Statistics Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

10-1997

Publication Source

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

21

Issue

1-2

Start Page

40

Last Page

55

DOI

10.1006/game.1997.0595

Abstract

Suppose two players repeatedly meet each other to play a game where:

1. each uses a learning rule with the property that it is a calibrated forecast of the other's plays, and

2. each plays a myopic best response to this forecast distribution.

Then, the limit points of the sequence of plays are correlated equilibria. In fact, for each correlated equilibrium there is some calibrated learning rule that the players can use which results in their playing this correlated equilibrium in the limit. Thus, the statistical concept of a calibration is strongly related to the game theoretic concept of correlated equilibrium.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© 1997. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.