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Support For Authoritarianism: The Case of Augusto Pinochet

Alina Mizrahi

University of Pennsylvania, alinamg@sas.upenn.edu

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Abstract

Why do people support repressive and authoritarian leaders? In many Latin American countries, as well as other countries around the world, people vote for and support leaders who have infringed on their human rights. In 1973, Augusto Pinochet staged a coup in Chile and seized power for over sixteen years. Although Pinochet's regime was brutal and repressive, numerous Chilean citizens still profess their support for him. This paper investigates the variables that predict support for Pinochet in Chile. This is done using surveys carried out in 1988, 1991, and 1999 by the Centro de Estudios Públicos in Chile. The correlates of support for Pinochet are investigated using an ordinary least squares regression model. This work finds that preferring authority/order over liberty drives support for Pinochet more significantly than demographic variables and concern for unemployment. Concerns over crime or corruption seem to drive support for Pinochet to a lesser extent. Further, this paper finds that demographic variables and concerns for crime, corruption, or unemployment do not consistently predict preference for authority/order. Recent research suggests that economic and social polarization as well as uncertainty drive support for authoritarians. However, the results presented in this paper suggest that the people who support Pinochet could be doing so because they simply prefer authoritarian forms of government over democratic ones on an ideological level.

Keywords

Authoritarianism, Augusto, Pinochet, Chile, Dictatorship, Social Sciences, Political Science, Dorothy Kronick, Kronick, Dorothy

Disciplines

Other Political Science | Political Science | Social and Behavioral Sciences

Support for Authoritarianism: The Case of
Augusto Pinochet

Alina Mizrahi

2020

Advisor: Dorothy Kronick

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Department of Political Science with Distinction

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1 Abstract

Why do people support repressive and authoritarian leaders? In many Latin American countries, as well as other countries around the world, people vote for and support leaders who have infringed on their human rights. In 1973, Augusto Pinochet staged a coup in Chile and seized power for over sixteen years. Although Pinochet's regime was brutal and repressive, numerous Chilean citizens still profess their support for him. This paper investigates the variables that predict support for Pinochet in Chile. This is done using surveys carried out in 1988, 1991, and 1999 by the Centro de Estudios Públicos in Chile. The correlates of support for Pinochet are investigated using an ordinary least squares regression model. This work finds that preferring authority/order over liberty drives support for Pinochet more significantly than demographic variables and concern for unemployment. Concerns over crime or corruption seem to drive support for Pinochet to a lesser extent. Further, this paper finds that demographic variables and concerns for crime, corruption, or unemployment do not consistently predict preference for authority/order. Recent research suggests that economic and social polarization as well as uncertainty drive support for authoritarians. However, the results presented in this paper suggest that the people who support Pinochet could be doing so because they simply prefer authoritarian forms of government over democratic ones on an ideological level.

2 Introduction

When General Augusto Pinochet died in 2006, thousands of people gathered to mourn their beloved dictator. Signs bearing “Gracias General” and “Libertador de Chile” were sported and many tears were shed at the general’s funeral. Simultaneously, large masses of protesters attended the event and the government refused to sanction a state funeral and recognize Pinochet as a head of state. This scene highlights the deep polarization in Chile over Pinochet’s legacy. While some people remember Pinochet as a brutal dictator, others believe that “Pinochet saved the lives of an entire generation” by preventing the consolidation of a Marxist regime in Chile (Long, 2013). Some view him as a violator of human rights, while others characterize his regime as the foundation upon which Chile’s economic, social, and political stability rests. The case of Augusto Pinochet in Chile poses a puzzle: Why do some people support and even praise a dictator whose regime violated the human rights of the citizens it claimed to protect?

Support for authoritarian leaders is not unique to Chile and the case of Pinochet, but a widespread phenomenon. Recent literature attempting to explain support for authoritarians has been focused on two main explanations. The first, championed by Milan Svolik and Daron Acemoglu, emphasizes political and economic interests in predicting support for authoritarians. Svolik (2018) claims that polarization causes people to be more tolerant of authoritarian policies when those policies are being carried out by candidates of their respective parties. That is, people place a greater emphasis on party loyalty than they do on their self-reported support for democracy. Acemoglu et al. (2013), in investigating why voters dismantle checks and balances,

propose yet another polarization-based explanation for the popularity of authoritarians. They posit that reducing checks and balances makes it easier for the elite sector in a society to buy political influence. Thus, a society that suffers from more economic inequality and has a stronger elite segment is less likely to have checks and balances. Since checks and balances make a government less authoritarian, Acemoglu et al. (2013) argue that economic polarization leads to more authoritarian governance. This conclusion reinforces the idea that authoritarian support stems from social divisions and from voters caring principally about sectarian interests. The second explanation, posited by the work of Monika Nalepa, attributes people's endorsement of authoritarian incumbents to their uncertainty regarding whether these leaders will carry out autocratic policies once in office (Nalepa et al., 2018).

These two explanations are insufficient in the case of Pinochet. While there could be economic preferences driving people to support Pinochet, these do not seem to be the only or even the most important factors. First, the wealthy were not as powerful in Chile as they were in many other Latin American countries before or immediately after Pinochet's regime. Further, some of the people that seem to support Pinochet were actually hurt by his economic policies. Pinochet's neoliberal economic agenda widened the wealth gap in Chile, which hurt the middle class, one of Pinochet's original bases of support. As for the theory related to uncertainty, Pinochet was widely supported in Chile after his regime ended and even after he was publicly arrested and charged with crimes against humanity. He remains popular even today! Uncertainty about Pinochet's policies cannot be driving people to support him since it is clear that his regime was brutal and unequivocally authoritarian.

I propose that support for authoritarianism is a variable that can be disassociated from demographic and economic variables. This paper seeks to test that hypothesis by examining the case of Chile, for reasons explained in section 5. I do so by analyzing data from surveys acquired from “El Centro de Estudios Públicos” (translated as the Center for Public Studies) and conducted in 1988, 1991, and 1999. Using a regression analysis I find that having a favorable opinion of Pinochet, in all three survey years, is predicted by supporting authority and order over liberty. I find that same effect when controlling for socioeconomic status, education, age, gender, and a concern for unemployment, crime, and corruption. Further, I do not find a consistent correlation between support for Pinochet and any of the aforementioned demographic variables. Preliminary results suggest that concern for crime and corruption might also drive support for Pinochet, while concern for unemployment does not. Since authority/order is the variable that correlates best with support for Pinochet, I attempt to understand what predicts preference for authority. I find that none of the variables representing demographics or political concerns drive preference for authority and order. My results suggest that support for authoritarianism can exist as a characteristic that is independent of demographic variables and of a perceived threat from unemployment, corruption, or crime. My conclusion conflicts with the literature suggesting that specific economic or social interests are the key drivers of support for authoritarianism.

My conclusions are consistent with those of Seligson and Tucker (2005). Seligson and Tucker look into the factors driving people to vote for formerly repressive authoritarian leaders in Russia and Bolivia. They ask whether people voting for

former authoritarians are expressing disillusionment with their available options in the democratic context, or whether they are casting a vote against democracy itself. Their results indicate that the people in Bolivia and Russia are driven in their votes for former authoritarians by a preference for authoritarianism. This conclusion contradicts the research emphasizing economic or social polarization as the main drivers of support for authoritarianism. The fact that they look at former authoritarians also rules out the uncertainty hypothesis. The people voting former authoritarians into office can have no doubt about the character of the leaders and regimes they are supporting. My research adds to the analysis of Seligson and Tucker by providing another case study, that of Augusto Pinochet, that confirms their results.

2.1 Outline

First the history of Chile will be discussed in order to provide context. This will include a discussion of the Chilean government prior to Pinochet's rule, mainly focusing on the election and administration of Salvador Allende. Then it will focus on what Pinochet's anti-democratic and economic policies were and on the repression carried out by his government. It will then lay out the circumstances of his resignation and the aftermath of his rule.

This thesis will then analyze the literature surrounding support for authoritarianism. It will discuss in detail the concept of democratic backsliding and the main theories behind it. It will also describe the leading theories on what drives the populace to support authoritarian rulers. It will then briefly move to illustrating the work that has been done looking at support for Pinochet. This will be followed by a

discussion of why Chile is an interesting case study to look at in this context.

Next the data and methodology used will be explained. This will then be followed by a discussion of the results, their implications, and their limitations as well as suggestions for future study.

3 The Rise and fall of Augusto Pinochet

3.1 Salvador Allende and the Socialist Movement in Chile

The Chilean political system was presided over by a presidential system for some, but not all, of the twentieth century. Democracy in Chile faltered when General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo established a dictatorship from 1927-1931. Then, political unrest caused by the great depression led to the ouster of General del Campo. The ouster led to a period of political instability characterized by coups and insurrections. In 1938 Chile transitioned back to democracy with the election of Pedro Aguirre Cerda from the Radical Party. Between the years of 1938 and 1952, the radical party had a firm hold on the presidency (“This is Chile”, 2014). Following the period of Radical Party domination, the electorate was divided roughly into thirds: the socialist supporters of Salvador Allende, the Christian Democrat supporters of Eduardo Frei, and the right-wing supporters of Arturo Alessandri. Alessandri won the 1958 election, but his popularity faltered because his presidency was complicated by natural disasters, including a large earthquake and a tsunami. Due to Alessandri’s loss of support, Eduardo Frei was elected in 1964. His most noteworthy policies were agrarian reform and the expropriation of the Chilean copper industry.

Then, in 1970, Salvador Allende was elected to the Chilean presidency through a wholly democratic process. He was elected by the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) coalition, which was made up of the Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties, as well as other leftist groups. Allende promised to build a socialist revolution through democratic and constitutional means, which included the expansion of welfare and government support of workers (Skidmore and Smith, 2010). His administration nationalized mining and other major industries, expanded agrarian reforms, and increased worker compensation. In the first year of his presidency, the economy grew by 8% (“This is Chile”, 2014). However, in 1972 and 1973, Chile experienced an intense economic crisis characterized by food shortages, strikes, and inflation (Skidmore and Smith, 2010).

There is evidence that the economic crisis arose from US-led sabotage (Kornbluh, 2016). Following World War II, the United States was an active presence in Latin American affairs. In order to triumph over the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the United States became concerned about the spread of communism in the western hemisphere. With the rise of Allende, the US government was fearful that having a socialist president would lead Chile to join the communist camp. US Secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, is quoted as having said “I don’t see why we have to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people” (Skidmore and Smith, 2010). Even President Richard Nixon famously said that the United States would make the Chilean economy “scream” in order to destabilize Allende’s allegedly communist government (Kornbluh, 2016). Following Allende’s electoral victory, the United States attempted to undermine his presidency in mul-

tiple ways. A few of the actions taken by Nixon's administration included suspending most of the economic aid to Chile and funding the political opposition groups within the country (Kornbluh, 2016). While the policies of the Allende government most likely played a role in the economic downturn of 1972 and 1973, the United States was also partly responsible for Chile's sinking economy. The economic maladies eroded middle class support for Allende. By 1973, the Chilean left consisted only of the urban working class while the right was made up of a cohesive upper class, middle class sector groups, and militant lower-middle class activists (Skidmore and Smith, 2010).

3.2 Pinochet in Command

On September 11, 1973, Augusto Pinochet overthrew the democratically elected president Salvador Allende. Pinochet was in power for about 16 years and, while the exact number is unknown, thousands of people were killed, tortured, and abducted by the regime (Allier-Montaña and Crenzel, 2016). Pinochet also dismantled some of Chile's "long-standing democratic institutions" (Kornbluh, 2016). He disbanded the national congress and banned the established political parties. His government also infringed on the peoples' political civil rights including freedoms of expression, information, and assembly. Political dissidents were imprisoned and gatherings disbanded, thus making it dangerous to participate in politics and express disapproval of Pinochet's regime. Pinochet established a state of siege, imposed a curfew, set strict limits on the media, and outlawed unions and leftist parties (Skidmore and Smith, 2010). He also passed a new constitution in 1980 that allowed him to remain

in power for eight years.

Apart from dismantling existing democratic institutions, Pinochet established the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), which was responsible for most of the violence that took place under his government. By July of 1973, DINA had held hundreds of Chilean citizens in detention centers, some of which were torture compounds (Esberg, 2018). DINA was even responsible for the assassination of Orlando Letelier, a former Allende minister, in Washington DC. Backlash from this assassination prompted Pinochet to replace DINA with the Center for National Intelligence (CNI). The CNI continued detaining people for a short period, then focused on intelligence gathering, but ultimately returned to carrying out acts of oppression until Pinochet stepped down from office (Esberg, 2018).

Despite the brutality of the military regime, Pinochet is thought by many to have laid the foundation for Chile's current institutional and economic strength. When Pinochet took power in 1973, his economic policies consisted of reducing tariffs, devaluing the currency, and privatizing industries. During this time, unemployment was still increasing, real wages were falling, and inflation remained at over 300 % (Brender, 2010). In 1974, Pinochet's government called in a group of advisors, educated at the University of Chicago, known as the Chicago Boys. Overall, the economic recommendations of the Chicago Boys consisted of deregulation, privatization, and other free-market policies. Under the guidance of the Chicago Boys, Pinochet reduced tariffs and decreased spending on social services. He also carried out two privatization processes. The first spanned from 1974-1978, and involved returning firms seized by the state to its previous owners. The second consisted of dismantling

the “social property area” (Meller, 1993).

In 1975, there was still high inflation, unemployment, and poverty rates. The economy did not see an upswing until 1977 to 1981, now termed the Miracle Years, during which Chile saw high growth rates and more moderate inflation (Stern, 2006). In 1983, there was a major recession that incited protests and after that, Pinochet’s administration followed more pragmatic economic policies. Between 1990 and 1998, Chile had an average of 5.6% GDP growth and a reduction of those living in poverty in those years from 38.6% to 21.7% (Brender, 2010). Supporters of Pinochet attribute Chile’s post-1990 economic growth to the foundation that was set by the dictator’s government and that was later built upon by his successors.

Pinochet’s immediate successor was Patricio Aylwin. Aylwin’s economic policy retained the features established by Pinochet. Aylwin’s successor was Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, who also carried on with the policy of trade liberalization handed down by Pinochet. Chile’s GDP grew by around 7% annually under Aylwin and by around 7.8% under Frei Ruiz-Tagle (“This is Chile”, 2014). Thus, Pinochet’s government set the precedent for a new economic policy in Chile.

3.3 The Plebiscite and its Aftermath

The end of Pinochet’s authoritarian regime was surprisingly democratic. By 1985, Pinochet had lost the support of the United States and by 1988 he bowed to international pressure calling for his government to liberalize. Pinochet decided to conduct a plebiscite to vote on whether or not he should remain in power. Voting “Yes” on the plebiscite meant keeping Pinochet in power for eight more years. Pinochet’s

opposition, composed of fourteen parties, united into one coalition and campaigned for people to vote “No”. Pinochet, under international scrutiny, stepped down from power peacefully, having lost the plebiscite with just a little under half of the vote. However, the constitution he had drafted in 1980 allowed him to keep the position of commander in chief of the army. In this manner, Pinochet managed to maintain a hold on the Chilean military, judiciary, and legislature even after stepping down from the presidency.

Following Pinochet’s removal from office, there were some modest attempts made at transitional justice measures. In 1990, Aylwin established the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Its aim was to investigate the murders and disappearances carried out under the regime. Due to the influence of institutions still loyal to Pinochet, the commission was not allowed to discuss the victims of human rights violations that did not include death or disappearance. As a result, the report produced by the commission left out the numerous instances of non-lethal torture carried out by Pinochet’s government (“Truth Commission : Chile 90”, 2014). The commission was also denied the right to subpoena government documents, making its mission nearly impossible to fulfil (Collins et al., 2013). The National Truth and Reconciliation Commission produced the Rettig Report in March of 1991. The report recorded 3,428 cases of disappearances, tortures, killings, and kidnappings, but modern sources suggest that the number of victims was much higher (“Truth Commission : Chile 90”, 2014).

In 1998, Pinochet was arrested in London; a judge in Spain requested he be extradited and tried for his use of torture against Spanish citizens. As a result,

Pinochet was held under house arrest for a year and a half. Eventually, he was deemed unfit to stand trial and in the year 2000 was allowed to return to Chile. Upon his return to Chile, Pinochet was stripped of the immunity he had previously enjoyed and was indicted. Nevertheless, the charges were suspended and later dismissed.

A second truth commission, named the Valech Commission, was attempted in 2004, more than a decade following Pinochet's removal from power. It acknowledged the victims of torture and political repression. Unfortunately, the testimonies gathered by the commission were classified as confidential for 50 years and thus inadmissible in court ("Commission of Inquiry : Chile 03", 2014). The Valech Commission was more successful than the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission in that it acknowledged the thousands of torture victims that the earlier report ignored. However, it failed in producing evidence that could be used to prosecute the perpetrators of human rights violations under Pinochet's regime. In 2005, Pinochet was again indicted, but he died in 2006 without facing any punishment for the atrocities committed during his time in power. While there were attempts at transitional justice with the truth commissions, their reports were largely incomplete and Pinochet died without ever facing legal ramifications for his crimes. As a result, the people of Chile were not immediately forced to face the painful memories of their dictatorship and were not granted an opportunity for retribution.

Some Chilean citizens deny that the human rights atrocities happened at all while some maintain they were a necessary evil to propel the country forward. While support for Pinochet in Chile is not as strong as it used to be, there are many modern examples of how his legacy remains strong. Many political figures are actually out-

spoken about their support for Pinochet. For instance, a documentary glorifying the dictatorship was screened in Chile in 2012. At the screening, the president of the Union of Retired Officials of the National Defense (UNOFAR) made the following statement: “Pinochet’s image has been defamed, and they have tried to destroy his image. But I will reiterate, he was the best president in Chile and he is the one who transformed Chile from being a poor country to the jewel of America” (Villarreal, 2012). Even a former Chilean President, Miguel Juan Sebastián Piñera, was publicly against the arrest of Pinochet (Esberg, 2018). Despite reports citing his human rights abuses and brutality, support for Pinochet is strong even today.

4 Explaining Support for Authoritarianism

Recent scholarship attempts to understand why voters choose to support leaders who are subverting democracy. The literature often uses a simplified model to understand the reasons people support authoritarian leaders. Generally, a person’s rationale falls into one of two categories: either they support authoritarianism over democracy as a whole system or they prefer the authoritarian leaders to the other options available to them in their current democratic context. A significant body of research addresses whether someone can be predisposed to supporting authoritarianism as their preferred form of government. Two key papers on the subject of supporting right-wing authoritarianism are found in Altemeyer (1996) and Feldman and Stenner (1997). In his paper, Altemeyer claims support for authoritarianism is a socially learned personality trait. Stevens et al. (2006) support this position by claiming

they find that economic threat directly affects levels of authoritarian aggression. They go on to then link levels of authoritarian aggression with a preference for order over democracy. On the other hand, Feldman and Stenner posit there is no direct effect of societal threat on authoritarian preference, but rather an interaction between authoritarian predispositions and perceived threat. These are two of the most widely cited theories attempting to explain whether the social environment gives rise to authoritarian attitudes or whether having authoritarian leanings is more innate and can be modified with environmental interactions.

Much of the research on support for authoritarian leaders is done in the context of democratic backsliding. Democratic backsliding, as defined by Waldner and Lust (2018), is a “deterioration of qualities associated with democratic governance, within any regime.” Many of the researchers looking into democratic backsliding do so in the context of a legitimately established government that rolls back democratic guarantees while in power. This form of democratic backsliding is referred to as an executive takeover. In this scenario, Waldner and Lust (2018) define backsliding as the undermining of the principles of competition, participation, and accountability. Executive takeovers are interesting to study because if people favor a democratic system, it is hard to explain why they electorally support incumbents that erode democracy. However, this type of democratic backsliding is difficult to study because people may be voting for anti-democratic incumbents without being aware of the threat these candidates pose to democracy.

The other way democratic backsliding can take place is through the forceful removal of a democratically elected government, often through a military coup. Exec-

utive takeovers entail a gradual degradation of democratic institutions by an elected executive whereas military coups usually result in an abrupt rise to power of a right-wing dictatorship. The latter form of democratic backsliding is the one that occurred in the case of Chile.

Many theories have been posited to explain the phenomenon of democratic backsliding. Agency based theories place the blame on political entities acting under relatively unconstrained situations. Political culture based theories posit that political outcomes are a result of norms held by the populace. Theories of political economy blame structural-economic factors for regime outcomes. Theories of social structure and political coalitions assume democratic backsliding happens with the formation of opposing groups and state that conflict can undermine democracy (Waldner and Lust, 2018).

The influential work on democratic backsliding done by Milan Svolik (2018) falls under the category of theories of social structure and political coalitions. His research attempts to understand why people vote for incumbents that erode democracy. Starting with a discussion of the work of Verba and Almond (1963), he claims research into democratic backsliding has centered around the theory that when elites are kept in check by a a voting public with strong democratic values, democracy is kept intact. Svolik claims that this view is overly simplistic because it does not take into account other factors such as political ideology. Instead, he proposes that polarization is a key driver of decisions in a democratic context. He conducts an experiment in Venezuela in which he confronts voters with a choice that pits their democratic values against their partisan ones; he finds that people privilege their partisan interests over their

democratic ones. People, he concludes, will turn their backs on their pro-democratic beliefs if it allows them to continue supporting their party of choice.

These findings are validated by the work of Graham and Svulik (2019). In this paper, Graham and Svulik survey American citizens to test whether support for democracy is flexible. They claim that Americans will prioritize their partisan interests over their democratic ones. They also conclude that since polarization can lead to the acceptance of democratic backsliding, centrists are a democratizing force.

Nalepa et al. (2018) build on the theory of how political polarization can drive support for authoritarians. They concur with Svulik (2018) and Graham and Svulik (2019) and add that democratic backsliding can also happen in a context in which voters explicitly claim they would not support an authoritarian candidate. Nalepa et al. (2018) claim that this phenomenon can occur because voters usually do not know how authoritarian the administration of a proposed candidate will actually be. Looking at the Polish government's attempts to reform the judiciary, they extend the analysis of Svulik (2018) in saying that the degree of polarization necessary for voters to support authoritarianism depends on the uncertainty they have about the incumbent.

Acemoglu et al. (2013) present their own findings about the importance of polarization in supporting authoritarian forms of government. They do so by investigating why voters dismantle checks and balances. Acemoglu et al. (2013) posit that reducing checks and balances makes it easier for the elite sector in a society to buy political influence. If a society suffers from more economic inequality, it is likely to have a strong elite that will favor having fewer checks and balances. More eco-

conomic polarization, they conclude, leads to the establishment of more authoritarian policies within a government. This conclusion reinforces the idea that authoritarian support stems from social divisions and from voters caring principally about their sectarian interests. This line of thinking is congruent with the works of Lipset (1959) in which he warns of the perils of a bipolar society and states the importance of a strong middle class. The discussed works overall reinforce a view about support for authoritarianism that rests on political and economic polarization.

These theories do not neatly explain the case of support for Augusto Pinochet. First, Chile did not have the same degree of economic and social polarization that was seen in other Latin American countries when Pinochet came to power. Moreover, using data from the 1995-2009 Latinobarómetro Survey, we see that there is no significant difference between preferences for democracy at different socioeconomic levels in Chile (Barozet, 2011). On average, between 1995 and 2009, 51% of the lower, 55% of the middle, and 59% of the upper class in Chile stated that democracy is preferable to other forms of government (See Table 1). This data suggests that in Chile, there is no single social class that supports authoritarianism more strongly. Additionally, the middle class in Chile was instrumental in the overthrow of Allende in 1973. Middle class sector groups and more militant lower middle class activists were a part of the right wing coalition protesting against Allende's policies, which does not support the theories emphasizing the democratizing influence of the middle class (Bello, 2016). Theories emphasizing social and economic polarization as drivers of support for authoritarianism do not explain Pinochet's popularity.

In contrast to theories focusing on polarization as drivers of democratic back-

Table 1: Democracy preference in Chile by SES

Year	Lower Class	Middle Class	Upper Class
1995	50	55	56
1996	49	57	58
1997	60	65	62
1998	49	53	56
1999	48	56	61
2000	43	49	52
2001	49	53	57
2002	48	52	61
2003	51	58	64
2004	50	66	68
2005	61	51	67
2006	48	49	46
2007	44	53	59
2008	67	59	65
2009	51	55	69

Percentage of people that said democracy is preferable to any other form of government stratified by socioeconomic status. The data comes from the Latinóbarometro surveys and was compiled by Barozet (2011).

sliding, Seligson and Tucker (2005) propose that preference for authority and order is a category that is independent of economic and partisan concerns. They study why people chose to vote for Banzer in Bolivia, a former military dictator, and for Zyuganov in Russia, the candidate for the communist party. They test two hypotheses: The first is that people who report a preference for authoritarianism are more likely to support ex-authoritarian parties. The second is that voters who support authoritarians claim to be committed to democracy but believe the incumbent party failed to provide the country with important goods. Their findings support the first hypothesis, which is consistent with the idea that people are disillusioned with democracy as an institution and are seeking the perceived stability that authoritarianism would provide. They use a binomial logit regression to study the drivers of the vote for the former authoritarians. They examine whether preferring order and authority over democracy predicts the vote more strongly than demographic variables and concerns over unemployment, corruption, and crime. The reason they test crime and corruption specifically is that many studies have found that residents in recently democratized countries perceive a worsening in crime and corruption.

They find a significant relationship between voting for Banzer and being older, unemployed, a victim of corruption, and a supporter of both dictatorship over democracy and order over liberty. In Russia, they find similar factors driving the support for a former communist leader, Zyuganov, but they also find that dissatisfaction with the current economic state was significant. Seligson and Tucker (2005) claim that the commonality between the Russian and Bolivian case is a strong effect of preference for authoritarianism on vote choice. Their results suggest that the people in Bolivia

and Russia were driven in their votes for former authoritarians by a preference for authoritarianism more so than by any other variable.

5 Applying the Question to the Chilean Case

In this paper, I focus on support for an authoritarian leader who has perpetrated a clearly anti-democratic coup. Examples of military governments perpetrating coups, establishing authoritarian regimes, and retaining popular support permeate the history of Latin America. During the twentieth century, a wave of repressive dictatorships arose in much of Latin America, characterized by human rights violations and state terror. Economic and social instability led to the rise of authoritarian leaders including, but not limited to, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, and Hugo Banzer in Bolivia. Despite atrocious human rights records, representatives of some of those regimes were later elected to office in democratic proceedings. For example, following the democratization of Argentina, Antonio Bussi, José David Ruiz Palacios, and Roberto Ulloa (former military governors), Aldo Rico (a leader of military rebellions), and Luis Patti (a former police officer accused of torture), were elected to mayoral and gubernatorial positions (Seligson and Tucker, 2005). In Chile, those who support Pinochet are aware of the authoritarian and repressive nature of his regime but continue to hold a favorable opinion of his rule.

This poses the question of whether the people of Latin America support authoritarians as an opposition to democracy or due to a lack of better options within

the democratic system. The former explanation, as argued by Lagos (2001), seems to be supported by popular opinion survey data. For example, the Latinobarómetro reports that in 2018, only 58% of the Chilean population expressed support for democracy. Simultaneously, the report shows that 23% of the Chilean people surveyed in 2018 thought that an authoritarian government might be preferable to their current one. The people from other Latin American countries included in the survey held similar views. These astounding figures suggest that the disenchantment with governments in Latin America might be dampening people's hopes about the viability and benefits of democracy.

Chile is often lauded as one of Latin America's more stable and prosperous nations (BBC, 2018). By searching through testimony in newspapers and magazines, it becomes apparent that those who support Pinochet often cite Chile's economic success as a reason for its prosperity and attribute that success to the dictator. Angell (1993) writes that one possible explanation for Chile's economic success in 1993 is that the government continued the policies implemented under Pinochet. One of Pinochet's supporters, Fernando Alessandri, summarizes that point as such:

“The Pinochet regime has many mistakes, very serious mistakes, but these are mistakes that should always be kept in perspective...his biggest legacy will be that he opened the country's economy to the world and brought the world to the country” (Gjelten, 2006).

While those who praise the dictator claim Chile's successes can be attributed to its economic policies, it is rare to hear about Chile's longstanding democratic tradition when citing the country's accomplishments. Chile is an interesting case

study because of its recent and contemporary history of a strong democratic system. Before the coup of 1973, Chile had a resilient political system built on legalism and multi-party competition (Stern, 2006). During the 1950s and 1960s, Chileans had a voter turnout of about 80 percent in national elections, whereas in the United States it was around 50-60 percent during the same time period (Skidmore and Smith, 2010). Electoral results were seen as binding by most of the Chilean populace and the military had a tradition of professionalism and respecting civilian rule (Skidmore and Smith, 2010). This democratic base is unique in Latin America and makes the wide support for Pinochet more astonishing. It is hard to study whether Chile's democratic tradition is important to its present stability, but it is often dismissed too quickly by supporters of the dictator (Angell, 1993). While understanding what makes Chile a relatively stable Latin American country is beyond the scope of this paper, it is an important debate to take into account when trying to understand what drives people to support Pinochet.

It is surprising that Pinochet was able to remain in power as a dictator in a country that was so politically mobilized. Not much literature exists attempting to explain how Pinochet was able to remain in power for those sixteen years. One theory, posited by Jane Esberg, is that Pinochet's regime relied on both a support base and oppression (Esberg, 2018). She claims that in order to stay in power, Pinochet created the perception of an imminent communist threat that his government was working to keep at bay (Esberg, 2018). She references data showing that following the 1982 financial crisis, repression in high support areas increased. Her theory relies on an assumption that threat drives support for authoritarian leaders who make the

people believe a dictatorship can protect them. If this theory is correct, then those who support order and authority over liberty should support authoritarians, in this case Pinochet. There should also be a relationship between seeing crime as one of the main issues in Chile and supporting Pinochet.

Another theory is anecdotally explored by Tina Rosenberg. In Tina Rosenberg's 1992 book, she depicts how the democratic opposition to Pinochet's regime was dormant for the years of his dictatorship (Rosenberg, 1992). She argues that Chileans were afraid of speaking out and instead were waiting for a legal and political end to the dictatorship. She tells the story of a man named Jaime Pérez. Pérez was an Allende supporter whose friends were tortured, murdered, and abducted when Pinochet came to power. Pérez himself went into hiding until he felt it was safe to return to his normal life. With the economic boom, he was able to provide for his family and thought of Pinochet in a positive light until the economic downturn of 1982. The story of Pérez illustrates Rosenberg's point that people in Chile were tired of the chaos of the Allende presidency and instead were willing to tolerate Pinochet's repression in exchange for order, security, and economic stability (Rosenberg, 1992). Thus, Rosenberg cites order, security, and economic stability as the key reasons people support Pinochet.

Following the test methodology put forth by Seligson and Tucker (2005), I look at whether a person's support for Pinochet in Chile can be predicted by their preference for authoritarianism. In their study, Seligson and Tucker (2005) use data from both Bolivia and Russia. In both cases they conclude that voters are motivated in their support for authoritarian leaders by a preference for non-democratic systems. Their

work is intriguing because they find this support for authoritarianism in both countries even though they are demographically, historically, and politically different. I am examining the case of Chile to see if their results generalize further.

Using a similar methodology, I investigate whether preference for authoritarianism predicts support for Pinochet. I also consider demographic factors such as age, gender, education, and socioeconomic status and see whether they correlate with support for the dictator. In analyzing these demographic variables, I am testing whether economic and social status predict support for this particular authoritarian. I measure whether support for Pinochet can be predicted by a person's concern for unemployment, crime, or corruption. In looking at unemployment, I will be studying whether having pressing economic needs affects support Pinochet. By using a concern for crime and a concern for corruption as variables, I will be investigating whether these security concerns are drivers of support for authoritarianism. I extend their analysis by also looking into the factors that predict support for authoritarianism.

6 Data

To study support for Pinochet, I analyze national public opinion surveys conducted by the Centro de Estudios Públicos (Center of Public Studies), a Chilean think tank. The sample consists of adult residents (18 years and older) of Antofagasta, Valparaiso, Viña del Mar, Gran Santiago, Concepcion, and Talcahuano. These six cities made up about half of Chile's population in the years the surveys were being conducted. The survey data is only gathered from urban areas and surveys are

Table 2: Summary Statistics for the 1988 Survey Data

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Order	2,825	0.314	0.464	0	0	1	1
Liberty	2,825	0.243	0.429	0	0	0	1
Economy	2,825	0.442	0.497	0	0	1	1
Pinochet	2,825	0.455	0.498	0	0	1	1
Age1	2,825	0.230	0.421	0	0	0	1
Age2	2,825	0.257	0.437	0	0	1	1
Age3	2,825	0.177	0.382	0	0	0	1
Age4	2,825	0.150	0.357	0	0	0	1
Age5	2,825	0.099	0.299	0	0	0	1
Age6	2,825	0.086	0.280	0	0	0	1
NotHighSchoolGrad	2,825	0.527	0.499	0	0	1	1
HighSchoolGrad	2,825	0.241	0.428	0	0	0	1
HigherEducation	2,825	0.232	0.422	0	0	0	1
ABC1	2,825	0.098	0.297	0	0	0	1
C2C3	2,825	0.493	0.500	0	0	1	1
DE	2,825	0.408	0.492	0	0	1	1
Gender	2,825	0.502	0.500	0	0	1	1

conducted in Spanish. The first survey I use was carried out in December of 1988, two months after the plebiscite that voted Pinochet out of power. The second survey I use was conducted in September and October of 1991, months after the release of the Ritter Report, which documented the human rights abuses of the Pinochet regime. The survey from 1999 was conducted in September and October, 11 months after Pinochet was indicted in Spain for human rights violations. While the surveys are slightly different between years, I attempt to standardize the coding in order to make up for those differences.

Table 3: Summary Statistics for the 1991 Survey Data

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Gender	1,174	0.398	0.490	0	0	1	1
Pinochet	1,174	0.199	0.400	0	0	0	1
Authority	1,161	2.565	1.247	1.000	1.500	3.500	7.000
ABC1	1,174	0.037	0.190	0	0	0	1
C2	1,174	0.138	0.345	0	0	0	1
C3	1,174	0.531	0.499	0	0	1	1
D	1,174	0.282	0.450	0	0	1	1
E	1,174	0.012	0.109	0	0	0	1
Age1	1,174	0.188	0.391	0	0	0	1
Age2	1,174	0.244	0.430	0	0	0	1
Age3	1,174	0.201	0.401	0	0	0	1
Age4	1,174	0.149	0.356	0	0	0	1
Age5	1,174	0.118	0.322	0	0	0	1
Age6	1,174	0.100	0.300	0	0	0	1
NotHighSchoolGrad	1,174	0.547	0.498	0	0	1	1
HighSchoolGrad	1,174	0.256	0.437	0	0	1	1
HigherEducation3	1,174	0.197	0.398	0	0	0	1
Unemployment	1,174	0.181	0.715	0	0	0	3
Crime	1,174	1.365	1.495	0	0	3	3

7 Methods

To measure support for the authoritarian, I use the questions in each survey that ask directly about the respondents' opinion of Pinochet. In the 1988 survey, the participants are asked to rate their support for Pinochet from 1-7 (one being the worst and 7 the best) or fill in a 9 if they do not know of him. Of the 3030 people surveyed, I excluded 154 for filling in a 9. I code support for Pinochet in a binary fashion, with 5,6, and 7 code as 1 (support) and 1,2,3, and 4 code as 0 (no support). The proportion of people who are coded as supporting Pinochet under this binary

Table 4: Summary Statistics for the 1988 Survey Data

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Gender	1,268	1.562	0.496	1	1	2	2
WealthIndex	1,268	0.503	0.269	0.000	0.300	0.700	1.000
WealthIndex2	1,268	0.198	0.207	0.000	0.000	0.250	0.875
Pinochet	1,268	0.264	0.441	0	0	1	1
Authority	1,268	0.491	0.500	0	0	1	1
Corruption	1,268	0.073	0.260	0	0	0	1
Unemployment	1,268	0.527	0.499	0	0	1	1
Crime	1,268	0.417	0.493	0	0	1	1
NotHighSchoolGrad	1,265	0.591	0.492	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
HighSchoolGrad	1,265	0.221	0.415	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
HigherEducation	1,265	0.188	0.391	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Age1	1,268	0.134	0.341	0	0	0	1
Age2	1,268	0.218	0.413	0	0	0	1
Age3	1,268	0.219	0.414	0	0	0	1
Age4	1,268	0.162	0.368	0	0	0	1
Age5	1,268	0.124	0.330	0	0	0	1
Age6	1,268	0.143	0.350	0	0	0	1

is .337, which is lower than the proportion of people who voted to keep Pinochet in power in the plebiscite (.44). Adding the group of people who said they neither like nor dislike Pinochet (those who selected number 4) to the grouping of support increases the proportion of people in the support group to .454. While this is closer to the proportion of actual votes for Pinochet in the Plebiscite, I have decided to code 4 (neither like nor dislike) as a 0 (lack of support) because in this analysis I want to investigate the correlates of stated certain support of Pinochet. In the 1991 survey, the participants are asked to rate their opinion of Pinochet on a scale of 1-5 (1 being the worst and 5 the best) and 31 people are excluded from this analysis for

selecting the option to not respond. Of the 1206 respondents, 19.91% are coded as 1 for rating their support for the dictator at a 4 or 5, which is high. The survey question from 1999 asking about Pinochet is scaled in the same way as the one from 1991. Of the 1504 respondents, 138 are excluded for not selecting a value of 1-5 and 26.35 percent of them are coded as 1 for supporting Pinochet because they selected 4 or 5.

The variable coding support for authoritarianism varies slightly each year. The question included in the survey from 1988 that asks about a preference for authority over liberty also includes options relating to the economy. That is, the participants were asked to select the most important issue facing Chile and the options divided into three categories: economic concerns, concerns about a lack of order, and concerns about lack of liberties. The variables are then coded as three binomial variables (Order, Liberty, and Economy) where a 1 denotes that the respondent selected the variable of choice as his or her main issue of concern. A zero denotes that the respondent selected one of the other two variables as his or her main issue of concern. The question from survey year 1991 consists of four subsections that indirectly measure whether the participants feel that authority is sometimes more important than individual liberties. The questions ask the participants to rate on a scale of 1-7 whether they agree more with statements that seem to support the right of governments to establish their authority at the expense of liberties or whether they believe individual rights should not be infringed upon by the government. The following is an example:

Liberty Option: Es mejor un gobierno que consulte la opinión de todos los sectores

y busque consenso (A government that consults the opinion of all the sectors and seeks a consensus is better)

Authority/Order Option: Es mejor un gobierno que imponga su voluntad (A government that imposes its will is better)

The variable Authority/Order is coded as an index of all four of such questions posed and analyzed as a continuous variable. Having a lower index value indicates a preference for a liberty options and having a higher one indicates a preference for the order and authority options. The variable Authority/Order in 1999 is coded using a question asking whether the participant prefers order and authority, liberty, both, or neither. I exclude the participants that said neither and code Authority/Order as a binomial variable, with those who selected order and authority as 1 and those who said liberty or both as 0.

Gender is coded as a binary variable, with 1 being male and 0 female. The age variable is split into six groups coded as binomial variables in all three surveys. The age groupings are as follows: Age1 = 18-24; Age2 = 25-34; Age3 = 35-44; Age4 = 45-54; Age5 = 55-64; Age6 = 65 and older. For the purposes of this analysis, the regression constant absorbs the value of the sixth age group. As such, all coefficients are depicted in relation to this sixth age group's predicted coefficient.

The variable accounting for socioeconomic status is divided into categories in 1988 and 1991 and coded continuously in 1999. In the survey from 1988, SES is split up into three groupings. The first, which is coded as binomial variable ABC1, is high SES and is made up of people in the group ABC1. The second, coded as binomial variable C2C3, is middle SES and includes people in groups C2 and C3. The third,

coded as binomial variable DE, is low SES and includes people in SES groups D and E. The 1991 survey defines the categories for SES as five distinct groupings: ABC1, C2, C3, D, and E. I then code the variables to match the ones from the 1988 survey and are thus divided into ABC1, C2C3, and DE. For the analysis of survey year 1988 and 1991, the regression constant absorbs the value of SES3. As such, all coefficients are depicted in relation to this SES group's predicted coefficient. The survey from 1999 does not divide the subjects into discrete socioeconomic classes, and thus SES is approximated through a wealth index. I compiled two wealth indexes as continuous variables. The WealthIndex variable includes having a refrigerator, a microwave, a compact disc, a telephone, a water heater, a washing machine, a color TV, video equipment, a computer, and a vehicle. WealthIndex2 includes owning a credit card for a business, a bank credit card, a savings account, a checking account, a cellular phone, a maid, and a chauffeur.

To ask for respondents' educational attainment, all three surveys inquired about their number of years of schooling. I divided the variable quantifying education into three binomial categories for each of the three surveys. NotHighSchoolGrad is coded as a 1 for anyone who completed 11 or fewer years of schooling. HighSchoolGrad is coded as a 1 for anyone who completed 12 years of schooling. HigherEducation is coded as a 1 for those who completed more than 12 years of schooling. For the purposes of this analysis the regression constant absorbs the value of HigherEducation. As such, all coefficients are depicted in relation to this educational group's predicted coefficient.

The variables Unemployment, Crime, and Corruption are taken from a question

asking the respondents what the three most pressing issues are that Chile is facing. The 1988 survey does not include a question that could be used to quantify this variable. The survey from 1991 does not include corruption as an option, but Crime and Unemployment were coded as binomial variables. The survey from 1999 included all three variables and I code them binomially. I will refer to the collection of these variables as “issue variables” for the purposes of this analysis.

Using the variables defined above, I am studying the determinants of support for Pinochet by estimating the correlations and partial correlations using the survey data. In particular, this equation (Equation A) was estimated in the following form:

$$SupportPinochet_i = \alpha + \beta_1 * PreferAuthority/Order_i + \beta_2 * SES_i + \beta_3 * X_i + \epsilon_i$$

SupportPinochet is an indicator taking a value of 1 if person *i* supports Pinochet

α is the intercept

PreferAuthority/Order is a variable describing a preference for authority/order over liberty in Chilean government and society

SES describes the socioeconomic status of person *i*

X is the set of control variables, including education, age, gender, and a concern over unemployment, crime, or corruption as the main issue facing Chile

The following equation (Equation B) is then considered to study the determinants of preference for authority/order by estimating the correlations and partial correlations using the survey data.

$$Authority/Order_i = \alpha + \beta_1 * SES_i + \beta_2 * X_i + \epsilon_i$$

Authority/Order is an indicator taking a value of 1 if person *i* supports authority and order over liberty


α is the intercept

SES describes the socioeconomic status of person *i*


X is the set of control variables, including education, age, gender, and a concern over unemployment, crime, or corruption as the main issue facing Chile.

8 Results and Discussion


Looking at the overall data of stated support for Pinochet reveals some surprising patterns. I expected support for Pinochet to be the highest in 1988 and lowest in 1999. This is because in 1988, Pinochet had just been voted out of power, but still retained a sizeable support base. Further, the report detailing his human rights abuses had not yet been compiled. I believed 1999 would show the lowest support for Pinochet since by then, the public was widely aware of the atrocities committed under his regime and he had even been indicted. This was not the case. The highest support for Pinochet is reported in 1988, where it later decreases in 1991 and rebounds in 1999, but remains lower than the support held in 1988 (see Figure 1a). The levels of support reported in 1988 and 1991 were unsurprising. When the Chilean people voted Augusto Pinochet out of power, they did so with around 56 percent of the vote; the vote in favor of Pinochet was over 40 percent and the voter




(a) Comparative Support for Pinochet



(b) Support for Pinochet in 1988



(c) Support for Pinochet in 1991



(d) Support for Pinochet in 1999

Figure 1: Comparing Support for Pinochet

Support for Pinochet is highest in 1988 and lowest in 1991, with a surprising resurgence of support in 1999. Further, like and dislike for Pinochet becomes less extreme from 1988 to 1999.

turnout for the plebiscite was around 97 percent. These numbers are consistent with the reported support in 1988, as shown in Figure 1b. In February of 1991, the Rettig Report, signed by President Aylwin, was released. The report chronicled the human rights abuses that were committed under Augusto Pinochet and the military junta. Thus, the decline in Pinochet's popularity in September, which is when the survey from 1991 was conducted, is consistent with the investigation into his crimes against the people of Chile.

In light of historical events, the rebound of support for Pinochet seen in 1999 is surprising. In 1998, Augusto Pinochet was indicted in Spain for the human rights violations that were carried out under his regime. This indictment makes us question the reasons for his resurgence in popularity among the people surveyed in 1999. I propose a couple of possible explanations. One possible interpretation is that the people of Chile were enraged that Pinochet was being held in a foreign country (England), which increased sympathy for him. An alternative explanation is that as time passed, the memory of repression and how it affected the people of Chile faded. A third possible reason for the resurgence of support for Pinochet is a feeling of nostalgia for a regime that was, for the most part, economically stable.

Another expected result is that the proportion of people who chose the option of neither supporting nor denouncing Pinochet increased with time. With each survey year, the distribution of peoples' support began to take the shape of a normal distribution. That is, a smaller proportion of people were rating their support as extremely high or extremely low. In 1988, more than 30 percent of respondents stated an extreme dislike of Pinochet (Figure 1b). This is consistent with a political

climate in which Pinochet had just been voted out of office, presumably by the very people who would rate their support for him as either extremely or very low. In 1991, Patricio Aylwin was already president and despite the release of the Rettig report, the proportion of people that reported the lowest, level 1, support for Pinochet had decreased (Figure 2c). Simultaneously, the proportion of people who neither like nor dislike Pinochet doubled from .116 in 1988 to .227 in 1991. This trend continued with the 1999 data shown in Figure 1d. The people surveyed in 1999 had the lowest proportion of people who responded with the most extreme numbers (1 and 7 in 1988 and 1 and 5 in 1991 and 1999) and the highest proportion of people in the exact middle. As time passed after the removal of Pinochet, the opinions that people had of his regime, either positive or negative, became less extreme. Presumably, this happened as Pinochet became more irrelevant in Chile's political scene and therefore faded in the minds of Chilean citizens.

8.1 Preference for Order and Authority Drives Support for Pinochet

My results are in strong disagreement with the theories of democratic backsliding that emphasize economic or political concerns as the drivers of support for authoritarians. Instead, my analysis shows that preference for authority and liberty on an ideological level is crucial in predicting support for Pinochet. In every survey year that I used, preferring order and authority over liberty is significantly correlated with support for Augusto Pinochet to a .01 level. That relationship is strong even when controlling for demographic variables and issue variables. The regression using

Table 5: Preference for Authority Over Liberty Predicts Support for Pinochet in 1988

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Pinochet			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Authority	0.280*** (0.020)	0.285*** (0.020)		
Liberty	-0.218*** (0.022)	-0.215*** (0.022)		
Economy				
ABC1	0.057 (0.035)		0.083** (0.033)	
C2C3	0.037* (0.020)		0.034* (0.020)	
DE				
Age1	-0.027 (0.036)			
Age2	0.028 (0.035)			
Age3	0.034 (0.036)			
Age4	-0.014 (0.037)			
Age5	0.009 (0.040)			
Age6				
NotHighSchoolGrad	-0.029 (0.025)			-0.040* (0.023)
HighSchoolGrad	-0.028 (0.026)			-0.043 (0.027)
HigherEducation				
Gender	-0.041** (0.017)			
Constant	0.434*** (0.043)	0.418*** (0.013)	0.430*** (0.015)	0.486*** (0.019)
Observations	2,825	2,825	2,825	2,825
R ²	0.150	0.143	0.003	0.001
Adjusted R ²	0.146	0.142	0.002	0.0005
Residual Std. Error	0.460 (df = 2812)	0.461 (df = 2822)	0.498 (df = 2822)	0.498 (df = 2822)
F Statistic	41.242*** (df = 12; 2812)	235.228*** (df = 2; 2822)	3.572** (df = 2; 2822)	1.697 (df = 2; 2822)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the estimates of Equation A. With or without controls, preference for authority is the strongest predictor of support for Pinochet, both in magnitude and statistical significance. The relationship between support for Pinochet and the demographic variables SES and Education is weak. There is no relationship between Age and support for Pinochet.

Table 6: Preference for Authority Over Liberty Predicts Support for Pinochet in 1991

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Pinochet			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Authority	0.082*** (0.009)	0.080*** (0.009)		
ABC1	0.059 (0.064)		0.074 (0.064)	
C2C3	0.065** (0.026)		0.064** (0.026)	
DE				
Age1	-0.124*** (0.046)			
Age2	-0.103** (0.044)			
Age3	-0.038 (0.045)			
Age4	-0.081* (0.046)			
Age5	-0.049 (0.049)			
Age6				
NotHighSchoolGrad	-0.018 (0.033)			0.009 (0.031)
HighSchoolGrad	0.069** (0.034)			0.083** (0.035)
HigherEducation				
Gender	-0.028 (0.023)			
Unemployment	0.008 (0.016)			
Crime	0.018** (0.008)			
Constant	-0.004 (0.060)	-0.006 (0.026)	0.154*** (0.021)	0.173*** (0.026)
Observations	1,161	1,161	1,174	1,174
R ²	0.091	0.063	0.005	0.007
Adjusted R ²	0.081	0.062	0.004	0.005
Residual Std. Error	0.384 (df = 1147)	0.388 (df = 1159)	0.399 (df = 1171)	0.399 (df = 1171)
F Statistic	8.874*** (df = 13; 1147)	77.454*** (df = 1; 1159)	3.217** (df = 2; 1171)	4.110** (df = 2; 1171)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the estimates of Equation A. With or without controls, preference for authority is the strongest predictor of support for Pinochet, both in magnitude and statistical significance. The relationship between support for Pinochet and the demographic variables SES and Education is weak. The relationship between Age and support for Pinochet is strong, with younger ages associated with less support. Choosing crime as an issue variable is also correlated with support for Pinochet.

Table 7: Preference for Authority Over Liberty Predicts Support for Pinochet in 1999

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Pinochet			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Authority	0.149*** (0.025)	0.159*** (0.024)		
WealthIndex	0.087 (0.064)		0.075 (0.061)	
WealthIndex2	-0.033 (0.083)		-0.090 (0.080)	
Age1	-0.065 (0.048)			
Age2	-0.061 (0.043)			
Age3	-0.045 (0.043)			
Age4	-0.038 (0.045)			
Age5	0.053 (0.047)			
Age6				
NotHighSchoolGrad	0.034 (0.041)			0.041 (0.033)
HighSchool	-0.034 (0.041)			-0.041 (0.039)
HighSchoolGrad				
Gender	-0.011 (0.025)			
Corruption	0.107** (0.048)			
Unemployment	0.016 (0.025)			
Crime	0.054** (0.025)			
Constant	0.150** (0.074)	0.186*** (0.017)	0.244*** (0.027)	0.248*** (0.028)
Observations	1,265	1,268	1,268	1,265
R ²	0.055	0.033	0.001	0.006
Adjusted R ²	0.045	0.032	-0.0003	0.004
Residual Std. Error	0.431 (df = 1250)	0.434 (df = 1266)	0.441 (df = 1265)	0.440 (df = 1262)
F Statistic	5.243*** (df = 14; 1250)	42.562*** (df = 1; 1266)	0.831 (df = 2; 1265)	3.723** (df = 2; 1262)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the estimates of Equation A. With or without controls, preference for authority is the strongest predictor of support for Pinochet, both in magnitude and statistical significance. The relationship between support for Pinochet and the demographic variables SES (coded as the wealth index), Education, and Age is nonexistent. Choosing crime or corruption as an issue variable is also correlated with support for Pinochet, while choosing unemployment is not.

the data from 1988 shows a significant negative correlation to the .01 significance between the indexed preference for liberty and support for Pinochet. It also shows a significant positive correlation to the .01 significance between the indexed preference for liberty and support for Pinochet. The 1991 and 1999 results show an equally significant relationship, .01, between stated support for Pinochet and indexed support for authoritarianism.

On the other hand, the relationships between the demographic variables and predicted support for Pinochet are weak and inconsistent. I do not see any consistent effects of demographic variables, even when removing the controls and testing each demographic variable and its predictive value individually.

Socioeconomic status has a different relationship with support for Pinochet in each of the data sets. Looking at socioeconomic status, the data from 1988 and 1991 suggest that people who belong to the middle or upper socioeconomic class are more likely to support Pinochet. With controls added, in the 1988 data that relationship is statistically significant only for group C2C3 in relation to group DE and only at a .1 level of significance. Without controls, the ABC1 (at the .05) and the C2C3 groups (at the .1 level) are more likely compared to the DE group to support Pinochet. In 1991, compared to the people of the lowest socioeconomic status, people of the higher ones were also more likely to support Pinochet. The relationship between support for the dictator and belonging to the middle socioeconomic group was statistically significant to the .05 level with and without controls. The wealth indexes used in the 1999 data-set did not prove to be statistically significant. That means that socioeconomic status was not predictive of support for Pinochet in the

1999 data. Thus, there seems to be some weak and inconsistent data supporting a socioeconomic role in predicting support for Pinochet, mostly in the data from 1988 and 1991. Those results are not as striking and consistent as the relationship between an authority/order preference and support for Pinochet described above.

Another demographic variable that is not consistently predictive of support for Pinochet is education. Looking at the 1988 data, no educational group correlates with support for Pinochet with controls. Without controls, not graduating high school correlates negatively to the .1 level of significance with support for Pinochet. For 1991, graduating high school but not moving on to secondary education was significantly correlated with support for Pinochet at the .05 level of significance. This was true in both the absence and presence of controls. The data from 1999 does not show a relationship between support for Pinochet and education, with or without controls. Overall, in 1991, not graduating high school correlates with expressing low support for Pinochet without controls; in 1999, graduating high school correlates with support for Pinochet. Education is, therefore, not a consistent predictor of support for Pinochet.

The relationship between age and support for Pinochet is also inconsistent across surveys. The data in 1988 does not show a significant relationship between any group and support for Pinochet. In the 1991 data, young age appears to correlate negatively with support for Pinochet; those in age groups 1 and 2, representing the youngest age groups, have the most significant negative coefficients. That means that, compared to the oldest people surveyed, the younger ones are less likely to support Pinochet. The data from 1999 is similar to the one from 1988 in that none

of the age groups significantly predict support for Pinochet. There does not seem to be a general trend of age predicting support for Pinochet, with only the results from 1991 showing some significant negative correlation between the variables.

Looking at the issue variables presents some intriguing results. Choosing crime as one of the most pressing issues facing Chile is a consistent predictor of support for Pinochet. Both data from 1991 and 1999 shows a significance to the .05 level in the relationship between the variable crime and support for Pinochet. The issue variable corruption, which is only quantified in the 1999 data set, correlates with support for Pinochet at the .05 level of significance. I propose that both the crime and corruption variables correlating with support for Pinochet can likely be attributed to the fact that a military dictatorship is associated with an increase in law and order to combat crime rates and corruption. Being scared of crime and impunity might lead to supporting authoritarian leaders that promise to use a heavy hand against criminals and corrupt leaders. The surprising result in analyzing the issue variables is that there is no relationship between support for Pinochet and choosing unemployment as the answer to the pressing issue question. Authoritarian governance, especially in the case of Pinochet, is associated with heavy handed economic policies that can sometimes lead to rapid growth. Economic instability seems like a candidate reason for why people would support authoritarian leaders. However, the fact that a concern for unemployment is not associated with support for Pinochet suggests that this economic dimension was not the most important one in deciding to support the dictator. Crime and corruption as issue variables seem to predict support for Pinochet, but unemployment does not.

Overall, support for Pinochet strongly correlates with prioritizing authority and order over liberty. Support does not consistently correlate with any of the demographic variables that I analyzed. Believing crime and corruption to be some of the most pressing issues in Chile also correlates with support for Pinochet; choosing unemployment as a primary concern, surprisingly, has no relationship.

8.2 There is No Clear and Consistent Driver of Preference for Authority and Order

The most striking result of this study is that the only variable that strongly predicts support for Pinochet is preference for authority and order over liberty. It may sound intuitive that people who support authoritarians also support authority, but what is interesting is that preference for authority does not seem to be driven by demographic or issue variables, either. Looking at a regression analysis of what variables predict a preference for order and authority over liberty does not yield consistent results across the discussed survey years.

At first glance, it appears that socioeconomic status might have an impact on preference for authority and order since two of the three surveys show significant results relating to this demographic variable. Nonetheless, those results are inconsistent. The data from 1988 shows a correlation to the .01 level of significance between preference for order and authority and the group ABC1. This correlation appears to suggest that people belonging to the highest socioeconomic status groups are more likely to support order and authority over liberty (and in the context of this particular survey year's question, economic concerns). This would support theories claiming

Table 8: 1988 Correlations Using Authority/Order as the Dependent Variable

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Authority/Order
ABC1	0.092*** (0.035)
C2C3	-0.005 (0.020)
DE	
Age1	-0.001 (0.036)
Age2	0.036 (0.035)
Age3	0.043 (0.037)
Age4	-0.036 (0.037)
Age5	-0.013 (0.041)
Age6	
NotHighSchoolGrad	0.027 (0.025)
HighSchoolGrad	0.004 (0.026)
HigherEducation	
Gender	-0.027 (0.018)
Constant	0.296*** (0.043)
Observations	2,825
R ²	0.008
Adjusted R ²	0.004
Residual Std. Error	0.463 (df = 2814)
F Statistic	2.154** (df = 10; 2814)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the estimates of Equation B. In 1988, belonging to the highest SES group (ABC1) is the only variable that predicts preference for authority/order.

Table 9: 1991 Correlations Using Authority/Order as the Dependent Variable

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Authority/Order
ABC1	0.027 (0.207)
C2C3	-0.186** (0.084)
DE	
Age1	0.159 (0.149)
Age2	0.031 (0.143)
Age3	0.127 (0.145)
Age4	-0.016 (0.150)
Age5	-0.068 (0.158)
Age6	
NotHighSchoolGrad	0.105 (0.108)
HighSchoolGrad	0.003 (0.111)
HigherEducation	
Gender	-0.144* (0.075)
Unemployment	0.022 (0.052)
Crime	0.038 (0.025)
Constant	2.578*** (0.178)
Observations	1,161
R ²	0.016
Adjusted R ²	0.006
Residual Std. Error	1.243 (df = 1148)
F Statistic	1.545 (df = 12; 1148)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the estimates of Equation B. In 1991, belonging to the middle SES group (C2C3) negatively correlates with preference for authority/order. No issue variable (unemployment or crime) was a statistically significant predictor of preference for authority/order.

Table 10: 1999 Correlations Using Authority/Order as the Dependent Variable

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Authority/Order
WealthIndex	0.064 (0.073)
WealthIndex2	-0.009 (0.095)
Age1	-0.041 (0.056)
Age2	-0.008 (0.050)
Age3	0.044 (0.049)
Age4	-0.026 (0.051)
Age5	0.054 (0.054)
Age6	
NotHighSchoolGrad	0.104** (0.046)
HighSchool	0.033 (0.046)
HighSchoolGrad	
Gender	0.054* (0.028)
Corruption	-0.078 (0.055)
Unemployment	0.022 (0.029)
Crime	0.141*** (0.029)
Constant	0.238*** (0.084)
Observations	1,265
R ²	0.036
Adjusted R ²	0.026
Residual Std. Error	0.494 (df = 1251)
F Statistic	3.593*** (df = 13; 1251)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

This table shows the estimates of Equation B. In 1999, not graduating high school correlates with preference for authority/order. Crime was the only issue variable that was a statistically significant predictor of preference for authority/order.

that authoritarian leaders are mainly supported and kept in power by elites.

The data from 1991 tells a different story. Analyzing the 1991 data, there appears to be a negative association between belonging to group C2C3 and supporting authority using group DE as a frame of reference. That relationship is statistically significant to the .05 level. That means that in this data set, being in a middle class group made an individual less likely to support authority than an individual in the lower classes. That, coupled with the lack of a significance for the ABC1 elite group yields some contradicting results to those of the 1988 survey. In the analysis of the 1999 data, there is no relationship between authority and either of the WealthIndexes used. The 1988 results suggesting that the elites prefer authority more so than any other group are not replicated in 1991 or 1999. There is some evidence that there could be a socioeconomic dimension to preference for authority, but my results are too inconsistent to claim that effect is relevant or immutable.

Education is also an inconsistent predictor of support for order and authority. In the data from 1988 and 1991, there is no relationship between any educational attainment group and supporting authority over liberty. There is a relationship between not graduating high school and supporting authority that is statistically significant in the 1999 survey to the .05 level. What is interesting is that it is the opposite of the trend seen with socioeconomic status. Those with the highest income (only in the 1988 data) and those with the lowest education (only in the 1999 data) seem to be supporting authority more than other groups. These two results contradict one another because, in theory and practice, those in higher socioeconomic groups tend to be more educated. We would therefore expect more educated people

to support authority based on the relationship between preference for authority and high socioeconomic status. These results add more inconsistency to the attempt at predicting preference for authority based on demographic variables.

There was no effect of age group on the likelihood of supporting authority over liberty. This was surprising because it is often believed that older individuals are more conservative (Truett, 1993), and conservative individuals, in turn, are more authoritarian (Eckhardt, 1991).

The results about the effect of gender on preference for authority are inconsistent but surprisingly significant in two of the years. In the 1988 data, there is no relationship between the two variables. The results from 1991 and 1999 show a relationship to the .1 significance level, but do so in opposite directions. The 1991 data suggests a negative relationship being a male supporting authority. The 1999 data suggests a positive relationship between being male and supporting authority. These results add more inconsistency to the attempt to find the demographic drivers of preference for authority and order.

The issue variables also give us some fascinating results. Unemployment does not predict preference for authority, the same way that it did not predict support for Pinochet. This is further evidence that support for authoritarianism is not entirely a matter of economic preferences. A concern with corruption also does not predict preference for authority. Being concerned with crime, nevertheless, does predict preference for authority, but only in one survey year. This relationship is significant to the .01 level in 1999. This evidence might support the theory, albeit not strongly because of the lack of significance in 1991, by Esberg (2018) who says that Pinochet

maintained support in Chile by striking fear in his supporters of a potential communist takeover. By stoking fears of a communist uprising, Pinochet made his supporters believe he was the only force that could protect them. For people who are concerned with crime in Chile, it is likely that they believe an authoritarian leader would be more adept at stymieing crime, even if it is through repressive policies. Thus, it is likely they would feel safer under an authoritarian regime, and therefore value order and authority over liberty. Of the issue variables, unemployment and corruption do not drive preference for authority and order, and crime does so but only in 1999.

My results support Seligson and Tucker's theory that attributes support for authoritarianism to a preference for authority and order, which are characteristics of non-democratic forms of government. Collectively, the results in this and the above section consistently support that conclusion. The strongest predictor of support for Pinochet in Chile seems to be preference for authority and order. The demographic variables are not consistently correlated with support for Pinochet, with or without controls. Of the issue variables, only crime and corruption are consistently correlated with support for Pinochet. Those results are further strengthened by the regression analysis looking at authority as the dependent variable. No variable strongly predicts preference for authority and order consistently, which suggests that people might hold an inherent preference for authority.

9 Conclusion

This study investigates the roots of support for authoritarianism by focusing on the case of Augusto Pinochet. From a democratic standpoint, it is shocking that people would support leaders who have infringed on their democratic liberties. In Latin America, countless actors involved in military dictatorships have thrived electorally following their removal from power. Simultaneously, surveys such as *Latinobarómetro* suggest that support for democracy is not widespread in the region. These factors taken together paint a bleak picture for the future of democratic systems in Latin America. Democracy cannot survive if people do not support its institutions. It is crucial to understand why people would support authoritarianism and attempt to use that knowledge to inform democratic policies.

Chile in particular has been a model Latin American country for its stability and democracy following the election of Patricio Aylwin in 1990. Since then, its GDP has trended upward and every president has been elected through a wholly democratic process. It is interesting to ponder how a country with a strong democratic foundation gave rise to a brutal dictatorship that lasted for sixteen years. More interesting still is that numerous Chilean citizens still praise Pinochet as a hero. The deep division over Pinochet's legacy is enduring and makes for a fascinating case study.

My research addresses the factors that drive people to proclaim support for Pinochet. In doing so I examine the fundamental question of whether the people who support individual authoritarians also support authoritarianism over democracy. The relevance of the question lies in that supporters of former authoritarians are

littered across Latin America. If their electoral preferences are driven by a support for non-democratic systems, then how can democracy thrive in the region?

In order to provide an answer for why people support authoritarianism, many theorists focus on social or economic polarization. Svobik (2018) and Acemoglu et al. (2013) propose a model in which political and economic polarization predict support for authoritarian leaders and their policies. Through my analysis of survey data from 1988, 1991, and 1999, I find that a narrative relying on polarization is fundamentally incomplete. I do not find socioeconomic status, age, educational attainment, or gender to be consistently significant drivers of support for Pinochet. Additionally, I do not find that concern for unemployment predicts support for Pinochet. This finding contradicts an explanation of support for authoritarianism that emphasizes financial concerns. Looking at people's concern for crime and corruption and how they affect support for Pinochet provides us with interesting preliminary findings. Concerns over crime and corruption seem to predict support for Pinochet, but to a lesser extent than preference for authority and order. Since the variable for corruption is only included in one survey and the variable for crime in two, it is hard to make strong conclusions about their effects. Further research is needed to see whether concerns over crime and corruption drive support for authoritarians and whether that finding generalizes to other countries.

My results imply that some people inherently prefer an authoritarian form of government over a democratic one. I find that people who approve of Augusto Pinochet also support policies that are more authoritarian. Across surveys, those who state a preference for authority and order over liberty are more likely to support

Pinochet. Since this effect is present when controlling for demographic variables and issue variables, it seems people can prefer a form of government that infringes on their liberties, as long as it provides them with order and security. This supports the work of Seligson and Tucker (2005) in claiming that support for authoritarian leaders reflects a widespread lack of support for democracy.

The relevant question now is, if demographic variables do not predict preference for authority, then what does? In order to answer that question, I look at what drives preference for authority and order over liberty and find no consistent results. Thus, in this paper, I do not propose an answer to that question.

A next step would be to look into whether concerns over crime or corruption are drivers of support for authoritarianism in other countries. Seligson and Tucker (2005) find these issue variables to be relevant in their analysis, but the survey data available does not fully allow me to confirm those results. These two variables are especially relevant in Latin America given the high crime rates and corruption indexes. It would also be interesting to look at other measures of economic uncertainty or of social polarization to further test the aforementioned theories relying on those constructs. Further research could also look at whether my results hold true in other countries.

There are a few limitations to this study. One is that looking at different years and attempting to find consistent predictors of support for Pinochet obscures the possible effect of year-specific variables. This is a difficult limitation to overcome since political leaders do not operate in a vacuum. Another limitation is that since the surveys are representative of the urban population of Chile, they do not take into account the preferences of people living in the more rural areas of the country.

Additionally, the questions are not entirely consistent across survey years. This is a factor that could affect the consistency of the results and their ability to be compared temporally. I attempt to control for the survey weaknesses in the study by coding the variables uniformly in each data set. In order to correct these limitations, a further study could use original survey questions that more specifically address the desired variables. That would also allow for an analysis of the drivers of current support for Pinochet.

Looking at Chile through a contemporary lens is especially relevant in the context of the protests that arose against the right wing president, Sebastián Piñera, in 2019. The protests surprised the world, since Chile is often looked at as Latin America's success story. The citizens of Chile were protesting the economic inequality that decades of neoliberal policies have engendered. There is a wide wealth gap in the country and numerous corruption scandals have eroded the people's faith in the government (Taub, 2019). The initial protests were sparked when the government increased subway fare by four cents. With the rise in corruption of the democratically elected government and the increasing economic polarization, it would be interesting to see whether support for Pinochet and authoritarianism have increased in Chile.

Understanding why people support authoritarianism is a pressing policy issue. From the rise of Chávez in Venezuela to that of Putin in Russia and Erdoğan in Turkey, governments around the world are becoming more authoritarian. By looking at Latin America in the late twentieth century, we can study how authoritarianism takes root and what can be done to stymie it. A main lesson to take from Chile is not to reduce people's preference for authoritarianism into matters of pure economic

interest. While it is appealing to assume people are largely financially motivated, it is also true that a concern for order could lead to supporting an authoritarian government that can guarantee structure and safety. This study suggests that people can support authority and order over liberty regardless of their demographics and economic concerns. The idea that support for authoritarianism is not contained to a single demographic group seems frightening for the prospects of democracy.

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