•  
  •  
 

Article Title

Negotiating Moral Luck

Authors

Jack Cody

Abstract

In this essay, I intend to elucidate Thomas Nagel's radical concept of moral luck and the unnerving philosophical paradox that inevitably arises when it is stripped to its essence: in pursuit of a method of fair moral assessment, we approach the possibility that nothing and no one can be aptly judged on moral grounds. I analyze some refutations to this troubling paradox, including Susan Wolf's promising rejection of the subcategory of consequential luck due to the existence of a proposed "nameless virtue." In light of these refutations and Nagel's and Bernard Williams' musings on moral luck, I aim to propose courses of action that can lead to a functional society despite the paradox entailing the idea that humanity has not place for accurate moral judgment. In doing so, I suggest that moral luck must, to an extent, be ignored, and that a practical approach to humanity would continue to make moral judgments despite being threatened with Nagel's sound declaration that this behavior is not logical.

Share

COinS
 

To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.