Statistics Papers
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
10-1990
Publication Source
Theoretical Population Biology
Volume
38
Issue
2
Start Page
219
Last Page
232
DOI
10.1016/0040-5809(90)90011-J
Abstract
The concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a useful tool for studying the dynamics of natural selection. One of its limitations, however, is that it does not capture the notion of long-run stability when the system is subjected to stochastic effects. We define the concept of stability in a stochastic dynamical system, and show that it differs from both the traditional ESS and the concept of an attractor in a dynamical system. The stochastically stable set may be computed analytically using recent advances in potential theory.
Copyright/Permission Statement
© 1990. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
Recommended Citation
Foster, D., & Young, P. (1990). Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics. Theoretical Population Biology, 38 (2), 219-232. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(90)90011-J
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.