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Clarifying Goals, Revitalizing Means: An Independent Evaluation of the Freedom Online Coalition

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Clarifying Goals, Revitalizing Means: An Independent Evaluation of the Freedom Online Coalition

Abstract

This independent evaluation of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) was commissioned by the Coalition as it approaches its fifth anniversary. The FOC sought input into a wider strategic review they are carrying out to assess its effectiveness with a particular focus on four areas – membership, governance and structure, the Coalition’s efforts and activities, and funding.

Thirty interviews with government representatives, members of civil society, business representatives, and academics were conducted between September 2015 and January 2016, along with an in-person consultation with 14 stakeholders at the Internet Governance Forum in Brazil in November 2015. Desk research on five similar types of organizations was used for comparative purposes.

The findings of this research show that there is significant support for the existence of the Coalition and for its continuation as a government only coalition. However, there are a number of criticisms of the FOC, including the lack of transparency about its activities, inadequate consequences for countries not meeting their commitments, and frustration at the ambiguity of the aims and objectives of the Coalition, and the few tangible results that have been produced so far. A number of respondents also talked about the ways in which the Snowden revelations have complicated efforts to work on Internet freedom. There are specific recommendations in each of the four areas covered in the evaluation, but the highest priority suggestions for the Coalition moving forward are as follows:

- Clarify the aims and objectives of the Coalition;
- Increase the legitimacy of the Coalition by establishing a mechanism through which stakeholders can raise concerns about the actions of a member government;
- Institute a mechanism whereby members’ performance at meeting their commitments can be periodically reviewed;
- Establish more stable funding for the Coalition through the introduction of multi-year commitments and a tiered funding model;
- Create a formal link between the working groups and the FOC’s governance in order to ensure that outputs from the working groups are considered and responded to by the FOC;
- Improve the Coalition’s communication, clarifying membership criteria and rendering more transparent, to the extent possible, its diplomatic interventions.

The Coalition is still a young institution and some of the issues it faces are a reflection of this. However, there are areas that the FOC must address to increase its effectiveness. Ultimately, the question for the Coalition is whether it can rise to the challenge of leading the global conversations that will drive action and policy making on Internet freedom in an increasingly complex world.

Disciplines

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Clarifying Goals, Revitalizing Means:

An Independent Evaluation of the Freedom Online Coalition

Susan Morgan



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About the Author

Susan Morgan has twenty years' experience working in both the public and private sectors. For the last fifteen years she has worked in the technology sector. Now a London-based freelance consultant, she was the first Executive Director of the Global Network Initiative, a Washington DC located multistakeholder initiative focused on the responsibilities of technology companies to protect the free expression and privacy rights of their users when receiving government requests around the world. Prior to that, she worked for British Telecom (BT) in the commercial heart of the business and then on corporate responsibility issues, leading BT's strategy, policy and public reporting across the company. The first seven years of her career were with The Industrial Society, now known as The Work Foundation. She has a BA and MA in Politics from Durham University, UK. You can find out more about her work at <http://www.susanmichellemorgan.com>

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About the University of Pennsylvania Center for Global Communication Studies and the Internet Policy Observatory

The Center for Global Communication Studies (CGCS) is a leader in international education and training in comparative media law and policy. Based at the Annenberg School for Communication (University of Pennsylvania), CGCS produces original research, offers opportunities for graduate students, organizes conferences and trainings, and provides consulting and advisory assistance to academic centers, governments, and NGOs. The Center's interdisciplinary research and policy work address media regulation, media and democracy, monitoring and evaluation of media development programs, public service broadcasting, and the media's role in conflict and post-conflict environments.

CGCS's Internet Policy Observatory (IPO) is a program tasked with researching the dynamic technological and political contexts in which Internet governance debates take place and provides a networking function among relevant communities of activists, academics, and policy makers. The Observatory sponsors research and studies ongoing events and key decisions on Internet policy. To learn more about the project or to inquire about research collaborations with the IPO, please visit globalnetpolicy.org or email internetpolicy@asc.upenn.edu.

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Executive Summary

As the Freedom Online Coalition approaches its five year anniversary, it commissioned this research to review the cumulative work of the Coalition, assess its effectiveness and specifically get feedback on four key areas – membership, governance and structure, the Coalition’s efforts and activities, and funding.

Thirty interviews with government representatives, members of civil society, business representatives, and academics were conducted between September 2015 and January 2016, along with an in-person consultation with 14 stakeholders in Brazil in November 2015. Desk research was also conducted on five similar types of organizations for comparative purposes.

The findings of this research show that there is significant support for the existence of the Coalition and for it continuing as a government only coalition. However, there are also a number of criticisms of the FOC, including the lack of transparency about its activities, inadequate consequences for countries not meeting their commitments, and frustration at the ambiguity of the aims and objectives of the Coalition and the few tangible results that have been produced so far. A number of respondents also talked about the ways in which the Snowden revelations have complicated efforts to work on Internet freedom. There are specific recommendations in each of the four areas covered in the evaluation, but the highest priority suggestions for the Coalition moving forward are as follows:

- **Clarify the aims and objectives of the Coalition;**
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- **Establish more stable funding for the Coalition through the introduction of multi-year commitments and a tiered funding model;**
- **Create a formal link between the working groups and the FOC’s governance in order to ensure that outputs from the working groups are considered and responded to by the FOC;**
- **Improve the Coalition’s communication, clarifying membership criteria and rendering more transparent, to the extent possible, its diplomatic interventions.**

The Coalition is still a young institution and some of the stumbling blocks it faces are a reflection of this. However, there are issues that the FOC must address to increase its effectiveness. Ultimately, the question for the Coalition is whether it can rise to the challenge of leading the global conversations that will drive action and policy making on Internet freedom in an increasingly complex world.

Introduction

Launched in 2011 in The Hague soon after the revolution in Tunisia and political upheaval across the Middle East, the Freedom Online Coalition was first formed as a loose Coalition of 15 countries working to advance Internet Freedom.¹ At its foundation is the principle that offline human rights ought to apply online and that a free and open Internet is in service of human rights and contributes to development and economic growth. The Tallinn declaration several years later added further detail to the focus and commitments of the Coalition.² The website of the Coalition has more information about its work.³

The landscape of Internet freedom has evolved dramatically since 2011 and the Coalition has itself undergone considerable expansion and development since its formation. It now has 29 members (see Annex A for a full list of members) and has established working groups on specific aspects of Internet freedom that include members of civil society, industry representatives and academics.

The FOC's primary efforts in its first couple of years were hosting an annual Internet Freedom conference and the creation of the Digital Defenders Partnership, a fund for individuals and organizations working to defend a free and open Internet who may have found themselves at risk. In 2013, three working groups were established that brought that brought other stakeholders (civil society, business, and academics) to the FOC's table.⁴

The day-to-day activity of the Coalition is led by the Coalition Chair, who rotates on an annual basis. The Chair also hosts the annual conference in their country

and is supported by the Friends of the Chair, a group of the most involved countries in the Coalition, including the previous Chair. The Coalition is supported by an external Secretariat that provides coordination, administrative support and acts as a point of contact for anyone wanting to know more about the Coalition.

In the last five years, the broader Internet freedom and Internet governance agendas have developed significantly. Before this, the Tunis Agenda that emerged from the 2003 Geneva World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and 2005 WSIS in Tunis led to the creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The IGF brings together several thousand stakeholders from civil society, business, academia and the technical community at an annual week-long event to discuss public policy issues relating to the Internet. A number of regional and national IGFs have been created to continue those discussions at a more local level.⁵

In the years since the Arab Spring, which jettisoned concerns about free expression and privacy to the top of the global agenda, the topic of online human rights has been a prominent feature at the IGF. Following the resolution passed at the Human Rights Council in 2012 that the same rights that apply offline also apply online, there have been a number of reports produced by the UN in the last few years focused on issues related to Internet freedom and human rights.⁶ The first was by Frank La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Expression and Opinion.⁷ The following year saw "The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age" published, which led to the creation of the first Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy.⁸ In 2015, David Kaye, the UN Special Rapporteur on

1 Freedom Online: Joint Action for Free Expression on the Internet, Publication, February 2013, <https://www.freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/1-The-Hague-FOC-Founding-Declaration-with-Signatories-as-of-2013.pdf>.
 2 Ministers of the Freedom Online Coalition, Recommendations for Freedom Online, Publication, April 28, 2014, <https://www.freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/FOC-recommendations-consensus.pdf>
 3 Freedom Online Coalition, last modified April 2016, <https://www.freedomonlinecoalition.com/>
 4 Working group 1 – A free and secure Internet; Working group 2 – Digital development and openness; Working group 3 – Privacy and transparency online

5 "IGF Initiatives," Internet Governance Forum, last modified 2016, <http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf-initiatives>.
 6 United Nations, Human Rights Council, 20/8. The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet, Geneva: United Nations, 2012, http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/RES/20/8
 7 United Nations, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, By Frank LaRue, Geneva: United Nations, 2011, how to http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf.
 8 United Nations, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, Geneva: United Nations, 2014. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf.

the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Expression and Opinion, produced a report on encryption that explored whether or not free expression and privacy rights protect secured communication using encryption and anonymity and the extent to which governments can impose restrictions.⁹

The 2013 Snowden revelations about the surveillance activities of the National Security Agency in the US and Government Communications Headquarters in the UK rocked Internet policy communities worldwide and shone a spotlight on the activities of liberal democracies as well as repressive states.

A number of organizations have emerged in recent years that concentrate on these issues, for example the Global Network Initiative, which brings tech companies together with human rights organizations, investors and academics. Established organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, AccessNow, Bytes for All, the Centre for Internet and Society, Derechos Digitales and Privacy International are either fully focused on these issues or have incorporated them into their work. Many foundations that fund civil society work are increasingly

developing specific digital rights programs including HIVOS, which runs the Digital Defenders Partnership launched by the FOC.

Within this landscape, the FOC is uniquely a government-only coalition focused on Internet freedom. This gives it the opportunity to advance the cause of Internet freedom through diplomatic interventions and its Digital Defenders Partnership as well as facilitating communication and contact between governments and other stakeholders within the working groups.

The Freedom Online Coalition commissioned this independent evaluation as it approaches the fifth year since its launch, with the intention of assessing the work of the Coalition to date, getting feedback from stakeholders, and seeking recommendations to increase the FOC's future effectiveness. There was particular interest in four areas – membership of the FOC, the governance and structure of the FOC, feedback on the importance of the current activities of the Coalition, and funding. This report will feed into a wider review of the FOC's work that is being run by a working group within the Coalition. The recommendations in this report are a combination of those that come from the author, as well as those that came from synthesizing interviewee and consultation responses.

9 David Kaye, "Report on Encryption, Anonymity, and the Human Rights Framework," The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/CallForSubmission.aspx>.

Methodology

The research for this evaluation was carried out during September 2015 to January 2016 using a combination of in-person and phone interviews, an in-person consultation at the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in João Pessoa, Brazil in November 2015, and desk research.

Two interview questionnaires, one for government members and one for all other stakeholders, were designed to extract feedback from respondents about the four key areas of the evaluation – membership of the Coalition, the governance and structure of the FOC, the current focus of activities of the FOC, and funding. The questionnaire for government members included a greater degree of detail, reflecting the fact that they are more closely involved in the day-to-day work of the FOC. Opinions were also sought about Coalition successes thus far, challenges and opportunities that the Coalition faces and what benefits people see from working with or being part of the Coalition.

The desk research was designed to complement the information gathered from the primary research to provide useful comparative information on these issues as the recommendations were drawn up. The same four areas of interest (membership, governance, focus of activities, and funding) were reviewed over five similar organizations (The Community of Democracies, The

Open Government Partnership, The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative and the International Code of Conduct Association).

Thirty interviews were carried out with government representatives from the Coalition, members of the Coalition working groups, and other external stakeholders not involved in the Coalition's work. Government representatives, civil society organizations, industry representatives, and academics were interviewed. The author was given the names of government representatives and working group members by the FOC from which a list of interviewees was developed. Ten government representatives were interviewed and twenty non-government members, including four company representatives, seven from civil society, three academics and six Internet freedom experts who are not currently involved in the FOC's work.

At the IGF, 14 people representing different stakeholder groups attended a 90 minute focus group-like consultation and were asked the same set of questions. Government representatives were not present at the consultation in Brazil.

The Center for Global Communications Studies at the University of Pennsylvania provided project support, methodological guidance, and editorial assistance.

Findings

The first section of the questionnaire asked a series of general questions about motivation for joining the FOC, benefits of membership, successes and shortcomings of the organization, as well as the the FOC's challenges and opportunities.

Reasons for Joining the Coalition and the Benefits of Membership

When government members were asked why they had joined the FOC, the most frequent response was a desire to support the Internet freedom agenda in the face of restrictions to a free and open Internet that were being seen around the world.

“In 2011, Internet freedom was already one of the top priorities for the Swedish government. Trying to build a group on these issues that could be a stronger voice on an international level was a key motivation.”

Frida Gustafsson, Attaché, Permanent Delegation of Sweden to the OECD and UNESCO

“The restrictions we were seeing being placed on the Internet in many parts of the world at the time were a key reason for it being established.”

Stephen Lowe, Freedom of Expression Team Leader, Human Rights and Democracy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK

“The Coalition brings together three issues that are very important to Costa Rica: Human rights, the respect for freedom, and the Internet.”

Mario Hernandez, official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica in the team for the Freedom Online Coalition

From the perspective of the Coalition's government members, the most frequently mentioned benefit of membership was improved diplomatic coordination and the opportunity to work with like-minded government partners to break through some of the traditional diplomatic blocks. Because the Coalition's structure combines member governments and the involvement of other stakeholders through the working groups and because the nature of diplomacy is often off the record, this benefit is largely invisible to those interviewees outside government and did not feature in their responses.

Other benefits that Government representatives highlighted included:

- Demonstrating to other parts of their own governments that it is possible to work constructively with other stakeholders, particularly civil society;
- Facilitating engagement with other parts of government on Internet freedom and its connectedness with other issues such as cyber security and national security;
- Raising the visibility of their government at international events such as the IGF;
- Using the Coalition as a valuable venue to talk about security and human rights concerns;
- Facilitating the use of diplomatic channels to progress towards the 2012 Human Rights Council resolution regarding the same rights applying online that apply offline;
- Increasing knowledge within government of rapidly evolving technology and the potential implications for human rights.

“It has been a reasonably constructive space to discuss how we balance our need for national security with our human rights obligations.”

Stephen Lowe, Freedom of Expression Team Leader, Human Rights and Democracy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK

“When we are talking about Internet freedom we can say we are working with a lot of other countries through the Freedom Online Coalition, so it is useful public diplomacy.”

Australian government official

In contrast, when asked about the benefits of being involved in the FOC, non-governmental stakeholder responses were inflected differently. For example, these respondents appreciated the collective sharing of challenges among stakeholders, gaining insight into the way in which governments work on Internet freedom both publicly and privately, learning about dilemmas faced by companies, finding areas of common interest to work on, as well as the role the FOC working groups play in sustaining a global, multistakeholder conversation about Internet freedom.

“There is a lot of US expertise on these issues among non-government stakeholders so having people from other countries in the working groups helps that expertise to develop and also makes sure that voices and perspectives from other countries are included.”

Stefan Heumann, Member of the management of Stiftung neue verantwortung

The FOC’s Successes

Respondents across all stakeholder groups most frequently cited the FOC’s creation of a space for government coordination and engagement on critical topics with other stakeholders through the working groups as a success.

Other successes cited include:

- The growing number of member states;
- The quality of the substance and discussion in the working groups;
- The fact that the annual conferences have been held in locations around the world, including the Global South;
- Opening up conversations on critical subjects and raising awareness of Internet freedom;

- Its uniqueness as a coalition of like-minded states;
- The Digital Defenders Partnership.

“The Tallinn Agenda makes it possible for companies operating in those markets to have a conversation about their commitments.”

Patrik Hiselius, Senior Advisor, Digital Rights, Teliasonera

“One of their successes is that it created a space for governments to have conversations when they didn’t have the forum or the space to do so.”

Eduardo Bertoni, Global Clinical Professor, New York University, School of Law

FOC Shortcomings

A majority of respondents mentioned the lack of concrete deliverables and the difficulty in pointing to specific impacts the Coalition has had as shortcomings. Common responses include:

- A lack of clarity on what the Coalition is and what it is trying to achieve;
- The challenge of pointing to tangible results and successes since the creation of the Coalition and the need to create clearer metrics to measure successes;
- The need for better external communication about the Coalition’s work;
- Poor senior level government attendance at the most recent FOC conferences.

Depending on the stakeholder affiliation of the respondent, shortcomings were expressed differently. For example, government representatives were more likely to talk about the challenge of defining the FOC’s work post-Snowden, but other stakeholder groups were more likely to talk about hypocrisy and questioned whether signing up to the FOC commitments is making any tangible difference in member countries.

Other shortcomings mentioned include:

- The relative weight of resources and institutional emphasis given to cyber security rather than Internet freedom within governments;
- The invisibility of the diplomatic work of the Coalition to those outside the FOC (including to members of the working groups);
- The lack of a significantly diverse global membership;
- The perceived inadequate response to the growth of restrictions on Internet freedom, including among FOC member countries;
- The uneven capacity among member countries and its impact on active involvement in the Coalition;
- A lack of clarity on whether the principles of the Coalition are being followed by members and unclear consequences for membership if they are not;
- The slow pace of progress in the working groups (particularly in Working Group Two on Digital Development and Openness) and the creation of joint statements from the FOC.

“I’ve seen very little media coverage of anything the FOC does, and I think journalists who cover these things have probably not heard of the FOC. That is unfortunate.”

Rebecca MacKinnon, Director, Ranking Digital Rights at New America

“There’s a major tension point now with what the purpose of the FOC is. We have to figure out what we can all work on together in order to improve our goals.”

Chris Riley, Head of Public Policy, Mozilla

Challenges and Opportunities for the FOC

Respondents registered both frustration and optimism when asked about challenges and opportunities for the FOC. Some were skeptical about its ability to achieve meaningful change but others were more optimistic that concrete achievements were just a matter of time, especially if the FOC actively confronts roadblocks such as the different levels of interest among member states.

Other challenges identified included:

- Broadening membership geographically;
- Keeping members engaged and committed to a strong set of principles;
- Creating greater clarity on the added value of the FOC and what it is trying to achieve;
- The discrepancy between what members of the FOC have committed to and what they do in practice;
- The need for some kind of accountability mechanism to address instances in which member governments are not meeting their Internet freedom commitments;
- Developing specific indicators and measures of success;
- Recapturing credibility after the Snowden revelations;
- Ensuring that the people in the room have the authority within their governments to make policy.

Opportunities:

- Promising growth in the membership of the Coalition and the opportunity to involve a broader range of governments in its mission;
- Building on the solid foundation that already exists among the working groups to deliver high quality, substantive outputs;
- Championing an online human rights framework through the establishment and promotion of best practices in Internet policy-making;

- **Facilitating honest discussion among members about the challenge of meeting FOC commitments in the present global environment;**
- **Creating something like the Universal Periodic Review to evaluate progress on member commitments;¹⁰**
- **Acting as a counterweight to the top down vision of Internet governance promoted by some authoritarian states;**
- **Developing a capacity-building model that offers added value to FOC members.**

“The FOC could potentially be a platform through which best practices get established and promoted and that would be a very good thing.... I’ve seen some evidence of best practices being suggested by the working groups but I’m not seeing any evidence of best practices being implemented by governments yet.”

Rebecca MacKinnon, Director, Ranking Digital Rights at New America

Membership of the Coalition¹¹

Respondents were asked whether they thought other stakeholders should become full members of the Coalition. The majority of all interviewees (22) thought Coalition membership should continue to be government only. Two were supportive of making it a multistakeholder initiative and six either didn’t have a view or didn’t know. Several people commented on the difficulty of having a firm view on this until there is greater clarity on the overall purpose of the Coalition. Some respondents, although supportive of the idea of retaining it as a government-only coalition, wanted to

see a greater link between the working groups and the FOC.

Since its launch in 2011, the Coalition has grown from 15 to 29 members. When asked about whether continuing to grow the membership of the Coalition was important, 17 respondents wanted to see a greater emphasis on the quality of membership rather than the quantity of members. Once again, many respondents said that this decision depends on more clarity about the purpose and objectives of the Coalition itself. Several respondents pointed out that it shouldn’t be a binary choice between growing the Coalition or not, but more about ensuring better geographic and regional membership of the Coalition in a way that does not negatively impact its principles. Ten respondents (six of them government respondents) were of the view that growing the membership should be the priority, and three respondents did not have an opinion on this topic.

“I would definitely go for a high bar rather than a universal approach. If you’re going to call it the Freedom Online Coalition then the goal should be to preserve freedom online and create certain conditions for membership.”

David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression

Many respondents did not have strong views on whether the current, fairly informal procedure to join the FOC should be made more formal. Thirteen (six of whom were government members) were in favor of adopting a more formal procedure, five were not in favor, and 12 either had no view or didn’t know. Many of the non-government respondents were unaware of the current procedure.

There was support for the idea of creating a tiered level of membership or some kind of observer status from 19 respondents. Three were not supportive, and eight did not express an opinion.

One of the key issues this evaluation addressed is whether membership in the FOC should entail ongoing commitments. In the current model, once a government has joined, there is a requirement to uphold the

¹⁰ “Universal Periodic Review,” United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, last modified in 2016, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx>.

¹¹ The remaining parts in this section of the report break down the responses that were received on the four key areas of membership, governance and structure, the focus of the activities of the FOC and finances. The number of respondents in this report is too small to meaningfully break out into percentages along the different stakeholder groups. Where there are particularly interesting differences in the responses between different stakeholder groups these are pointed out.

founding principles, but there is no mechanism of enforcement. There was almost unanimous support for some manner of standard, continued commitments for FOC members across all categories of respondents. Only two interviewees expressed reservations, largely around how practical it would be to introduce ongoing commitments at this stage.

“I think there should be some sort of standard that members keep up to and some obligation that they should respect and fulfill.”

Mario Hernandez, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica official on the Freedom Online Coalition team

Determining a set of commitments for FOC members is inextricably linked with the Coalition’s goals. The core issue to be determined is whether the Coalition is an outward facing initiative seeking impact on the ground or a more inwardly focused organization concerned with monitoring the performance of members who have made a commitment to Internet freedom. Many participants in this evaluation thought the Coalition needed to establish a mechanism for demonstrating whether or not member governments are meeting their commitments. Interviewees most frequently cited the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) that takes place through the UN Human Rights Council as an example of how this might be done. The UPR could be used as the basis to develop a similar type of mechanism for the FOC. Alternatively, issues of Internet freedom already appear in the UPR process itself and it would be worth exploring the possibility of this being increased so that outcomes from the UPR could be part of the FOC mechanism.

A number of interviewees brought up the failure of some governments to play an active role in the Coalition, citing the lack of participation from a number of governments at the 2015 annual FOC conference in Ulaanbaatar as an example. Lack of resources among some countries contributes to this issue, but respondents felt there should be minimum requirements, including attendance at the annual conference, in order to be members in good standing of the FOC.

Suspension or removal from the Coalition, and what (if anything) ought to trigger it, was the final section of the questionnaire’s section on membership. Even

though the Coalition is a voluntary, government-only organization, there was remarkable consensus among respondents that there ought to be a mechanism to either suspend or remove members.

“While there is desire to expand membership in the FOC to increase global awareness and support for freedom online, there should be a vehicle or mechanism for challenging members in their failure to live up to their commitment.”

Eileen Donohoe, Director of Global Affairs, Human Rights Watch

Some respondents had concerns about the practicality of implementing and enforcing these mechanisms. A contingent felt FOC members should be able to vote to remove members, but several pointed to the challenges of voting to remove members, given potential diplomatic issues that could arise. One government representative suggested a connection between a periodic review and a reaffirmation of a government’s commitment to being a member of the Coalition every few years. Several respondents wanted to see the same governance process for both joining the Coalition and potential removal or suspension of membership.

Recommendations

- **Keep the Coalition’s membership restricted to governments but review this in two to four years. At this stage, the FOC’s government-only composition is its uniqueness but, as its efforts progress, bringing stakeholders formally into the governance structure may make sense and should not be ruled out;**
- **Create a mechanism for a stakeholder from each working group to act as a liaison between the working group and FOC members. This will help build trust and more open communication between the FOC and the working groups;**
- **Develop clearer membership criteria that explains the ongoing expectations for members and aids other stakeholders’ understanding these commitments;¹²**

¹² For example, who is involved in the decision, and a publicly available process for applying. The application process should include a self-assessment from the applying Government on their current performance measured against the Coalition’s principles.

- After the Coalition's rapid growth, it should suspend new membership for a period of 12 months to consider the other recommendations from this report and implement its response;
- Institute minimum membership participation standards, such as participation in the annual conference;
- Revisit the idea of an observer status for the Coalition within two years;
- Create a mechanism for stakeholders to raise concerns about the performance of a particular Coalition member which includes the requirement for the member government to respond;
- Over the longer term, create a review mechanism (possibly every three years) for Coalition members' progress to be evaluated, using the Universal Periodic Review as a model. During the development of this mechanism, the Coalition will need to consider whether to introduce the potential suspension or removal of members.

Governance and Structure of the Coalition

Government respondents were asked a more detailed set of questions about the FOC's day-to-day functioning. These focused on the role of the Chair, the Friends of the Chair and the Secretariat.

Many government interviewees felt a tension between the current informal arrangements for governance and the potential need to evolve into a more formal structure as the Coalition matures.

When asked if there needed to be a more formal way of selecting the Chair, the majority of respondents (seven out of ten) were in favor of the current informal process. Currently, the Chair of the FOC hosts the annual conference, and a number of respondents noted that this can be a burden on non-Western states with more limited resources, and is contradictory to the desire among members to see more even participation among member states. Three people suggested the creation of a rotating Vice-Chair that would host the conference, easing the Chair's burden. Nine of the ten government representatives interviewed thought that the development of terms of reference for the Friends of the Chair would be beneficial, particularly one which ensures continuity within the group and precludes a

possible scenario where all members step down or rotate at the same time.

In comparison, all five organizations whose structures were reviewed (see Annex B) have a more formal overall structure, including a board, board terms and the development of an overall governance framework. With the exception of the Open Government Partnership, however, the FOC is a much younger organization, which may help to explain this informality.

The Secretariat

Global Partners Digital, a London-based social purpose company, currently provides the Secretariat support for the Coalition. This service is currently done on a one year contract basis. Government representatives were very complementary about the support they receive and the vital role that the Secretariat provides in keeping the Coalition on track.

The questionnaire tailored to FOC government members asked respondents their opinion about the establishment of a permanent Secretariat (all the comparative organizations reviewed have established one, with the exception of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights – see Annex B). There was provisional support from six government members for the creation of a permanent Secretariat, although many of those who supported the idea raised practical concerns such as the current lack of long-term funding for the Coalition, which would make the appointment of permanent staff challenging. Two respondents supported the current model and two were unclear as to what approach should be taken.

There was unequivocal support for the current contractual Secretariat arrangement to be reviewed on a regular basis if this model is retained (on a once every three-to-five year basis) and also for the competitive tendering of the contract. Currently those governments that contribute financially to the working of the Coalition pay for the Secretariat, and one person thought that those who contribute financially should determine the choice of the Secretariat.

On the whole, non-government stakeholders were not very familiar with the current arrangements, and of these, 12 expressed no view on the effectiveness of the governance structure of the Coalition. Those who did express views did so mainly around improvements

that could be made to the working groups, such as ensuring geographic diversity, and aligning stakeholder expectations with the outputs of the working groups. For example, it was mentioned that there needs to be clarity on whether/how the Coalition will consider the output from the working groups and whether it will implement any recommendations.

“There’s a kind of disconnect between the working groups and the Chair and Friends of the Chair at the Coalition that could be improved.”

Lucy Purdon, ICT Project Manager, Institute for Human Rights and Business

Recommendations

- **Introduce a Vice-Chair role while retaining the current informal arrangements for the selection of Chair;**
- **Consider revising the role of Chair such that it provides strategic direction for the Coalition and the Vice-Chair hosts of the annual conference;**
- **Develop concise terms of reference for the Friends of the Chair group;**
- **Institute a multi-year contract for the Secretariat of the Coalition and competitively tender it with the understanding that the countries contributing financially to the Secretariat will get to make the final selection;**
- **Review the creation of a permanent Secretariat again when the FOC is more established;**
- **Align stakeholder expectations and Coalition governance. Now that the Coalition has other stakeholders involved, it should create a formal link between the working groups’ outputs and the Coalition;**
- **Take under consideration whether the current consensus-decision making model could act as a barrier to implementation of the recommendations in this report. A more formal structure may need to be developed to ensure decisions can be made when consensus cannot be achieved.**

Coalition Efforts¹³

Interviewees for this project were asked to rate the importance of different efforts and activities of the Coalition with 1 being not at all important and 5 being very important.¹⁴ Notably, most activities have a relatively high score, with the exception of the publication of FOC statements and the side events at other conferences such as the IGF. The FOC annual conferences were also not rated as highly by external stakeholders not currently involved in the Coalition.

When asked about the future areas of focus for the FOC over the next few years, issues relating to terrorism, security and openness, surveillance and the security of critical infrastructure and how this relates to Internet freedom were mentioned. In addition to continuing existing activities, respondents brought up working on normative standards at a regional level, beginning to issue government transparency reports, placing increased focus on diplomatic coordination, growing Global South membership, and being more outspoken about the actions of repressive regimes.

¹³ Respondents were asked to rate the following Coalition efforts:

The Digital Defenders Partnership – A fund administered by Hivos to help individuals and organizations working in the digital emergency field.

The Annual Conferences held by the Coalition – Since its inception, the Coalition has held a conference once a year. So far, these have been held in The Hague, Tunis, Nairobi, Tallinn and Ulaanbaatar.

The interchange of ideas and best practice within the Coalition
Attending other conferences such as the IGF – Delegates from the FOC now regularly attend events such as the IGF and RightsCon to discuss its work and hold consultations on specific issues on which the working groups are focused.

The opportunity to work with other stakeholders through the working groups – In 2013, three working groups were established that bring FOC members together with NGOs, industry, and academics. Each working group is co-chaired by a government representative and a stakeholder.

Off the record meetings between the FOC and NGOs – These give FOC members the opportunity to hear about the state of Internet freedom in specific countries.

Publication of FOC statements – The FOC has now issued a number of statements on specific issues setting out their position on Internet freedom.

FOC work in regional networks e.g. HRC in Geneva and UNGA in New York – The FOC is now leveraging its contacts in New York and Geneva to put forward FOC positions on relevant resolutions.

¹⁴ In the interest of survey length, qualitative feedback about each activity or effort was not collected from the respondents.

Respondent Stakeholder Group						
Coalition Activity	NGO (7 respondents)	Academic (3 respondents)	Company (4 respondents)	Government (10 respondents)	External stakeholders not involved in Coalition (6 respondents)	Overall Average (30)
The opportunity to work with stakeholders in working groups	4.71	4.33	4.13	4.40	4.00	4.38
Internal exchange of best practice between FOC members	4.14	4.67	3.33	4.05	3.75	4.02
FOC Annual Conferences	3.57	4.00	5.00	4.35	2.75	3.98
Work with regional diplomatic networks e.g. United Nations General Assembly in New York and United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva	4.14	4.67	3.50	3.80	3.00	3.85
Digital Defenders Partnership ¹⁵	3.86	3.67	3.33	3.39	4.40	3.72
Off-the-record meetings with NGOs	4.00	3.67	3.00	3.80	3.33	3.73
Side events at conferences such as the IGF	3.86	3.67	3.13	3.60	2.75	3.48
Publication of FOC statements	3.71	2.67	2.75	3.75	3.33	3.43

“The Freedom Online Coalition should be part of the cutting edge conversations that are happening in the world, for example the privatization of governance. Governments have the primary responsibility for security but the private sector owns the vast majority of critical infrastructure. This has huge implications for free speech and privacy.”

Eileen Donohoe, Director of Global Affairs, Human Rights Watch

“For the moment I think the Coalition should work on improving the internal structure, making the work more meaningful and engage in more best practice discussions, improve the working groups and integrate them better into the outputs of the FOC.”

Stefan Heumann, Member of the management of Stiftung neue verantwortung

Recommendations

- Significantly enhance the FOC’s sharing of internal best practices. This has the potential to offer real value to Coalition members, particularly those whose policies in the area of Internet freedom are less well developed;
- Develop a concise statement of goals and the ways in which the Coalition’s activities facilitate meeting these goals. This should include the role of other stakeholders involved in the work of the FOC.

Funding

The FOC’s current funding comes from voluntary contributions by member governments with additional funding from industry for specific activities such as the annual conference and travel support for civil society members. The FOC budget has evolved over the past five years as the Coalition activities have expanded and developed, and it has fluctuated according to individual member states’ available funds. When compared to the other organizations reviewed for this work that make

¹⁵ There was support for the Digital Defenders Partnership, but several respondents made the comment that they didn’t necessarily think it needed to be connected to the FOC.

financial information available on their website, the FOC's budget is considerably lower.

All stakeholders were asked whether the FOC currently has sufficient money to meet its mandate and whether it should consider other sources of funding, for example, from foundations or industry. FOC members were also asked whether all governments should be required to make some financial contribution to the running of the Coalition.

Non-government interviewees were mostly not aware of the of the Coalition's budget position (16 respondents answered 'Don't Know' to the question of whether the FOC's budget was sufficient to meet its mandate). Eight (of ten) government respondents felt the FOC's funding was insufficient, and the two who felt it was sufficient noted that it was not stable.

Eighteen respondents were in favor of other funding sources being considered, but for most of them, it was important that this be transparent, on a case-by-case basis, and for specific projects. The other ten respondents were of the fairly strong opinion that the Coalition should not receive outside sources of funding (two declined to offer their opinion), because it could effectively put governments in competition with civil society groups for limited external funding.

“I think it would have to be very clear what is supported by the private sector but for specific activities I think there is value in exploring other possible funding.”

Australian government official

FOC members were largely in favor (seven out of ten) of a financial contribution requirement from all member governments, but registered concern about it being a potential barrier to entry for developing nations.

Recommendations

- **Be more transparent about the finances of the FOC via the website;**
- **On a case-by-case basis, other funding sources could be sought for specific projects in a way that does not place the FOC in a position where it is competing for funds with civil society;**
- **Draft a public statement about the ways in which the FOC will approach funding which should include a commitment to funding the day-to-day activities solely through member contributions;**
- **A simple, tiered funding model should be developed for member countries, including a nominal contribution for developing nations. Within the tiered system there should be an option of no financial contribution in order to not disincentivize developing nation membership.**

Conclusions

Overall, the interviews conducted as part of this evaluation revealed support for the existence of the Coalition, support for it remaining government only, strong support for the creation of the working groups and their potential added value, as well as confidence from government representatives in the Coalition's outputs in the diplomatic arena. However, respondents frequently cited the need to sharpen the Coalition's aims and objectives, clarify ongoing membership commitments and address accountability in terms of whether members are upholding those commitments. It is evident from their willingness to take part in this evaluation that respondents are invested in the future successes of the Coalition, but there was substantial criticism of the Coalition to date from non-government respondents, particularly around plugging the gap between the working groups and the lack of tangible outcomes so far.

Now in its fifth year, the FOC's success is somewhat dependent on its ability to mature as an organization and take steps to increase its legitimacy through better understanding of whether member commitments are being met. The involvement of other stakeholders in the Coalition through the working groups marks an important evolution in the trajectory of the FOC but it has also generated different expectations for the Coalition's accountability. It is vital that the Coalition address these concerns or the future active participation of other stakeholders may be at risk.

The FOC has the opportunity to leverage its distinctive governmental composition and lead critically important conversations on how governments can live up to their Internet freedom commitments and objectives in the current complex environment. This will be difficult to do but has the potential to produce important concrete results.

“The most important thing for me is an acknowledgement of tensions that have arisen and how to create the right incentives for deep engagement and collaboration.”

Chris Riley, Head of Public Policy, Mozilla

Recommendations

Contention around some recommendations in this evaluation will be inevitable, and the current consensus decision-making model of the FOC could be a potential barrier to making necessary changes. The utility of this decision-making model needs to be considered as the Coalition works out its response to the report and implements its next steps.

Clarifying the aims and objectives of the Coalition

Interviewees were vehement about the need to explicate the aims and objectives of the Coalition given the many new activities the FOC has taken on in the last few years, the involvement of other stakeholders directly in its work, and the new reality following the Snowden revelations. The lack of clarity makes it difficult to measure whether the FOC is meeting its mandate. Clarifying the coalition's intentions and function (including the involvement of non-government representatives in the working groups) should begin immediately, followed by the development of an internal monitoring framework, complete with success indicators. The Foundation Declaration from the Hague Conference and the recommendations at the Tallinn Conference several years later lay out the fundamentals of the FOC's work and can be used to create standards against which the FOC can be assessed.

Increasing accountability

Stakeholders need a mechanism whereby they can raise concerns about a member government. Creation of a light touch, preliminary model should be prioritized by the FOC and should include a requirement that the country of concern will respond to the issue.

Along these lines, the lack of consequences for members of the FOC who are not meeting their commitments, or who have changed their approach to Internet freedom since becoming members, is a significant concern. In contrast to the five organizations reviewed comparatively, although there is no common approach, they all stipulate expectations that have potential consequences if they are violated. This is one of the most important areas for the Coalition to address. The FOC should consider introducing a special work-

ing group to begin the introduction of a periodic review of members, along with a publicly available timeline for the implementation, which could include an acknowledgment that it will take some time to develop.

The current model is detrimental to its internal and external credibility. Minimum membership commitments should be developed, for example, attendance at the annual conference.

Developing the funding of the Coalition

The Coalition is funded mainly through the voluntary contributions of a handful of members. A tiered fee structure for membership of the Coalition should be introduced. Members should be encouraged to make a financial contribution, but it should be voluntary in order to not disincentivize the membership of states with fewer financial resources to join.

Multi-year financial commitments from the FOC would enable an ongoing commitment to the Secretariat, and should be introduced. In the longer term, the FOC should consider whether it needs a permanent dedicated Secretariat.

Improving governance

The involvement of other stakeholders in the working groups has complicated expectations among stakeholders. The interviews revealed a disconnection between the FOC and the working groups. The lack of clarity about the fate of work they produce is resulting in dissatisfaction among working group members. A more formalized link should be built into the governance structure with a commitment that the FOC will consider the output from working groups.

Improving external communications

Diplomatic coordination is an important part of the Coalition's work but it is not currently visible to anyone outside the FOC government members. Finding a way to address this through partially transparent measures, such as articulation of the different types of activities that take place, along with several examples that preserve confidentiality, would benefit the external validity and reputation of the Coalition.

Many of the non-government stakeholders involved in this evaluation were not familiar with the governance processes of the Coalition, for example its funding situation or even the basic process by which governments join. Some of the recommendations listed earlier in this report, such as creating clearer entry criteria, are the precursors to being able to communicate more effectively.

In closing

As a young organization, many of the challenges and concerns raised by those interviewed for this evaluation can be attributed to growing pains and the need for institutional maturity. However, this is not to say that the challenges faced by the FOC cannot also be attributed to what are now apparent structural flaws. Remediation of key governance issues, the creation of basic accountability mechanism for members, and clarity on what the Coalition is trying to achieve are essential. It is also critically important that the Coalition works to get itself onto firmer financial footing.

There is hope that the FOC can be a real change-making organization, given its unique composition of governments and the recent involvement of other stakeholders at the table. However, the FOC is currently having trouble navigating the fraught post-Snowden landscape to place itself at the center of difficult conversations that need to be had, and where the Coalition could be exceptionally suited for action. Its challenge in the coming years is to do this.

Annex A

Full list of coalition members

(As of February 5, 2016)



Australia
Austria
Canada
Costa Rica
The Czech Republic
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Ireland
Japan
Kenya
Latvia
Lithuania
The Maldives
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
The Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Spain
Sweden
Tunisia
United Kingdom
United States

Annex B

Comparison of other organizations (based on their website information in January 2016)

	Community of Democracies (CD)	Open Government Partnership (OGP)	International Code of Conduct on Private Security Service Providers Association (ICOCA)	Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Voluntary Principles)	Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI)
MEMBERSHIP					
What stakeholder groups are members of the organization?	CD is a government only coalition. Civil society, parliamentarians, the private sector, youth, and academia are also involved in its work.	OGP is a government coalition that involves civil society in its work. There are also partnerships with seven multilateral agencies including the World Bank, the Asia Development Bank, and the Organization for American States.	ICOCA is a multi-stakeholder organization with governments, companies and NGOs. Organizations can also be observers.	The Voluntary Principles is a multistakeholder model including governments, companies, and NGOs. There are also organizations that are observers of the Voluntary Principles.	The EITI is a multi-stakeholder coalition including governments, companies, NGOs, institutional investors, and partner organizations.
What is the size of the organization?	106 governments	69 governments	6 governments, 14 civil society organizations, over 700 private security companies	9 governments, 28 corporations, 10 NGOs	49 countries, over 90 companies, 9 NGOs
When was the organization founded?	2000	2011	2010	2000	2003
What is the process for joining?	Prospective members will be evaluated based on their support for emerging and transitional democracies, their participation in the UN Democracy Caucus, designation of a senior official to act as the point of contact, and tangible contributions to strengthening CD.	There is a section on the website that explains the process for joining. This involves achieving a minimum level of commitment to open government in the areas of fiscal transparency, access to information, income and asset disclosures and citizen engagement, submitting a letter of intent, and identifying a lead agency or ministry to develop the government action plan. The website displays a spreadsheet of the current status of member governments compared to the eligibility criteria.	Organizations wanting to join submit an application that is reviewed by the Secretariat with the Board making the decision on membership. It is also possible to be an observer member of ICOCA.	Applications are sent to the Secretariat and decisions on membership are made by the Steering Committee.	There are several different processes for different stakeholders joining the EITI. Governments can either be implementing countries or supporting countries. There are different obligations for each. Companies, investors and NGOs indicate their interest in joining the EITI, to support the implementation of the EITI standards and consider a voluntary financial contribution.

	Community of Democracies (CD)	Open Government Partnership (OGP)	International Code of Conduct on Private Security Service Providers Association (ICOCA)	Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Voluntary Principles)	Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI)
What are the commitments of membership?	The commitments of CD members are set out in the Warsaw Declaration of 2000, which includes 19 core democratic principles.	Joining the OGP entails committing to the Open Government Declaration of 2011, delivering a country action plan developed with public consultation, and committing to independent reporting on progress going forward.	Joining ICOCA means committing to their code of conduct, and certification depends on compliance with the code.	A set of principles articulate the steps member companies need to take to respect human rights while maintaining the security and safety of their operations.	The EITI is a global standard focused on the management of natural resources in an open and accountable way. Countries are responsible for implementing the standards.
Is there a process for removing members or assessing whether they are meeting their commitments? If so, what triggers this?	The Council can suspend membership by consensus for unconstitutional interruption or deviation from the democratic process.	OGP has adopted a Response Policy to enable concerns about members to be raised. Responses to issues raised are made public through their website. Members are also required to produce a self-assessment report, which is also made public.	ICOCA is a certification model for companies. This commits the companies to ongoing independent monitoring and evaluation. Companies are also required to report regularly on their performance. There is a process in place for complaints to be raised and for companies to be suspended if they have violated the code.	A government's status in the Voluntary Principles will be reviewed if there is consensus in one constituency that the government is committing genocide, widespread or systematic war crimes or crimes against humanity. There is no similar process for the review of either companies or NGOs, although NGOs must submit a letter each year requesting their continued involvement in the Voluntary Principles. The Voluntary Principles has a separate verification framework outlined for each type of member.	Implementing countries are required to publish the revenue they receive and companies also publish figures to enable comparison between the two. Implementing countries can be suspended from the EITI process. Two are currently suspended.
STRUCTURE					
What is the governance structure?	There is a Secretary General, a 28-country Governing Council and an International Steering Committee. An Executive Committee assists the Presidency which rotates between members of the Governing Council every two years.	A Steering Committee oversees the development of OGP's work. There are four co-chairs. There are also 2 OGP ambassadors.	There is a Board of Directors with 12 members and equal representation from all stakeholders. The General Assembly is a meeting of all members and takes place at least once a year.	The Plenary is the Voluntary Principle's decision making body and the Steering Committee is the main executive body of the Voluntary Principles. The Voluntary Principles Association addresses financial and administrative issues.	There is an independent Board Chair and a Board of 20, with representation of different stakeholders. A conference is held every 3 years for all members.
Is there a Secretariat?	There is a permanent Secretariat of 7 plus the Secretary General.	There is a permanent Secretariat of 14.	There is a permanent Secretariat of five.	The Secretariat for the Voluntary Principles is provided by the Washington, DC based law firm Foley Hoag.	There is a permanent Secretariat of 24.

	Community of Democracies (CD)	Open Government Partnership (OGP)	International Code of Conduct on Private Security Service Providers Association (ICOCA)	Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Voluntary Principles)	Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI)
FOCUS OF ACTIVITIES					
What are the key activities of the organization?	Promoting democracy and democratic values is done through working groups focused on a number of issues including governance and effectiveness, enabling civil society and improving electoral practices. There are also initiatives relating to specific countries. Ministerial conferences are held and there is capacity building work with civil society. The CD gives several awards and prizes, such as the Geremek Award. It also works to support transitional states (e.g. Tunisia) that have shown progress toward democracy via its "Democracy Partnership" initiative.	The focus of their activities is on advancing open government in member countries to benefit citizens. They achieve this by ensuring open government policy debates continue at the highest levels, supporting local reformers, fostering engagement with a wider range of stakeholders and holding countries accountable for the progress they are making in achieving their commitments.	The ICOCA promotes, governs, and oversees the ICOCA code. This includes providing certification for member companies that meet the standard; reporting, monitoring, and assessing the performance of member companies; and handling complaints that come in about member companies and potential violations of the code.	The Voluntary Principles is focused on the extractives industry (oil, mining, and gas companies and related governments and NGOs). The principles embodied in the code, that companies respect human rights while securing their operations, form its core activities. The emphasis of work is on mutual learning, best practice sharing, and joint problem solving with different stakeholders. An annual plenary meeting takes place for all members. Each participant in the Voluntary Principles is required to submit an annual report detailing what they are doing to implement or support the implementation of the Voluntary Principles.	Implementing the EITI standards is the key activity. This includes training and capacity building, validating the work of implementing countries, considering the applications of new countries, raising awareness of the standards, and publishing process and country reports. Work is currently underway to look at how the EITI can play a more active role in the public policy process.
FINANCES					
How is the organization financed?	There is no information about the financing of the CD on their website.	Foundations, bilateral agencies and governments fund the OGP with occasional company contributions.	ICOCA is funded primarily by its members. Government contributions are voluntary. It also receives funding from industry member dues and the one-time joining fee for applying members. Additionally, the Government of Switzerland and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) make significant in-kind contributions.	The Voluntary Principles is financed by government and corporate member contributions.	Companies, governments, and development agencies provide the funding. The majority of the funding comes from governments and development agencies (62% in 2014).
What is the budget for the organization?	There is no information about the budget of the CDs on their website.	The OGP's 2014 revenue was \$4.5 million.	ICOCA's 2016 budget is \$1.1 million.	There is no information about the budget of the Voluntary Principles on their website.	In 2014 the EITI's revenue was \$5 million.

Takeaways:

- Membership in each organization is based on a commitment to rights and principles.
- In terms of basic structure, the Communities of Democracies, despite its massive size and extremely broad focus, is most similar to the FOC as a coalition of nation states that involves other stakeholders in its work. The Voluntary Principles, ICOCA, and EITI all have formal multistakeholder structures. The OGP also involves civil society in the governance of its work.
- All five organizations are more established and institutionalized than the Freedom Online Coalition. CD and EITI have been in existence for much longer.
- They all have much more formal governance structures and with the exception of the Voluntary Principles, a permanent Secretariat. It is common to have a smaller steering committee or council for decision making independent of the full membership.
- All five organizations have significantly larger budgets and/or greater resources than the FOC.
- All of the comparable organizations have guidelines for continued membership and procedures for removal or suspension of non-compliant members.
- The goal of each organization drives the level of involvement of corporate and NGO partners. Organizations focused on the activities of companies (the Voluntary Principles and EITI) provide a much larger governance role for those stakeholders.
- Particularly in those organizations where governments play a larger membership role, funding comes largely from partner governments.
- Community of Democracies, due to its extremely broad focus and significant resources, may be hard to emulate, whereas OGP has comparably sized goals and focus to the FOC.

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