglo capital in Phoenix. Longtime resident G.W. Denker hoped:

Not so far distant the fast-growing Phoenix will fill this Wonder-Valley of the Sun and Sunnyslope should and would benefit by being part of that great development. Today Phoenix is really the only Nationally recognized Metropolitan city [in Arizona]...even as a part of Phoenix, Sunnyslope would hold its independence from the downtown shopping district with its traffic hazards and inconveniences.

At best, as Denker implies, peripheral communities could hope to maintain some modicum of independence from the commercial and financial interests that had captured control of municipal governance. But at the root of anti-incorporation was resignation to the fact that Anglo elites in Phoenix would eventually devise a development strategy. In any case, the civic elites who ran Charter government had successfully attracted capital investment during World War II—their past performance made annexation seem more feasible than incorporation.

Anti-incorporation advocates held little trust in the ability of Sunnyslope civic activists to provide community amenities. Instead, they were happy to allow the oligarchy of civic elites who Charter government to dictate the development of public infrastructure in Sunnyslope. In any case, the professionalism of Charter government seemed superior to small-town politics:

I’m against incorporation because it’s against [the] growth and welfare of Sunnyslope. I’m opposed to this additional expense which will increase taxes without providing any advantages in return…. Let us all be good and loyal citizens working for the betterment of our population. Let us patronize our home merchants especially those who have Sunnyslope’s future growth and development at heart. We don’t want to interfere with progress which is steadily reaching a welcome hand in our directions.\(^{344}\)

For all the civic energy that pulsed through Sunnyslope, anti-incorporation advocates distrusted the ability of residents to create a future independent of guidance bestowed by the Charter class.

On the other hand, some municipal proponents raised concerns that the poverty of Sunnyslope residents necessitated incorporation to improve public health among residents. James Cook, an Anglo migrant who had encouraged Sunnyslope to incorporate to obtain sewer infrastructure to prevent flooding, had publicly “called Sunnyslope everything he could think of” before moving to Scottsdale—a more affluent suburban community nearby. In this sense, Cook needled local residents on a basic fact: even though Sunnyslope residents (“Slopers”) were Anglo, they could not independently afford the infrastructure necessary to support metropolitan

Anglo settlement. However, through “good and loyal” deference to Charter, residents in the humble community could acquire junior access metropolitan infrastructure. Recalling their experience during the Great Depression, many longtime residents conceived of incorporation as a scheme that would enrich public coffers by consuming the financial savings and future income of the average “Joe and Jane” in Sunnyslope.\textsuperscript{345} In contrast, annexation by Charter government offered residents public resources that the political autonomy of incorporation never could.

So, in 1958, as Phoenix positioned itself to annex Sunnyslope, incorporation advocates set up one final campaign for self-governance. Unlike earlier elections, incorporation or annexation was the choice, and incorporation advocates altered their discursive justification for their activities—that residents would have more control over taxation if they remained politically autonomous.\textit{Our Town of Sunnyslope}, a weekly pamphlet circulated by incorporation advocates, argued that Phoenix officials could not guarantee a consistent taxation rate. Concerned about opportunities foreclosed as metropolitan expansion reduced the number of fire agencies in the Valley, Phoenix firefighters petitioned Phoenix voters for a pay raise in November 1958 that would have driven the city property tax from “$1.75 per hundred of assessed valuation...[to] as high as $3.05 per hundred.” While Phoenix Mayor Jack Williams promised members of the Sunnyslope Lions Club that there would not be “any annexation” if he could not promise stabilized tax rates, Sunnyslope incorporators argued that the firemen would win their raise and upset municipal tax calculations. In fact, they argued that:

\begin{quote}
PHOENIX’S ANNEXATION PROGRAM...is part and parcel of [a] 70 million dollar bond issue. In a sense, annexation is a part of the collateral they promised for the loan of the money they raised.... THE BOND HOLDERS, those big money interests, won’t let
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{345} “BOY MEETS GIRL IN SUNNYSLOPE,” DTO Sunnyslope, MSM 202, Arizona Collection, Hayden Library, Arizona State University Libraries.
Phoenix cease her efforts to keep on annexing more territory...to get the money to meet those bond obligations.\textsuperscript{346}

Incorporation proponents adapted anti-incorporation advocates’ discourse to forestall annexation. In effect, this last-ditch incorporation effort argued that Sunnyslope should become a tax haven.

Incorporation proponents adamantly argued that, as a town, Sunnyslope would and could NOT adapt a sales tax—a key gambit used to pay public expenses in Phoenix. In fact, they argued that the business privilege tax used by small towns such as Scottsdale was different than a sales tax because “if any merchants are passing the tax on to their customers, in our opinion, that is illegal.”\textsuperscript{347} Incorporation proponents, as opposed to seeking self-governance, now made it clear that they sought freedom from metropolitan taxes. “WHAT WOULD IT PROFIT a community to gain a city manager at $17,500 per Year (sic), and lose it’s (sic) identity to the baseball stadium, the airport, the congested traffic, and the tall buildings downtown?” A cartoon showing money flowing out of Sunnyslope and into the Phoenix city hall reflects the intense resistance of this latter incorporation effort to the asymmetrical relations of metropolitan development.\textsuperscript{348}

Phoenix officials would have to convince residents that these naysayers were inaccurate.

A central perk of annexation would be potential municipal employment for annexed residents—as the city required hundreds of additional employees to service these communities. That these opportunities would not manifest for Sunnyslope residents intimidated Sunnyslope


\textsuperscript{348} Bruney, Our Town of Sunnyslope, 1.3, November 7, 1958, 3, DTO Sunnyslope, MSM 202, Arizona Collection, Hayden Library, Arizona State University Libraries.
incorporators. They noted that, despite the fact Phoenix planned to reduce trash collection to save money, the city would hire white-collar inspectors to replace blue-collar trash collectors.\textsuperscript{349} There was no promise that working-class Sunnyslope residents would be able to qualify for employment the rapidly modernizing city offered. Their taxes would go toward paying white-collar employees from outside the community. Incorporators would argue, “YOU CANNOT SAVE ANYTHING WITH ANNEXATION. You \textbf{PAY} a big tax, then you get \textbf{LESS} in return.”

Phoenix had made a large bet that in many ways necessitated the annexation of its outlying suburbs. In May 1957, city voters authorized seventy million dollars in bonds to finance public facilities and metropolitan infrastructure—libraries, sewers, parks, and streets—even the airport expansion was included in this bond issue. However, in a quote attributed to the city manager, the per capita public indebtedness of each individual Phoenician had remained constant due to “the phenomenal rise in population.” The Sunnyslope Incorporation Committee questioned the veracity of this statement; instead, they questioned if Phoenix could offer residents a promised quality of life. In another example, the committee claimed that the assessed valuation in Phoenix was below expectation because the city employed a finance director who was “guesstimating” the actual value of property in the municipality. Additionally, the committee lambasted city officials when the city council ordered residents from one annexed water district to accept a debt settlement of one-fifth their original infrastructure investment without acknowledging their right to have their full debt repaid via water bill deductions. When the council moved to correct this error, in a pamphlet, incorporators loudly argued, “You can have $9.50 now or $50.00 OVER A 20 YEAR PERIOD WITHOUT INTEREST… apparently this high financing was worked

\textsuperscript{349}Bruney, Our Town of Sunnyslope, 1.5, November 20, 1958, 1-2; Robert S. Bruney, Chairman, Our Town of Sunnyslope, KTVK-ABC, November 28, 1958, (Sunnyslope, Arizona: The Sunnyslope Incorporation Committee, 1958), DTO Sunnyslope, MSM 202, Arizona Collection, Hayden Library, Arizona State University Libraries.
out by the WATER DEPARTMENT—NOT THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT. Sunnyslope incorporators argued that the benefits of annexation were worth the metropolitan bureaucracy.

On the other hand, Sunnyslope incorporators could not convince local residents that independence offered greater benefits than annexation. Incorporators attempted to develop a community culture that resisted amalgamation into greater Phoenix; incorporators published poetry, short stories, and songs that encouraged residents to celebrate community autonomy:

Don’t trade OUR SUNNYSLOPE
For bosses downtown-
Darn good connections,
For garbage collections, CAN BE HAD if we all
Stand our ground. We’ll still have water
And more policemen,
Fire service
And parks as well
Don’t trade OUR SUNNYSLOPE
OR YOU’LL PLAY NELL

This endearing attempt to rally civic pride paled in comparison to the cultural benefits to be gained from association with the civic institutions based in Phoenix.

However, in a billboard erected along one of the main arteries between Sunnyslope and Phoenix, pro-annexationists argued, “Think! Vote No on Incorporation…Phoenix has more to offer for less!” While incorporation proponents argued that all Phoenix could provide were “high taxes,


351 Bruney, Our Town of Sunnyslope, 1.5, November 20, 1958, 2.
lots of bossism, a maze of departments, turmoil, tempest, grief and frustration for many," annexationists argued that Phoenix could provide all Sunnyslope with sewers, streetlights, and sidewalks for less than it would otherwise cost residents. Incorporation proponents argued again and again: “sewers are fine, if you can afford them.” However, many residents could not afford sewer systems under the cumbersome improvement district model; the assessed value of the collective property in Sunnyslope made sewerage economically disadvantageous for most residents. Many had installed septic tanks, but this infrastructure was not nearly as sanitary or efficient as sewerage, so when Phoenix extended sewer lines to the Sunnyslope foothills, incorporators argued that it was done to “dramatize” political conflict and coerce annexation. Metropolitan development would exclude Sunnyslope if residents chose political sovereignty.

Incorporation proponents fumed over this type of external interference in local civic concerns. “Authority to use the streets of Sunnyslope for these sewer trunk lines stemmed from action by the County Board of Supervisors. The property owners and residents of the area were not consulted.” Incorporation proponents promised that in incorporated Sunnyslope future projects would only occur under the authority of municipal officials. Instead, residents were being coerced to conform to utility standards that alleviated concerns of a broader metropolitan community—not those specific to Sunnyslope. Phoenix only allowed city-approved, licensed and bonded plumbers to operate on trunk lines; moreover, because of the mountainous terrain of Sunnyslope, pipe installation could cost homeowners twice as much than in other parts of Phoenix. Incorporators argued that residents would be expected to for pay city taxes along with

352 Bruney, Our Town of Sunnyslope, 1.5, November 20, 1958, 3.
353 Bruney, Our Town of Sunnyslope, 1.3, November 7, 1958, 2.
improvement districts if annexation occurred—a process that “put the cost for everyone ENTIRELY TOO HIGH.”

Still, these estimates were predicated on outdated population statistics. Incorporation proponents anticipated that Sunnyslope had grown large enough to sustain itself on tax revenues the state provided to incorporated communities based upon population. Instead of letting Phoenix, “with its high tax rates and high salaried bureaucratic set-up,” annex Sunnyslope and lay claim to these resources, residents should incorporate and “keep the monies for the use of our own areas.” But, just like earlier elections, residents of Sunnyslope were unconvinced by arguments that tried to distinguish their future from Phoenix. Once the 1958 incorporation referendum was rejected by voters, Phoenix officials circulated annexation petitions.

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355 Ibid.


Meanwhile, as Sunnyslope debated incorporation, Charter government continued to annex communities neighboring Phoenix with joyous abandon.\(^{358}\) In the wake of the final Sunnyslope incorporation failure, the Pulliam Press argued that:

The biggest and economically the most important chapter in the post-war growth of the city is on the point of just being added to the record…. It is a chapter in the story of how

Phoenix, through annexation, is growing up to its new population in terms of corporate limits, community-wide uniformity of services, and breadth of tax base.\textsuperscript{359}

The Pulliam Press praised voters for the seventy million dollar bond expansion that made metropolitan annexation possible. Additionally, the stewardship of the Charter government had stopped residents from foolhardy acts such as wage increases for firefighters. The Pulliam Press argued that public financing for civic development convinced suburban residents to acquiesce to the Charter government to promote, “orderly and financially sound bigness” through metropolitan unification.\textsuperscript{360} Civic elites celebrated as unincorporated communities fell in line with annexation.

Phoenix provided many public benefits for residents, but at the same time, annexed communities would have to privately pay for neighborhood improvements. As Sunnyslope incorporation proponents had argued, municipal workers would grade and oil unpaved streets, but residents had to establish improvement districts to acquire pavement on unpaved collector streets. City official countered that, while annexed residents had to develop their own improvement districts to access municipal sewer lines, after annexation city taxes, and not monthly fees, would pay for the use of the lines after annexation. While it could take more than a year for street lighting to be fully installed, public safety service would immediately commence in annexed communities along with municipal control over annexed park facilities. Additionally, local school districts would remain unaffected by annexation.\textsuperscript{361} Phoenix officials talked a lot and promised little, but in many ways, the primary benefit of annexation was psychic: incorporation within the seat of Anglo capital investment in Arizona.


\textsuperscript{360} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{361} “City Gives Sunnyslope Facts on Annexation,” May 9, 1958, Phoenix-Annexation, Arizona Room, Burton Barr Public Library.
Annexation made Phoenix a more valuable city. The Sunnyslope annexation included more than seventy-two million dollars in assessed property—just more than the previously approved bonds had collected for capital improvements. Additionally, more than sixty-four thousand residents and nearly forty square miles of land were incorporated into Phoenix. These assets, both physical and human, would help pay back the public debt accrued to deliver metropolitan services.\textsuperscript{362} Many residents still longed for annexation despite the fact that their taxes did not bring immediate benefit—but Phoenix did not seek to annex communities that lacked the financial wherewithal to contribute to the broader city.\textsuperscript{363} In Laveen, an agricultural community in the southwest Salt River valley, local residents requested the Phoenix Union High School District annex their underfunded school district. With little property to assess (less than $1.5 million) city officials declined to annex the community despite requests for metropolitan inclusion.\textsuperscript{364} Anglo residents who sought entry into Phoenix through annexation could only join the city if they brought equity to the merger.

In contradistinction were the Mexican-American barrios which surrounded valuable industrial land in the Wilson fire district to the southeast of Phoenix. Despite the fact that these communities had nearly half the population of Sunnyslope in less than one-third of the territory, their annexation was treated as a virtual afterthought in the Pulliam Press.

\textsuperscript{362} “City Growth Plans Make Big Advance,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, March 25, 1959, 2, Phoenix-Annexation, Arizona Room, Burton Barr Public Library.


But moreover, despite the lack of social relationships between the two communities, the colored communities in the Wilson fire district had been brought into Phoenix as part of a package vote with Sunnyslope. In this sense, the colored communities that composed the Wilson Fire District had not been given an opportunity to determine if annexation was in the interest of their community; the power of their votes had been adulterated by inclusion in the Sunnyslope annexation petition. While the assessed valuation of property in the Wilson fire district (nearly fifteen million) was less than that of Sunnyslope, its annexation ensured spatial development.
remain under the Charter administration.\textsuperscript{365} The Anglo metropolis would amalgamate colored communities to ensure domination over development throughout the Salt River valley.

The Process of Civic Inclusion

Still, the capital resources necessary for metropolitan infrastructure made the incorporation of suburban Anglo communities a foregone conclusion. The primary question in these communities revolved around independent incorporation or municipal annexation. It was very difficult to obtain suburban infrastructure without support from elected officials; however, civic activists would be in an ideal position to develop these types of relationships. The collective nature of civic life allowed civic activists to speak on behalf of an organized group of voters. Gerald Daly, a civic stalwart in Maryvale, recalled that when he first moved to the community:

We had—the roads and all were in good shape; they were taken over by the county, the roads were, but we didn’t have garbage collection, we had very little in the way of police protection—whenever a county sheriff happened to be around, that was the only protection we had. No fire department. Water was a private well system and the water wasn’t very good, either, so there were a lot of things that the community needed and [we] just naturally banded together.\textsuperscript{366}

Maryvale offered local civic activists the opportunity to develop civic equity in the same way metropolitan Phoenix provided opportunities for civic elites to build institutions where none previously existed. But while civic elites were able to have members from the Charter class patronize their efforts, civic activists in Maryvale would find it more difficult to finance their vision.

Daly recalled that the association approached John F. Long to determine why advertised civic amenities were unavailable in the community so long after the first subdivisions had been


established. In response, Long proposed that if residents incorporated a community organization, he would donate a community center. The Maryvale Terrace Civic Association was formally established out of these efforts—with Daly as one of the directors. While other residents hoped that local civic activists could manage the facility, Daly had his doubts:

In my business connections, I became very well connected with two county supervisors; one, Jim O’Neil for this area, who was a Democrat, and Mr. Jim Hart from the east side of Phoenix, who was a Republican, and through my work with Dennis McCarthy, who was the county parks director, we started to talk about this and I realistically put to Dennis McCarthy that we weren’t really gonna be able to maintain—although—you know, it’s unrealistic to have people maintain this community center building and I said, ‘Why don’t you take it over from the Parks Department?’; and he said, ‘Well, how many acres does it have?’, and I said, ‘Two and a half,’ and he said, ‘Well, we need something like twelve or thirteen acres for a park,’ and I said, ‘Well, why don’t you go to John Long and suggest that you’ll… do away with the community center building—and maybe he will substitute the twelve or thirteen acres you need for a park,’ which John Long agreed to do. 367

Daly, who had relocated to Phoenix to serve in an executive role at Mountain Bell Telephone, utilized his access to political officials to acquire public investment into his community. While Maryvale residents collectively lacked the social networks that granted civic elites access to the Charter class, individual activists were able to help negotiate deals between elected officials and John F. Long—who had suddenly become the largest patron of civic life in the West Valley.

Not only did politicians seek access to Maryvale consumers, but preexisting West Valley businesses did as well. Daly recalled how local civic activists had to manage the largesse of external sponsors seeking publicity from their donations to local civic life:

We organized the first parade in Maryvale and all of the—the whole neighborhood participated. We invited the governor… the mayor of Phoenix, the mayor of Glendale, John F. Long, Dennis McCarthy, parks director; we had many of the judiciary, as honored guests, and we wanted them to participate in the parade so that we borrowed from new car dealers some thirteen convertible cars and we were gonna have all these people meet at the corner of 47th Avenue and Indian School Road to get into the cars, but this was held in the last part of August and it was so tremendously hot that my wife and I agreed that we would have everybody assemble at our house and we would set up some cocktails and keep them in a cool house until they were ready to get into the parade. The parade was a tremendous success and there must have been at least five thousand people there… through the donations of business people in the community, we put on a

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367 Daly, July 24, 1978, 5.
big fireworks display. [It] was a real success and it really unified the area and the community into great pride in Maryvale.\textsuperscript{368}

The personal nature of civic life in Maryvale made it possible for grassroots activists to intimately engage with civic elites. The Charter class would later face accusations of disinterest in Maryvale, but at the beginning, civic elites seemed readily available to residents in the local community.

These intimate encounters between political luminaries and civic activists belied the transactional nature of their engagement. Daly recalled the ease by which he had been able to procure funding from the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors to install a pool in Maryvale:

I talked to the supervisors over lunch one day, about, ‘How about a pool for Maryvale Park?’, and they got very much upset with that on the basis they couldn’t put a hundred thousand dollar pool out here and—when there were other areas of the county didn’t have it, and I said, ‘Well, let’s remember that there are now an awful lot of voters out here and a lot of people who need this sort of thing, and if you can’t afford a hundred thousand dollars for a pool all at once, how would it be if you could put up thirty-three thousand dollars a year for three years?’ , and they said, ‘Well, maybe that might be possible,’ and I said, ‘Well, why don’t we go to John Long?’\textsuperscript{369}

Maryvale residents would prove to be an important voting bloc. As suburban homeowners in the agricultural West Valley, they were pioneers repurposing the metropolitan frontier for modern habitation. Moreover, Maryvale residents would blanch the multi-racial West Valley in the eyes of incoming migrants. Their votes would counter those of counter-balance the votes of Valley residents who most resented the economic vicissitudes of Sunbelt Capitalism—colored communities on the social and spatial periphery of metropolitan Phoenix. Colored voters, with their proclivities for higher wages, lower rents, and union organizing, were the greatest threat to the investment conditions cultivated under Sunbelt Capitalism. The civic value of Maryvale voters to elected officials was highest when the community was independent of any corporate affinities.

The generosity of civic donors could not ameliorate local concerns that Maryvale paid higher rates for utilities than it received in service quality as an unincorporated entity. Until the neighborhood was within an incorporated municipality, it would not have access to sorely needed

\textsuperscript{368} Daly, July 24, 1978, 6-7.

\textsuperscript{369} Daly, July 24, 1978, 7.
bonds to finance and regulate quality improvements. So naturally, the activists in the Maryvale Terrace Civic Association began to weigh options for future incorporation. Delvin Ayotte, president of the Maryvale Terrace Civic Association, argued that independent incorporation would provide the best future for Maryvale residents. Similar to the Sunnyslope incorporation proponents, Ayotte argued that incorporation could provide residents with “a tax free city with a small municipal government” that stood in contrast to annexation offers from Phoenix or Glendale.  

Representatives from Phoenix and Glendale fiercely lobbied residents in unincorporated communities to resist the urge for incorporation. “Decisions such as incorporation affect people and property rights for many years,” the mayor of Phoenix patronizingly stated. He went on to say, “Phoenix is the logical city in this area to provide parks, recreation, and municipal services for those who live on its perimeter.”  

Mayors of both Phoenix and Glendale requested that civic activists in Maryvale provide their municipalities an opportunity to demonstrate the advantages of annexation to independent incorporation. Elected officials became concerned with the affairs of civic life in Maryvale when it appeared that residents might vote for themselves. The Pulliam Press was soon involved and was not on the side of incorporation. The Arizona Republic published an article citing concerns the Arizona Municipal League (AML) had with the proposed incorporation. While W.A. Moeur, executive secretary for the AML, claimed he did not want to “discourage the formation of new cities,” but he claimed that “a strictly residential area around a shopping center does not qualify as an economically sound unit for incorporation.”  

A Republic editorial questioned whether “a city of 5,000 – 10,000 residents could offer the same type of services the City of Phoenix provided without “a fantastically high tax


371 Ibid.

rate.” Maryvale incorporation proponents argued that nearly 30,000 people would live in the community once Long finished his proposed housing, members of the Charter class scoffed at the idea residents could raise sufficient revenue to operate a municipal government without homeowners paying property taxes—the great fear of anti-incorporation advocates in Sunnyslope. While both Phoenix and Glendale had made overtures for annexation, the Republic clearly favored one route of action of Maryvale residents—annexation into Phoenix.

Maryvale incorporation proponents also made arguments similar to their comrades in Sunnyslope. While the Pulliam Press argued that Maryvale lacked sufficient population in the 1950 census to earn its necessary share of state funding revenue, incorporation proponents countered with an opinion delivered by the state attorney general that allowed communities to conduct a special census after initial incorporation to acquire their shared tax revenue from the state. Consolidated Water Co., the local water provider, had tentatively agreed to infrastructure for fire protection that residents could pay back over time. Ayotte also rebuffed the critical statements made by the Arizona Municipal League. He claimed, “For several months I have tried to contact [them] and discuss our plans of incorporation… it was obvious that [they] were not at all familiar with our proposed plans.” Maryvale incorporation proponents would soon have to fight against the subversions of the Charter class in the court of public opinion.

Initially, many Maryvale residents seemed keen on the idea of incorporation. A resident argued that, personally, it wouldn’t make much of a difference since his veteran status left him exempt from many municipal taxes. However, municipal employees could help manage stray dogs—of which he believed Maryvale had too many. Other residents hoped that incorporation


would lead to a local post office. Local business-owners assumed that the projected size of Maryvale would make incorporation as sustainable venture. Eugene Keech, who would later gain prominence as a community healthcare activist, favored incorporation of the growing community. From the jewelry shop he owned at Maryvale Shopping City, he stated, “It’s a good idea, providing it isn’t too expensive and we wouldn’t want to set the world on fire.”376 The irony of these words will become apparent in the next chapter. More importantly, while Sunnyslope residents had lacked civic patrons to provide assistance with incorporation, Maryvale could always rely on John F. Long, who—even though the community builder took great strides to remain publicly neutral—Ayotte claimed would host city hall at Maryvale Shopping City.377

However, support for incorporation began to wane in Maryvale after hearing lectures from the AML and the mayors of Phoenix and Glendale at a meeting of the Maryvale Terrace Civic Association. While incorporation proponents argued the community needed to quickly incorporate to stave off annexation attempts, Maryvale resident Edward Morales questioned the timing of the incorporation drive when he stated, “We should wait until John Long…has the four business corners [at 51st and Indian School] completed. I am sure I will be interested then. At present, I’m not interested.”378 While local business-owners spoke out in favor of incorporation, William “Bill” Knudsen, a lawyer who lived in Maryvale, advised residents not to sign incorporation petitions Ayotte had been circulating. Ayotte would later protest that Phoenix officials tampered with the


meeting by planting anti-incorporation advocates in the audience, but one of the speakers at the meeting, a lawyer from Sunnyslope, had warned incorporation advocates to expect asymmetrical warfare by the Charter class.³⁷⁹ "Your newspaper will slant all stories to side with Phoenix in opposition to separate community incorporation. They are interested in having the City of Phoenix from mountain to mountain."³⁸⁰ Civic activists would soon take opposing sides on incorporation.

Morales and Knudsen joined forces to chair the Maryvale Homeowners Against Incorporation or Annexation. They argued that incorporation would “prove disastrous and costly to homeowners” and that they would “do everything in [their] power to keep Maryvale Terrace in the county and not changed into a city or annexed at the present time.”³⁸¹ However, Morales would soon step down due to his “heavy work schedule” and Knudsen would assume primary leadership of the organization.³⁸² Shortly after Morales stepped down, Ayotte delivered 250 signed incorporation petitions to the county supervisors—enough to initiate proceedings for an incorporation referendum.³⁸³ Due to recent alterations in state law, the community would have to


wait nearly five months, until early December, to hold an incorporation vote. Political alterations proposed to limit incorporation drives gave civic activists in Maryvale additional time to debate.

Incorporation debates also put young families at odds with each other. W. Mark “Bill” Fritz, who assumed leadership of the Maryvale Homeowners Against Incorporation or Annexation after Knudsen moved back to New York, lived down the street from Ayotte—moreover, they were brothers at the local lodge. The twenty-six-year-old Ayotte, a parent of three employed by AiResearch, had risked his health to acquire signatures for the referendum—he had lost thirteen pounds over the course of the drive. On the other hand, the twenty-nine-year-old Fritz claimed his four children were on his mind when advocating against incorporation. Fritz, a truck driver from Detroit, claimed that, “I’m trying to protect my home and my investment here. It is wrong to assume we can operate a city and pay less in taxes than we do now.” Fritz made it clear that his primary interest was to acquire the lowest taxation rates possible. Dorothy Davidson, a twenty-seven-year-old mother of two married to a mechanic, was the secretary for the Maryvale Homeowners Against Incorporation or Annexation. She asserted that “It is ridiculous to say that this corner here [at 51st and Indian School] would make a city. This incorporation attempt will be a dismal failure.” The thirty-six-year-old Long, who continued to argue that he was a neutral


agent and that incorporation was a decision for residents to make, was one of the most mature voices in the contest. The age and social status of the Maryvale civic activists stood in contrast with elites in the Charter class.

In the end, overwhelming sentiment went against incorporation in Maryvale. At a public meeting a week prior to the election, anti-incorporation advocates had a vocal majority in the room. Daly was present to publicly explain their arguments; he stated that the current incorporation petition excluded areas for potential industrial activity, “and a city needs industry to help pay the freight,” of municipal expenditures. Moreover, residents had no reason to be concerned about annexation as the City of Phoenix had not made immediate plans to annex the community. In addition, many residents in newer subdivisions had not lived in Maryvale long enough to be eligible to vote. Patience would prove to be the best course of action.

The Maryvale Homeowners Against Incorporation or Annexation issued a statement that mirrored Daly’s comments and warned that it could not endorse incorporation in a community “unable to provide the basic municipal services… without going into exorbitant taxes.” They attacked Ayotte for his inability to appreciate the quality of life the county had provided:

How ungrateful can the incorporationists be? Maryvale is now a community of good homes, good people? It has no distressing juvenile problems which be handled by parents who will take the time and trouble to do so. There is adequate police protection from the sheriff’s department, our other services are adequate. Let’s not give ourselves a headache by incorporating. "Adequate" services were what made Maryvale affordable for cost-conscious homeowners. Any municipal services would improve what existed—it would not provide anything currently lacking.


390 Ibid.
Ayotte had a different perspective than the anti-incorporation advocates—one that would resonate long after incorporation debates came to their end. He argued that Maryvale residents had to take steps to improve the infrastructure of the community or it would, “become a third-rate community and just an undesirable tract of homes.” He went on to argue that, “The area’s water supply is inadequate and of poor quality, that the traffic problem is great because of inadequate police patrol, and that fire protection is poor because the nearest fire house is 5 miles away... incorporation would eventually bring better services.” While better services would increase property values for Maryvale homeowners, voters declined incorporation by a vote of 577 to 52.

Maryvale would increasingly rely on external support for development of civic life after the rejection of the incorporation petition. However, much of this support was mediated by the consistent presence of John F. Long. He completed numerous deals with elected officials to acquire public resources for the development of civic amenities in Maryvale. For example, over a half-dozen parks would be constructed with public money in Maryvale by 1963. Additionally, Long developed a golf course that was managed by the city of Phoenix for the use of residents in Maryvale. Maryvale residents grew to appreciate their treatment by elected officials.

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392 Ibid.
395 “Maryvale Golf Course,” October 23, 1963, MS 9, Box 2 Folder 12, Phoenix City Records, Arizona Historical Society-Tempe.
In another example, Glendale and Phoenix joined forces to build a sewerage system and water treatment plant in anticipation of projected growth in the Maryvale area. There were so few utilities available when Long first began building Maryvale that the residents lacked telephone service. Long came to an agreement with the cities to connect 2,700 homes to the prospective sewerage lines. Despite that many of the homes had not yet been built, it was projected that the City of Phoenix would earn up to one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars in annual revenue in usage fees from Maryvale residents. Long promoted these improvements to prospective homebuyers to encourage home sales in his nascent community. Infrastructure intertwined the future of unincorporated suburban communities with incorporated cities in the West Valley. However, incorporated municipalities began to covet Maryvale residents as a source for revenue.

There were some civic activists in the West Valley who sought to incorporation as opposed to annexation. The agricultural community of Peoria, to the northwest of Maryvale, incorporated with 2,000 residents in 1954. Within a couple of years, it was able to pave about half of its roads, hire three police officers, and grow by another 500 residents—all without onerous property taxes. Instead, Peoria financed municipal expenses with state tax rebates and utility sales. City officials exuded confidence that energy investments made by the Salt River Project would encourage additional growth in the community. Peoria’s Mayor prophesied, “As jobs

397 Daly, July 24, 1978, 3.
become available, people will move to be near work. Maryvale activists saw how incorporation helped Peoria flourish and many hoped that incorporation could provide bring similar benefits; however, Peoria had also been able to acquire a water company debt-free to help finance their municipal government. Without similar types of initial investments, it would be nearly impossible for Maryvale to incorporate without the bane of the Anglo community—public debt.

Fortunately for Charter government, Anglo migrants preferred annexation into Phoenix than into other cities in the multi-racial West Valley. In 1958, Phoenix and Glendale came to an informal agreement on future municipal boundaries and agreed neither municipality would circulate annexation petitions in West Valley communities. But when residents encouraged Phoenix officials to initiate annexation proceedings, the City of Glendale sought to annex residential communities within their planned boundaries—primarily a series of subdivisions built by John F. Long as the northern extremity of Maryvale. Impacted residents organized to resist this annexation effort—not because they sought to remain unincorporated, or even to self-govern, but because they sought annexation into Phoenix. Residents pleaded that they had been promised annexation into Phoenix when purchasing their homes, but they were told that the city was not “responsible for the predictions of… salesmen.” Moreover, residents were currently paying Glendale to access water and sewer services—fees that municipality needed to pay its


portion of the sewer extension bonds.\textsuperscript{403} While Phoenix Mayor Mardian denied there had been any undisclosed agreements between the two municipalities, residents left feeling that Maryvale had been split between Phoenix and Maryvale in disregard of the residents’ desires. Derision for democratic deliberation would prove to be a common theme under Charter government.

\textsuperscript{403} Thelma Heatwole, “Annexation Move Begun By Glendale,” March 9, 1960, Phoenix-Annexation, Arizona Room, Burton Barr Public Library.
Figure 21 Street Map of Phoenix, 1961, courtesy of Northern Arizona University, Cline Library, Urban Map Collection.
Residents in Maryvale subdivisions slated for annexation into Phoenix were excited to finally join the Anglo capital; in fact, residents circulated and submitted their own annexation petitions to elected officials—labor typically reserved for city employees. However, they were told that the annexation would have to wait: officials had far grander plans for annexation than one-square mile of Maryvale. Instead, Charter government announced a plan to annex seventy-five square miles of land and 60,000 residents in the month prior to the 1960 census. This annexation, the largest the city would ever take, brought previously colored communities of the West Valley into Phoenix in a fell swoop. Just as the Sunnyslope annexation had conjoined with the Wilson fire district, the Maryvale annexation would include multi-racial South Phoenix as part of the petition.\textsuperscript{404} The Maryvale annexation ended political autonomy in unincorporated suburban communities surrounding Phoenix—none could resist the pull of the Anglo metropolis.

The Price of Civic Inclusion

Civic indigestion began to occur immediately after annexation was official.\textsuperscript{405} South Phoenix residents were largely disappointed with the lack of service improvement annexation brought their community. Complaints centered upon concerns tax revenue would not be spent to improve civic infrastructure. One resident complained, “[The Ice Cream Trucks] are as noisy as ever. [There’s] as much smoke [from burning trash] as ever. I haven’t seen anything yet that’s


worth the increase in taxes we'll have to pay.”

Even residents who looked forward to annexation were frustrated by the process of civic inclusion. A South Phoenix druggist who favored annexation griped, “I think we'll get [improvements] being in Phoenix. But I don’t think the city went about annexation right. They didn't get 51 percent of South Phoenix property owners to sign petitions… I think [South Phoenix] would have voted to come in… if we hadn’t been lumped in with Maryvale.”

The dismissal of democratic deliberation infuriated civic activists in South Phoenix—they would soon make elected officials defend their activities in a court of law.

Thousands of South Phoenix residents publicly protested before elected officials and at least 1,200 signed petitions requesting the state attorney general to void the results of the annexation election. Petitioners claimed that Phoenix had committed fraud and violated the rights of South Phoenix property-owners in the manner by which annexation had been conducted. First, South Phoenix had been “gerrymandered” into the annexation unit due to its assessed property values relative to other annexed neighborhoods as and Maryvale had higher property values than similar properties in South Phoenix. In essence, because of property devaluation in colored communities, residents had their property-rights infringed when included in an annexation unit with more affluent Anglo communities. Additionally, petitioners claimed that city employees misrepresented the gains residents could obtain from annexation. Frustration with the lack of improvements reverberated through the community long after the annexation lawsuit would be settled. Most interestingly, petitioners argued that area residents had been unfairly saddled with

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407 Ibid.

sixty-seven million dollars in bonded debt—liabilities assumed long before the annexation of
South Phoenix.409

Unfortunately for complainants, undemocratic deliberation was the price of civic inclusion
in Phoenix under Charter government. Charles A. Elmer, a Superior Court judge in Mohave
County, allowed the annexation to stand when he cleared Charter government of any wrongdoing
in its annexation of Maryvale and South Phoenix. While complainants argued that the relationship
between the two communities was “arbitrary, capricious and excessive,” Elmer opined that “so
long as the territory is contiguous, the size and shape thereof is a political and legislative question
not subject to judicial inquiry.”410 Moreover, municipal employees who promised undelivered
improvements to obtain signatures for an annexation petition had not committed offences that
met the legal bar for fraud. Indeed, the duplicitous tactics used by city officials to advance
annexation had irritated many residents. Elmer found no problem with the unannounced meetings
city officials held that reduced public awareness of annexation proceedings—even those
scheduled for as late as 10 P.M. Finally, Judge Elmer rejected the argument that annexation had
been done to “impose [bonded debt] upon the owners of the real and personal property in South
Phoenix… without due process of law; and for the unlawful purpose of permitting the City of
Phoenix to increase its bonded indebtedness… that contention is not correct. If it were, no city
with a bonded indebtedness could ever expand.”411 Judge Elmer decisively ended any debate on
the validity of the Maryvale annexation. Metropolitan Phoenix, and all the unincorporated
communities within it, had become the political fiefdom of Charter government.

409 Gene Lindsey, “Court Ruling Hits Annexation Foes,” Phoenix Gazette, February 15, 1960,
Phoenix-Annexation, Arizona Room, Burton Barr Public Library.

410 The Honorable Charles P. Maricopa County Superior Court, Memorandum Opinion and Order
Re. Motions of Defendant in Rovan v. Phoenix, February 10, 1961, 1-5, 10, MSM 951, Arizona
Collection, Hayden Library, Arizona State University Libraries.

411 Ibid.
Still, by 1960, suburban Anglos in unincorporated communities decided that annexation into Phoenix was superior to political autonomy. There were exceptions—but those communities chose to incorporate and finance metropolitan infrastructure via local taxes. Most communities lacked the civic leadership and economic base of the Anglo capital and desperately sought admission no matter the civic cost. Near the time of the South Mountain annexation suit, Phoenix mayor Mardian met a group of homeowners to express his condolences that the city would not seek to annex their subdivisions and quipped that it was pleasant to meet people who, unlike South Phoenix residents, were actively seeking annexation. One resident retorted in anger, “well, throw them out and take us in.”

However, the seeds of its own political opposition would flourish in the soil annexed by Phoenix to provide revenue to pay back bond debts.

The John Birch-influenced “Stay American Committee” (SAC) rose in civic prominence with a series of visceral political attacks against the development program advanced by Charter government. Many members of their electoral slate lived in the West Valley or South Phoenix; additionally, most had resisted annexation into Phoenix. In particular, their morality-based appeals (the vociferous agitation of one candidate against “clean prostitution” forced Charter government to publicly state that Phoenix had unremarkable rates for venereal disease or forcible rapes to deny the existence of organized prostitution) were couched in resistance to the centralized civic authority of the National Municipal League. One candidate argued that the “Municipal League…erase[d] identities of cities, counties and the next step would be to erase state differences and, finally, national identities entirely.”

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414 JFS, “Memo: SAC Meeting,” Southern Avenue & 7th Street, November 3, 1961, 8:00 – 10:40 P.M., Box 2 Folder 9, Phoenix City Records, Arizona Historical Society-Tempe.
the anti-democratic practices of annexation to produce a bumper crop of populism. Despite their ideological conservativism, civic elites in Charter government were perplexed by how to respond. SAC appealed to the dissatisfaction that rippled through recently annexed communities when infrastructure investment proved unforthcoming. In their statement of issues, SAC stated its candidates, "unalterably opposed Metro or any other municipal system of government which empowers the importation of a manager into our city over whom the citizens have no control." Their criticisms pointed directly at the clandestine annexations proposed under Charter:

Metro government has not been responsive to the electorate as it has worked in Phoenix. The faces on the council change, but the people behind the scenes remain, while the administration of city affairs and municipal planning grows progressively more disorganized, confused and wasteful... The Stay American Committee believes that the present city administration has been derelict in its responsibility to the citizens of Phoenix by not keeping itself and the people of Phoenix informed of the character and intent of the powerful agencies working against us.

SAC capitalized upon the disillusionment of annexed voters using the populist discourse that had halted incorporation efforts across metropolitan Phoenix over the previous decade. Where anti-incorporationists had previously rejected appeals for political sovereignty by under-funded civic activists, they now rejected the professional services of metropolitan governance. While annexation had rendered municipal services more affordable, to many, the cost of democratic deliberation had been a price too high to bear.

While critiques of Charter government resonated with many civic activists, the primary focus of SAC was, in fact, the city manager. SAC argued that the Phoenix city Charter—established in 1948 prior to the first elected slate of Charter government representatives—allowed the city manager to "override the elective franchise of the citizens of the City of Phoenix." SAC argued that the city Charter had rendered elected officials accountable to this

\footnote{Stay American Committee, “Statement of Issues,” October 18, 1961, Box 2 Folder 9, Phoenix City Records, Arizona Historical Society-Tempe.}

\footnote{Ibid.}

\footnote{Ibid.}
unelected professional—not voters. The professional distance the manager-council system placed between elected officials and the city manager—a distance enforced by the invisible hand of Charter—muddied the hierarchy of power within municipal governance. SAC questioned why councilmembers could not interfere with the plans of the city manager if “a person who was in authority over someone else would have the authority to remove a subordinate. Wouldn’t he?”

The council-manager system had brought efficiency at the cost of popular sovereignty: “Now we are looking for efficiency, then we can have a dictatorship because a dictator, of course, is the most efficient government, but we believe in doing the American way by electing our officials and letting the elected officials carry on our way of government.” SAC identified the city charter as a form of “Metro Socialism” that advanced ideas from “Russian International Socialism” on behalf of the “UNESCO-METRO government.”

Not only were programs such as urban renewal and water fluoridation promoted by philanthropists such as the Rockefeller family, but the Arizona Municipal League was a “front organization” for the “Public Administration Service at 1313 East 60th Street in Chicago.”

SAC concluded:

“The present city administration has been derelict in its responsibility to the citizens of Phoenix by not keeping itself and the people of Phoenix informed of the character and intent of the powerful agencies working against us. The Stay American Slate [of candidates] is pledged to remove the influence of the invisible international hidden hands from our local government.”

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418 Aubrey Moore Broadcast, undated, 2.
419 Aubrey Moore Broadcast, Station KHEP, October 24, 1961, Box 2 Folder 9, Phoenix City Records, Arizona Historical Society-Tempe, 6.
421 Ibid.
422 Ibid.
These political perspectives were unheard of from most serious political candidates. SAC emailed the editor of the *Phoenix Gazette* just to make clear that they shared the same conservative ideology as their opponents. However, "the inexcusable snarled traffic conditions of Phoenix, the ill-timed and repeated tearing up of streets," were seen as, "visible results of the confusion foisted upon our city administration by the experts in Chicago... [seeking] the ultimate objectives of Metro government, namely, a dictatorship under a socialistic U.N. one world system." And still, SAC would become the primary opposition to Charter government in the 1961 municipal election.

Rev. Aubrey L. Moore, pastor of the West Van Buren Southern Baptist church, was the Mayoral candidate for SAC. An internal Charter memo noted, “Plant [Moore] in Arkansas, give him a first-class depression, and he’d be Governor in two years. Huey Long could have used him.” Their derision belied Moore’s political success: he led a successful campaign to repeal the Phoenix Housing Code on the basis that it, “gave dictatorial power to the urban renewal director to come into my house without a search warrant... and demolish a man’s building on a property and make him pay for it by charging a tax lien.” On weekly radio broadcasts, Moore employed discourse straight from the Sunnyslope annexation debates with his calls for Phoenicians to reject their dependence on white-collar, college-educated technicians installed by Charter government. The Anglo voters against annexation or incorporation now had a candidate who promised to deliver the entire apparatus of municipal governance to their disposal.

Moore was driven apoplectic by the use of urban renewal funding to improve the built environment in the wake of annexation. Interestingly absent of any racist overtones, Moore claimed that it urban renewal made it possible for city planners to strip homeowners of their property rights in the pursuit of planned development. He argued:

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423 Ed Newhall, Public Information Officer, Stay American Committee, undated letter to the *Phoenix Gazette* Editor, Box 2 Folder 9, Phoenix City Records, Arizona Historical Society-Tempe.

424 Aubrey Moore Broadcast, October 24, 1961, 4.
The only way that these residential sections can become commercial is that there be some programs, much as the urban renewal program, with a housing code to come in and declare the residential sections unfit for habitation, so that the houses may be condemned and demolished. Whether or not the homeowner wants to sell them or not, he can be put out of his house... and his property, of course, taken at whatever evaluation is put on it, and that program will be an urban renewal project. There is no way to accomplish a plan which has already been planned in Phoenix through 1980 without first of all having some method whereby the property can be taken. \[425\]

These arguments were the first cries of voter’s remorse to emerge from civic activists in annexed communities. The benevolence of annexation had never been seriously considered; it was merely the most affordable and efficient way to ensure that all residents had access to metropolitan infrastructure. Annexation into the Anglo capital offered an opportunity for aspirational residents to join in an affluent lifestyle that attracted so many migrants to Arizona but lay beyond the financial capacity of many residents. The rise of SAC reflects how disillusioned many civic activists had become by the price their communities paid to acquire metropolitan infrastructure.

Conclusion

Charter government was still strong enough to weather dissent among civic activists. In many ways, while SAC had been able to attract small donations from civic discontents, their reserves of civic capital still could not match that of the Charter class. \[426\] Civic elites remained steadfast in their support for Charter government; moreover, by focusing resources on communities likely to support Charter government, civic elites had constructed an electoral firewall to withstand increased agitation by marginalized civic activists. Charter government won the 1961 municipal election with a nearly 2-1 margin of victory over SAC. Charter fared adequately well in Sunnyslope and faced significant opposition in South Phoenix, but in 1961,

\[425\] Aubrey Moore Broadcast, Station KHEP, October 19, 1961, Box 2 Folder 9, Phoenix City Records, Arizona Historical Society-Tempe, 2.

\[426\] Aubrey Moore Broadcast, October 24, 1961, 1.
civic activists in Maryvale offered solid support at the polls. Unlike residents in South Phoenix, who after annexation remained, “up to [their] neck in dust … [With] pot holes along the road, [while] there are millions being spend for 18-hole golf courses,” Maryvale was a recipient of such benefits from annexation. However, in 1962, the economy began to teeter, and by 1963 Maryvale had become a completely different community than the one annexed into Phoenix.

By the early sixties, a decade of home construction had enriched bankers and builders across the state. However, the market for suburban homes was over-saturated across the country by this time, and in their exuberance to build a suburban landscape, local land agents ignored a fatal constraint—debt. When the economy slowed down, hundreds of homes entered foreclosure, and the collective value of suburban housing plummeted. Long distinctly recalled the impact the sixties housing bubble left on Maryvale once it popped:

Ohhh, in the early 60s there was a severe recession in the Mary—well, not in Maryvale, but in the state of Arizona. Employment dropped. A lot of the people that had moved here and then lost their jobs wherever they were working were no longer able to make—could make their payments and they moved out and the houses went into repossession, either to the FHA or VA… At one time, FHA and VA together had about a thousand homes that were repossessed, and that was starting to be a real drag on the community. FHA and VA didn’t have the funds to—or the authority, I guess, at the time—because it takes nine months of legal process too—for them to completely repossess the home, and kids would knock out windows and weeds grow up and so forth. So, anyway, we stepped in and made an arrangement with FHA where we took over the management of all the repossessed homes in the—in the repainting and the cleaning up and so forth, and, by doing that, it turned the—it turned the

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427 Phoenix Municipal Election Vote Map and Vote Totals, 1959, 1961, 1963, Box 1, Folder 8 or Box 2, Folder 13, Phoenix City Records, Arizona Historical Society-Tempe.

428 Aubrey Moore Broadcast, Station KHEP, October 30, 1961, Box 2 Folder 9, Phoenix City Records, Arizona Historical Society-Tempe, 1.

market around and the area around and it preserved the value of the other homeowners’ properties.\footnote{430} Long served, as he always had, as a civic patron for his community; however, the city of Phoenix did nothing. Indebted West Valley property owners were like in the same position they always had been—at the mercy of the market.

Daly remembered that, “A lot… they didn’t make out and went back East where they came from and unloaded their houses; a lot of them were bought up by—by real estate operators and rented out and the renters didn’t help the area.”\footnote{431} While Black residents had struggled to find housing outside of South Phoenix, the FHA and VA foreclosures in the Maryvale area were made available for colored buyers via speculators who sought to sell the homes on contract or rent them out to colored tenants. The Phoenix Human Relations Commission helped publicize an experiment where Charles Harlins, director of the Phoenix Urban League, “made ten calls, and out of this number when he was told [I] was a Negro, 8 said ‘No’ and 2 said ‘Yes’ but upped the price… this is what is commonly called among Negroes “black tax.”\footnote{432} However, this experiment also found that the more expensive the home, the less likely neighbors were to complain about integration. Maryvale was just affordable enough so that colored residents could purchase homes there—but also expense enough to prevent residents from protesting too vociferously. In the end, speculators re-envisioned Maryvale as a racially-integrated community and due to the indifference of metropolitan governance, there was nothing Anglo residents could do to stop it.


\footnote{431} Daly, July 24, 1978, 29-30.

The words of Rev. Moore would haunt Maryvale after the city failed to step in to ameliorate the foreclosure crisis. Moore argued that he was, “Standing for the common man… [who’s] supposed to have the money to take care of his own property.” But when people in Maryvale encountered hardships that made it impossible to meet those concerns, Charter government was not there to support them. If anything, the Charter class had benefitted from the foreclosure crisis as civic elites had the resources to purchase properties from distressed owners for pennies on the dollar. Furthermore, despite the low taxes residents paid, the city of Phoenix continued to “[pay] those big corporation taxes and then charged the little man and simply put him out of his house if [taxes] were not paid.” Civic activists in Maryvale had ignored Moore when he argued that, “what is happening here…is part of a gigantic plan to take the individual and make him nothing but a servant of the government,” but after the foreclosure crisis, it was possible to see how residents may have been duped. Moore argued:

Charter Government boasts of what all it has done. It has taken away people’s private property and said we’re going to carry on our plan regardless of what it takes. They’re not concerned with the aged or those on pension, whether or not they have a home… They’re concerned with spending the great bulk of the $103 million bond issue on golf courses and civic centers for the elite.

Maryvale residents had come to believe that they were part of these elite—they were mistaken. In the next chapter, Maryvale’s civic activists would be treated as a threat by the Charter class, and when crisis came, civic elites would ensure Maryvale residents remained under their authority.

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433 Aubrey Moore Broadcast, October 30, 1961, 3.
434 Ibid., 4.
435 Ibid.
436 Ibid., 3.
CHAPTER 4

Public Debt, Private Profit: Community Healthcare and Civic Insolvency in Maryvale

Introduction

Maryvale quickly became a central site for West Valley civic activities after annexation into Phoenix. Sunbelt Capitalism continued to spur infrastructure investment in Maryvale and the West Valley through suburban development after Maryvale voted for annexation into Phoenix. Maryvale residents may have had dissimilar politics than civic elites in their expanded community, but ambitious local activists continued to wax optimistic about new opportunities made available by annexation into the Anglo capital. But, in humiliating fashion, local civic leaders shattered community goodwill once they helped outside speculators exploit West Valley medical patients under the pretense of community healthcare. These types of scams are typical in Arizona as beneficiaries of public confidence use their social status for private enrichment. However, unlike regional elites who could create distance from those affected by their schemes, local activists remained intimately involved in associative community life. Future residents would bear invisible taxes for debts civic leaders accrued enriching speculators who, adding insult to injury, broke public trust in order to profit from community development. The blots of debt that strained relations between the West Valley and Maricopa County would soon, to the detriment of local civic life, color relations between Maryvale and the City of Phoenix.

Community Healthcare

On September 11, 1961, the Maryvale Community Hospital opened its doors to the paying public. Maryvale Hospital was a non-profit corporation organized by local community healthcare advocates. With the support of local civic leaders, small investors, and, more
importantly, a projected population explosion, these advocates had been able to develop modern facilities, including a futuristic cancer treatment unit, in economically modest Maryvale. Among the civic boosters who supported the project, none was more prominent than John F. Long—recently named both Realtor and Citizen of the Year by the Phoenix Real Estate Board for his prodigious production (his family operated firm had become one of the ten largest homebuilders in the nation) and for his civic generosity. By this time, Long's personal charity was renowned across the Valley, as he had donated land and labor to construct an elementary school for the Cartwright district along with a municipal golf course he deeded to the city of Phoenix. But local healthcare advocates and civic leaders had provided what Long could not: healthcare. In a newspaper ad celebrating Maryvale Hospital, Long expressed his regard for the “people of Maryvale, who wholeheartedly supported the project through bond purchases, fund drives, cake sales, and by their contributions in time,” to collectively organize and operate “a fine facility brought about by [c]ommunity [e]ffort.” Residents of Maryvale, which Long had eponymously named after his wife, had pooled their resources to build a hospital much like a family that managing one of the West Valley farms which the Long family had grown up on.

Hudson L. McGuire, the primary developer for Maryvale Hospital, shared this sentiment. As president of the Universal Development Company, Incorporated, McGuire placed a full-page ad in the Arizona Republic celebrating the construction of a “badly-needed modern hospital” for residents of Phoenix. McGuire thanked Eugene T. Keech, secretary of Maryvale Community Hospital, Inc., for his collaboration with McGuire in order to bring Maryvale Hospital into

437 “Maryvale Hospital Dedicated, Phoenix Gazette, August 25, 1961, Maryvale Community Hospital (MCH), Arizona Room, Burton Barr Public Library.


439 “Congratulations to Maryvale Community Hospital,” Arizona Republic, August 26, 1961.
realization. Keech organized an auxiliary, which was uniformly staffed by local women, for those who sought to donate labor opposed to wealth. Furthermore, his non-profit corporation sponsored the sale of $3.325 million in mortgage bonds to finance construction of Maryvale Hospital. Without local healthcare advocates, Maryvale Hospital would not have been able to register as an Arizona non-profit corporation, a status that allowed McGuire and his fellow promoters to build the hospital beyond the gaze of federal regulators if their actions remained within the state of Arizona.

In many ways, Maryvale Hospital was emblematic of the strategy Long had first promulgated when he sought FHA section 213 financing for Maryvale—which was to have civic leaders operate community institutions at an affordable cost without the influence of outside investors. Healthcare advocates had not realized, however, how vulnerable civic participants would be to economic exploitation without regulatory oversight into hospital operations. Not only did securities salesmen expose Maryvale Hospital to unexpected legal liabilities, but Universal Development also offered exorbitant construction contracts to non-competitive bidders—including one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for land purchased from Long. He would accompany 150 other defendants into civil court when they were collectively accused of defrauding bondholders by “controlling and manipulating all of these corporations, including the hospital, [and entering] into a series of contracts with themselves.” In the end, the avarice of contractors and promoters bankrupted the Maryvale Hospital. Civic life would never recover from the foreclosure.

Maryvale Hospital was the crown jewel of the civic community. By orders of magnitude, it was the largest civic institution in the community; in many ways, it was the logical conclusion of the civic praxis that had established the community. Quickly and painfully, he non-profit corporation led by a local board of directors lost control of Maryvale Hospital to court-appointed

440 “Best Wishes to Maryvale Community Hospital,” Arizona Republic, August 26, 1961.

441 “Fraud Suit is Filed,” Phoenix Gazette, June 1, 1963, MCH, Arizona Room, Burton Barr Public Library.
receivers.\textsuperscript{442} The \textit{Arizona Republic} argued that “the community spirit that makes the Maryvale section famous” led healthcare advocates to trust unscrupulous Midwestern confidence men who took advantage of institutional development for their own financial gain.\textsuperscript{443} As creditor lawsuits began to pile up, healthcare advocates on the hospital board had to prioritize profit accumulation to reassure judges that their “loyalty [was] to the bondholders.”\textsuperscript{444} Despite the fact its debt reorganization led to financial solvency and debt repayment, Maryvale Hospital would be sold to a regional healthcare system in 1968; moreover, bondholders would earn every penny of their principal investment—with interest. The civic community would never be compensated for its sacrifices in efforts to maintain the “non-profit” hospital—there was no indemnification for social capital.

Community control of civic institutions was unusually difficult to maintain in Maryvale because of the deregulated ambiguities of land policy in the political economy of Sunbelt Capitalism. As engines of civic energy and economic development, big non-profit hospitals elicited intense attention from regional powerbrokers. While local property owners or civic leaders dictated neighborhood development, community control over the built environment had never been central to their agenda. These property owners and civic leaders ignored requests that the broader community of healthcare consumers, paid employees, and uncompensated volunteers receive compensation for the fraud committed by outside promoters. To financially protect investors, local communities both produced and consumed healthcare at prices distorted by

\textsuperscript{442} “Receivership of Hospital Held Illegal,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, November 15, 1963, MCH, Arizona Room, Burton Barr Public Library.

\textsuperscript{443} Gene McLain, “Maryvale Hospital’s New Look,” February 20, 1963, 1, 4, MCH.

\textsuperscript{444} Don Bolles, “Maryvale Community Hospital Fights After-Effects of Lawsuit,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, June 16, 1963, MCH.
banditry to make suburban development profitable in an unregulated, low-tax, high-growth political economy.\textsuperscript{445} Community control in civic institutions was sacrificed for profitable efficiency.

Healthcare in Postwar Arizona

Arizona faced unique challenges in its provision of healthcare in the immediate period after World War II. For starters, there was a dearth of investment in healthcare infrastructure. Maricopa County had fewer than 1,200 private hospital beds in 1952—roughly one for every 300 residents. State officials argued that Maricopa County would need to increase its supply of beds by one-third just to meet current demands for healthcare provision as the undercapitalized system did not have enough excess capacity to address emergencies.\textsuperscript{446} However, an even greater dedication of resources would be necessary to provide healthcare infrastructure for migrants, and especially for those who came seeking respite from respiratory illnesses.\textsuperscript{447} The infrastructure established to address these concerns remained insufficient.

Unhealthy migrants, especially those who were incapacitated or unemployed, were seen as an undesirable burden on an undercapitalized public health system. In fact, indigent hospital visitors were required to have been residents of Maricopa County for at least one year to qualify for public aid. These onerous restrictions did little to stem demands uninsured Arizonans placed upon the healthcare system. Around half of all hospital visitors lacked insurance, and many insurance plans such as Blue Cross were unavailable in the state until the mid-1950s. The

\textsuperscript{445} Gene McLain, “Maryvale Hospital’s New Look,” February 20, 1963, MCH.


\textsuperscript{447} Don Dedera, “Free Medical Services Run High,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, February 15, 1954, PHX-Hospitals.
broader public health system struggled to meet the demand for healthcare by those unable to pay for service. In addition to its charity services, Phoenix Memorial Hospital wrote off one hundred thousand dollars in unpaid bills in 1953. Good Samaritan Hospital, one of the largest in town, was unable to collect sixty thousand dollars in billed services that same year. Antagonism between penurious institutions and impoverished residents exacerbated disparities in healthcare provision.  

Figure 22 Good Samaritan Hospital Located at Tenth Street and McDowell Road, Phoenix, Arizona, December 11, 1931, courtesy of McCulloch Brothers Photographs, Herb and Dorothy McLaughlin Collection, Arizona State University Libraries.

These non-profit hospitals needed access to credit to cover payroll, supplies, and other operating expenses because of the unreliability of patient-based income. Federal programs, most notably the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, commonly known as the Hill-Burton Act, provided some outside capital to help pay for infrastructure investment, but antipathy toward federal subsidies made local institutions more likely to depend on underpaid service employees or, in many cases, unpaid auxiliary volunteers to lower operating expenses and reduce exposure to potentially damaging debt interest. Auxiliaries, who were usually married women or teenagers, would attend to the social needs of patients so that paid employees could more narrowly focus their energy on recuperative labor. Auxiliaries also served as seamstresses, laundresses, and interior designers for local hospitals. The most innovative auxiliaries found ways to independently raise funds for hospitals. At St. Joseph’s, the most affluent hospital in the Valley, 800 auxiliaries staffed hospital wards, operated the gift shop, and served as greeters for incoming

patients. They even organized a “baby alumni group,” which expectant mothers could join after the birth of their child. For one dollar per year, members could be part of a community that the auxiliary would draw upon for labor and goodwill.\(^{450}\) The unpaid labor of the women recruited by the auxiliaries was indispensable to the operation of the local hospitals.

Hospitals also depended on the civic energy of their auxiliaries to augment fundraising opportunities. In 1961, in response to dangerously high rates of hospital occupancy after years of underinvestment, the Maricopa County Hospital Development Association began a fundraising campaign to rapidly develop healthcare facilities in anticipation of an expected metropolitan population of 1.5 million in 1980.\(^{451}\) At St. Luke’s, one of the oldest hospitals in the Valley, soirees sponsored by the auxiliary raised ten thousand dollars annually in support of the hospital. The women of this auxiliary leveraged their relationships with high-end designers and the metropolitan Junior League to incite flurries of civic energy among regional elites. The hospitals, along with John C. Lincoln Hospital, were the largest drivers of civic energy in the Valley.\(^{452}\) And unfortunately for residents of Maryvale, all these facilities were distant from their locale in the primarily agricultural West Valley. Healthcare advocates would have to seek alternatives to provide healthcare infrastructure in Maryvale.

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Healthcare Speculation

Maryvale was not the only West Valley community seeking to develop healthcare infrastructure. Municipal leaders in Glendale had already determined that their city needed independence from the hospitals of central Phoenix. According to Byron Peck, the mayor of Glendale from 1958-1962, “apathy and lack of cooperation on the part of the doctors and most of the residents of Glendale” had previously prevented the development of modern health care facilities. However, municipal leaders in Glendale mustered community support after solicitation by promoters who argued that the booming population surrounding Glendale necessitated a hospital. City officials decided that the promoters would advance residents thirty-five thousand dollars to buy land for a Glendale hospital; construction costs would be financed through the sale of first mortgage bonds at eight percent interest. By September 1959, the non-profit Northwest Hospital, Inc. was formed to help sell bonds for the hospital with Valley National Bank, the largest bank in Arizona, as trustee for the mortgage.453

Similarly, healthcare advocates had been attempting to develop a hospital in Maryvale since the mid-1950s, but residents lacked the necessary knowledge to develop community health institutions. However, they were encouraged by the progress in Glendale, and when “someone with the money and the know-how” finally came to Maryvale with a similar offer, Maryvale Community Hospital, Inc., was born. Community leaders were optimistic about the potential of these Midwestern promoters to develop Maryvale Hospital. The healthcare advocates had the full-throated support of Long, because while he had planned for community healthcare facilities when he first designed Maryvale, he had been unable to finance the development up until this point. After the non-profit was established, Long stated:

It has been [my] pleasure to plan for the location well in advance of the actual need, make the land available to a responsible organization, and to cooperate with them

throughout the construction period. [I am] proud of this newest addition to the Maryvale Community and the fine organization responsible for bringing it about."\(^{454}\)

The 146-bed facility—more than twice the size of Northwest Hospital—would quickly prove its economic value to Long. In December 1960, he leased land adjacent to Maryvale Hospital to another builder to construct the for-profit Maryvale Medical Center—a suburban medical building with space for more than a dozen health professionals, x-ray laboratories, and a pharmacy.\(^{455}\) At every step of the process, land developers profited from Maryvale Hospital.

Unfortunately, development fever had obscured one vital detail—it was extremely difficult to sell the eight percent mortgage bonds. Mayor Peck would later recall that local professionals lacked confidence in the Northwest Hospital eight percent mortgage bonds and “failed to recommend them to the public.” Peck believed that “established” hospitals such as St. Joseph’s and Good Samaritan “feared the competition from new hospitals” and convinced the public that hospitals financed through eight percent mortgage bonds were being led by a “bunch of crooks.” In response, Peck intensified his promotional strategy and plastered the Pulliam Press with ads promoting the bonds—he even rented office space to help salesmen market the bonds.\(^{456}\) But in the end, it took the support of the broader civic community to arouse financial support for the facilities. First, Peck had the only four medical doctors in Glendale to release a statement expressing support for the hospital. They challenged residents to “get behind this effort and put it

\(^{454}\) “Congratulations to Maryvale Community Hospital,” *Arizona Republic*, August 26, 1961.

\(^{455}\) “New Medical Center Set in Maryvale,” *Arizona Republic*, December 21, 1960, 20

across, [lest] we shut our eyes as we have done before and let someone else do it."457 More importantly, Peck had convinced his wife and sister-in-law to help form an auxiliary for the Northwest Hospital. He later identified their tireless efforts as key to the development of the hospital. The auxiliary worked with the Glendale Chamber of Commerce to attract financial support for the hospital from First National Bank, Arizona Public Service, and Salt River Project.458 But ultimately, Peck had to rally municipal resources to promote bond sales. So, while it took nearly two years of civic activity to raise the eight hundred thousand dollars necessary to build the sixty-five bed Northwest Hospital, Maryvale Hospital was on another scale.459

Healthcare advocates and civic leaders followed the strategy implemented in Glendale to raise the capital necessary to construct Maryvale Hospital. First, Long highlighted the planned development in the promotional materials for his home sales—proving that Maryvale Hospital had the backing of the primary investor in Maryvale. Next, an auxiliary was organized to help rally women seeking civic engagement. The Maryvale Women's Club helped organize social events, such as dances, variety hours, and dinner plays, in order to raise proceeds for Maryvale Hospital. These events helped provide variety for an underdeveloped local cultural milieu; moreover, it gave local women opportunities to participate in the production and development of the hospital.460 In addition, the registered non-profit plastered the Pulliam Press with tidings of

457 "Four Glendale Physicians Ask Community support of Hospital," Arizona Republic, February 27, 1960.
economic windfalls to entice local residents to purchase bonds. For months, local residents were
told, “your money can earn 100% more” through the purchase of bonds via mail, at the
construction site, or at the sales offices in the Central Towers of Midtown Phoenix. Less affluent
residents could even acquire bonds with only ten percent down and monthly installments.\footnote{Advertisement, “First Bond Mortgages,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, July 9, 1960; Advertisement, “First Mortgage Bonds,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, February 12, 1960; Advertisement, “Earn 8% Interest; First Mortgage Bonds,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, October 10, 1960; Advertisement, “Bearing 8% Interest,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, January 22, 1960; Advertisement, “Your Money Can Earn 100% More for You,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, February 24, 1960.} However, the institutional forces most antagonistic toward these embryonic healthcare
enterprises pumped civic energy through the ventricles of political power in the city of Phoenix.
Unlike the Northwest Hospital, which received the full-throated support of small-town Glendale,
the Maryvale Hospital would have to weather its initial financial woes without any support from
Phoenix. Annexation into the Anglo Capital would deny civic participants in Maryvale municipal
support for their efforts to develop community healthcare.

Healthcare Competition

While Arizona continued to lag other states in the number of aggregate hospital beds, it
had quickly begun to catch up in the caliber of healthcare hospitals provided to patients. By the
late 1950s, Arizonans no longer needed to travel to other states for modern medical procedures;
the big non-profit hospitals finally acquired the innovative healthcare technologies developed
during World War II., As home to the Barrow Neurological Clinic, St. Joseph’s invested heavily in
medical technology in the postwar period. It became one of the first hospitals in the southwest to
have a dialysis machine—a revolution in the treatment of renal disease. St. Joseph’s also
invested heavily in cancer imagery equipment, and in turn, invested in cancer treatment. St.
Joseph's eventually housed the Southwest Cancer Center and acquired equipment for cancer radiation and cobalt therapy treatment. While above the national averages, local hospital beds were around three-fourths the cost of beds in unionized Californian cities, and civic elites prioritized technological investment to help the big non-profits to compete in that market.

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Figure 24 Saint Joseph’s Facilities After Expansion, Phoenix, Arizona, 1931, courtesy of McCulloch Brothers Photographs, Herb and Dorothy McLaughlin Collection, Arizona State University Libraries.
The big non-profits justified these investments despite the ongoing shortages in hospital accessibility by targeting external factors. First, they blamed strengthened construction regulations for driving building costs ruinously high; indeed, an entire constellation of construction companies’ rose to feed off the meteoric rise of healthcare facility costs. Additionally, Insurance companies like Blue Cross had only begun to make inroads into the state’s uninsured population. The growth of Blue Cross was essential for the financial health of the local hospitals; so

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metropolitan elites peppered Blue Cross’ board of directors and sought to reduce the giant pool of uninsured healthcare consumers. It made little financial sense to invest in general hospital construction until the liability of uninsured patients could be reduced.\textsuperscript{465} And in Maricopa County, most hospitals had difficulty acquiring the composite number of medical employees necessary to fully staff a functional facility. For example, in 1964, even St. Joseph’s could only fill three of eighteen vacant intern positions at its illustrious research center. This struggle was heightened for hospitals that focused on underserved communities—Phoenix Memorial Hospital was unable to fill any of its vacant intern positions that same year.\textsuperscript{466}

But more importantly, healthcare officials blamed the rising cost of medical labor for their inability to provide healthcare at an affordable cost. First off, the shortage of skilled medical labor in the region gave employees the leverage to select which employer they would render service. The big non-profit hospitals attempted to reduce upward pressure on payroll through collusion, but they could not manage labor conditions at community hospitals that had been financed using eight percent mortgage bonds. The big non-profits argued that, in the long run, healthcare would be more efficient and less expensive at their facilities than at the community hospitals. But a half-dozen upstarts developed in Phoenix in 1961, and it was unclear where the labor to staff these facilities would arise. Father Emmett McLoughlin, a healthcare icon in the Valley, claimed that these new hospitals were driving the cost of local healthcare up by “pirating” patients and staff.\textsuperscript{467}

Valley nurses, whose pay started at below four hundred dollars each month, were lured away by

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{465} “City Hospital Occupancy Rate, ‘Dangerously High,’” \textit{Arizona Republic}, May 15, 1962, Phoenix-Hospital Development Association, Arizona Room, Burton Barr Public Library.
\item \textsuperscript{466} “Arizona Hospitals Short of Interns,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, March 9, 1964, AZ-Hospitals.
\item \textsuperscript{467} “New Maryvale Hospital to Open Doors Monday,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, September 7, 1961, MCH; Julian DeVries, “Blame Put on Newer Facilities,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, September 12, 1961, PHX-Hospitals. McLoughlin started Phoenix Memorial Hospital in to provide health services to poverty-stricken communities in Phoenix.
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monthly pay raises of as much as forty dollars, and many of the nurses employed at Maryvale Hospital had been actively agitating for increased compensation while at other Valley institutions. Nurses at Maryvale Hospital bristled at the “inadequate economic status of the nursing profession” and requested a comparison of local wages to national averages. \(^{468}\) Reduced competition among healthcare providers was a tool of the big non-profits to maintain labor expenses. Underpaid hospital workers, especially those who relocated to community hospitals, rejoiced at the employer competition that undermined this tactic.

The big non-profits would redouble their civic activities to fundraise for facility expansion. The expansion of their hospitals would help reduce the demand for additional community hospitals. Furthermore, the nascent community hospitals would have to compete with established interests for charitable donations. The augmented civic activity of the big non-profits consumed charitable resources that may have helped improve the condition of more affordable hospitals in Maricopa County—institutional facilities that were as dangerous as the ailments treated in their buildings. Three-fourths of the unsuitable beds in the county were at the public hospital—it was a veritable firetrap—and at the shadiest of the community hospitals, all the beds were unsuitable. Rising business expenses had ruinous effects on hospitals in less-developed areas, yet the Hospital Development Association hoped to use Hill-Burton funding to expand affluent St. Joseph’s. \(^{469}\) As is the fashion of Sunbelt Capitalism, metropolitan elites provided the civic energy necessary to reroute federal subsidies toward the institutions most likely to enhance land

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development—with little regard for how these actions may impact community control over the local built environment.  

Healthcare Boom

When it became clear that Maryvale Hospital had been scammed, there was little that could shield the facility from financial fallout as the non-profit remained liable for the eight percent mortgage bonds sold to finance construction. This left residents to reorganize and refinance construction of a hospital they had little professional capacity to manage after the Midwestern promoters fled town without finishing construction. So, because of its lack of human capital, the board had to continue to depend on outsiders to finish development of Maryvale Hospital. Robert Cooper, the first administrator of the hospital, was hired from the Midwest. The public relations director for Universal Development, Paul LeBoeuf, became the next administrator after Cooper. This Iowan had helped Universal build hospitals in Iowa, Ohio, Missouri, and Florida. Maryvale Hospital would be entrusted to developers seeking financial remuneration—not civic prestige.

But Maryvale Hospital remained poorly run even after this reorganization. Civic leaders found that they owed additional money on equipment like x-ray machines, laboratory devices, and telecommunications appliances. The hospital board had to issue another five hundred thousand dollars in bonds to pay for construction cost overruns. These losses attracted negative attention from local residents. Before Maryvale Hospital opened, local residents John and Ruth Taylor sued the hospital for two thousand dollars on the grounds that, contrary to its non-profit status, it

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471 Gene McLain, “Maryvale Hospital’s New Look,” February 20, 1963, MCH.


had in fact been incorporated, “for the personal, private, and pecuniary profit of certain of its promoters.” Their argument was that the cost of the hospital would “require the sick people of this community to provide the capital funds [for] the construction of the defendant’s hospital and for the payment of the interest on the bonds. This would place a burden on the sick when they could least afford it.” However, this lawsuit was dropped once the defense attorney for the hospital argued that “specific provisions” in Arizona law exempted the hospital from securities law. The regulatory ambiguities, which allowed for unregulated financial investment, masked an unsettling dependency on outside human capital endemic to Sunbelt Capitalism.

Unfortunately for all involved, Maryvale Hospital began to lose money the day that it opened, and conditions steadily worsened. By the summer of 1962, Maryvale Hospital operated at half the capacity of competing regional hospitals in the region. This news was all opponents of community hospitals needed to increase political pressure on these putatively non-profit institutions. While the attorney general of Arizona argued that nonprofit hospitals were outside the bounds of state regulation, Walter Cheifetz, a lawyer representing the Arizona Hospital Association, argued, our law is almost identical with that of Texas which stopped one group of promoters in their tracks” on the basis that the institutions were being organized “for the profit of its promoters … does anyone seriously argue that these bond sale promoters are in it for their health?” Despite public pressure, state officials refused to accept any responsibility for the situation. According to Joe Sotelo, securities director for the state, Arizona lacked regulations that other states had imposed to limit the ability of promoters to sell bonds for non-profit organizations.

475 Ibid.
477 Gene McLain, “Maryvale Hospital’s New Look,” February 20, 1963, MCH.
Unlike Texas and Illinois, Arizona did not require non-profit securities salesmen to register with state agencies, and in New Mexico, state courts had ruled that the community hospitals could actually be regulated as for-profit ventures. Despite public pressure to intervene, as community hospitals in Arizona were in the throes of financial scandal, state officials argued they lacked regulatory and judicial precedent to reduce securities fraud. Maryvale Hospital had fallen so far in debt that board members lacked the resources to properly for account expenses. Civic ownership of the hospital would require bondholders to remain patient.

In June 1962, Maryvale Hospital bondholders were asked to wait at least one year before collecting interest payments. They were bluntly told that the hospital did not “have the money to make interest payments,” and that if bondholders chose to initiate foreclosure proceedings, they could expect to collect about ten percent of their principal investment. Led by prominent investor Walter Gorczynski, local bondholders worked with the hospital board to hire local administrators whom would work “in the best interest of the bondholders.” While a majority of bondholders agreed to postpone interest payments after Maryvale Hospital posted a quarter of positive net income, the Arizona Hospital Association continued to petition for strengthened regulatory oversight of the community hospitals as a way to avoid placing “an undue burden on the community.” The political tides had begun to turn against the community hospitals.

In October 1962, Union Title and Company, the trustee for the bondholders, publicly implied that Maryvale Hospital would probably have to declare bankruptcy. Union Title was already close to initiating foreclosure proceedings on another community hospital in Scottsdale. Civic leaders dreaded to think that Maryvale might suffer the same fate. Once again, Gorczynski


480 McLain, “Attorney Challenges State on Bond Stand,” Arizona Republic.

publicly petitioned bondholders to continue their support of the current Maryvale Hospital board after meeting with management. “We must see that the hospital is allowed to operate without pressure and adverse publicity. Forcing it to go through court proceedings now will mean a great loss to all its investors.” Upon further inquiry, the senior trust officer at Union Title argued that the hospital could be leased to an experienced hospital administration, but even this was too much for civic activists involved in the operations of the hospital. Gorczynski argued that, “since Union Title and Trust Co. have no capital investment in the hospital…we, as investors, and not the trust officer, should determine if the hospital should go into receivership or bankruptcy.”

Civic Health

Maryvale Hospital began to engage other stakeholders in order to stave off external management. West Valley residents initially rallied around the hospital because it was the primary healthcare facility for life-threatening emergencies on the metropolitan periphery. Being rushed to Maryvale Hospital saved countless lives—an option that had not been available a few short years before. One little girl, after a biking accident with a neighbor’s flatbed truck, was taken to Maryvale Community Hospital with concussion-like symptoms; she would previously have had to travel into the central city for medical. Another local family was so appreciative of hospital services that they took out an ad in the Arizona Republic thanking staff and volunteers for their support. The newspapers were peppered with birth and death notices for local residents whose most personal moments occurred at the hospital. Community residents were aware that civic energy would be needed to sustain the hospital in tough times; many were willing to participate in

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482 “Bondholder asks for hospital support,” Arizona Republic, November 2, 1962.


civic life if it meant they could maintain collective ownership over what they enthusiastically referred to as the “most modernly equipped hospital in the Southwest.”

Maryvale Hospital had taken steps to engender the allegiance of civic participants not directly involved in hospital operations. In June 1962, the vice commander of the American Legion Post 58 came to raise a flag donated by Congressman John J. Rhodes at a flagpole his post had previously installed at the hospital. Post members showed up in “full strength” for the highly symbolic flag presentation ceremonies. In addition, auxiliaries continued to organize community outreach programs. They promoted doctors affiliated with the hospital through educational lectures on preventive healthcare, pediatrics, obstetrics, and cancer treatment. The auxiliary also invited professionals beyond the medical community to lecture on topics such as home improvement. The use of the hospital as a space for civic activities helped integrate the facility into the local community. This support reaped tangible benefits as the broader community supported rummage sales organized by the auxiliary to provide financial support for hospital. The community was able to fundraise over two thousand dollars for the purchase of hospitality equipment, library facilities, and decorations for the pediatrics playroom. The auxiliaries’ projects improved public perception of the hospital in a time of crisis.

Maryvale Hospital would also depend heavily on wage suppression. Expedient layoffs quickly reduced staff numbers below the national average for comparable hospitals. Those staff members who were retained took on additional duties, primarily without salary increases, while

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486 “Legion Gift,” Arizona Republic, June 1, 1962, pg.4.
489 “Maryvale Hospital’s Auxiliary Sets Event,” Arizona Republic, October 12, 1962.
maintaining preexisting levels of care and service.\textsuperscript{490} But just as important were the auxiliaries—their service saved Maryvale Hospital roughly one dollar per volunteer hour.\textsuperscript{491} The women of the auxiliary had become essential stakeholders in the daily operation of the hospital: there was a subcommittee of members who produced drapes, tablecloths, and other linens for the hospital; there was a “creative art” subcommittee that scouted pieces for the hospital collection; the women saved bottle caps and sold rummage to pay for furnishings in the obstetrics and surgical lounges; they even provided entertainment for hospitalized children. As one Republic article declared, “they do anything and everything in the Hospital.”\textsuperscript{492} In 1963, the energized auxiliary would donate over 25,000 hours of service all while winnowing its membership to “cut down on the joiners and increase the workers.”\textsuperscript{493} It would have cost tens of thousands of dollars to replicate the work that the auxiliary volunteers, many of whom also had to work as homemakers with children, brought to the hospital. The unpaid civic labor of women in the auxiliary had become an integral cog at the hospital.

Labor expenses would have to be restrained as administrators attempted to offer residents service at a high enough price to help pay off the outstanding debt. While administrators bet that they could save money on labor costs and make a greater profit at more affordable prices, all parties realized that West Valley residents, and especially those in emergency


\textsuperscript{491} Wilson, “Value of Volunteers: Hospital Auxiliaries Save Your Medical Money,” Arizona Republic, June 9, 1963.


situations, had few other reasonable alternatives to visiting the hospital—no matter what the cost. Hospital administrators bragged that they were, “the [g]eneral [p]ractitioner to a lot of this community,” as hospital beds gradually began to fill toward capacity. Administrators argued that patients had originally attended Maryvale Hospital thinking, “it wouldn’t really be required that they pay,” but its financial precariousness required that administrators “be a great deal more businesslike” in their financial affairs in the community. Healthcare costs at the hospital had to be triangulated between investor interests and community concerns.

Maryvale Hospital had permanently reoriented toward profitability after its civic rejuvenation in 1963. A sense of camaraderie and community had begun to develop among hospital employees and the auxiliaries. Preston Powell, a Navy veteran from rural Arizona, was hired as an assistant administrator in April 1963. He quickly developed a strong relationship with the auxiliary as his leadership helped boost morale among volunteers. Additionally, the Maricopa County Hospital Development Association finally included community hospitals in its fundraising efforts. While prominent healthcare officials continued to criticize the methods by which the community hospitals had been financed, they had made their peace with hospitals that were currently solvent and only sought legislation to prevent future speculative development. Unfortunately, unexpected liabilities loomed on the horizon, and the economic stability civic participants had worked so hard to achieve would become undone in a matter of weeks.


495 “Hospital Names Top Assistant,” Arizona Republic, April 9, 1963.

Healthcare Bust

The decision to push out the local board would be made by bondholders—just not ones who lived in Arizona. In May 1963, Mr. and Mrs. John Roberts of Dallas, Texas sued the Maryvale Community Hospital on behalf of all bondholders. As they were residents of another state, the suit was brought before a federal court. Not only did the Roberts allege that they had been sold unregistered bonds on behalf of the hospital based upon “untrue statements of material facts,” but also they doubted that the hospital could pay off its indebtedness under the current board. Along with the Maryvale Community Hospital, Inc., the couple sued companies that contracted hospital construction, hospital administration, and hospital trusteeship. Moreover, the Roberts sued several leading board members, including Eugene T. Keech, for what they deemed to be, “the excessive cost,” of the hospital. Federal district court judge David Ling gave the hospital board ninety days to show cause as to why it should not be put in receivership.497

It initially seemed like the Maryvale Hospital had accrued enough goodwill to ride out the turmoil. But in June 1963, Keech sued the hospital, Universal Development Co., Union Title Co., and nearly 140 unnamed defendants on the basis that hospital promoters had collectively engaged in fraudulent activities,

[T]hrough a number of corporations created in several states and all controlled by the same parties. By controlling and manipulating all of these corporations including the hospital, promoters entered into a series of agreements with themselves, and…were able to unlawfully gain profits in the approximate amount of 1.5 million.

Keech pleaded ignorance arguing that he was unable to access information on bond sales or construction schedules. He also alleged that John F. Long Homebuilders had been part of the cartel because the company had been paid more than fifteen thousand dollars an acre for land

upon which Maryvale Hospital had been built. By the end of June, Union Title filed suit in Arizona superior court to put the hospital in receivership in order to preserve its assets.

Even worse news was yet to come. In July 1963, Blue Cross of Arizona faced financial ruin because of its underestimates in hospital utilization among its insured population. Blue Cross then asked state hospitals to absorb financial losses to keep the insurance company afloat. A quarter-million Arizonans, 10% - 15% of the state population, subscribed to Blue Cross; they would be thrown back into the ranks of the medically uninsured if the company were allowed to fail. Steve Morris, president of Arizona Blue Cross as well as an administrator at Good Samaritan Hospital, said it was better for his hospital to lose thirty-five thousand dollars “than wipe Blue Cross off the map. If that happens, then I’m talking about a $2 million loss.” The Pulliam Press argued that after the expansion of community hospitals reduced the bed shortage in the Valley, doctors and patients conspired to secure hospitalizations that exceeded reasonable expectations. It was concluded that, “[s]ince Americans are basically reasonable, we believe that the current abuse of hospital insurance…will promptly be brought under control. For if hospitals, doctors, and patients can’t discipline themselves, some sort of socialized medicine is inevitable.” Residents would again indemnify private liabilities to maintain externally-financed infrastructure.

Maryvale Hospital had to move quickly if it was to avoid potential losses in this new insurance deal. Ten hospitals, including the big non-profits, agreed to absorb losses by Blue

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498 “$2 Million Hospital Fraud Suit is Filed,” Phoenix Gazette, June 1, 1963, MCH; Don Bolles, “Maryvale Kickbacks Alleged,” Arizona Republic, June 1, 1963.


Cross. This strategy would have less of an impact on the big non-profits hospitals than it would to the community hospitals. Powell fired off an editorial in the Republic arguing that the constant growth of the community had unsettled utilization numbers as patients adjusted to the new infrastructure in the built environment. Moreover, Powell also argued that utilization figures had risen for all patients—not just Blue Cross subscribers—and he pushed for an audit of Blue Cross. But in humiliating fashion, Powell would soon admit that the Maryvale Hospital was unable to locate the records that established the “contractual relationship” between the promoters and builders of the hospital. This blunder would undo the tenuous equilibrium that allowed for community control of Maryvale Hospital; the absence of such records provided Union Title Co. with the political maneuvering room to have a judge send the hospital into receivership on July 27, 1963.

In November 1963, Maryvale Hospital hired Herbert Mallamo to help with its legal petition to remove the hospital from receivership and return control to the board. Mallamo argued that the Superior Court judge who put the hospital into receivership had no legal standing to do so and the request was “improvidently granted” in an abuse of the court’s “discretion.” Furthermore, Mallamo argued that Union Title Co. and the receivers it had installed lacked legal decision-making powers because they were not “the legal trustee for bondholders.” These efforts helped arrange an agreement to return control over Maryvale Hospital to the civic leader on the hospital board. Union Title Company declared that the hospital remained unprofitable, but resigned its position as trustee because the Maryvale Hospital board “should have an opportunity to institute its policy

505 “Receivership of Hospital Held Illegal,” Arizona Republic, November 15, 1963, MCH.
and direct the hospitals administration” if they were set on resuming management. This autonomy would be short-lived—a federal judge placed Maryvale Hospital back into receivership the same day the state superior court returned control to the board. Fred Foster, a key antagonist of the community hospitals as lead administrator at Maricopa County Hospital, was given the task of overseeing operations at Maryvale Hospital. Months earlier, Powell had apocryphally argued that, “there is some party or parties behind the scenes making every effort to gain control of this hospital.” The back and forth between the superior court, the U.S. District Court, and Blue Cross had strained morale at the hospital. It seemed that outside forces were intent upon taking control of the hospital from those who used it.

On May 4, 1964, a federal judge ordered that the hospital enter protection under the federal bankruptcy act in a last-ditch effort to repay bondholders without liquidating hospital assets. By this time, the secured debt of the hospital had grown more than five hundred thousand dollars because of unpaid interest, and the hospital remained embroiled in several legal battles between the original proprietors. Ronald Wilpitz, the director of the Marcus J. Lawrence Hospital in Cottonwood, was appointed federal trustee of Maryvale Hospital. His first course of action was to fire Powell. In his short time as administrator, Powell had proven popular with the unpaid staff at the hospital, and the auxiliaries were caught off guard by his deposal. The auxiliary had continued to fashion itself after the elite service clubs attached to the big non-profits; auxiliaries, along with many other hospital employees, had invested far more uncompensated labor than they had originally anticipated to keep the hospital operations. The auxiliaries were

507 “ Receivership Freedom Short-Lived for Maryvale Community Hospital,” Arizona Republic, November 26, 1963, MCH.
508 Don Bolles, “Maryvale Community Hospital Fights After-Effects of Lawsuit,” Arizona Republic, June 16, 1963, MCH.
509 “Maryvale Hospital Changes Approved,” Arizona Republic, May 5, 1964, MCH.
demoralized by this abrupt change, as they had not even been consulted, and their president, Mrs. Martin Cohn, quickly sent a written protest to Wilpitz demanding to know who engineered Powell’s removal. In an almost glib response, someone told Cohn, “[t]hat would be hard to say…. [One] might say ‘diverse interests’—doctors, shareholders, who knows?”\textsuperscript{510} Whoever these interests were for, they did not include healthcare advocates from the local civic community.

The auxiliaries deeply resented the imposition of outside control over the hospital. Wilpitz agreed that Powell had been an “able administrator,” and his lawyer issued a statement claiming that, “the dismissal certainly was not meant as a reflection of Mr. Powell.” But Powell had previously claimed that he was dismissed because of “differences of judgment,” which Wilpitz characterized as a “business judgment of the trustee.” Wilpitz then installed Roderick Clelland, a Maryvale resident who had recently been fired by the Arizona State Hospital, in Powell’s previous position. With Wilpitz’s work finished, he resigned as trustee due to the “press from other duties,” and was replaced by Frank Dunning—former administrator at Camelback Psychiatric Hospital, member of the American Academy of Medical Administrators, and well-regarded bon vivant in elite civic circles.\textsuperscript{511} While the operations of Maryvale Hospital would continue to present a local face, strategic control of the hospital had transferred to the metropolitan elites.

Hospital Consolidation

Arizona healthcare facilities continued to poorly serve those who could not afford access to the big non-profits. Competition for federal construction aid continued to heighten as additional

\textsuperscript{510} “Hospital Firing Rapped,” \textit{Evening American}, May 18, 1964, MCH; “Hospital Women Challenge Firing,” \textit{Phoenix Gazette}, May 19, 1964, MCH.

divisions of the healthcare industry, such as psychiatric facilities and retirement homes, demonstrated comparable demands for investment. The need for comprehensive reform had never been more obvious. Then, like manna from heaven, came Medicare. There were estimates that the overabundance of community hospitals had led to around 1,000 surplus hospital beds in the Valley; true or not, all agreed that hospital admissions could ascend 20 percent or more above current utilization rates. Moreover, the injection of insured patients into the broader healthcare system would deepen the local pool of healthcare capital—even in suburban and rural areas where Medicare patients may have preferred to utilize community hospitals as opposed to the big non-profits. Most importantly, federal regulations would improve overall care by requiring hospitals to operate at higher technological standards than previously allowed. In Arizona, Medicare further appreciated healthcare costs, which had grown at nearly twice the national average over the past decade. In Phoenix, where the average cost for a room increased 25 percent after a year of Medicare, healthcare had become an economic catalyst.

Healthcare workers would soon benefit from their augmented socio-economic status because there were not enough registered nurses and healthcare technicians in the Valley to meet the aggravated demand. Hospital administrators blamed a litany of environmental factors for the shortage, but fundamentally, conditions had to change if hospitals staffs were to meet anticipated consumer demand. Those conditions would include higher wages because labor

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activists in the nursing ranks had taken this moment to advocate for official union representation, which would have ripened the potential for work stoppages similar to those paralyzing California.\textsuperscript{515} So, the big non-profits met with the Arizona Medical Association and negotiated monthly pay increases as high as one hundred and twenty-five dollars in order to avoid unionization. The state medical professional organizations pleaded with nurses to reject the potential work stoppages and degraded social status that would accompany unionization. And overnight, the patient costs for Valley hospital beds shot up by more than fifteen percent.\textsuperscript{516} There was little that could halt the oncoming money train.

Maryvale Hospital was being restructured under Chapter X of the Federal Bankruptcy Act as Medicare money began to flood the scene, so while it remained in arrears, the facility was productive enough to begin to pay bondholders some of the interest owed. In July 1965, a federal judge approved a 2 percent payment to bondholders. This was followed by a three percent interest payment in November and a five percent interest payment in 1966. While the aggregate debt remained over three million dollars, the hospital had a net cash balance and had begun to

healthcare education pipeline, a reduced number of nursing migrants from other parts of the country, a state law which required "nurses from foreign countries… [to] make a declaration of intent to become a U.S. citizen," and snowbirds for the shortage in healthcare workers.


reinvest in design upgrades. Receivership would give Maryvale Hospital cash reserves and a 25 percent increase in monthly patient visits. Finally, the hospital was an economic success.

Now that the community hospitals had been made profitable, the big non-profits began to petition for “careful planning” in future healthcare decisions. After much delay, their agents finally denounced the mortgage bond hospitals on the basis that their unscrupulous financing had drawn national scrutiny and that the hospitals’ replication of administrative operations was economically inefficient. Some sought to advance legislation that would allow state regulation of hospital construction to prevent future speculation. Others sought to have non-profit regional councils guide infrastructure investment. But all sought to centrally plan healthcare provision by stripping operational autonomy from the undercapitalized, and in some cases, deteriorating, community hospitals by consolidating operations under the specialized guidance of the big non-profits.

Outside investors also began to note how lucrative the community hospitals had become. In June 1967, Lutheran Hospitals and Homes Society of Fargo, North Dakota, an entity with more than eighty facilities across the nation, propositioned the receivers of Maryvale Hospital after purchasing similarly distressed Mesa Lutheran Hospital. Soon after, the Sisters of Benedict, from Ferdinand, Indiana, also sought to raise funds to purchase Maryvale Hospital. However,


519 “Maryvale Hospital Purchased Proposed,” Arizona Republic, June 18, 1967, MCH.

520 Thelma Heatwole, “Nuns Raise Funds to Purchase Maryvale Hospital,” Arizona Republic, March 17, 1968, MCH.
neither of these groups made serious offers. Instead, in August 1968, after a bidding war with San Diego-based American Medical Enterprises, Good Samaritan purchased Maryvale Hospital for $5.1 million.\(^{521}\) Maryvale Hospital was finally profitable.

Conclusion

The financial success of the hospital had also drawn the attention of then-Arizona Attorney General Bruce Babbitt. Babbitt began to intimate that he might legally block the sale of Maryvale Hospital if he believed private actors would profit from the transaction. According to state law, the hospital was originally chartered as a non-profit organization, and any surplus funds left over after meeting obligations to creditors needed to be distributed to another religious, charitable, or scientific organization lest the state claim the monies. Other non-profit organizations in Arizona, such as the Health Facilities Planning Council, sought to garner portions of the potential profit for its own ends.\(^{522}\) Nevertheless, after a federal judge approved the sale of Maryvale Hospital to Good Samaritan, he ordered the surplus funds from the sale to be paid to bondholders since “there [was] no group with a priority other than the bondholders.” Charity organizations across the Valley appealed for access to financial surplus, but to no avail—the non-profit Maryvale Hospital would end up as a profitable investment for bondholders.\(^{523}\)

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\(^{521}\) “Maryvale Hospital Reported Profitable,” *Arizona Republic*, July 20, 1968, MCH.

\(^{522}\) Albert Sitter, “State Attempting to Block Auction of Maryvale Community Hospital,” *Arizona Republic*, 10, August 6, 1968, MCH.

To make the non-profit hospital profitable, bondholders had to wait until litigation surrounding the dispersal of surplus funds subsided in 1976; however, they were well compensated for their time. Investors earned a twenty percent return on their principal investment in the hospital after the dispersal of profit from the sale. This amount was in addition to the 8 percent annual interest bondholders earned until the bonds were called in September 1968.\(^5\) To ensure systemic stability, after Good Samaritan purchased Maryvale Hospital, patient expenses also rose.\(^6\) Some of this was due to inflation, but it was also a way to balance out costs throughout the Good Samaritan system. In 1973, the Maricopa County Comprehensive Health Planning Council (CHPC) denied a request by Good Samaritan to raise rates at the hospital.\(^7\) A denial of a rate hike was quite unusual. Intermediation by Motorola, a large semiconductor firm in the Valley, in the financial affairs of the hospital was virtually unprecedented. As the largest healthcare consumer in the Valley, Motorola had a vested interest in the cost of healthcare. Prior to this time, provider participation in the CHPC had been voluntary.\(^8\) However, Good Samaritan had recently opened a hospital in Mesa with projected deficits of around $1.5 million—it needed the additional revenue to balance the books for the system. The CHPC argued that it was not fair to patients to raise rates at the renamed Maryvale Samaritan Hospital since it was already profitable as an independent facility. In the end, it was not CHPC's call to make—rates at

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\(^7\) Grant E. Smith, “Hospital Defied on Hospital Rate Issue,” *Arizona Republic*, December 7, 1973, MSH.

\(^8\) “Motorola Aids Health Panel in Rate Battle,” *Arizona Republic*, December 11, 1973, MSH; Grant E. Smith, “Hospital Rate Hike Delayed,” *Arizona Republic*, December 12, 1973, MSH; “Hospital Hike is Approved for Maryvale,” *Arizona Republic*, December 13, 1973, MSH.
Maryvale Samaritan increased. The next year, the CHPC would back down from challenging another rate hike proposed by Samaritan Health Services. Regional healthcare had done little to ameliorate rising healthcare costs for Maryvale residents.

The most lasting legacy in all of this was the marginalization of the hospital auxiliaries. The CHPC found that relationships between local communities and the hospitals that served them had been permanently altered because of the removal of community input from hospital operations. In 1971, the big non-profits hosted a scholar who argued:

> A hospital is a community facility held in ‘trust’ for the public…. How this is done without a free and open dialogue between the staff of the institution and the administration is beyond me. How this can be accomplished without open discussions with planning groups within the community is a singular concern. That the community is uninvolved is a betrayal of responsibility by both groups.

While this had originally been the case at Maryvale Hospital, a decade of mismanagement and malfeasance had soured relations between hospital administrators and the broader community.

In Maryvale, the auxiliaries asked for a full-time staff member to manage their operations. While they were in the process of gaining representation on general planning committees, they no longer autonomously boosted the hospital to new heights. In many ways, the professionalization of the healthcare industry negated the impact that the auxiliaries’ labor could have on institutions. While many women continued to volunteer at local hospitals, their efforts were marginalized to fundraising and clerical duty. By the early 1980s, a renewed labor crunch

528 "Samaritan Backed on 5.8% Rate Hike," *Arizona Republic*, March 20, 1974, Phoenix-Hospitals 1973 & 74.


impacted the ability of the auxiliary to attract young women who sought paid employment as opposed to volunteer opportunities. In 1985, the Maryvale Hospital Auxiliary still had 125 active volunteers—some of whom had been working at the hospital for over twenty years. In addition to 30,000 volunteer hours, the auxiliaries also raised about thirty-five thousand dollars a year for the hospital. Many volunteers faced age discrimination and, even after community ownership of Maryvale Hospital had ended, continued to donate their labor to the institution. In this sense, these auxiliaries represent the continual praxis of healthcare provision in Arizona: investors are ensured profitability by the exploitation of medical consumers, healthcare technicians, and civic activists. Civic optimism would darken in Maryvale as public debt became permanently tarred within the imagination of Maryvale residents. Not even municipal representation could lighten the pallor that debt cast over the outwardly healthy civic community. The ingredients for a political revolution were brewing.


533 Connie Cone, “Hospital Volunteers Earn Rich Rewards,” *Phoenix Gazette*, February 20, 1985, MSH.
CHAPTER 5

The Colored City: Social Malaise, Civic Activism, and the Decline of Charter Government

Introduction

Phoenix would resume its exponential growth after economic recession in 1963; and, in many ways, the apex of civic activism in suburban Phoenix would occur in the mid-1970s. This upswing in support for community organizations coincided with decades of mounting discontent with the Charter political machine. While Charter had been weakened, it still controlled access to local political offices by the early 1970s. Business elites had been able to articulate a vision of development that could garner support from most of, many of voters—at least from those who managed to participate in municipal elections. However, some residents in recently-annexed suburban communities began to grumble about the undemocratic strategies of Charter and sought greater participation in public life. These residents led neighborhood-based civic organizations that sought to garner equitable access to regional planning for those outside of the Charter cabal. Such residents found support for their efforts to ameliorate local conditions exacerbated by the hidden, unequal costs of Sunbelt Capitalism.

However, political agitation led by civic activists did not effectively resolve the social tensions that had led to discontent with Charter. Many of the social concerns that had led to community displeasure—outmoded transportation infrastructure, rising crime rates, and low-quality education—metastasized even more rapidly as activists gained political prominence. Just as the annexed suburban communities had lacked the economic capital to maintain political autonomy, they also lacked the social capital to guide social policy in a direction that would improve the quality of life experienced by the typical Phoenician. Additionally, even as Charter began to slowly fade from the political scene, the Pulliam Press continued to drive the direction of
civic discourse toward terrain more comfortable for civic elites. In doing so, the Charter class could perpetuate the myth, which originally made annexation so appealing to so many residents of un-incorporated suburbs, that Phoenix remained an Anglo, and not colored, city.

While civic activists certainly offered suggestions to chill the simmering discontent of Phoenicians, and some gained prominence for populist legislative efforts, what resulted was the gradual disengagement of suburban residents from the public activities of local civic life. Community activists could not resolve the social disruptions stemming from the economic dislocations of deindustrialization in a way that could satisfy the disparate desires of suburban Phoenicians—at least not within the discursive battleground defined by civic elites. Community activists and career politicians failed to contend with how rapid growth and low taxes had drained social capital from suburban civic life; the racialized understanding of social malaise as an “urban” issue would, in turn, darken Phoenix in relation with the rest of the Valley.

The Freeway Revolt

The Papago Freeway, like the proposed housing code of the previous decade, aroused fury across the political spectrum in Phoenix. The freeway, which passed south of Maryvale and cut through older neighborhoods of central Phoenix, would benefit residents looking for alternatives to busy surface streets for cross-town travel; the freeway had also been supported by regional elites since the late 1950s. However, as the project dragged on, due to an inability to find local funding to expedite construction, inner-city neighborhoods negatively affected by the freeway began to organize and resist its development. As Charter tried to institute reforms that allowed for more citizen participation, community activists could bring the transportation plan before the voters. Despite their efforts, the original vision was duly implemented, and the Papago was built over historic inner-city neighborhoods that had become home to colored communities.

Without the support of suburban Maryvale, pro-development powerbrokers would have lacked the votes to approve the freeway—especially after the Pulliam Press turned against the project. Nevertheless, the Papago Freeway fiasco demonstrated that civic elites had reason to be concerned about the participation of community activists in development decisions.

The most obvious reason why it was unnecessary for pro-development interests to collaborate with suburban civic leaders is because, prior to these community-oriented realignments at the dénouement of Charter rule, regional elites had unilaterally decided transportation policy. Like other public projects conducted under Charter, the development of freeway infrastructure centered upon professional engineers working in concert with Charter to eschew input from the public at large. In 1957, the city council pushed to have the then-unnamed Interstate-10 pass south of the city despite the protests of local hotel and innkeepers fearful that this by-pass would destroy their businesses. In 1960, Charter and the Pulliam Press would advocate for a countywide freeway system proposed by Wilbur Smith and Associates. Although the plan would require the evisceration of numerous neighborhoods, the *Arizona Republic* encouraged citizens to “resign” themselves to the system because it would occur “whether you like it or not.” The Papago Freeway breezed through its public hearing process prior to earning federal approval in 1963. The ability of Charter to disregard alternative perspectives while strategically developing transportation infrastructure, along with their disinterest in a power-sharing alliance with civic leaders in Maryvale, merely reflected the power dynamics of the mid-century political economy of Phoenix.

Sunbelt Capitalism limited the availability of financial resources for public projects: there was no local support for publicly financed transportation infrastructure. In 1947, prior to Charter government, the Busey administration initiated efforts to construct public parking spaces to

535 In contradistinction, Tucson lacks a cross-town freeway due to voter distaste for the idea.


537 Ibid., 115.
alleviate the severe parking crunch downtown. While the proposed public parking had the support of the downtown merchants as well as the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, the parties involved could not agree on whether the ownership of parking spaces should be held by the city or subcontracted to a private investor. The conflict over who would benefit from the profits of downtown parking, private investors or municipal coffers, stalled the construction of additional parking for five years—by which time many merchants had already begun to plot their moves to less congested suburban locales.\textsuperscript{538}

In terms of road construction, while there were no potential profits to fight over, public officials had limited means for financing the necessary improvements. Phoenix began to receive portions of the state gasoline tax for road improvements after 1948, but these allocations were inconsistent; additionally, since construction most of suburban communities originated in Maricopa County prior to their, Phoenix often had to expand narrow roads or improve shoddy construction approved under county regulations after annexation into the city. Property-owners adjoining substandard roads could form an improvement district to upgrade roads, but many saw infrastructure development as an unnecessary, or unaffordable, expense. After 1954, the FHA refused to fund housing developments with substandard streets, but many older neighborhoods in Phoenix remained unpaved well into the 1960s.\textsuperscript{539}

A lack of local capital for transportation infrastructure delayed construction of the freeways long enough for a citizens’ revolt to occur. Transportation officials had initially proposed a limited-access roadway be routed near the final configuration of the Papago in response to congestion brought on by war-related economic growth. Still, it was not until after the Federal Highway Act of 1956 that Phoenix garnered funding to develop an urban freeway system. Even after receiving this funding, the city was unable to raise the funding necessary to accelerate construction of the highway due to public distaste for additional taxation. By the time public

\textsuperscript{538} Collins, The Emerging Metropolis, 105-109.

\textsuperscript{539} Ibid., 109-111; VanderMeer, Desert Visions, 248-249.
officials were ready to begin building, discontent with the freeway had begun to permeate political discourse. In 1964, the Valley Beautiful Citizens Council expressed concerns that the freeway would isolate the rapidly deteriorating downtown from the rest of the Valley. In 1968, the Arizona Republic, usually in lock-step with Charter, began to investigate the economic efficacy of the freeway and to question if it could turn Phoenix into “another Los Angeles.” And in 1969, as properties along the proposed right-of-way festered in the desert heat, the Citizens for Mass Transit Against Freeways began to openly advocate for alternatives to the Papago Freeway. The delay in construction, due to the penurious nature of the local neoliberal political economy, had given Charter opponents the time to mobilize the enthusiasm of the civic community around an alternative to Charter’s policies.\textsuperscript{540}

The citizen proposed alternatives to the Papago Freeway were an outright repudiation of the goals of Charter. Dr. Gerald Judd, a professor at Phoenix College, began the Citizens for Mass Transit Against Freeways to help document the injurious methods used by government officials to force relocation of residents in the path of the Papago Freeway.\textsuperscript{541} Some residents claimed that they were coerced into accepting unfair bids for their property by state officials with threats that the final price may be lower if they resisted. At least one resident found that the sum she was paid by the state for her property barely covered the cost of her relocation—let alone the reconstruction of her original abode.\textsuperscript{542} Judd, who was also a trained chemist, found that the Papago Freeway would also exacerbate air pollution in the Valley—an issue which had already


\textsuperscript{541} Judd would go on to become a cult legend in dental health. For more, see: http://www.fixyourteeth.org/Gerard-Judd/faq.htm, accessed June 17, 2015.

\textsuperscript{542} George and Conrad, \textit{Phoenix’s Greater Encanto-Palmcroft Neighborhood}, 102.
organized civic activists across the Valley. Heretofore, Charter had been able to prevent negative stories of environmental damage or government intimidation from entering the public sphere, but because of reforms to increase citizen participation in city planning, Judd had an arena where he could air these grievances.

In 1970, Judd presented his finding to his colleagues on the Phoenix Forward Land Transportation Committee. The public transit advocates on the committee rallied around Judd’s report to reject the “Wilber Smith” transportation plan—which Charter supported, and included the Papago Freeway—in favor of a plan that reemphasized investment into mass transit. While most members on the committee supported the freeway, high rates of absenteeism made it possible for the vocal minority of public transit advocates to submit a report in opposition to the Wilber Smith plan. Charter tried to prevent public awareness of the report, but as it became clearer that the plans of city engineers differed from what the public wanted, the mass transit advocates began to gain a foothold in the policy discourse. The expansion of discourse beyond the tightly controlled backrooms of Charter government led to democracy.

To be fair, Charter members had been transitioning the city away from mass transit as a transportation option since their arrival in office. William S. Collins finds that ridership on publicly-owned transit systems reached its apex in 1947 when the city eked out a small profit with over 19 million passengers. Despite its usefulness in transporting people to the congested downtown, the city shuttered the trolley system in 1948, and competition between city buses and private lines helped shrink ridership on public transit by more than one-third in less than four years. In 1959, four years after Phoenix voters rejected an offer from an eastern company to purchase the municipal bus lines, Charter fully privatized public transit in Phoenix by selling its transit system to local competitor Luther A. Tanner. Municipal officials further weakened public transit by opposing

543 George and Conrad, Phoenix’s Greater Encanto-Palmcroft Neighborhood, 93-112.

544 Collins, The Emerging Metropolis, 105.
federal funding for public transit projects throughout the 1960s; at the same time, they continued to appeal for federal support for the Papago Freeway.\textsuperscript{545}

Under these conditions, Tanner eventually requested permission to declare bankruptcy and end public transit in Phoenix. Unfortunately for Charter, this appeal came at the exact same time that the public support for mass transit reached a fever pitch. Seeing the writing on the wall, elected officials, began to finance public transportation in Phoenix.\textsuperscript{546} While the Pulliam Press opposed mass transit, it also opposed the freeway, and Gene Pulliam offered logistical support to community activists from the Encanto Citizens Association in their efforts to prevent the Papago from being built. His support helped Jim Walsh, second president of the Encanto Citizens Association and future state senator, get the city council to put the Papago Freeway to the voters across the city in May 1973. By a narrow margin, the voters rejected the Papago alignment and delivered victory to the neighborhood-based activists who finally broke Charter control over local development.\textsuperscript{547}

The stunning dismissal of the Papago freeway was seen by political pundits as a referendum on Charter. When Phoenicians rejected the transportation plans of the civic elites at the polls, it was seen as a rejection of the broader development plans asserted by Charter. Decades of rapid development had created environmental concerns such as pollution, traffic, and sprawl, and the Papago referendum was the first opportunity for voters to express their displeasure at the polls. Charter was mortally wounded by this rejection by voters at the polls; not only did temporarily derail their transportation plans, but it encouraged activists to organize around other civic concerns. Organizers would quickly find that there would be no issue that galvanized civic activism among residents than concerns about crime.

\textsuperscript{545} Ibid., 371-372.

\textsuperscript{546} Collins, The Emerging Metropolis, 373.

\textsuperscript{547} George and Conrad, Phoenix’s Greater Encanto-Palmcroft Neighborhood, 98-99.
Crime and Quality of Life

“We’ve got freak-outs in Encanto Park, narcotics (and God knows what else) in high schools and rape in Scottsdale. And you better believe, armed robberies and burglaries aren’t infrequent in the Valley of the Sun.” Even Phoenix magazine, with its focus on the posh neighborhoods of central Phoenix and Arcadia, could not ignore the impact of criminal activities on the lives of everyday Phoenicians. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, Phoenix had been considered one of the most crime-ridden cities in America. While Charter thought it best to stifle discussion on crime, poverty, civil rights, urban renewal, and other social problems, it became obvious to many that the “quality urban life” Phoenix provided was in danger. Statistics concurred. Between 1970 and 1975, the local total crime index more than doubled per 100,000 inhabitants, and it became nigh impossible for civic boosters to ignore how these crime rates negatively affected the reputation of Phoenix. Pundits claimed that Arizona was ripe for criminal activity for many reasons: many migrants lacked family ties in the area, many people had a sense of rootlessness and instability due to the dynamic growth of the region, and, of course, many thought that there was a “basic ignorance of law” because Arizona was a multilingual and multicultural border state. In other words, the rapid social growth of Phoenix led to increased criminal activities. This both reflected the fragmented state of the local community as well as

549 Luckingham, Phoenix, 180.
exacerbated that fragmentation. The consequences of these conditions made it clear that the affluent lifestyle promoted by civic boosters was not a reality for most citizens.

Outside of accepting federal dollars to augment the budget for law enforcement, Charter had been relatively unconcerned with providing an adequate police response for residents in less prominent Phoenician neighborhoods. Tactically speaking, the low pay of the Phoenix police officers made it nearly impossible for the department to retain officers—in the first nine months of 1968, fifty-six people left the department for "better jobs, higher pay, [and] less harassment." Charter’s policies did very little to stymie profligate theft and violence around the city. Colored communities south of Van Buren Road had a notorious reputation among Anglos for domestic disputes, drunken driving, fights, and drug deals while in east Phoenix, along McDowell Road, porn houses, adult book stores, and adult “entertainment centers” sprang up literally back to back with residential neighborhoods. Throughout the 1970s, a number of young women from west Phoenix neighborhoods were found murdered and dumped in the desert. Moreover, not enough had been done to limit the increase in local gang activity. Gangs had been a fact of life in Phoenix throughout Charter government: a gang-related “near riot” helped spur the expansion of the county parks program in 1952; gangs also fought with both police and fellow residents for control of the city housing projects during the late 1960s. The policies proposed by Charter did little about the rising levels of crime affecting older areas of the city; at most, they paid lip service to these problems and left the issue of street crime unresolved.

553 Luckingham, Phoenix, 178.
557 Collins, The Emerging Metropolis, 135-137, 275, 277.
The practices of the Phoenix police department antagonized and alienated many colored residents. In the wake of racial rioting in 1967, instead of seeking federal aid for education, employment, and housing programs as many asked, the city received funding to bolster local law enforcement.\(^{558}\) In Charter’s published “order of priorities,” police protection came first and social services came dead last.\(^{559}\) The local press covered the structural impact of these conditions to little avail: for example, in an exposé entitled, “Saturday Night and Sunday Morning,” a police officer follows a Mexican-American man to his house and writes him three tickets for vehicle infractions despite the man’s protests that he can’t afford to fix his car.\(^{560}\) Quotidian conflicts between law enforcement and colored communities continued without respite.

Moreover, many South Phoenix residents felt that law enforcement provided their communities with inadequate service. Rev. James Covington, pastor of a South Phoenix church, said that most Black Americans did not desire protection from the police but protection by the police.\(^{561}\) Allegedly, it could take up to half a day to have law enforcement dispatched to an incident reported south of Buckeye Road—not even two miles south the police sub-station near Seventh Avenue and Washington Road.\(^{562}\) Aggressive enforcement tactics also soured community relations. In 1978, an anti-robbery operation in predominantly Black Eastlake Park was marred as law enforcement shot an innocent bystander.\(^{563}\) Incensed at more than the collateral damage, members of the Eastlake Park community picketed the police station because of the “decoy technique” the police had used in the anti-robbery operation; the protestors felt that

\(^{558}\) Luckingham, *Phoenix*, 178.


\(^{561}\) Moore, “1968: It Was A Very Good Year…For Crime,” 19.


it targeted all the members of the community—not just the ones committing the majority of the robberies. The enlargement of the police force was ineffective at stopping crime and was often antagonistic toward members of the colored communities that composed South Phoenix.

While there were few complaints about policing practices in suburban precincts, street crime had a detrimental effect on the citizens’ quality of life even in the predominantly Anglo, middle-class suburban neighborhoods of Phoenix. In an exposé in the Arizona magazine, "Mr. Potter," a north Phoenix druggist, recounts the five times he was burglarized and the two times he was robbed at gunpoint over, "the last three or four years." In the final robbery, one of his associates was pistol-whipped by a robber looking for drugs in the pharmacy. Mr. Potter went on to say, "[t]hat’s been a year ago and I’m still in such a nervous state that even if a well-dressed, clean-cut guy comes to the door I get as nervous as I can be."

Maryvale was not immune to this type of violence, either. Local retail and commercial stores recorded thousands of dollars in annual losses to thieves and armed robbers in the early 1970s—once, a local retailer was robbed at knifepoint of over fifteen hundred dollars in cash and checks at high noon as he walked to the bank across the street from his store near the Maryvale Shopping City. In another nearby incident, an Anglo male robbed a beauty salon manager at gunpoint of eleven thousand dollars in jewelry and cash in front of his employees. Incidents such as these were common in both inner-city and suburban communities in Phoenix by the early 1970s.

In Phoenix, most residents and elected officials agreed that juvenile delinquency was at the root of the increase in the local crime rate. While the park system had originally been used as a tool to combat teen delinquency, by the end of Charter government, parks had stopped being developed in most of established neighborhoods. Charter ignored the suggestions by its constituents on how to deal with teen delinquency. But by 1976, Phoenix police chief Larry Wetzel worried that, "criminals are younger, more violent, more callous, and more likely to have a complete disregard for property and personal feelings." In local media, Anglo reporters would often portray "delinquents" as people of color. In another section of "Saturday Nights and Sunday Mornings," reporter James Cook follows four boys from what he identifies as a "poorer part of town;" during their exploits, they drink bootlegged beer and smoke marijuana acquired "from a kid [they] knew at Phoenix Union [High School]" until one is arrested and taken back to the station be cursed out by his father in Spanish. Local reporters adopted pornographic perspectives that criminalized the actions of colored children. While Republic columnist Greg Smith found that, "[s]tore managers in many parts of the Valley report little or no shoplifting," he wrote an article on the rampant shoplifting by Black youth in South Phoenix. Smith quoted convenience store owners who argued that young thieves would steal anything they could put their hands on; moreover, they would physically assault employees if confronted. According to some merchants, "[w]hen the police catch a juvenile…you'll never get anything out of it. They'll get off

570 Collins, The Emerging Metropolis, 135-140.
571 Moore, “1968: It Was A Very Good Year…For Crime,” 76.
575 Ibid.
and be back in your store before you know it." Charter declined to implement serious strategies to ameliorate juvenile delinquency despite consensus that it was the root of so much turmoil.

In inner-city neighborhoods, civic organizations attacked crime and drug use to improve life in their communities. Residents of the city’s public housing projects organized “Mothers That Do Care”; their goal was to remove the criminal element from public housing complexes and make(108,596),(632,614) play safe for use. Another public housing organization, the Matthew Henson Tenants Council, organized to improve the security features at their community center after the city refused to pay for a burglar alarm. In addition to the efforts of citizens, “Crime Stop,” “Operation Identification,” and “Block Watch” were all programs organized by the Phoenix police department to mobilize residents in the fight against crime. The Phoenix Citizens Committee on Respect for Authority (CCRA), however, predated all of these efforts. As early as 1963, the CCRA organized Anglo church leaders and concerned citizens to seek out causes as well as solutions to crime. The type of reform proposed by the CCRA would have helped protect those most vulnerable to violent and property crime. The CCRA recommended that the state combat teen delinquency by establishing programs to educate about drug abuse and by building additional correctional facilities for juvenile inmates. Civic leaders in older neighborhoods organized to stymie the effects of increasing crime during the 1960s and 1970s.

Suburban Maryvale also had its set of civic leaders who attempted to improve social conditions and, like other colored communities, Maryvale civic authorities struggled to manage a disproportionately high number of youth left unsupervised while guardians worked. Local law

576 Ibid.
577 Collins, The Emerging Metropolis, 275.
578 Ibid.
580 Moore, “1968: It Was A Very Good Year...For Crime,” 18.
581 Moore, “1968: It Was A Very Good Year...For Crime,” 76.
enforcement agencies had to adjust tactics in the wake of several U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the latter years of Charter government—most notably Arizona v. Miranda in 1966. Several local, high-ranking law enforcement officials argued that the Supreme Court decisions had made it more difficult for authorities to police juvenile delinquents. Police officers attempted to alert the public about the “immature professionalism” of juvenile burglars who menaced Maryvale. Police spokesmen argued that the “quaint streets” of Maryvale were juicy targets for youthful thieves who took advantage of homeowners who were too “embarrassed” to report the theft of easily fenced household items such as bicycles, jewelry, cash—even cans of Coca-Cola. Local students were even bold enough to steal thousands of dollars in equipment from their own schools. After the Bureau of Prevention Services at the state Department of Corrections published a report on the prevalence of juvenile delinquency in eastern Maryvale, civic leaders and elected state officials began to take the issue of juvenile delinquency seriously. They hoped their efforts to remedy social policy would re-energize grassroots activism across Phoenix.

By the early 1970s, even its own candidates argued that Charter was politically weak on crime. In 1971, the Charter city council candidate Armando de Leon, the only Charter candidate in that election from Maryvale, touted his nationally-recognized development of a city drug control program in his reelection campaign. De Leon also argued that Charter needed to take more concrete steps to remedy the causes, and not just the symptoms, of juvenile delinquency. John Driggs, the Charter candidate for mayor, similarly asserted that he would seek public input on how to address a perceived decline in the local quality of life due to the rapid urbanization of the previous fifteen years. However, these olive branches did little to assuage the concerns of Maryvale residents. In this same election, a Charter opponent called for “democratic government”

above all other concerns. He also pledged something that Charter candidates never clearly stated—to work with the civic organizations indigenous to Maryvale. In the end, both de Leon and Driggs won election, but the efforts of Charter to protect its political flank on the issue of crime did little to satiate disappointed suburban voters.” Civic activists recognized residents sought a more satisfactory quality of suburban life than the “oligarchy” of Charter provided. 586

Open Secrets

As a response to the declining political control of the Charter class, Frank Snell, Eugene Pulliam, and Tom Chauncey, a radio broadcaster, organized a meeting of approximately forty men—who came to be known as the Phoenix 40—who could “pick up the phone and get things done” to discuss the perceived decline in the local “quality of life.” 587 While the Phoenix 40 had tentatively opposed the Papago Freeway, business elites quietly celebrated the passage of the second freeway referendum—a political reversal due in no small part to the efforts of Tom Freeland and other civic leaders in Maryvale. However, the Phoenix 40 was disinterested in collaborating with civic leaders from suburban districts as equals—as seen in the fact that no members of the Maryvale civic community were asked to join the membership of the Phoenix


Instead, the Phoenix 40 sought a wedge issue with which they could excite voters and regain political hegemony in Phoenix.

While there was initial debate on what the most pressing issue was—allegedly at the first meeting it was decided that it was transportation—the murder of Ed Lazar, a witness in a criminal case against suspected swindler Ned Warren, on February 19, 1975—spurred the group to immediately turn its attention toward tackling the perceived problem of rising crime. The shift toward crime by civic elites had been a long time coming—first off, Phoenix also had consumer fraud rates five times higher than the national average and was beginning to acquire a negative business reputation nationally. Next, Charter opponents had made in-roads with voters by promising that they would place a higher priority on crime reduction than Charter candidates had. But it took the cold-blooded murder of Lazar—he was killed by a hetman in a parking lot stairwell—to force powerbrokers to reconcile how rampant crime had belied the “quality urban life” they alleged to provide Phoenicians.

The Phoenix 40 commissioned a crime task force to find a solution to the increase in criminal activity. The task force came to these conclusions:

- Organized crime existed in Arizona on a broad scale. It was centered on narcotics, gambling, and prostitution, but in Arizona it manifested itself in many other legitimate areas—particularly in land development, securities, and labor unions where fraud,


591 Luckingham, Phoenix, 181.

592 Collins, The Emerging Metropolis, 382-383.
bribery, extortion and murder were the main tools of the trade. Finally, although much of the crime was locally based, there was a connection to national syndicates.

- Ordinary violent and property crime had reached “unacceptable levels” in Maricopa County and it was affecting the quality of life for local citizens. The task force also commended the work of the Phoenix police department and its investigation of land fraud committed by Ned Warren.

- Finally, passiveness by both the apathetic public and ineffective law enforcement agencies had allowed the situation to spiral to the point it was currently at. 593

Many people questioned why the Phoenix 40 was so intent on solving the issue of crime. Much was made about the secrecy surrounding the group and its decided lack of diversity. State legislative representative Peter Kay said that the Phoenix 40 had good intentions but did not represent a broad spectrum of the people. 594 Pat Murphy, a member of the 40 and the editorial editor at the Arizona Republic, felt that the group did not want to have “any one-legged blacks … just so we can have a minority member. That would be tokenism.” 595 But these justifications rang hollow considering the long-established Charter tradition of identifying talented minorities to run for council. This break with tradition was seen to rebuild the political capital of Charter.

Kay was not the only one who suspected this uniformity belied an ulterior motive. Ed Korrick, one of the few city council members who won a seat during Charter reign without its support, said that the Phoenix 40 and Charter were two intertwined groups and saw “the formation of the group as a method of strengthening dwindling citizen support for Charter


Charter members downplayed their connection to the Phoenix 40. Don Jackson, a public relations official for Charter, denied any connection between the two organizations while Mark Harrison, a former vice-chairman of Charter publicly questioned the viability of the Phoenix 40. Nevertheless, State representative Art Hamilton stated, “[t]hese people in the Phoenix 40 are the fellows who’ve controlled this city while the apathy they’re complaining about set in. They are the embodiment of the problems they are complaining about.”

It was difficult to deny the connections between the Phoenix 40 and Charter. Sam Mardian, Jr., former mayor; Newton Rosenzweig, brother of former council-member Harry; and Jarrett Jarvis were all members of both Charter and the Phoenix 40. There were also philosophical similarities between the two organizations. Both groups were private organizations of elite Phoenicians committed to directing public policy. Both groups were secretive about their internal organization while performing work to benefit the public. Steve Levy, then the senior vice president of Motorola, responded to inquiries concerning the 40 by saying, “I don’t give a damn about people’s questions. What we are doing is worthwhile and as long as we are effective what business is it of anyone else. We are a group of private citizens.” The members of the 40 were even more demographically and philosophically homogenous than Charter. Loyal Meek, editor of the Phoenix Gazette, said that if his newspaper opposed the stated position of the group, he would have to “disassociate [himself] from the Phoenix 40.” He went on to say that the group

597 Ibid.
598 Ibid.
was relying on the judgment of his boss, Eugene Pulliam, to verify that his philosophy would align with that of the group. As for the other Pulliam Press editor, Murphy stated:

When you've been in the business as long as I have, you just know ... when you sit with a publisher day after day or just get a five-minute exposure on this subject or what is good judgment, what is common sense, what the institution or what the publisher feels without having to write it down.\(^\text{602}\)

Decades of incestuous hiring and hypocritical policies made it difficult for Charter government to maintain this level of transparency and continue to garner public assent for their political activities.

Both Murphy and Meek denied that their participation in the Phoenix 40 compromised their positions as editors, but Meek admitted that it damaged the credibility of his paper.\(^\text{603}\) But the mere membership of these editors in the Phoenix 40 could not have compromised the credibility of their newspapers among residents because it was an open secret Pulliam had been known to replace editors whose political views did not align with his political associates.\(^\text{604}\) In September 1975, when the Phoenix 40 attacked Maricopa county attorney Moise Berger for his decision not to prosecute land-fraud kingpin Ned Warren on charges they desired, Berger stated, “[w]e have a monopolistic newspaper that is a member of the Phoenix 40 that has been trying to control the people of this town. It does not speak for the people. It speaks for its own interests and the interests of the groups it favors, like the Phoenix 40, of which it is a member.”\(^\text{605}\) Berger accused Pulliam of suppressing negative information about “friends of the newspapers” as well as minimizing other prosecutions he had undertaken.\(^\text{606}\) By October, at least thirty-eight articles and three editorials—at least two calling for Berger’s resignation—had been written about him; when

\(^{602}\) Ibid.

\(^{603}\) Ibid.

\(^{604}\) Collins, The Emerging Metropolis, 49.


\(^{606}\) Ibid.
Berger announced that he would not seek another term in office, the number of articles written about him dropped precipitously.\textsuperscript{607} Both the \textit{Republic} and \textit{Gazette} ran articles applauding his decision to step down.\textsuperscript{608} The newspapers were doing what they always had done—representing the viewpoint of the Charter class.

The reaction that the Pulliam Press had to the Lazar murder was like the reaction of the Phoenix 40: “Grand Jury Witness in Probe of Warren is Slain Gang Style.”\textsuperscript{609} The article claims that Lazar was shot to death "gangland style." It seemed safe to assume that Lazar had been killed in connection to the Warren case. Ned Warren was a very well-known man in Phoenix. He was a former Sing Sing inmate who moved to Arizona and ran one of the largest land fraud organizations in the nation.\textsuperscript{610} He made enough money from his illicit business ventures to move into Paradise Valley and operated with impunity until brought up on bribery charges in 1975.\textsuperscript{611} Lazar had been Warren’s accountant; he knew the sordid details of Warren’s business affairs better than anyone.\textsuperscript{612} This crime resonated amongst civic elites because, not only was Lazar a key witness in a case involving the bribery of public officials, but also he had recently ascended to the rank of managing partner at a certified public accountants office in Phoenix—he was one of their own. The murder of Lazar, killed in broad daylight the very day he was to testify against some of the most powerful men in the state, belied one of the key arguments for Charter—the

\textsuperscript{607} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{608} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{610} Luckingham, \textit{Phoenix}, 209.

\textsuperscript{611} Luckingham, \textit{Phoenix}, 210.

elimination of corruption in the city government. To redeem the Charter class, it was necessary for the Phoenix 40 to focus on ending crime after Lazar’s murder.

The crime task force established by the Phoenix 40 proposed the following measures be implemented at the city, county, and state level to dismantle localized organized crime:

- The number of Phoenix Police personnel needed to be augmented so the organization could fight ordinary crime as well as have the manpower to establish separate departments for grand jury indictments against illegal land development schemes, gamblers, and other local rackets;
- The Maricopa County attorney needed to create a new, separate unit exclusively to prosecute organized crime. The head prosecutor of this unit would also place reports to the Arizona attorney general;
- The Phoenix 40 supported the initiatives proposed by then-state attorney general Bruce Babbitt to combat organized crime; and,
- Finally, governor Raul Castro should establish a special unit of prosecutors to stop the flow of drugs into Arizona from Mexico.613

The Pulliam Press ran articles that supported these measures by showing how little state officials knew about organized crime in the state. When Governor Castro stated that he had a list that named organized crime bosses in Arizona, the Republic ran an article with Attorney General Babbitt refuting that statement. “I don’t think we have a clear picture of who or how many are at the head of organized crime in the state,” said Babbitt.614 However, he also asserted that most of the organized crime was “homegrown” and not closely related to a national syndicate.615 The rest


615 Ibid.
of the article discusses Babbitt’s trip to New Jersey and his efforts to learn how organized crime was fought there. In the end, the article gives credibility to the research Babbitt had undertaken to craft his legislation against organized crime—legislation supported by the Phoenix 40 currently under consideration by the state legislature.616

The Republic ran special columns by its reporters to show that organized crime had begun to plant itself in the area. John Herzig, then staff director for the National Task Force on Organized Crime, stated in an interview that,

The area has appeal to organized crime which hasn’t established a power base, but has made some inroads in the state. All the ingredients are here … the drug problem, the land fraud schemes, the disappearance of key witnesses involved in the land fraud cases. There are also effective efforts on the part of law enforcement agencies, the news media and concerned citizens such as the Phoenix 40 to restrict the efforts of organized crime.617

The very praxis of Sunbelt Capitalism had made Phoenix a haven for organized crime. Charter government had fostered the corruption it claimed to uproot.

Herzig was proved a soothsayer: In October of 1975, a car bomb killed Joseph Nardi, “an average Joe” who had recently worked for Arizona Public Service as a truck driver, warehouse man, and storekeeper.618 He was a former member of the Mafia and had been moved from Chicago to Phoenix by the FBI as part of the witness protection program.619 A May 1976 article explicitly “aimed at businessmen” uncovered that a local loan-fraud ring, allegedly operated in part by the president of Commercial Mortgage Advisors, Rex Parsons, had bilked, among others,


617 John Herzig, “Meeting will study Mob Influx,” Arizona Republic, July 24, 1975


619 Ibid.
the executive of a Californian bread company out of one hundred thousand dollars.\textsuperscript{620} Organized crime was a threat that did not fit the image the local professional class had of the city; it was the job of the Pulliam Press to bring awareness to the extent of the damage.

Pyrrhic Victories

However, there was no question that organized crime had become a serious problem when Don Bolles, an investigative reporter for the \textit{Arizona Republic}, was killed in downtown Phoenix by a car bomb detonated on June 2, 1976. The media and the government immediately rallied behind legislation to smash organized crime in Arizona. In less than a month, three emergency bills were unanimously passed by at least one chamber of the state legislature to aid in the prosecution of white-collar and organized crime—a bill to open blind land trusts, a bill appropriating funds to the department of public safety to assist in the investigation of the Bolles murder, and a bill to allow conviction solely on uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.\textsuperscript{621} Phoenix 40 and Bruce Babbitt had endorsed the final bill; unfortunately, it took the murder of a prominent reporter to have the state legislature pass it.\textsuperscript{622}

Journalists believed that “public outrage” over Bolles’ murder led the state legislature to act with such swiftness and uniformity; legislatures were motivated to keep the memory of the crime in popular discourse.\textsuperscript{623} An organization Bolles was involved with, the Investigative Reporters and Editors, sent numerous reporters to the state to root out the corruption that made it


possible for “a reporter [to] be killed in broad daylight in the middle of town.”  The Republic published an article in June 1976 that established that there had been at least eight local murders due to organized crime in the past twenty-one years. During the mid-1950s, three members of the Greenbaum family had been killed because of its connection with the Chicago mob; while a fourth person, Willie Bioff, was killed after testifying against his fellow Chicago hoods. These murders were connected to the recent ones involving Lazar, Nardi, and Bolles as evidence of a twenty-year continuum of organized crime violence in Phoenix.

The Pulliam Press continued to draw attention to the prominence of organized crime in the Valley of the Sun. The headline of a Phoenix Gazette article in March of 1977 read: “Extent of Organized and White-Collar Crimes Shocks Probers.” The article blames the average citizen for the growth of local organized crime and white-collar corruption stating that they were “nourished by public unawareness.” The article also sympathizes with law enforcement agencies that had been “trying to tell people what was going on,” to no avail. Even Attorney General Babbitt said, “there hadn’t been a problem historically and nobody got excited about it until the eleventh hour.” The Arizona Republic and Phoenix Gazette made sure to keep the public aware of the fact that organized crime still existed despite efforts to expunge it from the state.

Also in March of 1977, the Investigative Reporters and Editors published their own findings on corruption and crime in Arizona in large newspapers such as the Miami Herald and

http://www.ire.org/history/arizonaproject.html.


626 Ibid.


628 Ibid.

629 Ibid.
the Denver Post. Their reporters did not lay blame for the rise of organized crime at the feet of the public as did the Pulliam Press; instead, it placed fault with one of Charter’s founders: Barry Goldwater. The reports stated that Goldwater and his brother “condoned” close relationships with mob figures among the business elite of the state; if this were true, then the image of a clean, efficient government would be turned upside-down.

Despite the popular interest in Bolles’ murder, only one paper in Arizona, the Tucson Daily Star, published the report. The lack of interest by the Republic and Gazette was a predictable reaction by the Pulliam Press. However, the report was heavily scrutinized and its findings were questioned even in places where it was published. The Republic eschewed the series on the basis that “its allegations could not be verified.” Nevertheless, local newspapers did not show interest in a report that was published, in part, due to its diligence in reporting, while the Washington Post, New York Times, and Chicago Tribune at the very least ran delayed copies of the report, and Newsday published it in edited versions.

After the publication of the IRE report, the Republic and Gazette began to declare victory over organized crime. U.S. attorney Michael D. Hawkins claimed that Arizona was no longer “the primary target of sophisticated white-collar criminals” due to the efforts by state officials to strengthen business regulations and avoid graft amongst elected officials. Hawkins stated that

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632 Ibid.


organized and white-collar crime had existed in Arizona throughout the 1960s for several reasons, including rapid, "economic growth, open and available land, weak or non-existent business regulations…[and] an influx of newcomers." However, he concluded that the single-party dominance of low-paid, public service positions was the final piece that fomented the growth of organized crime and corruption in Arizona. All were key political platforms and policy positions of conservative elites who ran Charter in the mid-century. Despite this damning assessment of the local political economy, Republic columnist Paul Dean declared that the "crime cleanup" in Arizona had spoiled "smug Easterners' fun" by putting famous swindlers such as Ned Warren in prison. Both members of the Pulliam Press and the Phoenix 40 insisted that comparisons between "Phoenix in the '70s and Chicago in the '20s" were over and that the image of Phoenix had been salvaged from the undesirable national attention. The Pulliam Press declared that the Phoenix 40 and state legislature had ended organized crime in the Valley.

Conclusion

Bolles' assassination was a watershed moment in this history of Phoenix and Arizona. It brought a national spotlight on local policies and forced local elites to remedy some of the excessively unscrupulous activities associated with Sunbelt Capitalism. Some of the less publicized bills passed in the wake of Bolles' death included: a witness protection bill, a bill prohibiting the concealment of evidence, increased penalties for explosive use, and a mandatory-minimum prison sentence for assaults involving deadly weapons. Unfortunately, these measures

636 Ibid.


did little to remedy losses to life and property experienced by so many Phoenicians. Nineteen seventy-five was the third straight year that Phoenix led metropolitan areas of its size in crime. From 1970 to 1980, the violent crime rate index per 100,000 people leapt from 468.2 to 743.7; the property crime rate more than doubled from 3,780.5 to 8,564.6. This new legislation however did not decrease crime rates over time. In 1985, the modified crime index was greater than 9,000, and in 1990 it exceeded 10,000. The legislation passed in 1976 did not decrease the amount of crime committed in Phoenix; it was a publicity stunt by civic boosters to assuage outside investors concerned by negative reports on the local political economy.

The policies of the Phoenix 40 took resources away from the fight against street crime to fight against organized crime. But, by doing so, Charter also mitigated concerns about criminal activity that may have deterred outside investors. There were only about two hundred people closely associated with organized crime in Arizona at the time of Bolles' murder; moreover, most major scam artists found marks outside of the state. The Phoenix 40 also largely ignored the impact of the illicit drug trade on local communities; in 1978, it was estimated that one in every hundred people in the Phoenix area used heroin.

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example, did not even mention how to ameliorate juvenile delinquency—much of which was fueled by drug addiction among local Anglo teenagers in recently annexed suburbs. Charter was unable to confront social malaise because, to do so, would have belied how Sunbelt Capitalism had colored the Anglo metropolis.

As we will see in the next chapter, civic leaders in Maryvale hoped that their social influence could mobilize the mass of Maryvale voters. Bradford Luckingham, one of the earliest historians of Phoenix, found that substance abuse, high divorce and suicide rates, air and water pollution, an increase in traffic deaths, and the number of murders had become recognized aspects of life for many locals by the 1970s. Civic activists focused on these issues to paralyze the Charter machine and forced municipal charter revisions—like the implementation of a district-based system representation in 1982. The success of the initial grassroots resistance in the Papago Freeway battle inspired civic leaders to organize the community and assume electoral power, but they overestimated the ability of their social capital to overcome political marginalization by other communities in Phoenix. In many ways, annexation had been a bet that Maryvale would fare better within the Anglo metropolis as opposed to outside of it. However, the foreclosures that the community had previously experienced were a prelude to the cataclysmic demographic changes that would soon envelop the community.

644 Ibid.

645 Luckingham, Phoenix, 209.
CHAPTER 6

End of the Fiesta: (Civic) Capital Flight and the Limitations of Civic Life in Maryvale

It’s pretty hard to pry people out here loose for community’s sake, whether they are truly busy all the time, as most of them claim, or just involved in a lot of things which aren’t really important. It’s our belief that a show of community spirit—community togetherness—which is what sponsoring the Maryvale Citizens Association is about, is important.

Introduction

Civic activists in Maryvale overcame the painful foreclosures of the early sixties to reach the apex of their power during the seventies. At a federal level, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 responded to a nationwide groundswell of grassroots activities and included community organizations in the process of allocating federal funding for urban areas. Civic activists in Maryvale sought to create opportunities for Maryvale residents by acquiring these spoils through organizing their communities; however, before activists could lead collective actions, they had to help residents develop a collective consciousness. But in dramatic fashion, civic activists came up short in their efforts to resolve social tensions in Maryvale via civic life. The community simply lacked the civic capital.

The valuable association with Phoenix, which had impressed some early residents to vote for annexation as opposed to incorporation, had cost civic activists access to public officials. Apart from John F. Long, civic elites in the Valley of the Sun were unconcerned with helping ameliorate community concerns in Maryvale; in turn, social concerns festered as public officials lacked political incentive to resolve community issues. Even when there was potential synergy between Charter and Maryvale residents, civic elites refused to fully integrate suburban residents into their inner sanctum. Charter rarely nominated suburban activists for public office so,

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effectively, Maryvale residents had no guarantee of community representation at the municipal level until the implementation of a district-based representational system. Annexation into Phoenix had begun to degenerate civic energy in Maryvale.

Civic activists’ initial optimism gave way to concerned panic as Maryvale endured continuous economic restructuring during the 1970s. Financial turmoil further augmented the stakes of the discord between civic activists and elected officials. Each group sought to resolve structural inadequacies that sprang from the low-tax, pro-growth policies that financed Sunbelt Capitalism. However, as we saw in the last chapter, well-organized civic activists from affluent communities consumed most of the civic capital in Maricopa County. Unlike racial minorities, many of whom had acquired language to express their alienation from Charter, Anglo residents in Maryvale had not yet found serious complaints with Charter governance. Instead, residents sought to form homegrown alternatives to social concerns since Charter failed to deliver desired services in Maryvale. To their horror, the civic energy that had long underpinned community spirit proved insufficient for the task at hand, and the Maryvale residents could not muster the labor to remedy the financial crisis that had enveloped the community. Their failure marked Maryvale as a colored community in the eyes of Anglo Phoenicians—even as civic leadership in Maryvale remained virtually completely Anglo.

The Civic Climate in Maryvale

The civic activists who initiated the Papago Freeway referendum held contrasting interests with civic activists in Maryvale. No other neighborhood in Phoenix would benefit as much from the Papago Freeway as Maryvale, yet despite being the most heavily populated section of town, civic activists had not been able to rally voter turnout. The Maryvale Star, the community newspaper, urged voters to go and support the Papago asserting that the intolerable local traffic would only worsen without additional infrastructure, and even if the Papago was imperfect, it was the best practical plan to quickly remedy the situation. The editors dismissed the
efforts of the city council to practice direct democracy regarding the Papago Freeway as “silly.”\footnote{647} Many voters, representing more than one hundred thousand residents in the Maryvale community, supported the Papago referendum, but it still failed at the municipal level.\footnote{648} Heretofore, most members of the civic community in Maryvale—with the notable exception of Long—had been excluded from participation in Charter government. Now, the residents of inner-city neighborhoods were dictating terms to Charter. Maryvale’s lack of political capital reflected, to many, a subordinate position within the city; its civic community would not be given its political keep unless the community asserted conscious and collective political power.

Civic life in Maryvale prior to the Papago debacle was small and incestuous; the same people often served in leadership roles in multiple organizations. For example, the \textit{Star} saw fit to print an editorial by the Maryvale Chamber of Commerce rebuking a previously published editorial from Justine Spitalny; she expressed her displeasure that the Miss Maryvale Pageant, sponsored by the Maryvale Women’s Club, had not received financial support from the chamber. The editorial sought to publicly clarify why the chamber had not supported the Miss Maryvale Pageant and concluded with, “[t]he Maryvale Chamber of Commerce wishes to express interest in any event worthwhile to the Maryvale community… and best wishes for continued success to Suzi Collins.”\footnote{649} Collins, winner of the pageant, was the daughter of \textit{Star} owner Taber Collins—who served alongside Spitalny, Charlene Chaney, and Mary Jane Roush, the co-directors of the Miss Maryvale Pageant, as a director on the Maryvale community council (MCC). The intimate civic community operated primarily as a social club for provincial suburban society.\footnote{650}

Still, there were many men and women in Maryvale interested in furthering the development of local civic organizations. The social life for the members of these civic organizations stemmed from their philanthropic service to the community where they resided. For example, the Maryvale Elks had been constituted in 1967 and, within four years, more than tripled the number of Elks at the Maryvale Lodge. Their growth in membership stemmed from the voracious social life that the organization offered members. Bill Bolt, the exalted ruler, exclaimed that "you don’t just join a club when you come into the Elks, you join a whole new set of friends." The Maryvale Elks would sponsor charity events, such as barbeques, which their members helped organize as well as attend; the Elks also sponsored day trips to the state house for high-achieving students. Similarly, Charles Sing re-constituted the Jaycees in 1972, and the Jaycees gained over fifty members in its first year. The Jaycees were heavily involved in the local community; around Christmastime, with Long’s financial support they would identify needy families who lived in Maryvale and take Christmas baskets to those homes. The civic community in Maryvale, while a provincial social club, also was driven by the interest its growing membership had in service philanthropy.

The burgeoning civic community offered opportunities for social prominence for residents who may not have otherwise had an opportunity for social prominence. Numerous politicians served on the local civic committees and councils dedicated to improving the quality of life in Maryvale. Bill McCune, an ambitious twenty-five year old when elected to the Arizona House of

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651 Fran Lang, “Four Year Old Maryvale Elks have Fun and 550 Members,” Maryvale Star, October 7, 1971.


Representatives in 1969, found that civic engagement provided an opportunity to develop a public persona focused on youth social issues in the hopes that it would help him earn re-election.\textsuperscript{654} Bill Donahue eventually earned the support of Charter government in his campaign for a seat on the city council due to his prominence in the Maryvale civic community.\textsuperscript{655} Furthermore, prominent club women were able to play an outsized role in the public civic community. Anne Lindeman, for example, was a long-time state representative from the area and counted on civic organizations for non-partisan support in the district and Spitalny managed the MCC for over a decade after she left the Cartwright school board.\textsuperscript{656} The civic community in Maryvale created small opportunities for social prominence by suburbanites who were distant from the more established and exclusive civic organizations in central Phoenix.\textsuperscript{657}

The central event for the civic community was the annual Maryvale Fiesta. While it had multiple names, the fiesta originated from the efforts of the MCC--a local civic group composed of Maryvale homeowners which organized to repay Long for his infrastructure improvements to the Maryvale Park rotunda. In 1970, the Maryvale Lions joined the MCC to have, according to Lions president Jerry LeRoy, “the most successful fiesta the Westside has ever seen.”\textsuperscript{658} Planned for the last weekend in May, the fiesta included a parade, a carnival, the Miss Maryvale Pageant, and most importantly, the co-sponsorship of more than two dozen local community organizations like the Maryvale Moose Lodge, the Maryvale VFW Post #9829, and the Maryvale Women’s

\textsuperscript{654} McCune, Phoenix, Arizona, October 1, 2014 and June 25, 2015.

\textsuperscript{655} “’75 Sees Maryvale Awaken to Need of Working Together,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, December 31, 1975.


\textsuperscript{658} “1970 Maryvale Community Fair will be ‘Greatest Ever,’” \textit{Maryvale Star}, March 25, 1970.
The Star hoped that the Memorial Day parade and fiesta would provide Maryvale with patriotic traditions that would help turn the community into “Hometown, USA.” In many ways, the successes and shortcomings of the fiesta represented the health of civic community in Maryvale.

The reason the fiesta was so emblematic of the civic community was due to the greatest challenge that the civic community in Maryvale faced: a dearth of accessible economic or political capital. In 1971, Mrs. Rita Karls called for residents to put together a children’s theatre to “put Maryvale on the map!” However, it would take land, labor and financial resources from the local community to operate the theatre. Unlike in central Phoenix or the East Valley, there were few corporate professionals within Maryvale who could organize the necessary private capital to make a theatre possible. It took years for funding to come together so that a play could be put on, and it took federal support—resources marked as undesirable within the logic of Sunbelt Capitalism—to hire a professional actress to produce plays at the Maryvale Youth Center. This is not what Karls had in mind.

Ed Savola, a Maryvale resident who was leader of Senior Girl Scout Troop 411 and a member of the Phoenix Library Advisory Board, organized a successful fundraiser through a bike ride to raise funds for the Community Organization for Drug Abuse Control (CODAC) after being named its community activities coordinator in September 1971. Some residents went as far as

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659 “Maryvale Community Fair will be Getting Into Full Swing by This Friday Morning,” Maryvale Star, May 27, 1970.


saying that Savola should be the honorary mayor of Maryvale. But even with his persistence, there was no public money available for drug abuse rehabilitation or prevention efforts on the part of CODAC, and despite the clear need for some type of anti-drug initiative, private donations could not support the organization in Maryvale. The challenge of eliciting financial support to further the aims of the civic community would prove to be an incessant challenge in Maryvale.

Although provincial in nature, the civic community in Maryvale spent much of its energy on causes or entities outside of the local community. For example, in 1970 the Maryvale Elks and Women of the Moose helped organize a fundraiser for the Gompers Rehabilitation Center. While an admirable project, the center was in north-central Phoenix and had valley-wide support. Other leaders in the Maryvale civic community left the neighborhood to lead regional institutions. Karls, three-time president and co-founder of the Maryvale-based Fairway Estates Garden Club, went on to serve as president at the centrally located Valley Garden Center (in the Encanto district) in 1970. The Fairway Estates Gardening Club offered home keeping tips and training to its fellow residents through its Maryvale Community Improvement Project; club members also reported homeowners who did not keep their yards up to city ordinance. Karls’ prominence came within the exclusive nature of the club world as the Fairway Estates Gardening Club only allowed for thirty members—diminishing her impact for Maryvale despite regional prominence.


663 “Bar-B-Que Karnival Time is Here at Gompers Center,” Maryvale Star, April 8, 1970.


It was the neighborhood politicians who gave the civic community a more local perspective. For example, in early 1972, as State Rep. Bill McCune desperately sought new angles to help guarantee his re-election, it came to his attention that, while rates of juvenile delinquency were lower than other neighborhoods in the city, incidents of juvenile larceny, drug use, and absconding had increased in Maryvale by more than fifty percent from the previous year. In response, he held a Maryvale town hall entitled “Community in Crisis” to develop a community plan to remedy the rise in juvenile delinquency. A supervisor at the Arizona Department of Corrections attended the town hall and told residents that they had to end their “habit of blaming” and take a civic responsibility toward remedying the causes of juvenile delinquency. This would be a clarion call for civic activists in Maryvale—they were needed to help coordinate a response to this disorder through the cooperation of public agencies focused on community development and private contributions from the business and charitable communities. The civic community was so concerned that it continued to develop an organized response to the McCune’s findings. The interest of the civic community in social policies related to juvenile delinquency was strong enough that McCune sailed to victory in his next election.

The Neighborhood Boosters

The local press could not help but notice the changes in the political economy. Taber L. Collins became the owner of the Maryvale Star in 1971; he purchased the newspaper from a

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666 “Delinquency Below Average, but Increase is of Concern,” Maryvale Star, April 20, 1972; McCune, Phoenix, Arizona, October 1, 2014 and June 25, 2015.


Pennsylvania business, Valley of the Sun Newspapers, which had its primary office in Tempe. Prior to this, various local publishers from Peoria and Apache Junction had owned the Maryvale Sun. Whereas previous ownership had not emphasized neighborhood news, Collins promised that local ownership would lead to even greater coverage of Maryvale if he could get community support with news alerts, advertising, and circulation.669 Collins also inherited a newspaper staff that included several well-respected employees in Ed Freitag, a reporter at the Phoenix Gazette, and the cosmopolitan Mary Jane Shoun. In particular, Shoun would develop a long-standing presence in the West Valley civic community—she was active in charitable work for women recovering from substance abuse and later helped with a publication on the history of Glendale.670 The influential Pulliam owned the Republic and the Phoenix Gazette, the premier papers in the Valley, but many felt that the papers ignored issues important to the neighborhoods tops and did not fairly reflect the span of political discourse percolating at the civic grassroots.671 The lacuna in coverage made it possible for neighborhood-based newspapers to find a niche among residents who desired an alternative to the Pulliam Press.672

Collins and his staff were attuned to the sentiment in the neighborhoods concerning Charter elites. After the voters rejected the Papago Freeway, the Star noted that Charter had "brought success but it has not brought free expression" and that caused the "suburban natives" to become "politically restless." And while Maryvale would get its "geographical due" in the form of one or two Charter candidates from the area, they would be ineffective due to the preponderance


of Charter involvement with downtown grass-tops. Collins tied the lack of free expression to the general “apathy” of the electorate; the low rate of civic participation was a manifestation of the ambivalence many residents felt within the local political economy. For example, an election on a potential tax increase by the Phoenix Union high school district to help build an industrial arts building at Trevor Browne high school in February 1973 was only able to draw 1.4 percent of eligible voters to the polls. The Star, however, argued that the potential for a political alternative to Charter arising from the “politically active and imaginative people in Maryvale who are tiring of downtown-interest control of Charter government,” and that, unless Charter integrated these new leaders into the organization, they had the potential to force a regime change at city hall. With the Star as a self-appointed mouthpiece, civic activists in Maryvale began conscious efforts to organize as a way to express their political will.

Political power became even more important once Charter declined to nominate a single representative from Maryvale for the 1973 municipal election. The Star used the omission to demonstrate that Maryvale would be unable to get “representation of its own choosing on the Phoenix City Council” until the local civic community was formally organized. The matter of political expression, and not merely representation, was what the Star argued was at stake. For example, Armando de Leon was a resident of Maryvale twice nominated by Charter, but the Maryvale Star argued that he did not “participate in the community” and did not know the needs of neighborhood residents. Furthermore, while de Leon had always been supportive of Maryvale, he had done little to help organize the civic community to politically lobby for local interests after he left office. The Star also argued that the never-ending sprawl of Phoenix had created “competition

674 “The Minority Strikes Again!” Maryvale Star, February 28, 1973. The tax increase was approved by voters.
for city funds and services" among the recently-annexed neighborhoods and that Maryvale could wind up “on the bottom of the heap in priority” if it did not find a way to make its presence felt at city hall. Maryvale was at its apex at the time of this editorial, but after the Papago referendum, the local civic community and neighborhood press began to realize it could no longer rely on Charter government to enact policies with the long-term interest of Maryvale in mind. Maryvale would have to figure out how to play the political games necessary to control its environment or risk being regulated by indifferent, and antagonist, outside interests.

Civic Revival

Collins, publisher of the *Maryvale Star*, took it upon himself and his staff to develop an even grander vision for the civic community. In March of 1973, Collins began to make overtures to the Maryvale high school advisory committee for it to join the MCC—of which he was president—at a renewed fiesta that fall. He envisioned a parade and pageant reflecting a new level of coordination between the disparate civic organizations in Maryvale—even those that had long-standing enmity with one another. He ultimately envisioned the MCC operating as the political nucleus, which could help the civic community in Maryvale reassert control over the social life of the community. He argued that the “cultural arm” of the MCC could collaborate with the Maryvale Artist’s League to develop local theatres and the “business arm” would work with the MCC to improve the local business climate. Collins helped arrange formal relationships between the Maryvale Youth Development Council (MYDC) and the “youth council” of the Maryvale community council so that they could achieve the synergy of scale that a structured civic community could provide. Most importantly, Collins planned for the MCC to have a “political

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arm" that would make "Maryvale's weight felt at City Hall." Maryvale had the ingredients for a well-organized civic community and a centralized structure would help further empower it.

Long addressed the MCC at a life achievement celebration with encouragement to undertake reforms like those proposed by Collins after Charter declined to nominate a single resident of Maryvale for the fall municipal elections. Long claimed that the Council had not “really changed [its] direction or set new goals in the last 15 years,” and suggested that the MCC try setting “a small goal and go after it.” The Star used these comments as an opportunity to argue that the community owed it to itself “to apply pressure on the city to fulfill needs through organizations such as the [Maryvale] Community Council or [Maryvale] Jaycees.” The Maryvale Star continued to argue that the organization of the civic community was the best way to ensure community residents would have the political clout necessary to make their concerns felt. However, the management of the Maryvale Star underwent a shock before any reforms were made—Collins abruptly moved to Maryland from Maryvale in September 1973 and left a vacuum in the local civic community. The Star identified Collins as the driving force behind the efforts to coordinate community organizations in Maryvale, and when he left, several of his opponents on the MCC discontinued his proposed reforms.

However, several of Collins allies had already begun to develop a non-partisan, political action committee for Maryvale in the wake of the town hall on juvenile delinquency called by Rep. McCune. d was a socially, well-connected civic organization that exerted political pressure on public officials to ensure municipal support for their policy efforts. McCune was only one of the politically prominent members on MYDC; fellow Rep. Anne Lindeman joined him. Don Cline, then the principal at the recently established Trevor Browne high school, was the original leader of MYDC. Numerous other members were involved in other civic organizations across Maryvale. One of MYDC's first initiatives was to pressure the city to improve Marivue Park at 55th and


Osborn by arguing that the park was a haven for teenage drug use and other illicit activities. MYDC petitioned the Phoenix police department to assign additional patrolmen to the area to reduce the prevalence of drug use at the park. Furthermore, MYDC pressured Phoenix parks and recreation to improve the lighting at the park so that the city could schedule teen and adult sports leagues at the park during evenings. After these changes occurred, McCune would later specifically claim that “community involvement” in MYDC was primarily responsible for the decline in juvenile delinquency in Maryvale.

The success of the civic activists in MYDC in using juvenile delinquency as leverage to create public investment in Maryvale was groundbreaking; heretofore, there had been little ability to get the city to provide support for a project that Charter government had previously been unconvinced to undertake. A previous civic organization, the Maryvale Parks and Recreation Council (MPRC), had suggested that park improvement could reduce juvenile delinquency before the report on juvenile delinquency had even been released. However, while MPRC sought local volunteers willing to help sponsor programming, it needed the city to pay for development first. It took the socially connected and avowedly political MYDC to provoke the city to pay for improvements to the acres of already purchased land for public parks. An editorial in the Maryvale Star even suggested that, despite the difficulties in actually resolving the causes of


684 “City to Buy Land for Westside Park,” Maryvale Star, April 29, 1970. By 1972, the city already had purchased land for at least five parks in the Maryvale area in addition to the green space developed by John F. Long.
juvenile delinquency, civic activists used the pretense of crime reduction to push for attention from city hall.\textsuperscript{685} MYDC represented a new model for Maryvale: an organization brought together by politicians riding the philanthropic drive of the local civic community to create a cohesive organization that could garner support for publicly-sponsored community improvement initiatives.

MYDC represented the political demands of local civic activists to Charter government to help ensure charitable organizations in Maryvale had support for their planned activities. Through extensive relationships with supportive public officials, especially from the Bureau of Preventative Services at the Arizona Department of Corrections, MYDC was able to cosponsor projects for children and adolescents with civic and volunteer organizations such as the Maryvale Chamber of Commerce, the West Valley YMCA, and the Junior League.\textsuperscript{686} Among their largest projects were: a “fun-mobile,” which would go to different sites and entertain children; weekend recreational sports activities for neighborhood youth at Maryvale High; the formation of an “Indian guide” program where teenagers mentored fatherless first-grade girls; the expansion of neighborhood Boys’ Club opportunities; and development of the Maryvale-Phoenix Girls’ Club Board.\textsuperscript{687}

MYDC struggled to develop more substantive programming for teens. Its primary program targeted at teens was the “dial-a-teen” program, which found work opportunities for unemployed teens at local small businesses; they also coordinated volunteers to inform parents of the status of their absentee high school students. However, their primary recourse for this age group was cooperation with legal authorities—a solution that attacked the symptoms and not the cause of juvenile delinquency.\textsuperscript{688} In all actuality, the MYDC was ineffective at developing programming targeted at teens, but the outrage it manufactured proved to be useful—not only


\textsuperscript{686} “Council Formed to Attack Youth Problems Here,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, May 24, 1972.


had MYDC augmented public investment in Maryvale, but it also legitimized the leadership of the participants in the civic community. In the face of outright political exclusion by Charter, this was a resounding victory for Maryvale civic activists.

When Collins returned to Maryvale less than a year after his departure, he came back to a community that had awoken to the prospect of political change. Collins contacted over one hundred members of the civic community in Maryvale to organize a new organization that would fulfill the political demands of the community. He had the support of many of the brightest luminaries in the local community: McCune, Lindeman, and Bill Lewis, who were elected officials; Sing, who was a prominent Jaycee; and Gerard Daly, who was on the Cartwright Elementary School District Board. Other supporters included Allen Rand, a lieutenant for Long, who was a potential candidate for Charter government. He also helped come up with the name of the organization—the Maryvale Citizens Association—and helped Collins compose the bylaws for the organization. While the organization retained a corporate structure, Collins argued that membership should be left open to any interested party and that all votes count equally toward decisions of the organization. However, at its election meeting, despite having contacted over one hundred individuals to join, only about thirty people showed to elect Robert Pettett, the owner of Pettett's department store at Maryvale Shopping City, to chair the MCA. It was clear that the MCA would have to do more work to engage the community.

691 “Pettett Elected President of Citizens Association,” Maryvale Star, October 2, 1974.
The Rejection of Public Debt

The MCA searched for ways to engage the broader community. Applications for individual and organizational memberships in the MCA were placed in the Star so that community residents could join of their own volition. Furthermore, meetings were open to the community so that all residents could hear about the impact city policy would have on the local community. In fact, the MCA left its nominating committee for leadership within the organization open to community at-large. These recruiting efforts helped the MCA overcome its inauspicious start and grow to over one hundred members by the end of 1974. Despite its overtures to the broader community, the leadership of the MCA remained in the hands of the local elite: Bill Donahue took over as MCA president after Pettett resigned his post partway through the first year to assume control over the Maryvale Planning Committee—soon after, Donahue was nominated by Charter to run for city council. In this way, the MCA attempted to imitate the top-down style of civic elites, but recognized that its power came from the mobilization of community residents—not corporate sponsorships. The civic activists who controlled the MCA needed followers.

The MCA attempted to politically organize residents through community celebrations. On April 20, 1975, the association sponsored a community picnic for Maryvale residents—an editorial published by the Star laid out the logic for the event. The editorial concluded that residents needed to attend events sponsored by civic organizations to demonstrate “community-togetherness” and to show the collective consciousness of the local community. The MCA envisioned that community outings such as this picnic would aid its ability to get voters to the polls. While Maryvale voters had been unable to serve as the fulcrum of power in the 1973


Papago Freeway referendum, the leaders of the MCA believed that their outreach would ensure Maryvale voters showed up to the ballot to ensure that Maryvale benefitted from public funding.

To the surprise of local leadership, the next time voters showed at the polls, they voted against what the MCA perceived to be the best interests of the community. The MCA had been holding public forums on the April 29, 1975, city bond election for months prior to the vote. In January, the MCA had assigned members to subcommittees that would investigate the bond election and propose recommendations to the group on how residents should vote. The MCA saw a need for additional libraries and social services, improved roads, and an augmented police presence in Maryvale; the sub-committees recommended that voters approve all bond proposals to ensure that these improvements would take place.\(^\text{696}\) However, the economy had begun to slide, and while the Star argued that the financial benefits of a quarter billion dollars in new bonds would help provide jobs to the community in a period of economic recession, voters rejected the burden of additional debt to help infrastructure investment keep pace with development.\(^\text{697}\) The incipient tax revolt limited the possibilities of community action.

The defeat of the bond proposal reduced the allocation of public funding for Maryvale. In response, the city council cut funding for improvements to Marivue Park—most critically, the addition of a pool, which had been the top priority of the city parks board. Maryvale had to appeal for Community Development Block Grants to help pay for the neighborhood pool.\(^\text{698}\) The civic community had assumed that its demographic clout would help ensure that the city government would operate to the benefit of Maryvale voters; instead, the civic community found that voters did not want to pay for the city government to provide benefits to the Maryvale community. As the


costs of delayed infrastructure investment began to climb, civic activists scrambled to find new ways to maintain the quality of the community that did not require public funding.

Impotence, Insults, and Indifference

Community activists sought to organize Maryvale voters in anticipation of the November election in which MCA President Bill Donahue was candidate for city council. Donahue was also one of two Charter candidates elected to office that year—his efforts with the MCA had helped him weather anti-Charter resentment at the polls. More importantly, Tom Freeland, with the support of the MCA, helped force another referendum on the Papago Freeway alignment; half of all eligible voters in Maryvale turned out to help carry the second Papago referendum to success over the tepid opposition of civic elites in the newly-formed Phoenix 40.699

However, the relationship between Maryvale and the Phoenix 40 would consume political capital that could have been used to improve social conditions in Maryvale. Local priorities were placed on the backburner so that civic elites could pass legislative policy. Moreover, the Phoenix 40 ignored many concerns and policies suggested by community activists and allowed these issues to metastasize. The Phoenix 40 also did little to ameliorate the paucity of public capital, which had undercut earlier initiatives to improve community space. Politicians found that they would need to support additional state retrenchment to remain politically viable.700 Finally, the civic energy, which had helped mobilize voters for the Papago referendum, would need to be perpetuated if Maryvale was to continue to receive proportional support from the municipal government. The paucity of representation on the city council meant that the concerns of

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Maryvale residents often were minimized when brought before the council.\textsuperscript{701} The shifting political landscape required that civic activists expend energies to help mobilize voters. The limits to this approach would soon become clear.

MYDC found that its influence in the community gradually eroded as external factors hampered their ability to follow up in its early successes. First, it was clear from a very early stage that the overcrowded conditions at Maryvale and Trevor Browne high schools were contributing to the preponderance of juvenile delinquency in Maryvale. The sheer number of students on campus allowed many to get lost in an overburdened system; however, it was the practice of double sessions—holding classes outside of typical school hours—that exacerbated absenteeism most. By 1974, neither school held double sessions, but the economic recession threatened the viability of a third high school in the neighborhood and raised the threat that double sessions might return.\textsuperscript{702} This decision was entirely up to the Phoenix Union high school district board of directors—a political body that MYDC marginally influenced.

MYDC soon suffered a greater humiliation. MYDC had helped construct the Maryvale-Phoenix Girls’ Club board in cooperation with the Phoenix Junior League in 1973. Prominent Maryvale activists organized the Board. Mrs. Ruth Daly, whose husband was president of Cartwright school board, was elected first president of the board. She had been president of the Maryvale Women’s Club on two occasions as well as a former editor at the Maryvale Star. To become officially affiliated with the national Girls’ Club organization, the board had to organize two years of operating funds for its youth center. However, by 1975, the board had yet to begin construction on a permanent facility and only had a site due to the largesse of Long.\textsuperscript{703} Even after


\textsuperscript{702} “Good Try, Folks,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, October 9, 1974.

all this support, the Girls’ Club board had to cut its sponsorship of the Maryvale Youth Club because it could not fund-raise enough money to maintain both programs. It became clear that without public economic support for civic leaders, success would be limited by the narrow basis of the charitable community in Maryvale.  

Nevertheless, civic activists sought creative, low-cost alternatives for costly service and maintenance projects in public space. Ann Saxton, secretary for the Maryvale Chamber of Commerce, collaborated with the Rio Salado district Girl Scouts, the Maryvale Women’s Club, and the city of Phoenix to organize a community “Clean-up Day” on November 19, 1977. More than one thousand children were slated to walk through Maryvale and clean up littered arterial and collector streets; if they encountered an unkempt yard, they would be encouraged to “go to the door and ask the homeowner for permission” to tidy up their property. The finale of the event involved an “adults only” cookout and award ceremony at the end of day.

Volunteers could pick up after litterbugs; property management, however, required state assistance. In June 1978, Tim Glynn helped form Citizens Against Property Pollution to force city officials to cite zoning violations at local residences. Glynn railed against the plethora of residents who ignored city ordinances and neighborly niceties that prohibited permanently parking “abandoned vehicles” in front yards in public view. Other homes sorely needed paint and other repairs to improve the curb appeal of the property—in an extreme case, Glynn identified one property with a large, uncovered hole prominently featured in the front yard. He and others believed that state enforcement, and not community pressure, was the best way to encourage homeowners to remedy property disrepair, but city officials countered that “regardless of how bad a property looks, we are powerless…there are no laws about housekeeping.” To Glynn, and other

704 “Juvenile Crime Rate Here Drops; Community Involvement Gets Credit,” Maryvale Star, March 6, 1974.

potential home sellers in the community, this argument was not acceptable “We the taxpayer,” Glynn argued, “are supporting a potential ghetto.”

Eventually, Glynn presented the city with proposed ordinances to prosecute behavior seen as contributing to neighborhood blight: he sought to limit the time under which a vehicle could remain in a state of public open-air car repair, to limit parking to impermeable surfaces, to alternate street parking so that street cleaning and repairs could occur with less obstruction, and to prohibit dumping household trash in communal alleyways. However, city officials had already informed residents that they were too short-staffed to cite all vehicle repair operations; it would not be feasible to expect them to assign additional regulatory duties to enforcement officers. Furthermore, the wages a mechanic could make moonlighting at home; the profits “front-yard merchants” made from weekly garage sales; the ability of commercial truck drivers to park near their homes—all of these working-class practices had been long accepted in Maryvale but were targeted by Glynn and his associates in their attempt to reduce “blight.”

Even worse, however, was the eventual inability of the city to maintain neighborhood infrastructure. By 1979, the streets were so bad that some Maryvale residents believed they needed a major overhaul. Lawrence McCally wrote Mayor Margaret T. Hance to alert her that “cracked, rutted streets [were] simply being glossed over with seal coating” and ruptured anew after a few weeks’ wear and tear. When he suggested that the city stop performing this task, he was told, “If the city government is to continue to operate within its budget…priorities must be established and adhered to.” McCally fumed, however, because of the futility of seal coating as

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street repair: “They’re going through the pretense and spending the money.” It would have taken a lot more money to fix the streets than paint them, and while the city wanted to appear as though it could maintain the infrastructure of Maryvale, there were only twenty repairmen for the entire city and there would be no public funding to employ more. Eventually, Long had to offer his services to the city just to get the potholes in the road fixed. When sweat equity became insufficient to improve community conditions, civic activists had to pay for improvements.

Around this time, the Star began to accuse residents of civic apathy. Resident participation in local civic organizations had flagged—in 1973, the Jaycees had nearly sixty members; by 1978, it barely had twenty. The Kiwanis had to establish an evening club to help draw members who could not attend the traditional mid-day luncheons. The chamber of commerce shed membership as constituents complained that the chamber was “giving them no reason to stay.” It was becoming increasingly obvious that “all of the work is done by a few of the members” because they were the only ones participating. The Star ran a two-part series on the impact of civic apathy on the MCA—concluding that people identified more as residents of Phoenix than as residents of Maryvale and saw little reason to engage in local civic life. Star reporter Greg Bucci wrote an editorial that bemoaned the impact of annexation and rapid suburban development for diluting the sense of place in Maryvale—a community now indistinguishable from any other tract community in Phoenix. However, it was still the

responsibility of residents to share the civic burden among each other lest the community
dissolve in the face of mounting social concerns.\textsuperscript{716} And just how did the MCA expect to help the
community resolve concerns over racial integration, urban blight, deteriorating infrastructure, and
social services for children without the public money that had financed MYDC projects? They
simply urged all Maryvale residents to attend MCA meetings.

The Final Fiesta

In 1980, the annual Fiesta Day celebration was cancelled because the featured carnival
behind the fiesta refused to work in Phoenix after the city passed an ordinance requiring all
workers at amusement centers like carnivals, skating rinks, and bowling alleys to be fingerprinted.
The carnival owner exclaimed, "When they start fingerprinting bank presidents … that’s when I’ll
do it. I’m through with Phoenix." The city attorney claimed that the ordinance had been passed to
help police amusement environments, but the fiesta organizers realized that they could not make
enough money to justify the effort for the event and cancelled the fair. It was one of the final
fundraising platforms available to the weakened civic community.\textsuperscript{717}

The fate of the Maryvale fiesta represents the unforeseen shortcoming of the underlying
strategy of Maryvale civic activists—that there was no more public money available to allocate
toward civic projects. Furthermore, the proposals of Maryvale civic activists had been disproven
by their inability to reduce the symptoms of juvenile delinquency—as manifested in the perpetual
rise of youth drug usage. In some ways, the public consternation over drug usage was sound and
fury—drugs and drug users were always a concealed thread in the suburban fabric—but the
emphasis on law enforcement by civic elites such as Gov. Jack Williams left more complicated


issues, such as rehabilitation efforts, to civic activists.\textsuperscript{718} In 1972, editors at the \textit{Maryvale Star} tried to encourage activism within the community when it claimed that Maryvale should feel “embarrassed” to have Marivue Park termed as the “youth drug center of the valley,” but MYDC was still too nascent to claim the mantle on this issue.\textsuperscript{719} However, as previously mentioned, CODAC had a strong presence in West Phoenix and attempted to remedy the situation. CODAC received funding from both state and federal sources to develop strategies to control drug use among the youth. Some of its leadership lived in Maryvale and had been influential in getting de Leon to hire a drug control coordinator. They also brought awareness to the desperate need for drug rehabilitation centers. CODAC had Long’s support, but its efforts to assist the west side fell short—there was no public money available to set up a rehabilitation clinic in Maryvale.\textsuperscript{720} Drug use was certainly an issue on the radar of Maryvale residents, but efforts by elected officials and community leaders could not meet the challenges of reducing public consumption of drugs or helping to remedy the social consequences of drug addiction.

Over the course of the decade, rates of drug usage among local teens sprouted upward despite the vested efforts of the civic community.\textsuperscript{721} Residents remained frustrated with the quality of life in their community and civic participation had proven an ineffective tool in attempts


\textsuperscript{721} “Study Sees Teen-Age Drug Use Growing in Maryvale,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, February 21, 1983.
to create a neighborhood befitting the imagined community of Maryvale. Vernon Hoy, director of the department of public safety in 1977, declared that even in predominantly Anglo areas, “the public has been most concerned about crimes of violence; about personal safety…. Public pressure on law enforcement agencies, therefore, has been to control the burglar, the rapist, the mugger, the murderer.”

However, despite the efforts of organizations such as MYDC, government officials did not implement most of the recommendations and legislation proposed by civic activists—Charter government blocked the recommendations and legislation.

Conclusion

Maryvale became marginalized within the Charter narrative as social concerns about juvenile delinquency rose to the forefront of community identity. In doing so, Maryvale lost the discursive protection of Anglo identity. For, in the fight against organized crime, the Arizona Republic presented a narrative that obfuscated concerns in colored communities—concerns that now plagued Maryvale. Financial insolvency would scuttle not only the ambitions of civic leaders, but also the reputation of the entire community. The inability of Anglo residents to privately afford youth services meant that the infrastructure would have to be built with public debt—a resource that had been thoroughly sullied in civic discourse. Instead, the weakness of civic leaders created openings for outside investors to capture the attention of residents. As usual, outside investors offered better access to Anglo culture than local speculators ever could.

CHAPTER 7

Distinction(s): Retail Consumption and the Politics of Community Control in Maryvale

Introduction

Well before civic stewards had lost leadership over their flock, Long knew that it would be beneficial to include shopping amenities in his original plan for Maryvale. So, after building enough properties to ensure demand, Long began construction on Maryvale Shopping City in July 1958. While he had originally planned to build the largest shopping center between Texas and California, soon other malls in the Valley surpassed the size of the Maryvale Shopping City. Yet, for its time, the shopping center offered affordable quality. Long retained Victor Gruen to improve the design of the mall and procure regional supermarket chains (El Rancho), national variety stores (Kresge’s), and family-oriented leisure activities (Bowlero) to lease space in the shopping city. In addition, Long created space for Arizona businesses, such as Ryans-Evans drug stores, to compete for new consumer spending. This agglomeration of chain stores helped draw foot traffic so that smaller, locally owned stores could flourish. For example, after moving to Maryvale from Chicago, the Hatch family opened “The Paper Mill,” a stationery store.

723 For the sake of clarity, I have grouped the Maryvale Mall, Maryvale Terrace, and Maryvale Plaza shopping areas as one entity under the term “Maryvale Shopping City.”

Maryvale Shopping City lacked luxuries, but it provided adequate services to West Valley residents.\footnote{Mr. and Mrs. Hatch Open The Paper Mill, \textit{Arizona Republic}, October 11, 1959, 65, accessed August 12, 2016, \url{https://www.newspapers.com/}.}

It was difficult for outsiders to develop commercial space in Maryvale without the support of civic activists because of the symbiotic relationship between Long, local business-owners, and nearby property-owners. For example, Long could corral public support to petition the county planning and zoning commission to block the efforts by the Bayless Investment and Trading Company to build a commercial property near 67th and Indian School Road on the basis that, "rezoning would invalidate a master plan for the area under which it already has adequate commercial zoning." Long’s lawyer stated, "Long has spent thousands of dollars developing Maryvale and he wants to prevent Bayless from coming in and destroying his investment."\footnote{They’re Agreed, \textit{Arizona Republic}, October 29, 1959, 56, accessed August 12, 2016, \url{https://www.newspapers.com/}.}

From an early stage, Long set the tone for development among business owners in Maryvale.

The Maryvale Shopping City Merchant’s Association worked closely with Long to make sure that the affordable quality he promoted would be reflected in the services and goods it provided. The association made sure to provide cultural options, such as art exhibits, gardening shows, and musical entertainment, that working families could afford.\footnote{Rezoning Move Lost By Bayless, \textit{Arizona Republic}, November 13, 1958, 3, accessed August 1, 2016, \url{https://www.newspapers.com/}.}

City also served as a nexus for civic life in Maryvale as numerous pageants and public service projects were undertaken on the facilities. Long made sure that the facilities stayed current—he reinvested eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars into upgrades in 1964 and continued to lease to additional stores, such as Walgreens, as time extended. While Maryvale Shopping City had not been large enough to convince residents’ that incorporation was superior to annexation into Phoenix, shopping center remained a central aspect of promotional material for the community and elicited pride among those who conducted business at the Maryvale Shopping City. But as external conditions changed, it seemed no amount of local investment could keep up with the demand for new attractions, and outside investors stepped in to provide more attractive amenities for residents. This progress came at a cost—community control over the built environment.


730 “$850,000 Addition Planned To Maryvale Shopping City,” Arizona Republic, January 5, 1964, Phoenix-Shopping Centers-Maryvale Shopping City, Arizona Room, Burton Barr Public Library.

The Westcor Project

Russ “Rusty” Lyon, Jr was born into real estate. As the son of a prominent realtor, Lyon established his reputation as a broker while working for his father in the 1950s. He soon struck up a partnership with several other ambitious young men to develop a firm focused on “large-scale capital investment” in local real estate. Eventually, his diligence would help him land the opportunity to oversee construction of Los Arcos Mall in Scottsdale. Los Arcos was a joint project between Angeleno John L. Holmes, Broadway-Hale Stores, and Sears, Roebuck and Co. While Sears and Broadway needed a local developer to oversee construction on jointly-owned land they wanted developed. The fifteen million dollar Los Arcos project created opportunities for Lyon to develop multiple revenue streams from affluent consumers who sought further engagement with the cultural appropriation of indigenous and Mexican culture that highlighted the luxurious facilities. Furthermore, it established Lyon’s credibility as an interlocutor between outside investors and local consumers. After the success of Los Arcos, Lyon doubled down on his production model to produce the first super-regional mall in Arizona.  

Lyon leveraged his relations with preexisting relationships to build one of the most expensive private facilities in Arizona. He reorganized his business relationships to become the principal of Westcor, Inc.—a shopping center development firm. In November 1970, he announced plans to build a fifty to one hundred dollar million shopping center on over 300 acres’

northwest of the municipal limits of Phoenix. In addition to building the first multi-level enclosed mall in the state, Lyon planned to surround the structure with townhomes, houses, a hospital complex, and an 800-room resort, which included a convention center, golf course, and executive suites. The real estate arm of Sears, Roebuck, known as Homart Development Co, assisted in the project once again.\textsuperscript{733} The shopping center was also proposed as the center of a “New Town.” Per historian Philip VanderMeer, the Arizona state legislature had begun to incentivize these types of urban developments in the mid-1960s, and Westcor was one of the first to take advantage of this opportunity.\textsuperscript{734} While Westcor did not expect to complete the development until the late-1970s, the tentatively named Deer Valley Center was scheduled to be completed in 1973. It would require coordination between local investors and external capital to bring this project timely to completion.

Fortunately for Westcor, the civic elites in the Charter class initially received the project well. Diamonds, a local retail chain that had become a subsidiary of Dayton-Hudson, planned to join the project as a second tenant in February 1971.\textsuperscript{735} Diamonds' participation had been emboldened by the support of the Maricopa County Planning and Zoning Commission—which would help protect the development from political intrigue.\textsuperscript{736} By the time this Westcor project was announced, there were two other sites zoned for super-region malls within three miles of it.\textsuperscript{737}


Much of this anticipatory zoning had been enacted by the city in efforts to aid retail development. The city council did not hide their hope that Phoenix would benefit from the potential tax revenue the development would create—even though the scale of the project had been reduced from initial estimates. By June 1971, Phoenix annexed at least six square miles of land near the proposed mall hoping to insure an “orderly growth of the area.” This level of official commitment would be necessary to overcome public resistance to the project.

From its inception, the Westcor project had encountered resistance from neighboring property owners. In January 1971, more than four hundred and fifty people signed a petition asking the county to ignore the recommendation of the planning commission to approve the mall because it would “pollute the air, cripple the schools, and cause an insurmountable traffic problem.” Residents resented the intrusion of the development into their community: some lamented their lack of financial clout in relation to Westcor; some asked why their neighborhood had been selected for development; others argued the neighborhood was already “saturated with commercial establishments.” While the arguments that commercial and apartment development would produce enough revenue to pay for public infrastructure within the next year calmed some residents, others countered that they would move out of their homes if construction proceeded.

In the end, once Westcor scaled back the amount of multi-family housing in the planned project, the MetroCenter shopping plaza was permitted to proceed.

Once the project was annexed into Phoenix, it would undergo additional scrutiny by the municipal planning commission. Mall antagonists again prepared their attacks against the plan. This time, mall opponents were incensed that the city had approved provisional building permits before the Deer Valley Citizens Planning Committee could complete its report on the potential


impact of the development on the surrounding community. John Beatty, city planning director, acknowledged that there had been a gentlemen’s agreement between the planning commission and citizens planning committee that zoning regulations would not be finalized until the report had been published, but it was currently seven months past due, and Westcor was under pressure to complete construction before the end of 1973. Nevertheless, in September 1972, a class-action suit was filed against the city for “abdicating its responsibility” to citizens who could be impacted by the scale of the mall. Ralph Gierish, head of the citizens planning committee, acknowledged that MetroCenter had the committee’s support, but it remained concerned about the height of the building. Fortunately for Westcor, a presentation to the petitioners assuaged concerns about building height, and the suit was dismissed so that construction could continue.740 And with estimates of 5,000 new jobs and one hundred million dollars in annual revenue, in addition to three movie theaters, two levels of shopping, an indoor ice-rink, and a plethora of peripheral retail services, Phoenicians were rooting for MetroCenter to succeed.741

Part of the reason Westcor had so much support was because of the local firms that stood to benefit from construction. After Diamond’s joined the project in 1971, Westcor hired a nationally renowned design firm through connections established with the local retailer.742 The appraised value of land near the mall also rose. Robert Crist and Co., a motorcycle distributor, claimed to have earned two hundred thousand dollars in equity on land the company owned in


northwest Phoenix after Westcor announced the construction of MetroCenter. More important, the financial titans in the state sought to benefit from the potential profits through their ability to garner loans for the project. For example, First National Bank of Arizona award twenty-one million dollars to Westcor in support of the project. As the president of First National stated, “we know MetroCenter will be a credit to our community and state, economically and aesthetically, and we are pleased to have had an opportunity to play a leading role in arranging for the interim financing of this project.” However, long-term financing was made available by Connecticut General Life Insurance through its Arizona based loan correspondent—a subsidiary of the holding company for the United Bank of Arizona. It was only through the support of outside capital that these levels on investment could be sustained; nevertheless, the local business community was grateful for the opportunity for investment created by Westcor and MetroCenter.

Westcor proudly promoted the improvements it planned to make to the public infrastructure in attempts to curry public favor. The company showcased the broad streets and manicured medians that would surround the facilities in presentations to the public. Westcor also planned to expand nearby arterial streets and develop new collector roads to reduce vehicle congestion near MetroCenter. It responded to concerns about “strip zoning,” and the negative reputation assigned to strip malls, by establishing regulations on building setbacks, landscaping, and signage. Finally, taking a page from Long, Westcor provided infrastructure for public safety and a public library within walking distance of the mall. While there were certainly many residents who resented the intrusion of Westcor in their neighborhood, many others viewed the

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development of public infrastructure with excited eyes. Private investment was becoming the most reliable form of public development.\textsuperscript{745}

With the support of the Pulliam Press, Westcor ensured that the public remained aware of the spectacle that was MetroCenter. In November 1972, Westcor halted construction to celebrate its mall with a firework salute. The twenty-five explosions were to commemorate the first mall in the country “with five major department stores.” Bus and helicopter escorted luminaries to view the construction site. While the mall was still scheduled to open the next fall, the date for completion was not until 1974.\textsuperscript{746} The \textit{Arizona Republic} also highlighted the efforts of the blue-collar construction workers who were helping to build the mall. Eugene Bragdon, a carpenter formerly from Yuma, was profiled in an article on the process of construction. Bragdon, a “cigar-chewing” member of the Carpenters’ union, served a project superintendent for Los Angeles-based contractor Ernest H. Hahn, Inc. His primary concern was that an impending labor impasse might have further delayed the completion of the mall.\textsuperscript{747} In addition, the Pulliam Press reassured readers that the mall would provide a well-manicured consumer experience. Westcor bragged about a “tenant mix” that would exclude dime stores and structure the retail landscape to prevent the “congregation” of teens.\textsuperscript{748} Nevertheless, it was unclear when the mall first opened if


this massive undertaking would succeed—but both the Charter class and outside investors were betting that their studies, which proved it would be successful, were accurate.\footnote{Mary Leonhard, “MetroCenter’s First Stores Open Tomorrow,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, September 30, 1973, 98, 102-106, accessed July 13, 2016, https://www.newspapers.com/.


In many ways, the profitability of MetroCenter was achieved the day that it opened despite being uncompleted. By this time, Westcor had several projects underway in other parts of the Valley and had established itself as the local leader in retail development.\footnote{\footnotemark[750] “New Shopping Center Under Construction,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, February 13, 1973, 8, accessed July 13, 2016, https://www.newspapers.com/; “Start Plaza in Glendale,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, January 2, 1972, 83, accessed July 13, 2016, https://www.newspapers.com/.


}\footnotemark[750] But structural deficiencies regarding piping plagued the uncompleted MetroCenter—flooding occurred on the premises at least three times in the first four months it was open. The most disastrous incident left the bottom level under a half a foot of water and was estimated to have caused one million dollars in damage. One employee grumbled, “[t]hey ought to close this whole place up and look at every piece of pipe.”\footnote{\footnotemark[751] Jack Swanson, “MetroCenter Flood Loss Near $1 Million,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, December 20, 1973, pg. 13, accessed July 13, 2016; “MetroCenter Water Break Floods 4 Shops,” \textit{Arizona Republic}, January 27, 1974, 13, accessed August 15, 2016, https://www.newspapers.com/.


}\footnotemark[752] Westcor had ambitions beyond enriching those in land development; its leaders hoped that the development of land owned by Westcor peripheral to MetroCenter would double the amount of commercial space in


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the area. The second phase of development, which would sprawl across 240 acres, would create “a new financial area for the Valley.”753 Local developers and city officials welcomed the intensified development and sought to aid Westcor in its quest to replicate this model across the Valley. Unfortunately, the residents of Phoenix did not share in this desire.

Village of Paradise Valley

The economic impact of MetroCenter was apparent to developers across the Valley before the project was completed. Speculators, investors, and city officials sought to re-zone land parcels to incentivize commercial intensification. For example, developers asked that the city alter the general transportation plan to accommodate a proposed thirty million dollar high-rise in the central corridor. They hoped that the city would re-route previously planned traffic patterns and invest six hundred thousand dollars into an underground access road for the building.754 To the southwest of the Phoenix Mountains, developers sought to turn the Biltmore Estate into a swank community comprised of high-end shopping and luxurious mansions. The developers hoped that the city would grant an exception so that they could build in the Phoenix Mountain Preserve—land that the city had hoped to buy to keep open for public use. However, at an estimated valuation of two hundred and fifty million dollars, city officials had to listen to the pitch.755 And on the other side of the Phoenix mountains, the Herberger family sought to develop 4,500 homes on


1,100 acres of what had heretofore been unvarnished Sonoran Desert. But still, Westcor continued to be the most ambitious builder of all.

After 1,200 people petitioned to block the development of a 30-acre shopping center and townhome development in a section of Paradise Valley annexed into the City of Phoenix, Westcor countered with a planned “Village of Paradise Valley” formed around the soon-to-be-built Paradise Valley Mall. Nearby residents were left aghast at the sprawling project proposal and exaggerations of expected population density and community size peppered popular discourse. As nearby resident Judy McElfresh argued, “this is not just the concern of residents of northeast Phoenix. Have all parts of Phoenix got all the parks, pools, tennis courts, and ball fields they need?” By this time, residents surrounding MetroCenter had begun to complain that, “there were assurances upon assurances given that MetroCenter would not be your common chrome-steel commercial shopping center,” but felt as though they had been misled by Westcor. Promised infrastructure, such as schools, golf courses, and parks, had not materialized as the project intensified commercial space. Moreover, nearby arterial roads and the Black Canyon highway had been insufficiently enlarged to manage the deluge of traffic—a legitimate concern of residents that had effectively been batted aside in pursuit of growth. Residents across Phoenix remained wary of developers’ promising public improvements.


To add to the turmoil, Westcor was soon embroiled in a petty crisis of crony capitalism. Near the beginning of her illustrious career as an investigative journalist, local journalist Jana Bommersbach uncovered that Westcor had loaned ten thousand dollars to the Phoenix Planning Commission to help finance a retreat on urban design for planning commissioners in the nearby resort town of Carefree. George Schoneberger, Jr., lead architect for Westcor on the Village of Paradise Valley, resigned his position as chairman of the planning commission, citing work and family obligations, once the commissioners discovered the source of funding. Don Jackson, a public relations official employed by Westcor, claimed that Schoneberger had petitioned Lyon for the money under the guise that it would be “completely repaid” by local businessmen. William Brown, who replaced Schoneberger as interim chairman, told the *Republic* that, “this has all been so above board” that numerous other businesses had been contacted for contributions as well.  

While the commissioners worried that it appeared they were “in the pocket” of Westcor, Lyon argued that his firm had made the contribution “to get the urban form study off dead center.” He argued that, “[m]any of us at Westcor are native Arizonans…. We live, work, and raise our families in Phoenix and we want to see grow in an orderly fashion that insures a pleasant lifestyle to everyone in the metropolitan area.” Still, the planning commission decided to select new officers who were not immediately connected to the projects under consideration.

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In many ways, the incestuous interplay between developers and public officials was par
for the course under Charter; but in this case, public outcry compelled Westcor to scale back its
ambitions for the Village of Paradise Valley. In a Republic editorial, Westcor attempted to
assuage anxieties about the scope, scale, and social status of the Village of Paradise Valley—
there were to be no “trailer parks” in the community—and Westcor reiterated promises to develop
public infrastructure. Most interestingly, Westcor noted that Paradise Valley Mall would be half the
size of MetroCenter, but would still become a net contributor to Phoenix’s tax coffers. Meanwhile,
the planning commissioners asserted that their “architectural control” over rezoning applications
would “hold developers to their plans.” However, while the policy had been written into the
municipal ordinance in 1971, none of the commissioners had previously heard of the concept
because it had never been used before. But within the next couple of months, Westcor had
donated land for a city parks, secured hospital facilities, and had gotten parts of the Indian Bend
Wash turned into a golf course—as opposed to the freeway desired by transportation officials.

Leadership,” Arizona Republic, July 25, 1974, 13, accessed July 13, 2016,
https://www.newspapers.com/.
762 John Rasor, “Developer Reassures Concerned Residents,” Arizona Republic, July 20, 1974,
763 Jana Bommersbach, “Architectural Control by City is Called Key to Growth Plans,” Arizona
764 Jana Bommersbach, “City is Offered 32 acres for Parks in Northeast Phoenix by Developer,”
Arizona Republic, September 18, 1974, 6, accessed July 13, 2016,
https://www.newspapers.com/; “Hospital Picks Site in Proposed Village,” Arizona Republic,
Bommersbach, “Golf Course Okd in Route of Indian Bend Freeway,” Arizona Republic, 1,3,
In many ways, the efforts of Westcor and public officials worked to reassure a concerned electorate about this grand reformation of the built environment.

The response of Westcor was enough to fracture popular resistance to the project as different factions petitioned for their specific interests as opposed to consolidating to reject the mall. As planning commissioner Michael Kennelly lamented, “[t]here are so many lobbying groups here now that I don’t know the real feeling of Paradise Valley.” He went on to say that, “On one hand, we hear approval from the committee and community council…yet we hear tonight the people don’t want to change the low-density lifestyle.” Meanwhile, out in the county, smaller leapfrog developments Westcor also managed were being limited by the planning and zoning commission—they argued that the areas were too sparsely populated to justify additional commercial projects. The broader market was slackening as high interest rates dampened construction production across the nation. Westcor, along with the Charter elites, badly needed the Village of Paradise Valley to succeed if Phoenix were to continue its rapid ascension in national prominence.

Fortunately for the Charter class, people continued to stream to Phoenix, but these migrants continued to strain an already overburdened built environment. Population growth was occurring so quickly that public infrastructure could not adequately judge demand; in response, speculative ventures flourished as prospectors struck out on the suburban fringe. In January 1975, it was reported that the Herberger family had asked the city to rezone land in northeast Phoenix for the creation of a fourteen thousand people and nearly eleven hundred acre


community. This was followed in April by the approval of a regional mall by the neighboring suburb of Tempe—competition over potential sales tax revenue remained at stake. So, in May, the Phoenix Planning Commission approved the rezoning application for the Village of Paradise Valley. The Phoenix Planning Commission made few alterations to the proposed plan, and all commissioners voted to approve the plan except Keneth Killian, a South Phoenix minister, who “wanted to hear from residents of the area who reportedly are strongly opposed to the plan.”

The city council went on to approve the rezoning application. The final project was one thousand two hundred and twenty-two acres and included fewer than ten thousand residents, but it opened the door for additional development surrounding the project. The night after the Westcor application was approved, an unaffiliated firm announced plans to open a private country club contiguous to the Village of Paradise Valley. Moreover, as the president of the Paradise Valley Community Council claimed, “the project is representative of a new precedent in community planning.” He acknowledged that, “the developer need not have gone to the community,” but was optimistic because, “there seems to be a tone of compromise between the developers and the community leaders in Paradise Valley.” Within the next year, construction began on high-end residential homes surrounding the mall. The mall itself was managed by Daycor—a partnership

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between Westcor and Minneapolis-based Dayton Hudson Corp. In other news, Anthony Mason, the lawyer turned chairman of the Phoenix Planning Commission, was awarded Planner of the Year by the American Society of Planning Officials. Compromise between Paradise Valley citizens and developers created optimism that other communities could achieve accords.

The village system proposed by Westcor was now seen as a tool to reduce leapfrog development and suburban sprawl. Residents in Maryvale saw the Westcor village model popping up across the Valley. Unlike other communities, they had an independent merchant class that sought to combine local service with attractive merchandise. However, Maryvale merchants lacked the access to outside capital on the likes of Westcor. While Maryvale merchants had already identified a node for a potential village, it lacked the economic impact of development on the scale of a new Westcor project. Led by Long, the local merchants would rally the broader community to oppose the intrusion by Westcor. In many ways, the Maryvale merchants were fighting to maintain local control and ownership over the built environment. The economic independence of their community hung in the balance.

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Maryvale Planning Committee

In response to concerns about sprawl (as well to advance citizen participation) the city began to organize community, planning committees in the various neighborhoods of Phoenix. In September 1975, it was announced that Roger Pettett, a long-time associate of Long and owner/operator of Pettett’s clothing store at Maryvale Shopping City, would head a citizens’ committee tasked with making planning recommendations to the city. Pettett would lead a veritable who’s who of local activists: Hap Barraza, who led the anti-incorporation forces back in the 1950s; Charlie Sing, leader of the Junior Chamber of Commerce; Gerard Daly, who along with Tom Freeland, served on the Cartwright school board; and perhaps most notably, John Nelson—the first municipal councilman elected to represent Maryvale under an upcoming district-based electoral system. Just as important were the commercial interests represented on the committee: Jim Hamra, a resident of Peoria who owned a business in Maryvale, was asked to join, as was Ann Walker—the promotional director for Maryvale Shopping City. The committee represented a wide, if not conclusive, swath of civic leaders, political activists, and business interests. However, the primary thread that bound them was their allegiance to Long.

The influence of Long may have been disquieting for those who could recall the efforts that he had taken to prevent interlopers from altering his master plan. Only a few years earlier, a young, hotheaded state senator had alleged Long attempted to use his economic influence in Maryvale to mute political discourse to aid Charter government in municipal elections. While community leaders had embraced Long’s civic patronage, few were in position to directly challenge him, for not only did he have relationships with every merchant in Maryvale, but Long was also one of the wealthiest men in the state. His web of financial patronage helped keep Maryvale solvent—as demonstrated by the web of loans he had made to community organizations. For example, it took more than a decade for the Maryvale community council to


pay back a loan Long had offered to help pay for facility upgrades at Maryvale Park. In the end, he wrote off half the balance once the council proved unable to pay the entire amount. But these actions, far from being coercive, had garnered Long a level of appreciation unseen by a builder of any other Valley community. So, while city officials may have expected the Maryvale planning committee to focus on long-range quality of life issues, the MPC, led by Pettett, sprang into action when Westcor threatened to build a regional shopping center in their community.

The rezoning process for Westridge Mall, just like with MetroCenter and Paradise Valley, moved faster than the citizens’ committee could keep up. In October 1975, Pettett had to request that the planning commission postpone its hearing on the project because the Maryvale planning committee needed at least an additional month to look over the materials. In theory, the MPC had only recently formed and its members were still getting familiar with their positions; but in practice, it was clear this delay gave Long time to respond. All parties saw how the Westcor project would directly compete with Maryvale Shopping City for clientele. But the delay worked, because by Thanksgiving, Long had submitted plans to build a regional mall at Maryvale Shopping City.

In what the Maryvale Star called, “a fight for a big portion of his financial life,” Long faced an uphill battle. The Westcor location on 75th and Thomas Rd. was closer to future freeways and removed from the congestion of the rail yards near Grand Avenue. In addition, planners projected future suburban development in Phoenix to occur west of 83rd Avenue—51st Avenue was less beneficial for residents of these future neighborhoods. Long countered these arguments with his claim that county zoning prevented the expansion of the suburban frontier further into the mix of desert and farmland that comprised the far West Valley. Moreover, the western location would put

Westridge Mall in competition with another facility in Litchfield Park—the only realistic choice was for Long to expand his property on 51st Avenue.\footnote{‘Where the Shopping Center,’ \textit{Maryvale Star}, November 19, 1975.}

When Westcor presented its proposal for Westridge Mall, it highlighted the perks of its development style: Westcor would donate space for public facilities near the mall; it would hire local residents to work in roles such as security; its proximity to Trevor Browne high school would not actually impact traffic congestion; Westcor’s shareholders were primarily residents of Phoenix and willing to work with community-members; and despite the upfront costs, Westridge Mall would provide more in tax revenue than it consumed in public services. But unexpectedly, Westcor unveiled its trump card—Westcor had relationships with more prominent retailers than Long and Westridge Mall would contain more modern features than Maryvale Shopping City.\footnote{‘Two Stores Committed to Center,’ \textit{Maryvale Star}, December 3, 1975.} Westridge Mall would offer West Valley residents something they could not obtain—elegance.

Long cashed in some of his social capital to rally public opposition to the mall. At a community meeting the following month, before a pro-Long audience, a representative from Westcor battled Long over which center could better attract department store retailers. Despite the poor economy, Long claimed that he was close to acquiring Sears as a tenant for his expanded shopping city. When Long questioned whether Westcor had any tenants lined up, the company representatives responded that they already had a tentative agreement with J.C. Penny’s; moreover, they knew that local retailer Diamond’s was disinterested in a store at Long’s location but was willing to invest with Westcor. When Long asked if that agreement had been finalized, the Westcor representative responded, “we can get it in writing.”\footnote{‘Growth to West Bone of Contention Over Proposed Shopping Center,’ \textit{Maryvale Star}, December 17, 1975.} The civic virtue of Long was no match for the outside capital of Westcor.
Long continued with an appeal to the civic community. The Star encouraged him to push for a “buy local” movement among local business owners. Local merchants had an awareness of the local retail conditions: Westcor was offering items that local merchants were simply unable to provide; they would be marginalized if they were forced to compete against department store retailers at a different shopping center. Many of the small merchants had invested into the properties that housed their businesses—the devaluation of the previously built environment would diminish the economic equity of their businesses. A new-found community loyalty would have to attract consumers to their businesses since merchants could no longer depend on monopolization of a spatially-captive consumer base. Unfortunately, Westcor had gathered thousands of residents across the West Valley, including many who lived closest to the project, to sign a petition requesting that the city council approve Westcor’s rezoning application. The consumer community wanted what the civic community could not provide—even if it came at the cost of ending local ownership over the primary commercial district.

Westcor received additional support for their project in the form of a consumer research report prepared by Behavior Research Center, Inc. Westcor commissioned the analysts at the Behavior Research Center, led by Research Director Earl de Berge, to conduct a survey that would help “determine the current shopping patterns of west side area residents” and “quantify the need for a major shopping center west of Grand Avenue” for the members of the MPC. The report found West Valley residents were largely dissatisfied with the built environment Long and the Maryvale merchants sought to defend. Residents were far less concerned about preserving

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preexisting facilities than complaining about traffic, transportation, and poor police protection. Moreover, more than half of respondents believed that a “new large shopping center” would be an important addition to Maryvale. But even more damning, most of the respondents reported that they primarily left Maryvale to shop at department stores, and Behavior Research Center reported that one-fifth of residents had not even visited Maryvale Shopping City in the previous year. West Valley residents had already abandoned Long and the Maryvale merchants.

The MPC had to take careful steps to maintain the appearance of impartiality. The Phoenix planning commission had delayed its decision until January so that the MPC would have the time to convene a subcommittee to survey the request. The subcommittee, chaired by Gerard Daly, was composed of residents who had no financial stake in a Long venture; however, the Maryvale chamber of commerce, which represented more than one hundred and eighty businesses during the apex of its power, had joined Long to petition the MPC for denial of the rezoning appeal. So, to the surprise of nobody, the subcommittee recommended that the commissioners deny the zoning request. The report published by the subcommittee questioned most of the projections that Westcor presented, including population growth, traffic congestion, and environmental protections, before suggesting that Long and Westcor collaborate to expand Maryvale Shopping City. The primary thrust of this argument was that the Westcor site “would represent poor land-use planning … [and was] incompatible with the professional planning and

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department which has already taken place.” The civic community did not trust that Westcor would allow civic activists exert control over spatial development.

In opposition were city planners had hoped to recommend the project to the commission, going as far to suggest that they would encourage Long’s property be downzoned to aid the Westcor project, but had hedged and suggested that both projects could be built. They were unsurprised by the anti-sprawl stance taken by the MPC: all the Deer Valley, South Mountain, and Paradise Valley citizens planning committees had initially come to the same conclusion. In the end, the professional assessment of the planners won out as the Phoenix planning commission voted 3-2 in favor of the project. While Chairman Mason rejected the Westcor proposal because it “contribut[ed] to urban sprawl,” most commissioners believed the Westcor project was fundamental to the success of the village system.

The Phoenix planning commission provided public officials with an alternative to engagement with suburban civic activists. The Phoenix planning commission allowed elected officials to circumvent civic activists when proposals that could potentially benefit the entire city arose. Furthermore, several members of the commission had been irritated by rumors that Long had provided dinner to the three hundred residents he bussed to the previous planning commission meeting. Long did not deny the accusations; he merely quipped that he provided sandwiches for them--instead of the chicken dinner which had been reported. But most interestingly, the commission would soon request that the city reduce impact fees on developers to


incentivize “Planned Area Developments” (PAD). Noting the disparity in cost between a PAD application and a regular land-use application, one commissioner argued that, “we’re trying to encourage better land uses, yet here’s a policy that contradicts that.”789 With a commission focused on smart growth, rather than community preservation, city officials could claim that they sought public engagement while preventing civic activists from delaying the destructive plans of developers.

The whiff of corruption would become more difficult to deny once the Republic ran a series of articles that detailed the relationship between public officials and land developers. Bommersbach reported that six of the seven city council members had received campaign contributions from either Long or Westcor. Bill Donahue, president of the board of the Cartwright school district, claimed that he had no conflict of interest even though his district had purchased half of its schools from Long. Although Donahue had been a Charter government candidate—Long had donated money to the organization—and two of Donahue’s donors were Long associates, Donahue claimed that he “had only met Long recently.” However, as interconnected as Donahue and Long were, someone from the Westcor project had donated at least two hundred dollars to four of the six other council members. Furthermore, none of those council members had run with support from the Charter civic organization—the first handful of council members who had not been nominated by the group in over a quarter-century.790 But unlike unelected citizens on the advisory commissions, elected officials did not see any conflict between donations and decisions, and none recused themselves in planning the future of Maryvale.


In an even wilder display of corruption, Harvey U. Jacobs, a Midwestern transplant who had recently served as president of the Maryvale Optimist Club, offered to help Long influence the city council vote on the Westcor rezoning in favor of Long. Jacobs told Long that Westcor already had promised Vice-Mayor Rosendo Gutierrez “substantial support” for future political elections, but that he could influence Gutierrez to vote in favor of Long. Jacobs, who had briefly served on the MPC, told Long that he was willing to call in a “personal debt” Gutierrez owed him if Long would enter a business relationship with his carpet company. Jacobs had been affiliated with the “Collins Gang” in Minneapolis and had been suspected of a 1966 murder—but he was never brought to trial. Long, who had recently presented Jacobs with a “Man of the Year,” award at the Maryvale chamber of commerce, contacted the Phoenix police department to inform them of the improprieties. Long, who helped the Phoenix police department record Jacobs making incriminating statements, later stated, “[i]f everyone cooperated with the police along these lines, we’d have a much cleaner city.”791 Jacobs, who eventually admitted that he lied about his influence, was later convicted of improperly influencing a public official; he was sentenced to three years of probation and twenty weekends in jail.792 While Long escaped relatively unscathed, both Gutierrez and the MPC faced further scrutiny concerning their entanglement with developers, and the entire saga further rankled public perception of development in Phoenix.793


As a city planner concluded, the entire affair had proven that “zoning should be spelled m-o-n-e-y.”

In the end, the endless growth of Phoenix convinced both city and county planners that it was inevitable that another regional mall would be necessary. While Maryvale residents questioned the projections of Westcor’s analysts, professional planners saw that the land zoned to the far west of Phoenix would eventually be zoned to accommodate more densely built dwellings—all the new migrants would have to live somewhere. Furthermore, while Maryvale Shopping City was currently accessible, it was too centrally located to serve future communities sprouting up in West Valley suburbs like Avondale, Goodyear, and Tolleson. Finally, the moneyed investors who promised to bring upper-end retail to the West Valley preferred to work with Westcor as opposed to Long. The city council ruled 5-2 in favor of Westcor with only Donahue and Calvin Goode, who felt the decision was “premature,” voting in favor of Maryvale. The Westcor project, titled Westridge Mall, was scheduled to open by the end of the decade.

The defeat was a painful blow for Long and the Maryvale merchants. Many of the small business owners at Maryvale Shopping City feared that Westridge would run them out of business. Led by Long, they had rallied the community together hoping to block the project. Virtually every major civic organization based in Maryvale that voiced an opinion sided with Long and the Maryvale merchants, More than nine thousand people had written to the city council protesting the project; and granted, while a similar number petitioned the council in favor of Westridge, Donahue claimed that nine out of ten Maryvale residents he had spoken to were in favor of Westridge.


opposition to the mall. But as Councilwoman Joy Carter stated, the project would “provide a larger tax base” for the city, and the western location would attract residents of the far West Valley to spend more of their money in the city of Phoenix.  

To add injury to insult, while Vice-Mayor Gutierrez had denied that he was obligated to any participant before he made his decision, he still voted in favor of the project. He argued that the decision was about, “more than Maryvale as it is today,” and that it was in the best interest of the Valley to perpetuate the urban forms model that the village system—of which Westridge would be a “core”—was based upon. Long expressed shock at the decision. He stated, “I didn’t expect to lose. I expected the council to stand behind the previous councils and commitments of the 1990 Plan.” He threatened the council with continuing legal action for ignoring, “the wishes of 90 percent of the people,” but all knew that he faced an uphill battle from here. The city council had decided urban development was a concern beyond the purview of the community residents.

This ruling was the first of many that would gradually alter the built environment of Maryvale disregarding civic sentiment. Many rulings would follow in rapid succession. Civic leaders in Maryvale wound up on the wrong side of public sentiment when the Maryvale planning committee, Maryvale chamber of commerce, and Maryvale Citizens Association supported the expansion of the Santa Fe rail yards immediately to the east of the Andalucia elementary school. Maryvale planning committee Board Chairman Pettett did not even know what Santa Fe planned to build when he sanctioned the rezoning. He remained optimistic, as he hoped to help attract employment to the area, and Santa Fe indicated, “they were very willing to work with [civic

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leaders].” Concerns about additional infrastructure to alleviate added traffic went unresolved. When nearby residents realized the scope of possibilities, they organized into a neighborhood-based civic group to petition the courts to reverse the zoning ordinance. The miscalculation of the civic community cost these residents dearly.

In other circumstances, external forces would influence the perception of civic leaders. Chairman Pettett petitioned the city council to abide by a Phoenix planning commission decision to reject an application for rezoning to make way for a proposed neighborhood shopping center at the northeast corner of 75th Avenue and Indian School Road. The Maryvale planning committee had unanimously voted against the development on the basis that the area had enough commercial property. However, the city council sent the proposal back to the committee for further review, and the committee altered its decision after understanding that Gemco, a desirable discount store, would be the primary tenant. Despite the committee’s change of heart, it still asked the city council to help remedy the abundance of vacant retail properties that lined Indian School Road. In fact, Councilman Donahue voted against the proposal to help illuminate one hundred and fifteen vacant acres of commercial zoned land that already existed in Maryvale. Civic leaders lacked the ability to direct investment toward desired locations; instead, they embraced investment on terms desired by corporate parties and public officials.

The Maryvale planning committee was rendered sterile in civic activism after the American Financial Corp. garnered approval for a rezoning site from the Phoenix planning commission after rejection by the Maryvale planning committee. To add insult to injury, because nobody had publicly commented on the proposal at the planning commission, only a council

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800 “No Enforcement Without Suit on Industrial Park is Claimed,” Maryvale Star, June 1, 1977.
801 Planners to Protest Zone Case,” Maryvale Star, June 2, 1976.
member could open discussion on it in the upcoming meeting.\textsuperscript{803} In frustration, Pettett resigned his post as chairman of the Maryvale planning committee; he argued that, “our recommendations are worth about as much … as the paper they print them on.”\textsuperscript{804} Nevertheless, the council granted the rezoning proposal on the grounds that nearby property owners approved of the development. Donahue remained the sole dissent to the proposal; he angrily spat, “every time you want to build something you put it in Maryvale.”\textsuperscript{805} When the representative for the corporate entity requesting the rezoning argued that Furr’s would differ from nearby stores because it would carry groceries, newly-appointed Chairman John Nelson continued to rail against the amount of vacant commercial land littering Maryvale. Yet he had no answer for how to induce capital investment into these areas. Maryvale was being remade by outside interests.

Capitulation of Community Control

Long still had a few cards to play in his quest to maintain Maryvale. First, he announced a one hundred and fifty million dollars expansion of Maryvale Shopping City in March 1977. He had always planned to expand the facilities around Maryvale Shopping City, he said, and began, “working at a more accelerated pace now because the demand is here.”\textsuperscript{806} The primary commercial investment would be sixty million dollars to enclose Maryvale Shopping City and develop space for two major retailers. Civic leaders had come to accept that the Westcor project would come to pass and argued two malls could benefit consumers. They acknowledged that it


\textsuperscript{804} “Pettett Quits Planning Post, Cites City Action, Inaction,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, November 24, 1976

\textsuperscript{805} “Maryvale Star, December 22, 1976.

would take external consumption to support the malls—the local population simply did not consume enough to do so.  

Unfortunately, another report by Behavior Research Center concluded that Grand Avenue and the railroad tracks that separated Maryvale from the rest of Phoenix limited the possibility of an expanded consumer base. Residents to the immediate east of Maryvale barely ever crossed Grand Avenue to shop; instead, they were more likely to visit Park Central—an even older shopping complex in central Phoenix. While Glendale residents were slightly more likely to shop at Maryvale Shopping City, with a third of residents having visited in the past year, all consumers in that area had visited Christown Mall in the same span. Even West Valley consumers were more likely to cross the I-17 than visit Maryvale Shopping City.

As time went on, neither Long nor Westcor followed through with the promised improvements at either location; however, Long had a plan to ensure that his project would be the only one standing. In a last-gasp gambit, Long petitioned the city council to overturn the rezoning ordinance in January 1979. He argued that Westcor had failed to meet stipulations put in place by Vice-Mayor Gutierrez at the final hearing in 1976. His representatives quoted Gutierrez as saying, “I also think that the record will reflect that the construction on this site is to begin in two years… I therefore move that this application be approved.” Gutierrez, who was no longer on the council, replied that his comment was not a deadline and could not be taken as legally binding. An attorney for Westcor glibly responded, “I think [Long would] like to kill our project.” Others in the

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community agreed: Janet M. Harvey, a long-time resident of West Phoenix, said that Long’s efforts were both “laughable and transparent.” She felt that city planners had intentionally underdeveloped retail in the “blue-collar” communities of West Phoenix and resented commutes she was forced to make to acquire goods. However, she held her sharpest critiques for Long:

Long has had ample opportunity to introduce upgraded shopping to Maryvale residents, but has failed to do so … Everyone I know has expressed approval of the Westcor proposal to build a decent shopping complex on the west side and anyone with half a brain would know that Long’s interest in stopping Westcor lies in keeping his profits up. The location he wants developed is the land that he owns. The longer he waits to sell or lease the land the more profit he will make.810

Harvey’s editorial signaled the end of civic resistance to Westridge Mall. Long would protest future zoning rulings that furthered commercialization around the mall, but to no avail.811

Facing defeat, Long joined forces with Westcor to develop another shopping center to the south of Westridge Mall at 75th and McDowell Road. Ironically, the Phoenix planning commission initially denied the rezoning application for this shopping center because the commission was not convinced it would lead to “the development of an urban village.”812 In the end, the city of Phoenix organized two dozen nearby landowners—some of whom owned parcels on county land outside city boundaries—to negotiate the development of an “urban core” involving the land Long and Westcor sought to rezone. As a Westcor representative said, “It’s almost impossible for private enterprise to assemble that many pieces of property,” and welcomed the engagement of city officials in planning the future of the built environment. As for Maryvale, a city planner hoped that

the consolidation of commercial development near Westridge would allow for scattered commercial lots elsewhere to be downzoned toward residential—further increasing population density in the biggest neighborhood in Phoenix. He did not think to ask how community residents might receive this information.

The Maryvale planning committee had been demoralized by the outcomes of the retail wars; but led by future councilman John Nelson, the committee regrouped to help determine what type of environment residents of Maryvale wanted. The committee found that many residents wanted upgraded amenities, such as bike paths, quality restaurants, and tiled irrigation ditches, which had not been at the cutting-edge of design when Long first planned Maryvale. In addition, residents hoped to vary the types of housing available in the community. From apartments to acre-lots—an alternative to tract homes would be necessary to help Maryvale accommodate the variety of living arrangements Arizonans sought by the early 1980s. As one of the committee members said, “[w]e’re trying to get away from the concept of subdivision after subdivision.” City planners had a difficult time imagining this reality; incremental changes would be more likely than large-scale reconstruction. Much of the open space, which remained in Maryvale was across the proposed Papago Freeway and was zoned for industrial development. And to the chagrin of both civic activists and city officials, it would be difficult to undo decades of blue-collar practices, like side-yard scrap storage or shade tree mechanic repairs, which cluttered the built environment of Maryvale. The Maryvale planning committee imagined an upscale, modern alternative to the mature, traditionally blue-collar community that had flourished there.


The Maryvale Village became an intellectual home to these aspirations once Long and Westcor settled their disagreement about where they would place the core of the village. The village model would cluster new dwellings around Westridge to house the continuous influx of migrants into the Valley. Moreover, high interest rates made Maryvale affordable for homebuyers who balked at the expense of more affluent communities in the Valley. As an outgrowth of the “urban form” seminars sponsored by Westcor, the “village” system would help public officials, civic activists, and business leaders better organize development across Phoenix to ensure that each village could build to augment its strengths. While this policy empowered developers as opposed to local landowners, grass-tops perceived no pushback from the general population, and they took this as consent to continue with their management of growth. As an Arizona State University professor stated, in Phoenix, “[people] seem to see shopping centers as centers of social activity.” Grass-tops saw the West Valley as the “last frontier” for suburban growth; many fantasized about the potential development that could occur once the Papago Freeway was completed and could improve connections to the central city. For those on the Maryvale


planning committee, once the issue over where the core would be located was resolved, they imagined an improved future through centralized planning.

However, smart growth would be more difficult in practice than theory, and the high-minded dreams of the Maryvale planning committee would have to negotiate the unexpected costs in even the best-planned suburban developments. Westcor found that the cost of commercial construction had nearly doubled between the time they began construction on MetroCenter and the time they began construction in Westridge. Merchants griped that the spatial constraints forced by the developers were undermining their ability to carry merchandise. As one anonymous retailer described, “[o]ur stores have shrunk so much that we no longer carry a big enough inventory to meet our customer’ wants … the cost is rising faster than the volume of sales per square foot. We’re being squeezed out.”

Municipal plans for coordinated development were also falling flat. Many of the property owners near Westridge had not been convinced that a village master plan was necessary for quality development; furthermore, there were contentions concerning where to locate parks, schools, and streets—and who would pay for their construction. City officials had begun to threaten landowners with eminent domain if parties were not able to reach some type of agreement. Westcor had also been delinquent in completing public facilities at its construction sites. Westcor’s inability to negotiate the needs of numerous tenants rivaled the difficulty of the city in corralling recalcitrant property owners. Only this delay hurt current residents more than

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impeded future growth: “[w]e’re coming right up to the time where the consequences of the delay will be more and more critical,” said an assistant director for Phoenix public libraries.820

Despite diminished expectations, when Westridge Mall opened in March 1981, it was still at about half capacity. Only two anchor stores were in place; construction on the third had only begun two months earlier. Westcor had still been looking for a fourth tenant as late as January 1981. Long had also been able to control enough land around Westridge to prevent Westcor from unilaterally developing the parcel. While it was still planned for the mall to be encircled by apartments and commercial buildings, Jim Miller, a Long employee, felt that they were stuck in a "lull pattern" until contracts for development could be finalized.821 For all the sound and fury, Westridge Mall, along with the surrounding Maryvale Village, did not capture the projected growth of the region in the way promised by those who approved and designed the project.

Conclusion

Westridge soon became a cherished fixture in Maryvale despite its inauspicious start. During a time of heightened racial tension across Phoenix, when other Westcor malls had gained ill repute as sites of racial contestation, Westridge Mall became home to New Covenant Christian Church in 1984; led by Pastor Jerry Smith, New Covenant argued that “prejudice” was a sin accommodated by many churches and actively sought to undo racial segregation among


believers. Along with churches, Rio Salado Community College began to offer correspondence courses at Westridge Mall to accommodate West Valley students seeking an alternative to Glendale Community College or the newly opened, Arizona State University-West campus. Even the Junior Chamber of Commerce, whose Maryvale branch had been one of Long’s staunchest allies during the retail war, held its annual “West is Best” rodeo at Westridge Mall. Westcor leveraged relationships with civic organizations across Phoenix to bring valuable resources into Maryvale. Smaller events, such as the county fair or car shows, continued to be held at Maryvale Mall. Labelle’s, a local catalog store, also moved into the Maryvale Shopping City. And the local civic community continued to maintain its loyalty to Maryvale Shopping City—Long completed an expansion of the plaza in 1980 and renovated the facility so that it was the only carpeted mall in Arizona. But on the aggregate, the locus of civic energy transitioned from Maryvale Shopping City to Westridge Mall, and informal practices of segregation ensured that Westridge Mall remained racially coded as Anglo—unlike the increasingly diverse Maryvale Shopping City.

Investors like Westcor continued to hunt for new development opportunities in the hinterland surrounding Phoenix. Landowners in the agricultural suburban towns surrounding Phoenix realized that they too might be able to get in on the land hustle. Westcor entered agreements to build shopping plazas on Bell Road in Glendale as early as a decade before the neighboring population could support the facilities; and less than fifteen years after Westridge


opened its doors, Westcor opened the competing Arrowhead Mall in the planned community of Arrowhead Ranch in North Glendale. The continuation of sprawl shows the limitations of the village model—it could not slow, or smarten, growth in areas outside municipal control while, in the city of Phoenix, it merely centralized decisions on how spatial development would occur.

The state legislature continued to incentivize investment into suburban development even after it became clear residents would like alternatives to the speculative placement of community infrastructure. For example, in 1982, the state legislature sought to redefine the taxation of shopping center developments after Jon Kyl, who would later serve as U.S. senator from Arizona, lobbied to reduce the liability upon owners of older shopping centers. He argued that a switch from property-value to property-income would protect owners of plazas stuck in low-rent, long-term leases facing pressure from new developers such as Westcor. Policies such as rapid depreciation encouraged the continual development of new suburban space by subsidizing the economic costs of overdevelopment.

Phoenix officials continued to alter existing zoning plans to appease developers who sought to build continuously larger projects. In 1982, the Paloma Corporation, a subsidiary of Texas-based Hunt-Stephens Investments, asked the city council to rezone the Deer Valley Village core so that it would not be required to submit development reviews to city officials. Neighbors were alarmed at the request to rezone for industrial use in proximity to suburban housing. Residents were also perturbed that Paloma refused to include features of the existing plan, including a park, school, and thoroughfare. Paloma, which was also building upscale Arrowhead Ranch in nearby Glendale, envisioned the Deer Valley core as the industrial gateway

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to its West Valley enclave—a concern beyond the purview of Phoenix residents. Residents were rightfully put off by the idea of a “village core” surrounded by barbed wire and devoid of community amenities to prevent “vandalism, dope-smoking, and beer-can throwing”; however, city council members were concerned the city was sending out a “no growth” message with the denial of large rezoning applications. In the end, national perception—key to attracting outside investment—continued to trump local desires and concerns.

Suburban development continued to enact socio-economic violence on local residents. First, residents lost the pretense that there was democratically exercised community control over their built environment. The village model negated the necessity for developers to acquire community support for projects—development decisions were completely under the purview of appointed citizens and elected officials. Moreover, the small plazas, which had allowed for property ownership by local merchants, were no longer a viable way to sell merchandise. Instead, merchants had to contract with impersonal corporate developers to acquire space to sell their wares; the pressures from this form of privatization homogenized much of the consumer supply in Phoenix as big-box/chain retail stores took on market share that undercapitalized local sellers could not maintain. Local residents and business-owners had lost ownership of the built environment as well as the rents to be collected from its use.

The village model continued the boom-bust cycle of real estate development in Phoenix. While Westcor had assured residents that their villages would not adversely affect extant infrastructure, they could not have predicted the deluge of development that would occur following construction of their regional malls. Between 1981 and 1984, 12 million square feet of office space had been constructed in Maricopa County—effectively doubling available space in

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the region.\textsuperscript{828} This glut office space, along with an overabundance of apartments, limited opportunities at Westridge so that some parcels surrounding the mall were never actually developed. Additionally, interest in Westridge, according to a report by Behavior Research Center, varied according to distance. They found that, even with the augmented amenities offered at Westridge, “residents living east of Grand Avenue… consider that thoroughfare a major obstacle to their future use of Westridge Mall.”\textsuperscript{829} The “smart-growth” of the village model could not alter consumer habits based upon proximity. Speculative retail development perpetuated a boom-bust cycle of suburban sprawl that residents had been seeking to end for decades.

But even within this unstable built environment, residents continued to understand spatial development to rationalize access to social amenities. Interestingly, most of the support for Westridge Mall stemmed from residents in western Maryvale—newer neighborhoods with an Anglo population higher than the metropolitan average. Their activism had helped push the city to approve plans for Westridge Mall. But on the other hand, as the community around Maryvale Shopping City grew more colored, consumer loyalty to the local plaza rose accordingly.\textsuperscript{830} In fact, while most malls lost consumer traffic in 1980, Maryvale Shopping City was the only mall in


\textsuperscript{829} Behavior Research Center, "Metropolitan Phoenix Retail Shopping Study: Westridge," (Phoenix, Arizona: Summer 1980), 8, FM MSS 144, Box 12, Folder 27, Arizona Collection, Hayden Library, Arizona State University Libraries.

metropolitan Phoenix to have more frequent visitors than before. As local communities lost ownership over the space they inhabited, they also lost the ability to structure social interactions within it. Malls became sites for adolescents and young adults to define their existence within metropolitan Phoenix. Tensions over racialized access to civic institutions would unfold as communities displaced for the sake of growth collided with those growth had left behind.

Footnote:

CHAPTER 8

Trouble Ground: Racial Violence and the (Dis)Integration of Civic Life in Maryvale

Introduction

Maryvale had become virtually unrecognizable to longtime residents by the late 1970s. The civic pride which had been the basis for community identity seemed to no longer have an impact on environmental conditions within Maryvale. This malaise disproportionately affected residents who were dependent on social service providers. Students were the most visible category of disempowered and disenfranchised residents. State surveillance and economic marginality left students defenseless against the failures of civic activists. The vacuum created after civic collapse trapped students in unsafe institutions through no fault of their own.

Maryvale resident Valerie Burner vividly recalls her intense trepidation upon matriculation into Trevor Browne high school in 1980. The huge campus and impersonal staff made her adjustment difficult, but racial conflict erupted in an off-campus park during her freshman year confirmed her fears:

I walk out of a class I had in the front building, and there’s helicopters landing, there’s people running all over the place, and there’s a row of trees ... where there’s always bad stuff happening. And there was a stabbing over there. So that’s where your druggies hung out, and your school dropouts, and everybody just hung over in those trees. And that was my first week of high school.  

Community youth attended institutions where violent outbursts occurred as adults ignored social discrimination. The effects from these conditions rippled throughout the community.

Burner came to dread the haphazard outbursts of racial violence which had become commonplace in Maryvale. “There were fights... a good one probably once a month. We did have

good security people; they were tough and they were really on top of it, but, you know, it was just kids being kids. Later, she would recall, “[f]rom that day on, I was terrified to go to school every day. Because you don’t know. It was just scary.” Residents in Maryvale had grown accustomed to fear; their children who forced action upon latent concerns.

A Troubled Community

By the late 1970s, Anglo Phoenicians came to a new consensus concerning Maryvale—it was a community to avoid. Fred Schlegal, a West Valley realtor, wrote in a Maryvale Star editorial that, “I hear entirely too many people say that they ‘don’t want to live in Maryvale … I hear that the schools are bad, there’s a high rate of crime, that they don’t want to live out that far, etc.” Members of the Maryvale chamber of commerce blamed the ill repute on news reports that mentioned “Westside” and associated Maryvale with other colored neighborhoods. But local civic organizations were little help in efforts to reestablish the community. Civic activists argued that the Maryvale Chamber of Commerce lost numerous members because of its inadequate services; this decline in enrollment amplified the gap between the Maryvale chamber and those that had obtained municipal affiliation with Phoenix or neighboring Glendale. Many civic activists supported efforts to deemphasize the Maryvale name hoped that it would improve real estate transactions. These pro-growth arguments encouraged Chamber leadership to, over the clamor of longstanding community boosters, regroup as the West Phoenix-Maryvale chamber of commerce. Civic concerns, which had initially ignited grassroots activism, smoldered without

833 Ibid.


recourse; most glaringly, the dearth of youth services in the community meant that countless latchkey kids sauntered the streets not chaperoned. Yet, civic leaders could develop no stronger solution than rebranding.

Concerns over inadequate youth services soon were expressed through the politicization of racial integration. Early on, both local civic leaders and regional grass-top leaders had been seeking ways to make the judicial system, at least for juvenile delinquents, operate in a more humane fashion. The Maryvale Youth Development Council had politicized juvenile delinquency as a tool to garner state-subsidized infrastructure investment through social services. Similarly, the civic elites on the Phoenix citizen’s crime commission vigorously supported rehabilitative activities (in this case—having the parents drive youth to South Mountain for a public works program) as alternatives to juvenile incarceration. However, augmentation of law enforcement agencies placated the Anglo civic community because, under the rapid development of Sunbelt Capitalism, new officer hires could not keep pace with population growth in Phoenix, and public investment of any type was sorely needed. Still, the actual ability of civic leaders to reduce crime without financial support from the state remained questionable. For example, residents remained on edge about underage home intruders well after stadium lights were installed at Marivue Park. The increased illumination did little to protect nearby homes from the teenaged bandits that continued to maraud Maryvale. However, it was not until inner-city Mexican-American communities began to relocate to the “soft exclusionary” community of Maryvale that Anglo residents began to complain about “gangs.” The crime rate in Phoenix spiked as law enforcement

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encouraged residents to participate in the criminalization of Black and Mexican-American residents. But more importantly, local civic leaders lacked the capital to address these concerns. Outside forces would have important roles in deciding how to resolve civic concerns in Maryvale.

Although middle-class minorities had begun to acquire property in Maryvale as early as the 1950s, Anglo residents identified “soft” racial exclusion in Maryvale as the foundation for peaceful integration. As a Maryvale homeowner recalled, “[w]e had a lot of wonderful, eh, not rich, but well to do Mexican families here and there…we’ve always had a blend down here.”

For the most part, racial integration operated smoothly, but throughout the 1970s, civic institutions in Maryvale had become sites of racial contestation: “[i]t was just a blend—and everybody loved each other. Except for, you know, a few of the snotty [Anglo] people that lived there. They didn’t associate with anybody.” In this sense, the local schools were the most cosmopolitan civic institutions in Maryvale as they reflected the full diversity of the community. However, because local civic life remained an exclusively Anglo domain, civic activists retained an outsized interest in Anglo students, and when interracial conflict arose, Anglo adults primarily worked to temper the impact of racial violence on Anglo students. As public resources became more limited, more “snotty” Anglos would have to share civic amenities with colored residents, and the loss of control over community institutions hamstrung efforts of civic leaders to maintain civility in civic life.

The loss of civic control over community youth precipitated the demise of any pretense that community residents, and not external actors, constructed public suburban space. Longtime civic activists ruminated over their inability to prevent the privatization of the Maryvale Community Hospital or to stop the overdevelopment of local retail space by outside speculators. The unusually high level of civic engagement in Maryvale, which had originally been a community selling point, had devolved toward caricature; then, Maryvale Star publisher Taber L. Collins reorganized the civic community after seeing the unexpected success of civic activists from

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842 Ibid.
central Phoenix who led a freeway revolt in the early 1970s. Collins argued that the civic community should reorganize to better lobby for public resources on behalf of Maryvale. The success of this project encouraged leaders from various civic groups across the community to join forces in the Maryvale Citizens Association.

However, most homeowners in Maryvale lacked either the necessary resources or interest to develop community amenities comparable to those available in corporately built, master-planned communities. Frustrated community members did not focus their ire at anti-democratic civic elites or mendacious state officials; instead, federally subsidized programs, which had long been a boogieman under Sunbelt Capitalism, came to symbolize the loss of community control over local institutions. The insistence of federal agencies to enforce racial integration as a policy objective catalyzed Anglo attachment to “soft exclusion.” The politicization of racial integration made community service unmanageable for civic activists accustomed to the culture of “soft exclusion” that typified civic and spatial relations in Phoenix.

Youth Services and Public Education

The primary areas where civic leaders had a modicum of authority during this period of extended economic malaise were in youth services and public education. The Maryvale Citizens Association had helped re-center civic life around the provision of youth services; residents filled a lacuna that private social service providers had not yet been able to completely fill. Stewardship over local youth provided civic leaders with opportunities to agitate for public infrastructure investment by the municipal government. In public education, the local Cartwright Elementary District Board was composed exclusively of local civic community luminaries because of the spatial dynamics of public education. Civic activists retained political relevance through their dedication to youth services.

Local children they fell under the dominion of the PUHSD once they were promoted to high school. In the eyes of many Maryvale residents, PUHSD was an aloof public agency run by
civic elites who refused to critically involve residents in educational policy. The *Star* ran an editorial in 1970 from a disgruntled resident with a laundry list of complaints: taxes in the district were too high; the district hired too many administrators; students could assault teachers with impunity; board leaders allowed “the inner city [to] wag the entire school system;” the high school calendars did not align with those of local elementary schools; and most importantly, the district needed less crowded facilities. Due to construction delays, Maryvale high school enrolled students in “double sessions” that had local teens attending class before dawn and after dusk. Students milled about at all hours; working families and youth service providers found it difficult to structure youth activities with such a sprawling school-day schedule. Finally, to add insult to injury, the board planned to name the long-awaited second high school after administrator Trevor Browne instead of the democratically supported “Starlight Valley.”

In response to these complaints, the president of PUHSD justified district policies and practices with answers alien to most Maryvale residents. He stated that the district provided more services and higher pay than its competitors; additionally, the district had to do all it could to keep inner city youth from being “shoved out into the street.” But many residents in Maryvale, despite the need for youth services in their community, were unimpressed by this argument. Many civic activists resented being saddled with costs of a progressive educational model while their priorities were disregarded. The *Star* questioned why, in the middle of a construction boom that had altered the skyline of the Valley, could the Charter class round up private capital for the construction of skyscrapers, but left the financial responsibility of “providing the best schooling possible for our young people … [to] property owners”?

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843 “A PUHS District Resident Complains, the PUHS Superintendent Answers,” *Maryvale Star*, April 8, 1970.


remained some of the most desirable public schools in the Valley, the political priorities of civic elites would always supersede those of Maryvale civic activists.

But in Maryvale, because the expense of education lay at the feet of homeowners, civic leaders found it infuriatingly difficult to balance costs with competency. Data from the Cartwright School District found that its students were average, at best, when it came to both state and national academic evaluations. A 1971 report found that Cartwright third graders earned reading scores at just above the state average, but were half a year behind the national average for their peers. Part of the reason for the mean outcomes is that, even for Arizona, Cartwright was grossly underfunded—per-student classroom expenses in the district were less than two-thirds the national average. This penury bled into every operation that the district maintained: classroom training, facilities, administrative costs, with the most notable exception being that of transportation. Dr. Byron Barry, superintendent of the district, argued that their aim was to meet the panoply of needs among the district’s students, and considering the many challenges Arizona districts faced, Cartwright was doing the best it could. One of Barry’s employees also noted that the median score in the district was in line with the national average; it was the poor scores of the worst performing students that undercut the district’s average. Privileged students could get a quality education in Cartwright; marginalized students received insufficient attention to excel.

Civic leaders found that the producers and consumers of public education were at odds over everyday classroom practices in Cartwright. A contentious meeting over educational practices at Starlight Park school revealed that educators and parents had wildly different assessments of how public education should operate. Horrified parents recounted tales of teachers physically assaulting students under the veil of corporal punishment; such behavior was so common that a teacher had casually acknowledged beating a student with an ironing cord “in the presence of the principal.” Another parent recounted an incident where a teacher thrust his

knee into a student’s chest. While several audience members lamented the resurgence of such incidents after a recent decline in complaints of teacher-initiated violence, others complained that the problem fell at the feet of parents who had provided their children with insufficient discipline. One parent asked the audience, “[h]ow far backwards do [teachers] have to bend before they can stand up straight[?] I think teachers need a little bit of support from you people.” The applause this response garnered illuminated a community fragmented by ideological fissures on educational policies and practices in public institutions.848

The extensive use of corporal punishment correlated with another concern: how ill-prepared Cartwright students seemed to be when they reached the secondary level. Some expressed frustration at the multitude of tasks they were expected to complete. Teachers collectively worked for hours on curriculum development after the end of their workday. Middle school instructors were required to monitor dangerous hallways and perform course prep during passing periods. The multitude of administrative demands teachers faced limited their ability to create an academically rigorous environment. Corporal punishment ameliorated insufficient administrative support for Cartwright faculty members through intensified student discipline.

While several parents in the audience came to the meeting to show support for the instructors and administrators at Cartwright, others complained that students were only being assigned ten minutes of homework per night and that there were not enough textbooks for all the students. The “open-school” model, which was also used at Trevor Browne high school, was derided by a parent as a crass experiment abandoned by educators in California because they were “raising idiots.” Several teachers argued that the “open-school” model could work, but it had become increasingly difficult to implement because of the increasing student-teacher ratio. Cartwright teachers were expected to manage attendance without any external counseling or truancy services. Any proposal to refurbish the curriculum would have required an augmentation

848 Maryvale Star, February 6, 1974.
of taxpayer funds—something nobody else at the meeting even mentioned. The disappointment of so many parties in Cartwright shows how difficult it was for civic leaders to provide quality, affordable education.

In contrast, the PUHSD was entirely controlled by outsiders. There was a citizen’s advisory committee that provided suggestions from civic activists to board members, and the administrators at the local high schools were often prominent in the civic community. But even the most active civic leaders in Maryvale lacked the citywide cachet necessary to win election to the PUHSD board—a type of prominence only afforded to civic elites. These grass-tops rarely deigned to nominate civic leaders from Maryvale, but because of its citywide tax base, the PUHSD ensured that local schools never lacked.

The PUHSD board was often out of touch with the desires and wishes of Maryvale residents. A case in point: many high school seniors assigned to Trevor Browne high school wished to graduate with their friends at Maryvale high school when the former school first opened its doors. However, in a spiteful decision, the PUHSD board denied students the right to choose which school to attend by closing a long-standing open enrollment policy at Maryvale. According to the district, this guaranteed that both Maryvale high school and Trevor Browne high school would operate at normal capacity, but as one student stated, “[s]o many would have gone to Browne without the ruling. They should have let the seniors make the choice on where they want to go.”

Maryvale residents resented the disinterest the PUHSD board had to their concerns.

In contrast, the PUHSD board cited broader systemic concerns for why they could not prioritize complaints from Maryvale residents. In response, the PUHSD board simply argued that policy would prevent the continuation of double sessions at Maryvale—something civic leaders

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849 Maryvale Star, February 6, 1974.

had sought to end under the guise that the practice exacerbated juvenile delinquency. The PUHSD had the resources to offer cutting-edge services in Maryvale; for example, despite its failure at Cartwright, the “open school” model was seen as very successful at Trevor Browne—students at the high school maintained some of the highest average ACT scores in Phoenix. Furthermore, the new principal John A. Black was a stalwart in the local civic community. Unlike local civic leaders in Cartwright, civic elites in PUHSD had provided residents with high-quality, locally managed public education—but, like always, at the cost of political sovereignty.

The most contentious topic in the area at the time was the issue of a third high school. In October 1973, the PUHSD citizens advisory committee put forward sixteen projects that needed to be completed in the next five years: an expansion of Trevor Browne high, a renovation of Maryvale high, and an additional west-side high school were all on this priority list. The PUHSD planned to put these items on a bond proposal to be submitted to voters later. While there were the typical protests about additional public spending from low-tax types, population growth in the West Valley continued unabated, and forward-looking residents saw that demand for new infrastructure would come sooner than later. Phoenix had only begun to feel the financial pinch brought on by the looming oil embargo and energy crisis, but the expected expense still stunned civic activists—the new high school alone was estimated to cost at least $8.5 million. However, the PUHSD officials feared that voters would reject the expense of another high school in the Maryvale area—especially after labor disputes and cost overruns had marred the construction of Trevor Browne. Despite strong growth in the area, the PUHSD board officials overruled the

851 “Good Try, Folks,” Maryvale Star, October 9, 1974.
citizen advisory committee and, citing a district-wide taper in enrollment, rejected the plan to build an additional high school in Maryvale.\footnote{“New High School for Area Taken Off Priority List,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, January 16, 1974.}

Many in the civic community of Maryvale were infuriated by this decision. They feared the return of the onerous double sessions.\footnote{“Enrollment Growth—What Should Be Done?” \textit{Maryvale Star}, December 25, 1974.} The principals of Trevor Browne and Maryvale high schools, joined by other participants from the civic community, submitted a report to the PUHSD board in August of 1974, which projected the two schools would be overcapacity by twenty-four hundred students if current population trends continued. Donahue, prior to his election as a city councilman, planned to present the report to the PUHSD citizens advisory committee to garner further support for an additional high school in the area.

Opponents argued that inclusion of the third high school on the omnibus bond measure could threaten the viability of the entire proposal.\footnote{“Citizen Report Shows 2,400 Student Excess in High Schools Here by 1980,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, August 21, 1974.} Local civic activists, represented by the \textit{Maryvale Star}, argued that the economy was destined to turn around, that the public investment would create local jobs, and that even those proposals that seemed “aesthetic” as opposed to “practical” were necessary to maintain the high quality of life in the city; but even these partisans had to acknowledge that a stand-alone bond measure for an additional high school would probably be voted down since Maryvale comprised a minority of voters in Phoenix.\footnote{“Bond Election Justified,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, April 16, 1975.}

None of these arguments responded to legitimate past, present, and potential concerns that accompanied FHA-subsidized suburbanization. Suburban voters across the city voted down the entire slate of proposals in the 1975 bond election. In turn, grass-tops supported cuts to local funding for youth services and public education; furthermore, the PUHSD soon allowed for district-wide open enrollment—the public high schools would now force civic leaders to engage
questions on racial integration. The civic community in Maryvale had accepted public access to grass-top education resources in exchange for political acquiescence because Maryvale lacked the private capital to self-finance desperately needed community amenities. Now, denied community autonomy, the civic community lacked the political capital to shield Maryvale from public austerity. If it were not for federal funding, almost no infrastructure investment in youth services would have occurred after this historical juncture.

Wedgewood Park and the Maryvale Youth Center

The bond defeat was catastrophic for the Maryvale civic community. Civic leaders had expected to serve as stewards over municipal infrastructure; they had no alternative to develop programming independent of public resources. Civic activists had been holding public forums on the city bond election for months prior to the vote. In January, they had assigned members to subcommittees, which would investigate the bond election and propose recommendations on how residents should vote. The Star reported that the Maryvale Citizens Association saw a need for additional libraries and social services, improved roads, and an augmented police presence in Maryvale; its sub-committees also recommended that voters approve all bond proposals to ensure that these improvements would take place. But after the result of the bond election, the city council cut funding for improvements to Marivue park and threatened the construction of a pool installation. Some had hoped that the demographic clout would help ensure mercy from elected officials; instead, residents had to seek external funding to finance community amenities.


Charitable organizations from outside the community would step up to provide service in Maryvale. In 1978, the National Conference of Christians and Jews provided a grant to help organize a citizen’s band (CB) radio block watch in the West-Phoenix/Maryvale area. The CB radio block watch was to address “rising violent and property crime” in the neighborhood; a half-dozen grass-tops, from prominent businessmen to state officials, showed up to promote the program to residents at a public interest meeting in September 1978. As their conversation with residents deepened, it became clear that Wedgewood Park was the primary concern of Maryvale residents. This subdivision had recently integrated several inner-city Mexican-American families; urban renewal projects had displaced some of these newer residents. Sonny Pena, a community member in the audience, argued that state authorities needed to locate a new community center in Wedgewood if they were to prevent major problems from diminishing the local quality of life. More importantly, Pena asked if contractors would hire neighborhood Mexican-Americans to build the center. Anglo civic leaders had not expected that they would need to include the concerns of Mexican-Americans to petition for public investment in Maryvale.

Federal funding would also become an option to help pay for social services sponsored by the civic community. The Maryvale-Phoenix girls’ club board was formed in 1973 with the intention of providing services for community minors. However, by the time of the 1975 bond election, the club was still located at a temporary site south of Trevor Browne high school in property donated by John F. Long. Eventually, the girls’ club board had to choose between its


sponsorship of the Maryvale youth club and the Maryvale girls’ club—they could not raise enough money to maintain both programs. The financial limitations of the local civic community necessitated federal subsidization of youth services, and before long, the Maryvale youth center owed its existence to federal dollars. However, the integration of recently-relocated Mexican-American youth became a central project for the Maryvale youth center once it received federal support.\(^{865}\) Once again, civic activists would have to partner across the color line if Maryvale residents were to gain access to civic resources—a disquieting fact for many Anglo residents.

Wedgewood Park would not receive a community center. The faltering economy eliminated that possibility. The \textit{Star} argued that the area desperately needed its own community center. However, \textit{Star} editors claimed that the Maryvale Youth Center was the reason there were nearly four times fewer incidences of juvenile delinquency in the sprawling Anglo subdivisions surrounding Trevor Browne than in relatively small Wedgewood.\(^{866}\) Trevor Browne Principal John A. Black claimed that his staff and the center had formed “a working relationship…good for many troubled young people in this community,” while Denise Jones, a junior at Trevor Browne, claimed that “if this center weren’t here, most of the kids would be out vandalizing.”\(^{867}\) The Maryvale Youth Center had become a beloved asset within the community; it was a safe haven for young residents lacking alternative support systems. Still, it was obvious upon further introspection that lack of public funding for additional facilities meant no new construction would occur: the Anglo and Mexican-American communities would learn to share the center.

The Maryvale youth center soon became home to an informal youth organization: the Intruders low-rider club. In another \textit{Star} exposé on “a part of Maryvale’s youth culture [attempting] to acquire a better public image,” Intruders spokesman Carlos Zarute claimed that young people

\(^{865}\) “Juvenile Crime Rate Here Drops; Community Involvement Gets Credit,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, March 6, 1974.

\(^{866}\) “Youth Commission Proposes $40,000 for Youth Center,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, May 4, 1977.

joined low-rider culture “out of a lot of pride an [sic] ego trip.” As members of the Arizona Low-Rider Association, Zarute claimed that the Intruders had taken efforts to legitimize their organization: they kept a ledger of group activities, had dues for club membership, and circulated a newsletter. Zarute argued that most of the negative attention previously directed toward the club had come from law enforcement; they knew “some officers who were OK and some who weren’t.” The Star disregarded the complaint and remained skeptical of the “California-based culture” brought to Maryvale by low-rider clubs. The intensified scrutiny of Mexican-American youth highlighted rising racial tension in Maryvale. Moreover, the language of law enforcement would come to define relations between Anglo and colored civic activists.

While Maryvale had long been home to Mexican-American residents, the civic activity of Chicanos por la Causa (CPLC), a civic organization dedicated to improving the lives of Mexican-American residents, had only recently become part of local civic life in Maryvale. In 1978, the Phoenix city council had given the organization permission to hold a Mexican Independence Festival at Sueno Park in Wedgewood. CPLC argued that the festival required relocation to the Westside facilities because the celebration had grown too large for central Phoenix’ Encanto park; this happened only months before the organization finalized plans to develop elderly public housing in Wedgewood Park. As usual, Anglo civic leaders rallied against proposed public housing in the Maryvale area. While they could not prevent the CPLC project, the recently renamed Maryvale-West Phoenix chamber of commerce would successfully petition to reduce the scale of proposed HUD housing in Wedgewood Park by arguing that they were not against low-income housing, but they felt that the neighborhood was a bad location for it—largely because of

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projected crime increases.\textsuperscript{870} Anglo civic activists continually criminalized colored communities in efforts to halt federally-subsidized integration.

Soon, the \textit{Star} was running exposés on three-dozen youth in Wedgewood who would “come wheeling around a corner in an old car with the springs cut down so that the carriage is three inches off the ground.” Residents were quickly inundated with reports that pathologized these teens. According to the law enforcement reports, “they congregate wherever there is Coors [and] Lowriders... As long as they’re in fear of their little bods down there they aren’t going to cause any trouble.” Two hundred residents signed a petition that requested an augmented law enforcement presence after an alleged “revenge shooting” left one Anglo youth dead and another wounded; in response, police officers immediately increased foot patrols in Wedgewood Park.\textsuperscript{871}

The criminalization of Mexican-American youth by civic leaders poisoned any potential for peaceful integration through the political pragmatism of civic life.

In the late 1970s, racial tension pervaded everyday encounters between law enforcement agents and Mexican-American families in Maryvale. Two officers were injured in a suspicious fight at a home immediately to the east of Maryvale with a Mexican-American family on the morning of Christmas 1978. They were responding to help firefighters who had answered a call but found no fire. Law enforcement detained four of the five adults who lived at the domicile—the remaining adult was left to watch the young children left at the house. It was unclear why the fight happened.\textsuperscript{872} In a similarly suspicious incident, officers responded to a reported fight at a Labor Day party in Wedgewood and precipitated what the \textit{Star} called a “near-riot.” More than four hundred attendees were forcibly dispersed from the party; some responded by throwing rocks

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{872} “Officers Assaulted,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, December 28, 1978.
\end{footnotes}
and bottles at police cruisers. Twelve people were arrested and four officers were injured during the incident. Furthermore, it was reported that low-rider clubs might have been involved in the calamity. Maryvale youth center staff member Jean Yoch claimed that low-rider club members may have been attempting to quell the disturbance; she added that the Intruders would be releasing a statement on the conflagration later in the week. When asked if anyone from the club had participated in the “disturbance,” Yoch replied, “[i]f they were there, we would have known.”

Anglo civic leaders would begin to reassess their faith in the rehabilitative power of alternative correction facilities; instead, they began to accept the problematic interpretations of juvenile delinquency promoted by local law enforcement.

The concerns of skeptical residents were solidified by outbreaks of racial violence between Anglo and Mexican-American youth. On the weekend of September 14, 1979, members from the Aztecas Unidos low-rider club engaged in an extended verbal confrontation with an unnamed group of males while cruising the West Phoenix/Maryvale area. The confrontation concluded at a home in Maryvale where several members of the low-rider club engaged in a gunfight with their unnamed antagonists. Fifteen-year-old Anthony Berry was killed in the conflagration; another man was injured. Most shockingly, three of the four perpetrators were juveniles.

In another incident, four young (presumably) Anglo men were injured after a shooting at a house party in Maryvale. According to the police report, partygoers had gone to investigate gunfire outside the party when two groups of young men fired into the crowd. Three of the four men arrested were identified as residents of a Wedgewood Park Mexican-American youth gang.

In its role as voice of the civic community in Maryvale, the Star ran a special report on a secret task force commissioned by the Maryvale-West Phoenix chamber of commerce. This task


874 “Youth is Shot, Police are Seeking Fourth Suspect,” Maryvale Star, September 24, 1979.

force found that racial violence in the community, which they argued was fueled by “alcohol abuse and the availability of firearms,” would escalate without a concerted effort by civic leaders to, “deal with three basic areas: legislation, schools, and church-family.” How this would occur was unclear. In addition, the chamber blamed the five thousand or so dropouts in the Phoenix area for the violence, as “many visit the school to visit friends, and, often, cause trouble.” A secondary issue was the racist values and practices “handed down from parents to children.”

In dismissing the potential culpability of Anglo youth in these confrontations, the chamber made it impossible for Anglo civic leaders to engage the Mexican-American community in good faith. When a couple dozen members of the Maryvale advisory committee met to discuss civic solutions to racial strife, they rejected a student suggestion that the group host a community dinner to encourage racial integration on the basis that the dinner “was a long-term project and would not do much to alleviate the tensions which exist[ed] in the community.” Instead, the commission concluded that it would organize “urban leagues” composed of Anglo, Mexican-American, and Black parents who would each account for the transgressions of the juvenile perpetrators in their particular background. This implicit acknowledgement, that civic activists lacked the social capital necessary to resolve disagreements between Anglo and colored communities, was also reflected in the sudden shift toward the professional expertise of law enforcement in youth service provision. Anglo civic leaders acquiesced their role as provider of youth services to state officials on the basis that law enforcement, and not juvenile rehabilitation, underlay state-subsidization of racially integrated youth services. The continuation of “soft exclusionary” policies by local law enforcement contrasted with the integrationist impulses of public policy reformers.


Racial Violence and the Disintegration of Civic Life

Since adolescent males perpetrated most of the racial violence in Maryvale, it was only a matter of time before the violence on the street entered the schools. Ralph Anderson, head of security at Trevor Browne high school, devised an innovative plan to prevent violence from occurring: use student volunteers to identify potential disturbances and alert security authorities before any incidents occurred. Once, law enforcement could apprehend a gun-wielding man who student assistants identified as a trespasser before any violence occurred. "Usually, someone from a rival school will come on campus just to kind of see what’s going on,” claimed student assistant Scott Eichorn. "We know most of the other students who belong on campus and it’s pretty easy to spot someone who is not supposed to be here." Anderson credited the program for a drop-in property theft on campus. Student assistants even paid for their own uniforms to wear while on duty. Civic leaders were encouraged by the possibility that the student assistant program could successfully help to prevent violence from taking place.

The student assistants were given an amount of power and leeway that belied the nonthreatening presentation of their activities. Some faculty members appreciated that the student assistants could enforce discipline in ways that faculty could not. One teacher argued that students broke up fights better than faculty because "if you poke at one of the student assistants, you could find yourself … with more trouble than you can handle." The student assistants wielded such power that their presence could compel students smoking on campus—a taboo if there ever was one—to toss their cigarettes. Eichorn said, "[w]e usually warn the student if the violation is not a serious offense. Sometimes we even give them a second chance." When asked if students abused these police powers, Anderson replied, "[t]here’s always a chance that


879 Ibid.

880 Ibid.
when you give someone this kind of responsibility it can go to their head," but he noted only a handful of students had been fired because they had not followed the guidelines for the position.  

School officials allowed practices of everyday life on campus to be altered by concerns off-campus racial violence. After the murder of Anthony Berry, school officials changed the time of Trevor Browne football games from 7:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. to allow local law enforcement the opportunity to provide protection after the game because of "the tense atmosphere" that racial violence had helped create. School officials also encouraged student assistants to patrol parking lots to prevent outside students from making it onto campus. However, no security force could keep students safe off campus. On January 24, 1980, two students were shot at a local convenience store while standing in a larger crowd during lunch break at Trevor Browne. While neither student was seriously injured, school principal Black contended that officials could only keep students safe if they stayed on campus. When asked if the shooting would lead to more violence, Black sighed, "I just don’t know."

An even worse incident would mar the upcoming school year—on August 27, 1980, three students were stabbed in an off-campus brawl between Anglo and Mexican-American gangs. The Star, which lacked the journalistic integrity to identity Anglo youth as gang members, reported that "several Hispanic students" had been questioned following the melee. In the long run, there would

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881 Ibid.


884 “Patrols Increased After Shooting,” Maryvale Star, January 24, 1980.

be no arrests made in the case. A couple of months later, Donald Crist, a Maryvale high school student, was hospitalized after being stabbed in a road rage incident that involved his girlfriend and another couple. Crist jumped out of his car and attacked Martin Alonzo Lizarraga with a broken pool cue as their girlfriends began to fight; Crist lost control of the weapon and Lizarraga stabbed him in the chest with it. No arrests were made in the case even though it had occurred midday outside of Maryvale high school. The indifference to these assaults reflects the sudden normalization of racial violence in Maryvale. The collapse of civic life created a power vacuum that required state intervention to prevent the disintegration of civil institutions.

Financially, the Maryvale civic community never recovered from the bond setback in 1975. The lack of public funding crippled its ability to provide quality service to its residents—especially in public education. The Maryvale Star, typically a sympathetic cheerleader for civic leaders in Maryvale, told the Cartwright board to cut its budget “to the bone” after the superintendent suggested doubling property tax assessments to maintain operations during the 1976 school year. This fiscal instability was exacerbated by a rapid decline in student enrollments; Cartwright had lost one thousand students over the three previous years. The souring economy had reduced the rate of new home construction in Maryvale, but the superintendent blamed state austerity for the potential property-tax increases. Donahue, now a city councilman, questioned if the superintendent had exhausted his efforts to allay increases. However, considering how low per-student costs were in Cartwright, it seems unlikely that the district had not already instituted severe cost-containment measures. The impecunious nature

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889 “Cut Budget to Bone, School Board Urged; Big Enrollment Drop Hurts,” Maryvale Star, September 15, 1976.

of Maryvale homeowners hamstrung the ability of local civic leaders to prevent the decay of the undercapitalized educational infrastructure built for Maryvale’s school children.

The undercapitalized Cartwright school district would have to take drastic measures to restore financial balance. Superintendent William Dabb decided to close the Wesley Powell School in 1981 even though enrollments had stabilized and Cartwright was projected to experience future population growth. Dabb argued that the district would make financial cutbacks that, while unnecessary at the time, would prevent a financial crisis from overwhelming the district.891 Instead, by closing the Powell school, the district saved over two hundred thousand dollars in annual operating costs and could avoid the cost of repairing the aged facility. Dabb hoped that the Powell property would be sold so that the proceeds could go toward reducing district indebtedness. To save money, Cartwright offered free room and board to a property watchman in lieu of wages. Cartwright would also decline to replace teachers who left the district and allowed the student-teacher ratio in district classrooms to float higher and higher.892 In Cartwright, civic leaders could not provide the caliber of education many desired at a cost a majority of community voters could support.

Still, despite outbursts of racial violence, Trevor Browne and Maryvale high schools remained two of the most attractive schools in Phoenix. The strength of these schools belied the intrinsic fact that the PUHSD endured cataclysmic changes—the enrollment figures in feeder elementary school districts declined by 10,000 students and, at one point, more than two hundred students per month were dropping out of its high schools.893 In addition, because of open enrollment, inner-city schools operated at half of their operating capacity while suburban schools attracted hundreds of commuters from the inner city. Finally, the PUHSD faced stiff competition

from private schools and suburban districts for students and the state funding that accompanied attendance.\footnote{334} But in some ways, declining student enrollments benefitted Maryvale because it meant high schools did not need to return to dreaded double sessions. Local schools fared well despite the decline of the overall district.

The decrease in student enrollment was driven by “Anglo flight” from the district. The PUHSD lost five thousand Anglo students between 1978 and 1981.\footnote{894} Furthermore, more than one-third of colored students in the district attended schools outside of their attendance boundary. Even though the area around Trevor Browne saw little racial integration, many students of color could attend the school through the process of open enrollment.\footnote{895} The rise in colored enrollments paled in comparison to the sheer number of Anglo students who left the district; the financial crisis precipitated by under enrollment led to the closure of neighborhood schools. At the height of the crisis, board members considered cutting programs for speech therapy, pregnant students, tutoring services, and freshman sports.\footnote{896} However, to the chagrin of students and faculty, proponents of school closures could convince the board to shutter inner-city North high school in the fall of 1981. This would be followed by the closure of Phoenix Union and East high schools in 1982.\footnote{897} The board hoped to sell the properties to developers to reduce the district budget deficit.\footnote{898} The closure of these schools pushed inner-city students into other institutions.
across the district. But after being threatened with a federal discrimination lawsuit due to the impact of school closure on colored communities, the board began to seek alternate schools.

Despite being arguably the most popular school in the district, the board suggested that Maryvale high school was the “logical” choice for closure due to its close proximity to Trevor Browne and predominantly Anglo student body. When enrollment figures for the fall 1982 semester came in at their lowest numbers since 1960, Maryvale residents realized that precious local institutions may be closed for the sake of district-wide racial balance. Some activists, led by Maryvale citizens planning advisory board member and future mayor, John Nelson, proposed secession from the PUHSD and the formation of a “Cartwright Unified District” as a way to maintain the status quo. However, enrollment patterns stabilized as the poor economy drove students back into the public schools; moreover, the district ended its open enrollment policy and switched to a “magnet” system as a means of encouraging racial desegregation. Nevertheless, no caliber of programming could remedy concerns about the community participating in forming education policy after the threat of school closures.


900 “Central High’s Enrollment Reflects Heavy Integration,” Maryvale Star, August 30, 1982.
Despite its specialized programs, the PUHSD had permanently lost its luster in the eyes of many residents. Anglo civic leaders in Maryvale felt betrayed by the PUHSD officials who had embraced plans to racially integrate community schools—especially as civic leaders watched impotently as racial violence broke out throughout Maryvale. But fundamentally, there no longer could be civic involvement in public education without an accommodation of Mexican-American stakeholders. On the other hand, master-planned suburban communities developed by corporate speculators, whose financial policies reinvented “soft exclusion,” beckoned residents who could qualify to relocate. In the PUHSD, Anglo students would soon be outnumbered by Mexican-American students as affluent Anglo residents began to relocate to communities like Arrowhead Ranch in the professionally manicured boom-burbs of Glendale, Peoria, and Chandler.

Conclusion

The failure of the civic activists to provide social services for Maryvale youth undermined residents’ faith that civic participation could provide desirable community amenities. In defense of civic leaders, their plans had been unexpectedly foiled by public austerity imposed after voters refused to approve increases to public debt. Still, their inability to garner local public or private funding in support of institutions like the Maryvale youth center compelled federal intervention. Without this support, Maryvale would have had severely limited youth services. For example, the CB radio block watch had been originally established with logistical support from local law enforcement and private civic leaders; within two years, the project had grown into the West Phoenix neighborhood service office with a payroll for a half-dozen employees. Despite its putative success, its office was forced to close in 1980 when no local alternative arose to replace federal funding lost to federal budget cuts. “As far as recruiting more block groups, that work will
be at a minimum once we’re gone,” director Richard Valenzuela lamented after hearing about the closure. While demand grew, the civic community could do no more than provide volunteers.

However, the proliferation of racial violence also prevented substantive civic work from occurring in Maryvale. The explicit criminalization of Mexican-American youth in the *Maryvale Star* prevented any realistic analysis of how civic leaders could serve a racially diverse youth population. More appalling was the inability of Anglo civic activists to acknowledge the role Anglo antagonists played in racial violence. While the *Star* acknowledged that there were Anglo gangs elsewhere in the Valley, they disavowed any knowledge of Anglo gang activity in Maryvale—instead euphemistically referring to interracial violence between “unnamed groups”—even though *Star* reporters had spent the last decade reporting on the nefarious acts of Anglo delinquents.

Civic elites refused to acknowledge colored discontent with racism as well. In 1981, after losing its city and county funding, the Maryvale youth center was accused of “fabricating” reports of racial unrest at the PUHSD schools to help win an operational grant. When center officials claimed that they had done nothing to distort the situation, board trustee Mary Carr replied, “I don’t feel comfortable accepting them.” The Maryvale youth center was forced to relocate to a district interested in providing youth intervention services for colored children. The loss of community institutions created an even larger vacuum for social services.

In this vein, civic leaders were supported by state agents who profited from the chaos created by this vacuum of civic service—particularly, law enforcement officials who became social service providers in Maryvale. However, this ascendance coincided with concerns about Mexican-American youth gangs. While crime statistics corroborate the rising fear, residents had of criminal activity, previous pleas for improved youth services had been replaced with support for

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906 “Youth is Shot, Police are Seeking Fourth Suspect,” *Maryvale Star*, September 24, 1979.

stricter scrutiny of juvenile delinquents. In addition, whereas social service providers at the Maryvale youth center had previously acknowledged the role of Anglo youth in racial violence, local law enforcement reported that ninety percent of local gang members were Mexican-American and another eight percent were Black Americans.\footnote{Dennis Russell, “Youth Worker Warns Area Could Explode,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, June 15, 1981; “Gangs…. They’re Joined for a Variety of Reasons,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, April 5,1982.} Law enforcement’s criminalization of Mexican-American youth shielded Anglo children from accountability for racial violence in Maryvale.\footnote{Catherine Houser, “Parent Group Seeks Solution to Problem of Youth Violence,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, November 19, 1979.} The ascendance of law enforcement as a provider of social service reflects a comfort with the punitive state power by Anglo civic leaders that stands in stark contrast with its position on youth rehabilitation prior to politicization of racial integration.

By 1982, residents across Phoenix had become restless for change. In Maryvale, civic leaders like Long could still organize community leaders, but the civic community lacked the financial capacity to assist alienated youth.\footnote{“John Long Hosts School Officials at Fashion Lunch,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, June 14, 1982.} Furthermore, many in the community had lost faith in integrationist state institutions—the three young men stabbed in the after-school fracas at Trevor Browne high school sued the PUHSD for failure to "curtail mounting racial unrest."\footnote{“3 Teen-agers File Suit for Stabbing,” \textit{Maryvale Star}, August 2, 1982.} Across Phoenix, displeasure with the environment created under the Charter machine consolidated in a desire for a district-based system of municipal representation. This event ushered the demise of the Charter class as new electoral coalitions were constructed to acquire political power in Phoenix. However, Maryvale would not reclaim the previously prestigious This electoral system would divide Maryvale between separate districts—diluting the political leverage
of the community at the municipal level. Eventually, John Nelson would be elected to represent one of the districts after running on a platform of “crime reduction.”

In Maryvale, and Phoenix, and metropolitan America, the disintegration of civic life would be distilled into a campaign slogan.

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CONCLUSION

Colored Phoenix: Civic Regeneration and the Reincarnation of Maryvale

Property Values

Despite the electoral reforms that neutered Charter in favor of progressive populism, Maryvale residents would continue to endure an abundance of calamities. Suspicions that carcinogenic water had created a cancer cluster plagued Maryvale throughout the eighties. In the nineties, employees at several different stores were killed in a series of shootings at Westridge Mall. In the twenty-first century, Maryvale endured some of the highest property vacancy rates in Maricopa County during the Great Recession as many were foreclosed from their homes. While Maryvale is still the largest neighborhood in the city, it has the lowest median value homes and ranks among the highest median value rents in Phoenix. But in other


ways, Maryvale continues to provide options for those seeking opportunities. Nearly three-quarters of Maryvale residents are Mexican-American or Mexican nationals. Even after his death, John F. Long, who spoke German as a child in his immigrant home, continues to provide housing for members of marginalized immigrant communities. In a sense, Maryvale continues to provide residents similar opportunities as before—just in a different hue of time and space.

The reincarnation of Maryvale as a working-class, Mexican-American barrio stands in contrast to the reincarnation of Arrowhead Ranch—a former property of the Goldwater family. The appraised value of Arrowhead Ranch would rise in value as the allegations lobbed against the family (and the property) by the journalists from the Investigative Reporters and Editors were bleached from the collective memory of Valley residents. In nineteen eighty, when Maryvale was at its apex, the Deer Valley Unified School District, home of Arrowhead Ranch, had some of the least valuable properties in Phoenix. As a site for agricultural production, absentee landowners declined to invest in infrastructure improvements that would have necessitated increased property taxes. In the local imagination, Arrowhead Ranch was colored by both the labor force that toiled in the groves and the industry that sought to reduce tax assessments on productive land.

However, as seen below, the ascent of home values in Arrowhead eclipsed those across the rest of the district as infrastructure investments necessary for suburban development helped drive up assessed values of local properties. More insidiously, suburban development erased the memory of migrant workers from the local community. The dilapidated infrastructure used to manage the ranch decayed, intentionally destroyed, to incentivize growth from development. There were few places for migrant workers to find housing. The value of Arrowhead Ranch increased as it left behind the legacy of Anglo growers and migrant farmers.

The median value of homes in Deer Valley district was similar to that in Tolleson district in 1980. Both places were primarily agricultural, and so, their home values were relatively lower than in Maryvale. But thirty years later, median home values in both districts are higher than in Maryvale—located south of Glendale district in the western expanses of Phoenix. Moreover, median home values in Deer Valley district have outpaced those in Tolleson as the former district has replaced colored farm workers with Anglo suburbanites.
More importantly, as a planned development in the city of Glendale, Arrowhead Ranch exists beyond the limited purview feasible under Charter government. While Charter might not run the city of Phoenix any longer, many descendants of the Charter class are prominent investors and land owners throughout the greater Phoenix area. The ability of the Charter descendants to influence multiple levels of government has rendered the municipal approach of their forebears’ moot. So, even though the decline of Charter created a civic vacuum in metropolitan Phoenix, descendants of the Charter class have continued to advocate for their interests at local, state, and federal levels of governance. The electoral practices of the political economy have been altered from the time of Charter government, yet relationally, so little seems to have changed.

The population in the Valley rose three-fold between nineteen eighty and two thousand and ten; more importantly, the median value of homes in Maricopa County rose four-fold over the same period. While these trends have enriched property-owners, new-found affluence remains
emblematic of the civic forgetfulness that drives development in metropolitan Phoenix. In many ways, civic forgetfulness is necessary for land reappraisal. For example, migrant labor had to be forgotten to turn Arrowhead Ranch into a high-end suburb. But on the other hand, Arrowhead Ranch drew homeowners out of Maryvale just as the latter drew homeowners out of central Phoenix under the Charter government. It appears forgetfulness is selective—for people do not forget the relational networks created by their forefathers. But in Phoenix, the preservation of historical spaces—to maintain a sense of continuity—is something few are interested in doing.

One final note: land speculators continue to repurpose desert sand to entice outside investors. But since nineteen eighty, diversity has driven the profitability of Phoenix—the proportion of racial and ethnic minorities rose from around one out of five to one out of three metropolitan residents during this time. Moreover, patterns of property ownership, along with the precipitous pace of development, spatially structured Phoenix in ways that encouraged racial integration. The violence of the 1970s has been largely forgotten in local life; but the patterns of that time continue until this day. Land reappraisal resets—not restructures—local inequalities.
APPENDIX A

Below are several historic images of Phoenix.

Figure 28 Elk’s Club Group Outside Elk’s Club, Lodge 335, with Children and Toys, Phoenix Arizona, 1939 December 12, courtesy of McCulloch Brothers Photographs, Herb and Dorothy McLaughlin Collection, Arizona State University Libraries.

Civic organizations rallied to provide charity to less fortunate Phoenicians during the Great Depression.
Civic events drew large crowds of attendees seeking to participate in the entertainment.
The spatial isolation of Maryvale is clear from the sky. Most developments were north of the railroad tracks and east of the City of Glendale—Maryvale is to the southwest of both those entities.
The foundation of metropolitan development is infrastructure development. The following maps show the development of water and banking infrastructure under Charter government.

Figure 31 Salt River Project and central Arizona, ca. 1977, Courtesy of Northern Arizona University, Cline Library, River Map Collection.
Figure 32 Map of irrigation system and properties, 1967. [Phoenix, Ariz.]: The Association. Courtesy of Northern Arizona University, Cline Library, River Map Collection.

Figure 33 Phoenix street map, unknown date, courtesy of Northern Arizona University, Cline Library, Urban Map Collection.
Appendix C

The author took the following photos of Maryvale in Spring 2017.

Figure 34 Signage outside of Maryvale SRP power station on Camelback Road. Photo by author.
Figure 35 Maryvale Samaritan Hospital is now part of the Abrazo Medical Group. Photo by author.

Abrazo Maryvale Campus is the new name for what was originally the Maryvale Community Hospital. The main building has been rebuilt since that time. Several of the following images will show different sides of the hospital—in use and in abandonment.
Figure 36 The south side of the Abrazo Maryvale Campus. Photo by author.

Figure 37 A panoramic view of Abrazo Maryvale Campus and the Maryvale Medical Center. Photo by author.
Figure 38 Signage for the Maryvale Medical Center on Indian School Rd. Photo by author.

Figure 39 A panoramic view of the main building at the Cartwright Elementary School on Thomas Road. Photo by author.
Maryvale high school has seen many facilities improvements as of late—including new signage.
Large trees still dot the campus of Trevor Browne high school. They provide shade on warm days.
Figure 42 Part I of a mural across from Trevor Browne High School on 75th Avenue. Photo by author.

Martin Luther King, Jr., Bobby Kennedy, and Cesar Chavez highlight a mural across the street from Trevor Browne high school.
Images of diversity reflect the complicated past of a neighborhood recently rocked by trepidation and fear as immigration enforcement sweeps increased in intensity after the State of Arizona passed SB 1070.
Figure 44 Part III of a mural across from Trevor Browne High School on 75th Avenue. Photo by author.

The mural also highlights lesser known role models and inspirational figures.
Civic engagement is encouraged via public art in Maryvale.
Figure 46 Part V of a mural across from Trevor Browne High School on 75th Avenue. Photo by author.

Civic awareness, while different from its apex in the seventies, continues to thrive.
Maryvale Park was the first park land John F. Long set aside for residents. It also has a public swimming pool.
El Oso Park is immediately north of Trevor Browne high school. It has rolling hills and is often used for kite flying. El Oso Park is named after the Trevor Browne mascot—a bruin bear.
The location of Marivue Park—right across the street from Maryvale high school—helped make it a notorious drug haven during the seventies.
Figure 50 Signage outside of the City of Phoenix’ John F. Long Family Services Center. Photo by author.

The presence of John F. Long remains in Maryvale. This eponymously named facility is on 51st Avenue and Osborn Road. It is a testament to his civic stature.
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