

1. Linguistic Anthropology of Education: An Introduction

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In "Resituating the Place of Educational Discourse in Anthropology," Bradley Levinson (1999) argues that cultural anthropology could benefit from research on education and that research on education could benefit from anthropology as well. He describes how contemporary cultural anthropologists, following a "cultural studies" focus on media, have not attended sufficiently to the role schools play in cultural production and reproduction. He makes a strong case that topics of central interest to cultural anthropologists—like globalization, post-coloniality, and the cultural production of identity—could be illuminated by research on educational contexts and processes.

"Globalization," for instance, refers to the increasingly global political economy; to the increasingly global movement of people, ideas, and objects; and to the increasingly common disjuncture between individuals' places of residence and their places of cultural identification (Appadurai, 1996). Levinson points out that schools are important sites of both clashes and congruence between global and local. The educational institution itself often brings culturally alien objects and practices from elsewhere in the world, and imported curricula embody globalized ideas that students and teachers incorporate and struggle

with. If contemporary cultural anthropologists expanded their focus beyond media and included educational institutions more centrally in their ethnographic work, they would discover data that speak to central concerns like globalization.

In addition to what educational research can bring anthropology, Levinson also argues that anthropology can help educational research. Anthropologists have always been attuned to education that takes place in families, in apprenticeships, in rituals and other out-of-school contexts. Because school-based education always works alongside and is in important ways derived from these "informal" educational processes, an anthropological perspective can provide important data to help us understand schools.

This volume begins to do with linguistic anthropology what Levinson envisions for cultural anthropology. Contemporary work in linguistic anthropology can both benefit from and contribute to educational research. Educational institutions play a central role in processes important to linguistic as well as cultural anthropologists. A society's beliefs about language—as a symbol of nationalism, a marker of difference, or a tool of assimilation—are often reproduced and challenged through educational institutions. Linguistic anthropologists have also become centrally concerned with ideologies of language, with people's beliefs about how different ways of speaking both identify and create sociocultural categories (Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskrity, 1998). Educational institutions are not the only place language ideologies get created and implemented, but they are surely an important site.

Research on education can also benefit from linguistic anthropology. The learning and socialization that occur through education are mediated primarily through language. Linguistic anthropologists have studied not only how particular ways of speaking become vehicles for sociocultural categorization, but also how close attention to naturally occurring speech can provide insight into central processes such as learning and socialization. The chapters in this volume illustrate how contemporary linguistic anthropology has developed important concepts that can illuminate a wide range of educational phenomena.

AN EARLIER GENERATION

Contemporary linguistic anthropology of education shares Levinson's project of enriching educational research by using concepts from (linguistic) anthropology and vice versa. Given the centrality of language as both object and medium of culture, adding linguistic anthropology should provide important support for Levinson's project as well. However, although cultural anthropology and related disciplines did produce a few important studies of schooling and culture in the 1970s

and 1980s (e.g., Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Willis, 1981), few cultural anthropologists have been centrally concerned with formal education. In linguistic anthropology, on the other hand, there has been an extensive body of work done on educational practices and institutions—primarily by Dell Hymes, John Gumperz, and their colleagues (e.g., Cazden, John & Hymes, 1972; Gumperz, 1982; Heath, 1983; Hymes, 1996; Michaels, 1981; Philips, 1983). This earlier work has laid the foundation for a contemporary linguistic anthropology of education.

Hymes and colleagues drew on several concepts from linguistic anthropology in their work on education. In this introduction I review seven of these concepts, divided into two groups. The first three—communicative competence, taking the native's point of view, and the connection between micro and macro—were extensively elaborated by Hymes and colleagues. The remaining four concepts—indexicality, creativity, regimentation and poetic structure—were also present in earlier work, but they have been elaborated more fully in contemporary linguistic anthropology. This section discusses the first three concepts, and the remainder of the introduction addresses the last four.

First, Hymes and his colleagues maintained linguists' emphasis on precise analyses of various linguistic structures, but they applied these to study language *in use*. As defined by Hymes (1972), Duranti (1997), and others, linguistic anthropology takes advantage of linguists' discoveries about phonology and grammar, but it studies how grammatical categories are used in communicative practices. Linguistic anthropology of education studies speakers as social actors, not as repositories of linguistic competence. So Hymes (1972) and his colleagues were interested in communicative competence, the ability to use language appropriately in cultural context. As I argue later, the concept of communicative competence does have central problem, but contemporary linguistic anthropologists of education nonetheless follow Hymes in studying the social presuppositions and consequences of language in use.

Second, linguistic anthropologists of education in the 1970s and 1980s also maintained the central anthropological emphasis on understanding the native's point of view. Unlike contemporaneous work that also studied linguistic action (e.g., Searle, 1969), Heath (1983), Philips (1983), and others did extensive ethnographic work and described how linguistic patterns were understood by the people they studied. Contemporary linguistic anthropology follows this principle—refusing to accept outsider models of people's categories, and instead insisting on evidence that people themselves explicitly or implicitly recognize the categories that we use to describe their communicative behavior.

Third, Hymes and colleagues also connected particular instances of language use to larger social patterns. They did not analyze particular texts for their own sake, but rather to understand larger processes that

might be occurring through the language use. The best known instance is the "difference" or "mismatch" hypothesis, which tries to explain schools' role in social reproduction as a result of mismatched majority and minority cultural styles of speaking that clash in the classroom (e.g., Michaels, 1981; Philips, 1983). According to this theory, ethnic and class differences in access to resources are unintentionally reproduced by schools, when majority teachers misrecognize minority styles of speaking as intellectual deficits. At the same time as they gave accounts such as the "mismatch" one, which connected culturally embedded speech to larger social processes, early linguistic anthropologists of education also paid close attention to the details of particular interactions. Instead of ignoring particular contexts and treating instances as mechanical replications of larger patterns, they began to describe the interplay between larger social processes and the particular contexts in which they are enacted and sometimes transformed.

These three concepts—studying linguistic patterns in use, searching for the native's point of view, and trying to connect micro and macro-level processes—remain central to contemporary linguistic anthropology of education. In addition to applying these three concepts from linguistic anthropology to educational research, Hymes, Gumperz, and their colleagues also began to use several other concepts that have become central to contemporary linguistic anthropology of education. I describe these concepts in detail in the next sections, under the terms indexicality, creativity, regimentation, and poetic structure. In the last decade, contemporary linguistic anthropology has extended these concepts in ways not available to Hymes, Gumperz, and their colleagues (cf., e.g., Hill & Irvine, 1992; Lucy, 1993; Silverstein & Urban, 1996).

This volume illustrates how contemporary linguistic anthropology of education can now return productively to the strategy begun thirty years ago by the earlier generation, with respect to several concepts that were not yet fully articulated then. We can use productive concepts from contemporary linguistic anthropology—concepts that have not yet penetrated educational research—both in order to enrich our work on educational processes and to illustrate how research on education illuminates issues of central concern to linguistic and cultural anthropology. The next sections describe these concepts, and the other chapters in this volume illustrate how they can be applied productively to educational research.

A CLASSROOM EXAMPLE

To introduce the concepts of indexicality, creativity, regimentation, and poetic structure, it will help to have an example. This section introduces an example drawn from a two-year study of high school English and history classes. Space limitations prevent a full analysis of

these data here, but I have provided more detail elsewhere (Wortham, 1994, 1996, 1997). This case centers around a classroom "participant example." A participant example describes some actual or hypothetical event that includes at least one person also participating in the classroom conversation.

All speech refers to and characterizes something, and all speech takes place in and contributes to some interaction. The linguistic forms actually uttered communicate information about both what I will call the "narrated event" and the "narrating event" (following and slightly modifying Jakobson, 1971). Speech about participant examples describes a particular type of narrated event: some actual or hypothetical event that includes at least one individual who is also participating in the narrating event. Those with a role in the example have *two* interactionally relevant identities: as a teacher or student in the classroom conversation (narrating), and as a character in the event described as the example (narrated).

This participant example occurred in a ninth grade history class. The class has read Cicero's letter to Atticus, in which Cicero ponders what he should do about the tyranny of Caesar and the plot to overthrow him. Should he tell Caesar? Should he join the plotters? Or should he just keep quiet? In this respect, the text describes a three-part role structure in Rome: Caesar the tyrant, those plotting against him, and Cicero stuck between the two. The teacher, Mr. Smith, presents his participant example to illustrate Cicero's dilemma. (See the Appendix for transcription conventions).

- T/S: Maurice let's give a good example, you'll love this.
suppose this dictator, me. there was a plot going on.
150 and you found out about it. and you knew it was gonna-
it's existing (3.0) among the people you knew. would
you tell me. (5.0)
MRC: you said they know about it.
T/S: the plotters, against me. they're planning to push me
155 down the stairs. [and you know about it
STS: [hnhhahahaha
T/S: now we all know Maurice and I have ha(hh)d
arguments all year. would you tell me about it.
MRC: well- I might but uh what if they- what if they found
160 out that I told you then they want to kill me. (5.0) so I'm
putting myself in trouble to save you, and I'm not going to
do it.
STS: hnh hahahaha

The example describes a role structure analogous to that in Rome: Mr. Smith the hypothetical tyrant, the conspirators plotting to push

him down the stairs, and Maurice the potential informer stuck between the two.

Figure 1.1 represents the classroom discussion at this point. The embedded rectangles represent the two realms described as narrated events: the situation in Rome, with the tyrant, the plotters, and the potential informer; and the example, with three analogous groups. The outer rectangle represents the narrating classroom interaction among teachers and students. Mr. Smith has already presupposed his "argumentative" relationship with Maurice (see line 157, and the discussion below), and the line between them represents this. The other students are not yet occupying any salient interactional positions other than the standard classroom role of students.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Speech about participant examples often has important implications for interactional positioning in the narrating event. While discussing participants' characters in an example, speakers inevitably attribute certain social attributes to those (narrated) characters. Participant examples can have rich interactional implications because characteristics attributed to participants' characters in the example often have implications for those participants' own interactional positions in the narrating event.

For instance, by asking whether Maurice would (hypothetically) side with him, against the student plotters, Mr. Smith may be raising an interactional question: is Maurice on the teacher's side or not? This could be an important interactional question in this classroom, because of Maurice's liminal position. Classroom conversation among these students in both their English and their history class has been dominated all year by the girls. None of the other boys volunteers information in class. They only speak when called on, and then tersely. Being male in this context seems to require silence. The teachers have tried both to entice and to force the boys into participating, but almost all of them have resisted. Maurice is the one exception. He has intelligent things to say, and he often participates in class. But he also sits in the back with the rest of the boys, and he clearly wants their respect as well. So Maurice faces the delicate task of maintaining his status as a "real" male while joining the girls and teachers in classroom discussion. In this context, when Mr. Smith asks Maurice whether he would side with him, the teacher, against the student "conspirators," the discussion might have implications for Maurice's own in-between position, which is analogous in some ways to Cicero's.

We cannot conclude at this early point in the discussion that Maurice's own interactional position is in fact relevant. But the possibility has been opened up, such that later discussion can presuppose and strengthen the parallel between Maurice's hypothetical position as a potential informer and his actual position as a boy caught between a desire to do well in school and his peers' injunctions against this.

Immediately after the example gets introduced, Mr. Smith does mark a potential connection between the example and his own (narrating) relationship with Maurice. At line 157, Mr. Smith says "now we all know Maurice and I have ha(hh)d arguments all year" (the (hh) indicates laughter breaking into the words while speaking). Before the example, everyone in the class knows that Mr. Smith and Maurice have had a strained relationship. Mr. Smith holds students to a relatively rigid code of conduct, and Maurice has resisted this all year. Most other students acquiesce, withdraw sullenly, or misbehave in a teasing way. But Maurice's resistance seems more of a genuine struggle for power.

As shown in line 157, and also in his "you'll love this" at line 148, Mr. Smith recognizes his power struggle with Maurice. He mentions it at this point because he *also* recognizes that the (narrated) example may have implications for their actual relationship. It gives Maurice the opportunity, within the example, to express his anger at Mr. Smith-the-teacher. Maurice takes this opportunity, in places, by imagining that he would leave Mr. Smith-the-hypothetical-tyrant to be killed.

I argue that, in discussion of this example, Maurice's own interactional position—caught between the teachers and the resistant boys—becomes increasingly salient and awkward. As it becomes increasingly presupposed that Maurice's hypothetical decision about whether to side with Mr. Smith has implications for Maurice's own interactional position in the classroom, the discussion becomes increasingly uncomfortable for Maurice. We begin to see this in the following segment:

- T/S: well that was my next question, do you think Caesar was
a tyrant. [do you think Cicero thought=
185 ST?: [I don't think so.
T/S: =Caesar was a tyrant.
ST?: no
MRC: yes
T/S: then what's his problem. if the man- you just told me
190 point blank [that we could be pushed down stairs=
MRC: [so.
T/S: =and you wouldn't feel a thing about it. what's his big
deal, if he believes Caesar is a tyrant, so what.
MRC: well- he- if u:h he [4 syll] that they're making
195 some kind of plot against him, but he doesn't want to get involved.
He doesn't know if he should get involved, he could get himself in
more trouble. since he's already [3 syll]=
T/S: well if Caesar's a tyrant why shouldn't you get
involved. tyrants are generally dictatorial nasty people,
200 that prevent peo:ple from being at their ease.

When Mr. Smith says "you just told me point blank that we could be pushed down stairs and you wouldn't feel a thing about it" (lines 189-192), both the volume and tempo of his speech increase. He seems angry. Even though they are speaking about the example, Mr. Smith-the-teacher treats Maurice's choice not to tell him as a betrayal. (Mr. Smith uses "we" here, because the other teacher in the classroom, Mrs. Bailey, has by now been included with him as another hypothetical tyrant, within the example).

This starts to put the same sort of pressure on Maurice himself that was applied to Cicero and to Maurice in his hypothetical role as a potential informer. Note that Maurice's characterization of Cicero's hesitation (lines 194-198) could apply to Maurice-the-student's own situation. He can tell that his answer does not please Mr. Smith-the-teacher, but he does not know what to do about it.

Indexicality

Although the analysis of this example is necessarily truncated here (cf. Wortham, 1994, 1995, for more detail), it can help introduce the

second set of concepts central to contemporary linguistic anthropology of education. The central issue in contemporary linguistic anthropology is: how do linguistic signs come to have meaning in cultural and interactional context?

To answer this question, it helps to use a distinction made by Peirce, between "indexes" and "symbols." A sign represents its object indexically if the sign and the object co-occur, such that the sign points to the object (Peirce, 1897/1955). The linguistic form *I* provides an example, as it refers by pointing to the individual uttering the form itself in the narrating event. A sign represents its object symbolically if that type of sign is connected to a type of object, such that a token of that type of sign represents that type of object. The verb *go*, for instance, refers to an event where the subject moves away from some presupposed place.

Despite extraordinary efforts to describe natural language use as primarily symbolic (by Saussure, 1916; Chomsky, 1965; and many others), it has turned out that much of everyday speech gets its meaning indexically (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967; Hanks, 1990; Silverstein, 1976). Both *I* and *go*, for instance, contribute to what gets denoted by an utterance only if speaker and hearer presuppose important knowledge about the context—namely, who is speaking at the moment, in the case of *I*, and where the presupposed point is, away from which the subject is/should/might be moving, in the case of *go*. In a more complex case like the preceding classroom example we need extensive contextual information to understand what the speech contributed both to denotational and interactional meanings (i.e., both to narrated and narrating events). For instance, to understand Cicero's predicament, we need to understand the source of tyrants' power and the often secretive nature of conspiracies. And we need to understand Maurice's position as a male student caught between the resistant boys and the teachers before we can see how the example presupposes and intensifies this awkward position.

Given that linguistic signs are indexical as well as symbolic (i.e., that the meanings of verbal signs always depend in part on how those signs presuppose aspects of the context as relevant) analysts of language have faced a choice. Some have chosen to abstract away from contextualized speech and to study the purely symbolic aspects of language. Chomsky (1965), for instance, does this by studying "deep structure" instead of empirically occurring speech. This strategy has yielded many important insights into grammatical categories, because some aspects of human language do seem to operate independent of context.

But this strategy leaves open the question of how such decontextualized categories operate when they are actually used. Real

speech has meaning through simultaneous indexical and symbolic processes. In other words, decontextualized meanings comprise part of what actual speech communicates, but context-dependent, indexical meanings are also always essential to interpreting an utterance. The discipline of linguistic anthropology has been one important site for studying how symbolic and indexical processes work together to produce meaning in cultural context. As mentioned previously, linguistic anthropology studies language in use, not linguistic structure for its own sake. Because they take advantage of linguists' discoveries about (symbolic) grammatical categories but examine how these categories are used in communicative practices, linguistic anthropologists are particularly well placed to study intersections between symbolic and indexical processes.

For instance, linguistic anthropologists of education would borrow grammatical analyses of personal pronouns—"participant and nonparticipant deictics," if one wants to borrow the jargon as well—to study cases like the preceding one. We know that in English a singular referent can be referred to with the deictics *I*, *you*, *he*, *she* or *it*. We know that each of these presupposes a different model of the narrating event, identifying the referent as playing different roles in that event. *You* presupposes that the referent is the addressee, while *he* and *she* presuppose that the referent is not participating in the narrating event. As the classroom discussion of Maurice's (hypothetical and not-so-hypothetical) predicament continues, pronouns do an important job. We can see this in the following excerpt.

As described previously, Maurice-the-student has begun to occupy Maurice-the-potential informer's role, as it is described in the narrated event: he is getting caught between someone in power (the teacher) and others who oppose the teacher. In the narrating event itself, the other (oppositional) group includes male students who typically sit in the back of the classroom and refuse to participate. We have here an emerging parallel between the narrated and narrating events. Cicero was caught between those in power and those opposing the powerful. In the hypothetical example, Maurice was caught between the teachers and the students who opposed them. And in the narrating event, Maurice is getting caught between the teachers and the unresponsive male students.

In the excerpts presented above, however, Mr. Smith may simply have been play-acting to involve the students. And Maurice himself may not really have been at risk interactionally. But Maurice's problems become more serious, and the parallel between narrated and narrating events becomes more robust, in the following segment—when several girls volunteer to tell the teachers about the plot. (T/B is Mrs. Bailey, the other teacher leading the discussion.)

T/S: gee you sound terribly confused Maurice. sort of like Cicero here.

T/B: what w- if you knew that they actually- you know there's a group of kids that are actually going to do: this dastardly deed. and you know that there's going to be some reaction. what might you do th- and you kn- you know basically wh:ile you might not be-, enamored totally of Mr. Smith or myself you- basically: don't wish that we were crippled for life or whatever, what might you do that day. you know that's going to come- that this is all going to happen on Wednesday. what are you going to do that day.

225

CAN: I would try to warn you.

STS: right. I would ((* overlapping [comments *])

235 T/B: [he's- he's not- he's not going to warn us though.

T/S: no.

T/B: what- what are you going to do that day Maurice. (1.0)

MRC: stay away. [2 syll]

240 T/B: what are you going to do?

MRC: I'm going to stay away so I won't be- be:=

T/B: so you're not going to come to school on Wednesday.

MRC: °no°

CAN: that way he's a coward.

245 ST?: what would you do.

MRC: what would you do.

T/S: a coward.

CAN: yeah 'cause he's scared.

At lines 233-4, Candace and then other girls affiliate with the teachers, within the example. In the narrated event, this adds another interactional group—loyal subjects. In the narrating event, when Candace and then Mr. Smith call Maurice a coward (lines 244ff.), she begins to speak as Candace-the-student and not just as a hypothetical Roman. Her energetic tone here indicates that she is not only elaborating the example, but also picking on Maurice himself in the narrating classroom interaction. This establishes another group in the narrating event—the girls—who position themselves with respect to Maurice and the teachers. Like their characters in the example, in the classroom the girls affiliate with the teachers and exclude Maurice.

Gender plays an important interactional role here, as in many ninth grade classrooms. Girls and boys generally occupy separate, often antagonistic groups. Girls typically have more latitude to affiliate with teachers, without damaging their standing with other students. Boys act more oppositionally toward teachers, and risk losing face if they do not. Thus the girls have intensified Maurice's interactional predicament in

the narrating event. He might like to affiliate with Mr. Smith-the-tyrant—and thus, implicitly, with Mr. Smith-the-teacher—since he may have aroused Mr. Smith-the-teacher's anger by distancing himself. But to do so, he would have to affiliate with both the teachers and the girls. This would damage his standing with the other boys.

Figure 1-2 represents the classroom discussion at this point. Candace's comment has inserted herself and other girls into the (narrated) participant example. Now Mr. Smith-the-tyrant has loyal subjects who would warn him of the plot. In the (narrating) classroom interaction, Candace and the girls have analogously inserted themselves between the teacher and Maurice. This puts more pressure on Maurice to choose between the resistant boys and the girls aligned with the teacher.

Insert Figure 2 about here

Like Maurice-the-potential informer, and like Cicero, Maurice himself gets excluded by the other groups as he thinks about what to do. We can see this exclusion in a pattern of pronoun usage. For most of the remaining discussion, other speakers exclude Maurice from the conversation, referring to him as he, whereas before they had referred to him as you. This shift from you to he establishes a different organization for the narrating interaction. Maurice himself started out participating with the teachers in discussing the example. But immediately after

Candace has said that she, unlike Maurice, would warn the teachers about the plot, Mrs. Bailey and some of the girls start to exclude Maurice—talking about him as he. (They could have continued to refer to him as you, as they do while discussing Mr. Smith and Candace as characters in the hypothetical example). This switch to he sends an interactional message: Maurice no longer belongs to the group that includes the teachers and female students in the narrating interaction. In both the narrated and narrating events, Maurice is caught on the outside.

To understand what this switch from *you* to *he* means we need to have more than just a grammatical account of the pronouns. We also need to know why people like the female students might be excluding someone like Maurice and why this might be something Maurice cares about. All this information is signaled indexically. Thus a linguistic anthropological analysis draws on accounts of language as symbolic, but it supplements these accounts with analyses of how language also gets meaning from particular aspects of the context.

Creativity

The earlier generation of linguistic anthropologists also made this point, arguing that cultural context was essential to the meaning of particular utterances. Hymes (1972) developed the concept of communicative competence to expand the Chomskyan focus on grammatical competence, arguing that language always gets used in cultural context and that systematic aspects of speech are tuned to cultural contexts. This was important in maintaining linguistic anthropology as a viable field in the early days of the formalist revolution in linguistics. But the concept of communicative competence had another consequence.

Based on the analogy with grammatical competence, the concept of communicative competence presupposes that cultural groups have relatively stable styles of speaking—which are identified by characteristic phonological, grammatical, and pragmatic cues. Competent hearers identify members of their own linguistic community and makes sense of utterances by attending to cues that are used in appropriate contexts. Michaels (1981), for instance, describes how some African-American narrators do not explicitly mark the transitions between events in a story or state the overall point of the story. When hearing a narrative told in this more "topic associating" style, African-American narrators from those communities will recognize it as competently produced and, all other things being equal, will identify the narrator as a member of their linguistic community. Hearers from linguistic communities with other conventions, however, may have trouble understanding the utter-

ance and will often interpret the absence of explicit transitions and thesis statements as evidence that the narrator is not a member of their group. In school, as Michaels showed, this can lead mainstream Anglo teachers to the mistaken conclusion that some African-American students are not only different but also deficient.

The concept of communicative competence, then, presupposes a style of speaking shared among a cultural group and a set of rules that stipulate which linguistic cues (phonological, grammatical, pragmatic) are appropriate in which contexts. Despite the power of this perspective, it cannot fully explain how people use and interpret language. Two types of argument have been made against communicative competence theories. The first relies on what Prague School linguists call "foregrounding" (Havránek, 1932/1955). Rules of communicative competence say that, given the appropriate presupposed contextual features, a given type of utterance will count as appropriate for a member of a particular cultural group. But any such regularity can be deliberately disregarded to generate an interactional effect. Speakers regularly utter forms in inappropriate contexts and achieve definite effects. One can use overly colloquial speech in a formal setting, for instance, in a bid to achieve solidarity with someone or to make an ironic comment on its pomposity.

Thus the analogy between interactionally effective and grammatical utterances breaks down, and ultimately it is the analogy with Chomsky (1965) that drives communicative competence theories. Violating a grammatical rule generates an incorrect structural type, but speakers often act contrary to pragmatic regularities and generate interactional effects. The competence theorist could propose a new rule for every effective "inappropriate" use. But such an explanatory strategy gets awkward quickly, and it seems unlikely that people carry around rules covering all possible foregrounded usages. Furthermore, any theory of linguistic action that depends heavily on rules must be incomplete, because no matter how many rules are proposed the last one can always be deliberately disregarded to achieve an interactional effect.

Contemporary critics of competence theories have reiterated the arguments made by the Prague School, and they have extended them (e.g., Goffman, 1976; Levinson, 1981). Linguistic forms can be uttered in appropriate contexts but yield unexpected results. Some aspect of a context unforeseen by the rule can always be made salient so as to negate or to transform the expected effect of an utterance—as when hearers catch the irony of a comment only by noting some anomalous aspect of the context. A new rule can be written to explain each exception, but this gets awkward quickly and can never be sufficient. An indefinite number of potentially relevant aspects of the context can be

made salient in any given case. Because communicative competence theories describe only relatively generic contextual factors, they cannot explain the subtle ways that particular contextual features can become relevant to and change the interactional functions of utterances in practice.

These critics of competence theories present a different picture of verbal interaction. Instead of following rules to make their utterances both grammatical and appropriate to particular cultural contexts, speakers deploy cues that could have multiple meanings and hearers must infer which of several possible messages the speakers are communicating. To be fair to Hymes (1972) and some of his colleagues, they did recognize that rules of communicative competence are sometimes inadequate to capture creative manipulations of cultural rules. They often described such manipulations in terms of "keying" (see also Goffman, 1974). But, with their continued emphasis on communicative competence, they did not develop adequate conceptualizations of how keying gets accomplished in practice. Contemporary work in linguistic anthropology has analyzed this process more fully.

A central shift in perspective has been to consider language use as creative, and not merely as reflecting social structure. Many sociolinguistic analyses (e.g., Labov, 1972) have studied how particular linguistic patterns correlate with presupposed social categories. As with communicative competence, such regularities undoubtedly exist and play an important role in social life. But speech does more than presuppose stable social groups and types of individual identities. In addition, speech can itself create novel social and interactional patterns. As described by Duranti (1997), Silverstein (1976, 1998), and others, contemporary linguistic anthropology studies how language use can constitute aspects of culture and identity. The most important work in this direction focuses on the concept of creative or entailing indexicality.

Competence theories fail because of the indeterminacy of relevant context. Other features of the context can always become salient, so as to transform the appropriateness or the meaning of an utterance. Because the meaning of any utterance can be refigured by making different contextual features relevant, the analytic question becomes: how do certain contextual features become salient, such that an utterance comes to have identifiable interactional functions? Something more flexible than communicative competence mediates between the cues in an utterance and people's conscious or non-conscious construal of its meaning. The concept of "contextualization cues" (Gumperz, 1982; 1992) or indexicality (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Silverstein, 1976) captures this mediating step. A contextualization cue or index indicates how its

context should be construed, by pointing to a particular aspect of context. Hearers attend to sometimes conflicting cues in utterances, on that basis select aspects of the context as relevant, *then* apply their knowledge of cultural regularities to determine what an utterance means.

So the relationship between an utterance and its meaning is mediated by participants' construal of the context. This process of "mediation" (Wortham, 2001) or "contextualization" (Silverstein, 1992) is crucial to preserving Hymes' insight into the importance of cultural context while overcoming the limitations of a "competence" theory. Note that, on this sort of account, two questions must be answered: (1) How do the linguistic and non-linguistic cues that compose an utterance make certain aspects of the context salient? (2) How does a set of cues and salient contextual features establish an utterance's meaning?

In response to the first question, linguistic anthropologists like Gumperz (1982) and Silverstein (1976) have answered: verbal cues signal indexically, to point out and sometimes create aspects of the context. Silverstein (1976) distinguishes between two types of indexical relationship that a sign can have with its object. First, the sign can indexically "presuppose" its object. In this type of case it points to an element of the context that exists *independent* of the occurrence of the sign itself. Second, the sign can indexically create or, in later terminology (e.g., Silverstein, 1993), "entail" its object. In this type of case the sign points to an element of the context that exists as a *result* of the particular use of the sign itself.

Particular signs do not essentially presuppose or entail, although some forms lend themselves more to one type of relationship than the other. *We* and *he*, for example, generally have determinate indexical presuppositions. In the example, by the time Candace says "that way he's a coward" about Maurice, it has been established that Maurice is on the other side from the teachers and the female students, closer to the plotters and the boys who sit in the back of the room. Candace's use of *he* refers to Maurice as a member of this group that is excluded from the narrating interaction, and it points to a *presupposed* aspect of the context. Speakers have by this point already come to presuppose that both within the example and in the classroom itself Maurice has chosen not to align himself with the teachers.

We and *he* can also have indexical entailments, however. The teacher's "he's not going to warn us though," at line 235, is the first use of *he* to refer to Maurice in the classroom discussion. This *he* points to an aspect of the context that results in part from this particular use of the sign. The use of we in this particular utterance begins to position Maurice as an outsider in the interaction. An adequate account of language use in

cultural context must capture both presupposing and entailing indexicality—both how speech involves expectable patterns and how it can have unexpected effects.

Regimentation

Whether a sign actually accomplishes indexical entailments for subsequent interaction depends on how subsequent utterances recontextualize it. This involves the process of "entextualization" (Silverstein, 1992) or "emergence" (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Wortham, 2001). When a speaker uses an entailing indexical, the element of the context potentially created will either be presupposed by following utterances or not. When the teacher said "he's not going to warn us though," hearers concerned to understand whom *he* referred to would have to search the context for a singular, masculine referent that was not at the moment a speaker or addressee in the narrating classroom conversation. The denoted content of the utterance also provides information: the referent of he was in a position to warn Mr. Smith and some others, but he chose not to. This makes Maurice the most plausible referent. Given that Maurice had just been referred to as *you*, by Mr. Smith and others, however, the switch to *he* carries more than denotational information. It also communicates that Maurice may be getting excluded from the narrating event. Whether or not this potential entailment takes place depends on whether subsequent utterances presuppose it. When Candace and then others also begin to refer to Maurice as *he*, the potential entailment "solidifies" and Maurice's new interactional position can be taken for granted as a fact about the narrating classroom interaction.

This concept of *emergence* was developed in ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970) and conversation analysis (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) to describe how subsequent utterances can transform the functions of prior ones. The conversation analysts argue that other participants' responses to an utterance can change its meaning. Without knowing what responses followed an utterance, participants and analysts often cannot know whether an utterance was appropriate or what identity the speaker was adopting. An utterance has particular interactional functions, ultimately, because of the effect it *comes* to have in the interaction. Indexical cues in an utterance establish its functions only as *subsequent* utterances indicate that those cues have been taken in a certain way. On this account, in order to interpret or react to an utterance, participants and analysts must attend not only to the moment of utterance but also to some later moment when subsequent context has helped the meaning of the utterance solidify. At the moment of utterance, the relevant context has often not yet emerged.

(Sometimes, of course, meanings do not solidify and utterances remain ambiguous, despite subsequent context.)

The concept of emergence is central to answering the second question raised in the last section: How does a set of cues and salient contextual features establish an utterance's meaning? By answering that speakers' own subsequent reactions are central (i.e., whether speakers themselves come to presuppose a potentially entailing indexical determines whether that entailment happens) contemporary linguistic anthropologists are following a traditional anthropological emphasis on the participants' own point of view. In some cases, of course, participants do not consciously represent the categories that they use to organize their thought and action, but they do systematically react to them (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Silverstein, 1981). Instead of imposing outsider categories, linguistic anthropology induces analytic categories that participants either articulate or presuppose in their action, and it insists on evidence that participants themselves are presupposing categories central to the analysis.

The concepts of contextualization and entextualization, or mediation and emergence, however, do not in themselves explain how relevant context gets limited and an utterance's interactional functions get established in practice. These concepts give a more precise formulation of how particular utterances point to elements of the context and make certain types of events salient. The denotational and interactional meanings that emerge in a conversation *are* shaped by the indexical cues in the utterances. But the relevant indexical values also depend on the type of event presupposed as going on at the moment of utterance. In other words, the account of utterance meaning described thus far is too linear. In understanding or reacting coherently to speech, participants and analysts cannot move sequentially from verbal and nonverbal cues, to construals of the context, to established meaning. To identify relevant indexical cues, and to construe relevant context, participants and analysts already need some presuppositions about what is going on.

Any utterance could index various aspects of the context. So the indexicals in any utterance cannot themselves determine interactional events. If they did, then analysts could develop rules that connect types of indexes to types of context. This would yield a somewhat more sophisticated theory of communicative competence. In fact, participants and analysts can make multiple construals of the indexical values of almost any utterance. This circularity makes it difficult to explain the connection between an utterance and its meaning. The values of particular indexes in an utterance highlight certain aspects of the context—and thus indicate that a particular type of event is likely to be going on—but at the same time prior conceptions about what type of event is occurring influence the values of the indexes.

For example, the he in "he's not going to warn us though" might presuppose various things about Maurice's identity. Grammatical information tells us that the shift from calling Maurice you to calling him he excludes him from the speech event. But hearers must search the context for reasons why he is being treated this way. This switch to he might index various things: perhaps Maurice has been teasing the teachers and they are just teasing back; perhaps Maurice is known for being nervous and diffident, such that he wouldn't get involved; or, as I have argued, perhaps Maurice is torn between the resistant boys and the cooperative girls, and the teacher's utterance casts him as siding with the boys in this instance. Because this latter set of identities and interactional issues has already been made salient in the classroom discussion, hearers are more likely to interpret the indexical as presupposing Maurice's in-between position. Contemporary linguistic anthropologists say that the larger set of identities and issues, or the frame, "regiments" or constrains the values of the indexical cues.

So a particular type of entextualization, or a coherent understanding of the conversation as being some recognizable type of event, emerges through construal of relevant indexical cues. But the identification and interpretation of relevant indexical cues depend on a presupposed understanding of what is going on. There is thus a back-and-forth or dialectic interpretive process required to understand speech. This process involves *two types* of cultural and linguistic knowledge: participants must know what particular cues index, and participants must be familiar with types of denoted content and enacted events. For example, participants must know that "coward" often indexically presupposes that the person thus characterized is unmasculine. Participants must also be familiar with the cultural text or script that involves adolescent girls teasing an adolescent boy. Silverstein (1993, 1998) and other contemporary linguistic anthropologists refer to this dialectic process as the "regimentation" of indexical cues by available cultural types of events. When speakers and hearers presuppose that a particular type of event is going on, the expectable script for that type of event comes to regiment many indexical cues—in other words, those indexicals are construed so that they come to support the emerging pattern of what is understood to be going on.

This presupposed pattern or cultural type of text or script has been called a "metadiscourse" (Urban, 1996). Social categories exist empirically in practice, as people enact characteristic events and adopt types of positions within those events. Silverstein (1993) and Urban (1996) describe this process in terms of the metadiscourses that come to regiment particular events of language use. Members of any society explicitly and implicitly recognize complex sets of types of events. When confronted with empirical evidence of an ongoing event, these

members will generally come to understand the event as coherent when the indexical signs that compose the event come increasingly to presuppose that a particular type of event is going on (Silverstein, 1992). Metadiscourses are the explicit and implicit framings available in a given society for understanding social events as coherent. Social life can only be coherent insofar as metadiscourses are available for understanding the types of events that typically exist and the types of people who characteristically participate in them. Another term often used to describe this process, as illustrated in several chapters in this book, is "language ideology." In understanding speech, people rely on ideologies about how particular kinds of speakers typically use particular kinds of language to participate in recognizable types of events.

Metadiscourses or language ideologies, then, are publicly circulating devices for interpreting or regimenting their object discourses—the patterned indexical signs that compose discourse. All coherent discursive interactions get inscribed or "entextualized" as particular types of denotational and interactional messages (Silverstein, 1993; Silverstein & Urban, 1996). That is, participants understand or orient to the interaction as if it were a particular metadiscursive type. As particular metadiscourses get invoked across speech events, they circulate more widely. The circulation of metadiscourses explains the "contextually-situated, interactional establishment, maintenance, and renewal (transformation) of social relations in societies" (Silverstein, 1993, p. 35). The social events, relationships and identities characteristic of a society are made recognizable by the metadiscourses that typify them (Urban, 1996).

In Maurice's case, the relevant metadiscourses involve his position as a black male student caught between resistant peers and the expectations of mainstream institutions. As the interaction develops, Mr. Smith comes to speak about Maurice's interactional position in the past tense, as if it has already been settled.

- T/S: you told us you wouldn't tell us anything.
ST?: haha
ST?: °I wouldn't.°
T/S: you'd rather see our mangled bodies at the bottom of
365 the staircase.
MRC: I: told you I wouldn't be coming to school that day.
T/S: does that mean you're not part of the plot.
ST?: yeah
MRC: I'd still be part of it. I- [if I
370 T/B: [if you- if you know about it=
T/S: if you know about it that's: an accomplice. you knew

about it. you could have stopped it. all you had to do is say-
it shouldn't be done, it's wrong.

By this point, Mr. Smith has given up trying to entice Maurice to join his group. He accuses Maurice of wishing for the teachers' violent demise. At lines 364-5, his colorful comment might be taken as a joke. But Maurice's tone at line 366 is quite earnest. In his comment at line 372, Mr. Smith's tone is angry again. And, by using the word "accomplice" to refer to Maurice-the-potential informer, Mr. Smith casts Maurice's character in the example as morally questionable.

Within the example, Maurice has made his decision, and this has consequences in the narrating event. After this segment, teachers and students consistently refer to Maurice as he for about six minutes. Maurice himself has been excluded from the teachers' and the girls' group, in the narrating event. He can still be a member of the boys' group, but the other boys almost never participate in class. So in joining that group he gives up participating in classroom activity.

Maurice thus gets interactionally positioned by the example in ways that could influence his identity development and his position in larger social orders. Maurice's responses in this discussion may have implications for his identity as a "good" or "bad" student and as a "real" male. This one example, in itself, will of course not determine Maurice's identity or the social location of African-American male students in general. But, through the example, the students do re-enact something about many students like Maurice: African-American males who want to engage with school sometimes face a balancing act in many urban U.S. classrooms, as they are caught between the often-opposed roles of "good" student and "real" male. If Maurice consistently positions himself as opposed to the teachers and the girls, he may no longer qualify as a "good" student. And if Maurice consistently positions himself on the same side as the teachers in classroom discussions, he may no longer qualify as a "real" male.

Poetic Structure

However rich the metadiscourses available for framing or regimenting an interaction as a particular type, we still face the analytic question: How is the circular relation between indexical cues and potential metadiscursive entextualizations or framings ever overcome in practice, such that a particular meaning emerges? This is a problem of "chunking": Given a stream of speech and indefinite potentially relevant context, how do speakers and analysts know which chunks cohere and have implications for establishing some recognizable meaning? Jakobson (1960) and Silverstein (1992) suggest that a particular type of

implicit *structure* (a "poetic" structure) emerges, solidifies, and thus establishes a relevant context and a more plausible set of interpretations for a series of utterances.

Poetic structure involves patterns of indexical cues that come collectively to presuppose each other, such that they "lock" together in a mutually presupposed set. Just a few indexical cues may be interpreted in multiple ways, and they often cannot overcome the indeterminacy of relevant context. But a pattern of indexical cues that not only presuppose relevant context but also presuppose each other can solidify and (provisionally) limit the context relevant to interpreting a set of utterances. Such poetic structure is *contingent* on particulars of the event. It is also *emergent*—speakers create essential parts of it over the course of an interaction, and no one could reliably predict the details of the structure that eventually emerges. (Hymes [1981] also drew on Jakobson's concept of poetic structure to analyze culturally situated language use, but he focused more on the poetics of verbal art and less on the process of regimentation in everyday discourse.)

In the example of Maurice, the poetic structure includes the consistent use of you to refer to Maurice early and the consistent use of he late in the classroom discussion. Mr. Smith's use of terms like "accomplice" later in the discussion also consistently characterize Maurice's hypothetical character—and, by implication, perhaps his real self—as on the wrong side of a moral issue. In this example, however, there are some indexicals that do not easily fit into this poetic structure. Sometimes, like at line 364 when he says "you'd rather see our mangled bodies at the bottom of the staircase," Mr. Smith seems to be teasing. Some cues would fit more easily with this alternative metadiscursive framing of the event as teasing. Most everyday interactions contain some ambiguity like this. Poetic structure is rarely so consistent and dense that no alternative framings can be imagined, except in ritual events (cf. Parmentier, 1997). Nonetheless, in most cases a poetic structure solidifies enough such that participants and analysts have a sense of what is going on.

Methodologically, the importance of poetic structure means that exemplary work in the linguistic anthropology of education systematically analyzes *patterns of indexical cues* across particular segments of language use, instead of relying on isolated instances selected from the data. This contrasts with much classic and contemporary work in discourse analysis—which unsystematically extracts segments of discourse that support an analytic point. Owing to space limitations, the preceding example does not meet this methodological standard. See Silverstein (1985), Wortham (1994, 2001), and several of the chapters in this volume for more adequate illustrations.

Contemporary linguistic anthropology, then, has described how linguistic signs come to have meaning in cultural and interactional context. In addition to drawing on and modifying central concepts from an earlier generation—centrally, "communicative competence," taking the native's point of view, and the connection between micro and macro—the contemporary approach has elaborated four other concepts: indexicality, creativity, regimentation and poetic structure. Indexical cues in utterances presuppose relevant context, and the concept of indexicality captures how the meaning of speech depends on context. Indexes not only presuppose established social identities and other aspects of context, but they can also create or entail new identities and arrangements that may come to be presupposed. A set of indexical cues in an interaction gets regimented, as a circulating metadiscourse or frame comes to organize the social positions being enacted in the interaction. This organization happens as a poetic structure of indexical cues solidifies, such that a particular relevant context can be consistently presupposed.

THE CHAPTERS

This volume contains seven core chapters—in addition to this introduction and a concluding commentary—each of which applies a contemporary linguistic anthropological approach to educational data. Each of the chapters adopts the general approach sketched in this introduction, but each emphasizes some concepts more than others. Some chapters also argue that this general approach should be supplemented with concepts from other traditions (e.g., the chapters by Collins and He). Thus the foregoing sketch of contemporary linguistic anthropology of education should not be taken as definitive. Instead of a canonical account, we offer a set of tools for looking at educational phenomena in new ways. We hope that the cases in this book can both enrich educational research and illustrate how educational institutions can be important research sites for anthropologists and other social scientists.

Indexicality and Regimentation

The first four chapters illustrate how the concepts of indexicality and regimentation can illuminate talk in schools. Each of the authors also argues that linguistic anthropological analyses of particular events can and should help us study more broadly contextualized social relationships, such as those surrounding persistent inequities related to class, race, linguistic diversity, and new social relationships engendered by

popular culture, communications technology, and the "information age" in general.

In Chapter 2, "*Language, Identity and Learning in the Era of 'Expert-Guided' Systems*," James Collins describes a university-based literacy tutoring program for middle school students with reading difficulties. Collins addresses three critical questions for a viable and contemporary Linguistic Anthropology of Education. (1). Does the widely proclaimed "information age" require a change in pedagogical relationships, towards greater self-awareness—heightened reflexivity—on the part of students and teachers? (2). Does a change in pedagogical relations lead to greater diversity in the linguistic resources drawn upon in schooled literacy lessons? That is, is there a heightened intertextuality or "discourse hybridity" relevant for today's students. (3). If there is a need in today's schools for heightened reflexivity and an understanding of discourse diversity, are these concepts essential or incidental to notions of language, identity, and learning? Collins shows how a linguistic anthropological perspective provides useful tools to investigate these questions, but he also shows that these tools must be applied within careful ethnographic studies and in dialogue with social theory.

In Chapter 3, "*Communicative Practice, Cultural Production, and Situated Learning: Constructing and Contesting Identities of Expertise in a Heterogeneous Learning Context*," Kevin O'Connor focuses on a contemporary brand of intertextuality—a collaborative educational project taking place in part through a geographically distributed learning context—in order to explore the cultural production of the "educated person." The chapter shows how a linguistic anthropological approach can illuminate processes of cultural production by examining the interplay between indexical presupposition and indexical entailment in interactions among participants in a multi-institution undergraduate engineering project. Two microanalyses reveal how students align themselves with differing views of what it means to be an "expert." In self-introductions by participants at Tech, a relatively lower-status school, this process results in the validation of the working class identity of one student, as subsequent participants indexically align themselves with him and construct a local understanding of expertise consistent with his identity. In contrast, in a later project meeting involving Tech students and students from the Institute, a higher-status school, Institute students draw upon available but unofficial contextual features in a way that promotes their own view of expertise—in a way that not only contrasts with but also denigrates the identities of Tech students.

Agnes He's chapter, "*Linguistic Anthropology and Language Education: A Comparative Look at Language Socialization*," examines the

relationship between a theory of language socialization and the linguistic anthropology of education. She argues that, while contemporary concepts such as indexicality and creativity from linguistic anthropology have not yet directly influenced mainstream educational research and practice, language socialization, which rests on a theory of indexicality, has already made an important impact on language education in particular. To illustrate this point, she describes research she had done in Chinese heritage language classes. The chapter first reviews critically and comparatively the notions of indexicality and creativity, as expounded in language socialization. She uses language education as both a site and a set of practices to demonstrate that language socialization's notions of indexicality and creativity can be enriched by the conversation analytic concepts of intersubjectivity and emergence. Her analyses illustrate how both theoretical issues and everyday practices in language education can be reconceptualized with an intersubjective, emergent account of language socialization—an account complementary to the contemporary linguistic anthropology of education.

Betsy Rymes' chapter, "*Relating Word to World: Indexicality During Literacy Events*," uses the concept of indexicality to examine literacy events in two very different classroom settings. She shows how aspects of particular teacher-student interactions limit teachers' and students' implicit conceptions of what literacy can or should be. She does this by examining two classroom contexts in which highly different curricula are in place. In one of these literacy contexts, the teacher follows a carefully scripted phonics program, while in the other the teacher freely selects children's literature trade books as well as themes and activities to accompany these books. Both of these teachers were seeking the best practices to help struggling readers who were already falling far behind their peers. However, these students' experience of the reading process is not necessarily related to the methodology teachers follow. Instead, Rymes argues, it may be that children's success as readers is crucially affected by the stance these teachers take in interactions as students use words of a text to index worlds outside that text. This chapter illustrates how analytical tools from linguistic anthropology can provide the first step to reforming the kinds of interactions that go on in classrooms and the way that literacy is constructed through those interactions.

Ideology and Linguistic Diversity

While Chapters 1 through 4 closely examine school language use to understand educational, social, and theoretical problems, Chapters 5 through 7 draw on linguistic anthropology—and in particular on the

concept of language ideology—to investigate issues of linguistic diversity. The authors describe indigenous language revitalization in Corsica, perceived dialectal variation in Costa Rica, and children's language ideologies in a dual immersion elementary magnet school in the Southeastern United States, respectively.

In Chapter 6, “*Imagined Competence: Classroom Evaluation, Collective Identity and Linguistic Authenticity in a Corsican Bilingual Classroom*,” Alexandra Jaffe looks closely at Corsican language literacy work in one of the classes in a Corsican/French bilingual school. She explores the interplay between the macro level of language ideologies and politics, and the micro level of classroom interaction, by focusing on minority language linguistic competence—both “real” and “imagined”—and how it is related to issues of individual and collective cultural identity and authenticity. She approaches these issues through close analysis of a familiar participation structure—initiation, response, evaluation—as it is used by one of the teachers in this school. She relates evaluative practice surrounding Corsican at the micro-interactional level to the overall patterning of literacy practices in the classroom in both Corsican and French. Jaffe shows how schools like this one face a key challenge: teaching a language that many of the schoolchildren do not know while at the same time authenticating their legitimate cultural claims to “own” that language.

In her chapter, “*‘Ellos Se Comen Las Eses/Heces:’ The Perceived Language Difference of Matambú*,” Karen Stocker also examines the intersection of language ideologies and particular interactions. Her analyses illuminate not “imagined competence,” but what might be called “imagined difference”—a case of the perceived language difference of Matambugueños, the residents of an indigenous reservation in Northwestern Costa Rica. She maintains that this perceived language difference is the result of the commonly held correlation between ethnic identity and language use, in a place where there is no clear ethnic distinction between Matambugueños and non-Matambugueños, but where the desire to create difference is great. As outsiders seek to define those residing within an arbitrarily defined reservation as distinct from them, they hear linguistic difference where it does not exist. The perception that Matambugueños speak a stigmatized dialect, different from that spoken by outsiders to the reservation, serves to place Matambugueños in a lower social status. As Stocker illustrates, the issue of perceived language difference is, perhaps, most noticeable in the school setting in which Matambugueños and non-Matambugueños occupy the same social terrain on a daily basis. She analyzes indexical and ideological processes through which the use of a particular dialect is perceived to identify a given group of speakers as intellectually inferior. She shows how a language ideology which privileges standard

language and values its speakers is taught, directly, in the classroom, and how teachers use this to rationalize their treatment of students from the reservation. She also provides examples of linguistic creativity and the poetic function of language, as indigenous students draw attention to—and parody—circulating language ideologies.

In Chapter 8, “*Voices of the Children: Language and Literacy Ideologies in A Dual Language Immersion Program*,” Norma González and Elizabeth Arnot-Hopffer examine the construction and negotiation of language ideologies in a dual language immersion program in which many of the English dominant students are Latino. They illustrate how the process of biliteracy development shapes and is shaped by language ideologies circulating within the school and the larger ideologically charged political context within which the school is situated. By bringing together theories of language ideology, the study of children's perspectives, and longitudinal study of biliteracy development within a dual language program, they affirm the social and historical essence of childhood and, simultaneously, illustrate the connection between children’s formation of language ideologies and their biliteracy development. As their research illustrates, children never learn language in a vacuum. Students are inevitably learning, through two languages, the language ideologies circulating around each—the students' immersion in ideological context is inseparable from their development as critically bilingual/biliterate students.

In the concluding chapter, “*Linguistic Anthropology of Education in Context*,” Nancy Hornberger, an educational and anthropological linguist who has worked in multiple research contexts spanning the fields addressed by the authors in this volume, reflects on the chapters and the prospects for a contemporary linguistic anthropology of education.

APPENDIX

Transcription Conventions

'·'	abrupt breaks or stops (if several, stammering)
'?'	rising intonation
'·'	falling intonation
'_'	(underline) stress
(1.0)	silences, timed to the nearest second
'['	indicates simultaneous talk by two speakers, with one utterance represented on top of the other and the moment of overlap marked by left brackets

'='	interruption or next utterance following immediately, or continuous talk represented on separate lines because of need to represent overlapping comment on intervening line
'[...]'	transcriber comment
''	elongated vowel
'°...°'	segment quieter than surrounding talk
''	pause or breath without marked intonation
'(hh)'	laughter breaking into words while speaking

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