A market-like mechanism for the allocation of children in both the primary market (market for babies) and the secondary market (adoption market) will result in greater social welfare, and hence be more efficient, than the current allocation methods used in practice, even in the face of repugnancy. Since a market for children falls under the realm of repugnant transactions, it is necessary to design a market with enough safeguards to bypass repugnancy while avoiding the excessive regulations that unnecessarily distort the supply and demand pressures of a competitive market. The goal of designing a market for children herein is two-fold: 1) by creating a feasible market for children, a set of generalizable rules and principles can be realized for designing functioning and efficient markets in the face of repugnancy and 2) the presence of a potential, credible and efficient market in the presence of this repugnancy will stimulate debate into the need for such markets in other similar areas, especially in cases creating a tradable market for organs for transplantation, wherein the absence of the transaction is often a death sentence for those who wish to, but are prevented from, participating in the market.
"Market Design in the Presence of Repugnancy: A Market for Children,"
Penn Journal of Philosophy, Politics & Economics: Vol. 8
, Article 5.
Available at: https://repository.upenn.edu/spice/vol8/iss1/5