Document Type
Working Paper
Date of this Version
2020
Advisor
Gad Allon
Abstract
Having undergone mergers with Uber China and Uber Southeast Asia in the past few years, DiDi and Grab now hold over 90% and 80% of the market shares in China and Singapore. This market control has allowed them to dominate the rideshare industry in the two countries, and this paper examines the impact of Grab and DiDi’s monopolistic power on rideshare drivers. Specifically, this research considers changes to both licensure requirements, pricing policies, commission rates, insurance coverage, and CSR programs as well as long-term corporate objectives and strategies following the merger. In order to understand the implications of DiDi and Grab’s decrease in competition and greater market control, this research draws from existing scholarly research, DiDi and Grab’s policies and terms of use, news articles, reports, government documents, and most importantly, qualitative interviews with employees at DiDi and Grab. The paper concludes that despite changes in pricing, insurance, and benefits, monopolistic ridesharing companies are able to leverage their resources and market power for diversification, which creates synergies, and greater social impact.
Keywords
gig economy, rideshare, ride hailing, two-sided markets, China, Singapore, competition, merger, monopoly, DiDi, Grab, insurance coverage, diversification, government regulation
Included in
Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Insurance Commons, International Business Commons, Labor Economics Commons, Technology and Innovation Commons, Transportation Commons
Date Posted: 15 December 2020