No Sympathy for the Folk Devil: How Presidential Speechmaking in the War on Terror and the War on Drugs Utilized Threat and Anxiety to Manipulate and Persuade the American Public

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Abstract
This thesis analyzes how presidential speeches in the War on Terror (2001 through the present) and the War on Drugs (1964 through the present) defined the out-group, characterized a righteous American in-group, and aided in the creation of atmospheres of escalating fear and anxiety to gain support for specific policy ends. To observe and quantify these trends of fear and crisis, out-group isolation, and in-group emphasis, the author uses quantitative and qualitative content analysis. The results reflect a higher concentration of rhetoric espousing punitive policymaking, characterization of the out-group in each era as immoral, violent, and ubiquitous, and a definition of each time period as one filled with chaos and threat to the “Good American.” These shared patterns reflect an intentionality in speech to rely on cues of fear and anxiety to reach certain policy ends and public opinion changes. From a political perspective, the power of fear and anxiety in political speechmaking is often accompanied by negative policy and social outcomes for a homogenized out-group, as well as a vulnerability in the public to misinformation, trends documented in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror.

Keywords
fear, anger, political psychology, communication, presidential speechmaking, war on terror, war on drugs, Humanities, Social Sciences, Political Science, Communications, Michele Margolis, Margolis, Michele

Disciplines
Communication | Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration | Public Affairs
No Sympathy for the Folk Devil:
How Presidential Speechmaking in the War on Terror and the War on Drugs Utilized
Threat and Anxiety to Manipulate and Persuade the American Public

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Abstract

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Introduction and General Problem

In the course of American history, there are few windows of time that have borne witness to greater levels of political trust in government than times of war, a product of a nation at threat and characterized by high levels of anxiety and fear believing in the capacity of its government to combat the wrong, the feared, the Other (Berinsky 2009). In the Revolutionary War, it was the British monarchy; in World War I, the Central Powers, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire; in World War II, Nazi Germany, Italy, Japan. Yet, not every war requires a geographic enemy, a country isolated in total opposition to the United States: at minimum, the requisite fodder for war is an ideological or abstract enemy. In other words, a “them,” positioned in moral opposition to American ideals and ways of life.

Two of the most potent wars of the last fifty years in American history had less conventional enemies, including many of its own citizens, as well as civilians of other countries who became a part of a monolithic and simplified “them,” separated from the righteous “us” through presentation of disparate moral beliefs and deviant behaviors (Morone 2004). Two such wars are the efforts of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror.

The War on Drugs found traction in the language of prosecution, criminalization, and fear of Barry Goldwater at the Republican National Convention in 1960 (Flamm and Steigerwald 2008). In this, the trend of rhetoric mobilizing policy against drug criminals and organized crime intensified dramatically, defining the criminal justice system debate and public opinion regarding domestic safety over the course of the next six decades (Duke and Gross 1994). Consolidated in a broader framework of law and order and couched in the ideals of 1950’s-era normalcy pushing back against tides of liberalization, these rhetorical and policy-based appeals found bipartisan support among Middle America and the Silent Majority (Shermer 2013). This movement laid the
groundwork for and reflected a wave of socially conservative thought in structuring domestic and foreign policy in the United States, both in drug legislation and other arenas. More specifically, these bipartisan platforms pushed American history along the path of pursuing and prosecuting Americans involved in illegal drug use, both violent and nonviolent offenders, as a primary political, social, and cultural issue (Nunn 2002). Efforts like instating a mandatory minimum, promoting a death penalty for drug dealers, and creating new agencies focused on drug use with millions of dollars in budgetary allocation became the norms of the War on Drugs (Nunn 2002). Such actions would disproportionately affect lower income communities and communities of color in the United States, facing astronomical levels of incarceration and other realities resulting from the cues of American leadership (Nunn 2002).

The War on Terror, catalyzed by a more specific series of events, began after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 on American soil, in which the United States lost nearly 3,000 lives (Bligh et al. 2004). Following this attack, then-President Bush initiated the pursuit of terrorists accompanied by a series of international acts of war with language based in fear, emphasizing the salience of law, order, and moral obligation to achieve specific policy ends (Rothe and Muzzatti 2004). These acts included the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, to be continued by his two presidential successors. This was met with a simultaneous domestic effort to increase security and further strengthen the capacity of American government against any perceived domestic or international terrorists, increasing surveillance in the PATRIOT Act and other pieces of policy and legislation – starting a War on Terror at home and around the world (Kramer and Michalowski 2005). The international drive to eradicate terrorism, a broad, abstract, and disperse enemy, was operationalized judicially by the Bush administration’s Torture Memos, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, extraordinary rendition, enemy combatants, and
military tribunals, operating as extensions of the American law enforcement system and expanding beyond precedents of international American justice (Kramer and Michalowski 2005). Here, Muslim Americans and civilians of Iraq and Afghanistan faced the policy and militaristic consequences of the War on Terror, experiencing limitations of their civil liberties, wrongful detainment, and actions by the American government that violated international and domestic law (Zarefsky 2007).

In the circumstances of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, the creation and manipulation of intensified, perceived threats and heightened security concerns were based in real and merited criminal and safety concerns. However, in each case, information often exaggerated, misconstrued, and sometimes even fabricated. For example, in the War on Drugs, by the 1990’s, the American public was citing drug use as their primary domestic policy concern; and yet, drug consumption had declined precipitously over the preceding decades, though drug arrests continued to skyrocket (“Illegal Drugs”). Despite these numbers, support for policies like the Crime Bill of 1994 under President Clinton and broader pushes for increased levels of punitive policies against drug users and drug traffickers continued into the 21st century (Kleiman and Hawdon 2011).

Similarly, the Bush administration’s publicizing of Saddam Hussein’s possession of biological weapons, Iraq’s possession of nuclear weaponry, and the ties of each to al Qaeda and those responsible for the attacks of September 11th were key premises that structured the War on Terror (Zarefsky 2007). However, these claims would later be proven false and based on minimal or nonexistent evidence by the Bush administration to gain support for an invasion, garnering bipartisan traction in the early stages of the War on Terror in part due to an atmosphere of fear and panic (Oliphant 2018).
Equipped with the powerful emotional cues of panic, threat, and anxiety, these efforts of exaggeration and misleading the public through the power of presidential leadership in each scenario had grave consequences for members of the targeted out-groups. This included Americans of color and in lower income communities in the realm of drug abuse, and civilians of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as America’s own Muslim and Middle Eastern populations in the War on Terror (Oliphant 2018).

In observing these efforts in ostracizing and blaming a specific group of individuals for a cultural, social, and political threat and wrong, and the mass acceptance of these efforts to eradicate the wrong among the public, several questions emerge. How is it possible that the public could accept these exaggerated or entirely fabricated claims regarding the threat of drug users and the constancy of the danger/misinformation regarding terrorism? What psychological phenomena enabled politicians in each time period to garner the electoral and policy-specific support necessary to permit such limitations of civil liberties, policies based on punishment and militarism, and widespread prejudice against designated groups?

Though the content of the wars themselves are different, the broader framework, political psychology, and judicial, social, and policy outcomes of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror bear significant and meaningful similarities. In both wars, leadership garnered support through a calculated and deliberate use of anxiety and fear to draw in voters. To accomplish this, they isolated, identified, and vilified enemies in order to consolidate power in their administrations and the presidency generally to combat these enemies – positioning themselves as ideological exploiters of the crisis, state of panic, and general anxiety, aligned with the “Good American” as victim and hero (Falco 1996). Likewise, leaders in each have isolated in rhetoric and ideology out-groups defined by racial, ethnic, and religious characteristics, mobilizing law
enforcement, politicians, the media, the military, and the public as actors integral to the genesis and maintenance of panic in each crisis (Hawdon 2001; Nunn 2002; Rothe and Muzzatti 2004).

Indeed, such large-scale policy and opinion shifts in the public cannot occur without mutual consent between invested actors, leadership, and the electorate, which leads one to wonder: what specifically in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror enabled these shifts to take place? In this research paper, utilizing the study of American presidential speeches in each time period as the method of analysis, the efforts of identifying and vilifying an out-group, bolstering a righteous in-group, escalating the terms of crisis and fear, and providing solutions through the presidency are some of the mechanisms hypothesized to have helped enable this shift in public opinion and policy support.

Here, these wars emerge as outcomes and initiatives founded upon great fears of domestic insecurity, with shared premises of anxiety regarding out-groups seeking to undermine American order and impose destruction. Using communication cues charged with racially and ethnically ostracizing rhetoric against black and Latino communities in the United States, the carceral efforts to combat drug use disproportionately targeted Americans of color and from lower income backgrounds (Bobo and Thompson 2006). Similarly, sweeping generalizations made regarding Iraq and Afghanistan in presidential rhetoric, as well as the emphasizing of the exaggerated constancy and ubiquity of terrorism, permitted presidents to utilize extreme policy measures to fight terrorism at home and abroad relating to privacy, the use of military tribunals, detention centers, and designations including enemy combatant status.

And though not without cause for fear, both were framed and formed as responses to extraordinary, existential threats, perceived at the vulnerability of American health, American safety, and the moral fabric of American society – to be protected by the presidency of the
United States and its domestic and international police state. In each, elected officials had major roles in not only responding to these anxieties and fears, but in stoking them and gaining from them politically (Welch, Fenwick, and Roberts 1998).

In both cases, the creation of this state of fear aided presidents and presidential candidates in consolidating a cultural and political shift rooted in anxiety, utilizing threat associated with an out-group of choice against the righteous members of the in-group (Cohen 2014, 9). Social identity theory, intergroup relations, fear in political psychology, and moral panics serve as useful tools to assess the consequences of these two case studies, as well as their manifestation in political communications: specifically, presidential speeches. With the historical pattern of each time period as a justification for comparison of these speeches, these political psychology frameworks are useful scaffolds to analyze and compare.

Contextualizing these two eras within the trend of fear rhetoric, I will show that the progression of specific speech patterns from Presidents Richard Nixon through Donald Trump helped to enable the public acceptance of mass incarceration and the War on Terror on domestic and international fronts, led by speechmakers of both parties. These two case studies can help to demonstrate how, since the 1960’s, American officials have successfully and effectively restructured the dialogue on crime and terrorism to suit their political goals and values. Likewise, this method can quantify in speech the roles that fear, isolation of the out-group, and anxiety have played in these time periods. In this, a comparison of long-term trends in the War on Terror and the War on Drugs will document and provide evidence of the thematic underpinnings of presidential speechmaking in each, and help to unpack the temporal atmosphere of each case study. Likewise, a comparative study of presidential speeches across each time period can support claims for certain generalizable trends in the rhetoric of fear used by American
presidents in the 20th and 21st centuries. Drawing on social identity theory and the moral panic framework, I will utilize content analysis to provide a proportional analysis of cues focused on crisis, out-group characterization, in-group characterization, perceptions of threat, and proposed solutions to see how presidential speech was operationalized to mold these time periods of fear, and how it was weaponized to achieve public opinion and policy ends.

Part of what elevates the importance of this study is just how salient this issue remains today, as the patterns of mass incarceration and discussion of terror exist in the same and evolved forms. Likewise, such language of out-groups, the righteousness of the in-group, and panic and crisis are by no means limited to the realms of terrorism and drug addiction. From presidential speeches about police brutality, to rhetoric regarding missile threats, to language about terrorism and non-drug criminals, these events and discourses are still present and have dynamic, constantly evolving realizations in policy and speechmaking. Fear and anxiety remain pressing and urgent forces in shaping electoral politics. They also still play a substantial role in generating and shaping support and trust in elected officials, in policy ranging from combating ISIS, to violence in schools, to approval of drone strikes, to immigration reforms based in fear and Othering (Loseke 2009). The study of elite-engineered eras of panic, fear, and anxiety resulting from a manipulation of public understanding of threat remains inexorably valuable today, and can help to inform consumers of media in skepticism and critical understandings of politics.

As the field of fear and panic in presidential speechmaking currently stands, no academic study exists to compare the communication cues of panic, anxiety, or threat in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, nor in independent studies of each case. Likewise, no historical or political assessment comparing the judicial and punitive consequences for specific racial or religious minorities in the United States and abroad has been conducted, to draw meaningful
similarities in policy- and decision-making regarding each racial, ethnic, or religious out-group. From the comparisons made possible through studies of each time period, I find important theoretical bases for applying the lenses of social identity theory, intergroup relations, fear and threat, and the moral panic framework to both events, to observe how these patterns manifested themselves.

The next two sections document the historical backgrounds of both the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, focusing on similarities in misinformation, rises in hate crimes and targeting of specific racial and ethnic groups for incarceration and invasion, violations of civil liberties, and expansions of the American bureaucracy and international and domestic police state. After having detailed the historical trajectories of both time periods and emphasizing their similarities, I will highlight the existing literature focusing on fear, threat, and anxiety in the communications efforts of leadership in both time periods, and note where the literature currently is limited in observing each individual case study. I will also compare the two to draw generalizable conclusions about time periods of panic and the power of elites in generating these panics, to grant a historical justification to the content analysis of the presidential speeches of both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs.

From here, I will provide a literature review of past research in the realms of political and social psychology in creating a vilified out-group and an empowered in-group, and the policy, behavioral, and intergroup consequences that increased strength of each identity can have for members of the out-group. Utilizing this framework of social identity theory and intergroup interactions, I will explain how past studies have documented the use of fear, anxiety, and threat in speechmaking regarding out-groups and in-groups, and the changes in public opinion that often result from politicians making salient these emotions of fear, panic, and anxiety to sustain
perceived threat. Here, I connect the psychological frameworks of these studies to what kind of policy support these patterns may lend themselves to inciting. Again, in the succeeding section, I will emphasize past studies of elite-engineered panics and the influence and power that is wielded by mass communicators in positions of power. Likewise, I will focus on how politicians historically have utilized the strategic isolation of out-groups to increase fear and anxiety in members of the in-group, gaining support for policies based in discriminatory practices, militarism, increased surveillance, and violations of civil liberties in the name of security and protection.

Drawing on these preceding chapters, I will supplement my literature review with the sociological framework of the moral panic, providing a linear framework of the patterns of escalation of the state of panic, and the policy and institutionalized implications of isolating and blaming an out-group in a time period of crisis and fear. With these comparisons in history articulated as well as the frameworks of social identity theory, intergroup behavior, fear and threat, and moral panics, I will explain my research question and methodology based in content analysis. I will quantify the forms of rhetoric based on my theoretical sections to understand what cues and appeals were most utilized in each time period, comparing where they converge and where they deviate. In this, I will provide an understanding of how elite-engineered panics of the presidency were comparatively orchestrated in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror by looking at fifteen presidential speeches from each time period.
Literature Review and Theoretical Justification

The War on Drugs: History and Past Studies

Since the 19th century, the enemy of “drugs” has always been a talking point in the conversation on American culture and crime, addressed in federal and state-level policies—including narcotics, marijuana, and other substances, with the first anti-morphine law enacted in 1860 in Pennsylvania and the first national law regarding drugs enacted in 1914 regulating the sale of narcotics (Belenko 2000). In 1930, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was created, with President Hoover’s Harry Anslinger as its first commissioner, defining the first stage of narcotics policy, a quiet and less visible war on drug use (Kinder 1981).

Though the early 20th century was defined by stringency in Prohibition regarding substance use, the period after consisted of a less aggressive set of policies on drug control and minimal national visibility for the issue. Such was the case until the Boggs Act of 1951 of the Eisenhower administration, in which mandatory minimum sentences were determined for marijuana, cocaine, and opiate possession, motivated by an observed increase in narcotics use among teenagers (Schlosser 2003). When use seemingly declined following the Boggs Act, by 1956, almost thirty states had adopted it in some form, expanding in 1956 with the Narcotics Control Act, increasing national capacity to reduce drug use, trafficking, and supply through harsher penalties and permitting agents to carry weapons and to make arrests without warrants (Bonnie and Whitebread 1970). This pre-1960’s era of drug policy in the United States was predominantly defined by narcotics use including opium, with periods of high levels of enforcement, interims of minimal enforcement, and lack of involvement of the FBI; this era had a far lower level of visibility for drug use as a primary federal policy concern (Whitford and Yates 2003).
With the 1960’s, American counterculture brought a massive wave of liberalization to a wide range of political and lifestyle fronts: the Civil Rights movement, the women’s liberation movement, anti-war protests, sexual positivity, and an increase in recreational drug use (Whitford and Yates 2003). This brought about a rise in marijuana use on college campuses, an increase in LSD use among young, college-educated Americans steeped in the musical counterculture, and a surge in drug addiction among many Vietnam veterans returning to the United States (Stinchcombe et al. 1980). These were dramatic changes from a decade prior (Musto 1999), with few Americans in the 1930’s through the 1950’s having even scant knowledge of the widespread use of drugs in the United States (Goode 1970). Citing an increase in organized crime and the perceptions of crime and drug use as being intertwined, drug use and drug users became a central political issue of the 1960’s among conservative Americans (Stinchcombe et al. 1980).

To combat this increase, the Johnson administration was the first to engage with the nascent concept of a war against drugs, creating the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BDD), tasked with controlling the use of narcotics and depressants, stimulants, and hallucinogens (Wisotsky 1986). This transition also placed control of narcotics and other drugs within the domain of federal law enforcement in the Department of Justice, a change from previous approaches to drug abuse policy; between its inception and the mid-1970’s, the BDD vastly grew to include federal, state, and local officers, enhancing regional law enforcement and creating foreign offices as well (Whitford and Yates 2003).

With the Nixon administration following a presidential campaign steeped in rhetoric of law and order and framed by concern with urban crime and violence in the American public, the president announced a new “public enemy number one” in drugs (Nixon 1971). In much of the
literature on the War on Drugs, this moment is considered the turning point for its escalation, incited in a “Special Message to Congress” in 1971 (Gooberman 1974). Here, he emphasized trends in youth arrests and an increasing prevalence of street crime in the preceding decade, asking for federal anti-drug policy to reflect his campaign promises and the burgeoning perspective of modern conservatives (Whitford and Yates 2003). In this speech, Nixon began the push for increased breadth and scope of legislation, education and research initiatives, an international component of law enforcement, and the involvement of all levels of American law enforcement (Gooberman 1974).

This push was not limited to any one kind of drug, blending different kinds of drug use into one criminal act in an aim to homogenize perceptions of drug use as a moral infraction (Musto 1999). Following, Nixon enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, bringing several agencies under one larger umbrella (Musto 1999). This act was equipped not only with mandatory minimum sentencing that would eventuate in disproportionate effect in low-income communities and communities of color, but provided for searches without warrant, expanded local funds for narcotics control, and called for a National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse (Gooberman 1974). By 1972, this commission would release a report whose conclusion would call for the decriminalization of marijuana and other tactics to focus not only on supply side control, but demand management through better treatment opportunities; however, Nixon denied the legitimacy of the report due to his own opposition to decriminalization, and the findings of the report were never realized in policy or platform (Musto 1999). Policy in the United States would continue to move further from decriminalization in the decades to follow.
In this same year, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was created to coordinate all activities in the War on Drugs under a united agency (Musto 1999). This expansion of agencies and consolidation of leadership equipped the presidency to monitor all issues drug-related (Kleiman and Hawdon 2011). These policies and a zero-tolerance stance on drug use gained bipartisan traction, with officials across the aisle supporting Nixon and other conservative leadership. In 1973, to accompany this language, Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Agency, the product of a merging of the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and the Office of Narcotics Intelligence to join efforts surrounding drug abuse under one organization (Johnson et al. 2004). Following Nixon’s resignation from office, Ford approved the creation of Office of Drug Abuse Policy in 1976, emphasizing the need to control high-level trafficking, increasing his authority over high-level interdiction efforts and creating mandatory minimum sentencing for heroin and other narcotics use (Kleiman and Hawdon 2011).

After Ford’s administration, President Carter brought about a slight shift in the drug discourse, seeking to end criminal penalties in 1976 for drug possession and running on a campaign of decriminalizing marijuana (Flamm and Steigerwald 2008). Though he encouraged greater international collaboration of law enforcement between the United States and other invested nations, he promoted a smaller penalty for possession of marijuana (Johnson et al. 2004). However, Carter failed to realize most of these more lenient drug measures and was electorally rebuked in 1980 by Ronald Reagan, who embodied the law and order movement espoused by Nixon; in Reagan, the War on Drugs found a renewed presidential champion. Shifting the dialogue away from Carter’s distinctions between drugs and differentiation of
sentencing, Reagan and the leaders of the DEA beneath him sought to restructure the conversation as one emphasizing policing and prosecution (Flamm and Steigerwald 2008).

In 1986, Reagan created the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, allocating a total of $1.7 billion to the War on Drugs, establishing stricter mandatory minimum prison sentences (Olsen 2017). This act also created differences in sentencing for crack and powder cocaine, a point of controversy as a disproportionate number of crack users were lower income Americans of color who faced much harsher sentencing than powder cocaine users, the likes of whom were more often wealthy, white Americans (Nunn 2002). This explicit differentiation is one that would garner criticism as a leading cause of mass incarceration in communities of color. Under the leadership of Reagan, who spearheaded the “Just Say No” campaign to incorporate families and schools into the movement, incarceration for nonviolent drug offenders increased from 50,000 to 400,000 (Nunn 2002).

Succeeded by his vice president and former head of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Reagan’s battle continued in the presidency of George H. W. Bush who engaged in stronger pursuit of drug trafficking indictments (Johnson et al. 2004). While serving as president, Bush proposed a death penalty against drug kingpins (Kleiman and Hawdon 2001). Likewise, proving the drug war a bipartisan issue, the Clinton administration continued this path of increasing federal funding for controlling drug use (Kleiman and Hawdon 2001). Despite anticipation of a return to more lenient laws and policies for drug use that had begun to emerge in the late 1970’s, Clinton encouraged the continuation of “Just Say No” and total abstinence from drugs, highlighting the crack epidemic as a central policy concern of his administration (Kleiman and Hawdon 2001).
By 1989, Gallup published a poll in which almost two-thirds of Americans considered drug use and its related organized crime to be America’s number one problem as a result of the decades long crusade against drug use, despite few Americans even knowing of the national prevalence of drug use only decades prior (“Illegal Drugs”). Openly deriding decriminalization as a guise for total legalization, drug arrests increased to one million during Clinton’s presidency, reflective of harsher federal sentencing practices (Wagner and Rabuy 2016). The racial disparity of incarceration between upper class white Americans and lower income communities of color was echoed in Clinton’s continuation of a ban on needle exchange projects which intended to curb rates of AIDS contraction among lower income drug users (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2001).

In the 2000’s, most anti-drug operations in the United States were tied to the administration of George W. Bush, with the expansion of the drug abuse fight into the Department of Health and Human Services, among other agencies. In this, Bush strove to encourage greater anti-drug educational programs among elementary age students by incorporating parents and teachers (Kleiman and Hawdon 2011). In this same vein, students could be randomly drug tested as a deterrent from drug abuse. These efforts were accompanied by the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant, an effort to aid drug addicts – however, this set of programs is frequently derided as more trivial rather than substantively useful, failing to rehabilitate drug addicts or promote effective re-entry programs for more than two million drug-involved inmates (Wagner and Rabuy 2016).

Temporarily pausing the formal use of the term “War on Drugs” in presidential speechmaking, President Obama initiated the Drug Free Communities initiative which funds anti-drug education in schools as well as the Prevention Prepared Communities Program, developed to enhance interventions in adolescent drug users; at the same time, however, he
increased funding for random drug-testing programs for students (Kleiman and Hawdon 2011). His 2009 Second Chance initiative emphasized job training and other educational tools for drug abusers, as well as a Residential Substance Abuse Treatment program to help states research treatment improvement for inmates dealing with drug abuse (Kleiman and Hawdon 2011). Continuing efforts to limit international drug trafficking, Obama increased funding aimed at stopping aircraft suspected of participation in drug trafficking and organized crime related to drugs; he also created Project High Point, a state level program relying on police-community relationships to identify drug dealers, as well as instating random drug tests for probationers and parolees with immediate arrest following violation (Kleiman and Hawdon 2011). In his presidency, with the opioid epidemic reaching higher death rates in various demographics – including white, rural Americans – the discussion of drug use, for addicts of certain drugs, became rehabilitation-focused, sympathetic, and apologetic (Netherland and Hansen 2016).

This increased trend of sympathetic policymaking and a shift in cultural understandings of opioid addiction as a disease, and not a moral failing, finds resonance in much of the presidency of Donald Trump. However, with language of Mexican immigrants bringing drugs and crime into the United States in President Trump’s campaign rhetoric, the revival of language of a “War on Drugs” finds returned importance in presidential speechmaking, as well as in policy (Cooper 2017). Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s reemphasizing of the importance of mandatory minimums, Trump’s reiteration of a U.S.-Mexico border wall to keep out drug criminals, and Trump’s desire to pull out of NAFTA founded in part on the argument that the transnational criminal organizations of Mexico pose drug threats to the United States all embody this trend. In this, President Donald Trump has reescalated the rhetoric of war in the drug abuse debate resonant of the language of past presidents (Cooper 2017).
Indeed, over the last six decades, through fluctuations of policy, domestic and international aims, and changes in the criminal justice system, the War on Drugs has constantly evolved. A substantial body of literature exists connecting fear and policy-making strategies to disproportionate rates of mass incarceration in American communities of color, as well as presidential efforts to lead this fight as an ideological tool against specific racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic minorities (Nunn 2002). Using rhetorical and visual devices with racially and ethnically charged scapegoating rhetoric against black and Latino communities in the United States, the presidential charge to end drug crime disproportionately targeted Americans of color and from lower income backgrounds (Bobo and Thompson 2006). Among black men born between 1965 and 1969, 30% of those without a college degree and almost 60% of high school dropouts went to prison before 2000, largely in relation to drug crimes (Pettit and Western 2004). At the complicated nexus of wealth inequality, urban deindustrialization, and residential segregation sits high levels of incarceration for violent and non-violent drug crimes, resulting from the race-baiting appeals of the War on Drugs amidst the cultural shifts of the Civil Rights movement and general liberalization of American politics and society (Pettit and Western 2004).

In the United States today, more than 20% of all incarcerated people are in prison for a drug offense, including nonviolent drug offenders (Wagner and Rabuy 2016). Beyond those serving sentences in prison, as of 2016, the American criminal justice system has almost 4 million Americans on probation, 2.3 million Americans in correctional facilities, and more than 800,000 people on parole (Wagner and Rabuy 2016). Until the 1970’s, the state and federal prison population remained at a fairly stable rate – upon the escalation of the War on Drugs, the incarcerated population grew precipitously, up nearly 800% from 1960 to 2010, with the highest rates of incarceration of any nation in the world (Richie 2018). All this, despite the fact that self-
reported drug consumption levelled off during the early 1980’s, and had been steadily decreasing throughout the 1970’s (Gerber and Jensen 2001).

In looking at institutional mechanisms of the War on Drugs in expanding the power of the judiciary and executive, policies including the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (Duke and Gross 1994, 187), the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 which included the hiring of 1,000 new agents and a budget increase of $1.7 trillion, and the declaration of drug abuse as a national security problem allowed the use of military power to control trafficking and dealing. Likewise, the national budget and size and number of involved agencies continued to grow massively across presidencies during the War on Drugs (Kleiman and Hawdon 2011). These acts and changing standards in the criminal justice system aided in the curbing of civil liberties for many Americans, allowing for searches without warrant, indefinite detainment of individuals arrested for drug-related crimes, and a documented effort of the criminal justice system to target people of color (Nunn 2002).

In the War on Drugs, these expanded criminal justice measures have included the instatement of mandatory minimums for nonviolent drug offenders, life-long systems of parole and probation, and limitations permanently in the workforce, licensing, electoral access, and general disenfranchisement of past offenders who have reentered the world post-incarceration (Nunn 2002). With the advent of a “prison industrial complex,” the web of incarceration in the United States has condoned and enabled a mass imprisonment system, predicated on a legal system organized to “presume, protect, and defend the ideal of superiority of whites and the inferiority of blacks” (Bobo and Thompson 2006, 448). Through these mechanisms, minority individuals have been denied access to a fair and transparent trial guarded and dictated by the laws of international and domestic bodies, and to the virtues of a criminal justice system founded
upon rehabilitation instead of punishment, a process in which American presidents play a substantial role (Fisher 2005). The power of fear and threat associated with drug use and organized crime in amassing support for these policies and values condoning discrimination cannot be understated, nor can the War on Drugs’s repercussions for communities of color undervalued (Nunn 2002).

The role that presidents played in this trajectory of the War on Drugs is critical in understanding how public support was garnered for policies that so indiscriminately incarcerated poor Americans and Americans of color. By observing speeches made from Richard Nixon through Donald Trump, patterns of vilification of such out-group members and emphasis of the threat they posed to the in-group can be analyzed. In this, I anticipate these speeches will demonstrate support for the claim that presidents vilified specific Americans in the War on Drugs and were thus able to consolidate electoral support for punitive policies. Having articulated the historical premise of the War on Drugs as it fits with the theoretical frameworks of this research paper, the next section will perform a similar exploration of the War on Terror and its consequences for Muslim Americans and Americans from the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the world who shared the discriminatory social and political repercussions of the War on Terror, contextualized in the broader historical patterns of post-9/11 American and global history.
The attacks of September 11 presented an unprecedented scenario for the United States: the infliction of a direct attack upon American soil, killing thousands in the deadliest terrorist event in American history (Enders and Sandler 2005). In this, a non-state actor used systematic violence to cause panic and submission in a target nation and its government. Launching both a rhetorical and literal form of war (Roberts 2005), many historians reflect that President Bush’s “State of the Union” address recognized how much American political culture and values had changed, as a turning point in American history for domestic security, discourse on international crime, and the conception of American national identity (Enders and Sandler 2005). The attacks also demonstrated that weapons of mass destruction were not necessary for terrorist success, highlighted the vulnerability of Americans to acts of terror, and generated a culture of fear and anxiety that would support a massive network of vigilance in industrialized countries.

By September 13, 2001, the White House released public statements regarding the culpability of Osama Bin Laden, followed by an authorization the following day by Congress for President Bush to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons” (Grimmett 2006).

Before the end of September, the Justice Department permitted the government to detain non-citizens suspected of terrorism indefinitely, while granting the president permission to try these prisoners in “military commissions of his creation” (Pushaw 2006, 1005). In this, “enemy combatant” status was developed, allowing American military authorities to continue indefinite
detainment of suspected terrorists without charge before trial in a military tribunal, denying many of the rights guaranteed to prisoners of war by the Geneva Convention and other international law (Danner 2007). These foundational decisions created the reasoning through which Bush would authorize the establishment of detention camps, including Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, greatly expanding the power of the executive in military powers and limiting the power of judicial review in wartime (Pushaw 2006). Despite pushback from the international legal arena, the shouts for the elimination of terrorism and outcry over the horrors of the attacks of 9/11 drowned out these criticisms (Danner 2007). Following this, Bush announced a new cabinet-level Office of Homeland Security, receiving widespread, public international support (Pushaw 2006).

By early October, with Congress’s authorization, Bush commenced the first bombings of Afghanistan, with air strikes against networks of al Qaeda and the Taliban regime within Afghanistan who the Bush administration accused of aiding and abetting terror (Danner 2007). With the aim of dismantling al Qaeda and removing the Taliban regime from power after their failure to close down terrorist bases and hand over terrorist suspects, the Bush administration drove the Taliban from power by mid-December (Danner 2007).

Simultaneously, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, or the USA PATRIOT Act, was passed, permitting the American government without warrant to listen to phone calls, read emails, access medical and financial records, and detain suspicious individuals without legal representation (Whitehead and Aden 2002). By this time, 1,182 individuals had been placed in secret custody in 2001, almost all of whom were from the Middle East or South Asia; without any form of due process,
the international network of the American criminal justice had begun its expansion to pursue terrorism (Pushaw 2006).

In December, the American Army confirmed its efforts to create anthrax weapons and other tools of biological warfare, followed by Bush first coining his “axis of evil” description of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, expanding the scope of the War on Terror beyond Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the Taliban (Suskind 2006). The conversation led by the Bush administration made the case for Iraq as a terrorist threat, connecting Saddam Hussein to al Qaeda (Whitehead and Aden 2002). In testifying before the Senate Budget Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell confirmed the goal of regime change in Iraq in the midst of the War on Terror; days later, CIA Director George Tenet highlighted links between Iraq and al Qaeda, the group responsible for the attacks of 9/11 (Zarefsky 2007). In the same week, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared possession of evidence of the looming prospect of future suicide bombings and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and leadership in Iraq and Afghanistan (Pushaw 2006).

In August, Rumsfeld cited intelligence reports declaring that Iraq was aiding and hiding an al Qaeda presence within its borders, and continued to bolster the claim of Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction (Zarefsky 2007). By September of 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney publicly declared possession of evidence that Saddam Hussein was seeking to create nuclear weaponry that he could not release to the public, lending clout to the “Bush Doctrine,” a military policy founded upon preemption of attacking terrorist threats before they might take action against the United States. A month later, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing Bush to use military power against Iraq (Monten 2005). Most of the intelligence disclosed by
senior officials in these critical few weeks would later be proven to have been misleading or false (Zarefsky 2007).

Following this, what came to be known as the “Torture Memos” were released, advising the CIA, the president, and other important actors on enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, binding in positions of pain, and mental and physical torment that violated several international accords on torture (Suskind 2006). Accompanying these international efforts, on the domestic front, the Department of Homeland Security was created, bringing almost 200,000 employees under its umbrella from the Coast Guard, Customs Service, and other branches, concerned with protecting domestic security primarily against terrorist threats (Monte 2005).

The Special Registration program was also initiated, requiring non-immigrant men of ages 16 and older from countries with large Muslims populations to report to local immigration offices – of the tens of thousands who registered, not one man would be charged with terrorist activities (Cainkar 2004). And yet, despite their lack of terrorist activity, 2,000 of these men were eventually deported as a result of this registration, lacking any kind of criminal record. Following, the Immigration and Naturalization Service launched an initiative to track down 6,000 men from Middle Eastern countries who were non-citizens, who had not been deported; in June of 2002, the Department of Justice released an internal memo to seek out all Yemenis traveling in the United States, removing them from planes and forcing them through additional screenings and security clearance (Cainkar 2004). In this, domestic policy also reflected a targeting of members of the broadly homogenized Middle Eastern and South Asian community with unproductive, ineffective, and discriminatory efforts (Cainkar 2004).
Hundreds of incidents of bias and discrimination against people of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Muslim descent and faith followed in the days and weeks after 9/11 in the United States, accompanying these policy and legislative efforts (Elver 2012). In accord, in 2017, the FBI Hate Crime Reports documented an anti-Muslim bias increase of 1600% since the attacks of 9/11, complete with employment discrimination; despite a Department of Justice report issued on racial profiling, the practice persists (Considine 2017). The “Watch” and “No Fly” lists that followed echo this racial profiling, with certain marked individuals from the Terrorist Screening Database unable to board planes and others required to undergo additional screening, a practice accused of discrimination as well (Cainkar 2004).

Mere months after publicizing Saddam Hussein’s acquiring of uranium, a coalition of the United States, Britain, Australia, and Poland officially invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, continuing airstrikes in Baghdad (Cainkar 2004). By December of 2003, Saddam Hussein was captured, though the conflict’s end was nowhere near. Though Bush declared that major combat operations in the United States were ending in May of 2003, this end would be only a temporary lessening of a presence in Iraq and the war would wage on.

In April of 2004, pushback to the War in Iraq came after the publishing of sexual and physical torture at the detention center in Abu Ghraib, followed by a resignation of acting CIA Director George Tenet (Hersh 2004). Photos replete with naked “enemy combatants” provided evidence of torture of Iraqis by American soldiers and were shared by every major news outlet, bringing mass waves of criticism against the Bush administration (Hersh 2004). This publishing, among other criticisms of the torture practices of the Bush administration, would bring the War on Terror under further international scrutiny – and yet, forces would still not withdraw from the Middle East in the remaining years of Bush’s presidency.
With Obama taking office in 2009, despite Bush’s promise that all American forces would be out of Iraq by 2011, nearly 40,000 more troops were sent to Afghanistan with a push to attack the Taliban and al Qaeda, supplementing an additional $60 billion to Bush’s own budget (McCrisken 2011). Failing to plan for post-invasion governments in either state, unrest, violence, and turmoil erupted across the Middle East, as did a renewed anti-American insurgency, in part reasoning for why the administrations to follow would remain and increase their presence there (McCrisken 2011). After the capture and execution of Osama bin Laden in May of 2011, Obama would then begin partially withdrawing troops from Afghanistan and Iraq in 2013; before full withdrawal was completed, Obama ordered troops to return to Iraq to combat the Islamic State, with similar missions sent to Afghanistan and Syria (McCrisken 2011). At the same time, attacks in San Bernardino, Orlando, and Chattanooga continued to stoke fear of terrorism within the bounds of the United States, with Americans prioritizing terrorism as a policy concern as highly as in polls conducted directly following the attacks of September 11 (Dombroski and Reich 2018).

As directed by successor Donald Trump, with ISIL continuing to grow in insurgency, the United States dropped the largest non-nuclear bomb ever used in American history, targeting the networks of ISIL in tunnels built in Afghanistan and killing almost 100 ISIL fighters (Dombrowski and Reich 2018). President Trump cleared the way for thousands of troops to be deployed to Afghanistan in his first formal address to the United States, requesting an additional $24.9 billion for the Department of Defense in 2017. This trend of increased budgetary allocation to the army continued under Trump to combat terrorism, with an expansion of the Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marines, as well as a pledged Space Force, with a budget of $126.8 billion (Dombroski and Reich 2018).
The War on Terror has had massive costs in human life, political unrest, and financial burden. In Iraq and Afghanistan, estimates placed the civilian death toll as high as 210,000 in March of 2015, with homes destroyed, livelihoods ruined, and families killed by bombs, drones, and gunfire, premised on evidence from the Bush administration that would later be discredited (Fischer 2014). Between 2002 and 2004, the budget for the Department of Homeland Security nearly doubled (Enders and Sandler 2005). The U.S. debt went from $6.4 trillion in March of 2003 to $10 trillion in 2008, largely due to the War on Terror (Dombroski and Reich 2018). In its wake, the vacuum of power created by American intervention and regime change in part gave rise to a new wave of terrorist insurgency of continued violence by ISIL (Dombroski and Reich 2018).

The homogenization of blame placed on Middle Easterners, South Asians, Arabs, and Muslims for the attacks of 9/11 allowed for American political violence to be exercised against these groups blindly, with the support of the American public (Welch 2006). In the War on Terror, the power of creating this homogenized out-group has manifested in increased rates of Islamophobia and hate crimes against Muslims in the United States; an invasion, occupation, and regime change that has resulted in the creation of a new terrorist insurgency and hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths, premised on misinformation and misguidance from American leadership; domestic American policies founded upon discrimination by ethnicity and religion; and a severe limitation of civil liberties at home and abroad (Ser 2016). The spread of hostility and hatred against these groups has included increases in murder, assault, arson, attacks on mosques, shootings, and threats against individuals of these identities: indeed, “This violence was directed at people solely because they shared or were perceived as sharing the national
background or religion of the [9/11] hijackers and al Qaeda members deemed responsible for attacking the World Trade Center and the Pentagon” (Welch 2006).

In this, the Human Rights Watch cited more than 2,000 September 11-related backlash incidents in 2001, and the Council on American-Islamic Relations reported 1,717 incidents of backlash discrimination against Muslims in the United States between September 11, 2001 and February of 2002 (Welch 2006). Places of worship became targets of hate crimes, with more than 100 attacks taking place in the first week following September 11 (Welch 2006); with policies like stop-and-frisk, the labeling of mosques as terrorist entities by the NYPD, and the number of hate groups increasing by 70% since 9/11, the hatred and fear of the era percolated into daily experiences of American life (Welch 2006).

In this same vein of patriotic zeal and panic, the extent to which American civil liberties and the human rights of global citizens protected by international law have been violated by the War on Terror speaks to the permission granted to governments when the public perceives threat. The PATRIOT Act created a massive network of surveillance that denied the necessity of warrants or informing the public about their rights to privacy, and the Special Registration program similarly limited civil liberties for groups identified as vulnerable to terrorist sentiments (Lewis 2004). The status of “enemy combatants,” the use of enhanced interrogation, the creation of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, and other violations of international law and the standards of justice within the United States demonstrate similar impingements on the rights of those detained (Lewis 2004).

The use of military tribunals violated American norms of due process (Lewis 2004), violating the Geneva Conventions, the United Nations Convention Against Torture, and the uniform Code of Military Justice, placing American actions outside of the scope of legal
recourse to curb terrorism. In the same vein, the torture exercised in Abu Ghraib, wrongful and indefinite detention of suspected terrorists, and the mistreatment of detainees suggests a wrongful expansion of the judiciary beyond what international and domestic law suggests is possible (Welch 2006). These policies demonstrate patterns of prejudice, discrimination, and a privileging of the safety of the majority at the risk of harm of the minority. The power of fear and anxiety in times of threat is manifested directly in the policy outcomes of the War on Terror and its continuation, as well as in the social experiences of those decidedly assigned to the out-group. As led – and misled – by presidents and their administrations, these decades of panic continue, as does support for policies based in militarism, surveillance, and security.

Again, as demonstrated in the historical analysis of the War on Drugs, the policy outcomes of the War on Terror that resulted in the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives in the Middle East, as well as the wrongful detainment of innocent men, the deportation of others, and the extension of the judiciary in ways that violated international and domestic justice, comprise an important basis for study. By highlighting the threat posed by terror and the constancy of danger posed by terrorists to the in-group, the same rhetorical devices may be observed across the War on Drugs and the War on Terror to ostracize and blame a homogenized group of choice. With these backgrounds explained, my next section will delineate where past research has documented the use of fear and panic in political communication strategies to consolidate power in authority; I will also highlight the current chasms in such research as they pertain to both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, emphasizing the salience of this research project.
Existing Literature and its Limitations

The overlaps between the War on Drugs and the War on Terror in speaking to their histories, their psychologies based in fear and anxiety, and their negative consequences for out-group members founded upon racial, religious, and ethnic differences merit further conversation. Though the content of the wars themselves is very different, the broader framework, political psychology, and judicial, social, and policy outcomes of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror bear significant and meaningful similarities. In both wars, leadership garnered support through a calculated, deliberate, and intentional use of law, order, and fear to draw in voters, done to isolate, identify, and attack enemies. Utilizing this strategy, presidential leadership was able to consolidate power to combat these enemies – positioning themselves as ideological exploiters on the side of the “Good American” (Falco 1996).

Likewise, leaders in each time period have aided in isolating a homogenized out-group by promoting generalizations made about the immorality, omnipresence, and threat of the scapegoated groups. As a consequence, many members of these groups have seen the American criminal justice system limit their civil liberties, rights to due process, and rights to a fair trial (Hawdon 2001; Nunn 2002; Rothe and Muzzatti 2004). In both cases, out-groups have been the subjects of discriminatory policies, including disproportionately targeting drug users in communities of lower income status and communities of color, as well as utilizing Special Registration acts that required non-citizens to register with the American government who, innocent of terrorism, were then deported.

In both cases, the creation of this state of fear aided presidents and presidential candidates in consolidating a political culture steeped in anxiety, threat, panic, and fear (Cohen 2014, 9). In the circumstances of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, the creation and manipulation of
intensified, perceived threats despite contradicting, corroborated information permitted the
presidencies of each time period to pursue their desired agenda. Examples include the National
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse’s suggestions for decriminalization of marijuana
which would be discarded, as well as the Bush administration’s suggestion of connections
between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda that were never proven (Wilson 2005; Roberts 2003;
Alexander 2012).

In this, the War on Terror had negative implications in hate crimes and discriminatory
policies against people of Muslim faith and of Middle Eastern descent, including arson, murder,
vandalism, and targeting of mosques (Welch 2006). Likewise, in the War on Drugs, people of
color from lower income communities have been targeted by the American criminal justice
system, with dramatically increasing rates of incarceration from the 1970’s onward (Nunn 2002).
In each case, the American government permitted searches of such individuals without warrant,
indefinite detainment, and ensured life-long systems of a mass imprisonment complex. Here,
out-groups have been characterized by bigoted language and media, reflected in the views of the
American public (Welch 2006).

This is not to say that organized, violent crime relating to drug use nor the presence of
terrorism were meritless threats: rather, that their presentation by presidential leadership was
misleading or falsified, reliant on fear and sustained perception of crisis as persuasive tools of an
anxious public. In both time periods, leadership misled the American public with exaggerations
of the extent to which drugs were being used in the United States, as well as wholly fabricated
evidence presented to the American public justifying an invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan
(“Illegal Drugs”; Oliphant 2018). Bolstered by fear, patterns of out-group threat in presidential
speechmaking provided justification for policies based in punishment, surveillance, and militarism.

Scholars have conducted important and similar research into the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, and the roles played by media and the speeches of elected officials in each. Bonn and his co-authors conducted a thorough investigation of presidential State of the Union addresses to assess for changes in tone following 9/11 (2011); others have focused on the content and frequency of media coverage following 9/11, and how that translated into largely positive coverage of the War in Iraq (Rothe and Muzzatti 2004).

Similarly, authors have delved into the speech-making of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush in the War on Drugs based in a lens of fear (Hawdon 2001), the power of moral panics broadly in criminalizing black drug users in tandem with organized crime (Nunn 2002), and the general trends of fear-mongering that have enabled mass incarceration to so disproportionately impact men of color in American history (Whitford and Yates 2003). In this, both media and presidential speeches have been analyzed in each case study.

In research on the overlap of the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, much has been done in the realm of unpacking the relationship between terrorism and international narcotics dealings in policymaking, criminal justice, and other subject areas (Bjornehed 2004; Kenney 2003). However, in studying their overlap, no scholarship documents any comparison broadly between the War on Terror and the War on Drugs as comparable but separate series of cultural and policy changes embedded in phenomena of fear, nor any comparison of presidential speech patterns or media in either era.

There also is no comprehensive study that compares the psychology of panic, anxiety, or threat in each era nor their outcomes for specific racial or religious minorities in the United
States and abroad. From the similarities in individual studies of each time period, I find important theoretical bases for applying the lenses of social identity theory, intergroup relations, political psychological tools of anxiety, fear, and threat, and the moral panic framework to both events, and observing how these patterns manifested themselves in the speechmaking of both time periods.

This chasm in the literature for comparison and historical analysis of each time period provides an opportunity to analyze for similarities and differences in each. Likewise, the mechanisms by which each time period was able to define and characterize specific out-groups should share similarities in their description and frequency in presidential speeches. The structural utilization of fear in the presidency in each case study allows for a meaningful comparison of the psychological drives for social control, security, and isolation of righteous Americans in both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs. And, through such comparisons, possible generalizations about fear, anxiety, and threat in speech and the power of ostracizing and scapegoating out-groups, compounded with the unification of an in-group, may generate a framework through which to evaluate similar crises. Prior to analyzing the specific communication materials of each time period, the next section introduces my first theoretical lens through which to understand how an out-group is created in political discourse, as well as how an in-group and its identification can be intensified to gain public opinion support for specific policy aims. From here, I will articulate the policy and behavioral consequences that result from such social distancing between groups.
Social Identity Theory: Enemies in the Out-Group and “Good Americans” in the In-Group

In comparing the psychological drives and rhetorical utility of the presidential speeches made in the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, one of the factors that plays a substantial role is fear and threat of the out-group, or a group to which one does not belong, and the ability to blame and scapegoat a homogenized and generalized understanding of that group (Tajfel and Turner 1979).

In the history of social identity theory, isolating an out-group has taken the form of majoritarian parties, majority races, law enforcement officials, and other dominant social forces rhetorically and ideologically isolating and blaming groups for social ills and issues, including the American debate on homosexuality (Fejes 2016), the decriminalization debate regarding sex work (Weitzer 2007), school shootings (Killingbeck 2001), and youth violence in lower income communities of color (Welch et al. 2002). This kind of language by people in power, targeted at the actions of a specific group, has important consequences for changes in societal values, policy norms and expectations, and for the expansion of the powers of the authority responsible for bringing attention to the object of panic (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2010).

Social identification speaks to the perception of oneness with one’s identifying group of people, stemming from categorizations of individuals (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Here, the in-group is defined as that with which an individual shares a salient and meaningful identity, be it race, religion, national identity, sexual orientation, geography, etc.; conversely, out-groups are comprised of those individuals who do not belong to the in-group, with whom an individual does not identify due to saliently different characteristics (Ashforth and Mael 1989, 20). In intergroup interactions, group members with higher levels of social identification with their in-group demonstrate favoritism for members of their own group, accompanied by higher levels of
disapproval for individual members of out-groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and higher levels of hostility toward the out-group as a whole (Levinson 1949). This trend demonstrates negative treatment of those in the out-group as individual identification with the in-group increases (Duckitt 1989).

In-group favoritism and out-group hostility frequently manifest themselves in negative behavior or limited acceptance of those who do not belong to one’s in-group when speaking to material benefits and social cooperation (Scheepers et al. 2002). Social psychology research has shown a generally strong innate degree of preference for inequality among social groups when competing for finite resources, material advantage, and other factors; as such, those with higher levels of involvement in social and political groupings (including levels of nationalism and patriotism, etc.) have higher levels of support for differentiation in hierarchies, causing negative implications for intergroup relations in policy relating to civil rights and social welfare support (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle 1994).

As identification with the in-group increases, the perceived difference between oneself and the out-group also increases, and can provoke negative intergroup responses on the part of the in-group, including support for discriminatory policies, interpersonal interactions defined by prejudice and discrimination, and other behaviors (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Giles and Johnson 1981). Likewise, the presence of threat causing panic or fear intensifies the in-group extremity effect, or positive perceptions of one’s own group; this in turn creates a cycle of depressing perceptions of the out-group with increasing levels of panic, fear, and anxiety (Branscombe et al. 1993). This effect is intensified when a threat is perceived to be directly caused by a specific out-group.
Similarly, social categorization into groups is a sufficient condition to generating negative stereotypes and increasing support for punitive policies against an out-group, the likes of which are precursors for prejudice and discriminatory behaviors (Tajfel and Billig 1974). Intergroup difference, made salient through rhetoric and propaganda, enables individuals to more easily homogenize and vilify the Other, dehumanizing the out-group and desensitizing members of the in-group to negative experiences of the out-group (Allport et al. 1954). Indeed, the greater the perceived difference between groups based on any particular custom, detail of physical appearance, perceived values, or ideological positioning, the greater the perception of these intergroup differences and aggravation of the negative effects of intergroup differences on stereotypes, out-group hostility, and other measures (Allport et al. 1954).

These intensified perceptions of out-group difference can cause high levels of perceived threat from the out-group by the in-group. Riezler’s notion of collective insecurity, or fear of the out-group held amongst members of the in-group, has been associated with high levels of intolerance and desire to seek extreme measures to protect the in-group (Riezler 1960, 154). The presence and increasing power of the out-group promotes identification with the in-group, and increases the negative behavioral consequences associated with higher levels of in-group identification (Greenberg et al. 1992). Increased perceived threat of the out-group has been shown to increase support for retaliation against the culpable group, and anxiety has been shown to increase support for action against the out-group such as militarism, surveillance, restriction of out-group member participation, and incarceration (Huddy et al. 2005).

The study of in-group and out-group dynamics and their relationships to threat, fear, anxiety, and prejudice have been studied at length, producing another field of study called threat theory, consisting of four types of threats: realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety,
and negative stereotypes, all of which bode for negative intergroup relationships and low approval ratings of out-groups when perceived threat is high (Stephan and Stephan 2013, 25). Emotional consequences of intensified threat and intergroup anxiety can cause hatred, disdain, disliking, and disapproval of out-groups, with similar effects to in-group favoritism (Levine and Campbell 1972). The study of social identification and threat theory as posed by the out-group melds with the potency of panic and anxiety as motivators of political attitudes and support for specific types of policymaking (Tajfel and Turner 1979).

Here, the potency of fear, anxiety, and threat in policymaking and psychology in the general public can have grave consequences for out-group members: in the case studies of the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, racial and religious minorities stereotyped into the scapegoated population were vulnerable to these patterns of out-group hostility and their repercussions in policy and behavior. And while the existence of an out-group is present throughout human history, the emphasis of political and social leadership on the threat of these out-groups is one of many possible tools used to divide a society. This mechanism allows public officials to gain support for policies that punish, ostracize, and incarcerate populations of out-group members. Such rhetoric has psychological and policy-oriented potency that finds resonance in both the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, and constitutes an important element of study in the presidential speeches analyzed in this research project. As such, the next section will outline the existing literature on fear, anxiety, and threat in political communication, and how such emotional codes can influence the views and stances of the electorate.
Fear, Anxiety, and Threat Theory in Public Opinion, Political Participation, and Electoral Decision-Making

Here, presidential speechmaking becomes a pivotal factor in creating and managing time periods characterized by anxiety and fear. The process of making salient these emotional cues allows for the elevation of an issue to a primary policy concern and the persuasion of the general public to dichotomize the issue into a battle of good and evil (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2010). Perceived threat of the out-group, fear, and anxiety in the in-group have strong ties to support for militarism, increased surveillance, and retaliation against the out-group; as such, presidential stoking of fear and panic resulting in public prioritization of the crisis generates support for more punitive policies that restrict civil liberties – especially for out-group members (Berinsky 2009; Davis 2007).

These factors are some of the most powerful emotional, social, and psychological tools at the disposal of a public political figure, generating desire to eradicate threat out of fear and anxiety and increasing rates of trust in public officials positioned in opposition to the out-group (McRobbie and Thornton 1995). One of the tools of fear in speechmaking is the ability to strengthen the cohesion of the identity of the righteous in-group, conducive for total polarization and maximum social distance from the out-group and policies that reflect this distance (Hildreth et al. 2016). In studies on the power of emotional cues in presidential speechmaking and political campaigns, presidential rhetoric has been integral to influencing the beliefs and values of Americans. Using fear in presidential speechmaking has been shown to send emotional cues when citizens cannot otherwise receive information about the verity of a threat, and can thus be convinced to support policies they might not in other conditions (Lupia and Menning 2009).
Broadly, studies of fear, panic, anxiety, and threat have substantive overlap in the political sphere. Anxiety has been demonstrated to trigger engagement and increase attention to political information, on topics ranging from public health threats, to immigration, to terrorism (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Anxiety and panic in the general public are often powerful precursors for public support for increased protective measures, as well as higher levels of trust in politicians and policies that represent a greater commitment to increasing security, even at the cost of civil liberties (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Anxiety, then, is seen as a result of perceived threat (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), as is fear (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Pyszczynski 2004). Anxiety and panic also are associated with higher levels of possibility for persuasion by elites, two psychological trends that increase the ability of elites to serve as effective opinion leaders (Lerner and Keltner 2001).

Likewise, citizens who feel threatened by terrorism and crime are more supportive of civil liberties restrictions in the name of safety and security (Berinsky 2009; Davis 2007). Fear of violence and threat have been demonstrated to increase support for stronger punishment of criminals (Page and Shapiro 2010). Across the literature, political elites play a significant role in connecting public anxiety resulting from threat to proposed solutions for combating the threat, utilizing increased levels of trust in government, fear and panic about possible insecurity, and other emotional cues as tools to present their policy platforms as effective and protective (Albertson and Gadarian 2015). Broadly, there are stronger responses to messaging when audiences feel an emotional drive regarding a public policy issue (Roser and Thompson 1995), as emotion often precedes cognitive understandings of events and political issues (Lerner and Keltner 2001).
As Loseke argues in his analysis of the power of fear in presidential speechmaking, emotional appeals can effectively target mass audiences otherwise classified by heterogeneity (2009). Emotional codes comprise what he calls an emotional culture, or a set of norms and rules as to which emotions are appropriate to exhibit and experience where and when, as well as what individuals may feel comfortable sharing outwardly versus what individuals must internalize, including anxiety, fear, and panic (Loseke 2009, 492).

When individuals are informed by the same media, hear the same speeches, and are appealed to utilizing the same emotional cues, the construction of an emotional culture can be formed among listening individuals, even those who have otherwise cross-cutting identities (Johnson 2002). Indeed, part of what makes the study of presidential speechmaking in the politics of emotion so salient is the construction of such emotional cultures in speech and how they influence public opinion and political participation (Loseke and Kusebach 2008). Despite the heterogeneity of the audience and the complicated nature of the culture in which the president resides in American history, this set of emotional cultural cues can produce resources for social actors to utilize and transform how people understand cultural meanings, and can help to further consolidate the strength of in-group identification in invested listeners through shared sentiments of fear and anxiety (Loseke 2009, 501). They also serve as powerful emotional unifiers that play on cues of patriotism and national identity in times of crisis, creating a cohesive in-group beneath the umbrella identification of nationalism (Loseke and Kusenbach 2008).

These emotional cues of anxiety and panic in the speeches of the presidency have been shown to have direct participatory, behavioral, and public opinion consequences, including changes in policy prioritization, voting preference, and support for leaders’ policies in times of crisis (Altheide 2004; Landau et al. 2004; Higgs 2006). This has included everything from
support for enhanced interrogation (Landau et al. 2004), to support for increasing punitive policies in the judiciary (Altheide 2004), to other broad changes in policy, budget, and size of the bureaucracy (Higgs 2006). These cues of threat, fear, and panic make the study of the use of such cues of emotion in presidential speechmaking especially important for study. Additionally, as the next section suggests, this specific power of leadership in opinion generation and emotional cultivation helps to not only decide the emotional responses of the public receiving these cues, but helps to generate affectively charged views in a public that frequently does not have the resources to adequately and accurately corroborate views independent of political leadership.
In studies of both the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, discussions of the media and speechmakers’ use of fear and panic incitation arise as tangible means of documenting changes in rhetoric and news coverage that structured and influenced each (Nunn 2002; Kramer and Michalowski 2005). Historically, leaders who publicize and guide such moments of crisis gain support for these more punitive and aggressive policy measures if trends of public anxiety continue to intensify. This cyclical process allows for further consolidation of power in the hands of the exploiter and his allies in power, creating solidification of the debate as well as intense polarization on the two sides of the argument (Cohen 2014, 171).

As Clarke and Chess explore in their piece in 2008, the politics of fear are often generated by elites, who stir panic to accomplish specific political ends, an output of fear-focused presidential speechmaking (Clarke and Chess 2008). Broadly, the importance of fear as an emotional appeal in communication cannot be understated: for presidents at war, fear-based rhetoric has been utilized to convince citizens of total necessity of war (Moerk and Pincus 2000), encouraging national pride and patriotism (Bostdorff 2003; Murphy 2003), highlighting victory (Burkett 2005), generating anger, fear, and anxiety towards an enemy (Burkett 2005), and other efforts that rhetorically isolate the needs of war from a moral perspective (Coles 2002). Whether real or not, exaggerated or precise, the characterization of an enemy and threat benefits presidents in speech for stirring up the drums of war using public fear and anxiety (Moerk and Pincus 2000).

In this, the speechmaker is enabled to exploit the identity of the out-group in times of crisis and panic in order to suit his ideology, empowering leadership to shape the policy discussion regarding the crisis (Mackey-Kallis and Hahn 2009). The deliverer benefits from this
molding of fear as a means of earning the political trust of the listener, directing the public to have faith in authority to ensure that the moral deviancy is vanquished (Chen 2014, 38).

Total polarization serves to separate deviants even further from the norms of society, allowing law enforcement or military force to be mobilized as agents of control against out-groups and scapegoats in time of crisis (Hawdon 2001). Such polarization and social distance also grants widespread permission to governments and other authorities to do what they see necessary to right whatever wrong or combat whatever group is the cause of the crisis (Chen 2014). With policy rhetoric as an important factor in shaping cultural understandings and dialogue surrounding electoral issues, presidents can utilize proactive and reactive policy statements to sustain this anxiety and fear, with proactive policies equipped with decisive plans to eradicate future deviance, and reactive policies equipped to punish the blamed out-group (Hawdon 2001, 432).

Thus, the singularity of morality in times of crisis bestowed upon the speaker and his allies serves the presidency effectively. In this, presidents are able to serve as moral leaders, framing any kind of group as deviants from the righteous national or global order, and unifying themselves with those citizens victimized by the deviance at the center of a time of crisis, who are in turn supporters of policy and invested voters in the electorate (Chen 2014). This salient idea of the power of leadership in structuring the emotional and policy views of a polity finds further resonance in the moral empowerment of leadership in speaking to the public, bolstering their isolation of the out-group and the policies that result from these efforts. In this, the succeeding section will introduce what is known as moral panic theory, a sociological framework that applies neatly to political eras of panic and anxiety, focusing on the use of these
emotions by elites to engineer feelings of threat and fear. In this, these emotions help to cultivate support for specific policies against out-group members.
Moral Panic Framework

Another foundational framework in which this comparison is set is that of the moral panic, a sociological framework created in the 1970’s as a tool for analysis of the musical counterculture in the United Kingdom; since its inception, the gamut of time periods, events, and political movements that have fallen under this term of study range from anything from same-sex marriage, to child pornography, to violence in videogames (Cohen 2014). This phrase coined by Stanley Cohen, moral panic, describes a societal wave of fear and paranoia spread among a population of people regarding a present social ill, whether real, exaggerated, or invented, that threatens that population of innocent people (Cohen 2014, 12). Indeed, moral panics need not be formed in response to invented threats necessarily; however, the presentation of the severity, omniscience, and insecurity of the threat is at least misleading and founded upon specific social, political, and cultural goals of those actors who have created the atmosphere of crisis and publicize it (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994).

Moral panics often arise in governmental and social language with the emergence of a new issue that deviates from dominant values, especially working-class values of conservation, preservation, security, and defense. However, as Cohen explains, the term does not focus so much on ideological differences. Instead, “The focus here is on how society labels rule-breakers as belonging to certain deviant groups and how, once the person is thus typecast, his acts are interpreted in terms of the status to which he has been assigned” (12). Again, this kind of labeling has dramatic social and political repercussions for members of the out-group in question, especially when such characterizations are rooted in fear.

In this, those who represent the norms of society, its values, and its interests, can create or guide the formation of a panic around an object of deviancy, or folk devils, and use this panic,
fear, and anxiety to realize specific policy goals, nostalgic cultural changes, and the ascription of certain negative attributes and blame for social ills on the *folk devil* (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2010). As Goode and Ben-Yehuda define it, *folk devils* are these groups who are portrayed as deviant outsiders, blamed for specific crimes and social ills of a specific time period, receiving scapegoating rhetoric and policy decisions that permit the intensification of a *moral panic* (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2010). Leadership may attach specific images and characterizations to this *folk devil* – meaning, an out-group responsible for the deviation – and a notion of deliberate intent of that group of people in their wrongdoing. In speaking to past *folk devils* in this arena of study, again, queer individuals, low income children in areas of high youth violence, women of color in the welfare system, and sex traffickers have all been specific groups of study as targeted *folk devils* blamed for cultural changes and social unrest (Cohen 2014). Across these varied groups, the common traits of constancy of threat, omnipresence, and capacity for immoral actions against the safety and well-being of the in-group unify them in characterization by leadership (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2010).

This kind of language allows for a homogenization of all possibly involved parties as equally and fully culpable for the wrongs in question, a simplification that can have grave consequences for those who are associated with the out-group without sharing actual responsibility for the actions committed by some individuals therein. This simplification can take the forms of entire races, political parties, and individuals with any shared characteristic being culturally blamed for a social ill for which they are not personally responsible (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2010). Here, the *folk devil’s* behaviors are recognized as an intentional moral failing of a specific group of people, absolving innocent members of society of responsibility for the problem, and allowing communitarian arguments to glorify the innocent in-group. This permits
the depth and gravity of the problem to be overblown and reactionary measures to be taken for their defense (Hawdon 2001, 427).

In their pieces on Stanley Cohen’s initial moral panic framework, Goode and Ben-Yehuda further delineated the process by which a moral panic is created and intensifies into a societally known phenomenon: as they articulate, “…sides are chosen, speeches are delivered, enemies are named, and atrocities are alleged” (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2010, 7). The authors point to the agents that are responsible for informing and structuring moral panics as one of the most critical areas of study: the press, politicians, the public, and law enforcement. In this, the press structures the information that the public knows about the phenomenon and makes agenda-setting decisions that shape the surrounding discourse; politicians make performative speeches and propose policies that help to shape understandings of the crisis, its culprits, and the punitive and legal measures necessary to remedy the crisis; the public must participate in order for a moral panic to occur at all; and law enforcement must present the danger as an exigent and current threat, and validate it through stronger enforcement mechanisms (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2010, 9). As they highlight, “Sentiment necessitates a vehicle to elevate a latent fear or concern into widespread, mutual awareness; the feelings of scattered, isolated individuals must be given an appropriate expression. This vehicle may take the form of mass media, political speeches, action groups, and so on” (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994, 163).

With these actors working in tandem and utilizing these public means of discussion, a moral panic can elevate an issue to a central concern of an age, done through a gradual process of escalation, in which officials in positions of power intensify agenda-setting efforts to ensure the issue becomes and remains a prominent concern in popular discourse (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2010, 28). In this, they ask seemingly upstanding, morally righteous members of the
public to align against the folk devil, to take community-based action themselves, and to support the officials revealing the gravity of the situation to the public in their efforts to change it (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2010, 30).

This escalation historically influences public opinion in ways that allow these officials to broaden law enforcement capabilities, increase the intensity of the judiciary, justify punitive and overly aggressive actions, and validate any and all behaviors on the basis of threat and the vulnerability of society. In many cases, this specifically takes the form of limitations of civil liberties of the out-group, invasions of privacy on behalf of a moral panic and the security of the majority, and incarceration and punishment expanding in the afflicted society (Cohen 2014). These simultaneous processes contribute to the prioritization of the issue of the moral panic as a top safety concern, reflected in public polling, voting behavior, and activism to follow, and intensifying emotional cues for fear, panic, and perception of threat (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994).

Through this legitimizing process, the opportunity to deploy control agents is created, with public support having been brought into the fold of dichotomizing good and evil, creating a side worthy of salvation. These control agents, then, in the police and the courts, are prepared to create a societal control culture, or a new set of values, beliefs, and tools to fight the deviance. This culture enables interested actors to punish the deviance further and with any means necessary (Cohen 2014, 78). From here, the potential for institutionalizing the moral panic becomes possible, resulting in law, legislation, social movements, action groups, and other means to punish and ostracize the folk devil and their behavior as scapegoats (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994, 170). Here, the consequences for out-groups can have dire cultural and political
outcomes resulting in discrimination, militarism, and incarceration, including those groups
targeted in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror.

In the next section, I will tie together the frameworks of social identity theory in looking
at in-groups and out-groups and the *moral panic*. I will do this to sustain further justification for
the analysis of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror for these patterns in speechmaking,
policy outcomes, and social consequences for out-groups, impacted in each time period by
incarceration, wrongful detainment, loss of life, and general consequences based in prejudice and
discrimination.
Folk Devils and Good Americans: Out-Groups and In-Groups by Another Name

In the moral panic framework, the folk devil achieves out-group status simply by another name, and embodies these trends in political psychology and sociology that have historically divided societies in dangerous ways. Intergroup anxiety, perceived out-group threat, discrimination against the out-group, and strong in-group identification all serve as salient tools that grant leadership increased support in policy, public opinion, and electoral advantage, allowing for total scapegoating of the Other and facilitating laws and reforms that reflect this (Campbell 1967, 823). By encouraging the generalization of perceived out-groups; vilifying groups of people by physical, religious, ethnic, and racial stereotypes; and utilizing fear, threat, and anxiety to encourage these processes, invested actors of the moral panic can unify the side of the righteous in-group in stronger opposition to the out-group. This allows for the support for consolidation of power in moral leadership, the encouragement of electoral loyalty, and the fostering of unwavering support for the unilateral decision-making of leadership (Garland 2002; Welch 2005).

Thus, with high levels of social identification with the in-group and social distance from the out-group, moral panic speechmakers and leaders utilize the power of division and hostility to further their policy goals and to gain support from those aligned with their aims and values: who Loseke aptly calls the “Good American,” or what Tajfel and Turner would consider a highly self-identified member of the in-group (Loseke 2003, 497). In this, leaders and speakers can appeal to the unified American audience brought together against a social ill and its perpetrators, appealing to the “distant spectator” (Boltanski 2009). Despite the diversity of the audience of the “Good American” in presidential speeches, the unifying values and identities of patriotism, nationalism, and ideological positioning serve as in-group identifiers to isolate them against the
*folk devil.* Here, presidents appeal to Americans who accept the presidentially displayed culture of acceptable emotions and set of values, bonded by social identification and unified in collective responses to threat and fear (Boltanski 1999). The utility of constructing the hero and victim, the icon of the in-group, as one half of the binary united against the villain relies on crucial American identities and symbolic codes (Loseke 2003).

As Loseke describes, members of the in-group are defined by a set of coded language requiring cognitive agreement that morally righteous people have been hurt through no failing of their own, but the moral failings of the villain instead, a key component of the *moral panic* framework (Holstein and Miller 1990; Best 1997; Loseke 2003). Utilizing these codes of pride, patriotism, and nationalism, speakers can exacerbate intergroup difference, intergroup anxiety, social distance, and perceived threat. As Loseke articulates:

Finally, victims and villains are binary opposites because, simply stated, victims are good people and villains are bad people. Clearly, the Good American is a moral exemplar and…The enemy is none other than evil. (Loseke 2003, 507)

With fear, anxiety, and threat in his arsenal, the president as leader of the *moral panic* and emblem of the “Good American” is positioned as moral icon, able to call other “Good Americans” to take a stand and save the nation from the *folk devils* responsible for deviance, asking listeners to collaborate in virtue (Loseke 2003; Coles 2002). As Hawdon echoes, “communitarianism, at least in its extreme, emphasizes the group over the individual and argues that the collective has rights independent of, and sometimes opposed to, the rights of individuals…individualism contends that the individual is fundamentally ‘good,’ and the corrupt and dysfunctional group is the source of ‘evil’ ” (425-426). In this, those individuals whose rights oppose those of the collective, occupying space in the “corrupt and dysfunctional group”
are those members of the out-group defined by presidential communications. The emphasis on
the collective in-group and its righteousness places the out-group in a position of evil against the
will of the majority.

Thus, in the cases of the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, the realization of much of
these elements of study in the literature on social identity theory, intergroup relations, threat
type, and moral panics sees realization. In both cases, a threat was perceived to the national
security of the “Good American” and the civilized world, in the form of drug addicts and dealers
tied to violent organized crime and social ills, and terrorists specifically oriented in the Middle
East and the states of Iraq and Afghanistan as violent and omnipotent out-groups (Whitford and
Yates 2003; Enders and Sandler 2005). Tied into this binary opposition of good and evil, the
“Good American” in its heroes and its victims sees manifestation as the in-group, positioned in
total binary to a homogenized and evil out-group (Loseke 2009).

Again, this political and social positioning and opposition permitted several common
social and judicial outcomes in each case. Spearheaded by presidents who led the charges in the
War on Terror and the War on Drugs, a homogenized out-group was blamed with harmful
consequences for each in both cultural and institutional means. For Muslim Americans and
people in the United States from Muslim countries or fitting the profile of Middle Eastern or
South Asian descent, this included a rise in hate crimes, attacks on mosques, discrimination in
the workforce, racial profiling, and Special Registration programs that eventuated in the
deporation of many innocent men (Welch 2006). In the War on Drugs, disproportionate
sentencing for crack and powder cocaine, search without warrant, a targeting of lower income
communities of color, and a system of mass incarceration predicated on keeping Americans in
prison and stuck in the parole and probationary systems for decades – if not permanently – after release had similarly racially and ethnically charged consequences (Nunn 2002).

In speaking to solutions and institutionalized out-group consequences, politicians in each proposed expansion of agencies in the Department of Homeland Security and the Drug Enforcement Agency; likewise, they expanded the power of the judiciary greatly in its ability to punish and detain (Kleiman and Hawdon 2011; Landau et al. 2004). In the War on Terror, this took the form of military tribunals, “enemy combatant status,” Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, enhanced interrogation techniques, and indefinite detention of suspected terrorists, violating norms of international justice and the criminal justice apparatus of the United States (Landau et al. 2004). Similarly, the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan in a unilateral American decision violated norms and institutions of international governance (Zarefsky 2007). In the War on Drugs, this took the form of extreme sentencing in mandatory minimums, the pursuit of drug criminals and dealers with the death penalty, search without warrant, and other violations of the due process expectations of American citizens (Nunn 2002). Civil liberties were drastically restricted in each, with surveillance and monitoring without warrant in the War on Terror under the PATRIOT ACT and indefinite detention without cause of copious suspected terrorists in centers like Guantanamo Bay, as well as the ability to search and seize without evidence in the War on Drugs (Kramer and Michalowski 2005; Musto 1999).

In each, the direction and intensity of fear and anxiety of the time was misguided, based on false information and manipulated by American leadership. In the case of the War on Terror, the invasion of Iraq was predicated on the existence of evidence that was later demonstrated to be fabricated, an invasion based on the presidencies’ stances on Saddam Hussein’s ties to al Qaeda and his possession of weapons of mass destruction which were never proven (Monten...
Such information and persuasion boded for high levels of initial support for the invasion of Iraq, despite the reality that this evidence would later be proven misleading (Oliphant 2018). Likewise, despite the reality that drug use was decreasing in the 1980’s or the reality that a government-ordered commission recommended decriminalization of marijuana to curb the patterns of drug addiction in the United States, presidential leadership maintained the intensity of fear in speech and policy regarding drug use such that Americans continued to prioritize it as their top domestic concern well into the 1990’s (Gerber and Jensen 2001).

Based in the cultivation of fear, characterization of the out-group, and consolidation of moral leadership in the in-group, American presidents in the War on Terror and the War on Drugs were enabled to expand the power of the executive and limit judicial review in means unprecedented. Utilizing the power of threat and anxiety, presidents were able to create and maintain an atmosphere of fear that would grant them a wide range of powers to combat the scourge of each crisis, within the bounds of the United States and beyond. Knowing, thus, the power of presidential rhetoric in shaping emotional cultures, as well as in stoking nationalism, patriotism, and common understandings of American identity and fear, the importance of American presidential speeches warrants further study in both the War on Drugs and the War on Terror – and their comparison may yield generalizable understandings for how characterization of out-groups and in-groups by presidents can manifest in language in times of crisis.
Research Questions

Here, I find the nexus of my research and discover my question: How did emotional codes of fear, crisis, and moral panic towards out-groups and righteous identification with the American in-group manifest in presidential speechmaking in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror? In this question, this study draws on past research on the impact and import of presidential speechmaking on policy and public opinion, the historical backgrounds of each war, and the potency of fear frameworks as founding premises and methodological precedents. By analyzing thirty major speeches from the 1960’s through the present in the War on Drugs and from 2001 to the present in the War on Terror, the manifestation of increasing in-group identification, characterization of a specific out-group, and increasing of language of fear and crisis can be studied.

Methodology

To accomplish this, drawing from the approaches of authors like Domke and Coe, my methodology relies on content analysis to analyze fifteen speeches from each era. Drawing from their work, as well as Hawdon’s coding scheme for Reagan’s War on Drugs speeches (2001), and the content analysis of major media outlets in the War on Terror conducted by Bonn (2011), I informed my own coding scheme. My scheme empirically measures core themes from the moral panic and social identity frameworks, as well as those of fear and anxiety, which I will outline in the succeeding sections based on the preceding literature review.

Argument and Hypothesis

With my preceding literature articulated, my argument is simple. The historical patterns of the War on Terror and the War on Drugs share important similarities in restrictions of civil liberties, denial of due process to suspected individuals, massive budgetary allocations, and an
increase in the bureaucracy and power of the executive to deal with each crisis. These patterns reflect the field of political psychology in studies of fear and anxiety, boding for higher levels of public support for policies predicated on punishment, militarism, and security (Boltanski 1999).

Likewise, in observing the *moral panic* framework, the historical trajectories of each case study reflect this theory, justifying the hypothesis that both sets of speeches might share rhetorical similarities based in fear, negative out-group characterization, and in-group bolstering.

In speaking to outcomes for members of out-groups as defined by each time period in culture and politics, both Muslims and Americans of color were the victims of these policies as a result of homogenization of an out-group based on stereotypes, suffering in acts of discrimination and hate crimes. Each time period, thus, has salient similarities regarding atmospheres of anxiety, panic, fear, and threat, characterized by desires for in-group security and protection dichotomized against punishment and restriction of the homogenized out-group, founded in a moral quest to eradicate evil. In this same vein, the framework of the *moral panic* maps neatly onto the historical trajectory of both case studies.

Considering the role of the presidency in generating fear and anxiety across global history, as well as the documented importance of media in shaping public opinion in times of crisis, a comparison of presidential speech-making in each time period can help illuminate a broader portrait of the use of fear, anxiety, and panic. Here, I can observe efforts to utilize these emotional cues to encourage greater identification with the intended, morally righteous in-group, definition and derision of the out-group of choice, and characterization of threat. Combining an understanding of intergroup relations, social identity theory, and *moral panic* framework, the process of escalation of actors creating and maintaining crisis, and institutionalization of fear-driven policy and cultural changes can help to create an understanding of how these elements
interact. To compare, then, is to also understand where these events deviate and how they have changed, or if their patterns are similar.

The sample of presidential speeches consists of thirty total, with fifteen from the War on Drugs and 15 from the War on Terror, focused explicitly on either the effort to combat drug use in the War on Drugs, or on combatting threats of terrorism in the War on Terror. These speeches and their transcripts were drawn systematically from digital archives of presidential speeches from Richard Nixon through Donald Trump, using key word searches spanning from 1971 to 2018. Speeches were only selected if made within the individual’s term as president and to a public audience, excluding post-presidency speeches, vice presidential speeches, and campaign trail speeches made prior to or while serving. Considering the brevity of the War on Terror due to its inception following September 11th, 2001, I was able to collect and analyze every significant, nationally publicized terror-specific speech from President Bush, President Obama, and President Trump’s terms in office.

Likewise, despite the longevity of the War on Drugs, considering it has persisted over the course of so many decades, the significant and publicized speeches made have been much less frequently made compared to those of the War on Terror. As such, I was able to find fifteen significant speeches of the era. I also made sure to select at least one speech per president (more consequential in gathering War on Drugs speeches, spanning decades, as opposed to the eighteen-year-old crisis of the War on Terror) so that I might gain a clearer picture of rhetorical and moral panic changes over the course of many presidencies.

The method of data collection was content analysis, utilizing a quantitative and qualitative approach. It is quantitative in measuring the frequency of topic areas, framing, and rhetorical styles. With this, my syntactical units are sentences, manually coding each sentence
according to my coding scheme. In this, each sentence received an individual code that was then tabulated to quantify the proportional presence of each category in each speech, which was then tabulated as a total proportionality in each time period.

As with any method of data collection, there are advantages and disadvantages of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis. In terms of analyzing presidential rhetorical patterns, content analysis is one of the most comprehensive tools in the political communication arsenal. Some argue that specific themes and words might be challenging to distinguish from one another, that these choices are subjective, or that there might be other questionable selection biases in my research. However, in the field of political communication research, there is a well-documented and substantiated body of literature on the topic of fear in content analysis. By combining quantitative and qualitative approaches to content analysis, I hope to supplement the concerns of those who feel I may neglect broader ideology and context by observing historical context and qualitative judgments of each speech; for those who feel I may make fallacious evaluations solely by conducting manual analysis, I will show sample content of each rhetorical framework to demonstrate examples of my methodology.

In this, the issue of manifest content and latent content are critical to note, as well. Manifest content includes the analysis of data that is physically present and quantifiable by frequency – examples of this would fall under my syntactical approach, classifying sentences by topic by looking at specific word choices and subject matter, and would include other variables like word count, date, what percentage of total speech a specific category is, and changes over time of the proportional breakdown of these specific categories and touch points in each era. Latent content, however, focuses on the interpretation of symbolism in speech, observing general tone of the speech, historical context of each individual speech, and other analytical observations.
I may draw that can not so tangibly and directly be checked for within each speech. In this, the theoretical frameworks of fear, anxiety, and threat as associated with an out-group, and themes of communitarianism, voluntarism, and righteousness on the part of the in-group are salient ideas for me to mind.

Manifest content is employable directly in my quantitative approach, while latent content resonates with my qualitative understandings of these thirty speeches. Beyond quantifying specifically how many sentences fit certain themes and the categorizations of my coding schema, I also will gather “detailed excerpts from relevant statements (messages) that serve to document the interpretations” (Berg et al. 1995, 176). While the crux of my analysis relies on manifest content analysis, the use of latent content analysis can help to provide a broad understanding of the messages of these thirty presidential speeches. Much like the question of quantitative versus qualitative content analysis, incorporating both manifest and latent content analysis helps to depict the most comprehensive understanding possible of presidential speech-making and moral panics within the War on Terror and the War on Drugs.

To justify my categorical choices of quantitative, manifest content analysis, I drew on the theoretical underpinnings of the moral panic, threat theory, and social identity theory frameworks, compounded with rhetorical studies of media, speechmaking, and other forms of communication literature. As such, I break down the content analysis schema to identify how presidents employ different elements of fear, anxiety, panic, and in-group and out-group identities. Utilizing these theories and ideas, my scheme is constructed as follows: Good American rhetoric, which distinguishes Americans as being either heroes and victims; moral and religious evocation; punishment and war rhetoric; rehabilitative rhetoric; folk devil rhetoric in domestic or foreign folk devils; patriotic and nationalist rhetoric; crisis rhetoric in
either figurative or statistical terms; and solution rhetoric in the form of expanding legislation, expanding budgetary allocation, expanding government, past failures, international cooperation, ongoing fight, and past successes. Looking at every sentence in each of the thirty speeches as an independent syntactical unit, my analysis consists of a sentence by sentence analysis of each speech for the aforementioned rhetorical cues, as well as a broader qualitative understanding of each speech. In these key pieces, I hope to discern patterns that align across eras, predicated on the similarities of behavior, pursuit of unjust policies in the judicial system, and total pardon for any decision-making and policy implementation granted to American policymakers in each perceived crisis.

*Good American* rhetoric includes themes of unity, vigilante involvement of Americans in the in-group in fighting whatever crisis is underway, and joining one united “we” against the *folk devil* – designated by words including “we”, “together”, “united”, “family”, “community”, and “local”, and drawing on Loseke’s framework of the “Good American” (Loseke 2009). In the *hero* element of this distinction, rhetoric focuses on those servicemen and women who are directly responsible for fighting and combating the out-group, as well as those everyday Americans who perform acts of vigilante justice that help to preserve the safety and security of the in-group (Loseke 2009). *Victim* rhetoric draws on the understanding of those within the in-group who have been directly afflicted and harmed by the acts of the out-group. As Loseke identifies in his distinction of the “Good American,” these identities are salient in connecting members of the in-group.

Drawing on the understanding of the psychological and political potency of the in-group, this type of language and ideological focus is a driving force of the *moral panic* and fear studies generally (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Motifs of heroes and victims amidst a time of crisis, as called
upon by the speechmaker of the *moral panic*, help to unify the audience into the righteous, socially distant group isolated from the culprit of the social ill (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). In understanding communitarian rhetoric’s connection to fear, one of the critical elements of the theory is the power of the speaker or media campaign to rhetorically unify those who do not deviate, uplifting working-class values of conservation, preservation, security, and defense (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2010). Indeed, this style of speech aids in the notion of isolating rule-breakers as deviants responsible for social disorder, with communitarian rhetoric generating this joint identity of those who abide by the values and beliefs of the broader society (Loseke 2003).

Examples of *hero* rhetoric include War on Drugs’s language of responsibility and community, as drawn from President Donald Trump’s “Remarks on Combatting Drug Demand and the Opioid Crisis”: “Each of us is responsible to look out for our loved ones, our communities, our children, our neighbors, and our own health” (Trump 2017c). In the War on Terror, one sample syntactical unit includes a sentence from President George W. Bush’s “Address to the Nation from Atlanta on Homeland Security”: “And tonight, we join in thanking a whole new group of public servants who never enlisted to fight a war but find themselves on the frontlines of a battle nonetheless: those who deliver the mail, America’s post workers” (Bush 2001a). In this, the notions of voluntarism, community security, and the uniting of Americans against a common cause for a common good are salient.

In *victim* rhetoric, examples in the War on Terror include two syntactical units from President George W. Bush’s speech on October 11th of 2001: “Americans have known the casualties of war but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks but never before on thousands of civilians” (Bush 2001b). In the War on Terror, Nixon embodied this in the speech many claim launched the War on Drugs: “The threat
of narcotics among our people is one which properly frightens many Americans. It comes quietly into homes and destroys children, it moves into neighborhoods and breaks the fiber of of community which makes neighbors” (Nixon 1971).

*Moral and religious* rhetoric finds its resonance in a similar unifying of the intended public audience against folk devils – in line with the Judeo-Christian American ethos, spiritual rhetoric has historically aided presidents in unifying the country in times of crisis, as well as in use as a tool to generate fear among American listeners (Domke and Coe 2008). The use of religious ideals in *moral panic* frameworks is well-documented and explored as a tool of Othering against non-participatory deviants (Laycock 2015). Similarly, the isolation of the speaker and the corresponding in-group as righteous leaders in a moral battle helps to solidify social distance between the in-group and out-group.

The language of law and order that so bolsters the history of *moral panics* in the United States finds support historically in religious invocations in American presidential speech-making. Words that align with this category include “God”, “heaven”, “hell”, “crusade”, “morality,” and other religious references to good and evil (Domke and Coe 2008). The cohesive identities of patriotism and national identity serve as strong in-group identifiers of the “Good American” and are represented in these appeals of spiritual rhetoric.

Examples of *moral and religious* evocation from the War on Drugs includes Reagan’s explanation of decision-making in policy: “There’s no moral middle ground. Indifference is not an option” (Reagan 1986b). Bush’s positioning of Americans as moral leaders in the fight against terrorism show similar cues: “And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight” (Bush 2001b). These syntactical units draw on
moral obligation, the moral righteousness of leadership, and create binaries of ethics in each time period that discern right from wrong.

Further helping to encourage self-identification of the in-group by calling on shared identities and emotional cultures in the in-group I am employing in my content analysis patriotism and nationalism rhetoric. In the same vein that moral and religious categorizations highlight efforts on the part of the presidency to reinforce shared characteristics to strengthen identification with the in-group, patriotic and nationalist identities help to solidify the righteous in-group as a cohesive entity bound by pride in country (Wilson 2005; Roberts 2003; Alexander 2012).

In times of crisis and in efforts to justify increased governmental reach, infringement upon civil liberties, and other elements of eras characterized by fear and panic, the use of nationalism and patriotism to accomplish this goal helps to cement the emotional culture that frames policies and decision-making processes (Kellner 2007). In the War on Terror, this takes the form of cues such as, “Love for America requires love for all of its people. When we open our hearts to patriotism, there is no room for prejudice, no place for bigotry, no tolerance for hate” (Trump 2017a). Likewise, in the War on Drugs, “Drug abuse is a repudiation of everything America is. The destructiveness and human wreckage mock our heritage. Think for a moment how special it is to be an American” (Reagan 1986a). These calls upon Americans’ shared history and national pride are tools that, like moral and religious rhetoric, evoke shared identities that create a level of in-group identification that is politically and psychologically potent (Hawdon 2001; Nunn 2002; Rothe and Muzzatti 2004)

With elements of the identity of the in-group made salient through calls to nationalism, morality, and hero and victim identification, the characterizing of the out-group and their
immorality, threat, and violence are critical to structuring the analysis of *moral panic* frameworks and understanding the stoking of fear and anxiety by presidents. In this, *folk devil* rhetoric is that which explicitly identifies Cohen’s articulated “folk devil,” or those groups, individuals, or ideologies that are responsible for creating and maintain the social disorder at the heart of the *moral panic*. The emphasis of the out-group, generation of disdain for the out-group, and total dichotomization of the actors of good and evil in a *moral panic* are realized through both directly and indirectly referring to the out-group and the culprits of the social disorder (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Campbell 1967; Tajfel and Billig 1974). Corresponding with threat theory, intergroup anxiety, and social identification theory, this strategically isolates the *folk devil* against the community of actors harmed by and interested in ending the *moral panic*.

Language like “the terrorists”, “drug addicts”, and “our enemies,” among other scapegoating language are some of the key words that I will seek in my content analysis to capture this idea.

By breaking *folk devil* rhetoric into *foreign* and *domestic*, I hope to highlight the concentration of out-group focus in either American residents or in enemies abroad. As for the War on Terror, *foreign folk devil* rhetoric consists of syntactical units such as, “Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere” (Bush 2001b). Likewise, *domestic folk devil* rhetoric includes, “Now, make no mistake, our nation is still threatened by terrorists. From Benghazi to Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth” (Obama 2013).

In the War on Drugs, example *foreign folk devil* rhetoric includes, “Other studies show that approximately one-fourth of all bail-jumpers in drug cases are aliens who were caught smuggling drugs into the country” (Ford 1976). In *domestic folk devil* rhetoric, examples include, “Well, these cocaine users can no longer claim noncombatant status. There is blood on their
hands” (Bush 1989). This will help to illuminate where folk devils are being isolated in each case study, as either domestic, foreign, or both kinds of threats. Again, the focus on violence, ubiquity, and evil of these out-groups and their members are critical to my qualitative understanding of this categorization (Cohen 2014).

Adding to the heightening of anxiety and fear in times of crisis, modes of crisis rhetoric help to make tangible the negative consequences of the behaviors of the out-group, and model just exactly the harms that the in-group is suffering from at the hands of the folk devil. Crisis rhetoric focuses on the notion of disorder as advanced by Stanley Cohen’s framework of the moral panic, pivotal to shaping emotional cultures based in fear and anxiety. Words and phrases in this rhetorical framework include “epidemic,” “chaos,” “disaster,” and syntactical units that highlight the increasing gravity or severity of an issue, culminating in that fear cultivation of the moral panic by exacerbating concerns and highlighting a worsening condition. The aforementioned processes of escalation and diffusion are critical to intensifying the perceived gravity of the moral panic, corralling shared public understanding and concern for its severity, and positioning the speaker as observer and prepared champion against the social ill (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2010). Similarly, the perception of chaos and overwhelming crime and insecurity are important to generating the feelings of anxiety, fear, and threat that are integral to emotional and cognitive support for these more punitive policies and expansions of enforcement (Garland 2002).

Broken into figurative and statistical references to crisis, figurative elements focus on descriptions of chaos that include visual imagery and descriptions of destruction. Conversely, statistical references to crisis include a focus on casualty numbers, rates of addiction, numbers of terrorist group members, and similarly quantified elements of crisis. Figurative crisis rhetoric
includes Nixon’s explanation that “Despite the fact that drug addiction destroys lives, destroys families, and destroys communities, we are still not moving fast enough to meet the problem in an effective way” (Nixon 1971). Likewise, statistical crisis in the War on Drugs includes Reagan’s highlighting that, “Nine out of ten Americans believe that courts in their home areas aren’t tough enough on criminals, and the cold statistics do demonstrate the failure of our criminal justice system to adequately pursue, prosecute, and punish criminals” (Reagan 1982).

As for the War on Terror, descriptive crisis includes an excerpt from Bush’s October 11th speech: “After all that has just passed, all the lives taken, and all the possibilities and hopes that died with them, it is natural to wonder if America’s future is one of fear. Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead, and dangers to face” (Bush 2001b). Likewise, statistical crisis includes, “Today, our entire nation grieves with you and with every family of those 2,977 innocent souls who were murdered by terrorists sixteen years ago” (Trump 2017d). These syntactical units highlight descriptions of the crisis at hand that draw on statistical evidence, as well as figurative and literary elements that emphasize fear and threat.

With the crisis, those who cause it, and those who suffer from it coded in these thirty presidential speeches, the act of suggesting solutions for the issue comes naturally as the next set of rhetorical cues. Most salient in comparing the time periods’ solutions and how fear and anxiety manifested in support for differing public policy trends, the nature of rehabilitative and punishment and war rhetorical frameworks focus on a few critical elements of the moral panic. In the process of generating a moral panic, the speaker or driver of the campaign is frequently positioned as the one to cure the ill and disable the folk devil responsible for the social disorder, in both proactive and reactive policy reactions (Hawdon 2001). As mentioned in the preceding literature review, times of fear and anxiety bode for higher levels of support for militarism,
surveillance of the out-group, and discriminatory practices, as well as the practices of elected leaders elevating fear and anxiety in times of crisis to consolidate support for these kinds of crises (Huddy et al. 2005; Loseke 2003). As such, the War on Drugs and the War on Terror should exhibit high levels of punitive policy references, if they possess these elements I hypothesize they will.

These two opposing perspectives, of rehabilitating the folk devil or punishing them, help to illuminate the long-term trends in each direction in policy-making and general political trends (Welch 2006; Cohen 2014). These two frameworks also help to differentiate approaches over the course of time to better understand the aims of the presidency in policy suggestions to fix the deviance.

_Punishment and war_ rhetoric focuses on phrases and ideas that include pursuit of the out-group, seeking justice and retribution against those who have wronged Americans, and increased levels of law enforcement or militarism. In the War on Drugs, examples include Nixon in his “Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control”: “Increased enforcement and vigorous application of the fullest penalties provided by law are two of the steps in rendering narcotics trade unprofitable” (Nixon 1971). Similarly, Bush’s emphasis on justice resonates with similar emotional cues: “Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done” (Bush 2001b). Elements of promised threat, retribution, and a desire of pursuit of wrong-doers makes for the _punishment and war_ code.

In the opposite policy direction, words and phrases of note in _rehabilitative_ rhetoric include “rehabilitation,” “treatment,” “rebirth,” “renewal,” and others, that highlight efforts to rebuild, reconstruct, and repair communities that may have been negatively impacted by the policies and doctrines of either time period. Similarly, _rehabilitative_ rhetoric also includes
ending punitive policy stances, focused on ending conflict and pursuit. In the War on Terror, this takes the form of units such as Obama’s pledge that “Our troops will come home. Our combat mission will come to an end” (Obama 2013). In the War on Drugs, Nixon’s claim that “Enforcement must be coupled with a rational approach to the reclamation of the drug user himself” (Nixon 1971) constitutes rehabilitative rhetoric.

Other policy solutions are important in quantifying how exactly presidents, positioned as moral leadership, suggest remediying the crisis outside of policy reactions directly enforced against the folk devil. In looking at forms of solution rhetoric, expanded government, expanded legislation, expanded budgetary allocation, past failures, and past successes, these elements capture different stages of the policy process of speechmakers in times of panic or fear.

Syntactical units coded as expanded government focus on ideas of expanding the capabilities of the executive or judiciary in times of crisis, as well as expanding the number of agencies that have a role to play in combating the social ill in each time period. In this, the realization of specific role-players in combating the crisis are highlighted in governmental roles, including in the DEA, the DHS, and copious other branches, creating mechanisms of institutionalizing the moral panic. In the War on Terror, expanded government codes include references to new agency work, like, “We’ve got a Homeland Security Office now running, as I mentioned, headed by Tom Ridge” (Bush 2001b). Likewise, in a general reference in the War on Drugs, “But we must recognize that piecemeal efforts, even where individually successful, cannot have a major impact on the drug abuse problem unless and until they are forged together into a broader and more integrated program involving all levels of government and private effort” (Nixon 1971).
Expanded legislation rhetoric focuses on the discussion of new laws, acts, and other efforts in either time period that highlight institutionalized efforts of the presidency in both wars, modeling the stage of institutionalization referenced in Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s characterization of a moral panic (1994). In the War on Drugs, this could include, “Fifth, I am asking the Congress to amend and approve the International Security Assistance Act of 1971 and the International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act of 1971 to permit assistance to presently proscribed nations in their efforts to end drug trafficking” (Nixon 1971). In the War on Terror, “We’ve passed a new antiterrorism law which gives our law enforcement officers the necessary tools to track terrorists before they harm Americans. A new terrorism task force is tightening immigration controls to make sure no one enters or stays in our country who would harm us” (Bush 2001a).

In looking at resource allocation, expanding budgetary allocation simply focuses on the discussion of increasing money allocated to fighting either the War on Terror or the War on Drugs, and provides resources for the proposed policy solutions. For example, “As you can tell, such an approach will not come cheaply. Last February, I asked for a $700 million increase in the drug budget for the coming year” (Bush 1989); similarly, “That’s true for Democrats and Republicans – I’ve seen the polling – even though it amounts to less than one percent of the federal budget. In fact, a lot of folks think it’s 25 percent, if you ask people on the streets. Less than one percent – still wildly unpopular. But foreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity” (Obama 2013).

Past failures focus on efforts in the past to fight each war that have not produced the desired results or fallen short of the goals of the new administration, positioning the speaking president to demand greater resources, power, or stronger enforcement mechanisms to right past
wrongs or mistakes. In the War on Drugs, this includes, “Despite the magnitude of the problem, despite our very limited success in meeting it, and despite the common recognition of both circumstances, we nevertheless have thus far failed to develop a concerted effort to find a better solution to this increasingly grave threat” (Nixon 1971). Likewise, in the War on Terror, “And from the beginning, the American people have heard the critics say we’re failing – but their reasons keep changing. In the first days of Operation Enduring Freedom, the critics warned that we were heading toward a ‘quagmire’ ” (Bush 2006). These cues point to past inadequacies of various reasons and provides ample evidence for further consolidation and increasing of power to fight the crisis, an important cumulative effect over the decades of each time period.

Past successes include the opposite, largely focusing on presidents discussing their own past successes in meeting the crisis through policy, law enforcement, and other mechanisms as evidence for future capabilities of continuing to do so. In the War on Terror, “Across the Middle East, a critical mass of events is taking place in that region in a hopeful new direction. Historic changes have many causes, yet these changes have one factor in common. A businessman in Beirut recently said, ‘We have removed the mask of fear. We’re not afraid any more’ ” (Bush 2005a). Likewise, in the War on Drugs, “As you know, one of the most critical duties that we faced upon taking office was controlling the influx of illegal drugs into this country. The South Florida Task Force, which we established under the leadership of Vice President George Bush, has, in the opinion of virtually all knowledgeable observers, been highly successful in slowing the illegal flow of drugs into the United States” (Reagan 1982). These statements highlight past efforts that have been successful in combating the out-group and crisis resulting from the behavior of the out-group.
Solution rhetoric of international cooperation focuses on presidential emphasis on the importance of countries joining together to combat specific issues in each time period, as well as the sharing of intelligence, cooperative enforcement mechanisms, and other measures. This positions the United States to emphasize global goals in each crisis, as well as providing explicit directives of American desires for international efforts. In this, American leadership has important say in deciding who is a member of any out-group and providing exigent pressure on other nations who might have such out-group members within their borders as to how to deal with these individuals. For example, in President Obama’s 2013 “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University”, “In many cases, this will involve partnerships with other countries. Already, thousands of Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives fighting extremists” (Obama 2013). Likewise, in the War on Drugs, “We are establishing a commission made up of government officials from our two countries to coordinate a stepped up effort to deal with the major international trafficking of cocaine and marijuana between our two counties, and the devastating economic impact of that traffic” (Nixon 1973). Again, in the same vein as the previous solution rhetoric tools, international cooperation helps to understand what groups are joining the United States in its efforts to combat the out-group and social ill of each time period.

Last within solution language, ongoing fight rhetoric speaks to persistence and acknowledgement abstractly that the pursuit to defeat the out-group and right the wrongs of the time period is not complete, justifying continued efforts to combat the out-group. In the War on Terror, this includes, “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not stop there” (Bush 2001b). Similarly, in the War on Drugs, “The problems of drug abuse must be faced on many fronts at the same time, and we do not know yet which efforts will be most successful” (Nixon 1971).
Thus, drawn together, the *Good American* rhetoric of heroes and victims, tied with *moral and religious* rhetoric and *patriotic and nationalist* rhetoric, help to comprise an understanding of the in-group, its characterization in presidential speeches, the strength of in-group identification as made possible through shared identity, and the morality of the in-group. In contrast, the characterization of the *domestic* and *international folk devil* unpacks how often and to what extent out-group members are discussed, in terms of their morality, their ubiquity, and their violence against the in-group, reflecting social identity theory’s understanding of the out-group and the power of ostracizing *folk devils* in *moral panic* theory. Likewise, characterizing the *crisis* in *descriptive* and *statistical* terms helps to quantify and describe how exactly presidents in the War on Terror and the War on Drugs comparatively heightened the fearful understanding of each time period, through emphasizing the state of chaos in each speech to increase levels of anxiety necessary for garnering support for specific policy ends. *Punishment and war* and *rehabilitative* rhetoric help to establish the goals and ideological approaches of each president. And, finally, the copious forms of *solution rhetoric*, from budgets, to policies, to agencies responsible for righting the crisis, document how presidents present solutions in each era.

After tabulating these coding mechanisms within each speech, proportional representation of these categories within each speech will be determined by a simple division method, in taking the number of syntactical units coded and dividing that number by the total number of sentences in each speech. This simple method will effectively compare focus areas within each speech, and across the time periods of each case study.

Considering my question and the categorical approaches of my content analysis methodology, I have several hypotheses:
H1: In both the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, there will be a presence of *Good American* rhetoric, *moral and religious* rhetoric, *patriotic and nationalist* rhetoric, *solution* rhetoric of all forms, *crisis* rhetoric, *folk devil* rhetoric, *rehabilitation* rhetoric, and *punishment and war* rhetoric.

H2: There will be higher levels of *punishment and war* rhetoric than *rehabilitation* rhetoric in the War on Terror and the War on Drugs overall. However, given the shifting dialogue on each issue, there will be more *rehabilitative* rhetoric in the speeches of the War on Drugs of the last ten years as compared to those speeches of the decades before, a trend that will not be present in the War on Terror.

H3: The *folk devil* rhetoric of the War on Drugs will have high levels of *domestic* and *foreign* out-groups, but the War on Terror will focus more on *foreign* out-groups.

H4: Though *folk devil* rhetoric of the War on Drugs and War on Terror will have different focuses in members of each out-group, the characterization of both kinds of folk devils will emphasize violence, evil, and ubiquity of members of each out-group in the vein of *moral panic* descriptions.

Part of why this matters finds resonance in other communication studies in the political arena: awareness of these trends allows for an understanding of how viewers may learn to identify these trends, and can aid in the creation of a public skepticism and literacy of how these factors influence policy- and decision-making in American government.
Findings

Common Rhetorical Cues

My first hypothesis, that each time period would have a presence of all the focus areas of rhetoric, was true. The five rhetorical codes most frequently employed in the War on Drugs by presidents in the collected sample are Good American hero rhetoric (12.807% of total syntactical units), punishment and war rhetoric (8.533%), international cooperation rhetoric (6.887%), expanded government rhetoric (6.495%), and domestic folk devil rhetoric (6.94%). In the War on Terror, these are foreign folk devil rhetoric (20.567%), Good American hero rhetoric (15.447%), Good American victim rhetoric (8.36%), international cooperation rhetoric (7.26%), and punishment and war rhetoric (5.073%). In both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, punishment and war rhetoric, international cooperation rhetoric, and hero rhetoric were three of the five most employed frames by presidents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>War on Drugs Average</th>
<th>War on Terror Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good American: Hero</td>
<td>12.807%</td>
<td>15.447%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good American: Victim</td>
<td>5.0867%</td>
<td>8.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution: War and Punishment</td>
<td>8.573%</td>
<td>5.073%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution: Rehabilitation</td>
<td>5.407%</td>
<td>1.733%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution: Expanded Government</td>
<td>6.947%</td>
<td>3.753%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution: Expanded Budget</td>
<td>2.207%</td>
<td>1.433%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution: New Legislation</td>
<td>2.307%</td>
<td>0.993%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution: Successes</td>
<td>2.24%</td>
<td>2.033%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In looking at hero rhetoric, the second most utilized framework in the War on Terror (15.45%) and the most utilized framework in the War on Drugs (12.81%), this rhetorical cue focuses on the Good American as a vigilante server of the will of the American people, as well as the honoring of servicemen and women who are directly operationalizing the fight against the out-group in both time periods (Loseke 2003). Cues of vigilante participation in this include a focus on neighborhoods and families, with Americans on the right side of the fight against terrorism or drug use finding a way to serve the greater cause. As President Ford articulates, “All of this will be of little use, however, unless the American people rally and fight the scourge of drug abuse within their own communities and their own families” (Ford 1976). In the same fashion, as President Trump explains, “We also came together with a renewed purpose. Our differences never looked so small, and our common bonds never felt so strong” (Trump 2017d). Here, the calling on Americans of all walks of life unites an in-group bonded by shared goals,
responsibilities, and values, and creates concrete calls to action for every American isolated in the in-group.

In addition to calls for community life and individuals to play their part in the fight against terrorism or drug addiction, the honoring of servicemen and women in law enforcement and other government roles occurs throughout both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs. Interestingly, hero rhetoric in each time period also highlights an important target recipient of these efforts: children. In both the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, emphasis on community cooperation was largely done on behalf of children in these communities, as well as safety and security working on behalf of American children, with a pressure to create a greater future for younger generations. Here, presidents focus on the innocence of children and the necessity of American heroes in working to protect the future and the peace of children. As Bill Clinton explained in his 1994 speech, “Even when we keep our schools open late and give our children an alternative to drugs and gangs, your children won’t learn the difference between right and wrong unless you teach them and they’re in those schools when they’re open” (Clinton 1994). Again, in the War on Terror, Bush articulates, “Before September 11, my administration was planning an initiative called Communities of Character. It was designed to help parents develop good character in their children and to strengthen the spirit of citizenship and service in our communities. The acts of September 11 have prompted that initiative to occur on its own in ways far greater than I could have ever imagined” (Bush 2001b). The onus of teaching morality to American children, then, falls to parents and community members who equally bear responsibility in maintaining a culture of youth who know right from wrong and remain identified with the in-group, with calls upon families by presidents to teach their children these values.
Though *Good American victim* rhetoric was only the seventh most employed cue in the War on Drugs, (5.087%), it was the third most used in the War on Terror (8.36%). Perhaps due to the direct affliction of violence on the American people by terrorists, as opposed to a lack of one specific incident like September 11\textsuperscript{th} in the War on Drugs, the War on Terror employed this rhetorical tool more than the War on Drugs. However, despite their divergence in frequency, again, their characterizing of American victims had a tremendous amount of thematic overlap.

In each, the focus on Americans of high moral fiber falling victim to the willful, morally corrupt decisions of others resonates: “American society should not bear the cost” (Nixon 1971). Likewise, the emphasis on fear and fright experienced in the general public, who are characterized again as moral leaders, is salient. As Clinton recounts in an exchange with a voter who was a father in speaking to crime driven by drug use:

But he said, “I want to tell you something first. I came here as an immigrant, and the place where I lived was very poor, and we were very poor. But at least we were free. Now we live here, and we have more money, but we are not free. We are not free because my boy can’t walk to school unless I am with him. Make my boy free.” (Clinton 1994)

In this, characterizing drug users as driving crime and making innocent Americans unsafe is a crucial rhetorical mechanism, compounding feelings of crisis, insecurity, and anxiety by reminding Americans of the shared victimization and suffering caused by the out-group against innocent, morally righteous people.

Likewise, in the War on Terror, which documents far greater emphasis on the experience of American victims, “Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment” (Bush 2001b). In the words of
President Obama, “As a father to two young daughters who are the most precious part of my life, I know that we see ourselves with friends and co-workers at a holiday party like the one in San Bernardino. I know we see our kids in the faces of the young people killed in Paris” (Obama 2015a). In each of these references, the emphasis that all Americans suffer jointly, and that any innocent person or family might be afflicted by the dangers posed by drug users or terrorists at any time, highlights the characterization of all Americans as the Good American victim. Here, Americans are united in cues of bravery and in suffering as strong, shared moral identifiers, and the threat to the in-group is embodied by the experiences of individuals.

In the speeches of the later presidencies of President Obama and President Trump, those who have lost loved ones to drug addiction and at times, even drug addicts themselves (who, however, are involved in no capacity in drug dealing or drug trafficking) are increasingly referred to as victims of a chronic illness, succumbing not to personal moral failings but to a disease. This framing shift, for victims of certain kinds of drug addiction, reflects a cultural change in some areas of the War on Drugs that focuses more so on forgiveness of victims. Examples include, “Some of these children will likely lose one or both of their parents to drug addiction and overdose. They will join the growing ranks of America’s opioid orphans” (Trump 2018). As for addicts framed as victims, examples include, “And it gave you a sense that this is not something that’s just restricted to a small set of communities. This is affecting everybody – young, old, men, women, children, rural, urban, suburban” (Obama 2016). However, such victim categorization is only extended, in these speeches, to those individuals suffering from opioid drug addiction, rather than users of other drugs that previously made up the focus of the War on Drugs, such as crack. This is reflective of a wealth of research into portrayals of forgiveness and innocence for white, rural drug users, and continued support for punishment and stigma for black
and Hispanic drug users, and demonstrates the participation of presidents of both parties in perpetuating these harmful racial differentiations in guilt and innocence in drug use (Netherland and Hansen 2016). In a more insidious and less explicit manner, such cues further cement both cultural and institutional processes of racial and ethnic scapegoating of American communities of color, while uplifting white victims of drug addiction and their families.

As for the other in-group cues of patriotism and nationalism and moral and religious evocation, I observed low rates of both codes, though they were each present in both time periods. In the War on Drugs, moral or religious codes were used in 2.733% of all syntactical units and patriotic and nationalist rhetoric only comprised 1.06%; in the War on Terror, 4.24% of syntactical units were coded as moral or religious and patriotic and nationalist rhetoric only comprised 1.97%. As far as latent content is concerned, the calls to patriotism, morality, religion, and nationalism looked fairly identical in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, drawing again on shared histories of American culture, morality as global leaders, and moral obligation to wage each war domestically and abroad as tools for united identification.

In each, presidents highlighted themselves, those that aligned with them, and their causes as an absolutist moral choice without debate or discord, as I had anticipated, polarized in moral opposition against the out-group. Cues of patriotism and nationalism highlight histories of shared heritage as another point of unification. Again, by highlighting these common histories, presidents unify the in-group through cues of patriotism, and call on cues of loyalty to national identity as a driving force to dichotomize the American public from the out-group in question.

Folk Devils Abroad and at Home: Characterizing Both Foreign and Proximate Folk Devils as Evil, Violent, and Ubiquitous
In looking at each time period and its focus on out-groups, the War on Terror had foreign folk devils as its most employed frame (20.567%) and the War on Drugs had domestic folk devils
as it fifth most employed code (6.94%). In each case, regardless of the geographic location of the out-group in question, the same questions of morality, of personal choice in participating in proclaimed evil, and the description of the threat posed by individuals of each out-group are similar. Their prioritization in each time period reflects a concerted effort by presidents to characterize individuals of the out-group in their speechmaking. In looking at my third hypothesis, I was accurate in my hypothesis that the speeches of the War on Drugs would emphasize *domestic folk devils* and that those of the War on Terror would emphasize *foreign folk devils* over each respective alternative, with the exception of Trump’s 2018 speech “Remarks by President Trump on Combatting Drug Demand and the Opioid Crisis.” In speaking to my fourth hypothesis, based mostly in the qualitative understanding of descriptions of the out-group in each time period, the elements of morality, mortality, and omniscience of members of the out-group are important qualitative understandings of these coding elements – made especially salient through being two of the most utilized syntactical cues in the War on Drugs and War on Terror.

Emphasis on violence in both time periods speaks to the threat that each is vocalized as posing by the presidency, and the anxiety and fear that these out-groups should cause. In the War on Drugs, such cues point to crime driven by drug addicts and drug traffickers. For example, “Well, cocaine users can no longer claim noncombatant status. There is blood on their hands” (Bush 1990). Likewise, in the War on Terror, “Most, though not all, of the terrorism we faced is fueled by a common ideology – a belief by some extremists that Islam is in conflict with the United States and the West, and that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause” (Obama 2013). By highlighting the violence exercised and desired by drug addicts and terrorists, the constancy of the physical threat posed by drug users
and terrorists to the in-group is made tangible, supporting efforts to mislead and distort the frequency and proximity of such threats.

Similarly, the threat of the omnipresence and violence of the out-group is notable both in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, ensuring that the anxiety and fear caused by the out-group and its description are constant and pressing. Sample language includes, “For too long, dangerous criminal cartels have been allowed to infiltrate and spread throughout our nation. An astonishing 90 percent of the heroin in America comes from south of the border, where we will be building a wall which will greatly help in this problem” (Trump 2017c). In the War on Terror, similar cues point to an unwavering and unending kind of threat: “We have seen the depth of our enemies’ hatred in videos, where they laugh about the loss of innocent life. And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design. We have found diagrams of American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, detailed instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of American cities, and thorough descriptions of landmarks in America and throughout the world” (Bush 2002b). This connection of drug addiction to organized crime and violence is a crucial emotional cue for fear and threat in presidential speeches in the War on Drugs, and depicts individuals of the out-group as constantly in physical proximity, capable and desirous of inflicting damage and violence.

In the War on Terror, this more direct cue connects international out-groups as foreign, yet proximate threats. In speaking to their ubiquity, President Bush describes the situation as such: “There are thousands of terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods, and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan where they are trained in the tactics of terror” (Bush 2001c). Likewise, “Now, make no mistake, our nation is still threatened by terrorists” (Obama 2013), and “Because we have witnessed how the violence
in that region can easily reach across borders and oceans, the entire world has an urgent interest in the progress and hope and freedom in the broader Middle East” (Bush 2005a). In each conflict, presidents make the threat constant and universal in nature, boding for an emotional culture predicated on these sentiments of anxiety and terror.

Likewise, the clear moral distinction of good and evil in these out-groups is present in both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, as well as in both foreign and domestic out-group characterizations. For example, in Trump’s description of out-group members in sanctuary cities blamed for drug addiction and trafficking, “They’re safe havens for just some terrible people. Some terrible people. And they’re making it very dangerous for our law enforcement officers” (Trump 2018). As Gerald Ford also characterized them, “These merchants of death, who profit from the misery and suffering of others, deserve the full measure of national revulsion” (Ford 1976). Similarly, as Bush articulates in his description of terrorists, “And while the killers choose their victims indiscriminately, their attacks serve a clear and focused ideology, a set of beliefs and goals that are evil but not insane” (Bush 2005b). In this, presidents have isolated out-group members as subjects of what should be unquestioned American moral disdain and in no unclear terms, highlight the moral depravity of those who are to be blamed in the War on Terror and the War on Drugs. Without context including cultural factors and social determinants that might make individuals vulnerable to joining either kind of out-group, the total and permanent immorality of the out-groups is made clear.

Of note in both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs in their descriptions of foreign folk devils is the tendency to homogenize entire nations as bearing blame for the wrongs suffered by the United States. Though not nearly as present a frame in the War on Drugs, language of blaming entire nations for the ills of drug addiction in the United States was still used: for
example, in President Trump’s 2018 speech, “And I told China: don’t send it. And I told Mexico: don’t send it. Don’t send it” (Trump 2018). Likewise, in President H.W. Bush’s 1989 speech, “I also want to target the supply of illegal drugs that are the source, particularly those in the Andean nations. That’s why I’ve requested $731 million for the Andean Counter-Drug initiative, the countries of Bolivia and Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. I look forward to making sure their programs are effective, that crop substitution works and crop destruction there goes forward” (Bush 2002a).

In the War on Terror, this characterization of entire nations being at fault was a premise for the accusation of Iraq and Afghanistan as harboring terrorists, a *folk devil* that served as a precursor for an invasion and occupation. As Bush explained in 2001, “Iraq aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror…Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade” (2001b). Here, broad generalizations – and sometimes, fabricated generalizations – about countries in each case have dangerous implications for stereotyping and sweeping categorizations, leading to crises for the hundreds of thousands of civilians in each state that would be caught in the crossfire of punishment and war.

In Trump’s aberration from the trend of concentrating on *domestic folk devils* rather than *foreign folk devils* in the War on Drugs, his 2018 speech on drug addiction discusses at great length international drug trafficking and immigrant responsibility for drug use in the United States, referring copious times to MS-13 and the construction of a border wall. As he explains, “According to a recent Dartmouth study, the sanctuary city of Lawrence, Massachusetts is one of the primary sources of fentanyl in six New Hampshire counties. ICE recently arrested 15 MS-13 gang members - these are not good people, folks, okay?” (Trump 2018b). This shift away from
domestic folk devil language, however, does align with my prediction that rehabilitative rhetoric would increase in the last two decades in the War on Drugs, providing concrete appeals to rehabilitation for domestic drug users who fit the mold of the righteous in-group as victims, unfortunately caught in a personal crisis of no failing of their own. Yet, this only extends to certain kinds of people using certain kinds of drugs. In this, a shift towards blaming Latinx and Hispanic immigrants for drug abuse and drug-related, organized crime allows for a perpetuation of an ethnically driven War on Drugs, while pardoning white drug users.

In this, Trump has shifted the identification of the out-group from those traditionally designated throughout the War on Drugs – meaning, urban populations within the United States of lower socioeconomic background, and largely in communities of color – to immigrants entering and already residing in the United States. Though not a total deviation from past scapegoating appeals, this shift reflects broader discussions of the modern targets of the War on Drugs. Here, punishment and war rhetoric remains sustained for foreign folk devils in the War on Drugs, but domestic folk devils falling victim to the opioid epidemic receive language of forgiveness, sorrow, and rehabilitation in the presidency.

Crisis: A Lesser Tool to Amplify Fear

In looking at both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, descriptive and statistical crisis rhetoric were some of the lesser employed rhetorical strategies, though each form was still present in both time periods, with statistical crisis comprising 0.487% of the War on Terror and 2.96% of the War on Drugs’s syntactical units, and descriptive crisis comprising 4.1% of the War on Terror and 3.68% of the War on Drugs’s syntactical units. In this, both descriptive and statistical crisis rhetoric focuses on the state of panic and fear present in each time period, echoing the same concerns explicit in folk devil language, and realizing some of the tangible
threats imposed by folk devils against Good Americans. In this, language points to “a social crisis” (Bush 2002a), as well as a physical and dangerous one.

Frequently, language of “epidemic” and “cancer” has been utilized in both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs. In the War on Drugs, “These steps would strengthen our efforts to root out the cancerous growth of narcotics addiction in America” (Nixon 1971); “I ask for your support and the support of our people in this effort to fight the drug menace, to eradicate the cancers of organized crime and public corruption, to make our streets and houses safe again, and to return America to the days of respect for the law and the rights of the innocent” (Reagan 1982a). In the War on Terror, “And I know that after so much war, many Americans are asking whether we are confronted by a cancer that has no immediate cure” (Obama 2015b). Here, the use of disease metaphors helps to escalate the atmosphere of fear and panic through literary elements of contagion, disorder, and inability to contain the menace.

Much of statistical crisis rhetoric, conversely, was focused predominantly on casualty numbers, whether explained by drug overdose deaths, rates of homicides in drug-related crimes, or numbers of individuals killed in terrorism-related attacks. These sentences provide concrete examples of the consequences of the wrong-doings of the out-group, and give tangible evidence of descriptive crisis rhetoric.

War and Punishment versus Rehabilitation Over Time
With *punishment and war* rhetoric as the second-most employed framing strategy in the War on Drugs and the fifth most utilized in the War on Terror, important commonalities of
highlighting and characterizing punishment and war surface. In each, the language of “pursuit” and “justice” underlie many rhetorical cues, with this frame accomplishing several aspects of the moral panic framework and providing important policy-based and abstract solutions for righting the wrong of the time period. In the War on Drugs, punishment and war rhetoric comprised an average of 8.53% of the frames used in each speech by syntactical unit, whereas in the War on Terror, this frame comprised 5.07% of the syntactical units in the speeches gathered. While no specific terms arose to notable shared frequency across frames, their content shared important ideological and partisan concerns.

In reference to my second hypothesis, my results were more mixed than I had anticipated. To be sure, in both the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, the majority of speeches have a greater focus on punishment than rehabilitation, and the long-term trends of each have a greater concentration of punishment and war rhetoric than rehabilitative, as figures $D$ and $E$ show. However, a few anomalies stand out in each time period. In the War on Terror, the only speech to defy this trend was that of Bush’s March 2005 speech, in which he recounted the successes of the War on Terror to date, highlighting the democratic progress of Afghanistan, the new Lebanese government, and the prospect of Egypt’s own multi-party elections approaching in the months following this speech (Bush 2005). Here, the focus of his speech years after September 11th was far less focused on combating terrorism than on celebrating the progress made thus far, with Saddam Hussein having been captured and deposed, and the United States preparing to protect Iraq’s first “free” election (Bush 2005). Compounding his capture with upcoming midterm elections with perilous polling for Republicans and international doubt about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a speech highlighting these successes and emphasizing reasoning for the conflict and its continuation would be electorally beneficial and logical in the context of
American politics (Zarefsky 2007). Similarly, following the release of the photographs of Abu Ghraib, a general waning of levels of support for the war and other factors may have pushed Bush to make such a speech. In this, a focus on rehabilitating the governments of these states is an unsurprising motif of this speech and accounts for this fluctuation in punishment and war versus rehabilitation rhetoric.

Likewise, in the War on Drugs, the increase in Obama’s presidency of rehabilitative rhetoric over punishment and war resonates with the predictions of my second hypothesis. In the wake of greater public awareness of the crisis of mass incarceration and shifting views on addiction and drug use, a shift in the conversation of the War on Drugs is visible in the disparity between punishment and war and rehabilitative rhetoric. Even in the Trump presidency, to a lesser extent, the higher levels of rehabilitative rhetoric than in preceding presidencies reflects a greater societal trend toward rehabilitation for some drug users – specifically, those affected by the opioid epidemic.

However, overall and in every speech excepting these anomalies, both the War on Drugs and the War on Terror exhibited far greater rhetorical use of the punishment and war framework than that of rehabilitation. In the process of coding frames of punishment and war, several key themes emerged. The idea of pursuit, of “driving them out” in regard to either drug users or terrorists, was a salient focus of these syntactical units. For example, in the War on Terror, this measure included an increase in law enforcement capabilities, a highlighting of increased arrest rates of suspected terrorists, and the presence of FBI agents “on the trail of other suspects here and abroad” (Bush 2001b). In this, self-reference to “aggressively pursuing” and “hunting down our enemies” is a major focal point: this extends into the invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. It also extends into incarcerating suspected terrorists, and enacting policies that
help to make law enforcement stronger against suspected terrorists stricter, including indefinite detainment.

Likewise, the presidents of this time period focus largely on “bringing them to justice” and “they’re paying a price,” cues that point to an effort to eradicate the wrong and positioning American leadership as the decisive force to dictate punishment and ethics (Bush 2001b). In the War on Terror, with countries like Iraq and Afghanistan’s governments as sources of blame for allegedly harboring and aiding terrorist cells, this punitive language of an entire host country embodies direct threats of invasion, occupation of their countries, and the notion, again, of a “price to pay” for the injustices suffered by the American people (Bush 2001b). Ideas of destruction, disruption, and dismantling also are important focuses of the War on Terror in punitive policy suggestions.

In the War on Drugs, a similar focus on law enforcement underlies most speeches, with “Increased enforcement and vigorous application of the fullest penalties provided by law” as crucial speaking points that carry importance from the 1970’s until 2018 (Nixon 1971). This includes the threat of the death penalty for dealers in the speeches of George H.W. Bush, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Donald Trump, life sentences for certain drug users, and other punitive measures (Nixon 1973; Ford 1976; Bush 1989; Clinton 1994; Trump 2018).

Again, as in the War on Terror, reports of increasing numbers of arrests as evidence of success and efficacy, accompanied by promises of increasing future arrest rates, dominate policy discussions in law enforcement in War on Drugs until the Obama presidency, with his speeches during the War on Drugs having only 0.4% of syntactical units possessing a punitive frame. Here, President Obama placed a much greater prioritization on rehabilitative rhetoric than
punishment rhetoric, an aberration from every president across the span of the War on Drugs. In the Trump presidency, the reemergence of this punitive rhetoric mirrors the long-term patterns of the War on Terror and echoes his predecessors excepting Obama in the War on Drugs, with 7.7% of units having a punishment and war frame in his 2018 speech on “Combating the Opioid Crisis” (Trump 2018). Much like the War on Terror, language of destruction and driving out the out-group provides important psychological cues across the decades of the War on Drugs.

Again, as is reflected in the folk devil rhetoric in the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, punishment and war rhetoric geared towards foreign folk devils remains present in today’s War on Drugs, though the discussion of domestic folk devils has taken a largely more rehabilitative approach.

Other Policy Solutions Over Time

In looking at the various forms of solution rhetoric, another of the top rhetorical tools used by both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs was that of international cooperation, in which presidents positioned working with other countries as a critical step in combating the issues of terrorism and drug addiction. In the War on Drugs, this frame constituted 6.89% of all syntactical units, while in the War on Terror, this constituted 7.26% of all syntactical units. Working with other countries to share intelligence, aid in seizing drugs and arresting criminals associated with terror and drug trafficking, and other efforts are central to the discussions of international cooperation by presidents across the two time periods. In both scenarios, a power dynamic emerges of American forces intervening on behalf of developing countries who they characterize as unable to deal with the concerns themselves – but dealing with these issues on American terms, with American resources.
As George W. Bush explained in a 2002 speech, “As we reduce demand in America, it will take the pressure off of our friends in the South. It will make it easier for our friends in Mexico to deal with the drug problem. It will make it easier for Colombia to be able to deal with the growers and mobsters who tend to wreak havoc in your country” (Bush 2002a). In the War on Drugs, countries in Central America and South America including Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela become targets in each scenario culpable for many of the drug traffickers who supply Americans with drugs, in similar language to the description of Middle Eastern countries who have been apportioned blame by presidents in the War on Terror as housing terrorists. Though in each recognizing the financial burden of combating these crises in these countries and the plight of victims in the Middle East and in Latin and South America (Bush 2002a), international cooperation here places the will and desires of the United States as primary in shaping actions taken in more directly affected countries, whether by drug trafficking and production in foreign countries, or the collaboration of countries like Syria and Afghanistan (Bush 2001b). In this, presidents in each era refer to the power of the United Nations and other international bodies as crucial to enforcing their moral positioning across the globe. These cues focus largely on collaboration and promoting an American vision for global safety and security.

In looking at less frequently employed but still important factors, expanded budget, expanded government, and new legislation rhetoric all highlight specific policy reactions beyond the punishment and war rhetoric that focus on seeking justice and punishing members of the out-group. In the War on Terror, these cues were utilized in 1.433%, 3.753%, and 0.993% of syntactical units respectively; in the War on Drugs, 2.207%, 6.947%, and 2.307%. Here, expansion of agencies like the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Department of Homeland Security embody those direct expansions to combat the issue; likewise, expanded budget rhetoric
focuses on the tangible, monetary needs of combating the out-group in each crisis, with each presidency focusing on increasing the budgetary allocation as anxiety intensifies. Such budgetary emphasis serves to position the president as an effective and goal-oriented leader with, again, a concrete plan for restitution of the current state of crisis. New legislation simply codifies specific acts and policies by name, and again positions leadership in a positive of effectiveness.

Though not any of the more heavily employed syntactical frameworks, these policy suggestions compound to point to an effort of presidents who have characterized the out-group, positioned the in-group as the morally righteous, and escalated the state of the crisis in rhetoric as decisively prepared to end the aberration and ready to increase the capacity, resources, and tools of the government to realize these goals. By heightening the state of crisis through these mechanisms, presidents were then enabled to propose these policy solutions, positioned as strong, moral leaders.

Conclusion

The presence of emphasizing in-group social identification, distancing and vilifying an out-group, and heightening language based in fear through emphasis on crisis as rhetorical tools all found realization in this study of presidential speeches in the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. These tools serve as means to justify punishment of the out-group to extreme degrees and to proffer direct solutions in the presidency, emphasizing higher levels of punitive rhetoric than language based in rehabilitation of out-group members. More similar than different, the emphatic discussion of the war of morality between the in-group and out-group in both case studies defines the conversation of the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, and embodies the characteristics of a moral panic and elite-driven conversations on fear, anxiety, and panic. Based on this analysis, I find that presidents effortfully identified and characterized members of the out-
group in each case while uplifting members of the in-group, drawing on the power of fear and anxiety towards specific groups as means to gain support for their punishment and incarceration.

There was a presence of all of the rhetorical trends I hypothesized, reflecting the work broadly in the fields of political psychology, criminology, political communications, and sociology regarding fear’s ability to drive moral wedges in divided societies, and to create negative outcomes for those on the wrong side of those lines. Each stage of the process of generating fear and anxiety manifested as I had hypothesized, including characterization of the out-group, uniting the in-group, escalating feelings of crisis and fear, and solutions of punishment and expansion of government. Though rehabilitation rhetoric of the War on Drugs has increased in the last two presidencies, such rehabilitation rhetoric, again, highlights sufferers of the opioid epidemic, and denies rehabilitation attribution to communities of color more gravely impacted by crack and other epidemics over the last six decades, the likes of whom were also disproportionately incarcerated. Except for President Trump’s speech in 2018, the War on Drugs demonstrates a distinct trend to concentrate on domestic folk devils, and the War on Terror focuses far more on foreign folk devils, as I had predicted. The aberration of Trump’s speech focusing on foreign folk devils in the War on Drugs, again, may be accounted for in an anti-immigration platform that finds resonance in discussion of international drug trafficking, as well as a shifting of out-group blame towards another, more specific minority group in Hispanic and Latinx immigrants.

Each stage of the coding schema and their documented presences in the presidential speeches of this study finds reflection in the patterns of moral panics. Those who represent the norms of society, in both presidents and the “Good Americans,” were able to realize specific policy goals and ascribe negative attributes to a folk devil, be them drug users in communities of
color or the broadly homogenized communities of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and other racially and ethnically generalized groups who were subjected to institutionalized discrimination and bigotry. Here, my predictions of the language of moral panics and intergroup interactions were tangible in presidential language – and the negative description of out-groups aligns directly with the policy and social consequences they faced historically in both time periods. The escalation of these patterns of fearful rhetoric, in the moral panic framework, have enabled a strengthening of the judiciary, increasing punitive and war-like actions, an expanded budget, and increasing executive authority.

With a higher concentration of domestic folk devil rhetoric in the War on Drugs and a higher concentration of foreign folk devil rhetoric in the War on Terror, my third and fourth hypotheses also found realization in the content analysis of this study. Indeed, characterization of the folk devil in each time period was a major focus of every speech – and despite their geographic disparities in concentration, the characterization of each out-group as immoral, violent, unwavering, and omnipresent was realized in latent content analysis. Thus, focusing on punishment, on the state of crisis, and on the in-group of victims and heroes suffering from and fighting the out-group mirror the progression of moral panics and other time periods characterized by fear and anxiety.

In looking at trends of consolidating in-group identification, the especially concentrated use of hero rhetoric echoes much of the political psychology literature on intergroup anxiety and social identity theory. By drawing on cues of shared loss and harm through victim rhetoric, moral righteousness and responsibility in hero rhetoric, and cues of patriotism, nationalism, and shared religious abstractions, presidents in the War on Terror and the War on Drugs effectively
encouraged in-group identification and garnered support for many of their intended policy outcomes.

Consequences of in-group favoritism have been tied, again, to negative implications for support for denial of civil liberties in times of crisis and decreased support for social welfare of out-group members (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle 1994). Other consequences for high levels of in-group identification include high levels of panic, fear, and anxiety (Branscombe et al. 1993), increased stereotyping and discriminatory responses, and support for militarism, surveillance, restriction of out-group members’ participation, and incarceration (Huddy et al. 2005). Promoting this notion of collective insecurity, shared perceptions of unsafety and threat in the American in-group bode for high levels of intolerance and the seeking of extreme measures to protect the in-group (Greenberg et al. 1992). These consequences, whose support finds evidence throughout the literature in political psychology, were realized in both case studies. In both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, out-group members experienced high levels of surveillance, wrongful detainment, denial of due process, militarism, and acts of prejudice set in racial profiling and bigoted policymaking.

As is demonstrated in the breakdown of syntactical units in the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, presidents of the last seventy years have not shied away from exploiting times of panic into amplified crises (Page and Shapiro 2010). Presidential speechmaking is a documented, salient factor in creating and managing the emotional cultures of any given time period (Loseke 2009). Through the mechanism of nationally publicized speechmaking, the possibility of creating social distance between the American in-group and any chosen out-group reflects the possibility of an “us-versus-them” paradigm conducive to high levels of fear, panic, anxiety, and threat (Morone 2004; Albertson and Gadarian 2015). By amplifying the salience and publicity of
threat, again, these trends of increased fear and anxiety are made possible, and an otherwise heterogeneous American public can be united by a shared emotional culture predicated on patriotism, morality, threat, and fear (Loseke 2009). Hearing these nationally broadcasted speeches, individuals of the American in-group had the opportunity to be informed by the same media, and to opt into this shared emotional culture bonded across cross-cutting identities (Loseke and Kusebach 2008).

Although copious factors in media influenced the creation, sustaining, and solving of each panic, it is undeniable that presidential speeches of each time period are characterized by a focus on vilifying the out-group, uniting a “Good American” in-group through cues of fear, anxiety, bravery, and patriotism, and a focus on providing specific policy solutions that aim to reconcile these generated emotions of panic. The documented rise of concern for drug addiction and drug-related crime, as well as support for invasion of Iraq on falsified evidence, suggests a potency of cultural anxiety in sustaining misinformation and supporting related policies. Promoting a law and order-based, conservative, hawkish reaction to the issues of drugs, crime, and terrorism find resonance in these cues of fear.

In American and global history, the power of emphasizing in-groups and out-groups in political communications has been a culprit of societal division with grave consequences: wars of both abstract and concrete nature have been founded upon such wedges, beyond the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. This paradigm, of us-versus-them, has been integral to shaping the course of American history in countless issues and between countless groups of people defined by any number of characteristics: race, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation. When politicians knowingly drive wedges between groups for political means, the results can take the form of discrimination, punitive policymaking, and social and cultural upheaval, in which out-
groups – specifically, minorities – historically have paid the price. In a political era where cues of fear and anxiety, as well as appeals to division and isolation of out-groups in opposition to American values, continue to shape our modern political discourse in drastic ways, understanding the rhetorical tools that presidents can employ to stoke and manipulate fear in individuals is crucial. The susceptibility of citizens to misinformation and support for increasingly punitive policies against out-group members is something to indeed be cognizant of. The implications for participation, social consequences, and belief systems are grave, if allowed to proceed unchecked.
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