

North Africa and the Making of American Psychological Warfare and Propaganda, 1942-1945

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## List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIAA	Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
CIG	Central Intelligence Group
COI	Coordinator of Information
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIS	Foreign Information Service
FN	Foreign Nationalities
IIIS	Interim International Information Service
IRIS	Interim Research and Intelligence Services
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JICA	Joint U.S. Army-Navy Intelligence Collection Agency
JPWC	Joint Psychological Warfare Committee
JSC	Joint Security Control
MO	Morale Operations
NIA	National Intelligence Authority
NSC	National Security Council
OCCCRBAR	Office of the Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics
OCD	Office of Collection and Dissemination
OEM	Office of Emergency Management
OFF	Office of Facts and Figures
OGR	Office of Government Reports
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	Office of War Information
RA	Research and Analysis
SACO	Sino-American Cooperative Organization

SI	Secret Intelligence
SOE	Special Operations Executive

## Timeline

August 16, 1940	Creation of OCCCRBAR
July 11, 1941	Creation of COI
July 30, 1941	Establishment of CIAA
June 13, 1942	Creation of OWI, OSS, and other agencies as well as dissolution of COI
May 1942	Renaming of OSS Mediterranean section to Africa section
August 24, 1942	Correspondence about recommendations in preparation for Torch
September 30, 1942	Preparations being carried out for Torch
November 8, 1942	Operation Torch landings
December 23, 1942	JCS issued 155/4/D
January 3, 1943	OSS General Order No. 9
February 1943	Insertion of “Tommy” into Italy to gather intelligence
March 1, 1943	Major King memorandum on North Africa
March 9, 1943	Executive Order 9312 distinguishing OWI and OSS differences
March 15, 1943	Report on lessons from Operations Torch by Wallace Deuel
April 4, 1943	JCS issued 155/7/D which revised 155/4/D
April 1943	MO sends out first rumors in Italy, SACO agreement reached
June 12, 1943	Donovan sends field manual on psychological warfare
June 1943	MO produces ten million leaflets in North Africa
July 9, 1943	Allied invasion of Sicily, Italy
August 5, 1943	JCS established JICAs
October 26, 1943	JCS published 155/11/D, the final basic directive for the OSS
November 1943	MO disseminated rumors in Egypt
January 1944	Start of “Morse” radio program
February 1944	“Sioux” mission in Stockholm
April 1944	Start of <i>Soldatensender Calais</i> radio, establishment of MO radio in Palestine, MO Far East becomes operational

June 6, 1944	Operation Overlord invasion
June 1944	Start of <i>Wie Lange Noch?</i> poster campaign, MO team meets with “Horsebreeders” team
July 20, 1944	Failed coup against Hitler, switch from <i>Soldatensender</i> to “Joker”
July 1944	Jedburghs liberate French towns, “Who is your enemy” rumor and leaflet campaign with OWI
August 1944	“League for Lonely Women” campaign, start of <i>Volksender Drei</i> radio, “Boston” radio in Izmir, approval for JN-27
September 1944	Operation Annie radio
October 1944	Warnings about <i>Das Neue Deutsch</i> newspaper
November 1944	End of <i>Volksender Drei</i> and “Boston” programs
November 18, 1944	Donovan submits memorandum to President Roosevelt
April 12, 1945	Death of President Roosevelt
August 25, 1945	Donovan informs Budget Bureau of OSS liquidation budget
August 31, 1945	Executive Order 9608 establishing IIS
September 20, 1945	Executive Order 9620 terminating OSS, transfer of OSS branches to new branch IRIS at Department of State
October 1, 1945	Liquidation of the OSS
December 31, 1945	Liquidation of the OWI
January 22, 1946	Establishment of NIA and CIG
May 1947	Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter takes over as first DCI
July 26, 1947	Signing of National Security Act of 1947 creating CIA and NSC
September 18, 1947	CIA becomes operational

## Introduction

In November 1942, the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS) played a decisive role in planning Operation Torch, as the Allied invasion of Vichy French-controlled North Africa was known. The OSS provided maps to Allied forces, broadcasted speeches, dropped leaflets in French, and provided support to local armed resistance groups, and in this way developed the first psychological warfare and propaganda operation undertaken by a U.S. intelligence agency. After this foundational event, however, tensions immediately arose between the wartime U.S. intelligence agencies, especially the OSS and the Office of War Information (OWI) over jurisdictional issues regarding their psychological warfare and propaganda efforts. Despite these tensions, U.S. intelligence agencies managed to systematize their “morale operations” and propaganda during the war, while developing new tactics of psychological warfare, such as the use of rumor, blackmail, and forgery. This study examines the study of psychological warfare while arguing for the centrality of North Africa, and Operation Torch, to the process.

A review of declassified OSS documents from the electronic reading room of the Central Intelligence Agency’s website, as well as of war reports written by the Strategic Services Unit of the U.S. War Department, shows how numerous intelligence committees developed increasingly sophisticated efforts in joint intelligence gathering, the collection and dissemination of reports, and the psychological assessment of enemy situations, outlooks, and capabilities. While the U.S. government formed new organizations and oversight committees to establish chain of command in the intelligence field, propaganda efforts and what we would call “morale operations” continued to advance. As World War II raged on, the OSS continued to conduct psychological operations throughout the world. In 1943, the OSS expanded into Europe and Southeast Asia. By

1945, the OSS had established itself in the Far East. Between 1942, when Operation Torch began, until the dissolution of the OSS in September 1945, OSS operatives became masters of deception, fully trained in the craft of psychological warfare after many successful operations that reflected the increasing sophistication of their work.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ultimately absorbed the work of the OSS and other wartime agencies when the U.S. government restructured operations upon the end of World War II. Looking back on the history of the OSS in the Maghreb, and specifically in the territories corresponding to present-day Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, we can see that the psychological warfare methods, procedures, and tactics that the OSS established during Operation Torch were instrumental in laying the foundation for U.S. intelligence operations during the Cold War and up to today.

This study builds upon a strong body of books and reports published in the 1970s, '80s, and '90s about the OSS and its implementation of psychological warfare and propaganda, along with a number of articles published in the early 2000s. Interest in the topic has faded somewhat in recent years, and yet, the time is now ripe for a reassessment. That is because, as recently as 2013, the U.S. government declassified a new body of documents from OSS archives and published them online in the electronic reading room of the Central Intelligence Agency's website in 2016. These declassified OSS reports and documents provide new and original content which can help provide details about the true complexity of operations as well as sophisticated command and control measures implemented directly from the director, William J. Donovan (1883-1959), to operatives in the OSS.

This study also draws upon a more theoretical literature consisting of books and resources that describe U.S. psychological warfare and propaganda beyond the OSS and the

wartime setting of North Africa. This literature is worth reviewing because it can help to show prevailing motivations and conceptions of psychological warfare and propaganda among U.S. strategists in these years as well as how the period covered in this study had far-reaching consequences for U.S. government interests later in the Cold War era.



## Terminology and Roadmap

Before proceeding, it is worth reviewing some technical language and terminology that will appear throughout this study. Given that this study deals with the foundation of American propaganda during World War II, it is necessary to define psychological warfare. The term “psychological warfare” evolved over time. And yet, William J. Donovan, the director of the OSS, provided a useful early definition in a report called the “Basic Estimate of Psychological Warfare:”

Psychological warfare is the coordination and use of all means, including moral and physical, by which the end is attained—other than those of recognized military operations, but including the psychological exploitation of the result of those recognized military actions, which tend to destroy the will of the enemy to achieve victory and to damage his political or economic capacity to do so; which tend to deprive the enemy of the support, assistance or sympathy of his allies or associates or of neutrals, or to prevent his acquisition of such support, assistance, or sympathy; or which tend to create, maintain, or increase the will to victory of our own people and allies and to acquire, maintain, or to increase the support, assistance and sympathy of neutrals.<sup>1</sup>

After properly defining psychological warfare by the man who ordered the execution of a vast majority of it in World War II, it becomes necessary to also distinguish between the three types of propaganda to which this study refers: “white,” “black,” and “gray” propaganda. The *Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda* defines “white propaganda” as

Propaganda from properly identified sources. White propaganda is open and straightforward and makes no pretense that it is anything but propaganda. It is also called overt propaganda. White propaganda is officially acknowledged by the government that disseminates it. Examples of white propaganda include Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Voice of America, Radio Moscow, official government radios in World War II, and recruiting posters.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Report of Basic Estimate on Psychological Warfare*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100250003-4 (Washington, D.C., 1942), 7.

<sup>2</sup> Martin J. Manning, and Herbert Romerstein, *Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2004), 319.

Thus, when the term overt propaganda or white propaganda arises, it is referring to propaganda that is clear in its intent and purpose. The other primary type of propaganda is “black propaganda,” which is also referred to as covert propaganda. The *Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda* defines “black propaganda” thus:

Black propaganda refers to falsely attributed propaganda. Sometimes practitioners of this form pretend that the information is being published by the enemy to deceive the reader or listener as to the origin of the information, which may be true or false. The results are usually quite ingenious and rather intriguing. Samples include fake newspapers, broadsides, leaflets, booklets, postage stamps, radio broadcasts, currency, and even army discharge forms requiring only the name of the soldier to be filled in. During World War II, the British were extremely successful with their black propaganda campaign, whereas the Germans were often unsuccessful, too obvious in their message, with fake stories unsubtle in their lies and poor printing. Black propaganda was often created to undermine the enemy's morale.<sup>3</sup>

Out of the three types of propaganda, black propaganda is referenced the most in this study as it was the exceedingly prevalent type of propaganda utilized by the OSS. There were instances, however, where U.S. intelligence agencies produced propaganda that fell in-between black and white propaganda. That type of propaganda is called gray propaganda, defined this way:

Form of propaganda located between white propaganda and black propaganda in which truth and falsehoods are mixed and whose origin is lightly concealed. The true origin can sometimes be determined when the question, "Who benefits?" is asked. The source may or may not be accurately presented, and the correctness of the information is not ascertainable. Gray propaganda has often been dismissed as nothing more than poorly disguised covert, or black, propaganda that originates from a source other than the true one.<sup>4</sup>

While this study does not frequently refer to gray propaganda, it is important to understand what it is so that one can understand American psychological warfare efforts, especially regarding the analysis of enemy psychological capabilities.

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<sup>3</sup> Martin J. Manning, and Herbert Romerstein, *Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda*, 28.

<sup>4</sup> Martin J. Manning, and Herbert Romerstein, *Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda*, 124.

There is another term that is frequently employed in this study: “morale operations.” Morale operations or “MO” for short, was a branch of the OSS designated to conduct black propaganda to undermine the morale of enemy troops and larger enemy civilian populations.<sup>5</sup> The MO branch was officially established on January 3, 1943 by General Order No. 9, but that is not to say that the OSS did not conduct black propaganda and other “morale operations” before the branch’s official inception within the OSS.<sup>6</sup> Rather, it seems that the formal inception of the morale operations branch of the OSS consolidated all the various morale operations into one section for logistical efficiency.

Again, this study asserts that the psychological warfare methods, procedures, and tactics that the OSS established during Operation Torch in North Africa were instrumental in laying the foundation for U.S. intelligence operations during the Cold War and today. Five sections follow to establish this claim by showing how and why Operation Torch was foundational.

The first section of this study defined some technical terms that will be used later in the study. The second section focuses on the establishment of the OSS and OWI from the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI). It sets the stage for the origins of the wartime intelligence agencies and provides a starting point for examining American psychological warfare in World War II. The third section explains Operation Torch in detail as the first major operation of the OSS and first primary instance in which the U.S. defense establishment used propaganda and psychological warfare on a grand scale during World War II. This section emphasizes the importance of North Africa as the foundation for the changes that followed later in the war. The fourth section discusses the tensions that arose between the OSS and OWI over jurisdiction of

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<sup>5</sup> Robert H. Alcorn, *No Bugles for Spies: Tales of the OSS* (New York: D. McKay Co, 1962), 83.

<sup>6</sup> Strategic Services Unit, United States War Department, *Washington Organization*, vol. 1 of War Report: Office of Strategic Services (Washington, D.C., 1949), 212.

propaganda implementation. This jurisdictional conflict is another factor that contributed to the sophistication of methods and procedures in American psychological warfare following the events in North Africa. The fifth and sixth sections provide examples of the growing sophistication of American propaganda efforts in North Africa, broader U.S. government efforts in the Middle East, operations in Europe, and later developments in Asia. The final section analyzes the end of the OSS and transition to the CIA. These sections follow an order that is not only thematic but chronological as well, reflecting the evolution of U.S. policies towards psychological warfare during World War II and beyond.

## The Establishment of U.S. Intelligence Agencies

In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called on William Donovan to improve the quality of intelligence reaching Washington, D.C. Shortly thereafter, the President received various recommendations and drafts of ideas to solve this intelligence problem. In fact, earlier drafts of the presidential order that would later lead to the Office of the Coordinator of Information mentioned a Coordinator of Strategic Information and a Coordinator of Defense Information.<sup>7</sup> The COI was established by a military order of President Roosevelt on July 11, 1941.<sup>8</sup> President Roosevelt wanted the agency to focus on two primary mission parameters: the coordination of intelligence collection and analysis from all sources, including the armed forces, and the transmission of information abroad to areas outside Latin America.<sup>9</sup> President Roosevelt established the COI over the strong objections of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover and officials in the U.S. Department of State, the Army, and the Navy, all of whom were fearful of losing power through the division of intelligence services.<sup>10</sup>

Once established, William Donovan, the new head or “Coordinator” of the COI, appointed Robert Sherwood as the director of the Foreign Information Service (FIS), an integral part of the COI, which was headquartered in New York City, and had the mission of spreading democracy and explaining the objectives of the United States throughout the world. In accordance with its objectives, the FIS cleared plans and projects that dealt with U.S. foreign and military policies by coordinating with, and removing possible conflicts among, the State, War, and Navy Departments and by attempting to implement its operations in coordination with the

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<sup>7</sup> Martin J. Manning, *Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda*, 69.

<sup>8</sup> William E. Daugherty, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore: Published for Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University by John Hopkins Press, 1958), 127.

<sup>9</sup> William E. Daugherty, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, 127.

<sup>10</sup> Martin J. Manning, *Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda*, 69.

British government and its Special Operations Executive (SOE).<sup>11</sup> Donovan was not to oversee propaganda and intelligence activities in Latin America, however.<sup>12</sup> A bitter dispute with the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) director Nelson Rockefeller eliminated Latin America from Donovan's portfolio.<sup>13</sup>

President Franklin Roosevelt created the Office of the Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics (OCCCRBAR) by Council of National Defense order on August 16, 1940 and Nelson A. Rockefeller was appointed its coordinator. It was abolished by Executive Order 8840 (July 30, 1941), and its functions were transferred to the Office of Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs, which became primarily concerned with commercial and financial problems of the Latin American countries.<sup>14</sup>

Still months after the creation of the COI, top-echelon leaders from the President were deeply engrossed in problems of general military and political strategy and likely were unaware of, or indifferent to, the potentials and limitations of psychological warfare on the global stage relative to the Nazis and Japanese. Consequently, the level of preparation and organization required for effective operations in psychological warfare was neither clear nor consistent at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack in December, 1941.<sup>15</sup> Because of this, the U.S. government lacked psychological warfare capabilities and operations. Within six months, however, officials devised and submitted plans to President Roosevelt to improve the organization of intelligence

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<sup>11</sup> William E. Daugherty, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, 127.

<sup>12</sup> Clayton D. Laurie, "Black Games, Subversion, and Dirty Tricks: The OSS Morale Operations Branch in Europe, 1943-1945," *Prologue* 25, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 260.

<sup>13</sup> Martin J. Manning, *Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda*, 69.

<sup>14</sup> Martin J. Manning, *Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda*, 70.

<sup>15</sup> William E. Daugherty, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, 127.

and psychological capabilities in ways that aimed to remedy administrative problems and implement better planning and coordination systems.

On January 12, 1942, William O. Hall, the Budget Bureau monitor of COI affairs, stated that it was time to unify the domestic and foreign propaganda and psychological warfare agencies in an effort to bring the radio, news, and pamphlet departments of the COI, CIAA, OFF, OCD, and OEM under a single organization.<sup>16</sup> This declaration of a need for changes to the institution of American psychological warfare resulted in tensions at the onset.

Tensions arose, in particular, between Robert Sherwood, director of the FIS, and William Donovan. While he and Donovan had begun their relationship seemingly without any problems, they soon came to a most unpleasant parting of their ways. Sherwood became very unhappy in part over having FIS considered as "cover" for other activities. Apparently, Donovan, and many in FIS, found Sherwood's administrative talents deficient, and Sherwood was neither able to get someone to take on additional tasks for him nor to delegate responsibility to others. Sherwood's closeness to President Roosevelt led Sherwood to think that he was his own boss, whereas Donovan, though exceptionally respected, did not enjoy such close relations with Roosevelt; this difference led Donovan and Sherwood to stop speaking by early 1942.<sup>17</sup>

Six months after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9182 on June 13, 1942, which established the OWI as a centralized organization of various information services, including the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), Office of Government Reports (OGR),

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<sup>16</sup> Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981), 121.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency*, 122.

the general information activities of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), and the FIS contained within the COI.<sup>18</sup>

Executive Order 9182 dissolved the COI and created the OWI along with the OSS, with Donovan leading it.<sup>19</sup> The OSS was placed under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Donovan reported directly to the President.<sup>20</sup> The FIS, although transferred under jurisdiction of the OWI, became its own overseas branch.<sup>21</sup> This executive order did not clearly establish a division of responsibility between the OSS and OWI. Because of this, jurisdictional conflicts arose between the OWI and OSS, which will be discussed in a later section. It should also be mentioned that Donovan and the OSS lost to the FBI the authority to perform counterespionage in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>22</sup> Despite this, the OSS would continue to coordinate with the FBI for intelligence priorities and information on persons of interest, with J. Edgar Hoover even corresponding with William Donovan.<sup>23</sup> With the OSS just recently created, it would soon face the enormous task of planning for one of the largest joint intelligence-military operations in U.S. history, all while ironing out administrative and jurisdictional issues.

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<sup>18</sup> William E. Daugherty, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, 128.

<sup>19</sup> Alfred H. Paddock, *US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), 7.

<sup>20</sup> John Whiteclay Chambers II, *OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II* (Washington, DC: National Park Service, 2008), 31.

<sup>21</sup> Alfred H. Paddock, *US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, 7.

<sup>22</sup> John Whiteclay Chambers II, *OSS Training in the National Parks*, 31.

<sup>23</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS/FBI Correspondence, OSS War Situation Reports, OSS Inter-Office/Inter-Departmental Messages, 1941-1945*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100100001-2 (Washington, D.C., 1942), 57.



## Operation Torch

On the morning of November 8, 1942, approximately 100,000 Allied troops landed over a stretch of almost 2,000 miles of North African coast, at points in Vichy French-controlled Morocco and Algeria. This venture, called Operation Torch, represented the first major offensive of the United States in World War II.<sup>24</sup> There were significant preparations involved in establishing the conditions in North Africa for ensuring the operation's success. From the OSS, Allied officers with the landing fleets received maps of landing points, nearby airport and port locations and measurements, the disposition of the French fleet, the number of planes on every airfield, wind and weather conditions, and the locations of French headquarters and German offices among other detailed information.<sup>25</sup> These actions, which signaled the efficiency and sophistication of U.S. intelligence gathering during this period of warfare, showed the critical value of the OSS for the success of Operation Torch in North Africa and for American wartime operations more broadly.

Several declassified OSS documents underscore the remarkable thoroughness and efficiency that the OSS displayed in its preparations for Operation Torch, while also revealing the strategies that the organization pursued. While this section will utilize information from a variety of books and declassified OSS documents, the OSS "Plan for North Africa," a fifty-eight-page report published in September 1942 and declassified in 2013, helps support the claim of this study most significantly. Because this report served as a template for operational planning that occurred later in World War II, this study closely analyzes the entire document. The memoranda in the "Plan for North Africa" cover a variety of topics such as the purchase of millions of francs

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<sup>24</sup> David A. Walker, "OSS and Operation Torch," *Journal of Contemporary History* 22, no. 4 (1987): 667.

<sup>25</sup> Strategic Services Unit, United States War Department, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2 of *War Report: Office of Strategic Services* (Washington, D.C., 1949), 18.

for payments and expenditures, the distribution of leaflets by plane, the broadcast of a proclamation by President Roosevelt and his “Four Freedoms” speech, and the promised support of the French Separatists who would attempt a coup d’état of the Vichy governments in Morocco and Algeria.

The declassified, “Plan for North Africa,” contains a series of memoranda between the director of the OSS, William Donovan, and members of “Joint Security Control.” Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) historian Wilber Hoare, Jr., described Joint Security Control in a memorandum for record:

The Joint Security Control was a very small organization established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1942, having an office representative for each of the Army and Navy. Its original purpose was to coordinate the security arrangements regarding the planning for Operation TORCH, the landing in North Africa. Afterward, it took on other duties of coordinating security arrangements of the two military services. It never had more than a very small staff... It was abolished in October 1947 as one of the incidents attendant upon the unification of the military services under the National Security Act of 1947. Its functions were taken over directly by the JCS, and it might be said that they came to be assumed by the JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee].<sup>26</sup>

This correspondence commenced with Col. Donovan on August 24, 1942, in a memorandum addressed to the JCS with his recommendations of setting up operations in anticipation of Operation Torch. It seems that a conversation took place between Col. William A. Eddy, who was leading the North Africa Operations for the OSS, and Donovan regarding the recommendations for operations. The next memorandum, dated August 26, 1942, reports on this conversation, and provides key information about the establishment of personnel in North Africa.

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<sup>26</sup> Wilber Hoare, Jr., Interviewed by “[REDACTED]”, February 11, 1971, Central Intelligence Agency, *Joint Security Control: Memorandum for the Record* (Washington, D.C., 1971), 1-2.

For example, Col. Eddy discusses the promotion of military officers and Vice-Consuls in the area who were to lead operations.<sup>27</sup>

There is another memorandum dated August 26, 1942, from Eddy to Donovan, which identifies the specific preparations that should be conducted, including leaflets and pamphlets to be distributed in French, Arabic, and Spanish announcing the arrival of American forces; detailed arrangements for wireless communications; preparations of supplies to guerilla groups; arrangements to assassinate members of the German and Italian Armistice Commission (by French agents); acquisition of 40 million francs; acquisition of a hydrographer, an individual skilled in the study of water features, at General Patton's request; the establishment of a broadcast station at Gibraltar; and more.<sup>28</sup>

Following this memorandum, Col. Donovan then sent a memorandum to the JCS for approval, dated August 27, 1942, with primarily the same recommendations and preparations that the memorandum from Col. Eddy, dated August 26, contained.<sup>29</sup>

A memorandum from members of Joint Security Control, including Major General Strong, dated September 11, 1942, to Col. Donovan, shows that JCS received his August 27 Memorandum. This September 11 Memorandum lists the various recommendations set forth by Col. Donovan in his August 27 Memorandum and approves or disapproves each of them. JCS approved the acquisition of 40 million francs, the provisions of radio communications, the earmarking of supplies for guerilla groups, the acquisition of the hydrographer, the preparation

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<sup>27</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch* (Washington, D.C., 1942), 50.

<sup>28</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch*, 41-47.

<sup>29</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch*, 33-40.

of leaflets and posters, and the movement of OSS agents to make way for the assaulting military commanders on D-Day. JCS rejected a proposal for staff talks between Americans and leaders of the Separatist movement and the payment of salaries and pensions for all officers who joined the revolt.<sup>30</sup> JCS included recommendations about how the Supreme Commander and local commanders should handle certain aspects of approved actions.

There is also a memorandum on psychological warfare, dated September 8, 1942. This memorandum includes information about the situation in North Africa, with reasons supporting why psychological operations would be effective.<sup>31</sup> It also includes discussions about the French Separatists and their conditions for assisting American forces, such as demands for U.S. recognition of French territory; economic assistance; circulation of French currencies; circulation of a “Yellow Book,” which would outline German violations of the armistice agreement; and the provisioning of small arms.<sup>32</sup> This memorandum goes on to explain the reasoning behind psychological operations and offers recommendations from previous memoranda.<sup>33</sup> An additional recommendation suggests that President Roosevelt should prepare to record an informal talk to the French people concerning all the facts about the Separatist Movement and the intervention of U.S. forces that would restore North Africa to France.<sup>34</sup> This memorandum finishes by discussing radio broadcasting of the President’s proclamation, dissemination of leaflets with the proclamation, and the meeting of American representatives with the Sultan of

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<sup>30</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch*, 30-31.

<sup>31</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch*, 3-5.

<sup>32</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch*, 6-8.

<sup>33</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch*, 9-14.

<sup>34</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch*, 15.

Morocco, Mohammed V, to explain intentions and ensure friendship.<sup>35</sup> In fact, the Morale Operations Branch translated President Roosevelt's proclamation to the Moroccans into literary Arabic (*fusha*), and it characterized the American invasion into North Africa as a jihad of freedom while calling American troops "Holy Warriors."<sup>36</sup> The MO Branch also translated President Roosevelt's speech into a form of Arabic that aimed to be dignified, like classical or Koranic Arabic.

There are two appendices that support this psychological warfare memorandum: Appendix A, which includes the suggested proclamation, and Appendix B, which outlines the objectives of the psychological operations.<sup>37</sup> These objectives include assuring the goodwill of the French and native populations, combating panic, preventing efforts by Axis agents, and breaking down the will of any French units intending to oppose American occupation.<sup>38</sup> Appendix B further discusses the importance of the appearance of U.S. forces; ceremonial visits by commanders; distribution of free food, cigarettes, soap, and other items with propaganda slogans on them; mobile broadcasting units; distribution of leaflets; and elements of counterpropaganda, such as the reporting of rumors and neutralization of enemy broadcasts.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch*, 16-17.

<sup>36</sup> Miles A. Davis, "Lessons Learned but Soon Forgotten: The OSS and Insurgency Operations in World War II" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2011), 14.

<sup>37</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch*, 19-22.

<sup>38</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch*, 22.

<sup>39</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch*, 23-27.

There is a final memorandum for Col. Donovan, dated September 30, 1942, from Joint Security Control, which lists the actions being carried out based on recommendations in the September 8 Memorandum, the August 27 Memorandum, and the August 24 Memorandum.<sup>40</sup>

This series of document correspondence between the OSS and the JCS reveals a great deal about intelligence gathering and protocols, psychological warfare operations, chain of command, US foreign and diplomatic interests, and much more. Given all the information that these documents reveal, it is no surprise that the government took so long to declassify them – seventy-one years!<sup>41</sup>

The series of memoranda also shows the significant cooperation between the OSS and the U.S. military. For example, at the time, the OSS relied on the U.S. military for approval of its operations, mainly the JCS. If the OSS had not depended on its authorization, there would have been no need to have this lengthy correspondence of approval memoranda. Instead, there might have been a singular memorandum outlining the actions to be taken, authorized solely by William Donovan. Thus, these documents give indications about the chain of command during World War II and the early days of the OSS. Other examples of military cooperation are shown by the recommendation of officer rank promotions by OSS officials, the distribution of small arms, ceremonial visits by local and supreme commanders, and the appearance of soldiers during

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<sup>40</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa/Operation Torch*, 1-2.

<sup>41</sup> Seventy-one years is a significant amount of time in declassification timelines. Time until declassification varies by the content of the information and the potential damage that could occur to U.S. national security should the information be released. Some information is released before others due to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. For comparison, the CIA published the internal investigation into the invasion of the Bay of Pigs in 1984; it was declassified in 2016: Central Intelligence Agency, *Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation Draft Volume V CIA's Internal Investigation of the Bay of Pigs by Jack B. Pfeiffer*, 0001254908 (Washington, D.C., 1984), 1.

Operation Torch. The coordination of the OSS and the US Military for these actions shows how crucial the relationship was.

The content of the memoranda also reveals significant information about psychological warfare protocols that the OSS followed during Operation Torch. The extensive use and promotion of propaganda, including radio broadcasts, distribution of leaflets, proclamations, and slogans, shows how the OSS thought it would be best to communicate political messages and ideas. Giving away free food and supplies with slogans on them reveals the types of operations that the OSS believed would win the hearts and minds of the native population. Techniques of counterpropaganda illustrate how vigilant the OSS was in its anticipation of enemy efforts to perform similar actions. There is no doubt that the OSS or the CIA would utilize similar psychological protocols for future operations.

The memoranda also demonstrate the techniques and protocols that the OSS utilized to initiate a coup d'état against the Vichy leadership in the Maghreb. The documents outline discussions with French Separatist leaders, including the conditions of the French Separatists for participation in the coup d'état. The OSS followed up on these recommendations by showing the significant value that the Separatists could provide to Operation Torch. The communication and cooperation with the French Separatists in these documents illustrate how the OSS and the CIA could and would operate in future coups and insurrection operations.

The "Plan for North Africa" was one of just many documents within a large collection of internal OSS documents. For example, a different collection of memoranda labeled "North African Operations" contains documents from June 1942, predating the "Plan for North Africa." In this "North African Operations" document, Col. Eddy lists his initial recommendations and

operational summaries for North Africa.<sup>42</sup> He also mentions his request of funds for Moroccan operations, a summary of Germans in Morocco, and details about airfields and population sentiment.<sup>43</sup> These recommendations would later be woven into the “Plan for North Africa.”

There are also documents from the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee which lay out preparations and recommendations for Operation Torch. For example, in July 1942, Colonel Bentley, military attaché in Tangier, believed that an economic plan would tend to keep “the Arabs from revolt” and allow U.S. officers to move freely in North Africa.<sup>44</sup> These are all examples of elements that would later be finalized in the “Plan for North Africa.” This shows that plans and preparations for Operation Torch began early in 1942 and evolved over a course of months. This process for establishing psychological warfare operations and propaganda began with this planning for Operation Torch. Yet, even after the “Plan for North Africa” was introduced, changes were implemented, and new recommendations were offered. For example, a document titled “Intelligence Priorities for North Africa” represents a number of documents from October 1942 which describe the declarations the United States would make to the French to inform them about Operation Torch.<sup>45</sup>

As the “Plan for North Africa” became finalized, the OSS released specific operating instructions to all the individuals who would be involved. Of course, this stage of preparation

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<sup>42</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. *OSS - North African Operations/Listening Posts/Meeting Between Marshal Petain and Reichsmarschall Goering Regarding French Commitments to Germany/British Intentions Concerning Tunisia and Gibraltar*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100120001-0 (Washington, D.C., 1942), 5-9.

<sup>43</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. *OSS - North African Operations/Listening Posts/Meeting Between Marshal Petain and Reichsmarschall Goering Regarding French Commitments to Germany/British Intentions Concerning Tunisia and Gibraltar*, 10-92.

<sup>44</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Joint Psychological Warfare Committee/Classification of Areas for Types of Psychological Warfare*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100300001-0 (Washington, D.C., 1942), 12.

<sup>45</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Intelligence Priorities for North Africa, 1942*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100440009-7 (Washington, D.C., 1942), 15.



lasted all the way up until the initial landings in November 1942. One document titled “O.S. Standard Operation Instructions” represents a collection of documents referencing everything from military tribunals for enemy combatants in North Africa to code tables that the Allied Force would use to communicate.<sup>46</sup> Because the extremely detailed document is almost 300 pages long, it is not possible to fully analyze all its contents, but some important elements can be mentioned. From this document, one can see that the OSS sought to devise contingencies for possible events and outcomes that would result from the invasion of Operation Torch, with its list of general orders and its establishment of priority objectives and corresponding actions.<sup>47</sup> This document also shows just how much intelligence the OSS was able to gather on North Africa. For example, the OSS relied on resistance groups in North Africa to assist them in the invasion. This document shows the specific groups by name, size, and capabilities:

Medjez-El-Bab – group of about 800 Europeans (4 non-coms and 8 soldiers) and some natives; Cousin’s group composed of 60 natives already organized among whom are 5 veterans and 2 non-coms (French) material 5 Lebel and 4000 cartridges; one group Y including 3 Europeans and 30 natives and one group Z about same strength as Y. 3 Groups of Europeans and natives distributed between Medjez-El-Bab and Testour. 1 group at Montamad. 1 group at Kaar Tir – native group without Europeans on a native’s property. 2 groups at Testour European and natives who know the location of arms and munition depots in the region.<sup>48</sup>

This example shows the extensive intelligence capabilities of the OSS and willingness to work with local resistance groups to accomplish their objectives. Like other aspects of the preparations for Operation Torch, the OSS would use this method of conducting intelligence on local resistance groups in their future missions and efforts to disrupt enemy morale and conduct

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<sup>46</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - O.S. Standard Operation Instructions to Oran, Casablanca, Algiers, and Tunis/Report on Coast Landing Operations for Morocco/General Military Orders for Operation Torch, 1942*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330006-2 (Washington, D.C., 1942), 198.

<sup>47</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - O.S. Standard Operation Instructions to Oran, Casablanca, Algiers, and Tunis/Report on Coast Landing Operations for Morocco/General Military Orders for Operation Torch, 1942*, 14.

<sup>48</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - O.S. Standard Operation Instructions to Oran, Casablanca, Algiers, and Tunis/Report on Coast Landing Operations for Morocco/General Military Orders for Operation Torch, 1942*, 212.

psychological warfare. Again, however, these standard operating instructions were just one of many documents that were released, revised, and re-implemented. This evolving process of recommendations and preparations utilized to plan Operation Torch would later offer U.S. intelligence officials blueprints for other subsequent operations. In that sense, Operation Torch and North Africa were the testing ground for the OSS and American psychological warfare overall.<sup>49</sup>

To be clear, the “Plan for North Africa” was a plan and just that. Some aspects of the elaborate preparations enumerated in the memoranda did not all come to fruition. Neither did every part of the operation go according to those plans. For example, in Algiers, the OSS failed to supply cases of Sten guns, revolvers, and plastic explosives, which Robert Murphy had promised, yet despite this, several hundred young supporters of the underground (many of them pro-Gaullist) seized the key positions in the city and awaited the arrival of American troops.<sup>50</sup> Robert Murphy was a career diplomat for the U.S. Department of State, who in 1941, became President Roosevelt’s special representative in French North Africa.<sup>51</sup> Unfortunately, the American troops were late. On the Moroccan and Algerian coasts, American soldiers landed at the wrong spots and did not reach their targets until hours later, which meant that the pro-Allied general in Morocco was arrested by Vichy police.<sup>52</sup> It seems that the young French patriots in Algiers were also captured. Thus, the landing aspect of Operation Torch did not go according to plan as American soldiers encountered active opposition from the French.

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<sup>49</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 17.

<sup>50</sup> Richard H. Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 60.

<sup>51</sup> Walker, "OSS and Operation Torch," 672.

<sup>52</sup> Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, 60.

While the landing aspects of the plan did not go smoothly, there were also problems with the support from key individuals in the Vichy government. Vichy collaborator Admiral Darlan appeared in Algiers, which presented a problem. Admiral Darlan was a self-declared protector of French interests in North Africa who appointed General Giraud and his commander-in-chief and based his authority on Marshal Petain, whom he assumed was unable to command on his own.<sup>53</sup> During the landing, General Giraud was not in Algiers, but he finally arrived 36 hours late. Murphy discovered that he could not command the support of the pro-Vichy commanders who had already overwhelmed the insurgents.<sup>54</sup> Eventually, Darlan agreed to a ceasefire in Algiers on November 8, 1942. It seems that in this case as in the case of the landings, the OSS had wrongly counted on the support of French commanders because they assumed that support for the Vichy regime was slimmer than it appears to have been.<sup>55</sup> The goal of the plan for North Africa was accomplished, however, despite the significant complications that occurred. This only showed the OSS that while elaborate planning and preparation for operations and psychological warfare was necessary, there were no guarantees when it came to execution.

On the other hand, a great deal of the preparations in the plan for North Africa were implemented as devised. For example, the OSS desired to establish a clandestine network of radio sites across North Africa for communication and propaganda purposes. Robert Murphy and Eddy were able to accomplish this aspect of the plan without a hitch.<sup>56</sup> Plans also called for connections and relationships with underground contacts and sources who could provide

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<sup>53</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. *OSS - Relations between Moslems and Americans in North Africa/Mistakes Made in Working with the French and Resistance Groups in North Africa/Factual Account of the Night of 7-8 November 1942 in Algiers/French Memorandum on Questions/Concern*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100440008-8 (Washington, D.C., 1943), 57.

<sup>54</sup> Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, 60.

<sup>55</sup> Arthur Layton Funk, *The Politics of Torch: The Allied Landings and the Algiers Putsch, 1942* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1974), 223.

<sup>56</sup> Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 155.

valuable information in preparation for Operation Torch. As it happens, one example is that the OSS developed a relationship with an underground contact called "Strings," a head of a powerful religious brotherhood in northern Morocco, whose sect numbered tens of thousands of "Moors" in all walks of life, each sworn to obey their sheikh.<sup>57</sup> The OSS paid "Strings" fifty thousand francs to furnish reports from various sheiks, from shepherds who relayed relevant local information, and also from holy men who penetrated areas forbidden by the French authorities to the general populace.<sup>58</sup> Another example of items in the plan that went according to plan was the acquiring of specialists in North Africa. These individuals, such as the hydrographer requested by General Patton, were secretly exfiltrated by shipping them in Portuguese boats at night or on British boats sailing from Tangier to Gibraltar.<sup>59</sup> Along the same note, this ability of the OSS and Donovan to acquire individuals for their specialized skill set would not be limited to hydrographers; Donovan would also request individuals from different government departments to work in overseas locations if it benefited the organization, such as a transfer for a treasury department employee to work in Lisbon in November 1942.<sup>60</sup>

While not everything went according to plan, the OSS's ability to adapt and respond to changing circumstances along with intense preparation provided the foundational template for OSS operations for the rest of World War II and beyond. Operation Torch was the first major operation of the OSS and showed how effective American psychological warfare could significantly impact military operational objectives and further American interests abroad.

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<sup>57</sup> Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, 156.

<sup>58</sup> Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, 156.

<sup>59</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 16.

<sup>60</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Report on General Situation in the Near and Middle East/Free French Movement/Personality Assessments of French Leaders*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100300006-5 (Washington, D.C., 1942), 2.

Because Operation Torch was so significant as the first major operation of the OSS, the OSS conducted reviews of its efforts and sought to improve on any instances where it had failed. This review also provided the OSS the opportunity to establish memoranda and orders that were issued for Operation Torch as templates for future operations. For example, certain aspects of preparation went on to remain relatively similar for all operations, like the procurement of weapons, materials, and supplies. The procedures for this procurement were laid out by the JPWC in December 1942, to be used as a template for future operations, like much of the intelligence and psychological warfare efforts would be in the coming few years.<sup>61</sup>

Memoranda on procurement were not the only takeaways that the OSS produced from Operation Torch. In March 1943, William Donovan requested Wallace Deuel to review the reports from North Africa and compile lessons to be learned for future operations.<sup>62</sup> Wallace Deuel had become William Donovan's special assistant in 1942 before being tasked to write a history of the OSS in September 1943; he would later become the special assistant to the U.S. Political Advisor to the Supreme Allied Headquarters.<sup>63</sup> In his memorandum to William Donovan on March 15, 1943, Deuel noted that landing military officers were unaware of OSS-brokered arrangements and were sometimes unwilling to accept the judgement of OSS agents during the execution of the operation not to mention that many of the officers were not fluent in French and could not speak with locals.<sup>64</sup> Deuel suggested that these issues could be addressed

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<sup>61</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Procedures for Procurement of Special Operations (SO) Equipment for Psychological Warfare Activities, 1942*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450003-2 (Washington, D.C., 1942), 7.

<sup>62</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Combat Training Instructions/Weapons Utilization/Employment of Tactical Reconnaissance/Memoranda on Situation in French North Africa/Report on Financial Manipulations of German Collaborationists in French Africa*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100440007-9 (Washington, D.C., 1942), 144.

<sup>63</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *Wallace R. Deuel: Candidate for Writing Official History of the OSS*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100460005-9 (Washington, D.C., 1945), 15-83.

<sup>64</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Combat Training Instructions*, 145.

through the Joint Chiefs of Staff since many of the problems were related to the allied military officers leading the landings.<sup>65</sup>

Deuel's findings were very similarly matched with those described by Major D. W. King, who worked in the OSS North Africa section. Major King particularly mentioned that the Army G-2 unit, in addition to the landing officers, did not speak French and had never been to the country before.<sup>66</sup> Major King also seemed to reference a memorandum dated March 1, 1943, titled "Political Policy in North Africa," which explained lessons to be learned from OSS experiences in North Africa. This memorandum mentioned that future operations should utilize "trained American administrators and intelligence officers to supervise political affairs" as well as "thorough knowledge of the local situation and of the reliability of local personnel with whom cooperation is planned."<sup>67</sup> The memorandum states that there was no program for removing "notoriously pro-Vichy and pro-Axis groups and individuals from positions of power," for freeing and using "individuals and groups who had consistently served the Allied cause," and for establishing "in North Africa a regime that could arouse the enthusiasm of those elements in occupied countries who are resisting the Axis."<sup>68</sup> Major King and Wallace Deuel read reports from Operation Torch and were well aware of its exact execution. These reports also contained information about U.S. army soldiers in Morocco in the aftermath of Operation Torch. Apparently, a well-informed French woman from Rabat wrote a letter describing how American soldiers were very easy-going compared to their German counterparts; it seems that the American soldiers lacked hierarchical relationships and would gossip with locals, even drinking

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<sup>65</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Combat Training Instructions*, 144-145.

<sup>66</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Combat Training Instructions*, 165.

<sup>67</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Combat Training Instructions*, 180.

<sup>68</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Combat Training Instructions*, 180-181.

heavily.<sup>69</sup> These reports certainly gave the OSS writers and leaders a seemingly interesting opinion of U.S. soldiers, which is perhaps why much of the “problems with Operation Torch” came to be related to Allied military soldiers and officers. Yet, these memoranda and reports by Major King and others constituted the formal feedback system that the OSS utilized, that William Donovan utilized, to make the organization better for future operations. They were surprisingly thorough and honest, given that they were written by an all-OSS group. While the OSS was able to learn much about conducting operations from Operation Torch, the OSS learned how North Africa itself was also very important.

Following Operation Torch, a number of planning concepts developed. North Africa became crucial for the OSS and American psychological warfare overall. The establishment of source contacts, radio broadcast networks, and government officials meant that North Africa was a valuable intelligence hub and one that could be used to further OSS objectives in other areas of its responsibility. In fact, some in the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee expressed that North Africa had a need for special operations as it could be used as a place of preparation for similar operations elsewhere in the Mediterranean. One way that this could occur would be to establish a training school, which would allow for quicker training of OSS agents.<sup>70</sup> The Committee also desired to establish new activities for the OSS that would expand its roles and functions.<sup>71</sup> This desire to expand jurisdiction would lead to conflict with other U.S. intelligence agencies in 1943.

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<sup>69</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Preparations for Landings in Morocco/Purchase of Machine Tools by German Armistices Commission from Morocco, 1942*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330004-4 (Washington, D.C., 1943), 12-13.

<sup>70</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Memoranda Regarding Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) Subcommittee, 1943*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100250005-2 (Washington, D.C., 1942), 16-17.

<sup>71</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Memoranda Regarding Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) Subcommittee, 1943*, 46.

## Tensions between the OSS and OWI over Jurisdiction

The end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943 would mark significant change for U.S. psychological warfare. Leaders in Washington, D.C. decided to establish new units and new divisions of responsibility. For example, in December 1942, the first psychological warfare units in the U.S. army were created with the establishment of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Service Sections, forming the 1<sup>st</sup> Combat Propaganda Company.<sup>72</sup> On December 23, 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued JCS 155/4/D, which abolished the JPWC and gave the OSS a new directive: "planning, developing, coordinating, and executing the military program of psychological warfare" and "the compilation of such political, psychological, sociological, and economic information as may be required by military operations."<sup>73</sup> Because of this new JCS order, the Army dissolved its psychological warfare branch since the OSS gained control over propaganda. That did not mean the end of the Army's involvement in psychological warfare matters, however.

Unfortunately, the new JCS directive (155/4/D), did not solve all the problems of jurisdiction that had arisen. It simply established the responsibility for securing OWI cooperation on a higher echelon – that of the JCS – yet this did not solve the fundamental issue of military coordination.<sup>74</sup> The directive instituted a planning group for psychological warfare that supervised and coordinated major projects and plans between the OSS and other agencies, along with an advisory committee.<sup>75</sup> Following the directive, a new General Order No. 9, released January 3, 1943, set in place the new reorganization of the OSS. New branches and

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<sup>72</sup> Alfred H. Paddock, *US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, 10.

<sup>73</sup> Alfred H. Paddock, *US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, 12.

<sup>74</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Washington Organization*, vol. 1, 105.

<sup>75</sup> Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 190.



administrative functions were created, along with new deputy directors, who alleviated Donovan of the numerous matters he had to personally sign off on.

While the new reorganization ameliorated internal OSS administration issues, the problems of demarcation of operations between the OWI and the OSS continued. It seems that Elmer Davis, the head of the OWI, met with Donovan on multiple occasions in the beginning of 1943 to try and work out these problems but they accomplished nothing. In the meantime, Elmer Davis and other OWI officials threatened President Roosevelt with their resignation since the JCS directive 155/4/D had given the OSS supervision of psychological warfare while also stating their case for the civilian control of propaganda and psychological warfare. From January to March, efforts to militarize the OSS, promote Donovan to brigadier general, and arbitrate responsibilities between the military and the JCS, all resulted in recommendations but no concrete action. In early March, Admiral Leahy, Chairman of the JCS, submitted a proposed order to President Roosevelt, subject to the understanding that JCS 155/4/D would be revised.<sup>76</sup>

Finally, on March 9, 1943, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9312, which established that the OWI would be the agency to conduct foreign information and white (overt) propaganda while also declaring that all operations abroad should be coordinated with military plans and be approved by the JCS and the theatre commander.<sup>77</sup> Of course, this relatively vague order left much still up to question. Executive Order 9312 did not explicitly define the role of the OWI for black propaganda, subversive activities, or coordination of psychological warfare, which meant that the President had still not drawn solid boundaries between the agencies.<sup>78</sup> With

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<sup>76</sup> Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 192-202.

<sup>77</sup> William E. Daugherty, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, 129.

<sup>78</sup> Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 203.

the President's new order, however, the JCS had to revise its original December 155/4/D directive. Thus, on April 4, 1943, they released JCS 155/7/D which revised 155/4/D by merely eliminating references to the OWI from its text, which essentially defined psychological warfare as everything except propaganda.<sup>79</sup> While this seemed to eliminate control of propaganda from the OSS, it ensured that the OSS had a mandate to continue in its psychological warfare operations. While this did not provide the OSS and OWI the clear demarcations that the agencies desired in terms of roles and responsibilities of operations, it did seem to put all control under the military theatre commanders for any operations conducted in their area of responsibility. This meant that civilian U.S. intelligence agencies had to cooperate with the local military commanders to conduct their efforts in the field, yet the JCS still required that operations be approved through them.<sup>80</sup>

On June 12, 1943, Donovan sent the JCS a field manual on psychological warfare which acted as a formal statement on OSS doctrine, operations, and procedures; however, this field manual was opposed by General Strong, the head of U.S. Army G-2's intelligence group, as well as by internal OSS employees who viewed it as harsh and "devoid of moral considerations."<sup>81</sup> Because of the backlash, the JCS ordered Donovan to submit a new draft that would alleviate instances where the OSS was already conducting operations that were not allowed under the previous JCS 155/7/D.<sup>82</sup> Finally, after a new draft of the field manual was submitted in September and recommendations were made, the JCS published JCS 155/11/D on October 26,

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<sup>79</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Washington Organization*, vol. 1, 107.

<sup>80</sup> Murray Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 108.

<sup>81</sup> Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 205.

<sup>82</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Washington Organization*, vol. 1, 109.

1943.<sup>83</sup> Being the final directive in the 155 series and final basic directive for the OSS, it contained several key changes, including changing the term “psychological warfare operations” to “strategic services operations,” which entailed everything except activities of the federal radio, press, and publication services.<sup>84</sup> This provided the OSS with authorization for many of its new activities, including those to take place in Latin America and the Far East. Shortly after the final JCS 155/11/D directive, a new propaganda branch was established in Army G-2 by Military Intelligence Division Directive No. 78 to coordinate propaganda functions for the War Department and theatre commanders while interacting with the OWI, OSS, and CIAA.<sup>85</sup>

It should also be mentioned that JCS issued a separate directive dealing with intelligence collection. On August 5, 1943, JCS established Joint U.S. Army-Navy Intelligence Collection Agencies (JICAs) in the North African, Middle Eastern, and India-China-Myanmar theaters, although China would later become its own theater.<sup>86</sup> Each JICA was then attached to its respective theater as a separate section and conducted the coordination of intelligence activities within that theater; it then collected that information and forwarded it to Washington to pertinent departments. Yet, theater intelligence activities diminished, leading authorities to liquidate JICA agencies two years later in August 1945.<sup>87</sup>

All these jurisdictional matters are very important to take note of because they greatly influenced the abilities of the OSS from 1942 to 1945 to perform certain radio propaganda or

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<sup>83</sup> Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 206.

<sup>84</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Washington Organization*, vol. 1, 110.

<sup>85</sup> Alfred H. Paddock, *US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, 18.

<sup>86</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Military Information Flow Chart for the Middle East/Reporting on Military Intelligence in the Middle East/Role of Joint Intelligence Collection Agency (JICA), 1942*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100390002-0 (Washington, D.C., 1943), 44.

<sup>87</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS - Military Information Flow Chart for the Middle East/Reporting on Military Intelligence in the Middle East/Role of Joint Intelligence Collection Agency (JICA), 1942*, 44.

psychological warfare efforts. The delegation of psychological warfare abilities between mainly the OSS, OWI, and the Army's Psychological Warfare Branch, ensured that certain operations would be performed over others from 1943 to 1945. One can imagine that when the Morale Operations section of the OSS was created in January 1943, it encountered many problems and had trouble expanding with all the tensions over jurisdiction. While these jurisdictional matters were being sorted out in Washington, D.C., agents from the Morale Operations Section began their psychological warfare efforts around the world in 1943.

## Morale Operations in 1943

Carleton Coon, a notable anthropologist-turned-OSS-agent associated with Harvard and later with the University of Pennsylvania, stated in his book, *A North Africa Story: The Anthropologist as OSS Agent, 1941-43*, that psychological warfare and printed propaganda efforts during and just following Operation Torch were almost useless because the “Arabs either could not understand or did not consider [the majority of the printed propaganda] funny;” this was true for the propaganda of the British and the Germans as well.<sup>88</sup> Of course, Operation Torch was the first significant operation of the OSS, showing the relative inexperience of the OSS at creating believable propaganda. The lessons that the OSS learnt from Operation Torch, however, propelled the OSS and its Morale Operations group to produce more and more sophisticated propaganda efforts, which this section will highlight. The Morale Operations section was tasked in accordance with the order of its creation to accomplish the following:

[I]ncite and spread dissension, confusion and disorder within enemy countries, and to promote subversive activities against enemy governments. In enemy-occupied or controlled countries, it was to encourage and support resistance to the enemy. Secret propaganda by radio and word of mouth (e.g., rumor), or hand to hand by pamphlets, leaflets, pictures, etc., as well as the manipulation of individuals or groups, were set forth as the methods necessary to accomplish these aims.<sup>89</sup>

With Morale Operations given its new mission, it began to establish branches in other overseas locations and to set up local field representatives, yet it encountered internal problems since many of its agents departed for other offices or branches due to changes in assignments, leaving offices with a continually rotating queue of leadership.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Carleton S. Coon, *A North Africa Story: The Anthropologist as OSS Agent, 1941-43* (Ipswich, Mass.: Gambit, 1980), 15.

<sup>89</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Washington Organization*, vol. 1, 212-213.

<sup>90</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Washington Organization*, vol. 1, 215.

Morale Operations mostly focused on the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, but it is important to note that the OSS was also conducting other intelligence operations. In one case, for example, the submarine *Casabianca* inserted an agent named “Tommy” into France in February 1943, where he secured German plans for anti-aircraft defenses of France and was subsequently retrieved via the same submarine.<sup>91</sup> Nevertheless, the plans for the psychological warfare efforts for the invasion of Sicily, code-named Operation Husky, continued to change based on shifting estimates of possible Italian resistance and “differing attitudes toward, and interpretations of, the policy of unconditional surrender adopted by FDR and Churchill at the Casablanca conference in January 1943.” But the policy on surrender was not the only thing that influenced Italians. POW interrogations revealed that Italian soldiers were likely to keep Allied leaflets. They were also more likely to be influenced by U.S. slogans and phrases emphasizing Italian emigration to America and lack of German care for Italians.<sup>92</sup>

Generally speaking, rumors are most effective and circulate most rapidly in atmospheres of crisis and emergency where there is no clear picture of the situation and official news is lacking.<sup>93</sup> The OSS knew this fact and recognized the opportunity to use it on the Italians. In April 1943, it sent out the first rumors. Morale Operations sent out a rumor that Mussolini had applied to the Swiss for asylum in case of an Allied invasion and was denied, which eventually reached a U.S. representative in Bern.<sup>94</sup> In June, MO established the first “black” radio in Tunisia, called “Italo Balbo,” which consisted of an Italian speaker attempting to promote discord between Fascists and Nazis by spreading rumors; it was very effective since Italian

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<sup>91</sup> Bernard Victor Moore, “The Secret Air War Over France: USAAF Special Operations Units in the French Campaign of 1944,” Ph.D. Dissertation (Air University, 1992), 15.

<sup>92</sup> Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 102-103.

<sup>93</sup> Terence H. Qualter, *Propaganda and Psychological Warfare* (New York: Random House, 1962), 85.

<sup>94</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Washington Organization*, vol. 1, 215.

POWs captured later were surprised to hear that the station was a front for circulating falsehoods.<sup>95</sup>

There was also a heavy emphasis on leaflets leading up to the invasion of Sicily. Apparently, by June 1943, about ten million leaflets were produced in North Africa that were then dropped over Sicilian, Sardinian, and other Italian towns. These leaflets mentioned the strong air power of the Allies and warned civilians to keep away from military targets, as well as reproducing speeches of Allied leaders.<sup>96</sup> Altogether, the leaflets, the rumors, and the radio broadcasts ensured that the invasion of Sicily was a success: Sicily, Corsica, and the outlying islands fell to the Allies with ease.<sup>97</sup> It seems that unlike Operation Torch, Operation Husky went very much according to plan thanks to the effective efforts of the OSS.<sup>98</sup> This success suggests that the OSS learned from its mistakes in Operation Torch and implemented significant planning and psychological warfare efforts to achieve better results in Sicily. Sicily would not be the only place that the OSS was conducting psychological warfare efforts in 1943, however.

In mid-1943, Morale Operations began conducting operations in the Far East, specifically trying to influence populations and efforts in Ceylon (Sri-Lanka), Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, Vietnam, and China.<sup>99</sup> Many of the OSS individuals in Morale Operations trained near Washington to write slogans and leaflets for use against the Japanese. MO had access to Japanese POWs in rural Virginia that they would bounce ideas off in their training. These captured Japanese soldiers would tell the Morale Operations personnel that many of the leaflets

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<sup>95</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 97.

<sup>96</sup> Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*, 108.

<sup>97</sup> Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, 178.

<sup>98</sup> Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*, 108.

<sup>99</sup> Elizabeth P. McIntosh, *Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 52.

they created would not be understood by the average Japanese soldier since many could not even write their own name at a time when literacy rates were quite limited. They thus implored the OSS to write simple, short written pieces. The same was true for slogans. In the case of slogans, the POWs advocated that writing about killing their commanding officers was a futile effort. Many esteemed women taught these courses, such as anthropologist Margaret Mead, whose husband was Gregory Bateson.<sup>100</sup> Gregory Bateson was a renowned member of Morale Operations, who spent much of his time designing and implementing black propaganda radio broadcast primarily for efforts in Myanmar, Thailand, China, and India.<sup>101</sup>

At the same time that Morale Operations were being established in the Far-East, activities in the Middle East were also accelerating. For example, the OSS issued a report in August 1943 mentioning intelligence regarding the Zionist-Arab problem, landing of Nazi parachutists in Iraq, Iranian political parties and communications, and information on Syria and Lebanon.<sup>102</sup> These intelligence efforts led to Morale Operations designing rumors and other subversive materials to disrupt Axis Middle East operations. It seemed that these efforts were successful. In a later OSS report from December 1943, it appears that MO agents disseminated rumors in November for German soldiers in the Middle East, primarily in Egypt. These rumors mentioned how the Allies were treating German POWs or deserters in Turkey well, even letting them out on parole, and giving them jobs, such as driving cars. These rumors were known to have been effective because “two German filers, departing from Crete, gave themselves up as prisoners of war” thinking that

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<sup>100</sup> Elizabeth P. McIntosh, *Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS*, 53.

<sup>101</sup> David H. Price, "Gregory Bateson and the OSS: World War II and Bateson's Assessment of Applied Anthropology," *Human Organization* 57, no. 4 (1998): 380.

<sup>102</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports - Middle East/Central Africa Theater of Operations, 1943*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140004-5 (Washington, D.C., 1943), 52.



they would enjoy good conditions.<sup>103</sup> This is remarkable because it shows how the OSS was becoming increasingly effective and creative in its psychological warfare and propaganda.

With the invasion of Sicily a success, and Morale Operations expanded to a number of overseas theaters, the capture of Italy was naturally the next step. Thus, the OSS was already planning and implementing psychological warfare efforts for the Italian mainland. While Mussolini's government did not need to be discredited through broadcasting or leaflets because Italians already reviled it widely, the OSS figured that it could still create a divide between the Italians and the Germans who were occupying the northern four-fifths of the country.<sup>104</sup> Thus, the OSS bombarded Italians with further leaflets, not ones just explaining Allied power as previous ones did, but ones that pointed out disparities between Italian and German rations, incidents of German and Italian military clashes, German stores overflowing with Italian goods, and instances where Germany bolstered its own defense at the Italians' expenses.<sup>105</sup> While these leaflet droppings certainly made an impact, broadcasts continued to serve as another means of destroying German and Italian morale and encouraging defections. These operations continued into 1944 and grew in their sophistication and deception.

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<sup>103</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports - Middle East/Central Africa Theater of Operations, 1943*, 12-13.

<sup>104</sup> Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*, 113.

<sup>105</sup> Clayton D. Laurie, "Black Games, Subversion, and Dirty Tricks," 263.

## Morale Operations in 1944

It seems that 1944 was the year when the Morale Operations Division of the OSS took its propaganda and psychological warfare efforts to its maximum potential. While Morale Operations influenced groups in various parts of the globe, this study compares the three most significant theaters of operations: Europe, Middle East, and Far East. It should be noted that this study uses the term Far East as an all-encompassing term to describe the areas of OSS China covered in the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) as well as the operations generally considered as Far East, such as Burma. SACO was an agreement that William Donovan reached with the Chinese in April 1943.<sup>106</sup> The agreement named General Tai Li as director of SACO and Milton E. Miles as deputy director, who was also named Far East chief of the OSS.<sup>107</sup> Nevertheless, a number of declassified OSS “Monthly Activity Reports” describe the status and accomplishments of the various OSS divisions each month in 1944. Through these reports, it is possible to see just how sophisticated operations became. The OSS used a variety of propaganda efforts, especially leaflet dropping, radio broadcasting, newspaper and magazine distribution, and applications of poison-pen letters.

For the European theater of operations, Morale Operations began in February 1944. The OSS monthly activity report from February describes a mission known as “Sioux Mission,” which proved to be useful as an effective way in which the OSS could approach Germany through Sweden with its Morale Operations. The specifics of the mission are never mentioned, but it seems the mission was cleared with the acting chief of the north Europe section of the U.S. State Department. Since the U.S. Ambassador Herschel Johnson was in Stockholm, the OSS

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<sup>106</sup> Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*, 159.

<sup>107</sup> Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, 267.

made a note that he was to be informed in person of the mission.<sup>108</sup> This appears to be evidence of increasing transparency and cooperation with other US officials from years past since the mission occurred on a modest scale. In March, there seemed to be a slowdown of operations due to the lack of manpower and staffing issues since the OSS dispersed much of the Morale Operations staff to other areas and on other missions.<sup>109</sup>

By April 1944, however, operations ran full steam ahead. A two-man MO unit arrived in Stockholm where they began production of some 250,000 pamphlets, leaflets, stickers, posters, and letters for distribution through Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany. They also produced and distributed the Harvard Project Newsletter, *Handel und Wandel* (“Trade and Change”), which was a weekly business publication containing largely financial news, angled from a German industry perspective. It hoped to encourage German businessmen to act out against Nazi leaders so that Allied interests would cooperate with them.<sup>110</sup> The OSS also started one of its biggest radio programs in April. The OSS took over the most popular MO station of the war, *Soldatensender Calais* (“Soldier Transmission Calais”), which was initially a British program. The broadcasts came from a 600,000-watt radio transmitter in Woburn, England. It delivered news, music, nostalgic stories, and anti-Nazi propaganda. It even had a special music department that wrote “black” lyrics for German and American songs for performance by Marlene Dietrich, Bing Crosby, and Dinah Shore; these new compositions were made especially for *Soldatensender*.<sup>111</sup> Apparently, the programs were so popular that one female host received

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<sup>108</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – February 1944*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140006-3 (Washington, D.C., 1944), 19.

<sup>109</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – March 1944*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140007-2 (Washington, D.C., 1944), 21.

<sup>110</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 266.

<sup>111</sup> Clayton D. Laurie, “Black Games, Subversion, and Dirty Tricks,” 267.

fan mail and requests for pictures through the mail. It was also so effective that the German propaganda ministry and military high command issued repeated warnings to soldiers and civilians not to listen to *Soldatensender*, with even Joseph Goebbels recognizing its potential negative effects.<sup>112</sup>

Newspapers also became a powerful MO Europe tool. The OSS printed daily “gray” papers, which were distributed by air over the German troops. Along with these gray newspapers, Morale Operations wrote black propaganda to maintain liaisons with the French resistance groups in April; some of this material was subversive, but in any case, the OSS distributed it over German troops for demoralizing effects.<sup>113</sup> French Resistance groups were known as *Maquis*, which literally means “men of the underbrush,” referring to the high dense shrubbery covering the sides of the Corsican mountains.<sup>114</sup> In May, Morale Operations produced millions of magazines (similar to American weeklies) and pamphlets supposedly from underground groups. Fortunately, the OSS determined that Germans were unlikely to tell the difference between real and “black” magazines. The OSS airdropped fake issues of *Time* and *Life* magazines, which contained stories by POWs describing the comforts of American internment while also encouraging enemy surrender. Some of these underground newspapers were called *La Ricossa* and *Marc Aurelio* for Italians; for the Germans and Austrians, it was *Das Neue Deutsch* (“The New German”) and *Der Oesterreicher* (“The Austrian”). Even more, the OSS issued forged copies of Himler’s SS newspaper, *Das Schwarze Korps* (“The Black Corps”), and issues of the Berlin newspaper, *Illustrierte Zeitung* (“Illustrated Newspaper”).<sup>115</sup> Another

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<sup>112</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 299.

<sup>113</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – March 1944*, 147.

<sup>114</sup> Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, 170.

<sup>115</sup> Clayton D. Laurie, “Black Games, Subversion, and Dirty Tricks,” 264.

subversive newspaper the OSS produced was *Nachrichten fur die Truppe* (“News for the Troops”), specifically for the Wehrmacht, which hoped to demoralize German soldiers. During May, the OSS was still developing many more projects and magazines, even French-language publications for resistance groups and Vichy collaborators.<sup>116</sup>

In June, much of the focus remained on D-Day, otherwise known as Operation Overlord. The D-Day invasion, June 6, 1944, was the largest amphibious invasion in history, with 175,000 American, British, and Canadian troops landing in Normandy that day. These would be followed by hundreds of thousands of additional Allied soldiers later. While not directly related to Morale Operations, the individuals known as Jedburghs were very important in Operation Overlord. Jedburghs was the code name for about one hundred three-man teams drawn from the United States, Great Britain, and France, and it always included at least one native-speaking Frenchman. These Allied teams led the Maquis in the disruption of enemy communications, attacks on troop movements, and raids on enemy headquarters, which bolstered Allied advances and hindered German resistance.<sup>117</sup> Of course, with the benefit of hindsight from Operation Torch, OSS officials began conducting propaganda and psychological warfare efforts for months leading up to Operation Overlord and the months after it. They learned just how effective planning and preparation were in a massive operation such as this.

Yet, Operation Overlord did not stop the OSS from producing more and more propaganda in June. For example, MO released a poster campaign titled *Wie Lange Noch?* (“How much longer?”) which was a series of sixteen different posters each with a red circle and

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<sup>116</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – May 1944*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140008-1 (Washington, D.C., 1944), 31.

<sup>117</sup> John Whiteclay Chambers II, *OSS Training in the National Parks*, 322-323.

three extended fingers forming a “W.”<sup>118</sup> This was in hopes to provide evidence that a strong underground movement operated inside Germany. The OSS printed more than 130,000 leaflets by June. Many of the posters showed how Nazis were taking the best of the food and women. It also deceived Germans into thinking secret weapons were fake and that Allied bombing was making life impossible.<sup>119</sup> At the same time, Morale Operations produced weekly magazines for French Resistance groups as well as those that had a thin cover of pure entertainment for a subversive article. The OSS also distributed leaflets intending to destroy enemy morale to German soldiers in Norway.<sup>120</sup>

Following the July 20, 1944, coup attempt against Hitler, *Soldatensender* broadcast the names of hundreds of Germans who were allegedly involved in the plot. Morale Operations sought to use this moment to implicate as many people as possible, guilty or innocent, so that they could eliminate the most capable people in Germany. It seems that even the Gestapo took *Soldatensender* information seriously. The OSS changed the *Soldatensender* program name to “Joker” in the fall. Under the new Joker name, they resurrected Gen. Ludwig Beck, the former German army chief of staff, who had committed suicide following the failed summer coup. Joker broadcasted a voice that sounded like Beck’s, which demanded that Germans kill Hitler and overthrow the Nazis.<sup>121</sup> It should be noted that the Nazis continuously jammed the Joker frequency since it was especially popular. Apparently, ninety percent of POWs taken in the

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<sup>118</sup> Clayton D. Laurie, “Black Games, Subversion, and Dirty Tricks,” 262.

<sup>119</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 97.

<sup>120</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – May 1944*, 167-168.

<sup>121</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 299.

summer of 1944 said they had listened to *Soldatensender* or Joker broadcasts, implying that German officers had their hands full trying to prevent their troops from listening in.<sup>122</sup>

In the wake of the failed July 20<sup>th</sup> coup, the OSS instituted Operation Sauerkraut. Its goal was to attack the morale of the German army by circulating rumors, fake orders, and leaflets about growing unrest among German military leaders. The OSS selected prisoners and dressed them in German uniforms with the proper insignia. It gave them forged identity papers, firearms with ammunition, survival supplies, and 3,000 pieces of MO material. Morale Operations instructed these prisoners to distribute the propaganda by nailing it to trees, leaving it in buildings, or scattering it through the streets. In addition to spreading the propaganda, the returning prisoners were able to bring back significant intelligence, including the location of German troops.<sup>123</sup> Barbara Lauwers was a significant agent in Operation Sauerkraut. She received the Bronze Star for her work in securing the surrender of 600 Czechoslovakian troops through black propaganda. Lauwers wrote five speeches from "fellow Czechs" who had supposedly defected and now worked with the Allies in Italy. Lauwers also disseminated a simple surrender pass "good for one return trip to Czechoslovakia via Allied lines." BBC broadcasted these speeches to Czechs in northern Italy, and as a result, six hundred Czech soldiers surrendered carrying these passes.<sup>124</sup>

At the same time that the OSS was carrying out sophisticated propaganda efforts across Europe in July, OSS operators – Jedburgh liberators – made their way through France traveling with the Maquis to liberate small villages and towns. Michael Burke, a 26-year-old football star

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<sup>122</sup> Clayton D. Laurie, "Black Games, Subversion, and Dirty Tricks," 269.

<sup>123</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, "Barbara Lauwers: Deceiving the Enemy," *Central Intelligence Agency Stories*, August 19, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/stories/story/barbara-lauwers-deceiving-the-enemy/>.

<sup>124</sup> Katherine Breaks, "Ladies of the OSS: The Apron Strings of Intelligence in World War II," *American Intelligence Journal* 13, no. 3 (1992): 92.

from the University of Pennsylvania was told by an eighty-year-old Frenchman, who had tears in his eyes, that he sobbed “to think that Gen. Eisenhower thought enough of our little village to send an American officer here to help us.”<sup>125</sup> While these actions did not disrupt enemy morale, they certainly gained the support of the local population, which the OSS learned from Operation Torch in North Africa.

Towards the end of July, the OSS applied somewhat new psychological warfare practices. Morale Operations utilized public address systems on sound trucks to broadcast propaganda, which enabled a number of Germans to surrender in the Bayoux area in France and later another 600 Germans surrendered to similar persuasion.<sup>126</sup> Morale Operations also utilized artillery weapons to fire tactical leaflets produced by mobile printing units. In one instance under Captain Patrick Dolan, this resulted in the capture of 1200 Germans. The OSS also began producing leaflets and news magazines in additional languages, not just German and French: they produced leaflets in Russian and Polish.<sup>127</sup> The OSS continued utilizing new methods and practices in August. Morale Operations designed a leaflet for German frontline troops on the Eighth Army front in the form of a Feld post (V-mail letter or circular) which supposedly came from the "League for Lonely Women." Apparently, soldiers on furlough only needed to pin an entwined heart symbol (given in the leaflet) on their lapels to find a girlfriend. The leaflet ended with the line: "Don't be shy. Your wife, sister and sweetheart are one of us. We think of you, but we think also of Germany."<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, 189.

<sup>126</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – July 1944*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140009-0 (Washington, D.C., 1944), 19.

<sup>127</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – July 1944*, 42-43.

<sup>128</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 97.



At the same time, the OSS received authorization to establish its own “black” radio station in Paris named *Volksender Drei*. Morale Operations intended to capitalize on fears of impending destruction of family and home by spreading rumors of terror, which would manifest itself in internal revolt. *Volksender Drei* broadcast in German, with its chief speaker purportedly being the commander of an unknown town in the path of the Allied advance. The program achieved great success. It headlined in all French newspapers.<sup>129</sup> Apparently, two thousand German POW's who listened to the program believed it “meant the end of Germany.” It was also so sophisticated that the U.S. 12th Army Group radio operators who picked up the broadcasts considered the news so important that high ranking U.S. Army officers, including General Bradley, were aroused from bed to hear about it. Of course, the OSS had not informed the U.S. Army about the broadcasts for security reasons. The Germans repeatedly tried to jam the program.<sup>130</sup> All these factors showed just how effective the program was, so much so in fact that even Army radio operators thought it was real. Problems with propaganda believability remained an issue following Operation Torch, but *Volksender Drei* showed just how far the OSS had come. Even with the radio success, Morale Operations increased their leaflet output substantially in August. To give an idea of the progress, MO completed 30 different subversive leaflets programs in August alone. There were also negotiations to establish more secret radio facilities in Paris, which was not surprising given the success of *Volksender Drei*.<sup>131</sup>

In September 1944, the Allies captured Luxembourg City, which gave the OSS the use of the most powerful commercial transmitter in Europe. While Allied propagandists pushed out

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<sup>129</sup> Clayton D. Laurie, “Black Games, Subversion, and Dirty Tricks,” 268.

<sup>130</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 300.

<sup>131</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – August 1944*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140010-8 (Washington, D.C., 1944), 30-31.

"white" propaganda during day-time broadcasts, MO ran a nightly program named Operation Annie. It was also called "1212" after its frequency. The program supposedly came from a German resistance group. What is special about Operation Annie is that it utilized a unique strategy of initially providing detailed and truthful news to build up audience trust and then beginning to insert false reports, orders, and rumors to create chaos.<sup>132</sup> One particular example of this is when the station was able to divert a few German Army trucks to a route leading behind American lines and that resulted in their capture.<sup>133</sup> By all accounts, Radio Luxembourg was a huge success. It continued to produce programming well into November. By that time, it was on the air a total of eleven hours daily, including seven relays from New York, twenty-three relays from BBC, and four relays from American Broadcasting Station in Europe.<sup>134</sup>

Yet again, the success of radio broadcasts did not mean Morale Operations reduced its printed propaganda efforts. In fact, it was quite the contrary. Morale Operations disseminated two hundred sixty-two thousand leaflets and stickers to the field and made arrangements for the transmission of other leaflets to Prince Bernhardt, who was the leader of the Dutch underground.<sup>135</sup> During September, one million copies of the August 15<sup>th</sup> edition of *Das Neue Deutsch* were printed in miniature and dropped over German territory by air.<sup>136</sup>

While the OSS established *Das Neue Deutsch* before October 1944, it was in October that warnings from *Nachrichten fur die Truppe* and Himmler's SS newspaper *Das Schwarze Korps* took the front page. *Das Neue Deutsch* showed itself to be highly successful, perhaps

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<sup>132</sup> Clayton D. Laurie, "Black Games, Subversion, and Dirty Tricks," 269.

<sup>133</sup> Howard Becker, "The Nature and Consequences of Black Propaganda," *American Sociological Review* 14, no. 2 (1949): 230.

<sup>134</sup> Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*, 139.

<sup>135</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – September 1944*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140011-7 (Washington, D.C., 1944), 44.

<sup>136</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – September 1944*, 66.

because it alleged to be the instrument of a German peace party which wanted to end the war, liquidate the Nazi Party, and set up a new German state on democratic principles.<sup>137</sup> It seems that the authentic German newspapers' efforts to try and dissuade German soldiers from reading the subversive material failed because numerous POWs – a remarkable 30 to 50% of the total – surrendered to Allied forces quoting from copies of the newspaper in their possession.<sup>138</sup>

While Morale Operations enjoyed significant success in Europe, along with establishing new and more sophisticated ways to conduct psychological warfare, even ways that tricked U.S. Army radio operators, the end of 1944 saw a slowdown of radio broadcasts and other projects. For example, in November, the OSS shut down *Volksender Drei*.<sup>139</sup> Of course, these are only examples from Europe. The OSS continued to conduct significant operations in its Middle Eastern theater during 1944, too.

For the Middle Eastern theater of operations, Morale Operations began in January 1944. Morale Operations there sought to terrorize German garrisons while also bolstering resistance in Greece. One of the methods that they utilized was radio propaganda. From the Cairo office, which was the main hub of the OSS in the Middle East, the black radio "Morse" broadcast in Morse code four times nightly to Greece and the Balkans. These programs consisted of news reports, which were intertwined with rumors.<sup>140</sup> This strategy proved to be effective because some of these rumors were published in underground newspapers. The programs were split between German and mostly Greek broadcasts. For example, the German broadcasts supposedly came from a Nazi wireless operator giving the "inside story" to fellow soldiers; for Greek,

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<sup>137</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 97.

<sup>138</sup> Clayton D. Laurie, "Black Games, Subversion, and Dirty Tricks," 265.

<sup>139</sup> Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*, 136.

<sup>140</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 122.

Hungarian and Rumanian broadcasts, they pretended to be an underground station sending out the truth to resistance groups. MO terminated the Morse broadcasts in October 1944 after Germany withdrew troops from Greece.<sup>141</sup> At the same time that MO broadcasted Morse starting in January, Cairo office also received reports that confirmed the value of the rumors and subversive material that were sent out. This became a standard Morale Operations practice which acted as a feedback loop to ensure the propaganda was successful. It was. For example, the OSS reported that in January alone an Austrian soldier had surrendered with six Italians from Crete.<sup>142</sup>

In February, the Cairo office circulated rumors every week throughout the Middle Eastern theater, though this was mostly in Greece and the Balkan areas. These rumors were successful in producing riots and the surrender of individual aviators. Morale Operations also made arrangements so that four pages of *Life* magazine were reprinted and disseminated amongst German soldiers encouraging them to defect, referencing how good the treatment of German POWs was.<sup>143</sup> There were also plans with OWI to drop special material to Yugoslav Partisans. A report for Prime Minister Churchill described these Partisans as those under communist leadership and firmly oriented towards Moscow, but also observed that as a resistance movement, it was highly effective and worth cultivating. This special material included news summaries and other American material such as the journal, *Tank*, in Serbo-Croat translations.<sup>144</sup> In March, Morale Operations work in Cairo steadily increased. Pamphlets, rumors, black broadcasts, and motion picture training films for Yugoslav Partisans continued to be produced. MO also instituted a “poison pen” letter campaign against well-known Greek quislings, with a

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<sup>141</sup> Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*, 113.

<sup>142</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – January 1944*, CIA-RDP13X00001R000100140005-4 (Washington, D.C., 1944), 53.

<sup>143</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – February 1944*, 37-38.

<sup>144</sup> Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*, 139.

weekly series of these letters being sent to Greek newspapers.<sup>145</sup> Poison pen letters, otherwise known as suspicion casting letters, are useful for driving a wedge in populations of people. They target specific individuals and cast doubt on or tarnish their reputation. They are most effective when they are essentially true since their highly personalized nature demands the use of credible intricate details.<sup>146</sup>

Morale Operations Middle East saw an expansion of efforts in April 1944. With increasing work between MO and Yugoslav Partisans, MO established a liaison with the group. MO also established another “black” radio station in Palestine, which it broadcast to Hungary, Romania, and Greece. Interestingly, the Cairo office also produced pamphlets urging Greeks to attack the Germans by calling on the Hungarian underground to use labor resistance, i.e., protests in factories. This might be the first instance where MO called specifically for labor resistance! Morale Operations also began sending black material to additional cities in the Middle East: they sent rumors to Istanbul for distribution while also planting rumors, poison pen letters, and other subversive material in Greek newspapers in Alexandria.<sup>147</sup>

Unfortunately, OSS “Monthly Activity Reports” regarding the Middle Eastern theater from certain months during 1944 were removed and sent to Lt. Col. Norman Newhouse, 2677<sup>th</sup> regiment, thus, they are consequently missing.<sup>148</sup> The reason for this removal of specific monthly reports is unclear. The only thing that is clear is that the OSS designated the Mediterranean section as the 2677<sup>th</sup> regiment with the militarization of the OSS in 1942.<sup>149</sup> The OSS reassigned

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<sup>145</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – March 1944*, 40.

<sup>146</sup> Howard Becker, "The Nature and Consequences of Black Propaganda," 224.

<sup>147</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – March 1944*, 169.

<sup>148</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – May 1944*, 39.

<sup>149</sup> Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA* (Washington: Acropolis Books, 1976), 71.

the Mediterranean section to the Africa section in May 1942.<sup>150</sup> For clarification, these sections combined with the Near East section to form the Middle Eastern theater.

For Morale Operations in the Middle East, June, August, and September of 1944 were busy months. For example, in June, MO dispatched special teams to Greece and Crete. One such team of two men traveled to Volos, where, under the care of an OSS Secret Intelligence (SI) team, called “Horsebreeders,” they distributed subversive MO material. The duo printed a Greek newspaper designed to bolster Greek morale and distributed pamphlets urging local resistance to the Germans. This special MO team also sent out poison-pen letters, posted fake military orders, and spread rumors. This is yet another example of Morale Operations agents working with other OSS branches to accomplish psychological warfare. In August, MO set up the black radio station “Boston” near Izmir with the cooperation of the Turkish secret police. It featured daily broadcasts of ten-minute programs from a supposed “reformed” Greek collaborationist, who was trying to convince his former partners that collaborating was futile.<sup>151</sup> Owing to the success of the broadcasts, the Nazis frequently jammed the station and even attempted to physically sabotage it. Additionally, in August, OSS Monthly Activity Reports indicate that MO executed mission “Ulysses” on Evvia. It published two daily underground papers, one in Greek, and one in German. The Greek newspaper contained news broadcasts from Cairo and the German one contained true and false news and general subversive material. In one example of the broadcast’s success, a German garrison was evacuated after MO issued an ultimatum for the leader of the Andartes forces. This resulted in a number of Germans surrendering with MO pamphlets in their possession.<sup>152</sup> Like the Morse broadcasts, the OSS discontinued the “Boston” station in October.

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<sup>150</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Washington Organization*, vol. 1, 52.

<sup>151</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 122.

<sup>152</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – August 1944*, 52.

In September, MO discontinued the Greek broadcasts, but continued to produce the Hungarian broadcasts, along with producing a number of printed materials for Hungarian consumption.<sup>153</sup>

While Morale Operations saw great success in the Middle Eastern theater, as evidenced by the number of Germans who surrendered in Greece with MO pamphlets in hand, it seems that the OSS utilized many of the more sophisticated psychological warfare tactics in western Europe. While MO did call on labor resistance through radio broadcasts as a method of encouraging civil revolt from psychological warfare, there was understandably not as great of a need for propaganda programs in the Middle Eastern theater compared to the European theater. While the Middle Eastern theater had a lack of opportunities compared to the OSS European theater, the Far Eastern theater suffered from more logistical and legal problems getting operations up to speed in its area of responsibility.

For the Far Eastern theater of operations, significant Morale Operations began in January 1944. Immediately in January, MO sought to discredit Japanese targets by increasing the number of subversive leaflets, making black sound recordings, and even gathering intelligence on deceptive media.<sup>154</sup> In February, MO wanted to expand to Delhi but lacked the manpower to send even a single representative. Of course, that showed that opportunities were growing. They were also growing in Burma. For example, in Burma, MO sought to destroy the hold that the Japanese had over the population through terrorism and propaganda.<sup>155</sup> Along with the desire to expand, OSS Far East officials sought to expand their use of local collaborators. According to Commander Edmond Taylor, a former journalist in France who wrote a book about fifth

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<sup>153</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – August 1944*, 66.

<sup>154</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – January 1944*, 62.

<sup>155</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – February 1944*, 51.

columnists called, *The Strategy of War*, before joining the OSS, the most effective type of MO operation was spontaneous activity by natives.<sup>156</sup> He argued that MO Far East should utilize natives and train them in MO principles and techniques. Unfortunately, the key problem that the Far East section faced at that time was the difficulty in acquiring key personnel with special knowledge of languages and areas – the very “natives” he was describing.<sup>157</sup>

In March, the Far East continued in its preparations for executing Morale Operations despite its logistical challenges. MO changed from this preparation stage to an operational stage in April. MO produced its first black leaflets, in cooperation with OWI, and delivered them personally to forward to operational units and drop to others. MO supplemented these leaflets with a succession of rumors as well.<sup>158</sup> It was during this time frame that specific operational plans were being prepared for in China, specifically the Shanghai area. An agreement was reached with General Tai Li and sent to Washington for approval to have American personnel at advance bases with the Chinese as well as to operate black radio stations together with the Chinese in several provinces. This agreement also gave MO the ability to install and operate under Sino-American control, means of printing and reproduction, along with the right to install separate communications, and to circulate MO communications by special codes between advance bases.<sup>159</sup>

In May, to act on original intentions to undermine Japanese control over the population in Burma, MO processed six leaflets and a series of rumors for distribution to operating centers within the country for circulation. In June, MO began preparing radio receiving sets to monitor

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<sup>156</sup> Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*, 12.

<sup>157</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – February 1944*, 52.

<sup>158</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – March 1944*, 203.

<sup>159</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – March 1944*, 212-213.



enemy broadcasts on an ad-hoc basis.<sup>160</sup> Although Morale Operations began working more closely with the Chinese during this time, preparing eight different propaganda projects, unfortunately, they encountered logistical trouble in finding qualified Chinese staff due to a lack of competent translators available. To try to bolster support, MO also issued a report to General Chiang-Kai-Shek explaining the potential usefulness of MO in the Chinese theater.<sup>161</sup> In July, little changed for MO China, but in the other Far East sections MO circulated rumors and produced leaflet requested on the theme of “Who is your enemy?” with the help of OWI. MO personnel went into the field to give lectures on the value and use of MO.<sup>162</sup> The reason that MO cooperated with OWI on many occasions in this theater compared to other theaters is that there were a limited number of “black” political targets available in Burma, so much of the propaganda they issued was “white.”

In August, however, MO Far East finally found opportunities to showcase its capabilities. As a testament to how quickly MO could turn around leaflet requests, on one occasion, a request from the field was made for a leaflet urging Burmans in one section to disregard requests of a Japanese officer. MO printed 10,000 copies of this leaflet and disseminated them on the day following the request.<sup>163</sup> On top of that, MO counteracted various rumors of enemy agents in China with the truth, which prevented chaos from breaking out among the local population. MO was also able to find more Chinese agents. For example, six Chinese students were sent into Canton to repeat rumors and gather intelligence. At the same time, MO received approval for four separate projects: JN-27, Glottis, Windpipe, and Kidney. JN-27 was a project to establish a

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<sup>160</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – May 1944*, 46-55.

<sup>161</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – May 1944*, 192-196.

<sup>162</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – July 1944*, 56.

<sup>163</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – August 1944*, 85.

black radio station at “Camp Y” to simulate Japanese stations broadcasting to the Japanese or to the native peoples of occupied countries.<sup>164</sup> In August 1944, it finally showed how MO Far East was gaining traction.

September brought an expansion of Morale Operations printing. Having established personnel at the New Delhi location, MO began sending larger printing orders there. Interestingly, MO was able to recruit China’s cartoon artist, Yeh Chen Yu. Yeh produced pictures at the Calcutta office. At the same time, operations also continued in Canton. For example, MO dispatched a radio operator and a code man to Canton on September 10 to join operations there. They continued to spread rumors and distribute propaganda leaflets. OWI also disseminated weekly newsheets to a MO agent in Canton and forwarded the first batch of 1,000 on September 15.<sup>165</sup> Similar examples of such MO printing occurred later into 1944 as well.

The effectiveness of the Morale Operations in the Far East is somewhat of a debate. While there is evidence that MO distributed vast numbers of propaganda and rumors, even countering enemy rumors, the Far East theater simply did not possess the same evidence of hundreds or thousands of enemy soldiers walking across front lines to surrender with pamphlets in their hands. Of course, the Far East situation was vastly different from Europe and the Middle East during that time. There was also a difference between the China and Burma sections of the Far East theater. Whereas most of the OSS military partners worked in China, Burma contained mostly OSS and OWI civilians.<sup>166</sup> This discrepancy in civilian and military resources certainly impacted the results and emphasis on Morale Operations in the Far East. It should be noted,

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<sup>164</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – August 1944*, 95-99.

<sup>165</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *OSS Monthly Activity Reports – September 1944*, 94-107.

<sup>166</sup> William E. Daugherty, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, 134.

however, that Morale Operations continued in the Pacific and Far East theater even while operations in the Middle East and Europe began to slow down.

Because the purpose of this study has been to show the effects of Operation Torch as a foundational template for the sophistication of Morale Operations later on, this narrative included a few examples from across various theaters of World War II. But readers should note that there were many other examples as well, attesting to the importance of Operation Torch for subsequent activities.

## The End of the OSS

To illustrate the far-reaching nature of the psychological warfare efforts of the OSS, while also suggesting its legacies for what followed, it is worth considering the end of the OSS, and its transition into the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The majority of significant Morale Operations in the European theater ended in April 1945 when the U.S. and Soviet forces met at Torgau, Germany.<sup>167</sup> As for operations in the Middle Eastern theater, with the German retreat from Greece and the Balkan areas in October 1944, the need for broadcasting of black propaganda from Cairo or Palestine diminished. Meanwhile, operations in the Far East continued until the end of World War II and the Japanese surrender on August 15. For example, in the late spring of 1945, Morale Operations established a presence on the island of Guam and issued daily black radio propaganda to the Japanese homeland until VJ-Day.<sup>168</sup>

As Morale Operations continued from 1944 until August 1945, William Donovan was establishing the early framework of the CIA. In late October 1944, President Roosevelt asked Donovan to submit his views and feedback on the structuring of an intelligence service for the post-war period. Donovan issued a November 18 memorandum with his proposal for a central intelligence service that would report directly to the President.<sup>169</sup> Donovan continued working as Director and ensuring operations went smoothly into 1945 as he awaited the President's decision on his proposal for centralizing intelligence. Unfortunately, by April, President Roosevelt had

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<sup>167</sup> Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*, 145.

<sup>168</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Operations in the Field*, vol. 2, 367.

<sup>169</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Washington Organization*, vol. 1, 115.

died, leaving Donovan without little hope of establishing a central intelligence agency.<sup>170</sup> Soon, too, in May 1945, Nazi Germany surrendered, the world's first atomic bombs fell on Japan, and hostilities slowed everywhere. Harry Truman became President at a time when many Americans were exhausted by war and were eager to return to the "good old days." Unfortunately, President Roosevelt did not brief Truman about the complexity of the intelligence field at a dawning era in American history. Thus, solving the intelligence dilemma was far from the top of Truman's list of priorities.

At the same time, Truman wanted to start anew. Unlike President Roosevelt, President Truman did not like unsolicited reports or visits to the White House. These facts, combined with public pressure to cut military expenditure, to disarm, and bring American soldiers home, all but ensured that Truman was wary of keeping the OSS in play as a government agency in the future.<sup>171</sup> During this time, Donovan tried sending reports to the White House, but these efforts were futile.

As the story goes, the Director of the Budget Bureau, Harold Smith, who always disliked William Donovan, went to President Truman in the spirit of cleaning up administrative matters and urged Truman to dissolve the OSS.<sup>172</sup> On August 25, 1945, Donovan informed the Budget Bureau that the OSS was working under a liquidation budget and was terminating many of its operational activities, including Morale Operations.<sup>173</sup> On August 31<sup>st</sup>, President Truman issued Executive Order No. 9608, which established an Interim International Information Service (IIIS)

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<sup>170</sup> Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A.* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 402.

<sup>171</sup> Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, 312.

<sup>172</sup> Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA*, 85.

<sup>173</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Washington Organization*, vol. 1, 117.

in the Department of State until December 31<sup>st</sup> and transferred overseas responsibilities from the OWI and CIAA. This Executive Order also liquidated the OWI on December 31, 1945.<sup>174</sup>

Donovan, now realizing that the end of the psychological warfare agencies was imminent, sent a short memorandum to President Truman urging him to keep the OSS together for the sake of “national interests.”<sup>175</sup> This effort, along with the support from some JCS committees, was not enough to deter Truman to take the advice of Harold Smith. Thus, on September 20, 1945, President Truman, without consulting Donovan or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued Executive Order No. 9620 which terminated the OSS effective on October 1, 1945.<sup>176</sup> The Executive Order transferred the Foreign Nationalities branch and the Research and Analysis branch to the Department of State while transferring the rest of the OSS to the Department of War.<sup>177</sup> The Research and Analysis branch became the Interim Research and Intelligence Services (IRIS) at the Department of State.<sup>178</sup>

With the intelligence community in flux, President Truman issued a Presidential Directive on January 22, 1946, which established a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) consisting of the secretaries of State, War, and Navy, as well as a personal representative of the President, in this case, Admiral Leahy.<sup>179</sup> The Presidential Directive also established a new intelligence unit called the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) which reported to the NIA. This new group replaced IRIS as the primary intelligence agency of the United States. President Truman assigned CIG to obtain and synthesize intelligence from the Department of State,

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<sup>174</sup> William E. Daugherty, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, 135.

<sup>175</sup> Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A.*, 407.

<sup>176</sup> Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA*, 85.

<sup>177</sup> Strategic Services Unit, *Washington Organization*, vol. 1, 120.

<sup>178</sup> Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*, 219.

<sup>179</sup> Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA*, 91.

Department of War, Department of Navy, and other agencies such as the FBI, and appointed Admiral Sidney Souers as its director. Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg from the Air Force replaced Admiral Souers and served from June 1946 to May 1947 when he turned the agency over to Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter.<sup>180</sup> It is easy to see how the various institutional problems lead to rapid turnover in these departments during the early post-war period.

Fortunately, the necessary stability finally arrived. On July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, which renamed and separated the War and Navy departments and added the Air Force and Marine Corps to the number of military services. The National Security Act also created the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency.<sup>181</sup> Although President Truman signed the National Security Act into law on July 26<sup>th</sup>, it did not take full effect until September 18<sup>th</sup>, at which point the Central Intelligence Agency was an operational agency.<sup>182</sup> The Act also created a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to lead both the CIA and the U.S. Intelligence Community; President Truman selected Roscoe Hillenkoetter, who led CIG, as the first DCI. Remarkably, the operative language used to setup the CIA in the National Security Act closely resembled ideas that Donovan presented in his November 18, 1944 memorandum to President Roosevelt. Indeed, the Central Intelligence Agency was based on fundamental OSS principles and Donovan's recommendations, with one-third of CIA's personnel coming from the OSS. For example, the CIA became the central authority of total U.S. intelligence and was put under the direction of the National Security Council, not military control.<sup>183</sup> The establishment of the CIA is a true testament to the legacy of

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<sup>180</sup> Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA*, 377.

<sup>181</sup> Lawrence C. Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*, 220.

<sup>182</sup> Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, 316.

<sup>183</sup> Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA*, 93.

the OSS and William Donovan, who finally got to see his proposal realized, even if he would not head the new intelligence agency.



## Conclusion

This study examined the nature of psychological warfare by the United States in World War II. While there are countless books and articles about the numerous recorded uses of propaganda and psychological warfare by the United States during the War, there is no possible way to encapsulate all the lessons, themes, and ideas into any single written work. Nevertheless, there is one theme that stands out: the psychological warfare methods, procedures, and tactics that the OSS established during Operation Torch in North Africa were instrumental in laying the foundation for U.S. intelligence operations in the post-World War II period. Operation Torch was the first major operation of the OSS, and in effect, the first significant psychological warfare operation by the United States in World War II.

While most scholars agree that Operation Torch was a success, it did not go entirely to plan. What is more important, however, is that OSS leaders drew lessons from Operation Torch's success and failures and applied them to its later operations by reviewing its actions and the results. It learned from its mistakes and it became better in the process. In North Africa in 1942, the OSS learned to draw on resistance groups for support, to utilize radio propaganda to destroy morale, to spread rumors to discredit the enemy, to produce leaflets and pamphlets that influenced populations, and much more. Although some of these first instances of psychological warfare were not always successful, these lessons and processes set the stage for the OSS Morale Operations Branch to reach its true potential in 1944. From Operations Torch, Husky, Overlord, and others beyond, the OSS went from producing material that populations could not understand to producing material that even deceived its own soldiers into believing it was enemy propaganda. It also developed a sense of realpolitik, as evinced by its willingness to collaborate even with groups – like the Partisans in Hungary – who otherwise seemed to have other

allegiances. While Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East were vastly different areas in World War II, each with its own situation, Morale Operations applied what it had learned in North Africa in a way that accomplished its objectives. In Europe, it sent out pamphlets explaining good treatment for enemy POWs, causing them to surrender. In the Middle East, Morale Operations sent poison-pen letters and forged copies of *Life* magazine, causing enemy soldiers to distrust each other. In the Far East, a relative lack of “black” propaganda targets led Morale Operations to turn to “white” propaganda, even recruiting a famous Chinese cartoon artist who produced his art from afar, from Calcutta in India.

At the same time that the OSS was conducting these operations, the United States underwent significant changes in its intelligence gathering agencies and military departments. Tensions over jurisdiction of “white” and “black” propaganda and restrictions on the OSS forced the OSS to adapt and execute its mission while coordinating with other agencies and military divisions. Ultimately, despite the significant success of the OSS, the coming of the end of World War II brought pressure from the public to disarm. Eventually, President Truman abolished the OSS and instituted a number of transitional intelligence agencies until a permanent Central Intelligence Agency could be formed, based on William Donovan’s proposals. There is no doubt that the Central Intelligence Agency inherited many of the foundational principles of the OSS, and by default, many of the psychological warfare practices and procedures that the OSS learned in North Africa. Thus, while American psychological warfare has evolved over the years, it seems that its origins lie in Operation Torch and present-day Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. This is significant because if American military and propaganda scholars are to better understand psychological warfare, they must understand its modern origins, its original context, and the at times winding paths that it has followed.

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