

MAKING AUTOCRATS ACCOUNTABLE:
INTERESTS, PRIORITIES, AND COOPERATION FOR REGIME CHANGE

Basak Taraktas

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Supervisor of Dissertation

Co-Supervisor of Dissertation

Rudra Sil, Professor of Political Science
SAS Director of the Huntsman Program
International Studies & Business

Julia Lynch
Associate Professor of Political Science

Graduate Group Chairperson

Matt Levendusky , Associate Professor of Political Science

Dissertation Committee

Yuhua Wang, Assistant Professor
Bruce Desmarais, Associate Professor

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Basak Taraktas

To my mother, father, and aunt, who endured this process as much as I

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ABSTRACT

MAKING AUTOCRATS ACCOUNTABLE: INTERESTS, PRIORITIES, AND COOPERATION FOR REGIME CHANGE

Basak Taraktas

Julia Lynch

Rudra Sil

In nearly all authoritarian regimes, democratization finds significant societal support and a number of organized opposition groups struggle for regime change. In some cases—such as in Iran in 1979—opposition groups are able to cooperate with one another and bring down authoritarianism. In others—such as the Assad regime in Syria—groups are not able to cooperate, and the ruler remains in place. Studies that apply cooperation theory on regimes predict that shared grievances about the current government and common interests in changing the existing regime foster cooperation among challengers. Yet, evidence suggests the contrary. This study examines the conditions under which diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their ideological preferences, are able to achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status quo. It uses the case studies of the Ottoman transition to constitutional monarchy (1876–1908) and the French transition to constitutional monarchy (1814–1830), paired according to the least similar systems design, in combination with network theory. Using this methodology, this study analyzes the effect of preferences on ideological issues (how the new regime should look like) and on strategic issues (how regime change should be carried out) to explain temporal dynamics of cooperation for regime change among challengers. This study conducts historiographical and archival work to identify the relevant actors and relevant issue dimensions and track preferences on these issues over time. It applies these findings on longitudinal network models (known as temporal exponential random graph models) to measure the extent to which preference alignment on an issue dimension, strategic or ideological, bring challengers to cooperate. Also, this study introduces two concepts. The first concept is “de-prioritization,” the process whereby challengers postpone the resolution of certain ideological disagreements to form sustainable cooperation against the regime. The second concept is “preference revision,” the process whereby challengers pragmatically replace their strategic preferences with more effective ones in response to past failures and environmental changes. Together these concepts emphasize that challengers become more likely to cooperate for regime change if they converge on a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if any). Convergence of preferences on strategic issues and the de-prioritization of ideological disagreements (if any) prepares the rise of a coherent oppositional coalition that is capable of signaling unity and coherence, hence potential to overthrow the regime if necessary or extract considerable concessions from an oppositional coalition that is capable of signaling unity and coherence, hence potential to overthrow the regime if necessary or extract considerable

concessions. Findings suggest that without preference-revision and de-prioritization, challengers remain divided and heterogeneous in their approach, at best achieving temporary gains that are later reversed in the course of authoritarian retrenchment. This study further shows that the oppositional coalition tends to form around a core actor who has been committed to effective strategies and attracts others (peripheral actors) who agree with the core on the strategies but not necessarily on the ideologies. The implication of these findings are twofold: By taking dynamics of cooperation among challengers into account, we can distinguish between the cases where the regime is strong enough and takes on challengers and those where the government is weak but surviving because opposition groups are unable to assume power. Also, there is a link between the rise of an oppositional coalition and the likelihood of regime change happening.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT	IV
ABSTRACT	VI
LIST OF TABLES	XI
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
THEORY	4
Prioritization & de-prioritization.....	5
Preference revision in response to environmental transformations.....	7
Hypotheses	8
RESEARCH DESIGN	13
Dependent variable & unit of analysis	13
CASE SELECTION	29
DATA COLLECTION	31
THE ARGUMENT.....	33
Implications of the argument	34
PLAN OF THE STUDY	36
KEY CONCEPTS & DEFINITIONS.....	38
CHAPTER 2 A DYNAMIC THEORY OF COOPERATION FOR REGIME CHANGE	41
Role of cooperation among challengers in regime change	42
Unpacking cooperation: The formation of oppositional movements.....	43
A theory of coordination for regime change	50
Why is cooperation among challengers a case of coordination with conflicting interests?	50
Why cooperation among challengers cannot be taken for granted	50
Prioritization & de-prioritization.....	59
Preference revision with respect to environmental transformations	61
The rise of the oppositional movement.....	62
The Argument in a nutshell.....	64
RESEARCH DESIGN	69

Dependent variable & unit of analysis	69
Measuring the effect of preferences	72
Studying the oppositional coalition	73
Case Selection	75
 CHAPTER 3 TRANSITION TO CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE	 86
The nature of the authoritarian regime and its sociopolitical environment	90
Democratic reversal & the Hamidian regime.....	91
Legacy of past conflicts: The emergence of the main axes of conflict	95
The identity and preference sets of challengers	99
Visions of society on the brink of imperial disintegration	100
How to overthrow the Sultan's regime?	105
Patterns of interactions among challengers.....	107
The rise of a heterogeneous opposition front demanding liberalization	108
The rise of a coherent oppositional coalition	116
Testing the role of ideologies and strategies on cooperative behavior	121
Dependent variable & the unit of analysis in the Ottoman case	122
Independent variables	125
Effects of ideological and strategic preferences on cooperation for regime change	130
Conclusion	146
 CHAPTER 4 TRANSITION TO CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY IN BOURBON FRANCE	 148
The nature of the authoritarian regime and its sociopolitical environment	150
The Bourbon Monarchy: Efforts to restore societal unity in a war-wearied society	151
Regime problems and grievances under the Bourbon Monarchy	153
Legacy of past conflicts: The Emergence of the main axes of conflict	155
The Identity and preference sets of challengers	169
Bourbon actors & their stance	170
Patterns of interactions among challengers.....	180
A fluid heterogeneous group of challengers.....	181
The Rise of a coherent oppositional coalition.....	185
Testing the role of ideologies and strategies on cooperative behavior	191
Dependent variable & the unit of analysis in the French case.....	192
Effects of ideological and strategic preferences on cooperation for regime change	198
Conclusion	213

CHAPTER 5 WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT DYNAMICS OF COOPERATION FOR REGIME CHANGE?	215
The stage of disunity	218
The rise of demands for regime change & the structure of the authoritarian regime	219
The role of preference convergence on issue dimensions in the shaping of cooperation patterns among challengers	223
The stage of unification among challengers: the role of preference revision & re-prioritization	227
The role of environmental changes in the stage of unification	228
What is the relationship between the rise of an opposition coalition and regime change?	231
APPENDIX I:	237
APPENDIX II: OTTOMAN CONTENDER GROUPS' NAMES & ABBREVIATIONS	241
APPENDIX III: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS IN THE OTTOMAN CASE	242
APPENDIX IV: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS IN THE FRENCH CASE	249
BIBLIOGRAPHY	255

LIST OF TABLES

<i>Table 1</i>	130
<i>Table 2</i>	133
<i>Table 3</i>	135
<i>Table 4</i>	142
<i>Table 5</i>	144
Table 6	199
Table 7	203
Table 8	204
Table 9	211
Table 10	212
Table 11	249
Table 12	250
Table 13	250

CHAPTER 1 Introduction

Studies that apply cooperation theory on regimes predict that shared grievances about the current government and common interests in changing the existing regime foster cooperation among challengers. However, in various cases, organized contenders are disunited and struggle against the regime separately despite sharing interests against the government and his regime --such as the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime. Yet, only in some cases--such as cooperation between Iranian leftists and Khomeini's followers in the 1979 Revolution-- do we observe successful cooperation among contenders. **What conditions enable diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their ideological preferences, to achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status quo?** This study attempts to answer this question by using the case studies of the Ottoman transition to constitutional monarchy (1876–1908) and the French transition to constitutional monarchy (1814–1830) in combination with network analysis.

Cooperation theory suggests that shared interests foster cooperation (Axelrod, 1970, 2006). In applying this argument to the study of regimes, bargaining theories tend to argue that shared interests or grievances bring challengers to cooperate against the regime (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001; Crescenzi, 1999; Przeworski, 2005; Swaminathan, 1999). However, empirical evidence suggests the contrary. Consider the case of Syrian civil war, where 100,000 civilians died due to the armed conflict between the Assad government and opposition groups (B.B.C. News, 2014). In Geneva, in January 2014, US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov brought warring parties together to find a peaceful solution to the problem, to which all opposition groups were invited. Some boycotted the talks, such as the National Co-ordination Committee, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, and the Syrian National Council (B.B.C. News, 2014). If all opposition groups had participated, together they might have put greater pressure on the Assad government. Despite this incentive, some refused and the talks became inconclusive. Interestingly, these groups were united neither before nor after the Geneva Talks. Again, one could argue that they would have been better off fighting the regime together than separately. Yet, they have been challenging the Assad regime separately. Behind disunity, there are ideological or

strategic disagreements—for instance, the Syrian National Council and the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces disagree on whether violence constitutes a legitimate means of regime change. Strikingly, despite ongoing civil war, ideological and strategic disagreements between these groups seem to take precedence over the opposition groups' common interests in overthrowing the regime. Contrast this case to the Solidarity Movement in Poland or the Cuban Revolution, in which various opposition groups collaborated against the authoritarian regime in pursuit of a shared ideological cause. In the case of the 1979 Iranian revolution, groups of intellectuals, merchants, and the clergy, who embraced different ideological preferences, cooperated to overthrow the regime. What distinguishes cases of successful unification among challengers in pursuit of regime transition from cases of non-cooperation? Why do shared interests in overthrowing the government only sometimes lead to cooperation? Also, why is it that in some cases challengers that belong to same ideological front (e.g., left or center-right) and have interests against the regime seldom cooperate. When and why do challengers perceive ideological or strategic disagreements to be more important than their common interests in regime change? What is the role of ideological and strategic affinity in the formation of an opposition group?

These questions are crucial to the study of struggles over regime type, because the incumbent government is better off when he can divide and rule challengers than challengers stay disunited (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Machiavelli, 1992; Tzu, 2010). In order to have a strong bargaining power against or deterrent capacity against the regime, challengers should signal unity and form a coalition capable of forcefully overthrowing the incumbent government. Otherwise, regime change through the intervention of some opposition group becomes less likely especially in regimes where governments cling to power —such as the Assad government in Syria or Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The formation of a coherent united opposition coalition also facilitates transition dynamics by setting the direction of change once protests break out, such as in the Eastern European transitions to democracy (Kuran, 1991; McFaul, 2002). Alternatively, the collapse of the government may lead to disorder (as in the case of Iraq after the fall of the Saddam regime). Thus, all else equal, in contended regimes facing a united opposition coalition should be more likely to experience an effective process of the overthrow of the government inauguration of the institutions associated with the new regime.

Against this backdrop, I reiterate the research question: Under what conditions do diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their ideological preferences, achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status quo? In an attempt to examine this question, this study will elucidate the role of ideological and strategic preferences in hindering or promoting cooperation among challengers. I focus on the case of transitions from authoritarianism to constitutional government in the 19th century given that 20th century transitions have extensively served to theory building on regime change (Centeno, 2002; Tilly, 2007; Weingast, 1997).

According to the scholarly literature on democratization, regimes may democratize through top-down reforms, pacts between ruling elites and opposition members, or after an oppositional movement overthrows authoritarianism and adopts democratic reforms. In cases where authoritarian governments cling to power, top-down liberalization is unlikely, while pacted transitions are improbable. Yet, in conceptualizing bargains between the government and its challengers, most actor-oriented studies tend to define challengers as a unitary actor. In such works, unity ensues from shared interests in overthrowing the government. Yet, in reality, organized opposition groups are multiple (such as in the case of the Syrian opposition to the Assad government), each defending a particular set of ideologies --e.g., nationalism vs. socialism, secularism vs. theocracy-- and transition strategies --e.g., coup vs. reform. The unitary actor assumption dismisses this plurality and heterogeneity across preference sets, whereby most actor-oriented studies happen to take the emergence of cooperation among challengers for granted.

This study shows that the plurality of challengers and of issue dimensions (on which preferences are defined) poses a coordination game rather than a simple iterated unidimensional cooperation game. Using the cases of the Ottoman transition to constitutional monarchy (1876–1908) and the French transition to constitutional monarchy (1814–1830) in combination with network analysis, I argue that challengers are more likely to form a coherent oppositional coalition if they postpone ideological disagreements and converge on their *strategies* of transition (i.e., preferences about how regime change should be carried out). Preference convergence on strategies is easier to obtain than preference convergence on ideological matters since ideological preferences are relatively more rigid in the short-run. On the other hand, preference convergence on strategies differs from issue-based type of cooperation, which is susceptible to breaking down once the object of cooperation is attained. In contrast, preference convergence on

strategies implies that challengers harmonize their plans of action to overthrow the government. Thus, preference convergence on strategies is likely to foster long-term cooperation, the type of sustainable cooperation that is necessary to form an oppositional coalition capable of signaling unity and coherence. I further argue that oppositional coalitions tend to display a center-periphery structure, as to which one challenger group assumes the leadership. In terms of preferences, what characterizes such coalitions is strategic alignment (i.e., on ways to overthrow the government). Ideological alignment is helpful but neither necessary nor sufficient. Ultimately, this study points out that unity among challengers is not a given; it is crafted.

THEORY

I theorize that strategic interactions among challengers in as an iterated non-cooperative game where conflicting interests require coordination.¹ In non-cooperative games, cooperation is self-enforcing unlike in cooperative games wherein third parties enforce contracts. Strategic interactions among challengers can be conceptualized as a non-cooperative game, because there is no third party to enforce cooperation. Furthermore, as I discuss in detail in the section on independent variables, preferences are multidimensional in real life. That is, actors take into account various issue dimensions (not just economic or political ones) when deciding how to behave towards the regime. The multidimensionality of issues makes that struggles between contenders and the government qualify as a coordination game rather than an iterated single-issue cooperation games.

Coordination games feature three characteristics: First, challengers are better off if they cooperate than if they do not. Nevertheless, cooperation fails due to disagreements on how they will cooperate. Second, coordination games have multiple Pareto-ranked solutions. That is, games have many outcomes (Nash equilibria), but some are better than others (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, pp. 168–69). Third, trust and expectations allow for coordination on a mutually desirable solution (Cooper, 1999, pp. ix–x).

¹ For more information on cooperative vs. non-cooperative games see (McCain, 2014; Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994; Vorob'ev, 2012).

In cases of cooperation for regime change, three characteristics manifest themselves as follows: Challengers are better off cooperating on forming an oppositional movement than taking on the regime by themselves. On the other hand, regime contention involves serious risks (for instance, challengers may be facing exile or capital punishment). Under uncertainty, challengers might suspect each other's intentions, wondering whether some ally secretly compromised with the government or would try to annihilate one's group after the transition. Thus, although trust facilitates coordination, it is hard to build.

Also, coordination problems get amplified if challengers prioritize different preferences on an issue dimension at a given time. The mismatch between actors' preferences, when all ranked at the top of preference ranking, narrows down the room for compromise, hence the set of possible solutions (Tadelis, 2013). On the other hand, actors might perceive some issues to have less priority relative to others. For instance, the structure of the administration might be conceived to be less urgent to be handled than, say, determining the boundaries of citizenship in a multi-ethnic society. In that case, actors might agree to some less than ideal solution on the administrative structure to obtain a better deal on the boundaries of citizenship. Game theory handles bargains on indivisible issues (issues that do not lend themselves to adequate dividing as a solution), among other things, via side-payments. In this study, I specify the concept side-payment with respect to time to incorporate the temporal variation in the ranking of preferences (aka *preference relation*) (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994; Tadelis, 2013).

Prioritization & de-prioritization

We have seen that the ranking of preferences might change over time according to the level of perceived priority of issues. Preference ranking at a given time affects a person's move and payoff. Importantly, not all actors rank issues in the same way. For example, a person might consider the boundaries of citizenship and the structure of the administration to be as equally important issues, if centralized administration would mean to subdue in a region where a minority is populated to the wills of the majority. Others might think that this battle might be fought later, say, after minorities are recognized as equal citizens. Thus, while the first person might not accept side payment on the administrative structure, the second one might. This would mean that the administrative structure is ranked higher for the former than is for the latter. I introduce

the concept of “priority” to talk about which the position of preferences in preference relation at a given time.

If actors “prioritize” some issue they are likely to see a less than satisfactory solution to it as unacceptable. However, actors might de-prioritize some issue at a given time. For example, the secular democrats in Turkey who endorsed Erdogan for democracy in the early 2000s de-prioritized his non-secular attitude for they prioritized democratization at the time.

Prioritization or de-prioritization complement the theory of preferences in the following way: As mentioned earlier, ideological preferences are less likely to change in the short run unless some external shock brings about irrefutable contrary evidence undermining the perceived utility of that preference. Without a shock, however, actors are less likely to reconsider their worldviews in the short-run. Nevertheless, in real-life we observe cooperation among ideological rivals. To continue with the abovementioned example, the groups that believe that the fight over the administrative structure may be fought later prioritize the boundaries of citizenship and de-prioritize the question of the administration. That said, this person’s collaboration with the majority over the boundaries of citizenship does not mean that he abandoned his preferences about the administrative structure. Rather, this person postpones this disagreement to obtain a better deal on an issue dimension that is deemed to have priority.

I classify the behavior of such actors as being “**pragmatic**” on that dimension. Conversely, I call the behavior of those who do not consider making concessions or postponing the resolution of ideological differences as being “**idealistic**” on that dimension. Let me illustrate the difference between idealistic and pragmatic behavior with examples from European integration. The behavior of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, the architects of the European Coal and Steel Community, qualifies as being pragmatic on the political disagreements. The latter prioritize economic dimensions and postpone the resolution of political disagreements on dimensions such as security. In contrast, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (aka the EU Constitution) did not enter into effect, because some member states rejected the Treaty via referendum for fear of undermining national sovereignty. The rejection of the EU Constitution exemplifies an idealistic behavior on the dimension of national sovereignty vs. supranationality.

Preference revision in response to environmental transformations

Besides changes in the ranking, preferences themselves may shift. For instance, a person who prefers rock music to pop and pop to jazz may become a fan of electronic music after being exposed to his roommate's electronic music for a while. This change is different than changes in priority. For example, an example of change in priority would be the rocker teen agreeing to listen to pop (his second best choice after rock) in his friend's mother car. In this example, the teen still prefers rock but he de-prioritizes enjoying his favorite genre for some other preference, such as, behaving good in front of the friend's mother. In the case of preference revision, the teen replaces his top choice for some other choice without changing its rank.

Preference revision is captured in game theory using the concept preference update, in that players reconsider their preferences as new information becomes available (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994; Tadelis, 2013). Yet, game theory is agnostic to sources of information other than nature or players themselves.² For example, an imperfect information game, a player might reveal his type, which would induce the other player(s) to change his moves. On the other hand, exogenous shocks factor into strategies and payoffs. For instance, in Acemoglu & Robinson (2001), in accordance with changes in the level of growth lower classes choose between revolt or not (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001). When conceptualized as such, environmental changes happen to be incorporated in the game.

However, in real life, implications of environmental changes cannot be incorporated in the game, because they cannot be foreseen. One main reason for this unpredictability is that environmental changes are a joint function of the structure of the context and the way actors other than the players respond to the changes (Aoki, 2007; Greif & Kingston, 2011; Greif & Laitin, 2004). Players cannot possibly consider such a complex outcome. To give an example, suppose a political crisis caused liquidity shortage and dropped the level of GDP/capita, hence deteriorating living standards of lower classes without yet bringing them to the point of misery. However, some segments of lower classes might find such welfare loss intolerable and start contentious activity (e.g., strikes). Seeing them, others, who have a higher tolerance to pauperization, might join in. In response,

² The exception would be stochastic games, where the game randomly moves from one state to another, thus changing payoffs. For more information see (Maitra & Sudderth, 2012; Neyman & Sorin, 2012; Shapley, 1953; Solan & Vieille, 2015).

organized contenders might decide to play revolt before welfare standards descend to the level preset in the game. Players cannot predict such collective action, which can be consequential on the fate of the regime if others decide to join in. An empirical example would be Eastern European transitions (Kuran, 1991). The point here is the following: Environmental changes are more than the rationally calculable outcomes of shocks themselves, since responses of actors outside the game also shape these outcomes. Thus, the structure of the game may vary independently of how players interact.

In this study, I relax the assumptions that the structure of the game is limited to interactions among players and that environmental changes can be fully factored in strategies and payoffs in advance. This assumption is particularly in order, since contended regimes are often situated in fluid international environments (such as interwar Europe or the Assad regime in the Middle East) and their domestic environments themselves display fluidity and uncertainty. As such, we should expect players to respond to environmental changes as they come rather than choose the most convenient response from a preset array of responses.

I conceptualize environmental transformations (stochastic or improbable) as an intervening variable that is capable of making actors revise their preferences independently of interactions among players. Preference revision can affect cooperation dynamics among challengers if revisions work to make more actors adopt similar preferences. On the other hand, environmental changes might also be such that actors' preferences end up becoming more dissimilar than before. In the first case, cooperation becomes easier. In the latter, it becomes more difficult.

Hypotheses

In the light of the multidimensionality and relative priority of preferences, I pose the research question in another way: if ***shared interests against and grievances about the current government bring challengers to cooperate only in some cases, to what extent can we explain the failure of cooperation in other cases by the mismatch between preferences on the issue dimensions that actors prioritize?*** This question requires identifying issue dimensions other than overthrowing

the government and examine their level of priority. A subsequent question is what type of preferences are more likely to foster sustainable cooperation among challengers?

One might ask whether there is a difference between the effect of ideological preferences on cooperative behavior and that of strategic preferences. Corollary to that, one might wonder whether a particular type of preference is associated with a particular type of cooperation (long-term vs. short term cooperation). Relatively speaking, strategic preferences are more flexible over time than ideological preferences. The reason is changing ideological preferences require changing one's worldview, which is more difficult and costlier than shifting strategic views (all else equal).

In this vein, I expect shared strategic preferences to be more likely to foster long-term cooperation, hence the rise of an oppositional coalition. Given the relative rigidity of ideological preferences over time, ideological preferences should be more likely to foster short-term cooperation (since achieving preference convergence on some ideological dimension is hard to obtain). The relative rigidity of ideological preferences suggests that preference convergence on some ideological issue dimension may or may not suffice to sustain cooperation on multiple successive rounds, especially if actors prioritize different issues and have disagreements among themselves with respect to the prioritized issues. In contrast, actors might find it easier to shift their strategic preferences unless they highly prioritize that issue dimension.

It is also worth reminding that the type oppositional coalition that is capable of overthrowing the regime requires long-term cooperation. Considering the relative flexibility of strategies, we should expect that long-term cooperation among challengers to follow from convergence of strategic preferences than those of ideological preferences – since preference convergence on ideological issues is harder to achieve. Also, if all actors highly value some ideological dimension on which their preferences diverge, that misalignment may trump agreement on another ideological issue. I expect long-term cooperation must be possible without preference convergence on all ideological issues. In this vein, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *The higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among ideologically diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and*

the more likely there will be either regime change or significant concessions to the opposition.

Hypothesis 2: *Cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when challengers react to past failures and new opportunities by deciding to pragmatically revise the priority of preferences on strategic issue dimensions.*

Hypothesis 3: *Such adjustment is more likely to occur as peripheral actors align their preferences to those of an emergent ‘core’ actor.*

I test these hypotheses on the cases of transitions to constitutional monarchy in Bourbon France and the Ottoman Empire under Abdülhamid II using contextual analysis, content analysis, and longitudinal network analysis. I conduct contextual analysis to identify issue dimensions. Content analysis helps pinpoint challengers’ publicly expressed preferences on the identified dimensions. Longitudinal network models serve to examine the patterns of interactions among challengers over time. Specifically, they calculate the probability of tie formation (cooperation) based on preference similarity on different issue dimensions. By measuring the effect of each preference dimension on cooperative behavior, network analysis allows for comparing between the behavioral impacts of different preference categories.

Network models rely on the following axioms:

(1) Contenders are not unitary actors. I define “an actor” as an organized group of challengers that occupy a position that is distinguishable from others’ positions in the space of issue dimensions. \Leftrightarrow Groups vary by their singular set of preferences across issues. In that, two groups of actors may have close but not identical preference sets in some issue space. New groups emerge if they offer a novel product (preference set) in the market (existing positions in the issue space). Similarly, group fracture into sub-groups because of differences on (a) certain issue dimension(s). Therefore, if preference sets were identical, we would be talking about the same group. That is to say that if two non-identical

preference sets correspond to two different groups, we can deduce that there are as many non-identical preference sets as the number of actors.

(2) Issue dimensions are derived from the contextual analysis (not assumed a priori).

(3) The number of actors involved in struggles over the regime may increase/decrease over time. Thus, we cannot assume a fixed number of actors (as usually done in game theoretical research). The number of actors is a variable that we cannot identify without conducting empirical observation. The temporal variation in the number of actors has a causal importance for it affects dynamics of interactions among contenders --e.g., increases in the number of actor may shift some game, say, from prisoners' dilemma to coordination game.

(4) To reemphasize an earlier point, regime change does not imply consolidation. It means to overthrow the current government's regime and declaring the foundation of another one (we cannot know if the new regime will survive unless we observe the regime over time taking into account citizens' responses to the regime).

If the study reveals supporting evidence for that preference convergence on strategic issues is more likely to foster long-term cooperation among challengers, the theory implies the following for the structure of oppositional coalitions: we should expect cooperation for regime change to happen among pragmatic actors (those who de-prioritize certain ideological debates) rather than among idealistic actors (those who do not consider making concessions or postponing the resolution of ideological differences). If most actors behave idealistically on more than one issue dimension an oppositional coalition becomes less and less likely to emerge. In other words, cooperation requires at least some actors to be pragmatic. This theory falls in line with other cooperation theories of political science. To go back to the European integration example, neo-functionalism predicts that

integration is more likely to begin on technical issues than on political issues (Haas, 1964; Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998; Schmitter, 1970). This hypothesis illustrates the case of going pragmatic on political issues and prioritizing economic dimensions. It is worth noting that the theory presented here does not go as far as to extend the argument to spillover. We see a similar behavior of prioritization and de-prioritization in Rawls' theory of "Justice as Fairness" (Rawls, 2001). According to Rawls, citizens will decide the principles of justice under the veil of ignorance. These principles of justice will serve as guidelines to which citizens may refer when dealing with differences on issues of daily politics once they are out of the veil of ignorance (aka "reflective equilibrium"). In other words, citizens prioritize the issues that constitute the principles of justice, such as equal opportunities and political equality, and align their preferences on those dimensions. Other issue dimensions are de-prioritized when establishing the principles of justice. Once preferences are aligned on the high-priority issues constituting the principles of justice, social contract becomes more robust in the face of disagreements on other issue dimension. The theory proposed here overlaps with existing theories in applying cooperation theory to the study of regimes.

One difficulty is to establish the difference between the case, in which actors cooperate because they postpone disagreements, and the one, in which actors cooperate because the process of revision harmonized their preferences on some problematic issue area and preference alignment now propels cooperation. The theory suggests that real preferences are unobservable and behavior does not perfectly mirror true motivations. I suggest the following:

Convergence of preferences is more likely to drive cooperation than re-prioritization if network analysis identifies a statistically significant positive effect on that issue dimension. In contrast, de-prioritization of some disagreement is more likely to generate cooperation if network analysis identifies no statistically significant effect on that issue dimension. In other words, actors do not take their preferences on that matter into account when deciding with whom to cooperate. On the other hand, if the analysis of the evolution of preferences detects change towards the harmonization of preferences, it could be that members of the opposition coalition groups have already adopted the same strategy, but because non-members have not, the estimate on this issue dimension turns insignificant. To establish whether this is the case, we need to examine the preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition. If network analysis yields a statistically

significant negative estimate, it is likely that those who think differently on this matter are likely to agree on some other issue that they prioritize more. I will elaborate in detail on the interpretation of results later in this chapter.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Dependent variable & unit of analysis

The unit of analysis in this study is organized groups of actors that make contentious actions to change the current regime (i.e., challengers or contender groups). The dependent variable is cooperation for regime change among regime contenders. Before defining what I understand from cooperation for regime change, it is worth explaining how regime change is conceptualized.

In this study, **regime change** is defined as the overthrow of the incumbent's regime. It does not extend to consolidation of the new institutions associated with another form of government. Consolidation spans the period from the foundation of new institutions to the moment when citizens will have internalized rules of the new regime ("the only game in town" as Linz and Stepan put it, (Linz & Stepan, 1996a, p. 5)). Although the overthrow of some regime is temporally antecedent to the consolidation of another, at the time new institutions are founded, it is impossible to know whether the new regime will survive unless one adopts a retrospective approach --one in which one explains a realized outcome from the hindsight (Tilly, 1993, p. 33). For instance, until a couple of years after the foundation of the 3rd Republic of France, French citizens constantly feared of a regime collapse; therefore, it would be erroneous for today's scholars to discount this public perception about regime fragility knowing that the regime survived and simply classify this regime as a case of consolidated regime (Breckman, 2014). This study does not go as far to explain consolidation of the new regimes --so doing would require also accounting for citizens' responses to institutions of the new regime to see whether the rules of the game are internalized. Thus, the scope of analysis is limited to the process from when demands for regime change arise to the emergence of a coherent oppositional coalition against the incumbent's regime.

Cooperation for regime change refers to contentious activities that two or more organized groups of challengers collaboratively undertake with the purpose of overthrowing the current government and his regime. The *indicators of cooperation* include co-participation in the organization of some protest activity (such as demonstrations, rebellions, riots, strikes), the process of mobilization of citizens against the regime, the generation of anti-regime propaganda, or the plotting and carrying out of a coup. It is worth noting that cooperation for regime change refers to “realized cases” of cooperation, where actors successfully undertake/finalize as one or more of the actions mentioned in the list of indicators. “Inconclusive attempts” of cooperation, in which actors fail to accomplish one or more of the abovementioned activities despite making efforts – such as broken negotiations or not carrying out the promise of participating in some protest activity – do not qualify as realized cases of cooperation. I code successful cases of cooperation as “1” and inconclusive attempts as “0”.

Types of cooperation

The dependent variable being cooperation for regime change, we need to specify what type of cooperation is needed to overthrow the government or extract significant concessions from it. Obviously, not all forms of cooperation are capable of overthrowing the government. For instance, actors who collaborate to pass some bill may part ways after successfully doing so. This type of cooperation does not necessarily lead to the formation of an oppositional movement to overthrow the government. On the other hand, not all regime challenging groups need to collaborate to overthrow the government such. For example, the coalition led by Lenin, which ended up eradicating the tsar’s regime, was a narrow but coherent coalition unlike the more heterogeneous, looser, and wider socialist coalition (Fitzpatrick, 2008, pp. 50–51). What type of a coalition is more likely to overthrow the regime?

The literature on regimes advances the following finding: Disunited governing elites are less likely to remain in power in the face of rivals’ attacks to weaken them and external shocks (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Haggard & Kaufman, 1997). I apply this logic to contenders: For the incumbent to step down or make significant concessions to some oppositional coalition, that coalition needs to be united. What is the indicator of unity? In order to give the impression of being united, a coalition of actors need to stand together

for a while, which can be conceptualized as **sustainable cooperation over time** (otherwise, it would be a one-time cooperation).

I suggest an additional criterion, “coherence.” In that, a coalition whose members have divergent visions on certain matters are less likely to be seen as robust, since such disagreements give rivals the incentive to employ divide-and-rule tactics. In contrast, a coalition whose members are like-minded on most issues appears to be more determined and robust, which might deter rivals from trying to fracture them from within. I define a coalition to be coherent if its members have similar preferences on most issues. The indicator for coherence is **preference convergence on more than one issue dimensions**. I use these two criteria to differentiate types of cooperation:

Definition 1: Long-term cooperation: Some groups A and B are engaged in long-term cooperation if and only if they have been cooperating on more than one issue for at least three successive years.

Definition 2: Short-term cooperation: Some groups A and B are engaged in short-term cooperation, if their cooperation is limited on one issue area and lasts less than three successive years.

In Definition 1, the condition “for at least three successive years” ensures that cooperation is not temporary, which signals unity. The condition “on more than one issue” captures preference converge, weakening the alternative explanation that cooperation is limited to a single issue. Preference convergence on multiple issues gives the impression that coalition members are like-minded on various matters and therefore likely to stick together in the future. If cooperation was limited to one issue, disagreements on other issues could have been exploited to fracture the coalition. Thus, the two conditions together work to rule out the possibility that cooperation is not temporary and is continuously renewed on multiple issue dimensions given preference convergence.

In Definition 2, “less than three successive years” suggests that, short of three years, cooperation is too brief for us to infer unity. We would need more observations to reject the possibility that cooperation is not temporary. The condition “on some issue” implies that cooperation is issue-specific. We would need more observations to get the impression that coalition members are like-minded on various fronts and likely to stick together in the future. Let me elaborate on these concepts via examples:

Suppose there are some groups *A*, *B*, and *C*. Imagine three scenarios:

Scenario 1: *A*, *B*, and *C* cooperate on issue *X1* in year *Y1*, and on issue *X2* in years *Y2* and *Y3*.

In this scenario, *A*, *B*, and *C* cooperate for three successive years but not on the same issues. One-year cooperation on *X1* and two-year cooperation on *X2* are not enough observations for us to dismiss that cooperation is temporary and issue-based. A sceptic could even suspect cooperation on *X2* to collapse in year *Y4* having observed the breakdown of cooperation on issue *X1* in year *Y2* (even though the renewal of cooperation on *X2* in year *Y3* makes this event less likely). Now, consider the following:

Scenario 2: *A*, *B*, and *C* cooperate on issue *X1* in year *Y1*, and on issues *X1* and *X2* in years *Y2* and *Y3*.

In this scenario, cooperation on *X1* is successively renewed every year. Moreover, it extends to *X2* in year *Y2*. This pattern sends a strong signal that this coalition might continue to work together in the future (we do not observe any contrary evidence to anticipate cooperation breakdown). Of course, a sceptic might prefer to wait and see what will happen on issue *X2* in year *Y4*. On the other hand, suppose *A*, *B*, and *C* cooperate on issue *X1* in year *Y1*, on issues *X1* and *X2* in year *Y2*, and on issue *X2* in year *Y3*. In this case, there is a stronger signal for unity and coherence, but we would still need more

observations to dismiss the possibility that groups are like-minded and stand united. Contrast Scenario 2 with Scenario 3:

Scenario 3: A, B, and C cooperate on issue X1 in year Y1, and issue X2 in year Y2, and on issue X3 in year Y3.

In Scenario 3, the same partners cooperate over and over again, but the object of cooperation changes every year. This pattern does not allow us to dismiss the possibility that cooperation on X1 and X2 were one-shot issue-specific cases of cooperation. Then, outside observers might suspect that cooperation on X3 is also a one-shot issue-specific case of cooperation. An alternative explanation is that issues X1 and X2 are successfully accomplished (i.e., handled for good) and therefore there is no need to further cooperate on these issues. However, we would need more contextual information to evaluate this claim.

Overall, the criteria coherence and unity are not perfect, but as the number of observations increases they allow us to make more confident claims about the nature of cooperation. In this study, I examine the patterns of interactions among contenders within the lifespan of a regime. Therefore, these criteria, particularly the one about “at least for three successive years,” allows us to have a greater confidence interval when evaluating the types of cooperation over time.

Lastly, the literature on contentious politics has long stressed that effective leadership makes contentious movements more likely to succeed (Goldstone, 2001; Lenin, 1975; Marx & Engels, 1968; McAdam, 1982; Wills, 1995; Wilson, 1973). Applying this to case of contenders, I expect the coalition to be more effective if one group takes the lead, motivates, and structures others (followers). This should not come as strange to those who are familiar with daily parliamentary politics in multiparty systems, in which one party often sponsors some bill and others endorse it. On the other hand, I do not make any assumption about the position of the leader within the coalition. That is, there can be one group predominating others or one group might operate as *primus inter pares*—both

would be different ways of rationalizing and structuring the coalition to ensure effectiveness.

In sum, if some oppositional coalition should signal unity and coherence to the incumbent, such signal is more likely to come from long-term cooperation. Otherwise, there would not be enough observations to give the incumbent the impression that the coalition is united and coherent, and therefore to be feared. Also, leadership is likely to improve the coalition's effectiveness.

Operationalization of the oppositional coalition

I proposed that the kind of oppositional coalition that is capable of overthrowing the government or extracting significant concessions from it should signal unity and coherence and is likely to have some kind of leadership. This coalition can be thought of as a cooperation network of challengers, where nodes represent challenger groups and ties represent pairwise relations of cooperation among challengers. For example, if two groups cooperate for regime change, there forms a tie (edge) indicating cooperation between them. If they do not cooperate, they are not linked by a tie (edge). The emergence of cooperation can be operationalized as edge formation, while the breakdown of cooperation can be operationalized as edge disappearance.

To capture unity (indicated by sustainable cooperation over time), we need to examine the evolution of cooperation in time. To this end, I measure cooperation on a yearly basis. So doing also allows us to establish when an oppositional movement emerges or dies.

I operationalize leadership in a coalition as a network that has a core-periphery structure. Networks displaying a core-periphery structure feature a cluster of high-degree nodes in the core that are surrounded by a less dense *periphery* of nodes with lower-degree (Newman, 2010). Here, the central node embodies the core-actor and peripheral nodes form the peripheral-actors.

Network analysis is appropriate to examine patterns of interactions among contenders and the structure of the oppositional coalition for three reasons: First, cooperation, by definition, implies interdependence. Network analysis is developed to examine interdependent data and relationships, whereas methods that rely on independence assumption (e.g., ordinary linear regression) would be impractical in dealing with relational data. Second, the number of contenders varies over time (some groups discontinue, others emerge, and some merge/fracture). Network analysis is appropriate to accommodate the temporal variation in the number of actors, whereas game theory assumes this number to stay fixed.

Most importantly, network analysis provides tools enabling us to identify whether convergence of actors' expressed preferences makes a statistically significant effect of bringing a pair of like-minded actors to collaborate. First, cooperation in a year can be operationalized as edge formation in a year and collapse of cooperation in a year can be operationalized as edge disappearance. Moreover, preference can be thought of as node-level characteristics, whereby one can examine edge creation/disappearance (cooperation or its breakdown) based on node-level characteristics (preferences).

Preference convergence implies similarity of preferences on more than one issue dimension. I operationalize preference similarity using concept of homophily. Homophily can be defined as the propensity to form ties based on similarity of characteristics. In social sciences, homophily has often been used to examine tie formation based on direct and indirect affinity in the social space (Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007; Kitts, 2006; Moody, 2001). As I discuss in depth in the next section, I derive issue dimensions on which to examine affinity from the context using contextual analysis. With that way of operationalization, network analysis uses empirical data to run MCMC simulations to establish whether preferences have a statistically significant independent effect on cooperation.

If they make an independent effect on cooperation, their estimates should be statistically significant. If preference similarity (homophily) precipitates cooperation, we should observe significant positive coefficients, meaning that more ties (representing cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random in networks displaying the same number of nodes and edges. A concrete example of tie formation based on homophily would be patterns of friendship by race in a high school. One study

identifies that Asians and Blacks in a high school are biased toward interacting with their own race and tend to have fewer White friends (Currarini, Jackson, & Pin, 2010).

If coefficients are significant but negative, we should infer that actors have a preference to work with those who hold different preferences on those issues. In more technical terms, such a finding indicates that fewer ties (cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random in networks displaying the same number of nodes and edges. For example, family members tend not to marry each other because intermarriage increases the risk that the offspring displays genetic diseases or birth defects. Also, the value of coefficients communicates the rate of change. Going back to the example of high school friendship networks, findings indicate that “Asians and Blacks are biased toward interacting with their own race at rates >7 times higher than Whites, whereas Hispanics exhibit an intermediate bias in meeting opportunities” (Currarini et al., 2010, p. 4857). This means that Asians are more than 7 times more likely to befriend other Asians than they are to befriend Whites.

Thus, network analysis helps us to identify whether preference alignment affects behavior. How does (de-)prioritization play out with preference revision? There are three possibilities: Preference revision may make preferences more alike or more dissimilar. Alternatively, preferences might remain unchanged.

If preferences remain unchanged and network analysis yields a positive statistically significant coefficient, we can infer that the issue is prioritized and convergence of preference drives cooperation among the like-minded. We should also expect coherence across the preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition.

If preferences remain unchanged and network analysis yields a negative statistically significant coefficient, this indicates that those who think differently on this matter are likely to agree on some other issue that they highly prioritize. Then, preferences of members of the oppositional coalition are likely to diverge on this issue dimension.

If preferences remain unchanged and network analysis yields a statistically insignificant coefficient, this indicates that that issue is de-prioritized and disagreements on that matter are postponed. Then, preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition are likely to display incoherence on this issue.

If preferences become more similar and network analysis yields a positive statistically significant coefficient, this indicates that that issue has high priority and now harmonized preferences foster cooperation. We are likely to observe coherence across the preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition.

If preferences become more similar and network analysis yields a negative statistically significant coefficient, those who think differently on this matter are likely to agree on some other issue that they highly prioritize and preference convergence on that other matter propels cooperation. Preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition are likely to be incoherent on this issue.

If preferences become more similar and network analysis yields a statistically insignificant coefficient, we understand that that issue is de-prioritized. On the other hand, preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition are likely to show coherence because preferences among a subset of actors are already harmonized and cease to impede cooperation.

If preference revision increases dissimilarity of preferences and network analysis yields a positive statistically significant coefficient, that issue is likely to be prioritized and convergence of preferences is likely to drive cooperation among a subset of like-minded actors.

If preference revision increases dissimilarity of preferences and network analysis yields a positive statistically significant coefficient, that issue is likely to be prioritized and convergence of preferences is likely to drive cooperation among a subset of like-minded actors.

If preference revision increases dissimilarity of preferences and network analysis yields a negative statistically significant coefficient, it is possible that actors agree on another issue that they highly prioritize.

If preference revision increases dissimilarity of preferences and network analysis yields a statistically insignificant coefficient, that issue is de-prioritized and disagreements on that matter are postponed. Table 1 below summarizes these possibilities.

Table 1

	<i>Positive statistically significant network coefficient</i>	<i>Negative statistically significant network coefficient</i>	<i>Statistically insignificant network coefficient</i>
<i>No revision in preferences</i>	Issue is prioritized & convergence of preferences drives cooperation among the like-minded	Those who think differently on this matter are likely to agree on some other issue that they highly prioritize	Issue is de-prioritized; disagreements on that matter are postponed
<i>Revision makes preferences more similar</i>	Issue is prioritized & now harmonized preferences foster cooperation	Those who think differently on this matter are likely to agree on some other issue that they highly prioritize and preference convergence on that other matter propels cooperation	Issue is de-prioritized, because preferences among a subset of actors are already harmonized, hence the oppositional coalition shows coherence on the matter
<i>Revision increases the difference among preferences</i>	Issue is prioritized & convergence of preferences drives cooperation among a subset of like-minded actors	It is likely that actors agree on another issue that they highly prioritize	Issue is de-prioritized; disagreements on that matter are postponed

When studying the effect of preferences, one major challenge is to distinguish the effect of homophily from that of influence (Shalizi & Thomas, 2011). Influence refers to the process whereby attitudes or opinions of actors who belong to a group will come to converge (Friedkin & Johnsen, 2011). Shalizi & Thomas show that it is impossible to establish using observational (and even longitudinal) data whether tie formation results from influence or homophily. Thus, the observed effect derives either from homophily or influence. However, influence is less likely to be operating in the sample sets used in this study:

First, if preferences shaped behavior through influence, we should observe preferences of groups within the oppositional coalition to differ at the beginning and grow alike over time after controlling for the exogenous factors such as updating of preferences. An indicator would be peripheral actors gradually adopting the preferences of the core actor. It is worth noting that influence is harder to observe than homophily among interacting organized groups of actors in the 19th century, which is the timeframe of this analysis. One reason is that within the conditions of the 19th century, communication

technologies did not allow actors to contact each other as easily as in the 20th century. Especially in the Ottoman case, challengers did not even share the same geographical space (some groups operated in Geneva, others in Cairo, and others were scattered across Paris, Berlin, and some Balkan cities between 1895 and 1902 (Hanioğlu, 1981) and censorship and the Sultan's spy network made challengers go underground rather than publicly announcing the solutions that proposed to resolve the country's problems. In the French case, similarly, censorship made challengers go underground between 1814 and 1816. The restriction of freedoms in both cases makes it difficult for challenger groups to easily learn about each other's preference sets and emulate it. Moreover, the incentives to emulate the solutions that the others marketed were lower than what we tend to observe in party systems where parties tend to adopt moderate preferences and address the median voter (Fowler & Smirnov, 2009; Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007). However, such incentives are lower under contended regimes displaying intense political polarization at least for those who stand on the opposite sides. In both Bourbon France and the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdülhamid II, the sociopolitical arena became increasingly polarized. In France, as I discuss in Chapter 4, royalists violently confronted Jacobins and bonapartists, and then liberals. In the Ottoman Empire, as I discuss in Chapter 3, polarization between minorities, who demanded independence, and those who worked for imperial integrity became increasingly violent. Given polarization, members of the opposite sides had little incentives to adopt moderate preferences on issues that caused societal conflict. On the other hand, one could imagine groups on the same front to have an incentive to emulate each other's preferences. However, these actors competed for the leadership of the country, and this competition was not democratic enough to induce groups to adopt moderate preferences to enlarge the electorate. For example, challengers in the Ottoman Empire sought to recruit militants and even combatants instead of votes as would be the case in contemporary multiparty systems; therefore, such groups had little incentive to adopt moderate preferences (Hanioğlu, 2001; Kevorkian, 2011). In Bourbon France, electoral and parliamentary competition was often muddled with fraud, oppression, and gerrymandering (Alexander, 2004). As I explain later, societal cleavages had a tendency to annihilate their rivals once they assumed power following the 1789 Revolution (Rosanvallon, 2007).

Finally, influence is less likely to occur than homophily, because challenger groups are not unitary (even though they are operationalized as unitary actor in this study for

modeling purposes). In that, we cannot know to the extent to which the opinion of those who emulated other groups' strategies carried weight within the group (such as during the decision making process). So doing requires an individual level analysis, which is beyond the scope of this analysis. This study is concerned about capturing expressed preferences of challenger groups based on the primary documents that challengers, themselves, penned.

The structure of the oppositional coalition

I suggested that the oppositional coalition network is composed of some leader and followers. I operationalize leadership as the central node in the network, while followers would be peripheral nodes. One question is what determines the structure of this network? What mechanisms make some contenders to become leaders and others to become followers.

In order to understand which challenger becomes the center of the oppositional coalition, we want to identify the years in which actors cooperate more and using these time frames to examine around which actor others populate. Specifically, first, I use the metric network density to examine the evolution of the *density* of network. The density means how connected a network is taking into account all possible connections in that network. In other words, it represents the ratio of the actual number of ties to the number of all possible ties (Newman, 2010, p. Chapter 6). Thus, if a network has a lot of ties among its nodes, it is dense –the ratio of the actual number of ties over the number of all possible ties gets close to 1. If a network has few ties, most of possible connections are not made; thus, it is not dense and the ratio in question approaches to $-\infty$.

At the second step, we want to understand which challenger becomes the center of the oppositional coalition. To this end, I compare the importance of each actor of the oppositional coalition. Importance in a coalition means who is central to a coalition network. That is, who is picked by others more frequently as a partner, which can also be reworded as who has more collaborators than others. Having more partners than others in an oppositional coalition indicates that one is more in demand by others as a partner. I operationalize importance using the network metric degree centrality. Degree centrality conveys how well-connected a node is (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). I discuss the

details of this measurement in the theory chapter. To give an idea about how degree centrality is interpreted, suppose that a node in some moderately well-connected network G with n number of nodes has $(n-1)$ degrees. This means this node is well-connected to all others and may be central to the network. Suppose that another node has degrees $(n-2)$, which would mean it is connected to everyone except for one other (besides himself). Such an actor would also be considerably central to the network. In contrast, if some node has degree 1, it is connected to only one other node. This means it is not central to the network (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It should be noted that centrality in a network can be measured using other metrics such as closeness or betweenness, among others. However, given that cooperation network is not directional, that is, if node A is linked to node B the link from A to B also implies a link from B to A, since cooperation is reciprocal by nature.³

Independent variables

Independent variables are preferences, which correspond to actors' positions on the issue dimensions relevant to the debate on regime type in a given context. I define preferences as any type of motivation that factors in actors' decision making and shapes their behavior. This definition includes material interests, grievances, ideological beliefs, and strategic calculations. In other words, I do not distinguish between material interests, grievances, ideological beliefs, or strategic calculations. I use preferences as an overarching concept to encompass all types of motivations shaping behavior.⁴

That said, I define ideological preferences the preferences about what the new regime should look like. For example, the role of religion in politics counts as an ideological preference for it determines the limits of the sphere of domination of religious institutions vis-à-vis political and social institutions. Similarly, whether the economy

³ For more information on centrality see (Borgatti, 2005; Easley & Kleinberg, 2010; Newman, 2010).

⁴ The reasons are twofold: First, we cannot know the true motivation of actors using observational methods, since expressed motivations may or may not reflect true intentions behind the behavior. Also, different types of rationality might be simultaneously at play in shaping behavior. Behavioral experiments, notwithstanding their shortcomings, are better suited to the study of motivations. Second, actors themselves do not necessarily know the true nature of their motivations. Various mental processes distort rationality as shown by bounded rationality theory (Kahneman, 2003, 2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) as well as theories critiquing thin rationality employed by rational choice (Elster, 1983, 2007; Elster et al., 2000).

should be centrally planned or follow the laissez-faire rule pertains to the organization of a regime.

In contrast, “a strategy is a complete contingent plan for a player in the game” (Watson, 2008, p. 24). In this study, the game refers to the struggle against the current regime with the purpose of building a new form of government. Then, strategic preferences correspond to preferences about the methods with which the current regime should be overthrown and the institutions associated with another form of government should be established. For example, views on whether to seek foreign assistance to overthrow some government count as strategic preferences, because this issue revolves around the acceptability and feasibility of employing a particular method (get foreign assistance or not) to overthrow the government and change the regime. It is worth noting that some strategic preferences may be perceived by some actors as ideological preferences. For example, whether the socialist revolution should be carried out before or after democracy is established may appear to orthodox Marxists as an ideological issue about how to implement Marxist principles, whereas social democrats or Leninists would be more pragmatic (focusing on ends rather than means) and see it as a strategic question. In this study, I do not take side on actors’ views and do not get into the discussion of the nature of motivations (whether some issue is an ideological question or a strategic one). I conceptualize all issues pertaining to the methods and means to achieve some end as strategic matters. In this vein, whether to, say, seek foreign assistance is a strategic preference dimension, although for some, this issue may call into question one’s beliefs and devotion to a cause. Similarly, whether one misrepresents one’s intentions in building an alliance with an ideological opponent to overthrow the government transition is also a strategic issue, because whether one believes that one can outweigh the partner after short-term collaboration for regime change and expects to take the other for a fool after transition is an ex post interpretation of some behavior. We cannot truly know intentions and calculations of those who make the decision on whether to ally with an ideological partner simply by observing one’s behavior at the time of alliance building. If, indeed, we observe one to play the partner for a fool, there still is the question of whether one had really planned this move or had decided to defeat the partner after the transition. We cannot truly answer this question unless some evidence about motivations of decision makers comes to light from the hindsight. Still, such evidence would not be 100% objective

--for it represents a particular set of views, but they might help us construct a falsifiable narrative).

On the other hand, distinguishing between ideological and strategic preferences is necessary for theorizing the effect of preferences on behavior. In that, ideological preferences are less amenable to change in the short/medium run compared to strategic preferences. The reason is as follows: changing ideological preferences for a person means abandoning an existing worldview and rearranging beliefs to rebuild a coherent vision to understand the world. So doing is costly and time consuming. Therefore, a communist is unlikely to become a rightwing supporter overnight. Such shifts are conceivable in the long run though. As explained by constructivism, mechanisms such as repeated interactions allow identities to change in the long run (Chandra, 2012). In this study, I conceptualize ideological affiliation as an identity, since one can argue that a militant nationalist ready to die and kill for his fatherland takes nationalism as a defining trait of his personality as well as the meaning of his life. Besides repeated interactions, the literature on regime shows that shocks may induce actors to reconsider their preferences (Haggard & Kaufman, 2012; Skocpol, 1979). For instance, a person may be a keen supporter of a leader prior to elections --such as secular democrats in Turkey who supported Tayyip Erdogan in the early 2000s-- but may be disillusioned by the latter's policies after elections --such as the democrats who turns against Erdogan once the latter becomes authoritarian.

To recap, ideological preferences are more likely to change in the long-run, but actors might also change them in the short run if some shock erodes the credibility of their ideological principles by uncovering undeniable contrary evidence. What does this tell us about how cooperation emerges? Preferences affect cooperation dynamics via two ways, their particular meanings and their number defining what dimensionality the issue space will be.

As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, actor-oriented studies of regimes tend to define preferences a priori. Typically, these preferences bear the same meaning from society to society, which implies that there are no differences in the way, say, grievances about living standards shape the struggles over regime type in, say, Weimar Germany and Iran under Shah Pahlavi. In reality, hyperinflation and war defeat, among other things, structured the debate over regime type in Germany, whereas in Iran, the debate revolved around discontent about top-down modernization and foreign interference in domestic affairs

(McElligott, 2009; Parsa, 1989). Such differences have causal value therefore are too large to be ignored. The specific meanings of grievances are causal because they affect which societal groups will mobilize (or not) and the dynamics of the power play among them (Locke & Thelen, 1995). In this study, I conduct a contextual analysis to identify what the grievances and the meanings (as understood by the players at the time) are.

Also, given the difficulty of knowing the true motivations behind some behavior, I use publicly expressed preferences such as pamphlet, treaty, journal article to identify a group of actors' position on an issue dimension. I take preferences on issue dimensions in their face value rather than conducting a heuristic analysis. That also means that I do not question whether publicly expressed preferences that we observe align or not with the true motivations. It is in order to do so, because the unit of analysis is organized groups. Organizations have to attract members; credibility and reputation are critical in how their preferences are marketed. Thus, a group that totally misrepresent its preferences to gain public support should face a reputation cost and loss of support when the true preferences are revealed (thus even if such misrepresentation is not impossible it bears considerable costs). Also, I do not get into the debate of how actors might differently perceive and understand publicly expressed preferences since that would mean taking sides on an array of interpretation of those preferences. Thus, I use contextual analysis to identify issue dimensions and content analysis to find out organized groups' publicly expressed preferences on those dimensions. To reemphasize an earlier point, in so doing, I depart from the game theoretical studies that define preferences a priori and as fixed. I will elaborate on this issue in the theory part.

Second, as also discussed in detail in Chapter 2, actor-oriented game theoretical theories of regimes reduce interests to a single dimension, economic or political. So doing ignores the complexity of the reasoning process. For instance, the axiom that lower classes prefer democracy because this regime type provides more income hints at a type of practical rationality, to use Weber's terms, and neglects the fact that partisanship also shapes behavior (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). On the other hand, classifying actors by ideological disposition (such as Przeworski's hard-liners, soft-liners) rather implies a mixture of substantive and practical rationalities (Przeworski, 2005). Again, behavior is too complex to be reduced down to preferences about a single regime dimension. It is worth noting that the literature on regimes has already pointed out that attitudes towards the regime affect regime stability and survival (Dahl, 1971; Linz & Stepan, 1996b; Lipset,

1959). Given this critical role that they play in the fate of regimes, we need to examine attitudes towards the regime by acknowledging their multidimensionality.

Overall, in acknowledging the multidimensionality of preferences and their context-specific meanings, I conduct contextual analysis to identify them. That said, this study will also use control variables such as financial flows from and to contenders or calculations about dynamics of interactions among actors —such as whether to ally with the friend of a friend.

CASE SELECTION

I test the abovementioned theory on the unification among regime challengers using a paired comparison of cases of transition from authoritarian to constitutional government. Demands for constitutional forms of government began to arise in the early 19th century in Western societies and in the late 19th century in non-Western societies. European peoples stood up against their monarchs in the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848. In the non-West, Iran, Russia, China, Mexico, and the Ottoman Empire had undergone constitutional revolutions by 1911 (Sohrabi, 1995). Despite fighting similar battles in the 19th century, however, a gap had opened between Western and non-Western societies by the 20th century. Western societies began living under accountable governments, whereas most non-Western societies were still struggling to tie the hands of their rulers. Comparing Western to non-Western cases thus has important theoretical implications. Comparison within an exclusively Western or non-Western sample gives us insights into the dynamics of a particular geography. This approach does not help answering the question of whether there might be dynamics that transcend geographical boundaries. Also, regime literature has been treating Western cases as benchmarks to evaluate non-Western transitions (Ziblatt, 2006, pp. 311–312). However, it might be Europe that constitutes the *sui generis* case. Many like Ziblatt and Hui have stressed the need to normalize Europe. Building on this insight, I selected from among 19th century cases of transition.

I use the least-similar systems design in this dissertation. The transitions to constitutional government in Bourbon France (a Western case) and the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdülhamid II (a non-Western case) similar outcomes, but different dynamics and contexts: Both regimes built on an imperial background, briefly liberalized before turning authoritarian again, and fell with a revolution —the 1908 Revolution in

the Ottoman Empire and the 1830 Revolution in Bourbon France. In neither case did foreign intervention play an important role in regime change. In both cases, governments faced considerable regime discontent and several organized challenger groups. In this sense, these cases are similar. On the other hand, these transitions occurred in the West and in the non-West, and in different periods of the 19th century. Accordingly, the structure of contention and the nature of interactions among the government, contenders and the environment differed accordingly. In this sense, the paired comparison is a dissimilar systems design, in which the actors, grievances, and the sociopolitical environment differ across cases but the outcomes (the overthrow of the government) are similar. The finding of commonalities in patterns of interactions among challengers in the French and Ottoman cases would hint that cooperation for regime change follows dynamics that are independent of the particularities of the Western versus non-Western context and early or late transition.

Bourbon France was a façade constitutional monarchy with a Parliament but without substantive checks on the power of the monarch. In contrast, the post-1877 Hamidian regime in the Ottoman Empire was purely autocratic. In France, confrontations between antagonistic factions caused unrest, whereas external and internal threats threatened the survival of the Ottoman Empire. These differences generated contentious activities of dissimilar structure, nature, and repertoire of contentious action. Challengers in the Ottoman case encompassed constitutionalists who worked to maintain imperial integrity, and secessionists that worked against it. Bourbon challengers were divided not over this issue of territorial integrity, but rather on the shape of the regime: Besides the republican-monarchist axis, issues such as the role of religion in politics, civil liberties, and the division of power between the executive and legislative divided challengers.

To test the theory on the emergence of cooperation for regime change among challengers, I conducted detailed historiographical and archival work to identify who the challengers and their preferences are in each case. I constructed original datasets for each case detailing the groups involved in the contesting of the regime (27 in the Ottoman case and 14 in the French case), their membership, goals, aims, and cooperation patterns. These databases may be of use to other scholars.

DATA COLLECTION

I constructed datasets of French and Ottoman challengers using primary and secondary sources. My strategy for sampling sources was threefold: First, I conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews with historians specializing in the political history of 19th century France and the Ottoman Empire.⁵ Interviews began with a discussion of my research design and hypotheses. Then, the interviewees suggested a set of primary and secondary sources to match my research interests and gave me information about the archives that contained these sources. I spent four months collecting the indicated sources, classifying them into three categories: (A) Sources on political history, the state, and society, (B) sources on ideologies and mental maps, and (C) sources on challenger groups' organizational structure, membership, and behavior (See Appendix I for the classification of sources by theme and country).

Second, I used the sources on political history, the state, and society, to establish the environmental conditions in which transitions took place and to identify the relevant actors. Actors included all of the challengers that are mentioned in secondary sources, government actors, and all of the foreign and domestic powers involved in the process. In other words, my definition of actors is not limited to elites or to "the most influential actors" defined according to some numerical criteria, such as the one in use in the political party literature (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979; Lijphart, 1999). "Small actors" are not necessarily negligible: Their reactions factor in the shaping of the environment. For example, the sphere of influence of a small contentious group in the Balkans may be regional, but the group or the region may play an important role— and in fact, resistance started by such local actors triggered the revolution in the Ottoman case.

Historical sources pose challenges in terms of reliability (Bercovic, 2005; Lustick, 1996; Thies, 2002; Vitalis, 2006; Wilde, 2004). Primary documents such as manuscripts, memoirs, and propaganda material, reflect authors' epistemological and ideological views and political agenda. The partiality of such work is desirable if one is, as I was, is seeking to understand a particular actor's ideas, perceptions, and mental maps. For other purposes, personal accounts require crosschecking facts, figures, and narratives. Secondary sources are not spared from issues of reliability. Historians might offer

⁵ The interviewees are Akşin Somel from Sabanci University, Ahmet Kuyaş from Galatasaray University, Warren Breckman from the University of Pennsylvania.

different accounts of the same facts and phenomena, in part because they themselves pursue a certain epistemological, ideological, or political agenda (Howell & Prevenier, 2001, p. 1). For instance, Soviet historians present the USSR as a *sui generis* entity, whereas subsequent research reveals similarities between Russian society and other modernizing societies (Sil, 2002, pp. 311–320). Therefore, which historiography one chooses requires theoretical justification (Lustick, 1996). Also, historical narratives are revised in light of new evidence or in response to paradigm shifts in the field. For example, early historiography portrays the Ottoman state in the 18th century as a declining entity, considering its overreliance on local private actors for tax collection and security provision, whereas later historiography interprets the same practices as cost-effective solutions to administrative problems, evincing the Empire’s adaptive capacity to changing environment (Barkey, 1994; Shaw, 1976). Before constructing the datasets, I thus contrasted and compared primary and secondary sources in order to improve data quality (Thies, 2002; Vitalis, 2006; Wilde, 2004).

I followed two rules in dealing with reliability issues. When faced with divergent narratives, I relied on recent historiography. However, I indicated in footnotes alternative accounts offered by earlier research. When coding factual data –such as, locations and dates of meetings or names, I verified information by consulting multiple sources on the topic. Crosschecks proved particularly useful in the Ottoman case. Ottomans used the Hijri calendar, a lunar calendar that starts in AD 622 marking the date of Prophet Muhammad’s emigration from Mecca to Medina. Hijri years have 354 or 355 days, which creates an 11-day difference from the Gregorian calendar.⁶ Historians sometimes translated calendars with a year lag –for instance, for a given event, some marked the date as, say, 1895, while others as 1896. In such cases, I followed the most frequent translation.

Secondary sources were particularly useful in collecting spatial and temporal information about group activities. Primary documents on challenger groups are never impartial, but sometimes they simply do not exist. In the Ottoman case, in particular, most challengers organized clandestinely, destroyed all documentation and registries on their activities and membership, and disciplined their members against divulging information in order to escape regime persecution. Consequently, there are only a handful of manuscripts and memoirs penned by members of some leading challenger organizations,

⁶(Publications, 2003, p. 1352).

such as the Committee of Progress and Union. Secondary sources provide missing information, which historians have derived from correspondences and diplomatic documents.

THE ARGUMENT

I argue that contenders are more likely to cooperate for regime change after they converge on a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if any). Such a coherent oppositional movement is more likely to signal unity and coherence. A movement of this kind is more likely to steer the process of transition once a contentious movement breaks out at the societal level, hence set the direction of institutional change.

The coherent movement becomes more likely to emerge among a subset of challengers, since it is easier to harmonize preferences within a smaller group than within a large one. Challengers are capable of forming a coherent oppositional coalition in three steps: In the first stage, there is disunity. Challengers hold mismatching preferences on varied issues shaping the struggle over regime type, some of which they highly prioritize. Mismatching preferences get in the way of long-term cooperation, which would allow to overthrow the regime, despite shared interests in overthrowing the government. This study shows that for challengers to build long-term cooperation, there must be a process, whereby challengers reconsider the relative priority of preferences on varied issue dimensions (which I refer to as “prioritization” or “de-prioritization”) and pragmatically replace some of their preferences with more effective ones (“preference revision”). Such a process begins in response to environmental changes, such as foreign invasion or authoritarian retrenchment. This second stage is instrumental in the overcoming of disagreements on varied issue dimensions. This study shows that preferences about strategic issues are more likely to be revised, whereas preferences on ideological dimensions are more likely to be postponed.

This study further shows that convergence happens around a “core-actor,” who attracts others, who form the “periphery” of the coalition and adopt the same strategy but not necessarily the same ideologies. For such a coalition to emerge, convergence of

preferences on ideological issues is helpful but neither necessary nor sufficient. Yet, preferences on strategic issues must converge. This means that some level of “pragmatism,” the propensity to postpone the resolution of ideological disagreements in view of overthrowing the government in the short run, is necessary to form an oppositional coalition. “Idealists,” those who are dedicated to their preference sets, are less likely to sideline disagreements, which makes ideological convergence much harder to achieve. Therefore, the probability of having a coalition of all idealists is lower than the probability of having a coalition of some pragmatists and some idealists. In other words, cooperation for regime change in the long run requires some level of pragmatism on strategic issue dimensions.

The rise of a coherent oppositional front follows from long-term cooperation. Long-term cooperation is distinguished from short-term cooperation because it is evident in iterated moves, with actors agreeing -despite their divergent ideologies- to repeatedly bring pressure to bear on the old regime using similar methods. My research shows that **unity among challengers is crafted**. Regime change depends not only on destabilization of the status quo but also on potential challengers being willing to postpone their ideological disagreements so as to arrive at common strategies that allow for building a united coherent oppositional coalition.

Implications of the argument

Cooperation for regime change is not a natural outcome of shared interests against the incumbent government as bargaining theories assume to be. Such cooperation is likely to follow from a process, whereby certain environmental transformations induce actors to postpone the resolution of ideological differences and revise their strategic preferences pertaining to how to overthrow the government. This means, unity among contenders is not given, which is why in real life, we observe challengers to unite work against the regime *only* in some cases.

This argument makes a significant contribution to cooperation theory of regimes. Findings from the case studies of the Ottoman and French cases indicate that cooperation among challengers against the current government is not a unidimensional sequential game of cooperation, as is generally conceptualized by bargaining theories. In such games,

distrust and low benefits from cooperation hinder cooperation, whereas shared interests and the shadow of future induce cooperation (Fearon, 1995; Watson, 2008). In cases of coordination, these factors are in effect. Yet, there are additional obstacles, which result from the multiplicity of issue dimensions constituting the debate over regime type. The higher the number of issue dimensions gets the harder the cooperation among challenger groups becomes. As a result, cooperation for regime change takes time to build. Hence, the plurality of possible solutions hinders cooperation for regime change independently of distrust, low benefits from cooperation, and incentives to cheat.

One central finding of this research is that cooperation for regime change becomes more likely after challengers converge on a particular strategy for changing the regime. In contrast, harmonizing preferences on ideological issues is less likely to obtain in the short and medium run. As the following chapters show, evidence from the Ottoman and French cases reveal that alignment of ideological preferences does not suffice to form sustainable cooperation. Specifically, in the Ottoman case, ideological agreement on society type and the role of religion in politics did not suffice to foster cooperation among those who shared preferences on these matters between 1895 and 1901. Between 1902 and 1908, challengers were able to form an oppositional coalition, after sidelining their differences on society type and state type (See Chapter 3). Similarly, in the French case, agreement on preferences about the executive-legislative balance did not suffice to foster long-term cooperation. Challengers cooperated for regime after aligning their preferences on whether to use violence to change the regime and the role of religion in politics (See Chapter 4).

What these findings imply is that in order to cooperate for regime change, contenders need not resolve all ideological disagreements. Postponing the resolution of certain ideological differences also helps with cooperation. In other words, long-term cooperation for regime change becomes more likely to emerge among actors who are pragmatic on ideological issues than those who are not.

Another important implication of the argument is that the rise of a coherent oppositional coalition makes it easier for challengers to steer the transition process once contentious activities break out at the societal level. Thus, such a coalition plays a fundamental role in dynamics of regime transition by setting the direction of regime change.

Methodologically, this study provides evidence for the theoretical and empirical shortcomings of defining motivations underlying cooperation --such as economic interests or political grievances-- a priori and with respect to a single issue dimension. Grievances and interests bear different meanings across space and time, whereby the nature of the game that contenders play varies across cases. Besides, preferences are not fixed over time. Scholars of regimes who focus on interactions between contenders and the government need to take shifts in actors' preferences into account. Deriving preferences using a contextual case study and incorporating changes in preferences over time into study designs help to more accurately analyze dynamics of regime change.

PLAN OF THE STUDY

The study begins with a discussion of the role and dynamics of cooperation among challengers in regime transitions. Specifically, I explain why we should not take cooperation for granted and why regime contenders are not unitary actors. I emphasize that grievances about regimes are multidimensional and actors take different positions on these dimensions. Building on these premises, I propose that cooperation for regime change among challengers is a case of coordination with conflicting interests on varied issue dimensions. I introduce the concept of prioritization and de-prioritization to capture changes in the ranking of preferences and that of preference revision to control for shifts in the content of preferences with respect to environmental transformations. Building on these insights, Chapter II advances the theory that cooperation for regime change among challengers becomes more likely when actors postpone their ideological disagreements and harmonize their transition strategies. Chapter II also presents the methodology for testing this theory.

Chapters III and IV consist of in-depth case studies of the Ottoman and French transitions. Each case study chapter begins with a historical analysis that lays out the nature of the authoritarian regime, the issue dimensions that shaped the struggle over regime type, the relevant actors, and the latter's positions on these issues. In so doing, I contextualize challengers in order to grasp the specific meanings of that they ascribed to issues and their preferences. This historical works draws on a content analysis of memoirs, pamphlets, and articles by prominent figures of each group, as well as secondary sources written on groups and their members following the procedure that I lay out in Chapter II.

In Chapter III, I show that Ottoman constitutionalists understood constitutionalism as a solution to secessionism, imperialism, and secularism rather than as a means to tie the hands of the leader, as was the case in Western Europe (Tilly, 1993; Weingast, 1997). Chapter IV uses the same methodology to analyze the French case of transition. It shows that French challengers embraced the idea of a regime of checks and balances upon realizing that they could not ensure political survival without putting constitutional limits on the executive.

In the case study chapters, the historical analysis is followed by a network analysis of patterns of interactions among challengers over time. Network analysis allows for identifying the dimensions on which preference alignment propelled cooperation and on which others preferences are not taken into account. As I explained earlier, longitudinal network models help reveal whether certain issues are (de)prioritized and if who in which direction this affected cooperation dynamics. I use descriptive network analysis to discern types of cooperation (long-term vs. short-term cooperation) and compare preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition to one another. I show that, in both cases, and despite various attempts at reunification, challengers failed to work together due to strategic and ideological disagreements.

Chapter 5 compares findings from the Ottoman and French case studies and discusses how they relate to the theory on cooperation for regime change among challengers. In both cases, despite differences in grievances, environmental conditions, and the profile of actors, cooperation unfolded in three stages. In the first stage, which I call the *disunity* stage, interactions among challengers are limited to short-term cooperation. At the broader scale, challengers remain disconnected, forming at best issue-based, temporary links with one another. In the second stage, environmental changes prompt challengers (as in the cases of France and the Ottoman Empire) to revise and re-rank their preferences such that strategic preferences are harmonized. In this process, a subset of challengers gravitates towards a core actor, who advocated for the most salient preferences. The rise of a coherent oppositional coalition is instrumental in setting the direction of institutional change once contentious activities break out at the societal level. Contentious activities are stochastic events. Therefore, the timing of regime change cannot be predicted. On the other hand, the rise of a coherent united coalition of challengers makes regime transition more likely.

KEY CONCEPTS & DEFINITIONS

Issue dimension: subject matters that are relevant to the ongoing debate on regime type in society, which is conceptualized as matters that contextual analysis identifies to be salient. Indicators of salience are matters on which the majority of actors (including challengers and the public) express a certain position and consider to be critical aspects of the regime debate. It is operationalized as a dimension on which actors have a particular position. For example, if socioeconomic equality is an important part of the debate on the regime, that topic qualifies as an issue dimension; we define an actor's position on that dimension (such as more redistribution). Issue dimensions can be (and usually are) multiple in a given context. Although a given issue dimension appears to be the same the term in which actors debate it varies by context (Locke & Thelen, 1995). Thus, issue space defining the ongoing debate on the regime is multidimensional.

Preference: Actors' position by an issue dimension. The indicator is the observed expressed position, such as a statement, declaration. Preferences are derived using a contextual analysis of actors' memoirs, propaganda material, books and articles written on the subject of issue dimensions affecting the debate on the regime. Thus, actors occupy positions on a multidimensional plane, which changes in accordance with changes in observed expressed preferences.

Strategic preferences: preferences about the methods with which the current regime should be overthrown and the institutions associated with another form of government should be established.

Ideological preferences: Preferences about what the new regime should look like.

Unity: A group of actors is united if the same actors repeatedly cooperate over time (otherwise, it would look like a one-time collaboration).

Coherence: A group is coherent if its members have similar preferences on most issues. Concomitantly, a group lacks coherence if its members have disagreements on multiple issues.

Long-term cooperation: Some groups *A* and *B* are engaged in long-term cooperation if and only if they have been cooperating on more than one issue for at least three successive years.

Short-term cooperation: Some groups *A* and *B* are engaged in short-term cooperation, if cooperation is limited on one issue and lasts less than three successive years.

One-time cooperation: the case in which players cooperate at only one round and not after given some sequential game.

Preference alignment: Preference alignment refers to similarity of preference on some issue dimension. In this study, it is not used to imply complementarity of preferences.

Priority: The position of preferences in the preference ladder (preference relations in game theory) that some player has at a given time.

Prioritization: Moving some preference to an upper rank in the ranking of preferences.

De-prioritization: Moving some preference to a lower rank in the ranking of preferences.

Environmental transformations: Changes in the sociopolitical and economic contexts that make actors revise their preferences independently of interactions among players.

Preference revision: Qualitative changes in preferences as new information becomes available (preference update in the game theoretical language).

Core-actor: The challenger group that assumes the leadership position in a coalition by virtue of adopting the most salient strategic and ideological preferences. Core-actors are connected to everyone else in the coalition but everyone else need not be interconnected.

Peripheral actors: The challenger groups that gather around a core actor (assuming the leadership position in a coalition). All peripheral actors are tied to the core actor on the basis of preference convergence on strategies, but preference convergence on ideological matters is not necessary. Peripheral actors need not be connected to each other.

CHAPTER 2 A Dynamic Theory of Cooperation for Regime Change

Regime transitions are turbulent processes. The proclamation of a republic, the adoption of a constitution, the collapse of a government, or a revolution constitute the endpoint of a long process of struggles between the incumbent rulers and its contenders. On the day of transition, we observe one of the possible realizations of the scenario in which contenders overthrow the incumbent's regime. In another world, the incumbent could have crushed his contenders and consolidated its authority. It could also have fallen into a state of disorder (such as civil war). Alternatively, the regime might have been dragged into a revolutionary situation that is neither completely disorderly (as in a state of civil war) nor completely orderly (as in the case of a consolidated regime). What is interesting is that in such what I will call "semi-orderly states,"⁷ the regime may stay for a brief or long period depending on the circumstances. Then, the semi-orderly state might lead to consolidation, disorder, or regime change. In this dissertation, I study and theorize the regimes that shift from a semi-orderly state to the establishment of a new regime.

What is a semi-orderly state and why is it important to understand dynamics of regime change? One can imagine semi-orderly state as a state in which organized contender groups challenge the incumbent's regime but neither contenders nor the incumbent is (yet) strong enough to suppress the other. In other words, the forces that work to (re)produce regime stability and those that work for regime change coexist. Empirically, some regimes stay in semi-orderly states longer than others. For example, the Colombian regime has been struggling with the guerilla group FARC for decades, whereas the 1979 Iranian Revolution unfolded within a couple of years once Khomeini emerged as a leader. Why do some regimes stay in semi-orderly states longer than others? Also, what role does cooperation among contenders play in whether regimes will move to a new regime or not, if any? This chapter elaborates on the role of cooperation among challengers in contended regimes, where opposition groups challenge the incumbent government demanding regime change.

The chapter is structured as follows: The first section elaborates on why we need to examine the role of challengers when studying processes of regime change. Specifically, I set the theoretical background and discuss existing explanations of transition and cooperation for transition among challengers. In the second section, I propose a theory of cooperation for regime change with multiple actors holding conflicting interests on issue dimensions constituting the debate over regime type. I argue that challengers are more likely to form a coherent oppositional coalition if they postpone ideological disagreements and converge on their strategies of transition (i.e., preferences about how regime change should be carried out). The type of the oppositional coalition that is capable of overthrowing the government or extract significant concessions from him is more likely to dwell upon preference convergence on strategies, since strategies are less rigid than

⁷ This is an adaptation of the term proposed by Wolfram in his classification of behavior in dynamical systems. For more information see (Mitchell, 2009; Wolfram, 2002, pp. 151–159).

ideologies in the short run. I further argue that oppositional coalitions tend to display a center-periphery structure, in which challenger groups gather around a particular group that assumes the leadership. This coalition comes about as a result of preference convergence on strategies. Preference convergence on ideologies is helpful but neither necessary nor sufficient. Ultimately, the theory suggests that it requires more than shared interests in overthrowing the regime to unify challengers. Cooperation for regime change among challengers is not a given; it is a result of process of re-prioritizing and revising preferences.

Role of cooperation among challengers in regime change

Why should we consider interactions among challengers in thinking about dynamics of regime change? Do opposition groups need to cooperate to change the regime? Theoretically, if a group of challengers possesses sufficient resources, it may overthrow the government on its own (for example via a coup). If so, interactions among challengers do not arise as a problem; what needs to be explained to understand regime change is how the challenger group mobilizes resources.⁸ Yet, often times, resources are scarce and challengers compete with one another to acquire them. In vying for resources, challengers spend the energy that they would otherwise allocate to contending the government. Competition also allows rulers to employ divide-and-rule tactics in order to fracture or preempt the rise of a united challenger front (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006).

Cooperation might be desirable to overcome such obstacles. For example, contenders might diminish the cost of resource mobilization by pooling resources or free riding on a more resourceful partner. Also, they might stand stronger against the incumbent if they form a united front. Collaboration might also be desirable, since acquiring the consent of groups making dissimilar demands might help to reduce regime contestation after transition. The alternative to not compromising with groups making different demands—which may become anti-regime groups after the transition—is to suppress or militarily defeat them—a costlier strategy for future incumbents (Goldstone, Rueschemeyer, & Mahoney, 2003; Gurr, 1988; Huntington, 1968; Skocpol, 1979). Thus, contenders benefit from cooperating with one another for regime change. Yet, in many cases of contended regimes cooperation does not come automatically—such as the disunited Syrian opposition groups to the Assad government. If beneficial, why do contenders not cooperate? Let us now see how opposition groups to the incumbent come to cooperate for regime change.

⁸ In this regard, scholars of contentious politics emphasize the role of ideological entrepreneurship, recruitment, financing, and political opportunity structures (Koopmans, 1993; McAdam, 1982; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Minkoff, 1993; Olzak & West, 1991; Tarrow, 1994; Weinstein, 2007).

Unpacking cooperation: The formation of oppositional movements

Under what conditions do challengers cooperate for regime change? The literature on regimes proposes two different explanations on cooperation among challengers. Process-oriented scholars theorize cooperation as an outcome of historical processes –such as military, bureaucratic, or industrial revolutions– and contingencies –such as foreign invasion or a crisis. History plays a causal role by gradually transforming the socioeconomic and political environment, which, in turn, empowers certain societal groups against others. As structural conditions change, novel sets of interests emerge, new societal groups form and begin making demands from the incumbent, forcing the political structure upholding the incumbent’s regime to adapt. Thus, struggles leading to regime change follow from historical transformations (Anderson, 1974; Downing, 1992; Ertman, 1997; Marx, 1978; Moore, 1993; Tilly, 1993). Typically, in these arguments, regime change happens when the opportunity presents itself after the power balance between the incumbent and challengers has shifted in favor of the latter (Luebbert, 1991; Tilly, 1993).

Regarding cooperation among challengers, process-oriented scholars argue that societal groups cooperate against the regime on the basis of distinct common socioeconomic and/or political interests (such as “taxation for representation” or “proletarian interests”), which, themselves, are products of environmental transformations (Marx, 1978; Tilly, 1993). On the basis of these interests, contextual constraints and opportunities bring actors to collaborate for regime change as we see in rise of “the lib-lab coalition” or the bourgeoisie that drove democratic transitions in Western Europe (Luebbert, 1991; Moore, 1993). Thus, cooperation among contenders and the transitions that the latter carry out are a product of historical and structural developments (Marx, 1978; Poggi, 1978; Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 2000).

The strength of these explanations lies in underlining the role of processes and contingencies. That is, the type of interests that fosters cooperation among challengers varies by contextual and historical factors. This perspective beautifully accounts for cross-sectional variations and differences in patterns of change. On the other hand, the emphasis on contextual and temporal specificities forecloses the possibility of posing the question of whether there might be common patterns in the way cooperation emerges across different cases. This is the question that this dissertation addresses.

As to what propels cooperation for regime change, some process-oriented scholars draw attention to the mobilizing role of organizations, such as trade unions and professional organizations (R. Collier, 1999; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992; Wright, 2000) or churches (Katznelson & Jones, 2010; McAdam, 1982). Marxist scholars emphasize the role of class consciousness, hegemony, and leadership (Althusser, 1972; Gramsci, 1971; Hechter, 2004; Lukács,

1972; Thompson, 1966; Wright, 1996). More relational arguments underline reconfigurations of power balance between the state and society, suggesting that regime change becomes more likely to when civil society gets stronger (Howard, 2003; Putnam, 1993). Even though the emphasis seems to be placed on different mechanisms, the gist of these arguments is that transition happens when proponents of regime change outweigh supporters of the regime.

In attributing changes in power balance to processes and contingencies, some process-oriented scholars also focus on the domestic and foreign factors that affect power balance. Ruling elites do not yield to pressures for regime change if they can overwhelm dissenters through institutional mechanisms (Brownlee, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Magaloni, 2008; Teorell, 2010), if they attract economic and communal elites to the regime, or if they enjoy foreign support (Bellin, 2004; Brake, 1989; Bunce, McFaul, & Stoner-Weiss, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Skocpol, 1979). Concomitantly, the withdrawal of foreign support, foreign invasion, or the threat of war or revolution might trigger regime change (Bellin, 2004; Levitsky & Way, 2010). The literature also finds that unity within the ruling coalition helps incumbents to remain in power during times of crises (Brownlee, 2007; Dogan & Higley, 1998; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Magaloni, 2008). These explanations display two distinct features.

First, institutional change and stability are a function of the balance of power between the incumbent and contenders. That said, it is the structural and institutional factors like regime capacity or configuration of class relations that are the most influential in affecting the power balance among actors. In this sense, this literature does not address the question of whether cooperation among challengers matters to transitions.

Second, in treating the balance of power among actors, most scholars tend to offer what Tilly calls “zero-sum accounts” (Tilly, 2000). That is, anti-regime forces’ ability to overpower the incumbent explains institutional change and the incumbent’s superiority over challengers accounts for regime survival. Although this type of explanations may seem reasonable at first glance (reasonable since we observe these parties interact and one of them outweighs the other), one party is treated as a function of the other, whereas it can be conceptualized as an independent force interacting with the other (Tilly, 2000). As a result, such a conceptualization dismisses the possibility that other reasons might be weakening them. It could be that problems about, say, hierarchy within some party diminishes this party’s capacity independently of the rival’s superiority (e.g., the Republican People’s Party in Turkey since the 1990s). In effect, a regime might be surviving not because its government is stronger than contenders, but because contenders are too weak to assume power. Of course, there are exceptions to this sort of explanations, but they generally focus on the inner dynamics of incumbents, such as (Brownlee, 2007; Dogan & Higley, 1998; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Magaloni, 2008). In contrast, there is not much written on the inner dynamics of challengers. This dissertation attempts to fill in this gap.

Contra process-oriented studies' emphasis on historical legacies and contingencies, the alternative strand of the literature on regimes, namely bargaining models, takes bargains between among governments and challengers to be the decisive factor on institutional change or stability. Within this framework, the number of actors that are party to bargains and configurations of alliances among them become decisive on the institutional outcome. In this sense, our question of whether cooperation among challengers has an effect on transition falls within the scope of the theory. As to what propels cooperation, the bargaining school argues that shared interests and grievances bring actors to cooperate (Coppedge, 2012). This school branches into one economic and one political variant when it comes to the nature of interests and grievances. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss these variants in order.

The defining characteristic of the economic branch of the bargaining school is to operate under the assumption that challengers are already unified. We will see that some political bargaining models relax this assumption. Economically, what unifies actors are shared interests in macrolevel stability or grievances about its lack. For example, in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), bargains over regime type define a "political conflict between the elites who are the relatively rich and the majority (or citizens) who is the relatively poor" (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, p. 22). Citizens want democracy for it generates more income for them and elites want nondemocracy (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, pp. 19, 22–23). Wealth also emerges as the most important factor in Limongi and Przeworski (1997), who "deliberately ignore factors such as religion, colonial legacy, income distribution, or diffusion" (Limongi & Przeworski, 1997, p. 155). (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000) follows the same pattern. In (Boix, 2003; Boix & Stokes, 2003), capital mobility is taken into account in addition to wealth. Overall, high taxes, pauperization, or inequality generate grievances among lower classes in this literature (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001; Boix, 2003; Boix & Stokes, 2003; Rosendorff, 2001; Zak & Feng, 2003). Once these grievances surpass a certain threshold lower classes threaten with rebellion. Ruling elites respond by liberalization if the cost of repressing lower classes' demands surpasses the cost of liberalization.

The strength of this reasoning lies in attributing the power balance among actors to observable economic indicators. Environmental changes and shocks are incorporated into the model, which allows modelers make precise predictions.

However, economic bargaining models are agnostic about the identity of actors and the causal implications of history. This means to assume that class conflict plays out in similar ways. For example, according to this perspective, class conflict produced similar dynamics in Sweden during the Interwar period and in Iran under Shah Pahlavi. Yet, the terms of these conflicts and the type of the parties involved were so different that these processes yielded to different outcomes, social democracy in Sweden and a mullah regime in Iran (Berman, 2006; Parsa, 1989). Yet, similar grievances do not necessarily unfold similar conflicts, because grievances may bear different meanings in different contexts (Locke & Thelen, 1995). Also, this literature makes the strong

assumption that lower classes can/will take action once structural transformations will present an opportunity.⁹ Under this assumption, problems related to mobilization and coordination or distributional conflicts do not arise. If these assumptions were true, most transitions would not have failed or must have happened earlier. However, evidence suggests the contrary: Organized leftwing supporters in Interwar Europe, all of whom wanted to carry out a regime transition, divided into socialists, communists, and anarcho-syndicalists due to disagreements as to how transition should happen, which weakened their capacity of action (Berman, 2006). That is to say, cooperation does not automatically flow from shared interests as the literature presumes.

In reality, actors also have political grievances and those that have the same economic grievances do not necessarily make the same policy choices. For example, both the social democrat and communist party capture votes of leftwing supporters in post-World War II France. Political bargaining models add the ideological dimension to grievances, defining them along the authoritarian-libertarian axis or loyalty to the regime (Colomer, 2000; Linz, 1978; O'Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986; Przeworski, 1991, 2005). Some models assume challengers to be unitary actors (Crescenzi, 1999; Sutter, 1995; Swaminathan, 1999; Zielinski, 1995). Others relax this assumption and classify challengers with respect to the strength of preferences, the composition of preference sets, or their level of organization. Using the strength of preferences, some models differentiate between actors holding strong preferences and those holding weak preferences (Przeworski, 1991, 2005). Actors holding weaker preferences –such as Przeworski's soft-liner autocrats– may consider compromise with opposition actors, whereas actors holding strong preferences –such as Przeworski's hard-liner autocrats– do not (Przeworski, 2005). This classification allows for recognizing that different strategies may stem from similar preference sets. The strength of preferences also shapes outcomes –it is the soft-liners choice between autocrats or and democrats determines the regime outcome. Using the level of organization, other models define an opposition and mass public (Casper & Taylor, 1996). The role of mass public is to send a signal, whereupon the opposition challenges the regime. Democratization happens when coordination between these two actors deter regime elites. While these models give a more accurate picture of regime contention –by incorporating interactions between the public and organized groups, the assumption that only one organized challenger group challenges the regime is unrealistic.

A third type of models classifies challengers with respect to the qualitative differences between preference sets (Colomer, 1995, 2000; Weingast, 1997). For example, Weingast divides challengers into groups A and B for demanding slightly different arrangements for the same type of regime (limited government). Using the Spanish case of transition, Colomer (1995) defines six

⁹ Process-oriented studies also make the assumption that actors take action when the opportunity presents itself. Yet, this assumption coheres with their theoretical approach that primes structural factors over macro-level dynamics.

actors based on how much continuity from the old regime they desire and makes different predictions using different game types –such as the battle of sexes or prisoners’ dilemma. Colomer models seem more realistic since he derives his assumptions from empirical observations of the Spanish transition. In both studies, challengers’ capacity to act depends on their ability to coordinate. These models do a good job addressing coordination problems that actors pursuing the same political objective face.

One limitation is that these models are designed with respect to a single regime dimension. In reality, more issue-dimensions shape bargains over regime type. Therefore, organized challengers may be as many as the number of differences on these various issues. Thus, one major contribution of such political bargaining models is to relax the assumption that challengers are identical in their preferences and reasoning. Regardless of how this literature conceptualizes challengers, the argument suggests that transition happens when supporters of democratization outweigh supporters of authoritarianism and the power balance shifts according to contingencies.

The strength of political bargaining models lies in recognizing that actors with common grievances need not employ the same strategies. On the other hand, both economic and political models assume fixed and unidimensional preferences. In real life, preferences transcend the democracy vs. authoritarianism axis or economic dimension. According to Tilly, societal actors confront the regime along multiple dimensions, including inclusion, equal opportunities, and security provision (Tilly, 2007, pp. 14–15).¹⁰ Therefore, as Ziblatt notes, it is unrealistic to theorize regimes according to a single ordering principle (Ziblatt, 2006, pp. 333–34). Moreover, actors may revise their preferences in response to environmental transformations. I follow Tilly and Ziblatt in contending that we should incorporate the multidimensionality of preferences to improve our theories.

What preference dimensions affect transition dynamics? To this question, bargaining theory provides an a priori answer—economic or political grievances (Coppedge, 2012, pp. 180–90). For process-oriented studies, the specific way in which historical processes structure the context determines what grievances are. In other words, the type of grievances underlying bargains over regime type varies by contextual and historical factors. In this approach, historical processes such as military, bureaucratic, or industrial revolutions empower a distinct set of actors with anti-authoritarian interests (Anderson, 1974; D. Collier & Collier, 1991; Downing, 1992; Ertman, 1997; Marx, 1978; Moore, 1993). Anti-authoritarian actors may be several and making different demands on the regime. In some cases, anti-authoritarian interests boil down to a particular material interest, whereby challengers act as a unitary actor against the authoritarian government. The Glorious Revolution provides a good example. English nobles stood up against the monarch on the basis of taxation-related grievances, and their contention gradually escalated to armed conflict

¹⁰ See pp. 14-15 for extended definitions.

which, in turn, resulted in the regicide and the regime's transition to constitutional government (Tilly, 1993).

Yet, actors need not be homogenous groups as is the case with English parliamentarians. In some contexts, anti-authoritarian coalitions involve groups with heterogeneous grievances – such as Luebbert's lib-lab coalition (1991) or and the 1906 Iranian Revolution carried by merchants, the clergy, and intellectuals (Luebbert, 1991; McDaniel, 1991). These disparate groups sometimes cooperate for an ideological cause and sometimes for strategic purposes (while keeping their divergent ideological beliefs). In the case of the Cuban Revolution for example, anti-imperialism – understood as the economic exploitation of the country's resources and its toleration by the national government– mobilized workers, peasants, and students under the leadership of the Movement and Fidel Castro (Farber, 2007). In the case of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the clergy, urban middle classes, and leftwing intellectuals collaborated under Khomeini's leadership to overthrow the Shah's regime (Parsa, 1989).

Both process-oriented studies and bargaining theories explain the process of unification among challengers by aligned interests. However, as these examples show, the nature of aligned interests pertains to economic grievances, ideological causes, or pure strategic thinking. Process-oriented studies attribute this variation to context and contingencies. Similar to the identity of anti-authoritarian actors, the nature of interests also plays a causal role in shaping outcomes of bargains over regime type. In the Cuban and English cases, transition leads to the type of regime that challengers previously agreed upon. Absent such an agreement, the Iranian transition resulted in the regime that the dominant challenger group desired, that is, a theocratic regime. Finally, this literature explains the timing of transitions by historical contingencies that provide an opening and allow anti-authoritarian actors to overthrow authoritarianism and democratize the regime –such as fiscal crises or interstate wars (Downing, 1992; Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1993). Structural thresholds for transition vary by context.

Following the process-oriented approach, I believe that the identity of challengers and the nature of grievances shape outcomes of bargains between the government and challengers. Process-oriented studies do a good job showing how a particular interest or cause unify challengers in a given context. On the flipside, this explanation raises the question of how challengers come to discount the other grievances that they used to care about. For example, how did Iranian intellectuals and leftists come to collaborate with Khomeini's movement? This is a noteworthy question in that regime contention involves great risks for challengers and although some might be engaging contentious movements because of the economic grievances that transition might bring, others pursue ideological causes.

What makes some challengers sideline ideological preferences and engage in strategic alliance when others do not? One possible explanation is that these issues are de-prioritized and their resolution are postponed. When de-prioritized, mismatch between preferences about this

issue ceases to impede cooperation. Actors begin considering cooperation with more partners than before. However, game theoretical models assume preferences to be fixed and the number of actors to stay constant. In reality, preferences evolve and challengers split or merge with respect to (dis)agreements on issue dimensions. Therefore, preference sets and the number of relevant actors vary over time. Can such dynamism be incorporated in cooperation models? Could there be a process whereby some challengers come to sideline some differences of opinion and focus on a particular set of grievances, which allow them to act as a unitary actor?

To recap, existing explanations either attribute no significant role to cooperation among challengers (as in process-oriented studies) or simplify cooperation among challengers to shared interests in one issue dimension. However, evidence suggests that challengers are several and each has a different stance on the issues that underlie bargains over regime type. Therefore, they may or may not unite against the regime. With the exception of some political models, bargaining theoreticians conceptualize challengers as a body of actors already unified around some shared interests, which makes them capable of rising against the government whenever the opportunity presents itself. The unitary actor assumption allows for neglecting coordination problems that challengers face. Some political bargaining models relax this assumption and treat coordination problems. However, because preferences are defined a priori, such models capture coordination problems only on one political dimension. Accordingly, models define a limited number of opposition actors, which differ from one another on the basis of this one particular dimension and whose number stays constant. Such assumptions make models less realistic, reducing their ability to capture complex real-life situations. Process-oriented studies include the exact number of actors and issue dimensions as are observed in a given context, thus providing a thick explanation. Historical analysis elucidates how challengers come to unite around a particular interest. Yet, this explanation raises the question of why and how challengers discount alternative bases of cooperation. How is it that challengers sideline some of their disagreements?

Overall, the process of unification among challengers plays a fundamental role in transition dynamics by determining whether challengers may or may not act as a unitary actor against the regime. However, only some branches of the literature on regimes address problems related to unification, while the rest assumes challengers to be already unified and neglects coordination problems. For both the process-oriented and bargaining approaches, cooperation grounds on interest alignment. As regards the nature of the interests that unite challengers, the literature is divided. Economic bargaining models underline material interests; political bargaining models and process-oriented studies emphasize ideological causes and strategic alliances. In reality, material benefits, ideological causes, and strategic calculations are simultaneously involved in decision

making and often are entangled. In this dissertation, as I later explain in detail, I conceptualize all these three categories under the concept of preferences. The question of why a particular preference type (rather than others) shapes cooperative behavior does not find a clear answer in the literature. It is this question that this dissertation tackles with. In effect, cooperation among challengers involves dynamics more complicated than is characterized by the literature on regimes. The next section discusses why such complexities cannot be neglected and how they can be handled.

A theory of coordination for regime change

Why is cooperation among challengers a case of coordination with conflicting interests?

The last sections discussed why cooperation among challengers is desirable and some ways in which it may come about. We have seen that existing theories tend to neglect the difficulties involved in the process of unification among challengers and attribute cooperation to different types of reasoning, including strategic reasoning, pursuit of an ideological cause, and material gains. In this section, I argue that cooperation for regime change is a case of coordination with conflicting interests, because it entails multiple issue dimensions on which numerous challenger groups occupy different positions. In this section, I begin by elaborating on how differences of opinions among challengers affect cooperation to show that the unitary actor assumption is too strong. I argue that unity among challengers is crafted (as opposed to given). Next, I show that interactions among challengers display the characteristics of a coordination game with conflicting interests. Finally, I discuss the conceptualization of interests, ideological causes, and strategic thinking. I explain how the concepts of preference-type and issue-dimension help capture these different types of motivations behind actions. I emphasize that the type of the coordination game that challengers play depends on the specific meaning of some issue-dimension in a given context. This specific meaning determines not just the identity of actors but also payoffs. This section concludes that historical analysis is necessary to identify the contextual meaning of issues and preferences in order to accurately model contenders' behavior during transition.

Why cooperation among challengers cannot be taken for granted

Interactions among contenders involve competition and cooperation. Although shared interests in regime change give actors incentive to cooperate against the incumbent government, uncertainty and mistrust work against it. One most frequent conceptualization of this type of interactions is the prisoners' dilemma (PD) game. Briefly, PD is a type of game in which two prisoners are to choose

between confessing a crime that they committed together and keeping silent. If one confesses and the other keeps silent, the confessor goes free. If both keep silent both receive a certain penalty. However, this penalty is no worse than the one they would receive if they both confess. Prisoners are held in separate cells and therefore lack communication. The dilemma of the game lies in that the dominant strategy is not necessarily the best (Axelrod & Dawkins, 2006; Dixit & Nalebuff, 1993).

If played once, PDs do not foster cooperation, because self-interest and the fear of punishment trump trust between the accomplices. However, if repeatedly played, cooperation can emerge in a world of egoists without central authority (Axelrod, 1984, p. 20). In repeated PDs, players encounter each other frequently enough to develop trust and trust changes payoffs. Knowing that the rival will be met in the future increases the stakes of cheating and improves the benefits from cooperation, whereby players are better off if they cooperate.¹¹

The PD is a non-cooperative game, as to which players cannot make credible commitments to a strategy (not confess). Under contentious regimes, contenders cannot commit to a strategy either. In this sense, their interactions *can* be conceptualized as a non-cooperative game. One caveat (not specific to PDs) is that game theory incorporates all possible environmental changes into the game (the modeler sets the array of responses, strategies, and payoffs by taking all eventualities into account in advance). Thus, once the game starts and the situation generated by the environmental change (say, a crisis) happens, players just adapt themselves by choosing the best strategy designed for it. This implies that players *know* in advance what the best strategy is and the probability of the environmental change happening. However, in real life, actors cannot foresee the implications of environmental changes on their payoffs.

In reality, environmental changes produce impacts on players that are more than their direct effect on strategies and payoffs. For one, environmental changes do not generate standard outcomes in every setting. Each setting has a structure of its own, which is shaped by history. For example, the impact of foreign invasion is different in post-1945 France and post-1918 France. Thus, the best strategies are also different.

Second, actors other than the players respond to these changes and these responses factor into the shaping of the structure of the game. In other words, the impact of environmental changes on players depends both on the structure of the context and non-players' responses to these changes (Aoki, 2007; Greif & Kingston, 2011; Greif & Laitin, 2004). Players cannot possibly consider such a complex outcome. This unpredictability results mainly from that environmental changes are a

¹¹ Computer simulations of PD identify that punishing the adversary when he cheats and forgiving him when he resumes cooperation (tit-for-tat) is best suited to generate cooperation in the long run. Tit-for-tat fosters cooperation if actors avoid unnecessary conflict by cooperating, punish the other's defection in the previous round, and are not revengeful (i.e., cooperation after punishing the cheater), and show a clearly identifiable behavioral pattern so that the other can adapt his accordingly (Axelrod, 1984, p. 20).

joint function of the structure of the context and the way actors other than the players respond to the changes (Aoki, 2007; Greif & Kingston, 2011; Greif & Laitin, 2004). Players cannot possibly consider such a complex outcome. To reiterate the example from the previous chapter, suppose a setting, where a crisis causes liquidity shortage, diminishes the level of GDP/capita, and deteriorates living standards of lower classes without yet bringing them to the point of misery. To some segments of lower classes, such welfare loss is already intolerable and they do not have to wait until they descend to the level of misery. Suppose these groups go on strike. Suppose that other sections of lower classes have a higher tolerance to pauperization, but, upon observing strikes, they decide to join in. The now enlarged crowd feels more decided to pursue the strike. Seeing the latter's resolve, organized contenders might play revolt before welfare standards descend to the level preset in the game. Such collective action would certainly be consequential on the fate of the regime, but players (the regime or contenders) may not anticipate it. That is to say, environmental changes are more than the rationally calculable outcomes of environmental themselves, since responses of actors outside the game also shape these outcomes. Being agnostic to the structure of the context in which the game is played, game theoretical models ignore impacts that are nevertheless of causal value.

A related but less important caveat is that some environmental changes are stochastic or too improbable that rational actors do not even consider them. For example, most people did not anticipate Hitler's invasion of Poland considering such a move to be too daring for a rational statesman. Yet, once happened, the invasion of Poland significantly transformed the international environment and triggered revisions some people's worldviews. If environmental changes are improbable, as in the case of the invasion of Poland, players cannot possibly take into account all eventualities and set the array of their preferences in advance. In the case of exogenous shocks – such as crises or natural disasters, the events themselves are random, which makes it impossible for players to consider their impacts in advance. A real life example could be the 2008 financial crisis, which came as a shock to many and generated significant changes in people's perceptions. Social sciences tend to underestimate the probability of random and improbable events, but they happen more frequently than assumed (Taleb, 2007). Therefore, they should not be ignored, since they have the potential to induce considerable changes in actors' perceptions.

Another caveat is that the number of players varies over time as contender groups merge, split, disappear, or get formed. With changes in the number of players so do payoffs.

Finally, one major difficulty is that payoffs are structured with respect to one issue dimension. However, regimes have multiple dimensions, including subnational governance, welfare, or minority rights (Tilly, 2007, pp. 14–15). If one takes into account the plurality of regime dimensions, one should acknowledge the plurality of issue dimensions underlying struggles over regimes. Let me explain this via an example:

Suppose there is a contended authoritarian regime, in which organized opposition groups contemplate transition to a more democratic regime. However, beyond the broad objective of democratization, on which interests converge, there might be disagreements concerning which aspect(s) of the regime should be democratized and how democratization should be carried out. Suppose that one such issue is the administrative structure. Imagine that, on this issue, some groups want centralization and others desire local autonomy in a society featuring regional minorities. Supporters of centralization oppose decentralization fearing it plays into the hands of secessionists. For others, decentralization improves the quality of the administration, which, in turn, boosts the local population's satisfaction with the regime. Thus, despite agreement on regime change, actors might have different expectations from aspects of democratization on which interests contradict. Conflicting interests on aspects of the future regime, in turn, might induce distrust –with challengers suspecting each other's intentions and moves, hence hindering cooperation against the authoritarian regime. How?

Suppose that within a setting where there are two issue dimensions shaping bargains over regime type, authoritarianism vs. democracy and the structure of the administration, the government tries coopting challengers in an attempt to pre-empt the rise of an anti-authoritarian coalition. Suppose that, for some challengers, acquiring political equality and freedom is more urgent in the short run than resolving the administrative structure problem, and others consider both issues to be equally urgent because decentralization ensures autonomy of regional minorities. The latter might agree to working with the government, since they might prefer the status quo to a regime with centralized administration. Because both goals have high priority for these actors, coming to an agreement with other challengers may be more difficult than coming to an agreement with the government. In contrast, cooptation might fail on the former group, for whom coming to an agreement with other challengers is not as difficult as the latter since the issue of the administrative structure does not get in the way of a compromise with other challengers. Thus, the nature and outcome of interactions between the government and challengers and among challengers depend on the perceived meaning and priority of preferences on regime dimensions.

Let us make the scenario more realistic by adding another dimension, say, the role of religion in politics. Suppose that some prefer a theocratic regime, whereas others demand secularism. If to challengers, this issue is of high priority, they would be uninclined to compromise with those who hold a different view on the issue. Then, conflict of interests is likely to impede cooperation. Now consider the case of challengers who attach lower priority to the role of religion in politics in the short run but high priority to the issue of the administrative structure. Relative openness to compromise on the issue of theocracy vs. secularism will help with cooperation if they interact the following types of challengers:

- (a) Challengers who have different preferences on the role of religion in politics but attach low priority to this matter in the short run AND hold similar preferences about the structure of the administration.
- (b) Challengers who have similar preferences on both issues regardless of their priority in the short run.
- (c) Challengers who have different preferences about the structure of the administration but are open to compromise because they give low priority to this issue AND have but similar preferences about the role of religion in politics and attach high priority to the issue in the short run.
- (d) Challengers who attach low priority to both issues and therefore are open to compromise regardless of whether preferences align.

Thus, it is not sufficient that preferences overlap on a dimension; the priority of the issues on which preferences conflict should be low. In other words, both the ranking and similarity of preferences affect cooperation. It is worth noting that building cooperation will get more difficult as additional issue dimensions add to bargains over regime type. Each additional issue will require actors more efforts to avoid mismatches in the level of priority and similarity, while facilitating the government to exploit matters of disagreements among challengers. Finally, cooperation will become even more difficult to obtain when more than two challengers bargain with the government, which is often the case in reality. For instance, more than ten organized groups challenge the Assad regime in Syria (“Guide to the Syrian rebels,” 2013).

The number of challengers and that of issue dimensions together point at the following: Challenger groups are numerous, in part because personality issues cause fractures, but also divisions happen because of the differences of opinion on the dimensions shaping the struggle over regime type. When more actors are involved, the set of possible solutions widens and conflicts of interests amplify. Hence, cooperation among challengers becomes more difficult and outcomes become more uncertain, as the number of actors and dimensions increases.

What is this a case of? As mentioned earlier, the studies that relax the unitary actor assumption conceptualize interactions among challengers as a coordination problem, whereas coordination problems do not arise if this assumption holds. In this study, I recognize the plurality of challengers and of issue dimensions. Following the process-oriented approach, I involve as many challenger groups as are observed in real life in a given context. Such a study requires a theory of coordination.

Cooperation for regime change as a case of coordination

I argue that strategic situations among challengers is closer to non-cooperative coordination games with conflicting interests. Coordination games are characterized as follows: First, challengers are better off if they cooperate than if they do not. Nevertheless, cooperation fails due to disagreements on how they will cooperate. Second, coordination games have multiple Pareto-ranked solutions (i.e., outcomes), but some are better than others (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, pp. 168–69). Third, trust and expectations allow for coordination on a mutually desirable solution (Cooper, 1999, pp. ix–x).

Cases of cooperation for regime change also display these three characteristics: Challengers are better off cooperating on forming an oppositional movement than taking on the regime by themselves. However, as we have seen in the examples of administrative structure and the role of religion in politics, conflicts of preferences on institutional arrangements of the future regime may hinder coordination on a solution.

Coordination problems get amplified if challengers highly prioritize some regime dimensions on which their preferences are misaligned. Such a setting narrows down the room for compromise, hence the set of possible solutions. Of the possible cooperative solutions, some satisfy challengers more than others. In some cases, no solution satisfies all challengers at the same time –e.g., a regime cannot be secular and theocratic at the same time. Also, challengers may draw different benefits on different issue dimensions. Thus, cooperation among challengers presents complex situations, which are more probable than assumed in game theoretical research on regimes and require coordination. What type of a coordination game this is?

Coordination & the meaning of preferences

Game theory conceptualizes coordination through various game types. In the battle of sexes, a couple wants to go on vacation but to different destinations –e.g., seaside vs. mountains. Payoffs are symmetric. The problem is when played once, no solution of this game satisfies both partners at the same time. Players benefit from cooperating only if they play the game successively. In this game, trust and conventions facilitate coordination by serving as focal points (Schelling, 1980). In contrast, in matching pennies, coordination on a solution always makes one player better off and the other worse off (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 174). In such zero-sum games, parties equalize gains only if they mix and randomize strategies over multiple sequences. Finally, stag hunt is a game of common interests, in which players draw greater benefits from cooperation than from going alone. Although cooperation is more beneficial for everybody, incentives to free ride hinder cooperation. How do we know which type of a game is being played in a given context?

Game theory determines the structure of the game and payoffs with respect to the nature of interests/grievances. To remind, economic bargaining models focus on economic grievances and model class conflict, while political models treat political grievances and model ideological conflicts. This means the type of coordination game to be used is a function of how interests/grievances are defined. Once the type of model is selected, the same model applies to all cases. That would mean to assume that, say, class conflict under the ancient regime in France can be modeled in the same way as the class conflict under Weimar Germany —a hard case to make.

Process-oriented studies, in contrast, reveal that grievances bear different meanings in different contexts; therefore, different actors are mobilized and different conflicts play out (Locke & Thelen, 1995). In other words, qualitative differences in the identity of actors and the meaning of grievances and interests determine the structure of the case of coordination specific to each context.

Following process-oriented studies, I assume that the meaning of grievances and interests, which varies across contexts, should be taken into account. I use historical analysis to identify these specific meanings, including the different ways in which they are understood and interpreted by actors. This assumption departs from the one that interests/grievances travel to every context. How can we conceptualize contextual meanings of interests and grievances? In the section, I introduce the concepts of issue dimension and preference type as tools to capture these different motivations.

Conceptualizing the meaning of interests and grievances via preferences & issue-dimension

As discussed earlier, the literature on regimes agrees on the mechanism that aligned interests foster cooperation but conceptualizes the nature of interests using different motivations (economic interests or ideological causes and strategic thinking in some models). In this dissertation, I use ‘preferences’ as an overarching concept that encompasses all types of motivations. The literature on motivations and rationality is extensive. It is outside the scope of this dissertation to discuss each in detail. I will instead discuss the concept of ideal types of rationality to make the point that by defining rationality with respect to a particular ideal type bargaining models of regimes oversimplify human reasoning. With reference to bounded rationality theory and critiques of the classical instrumental rationality, which argue that motivations are conflated in mind and rationality is intrinsically bounded in reality, I will show that we cannot know a person’s intrinsic motivations simply by observing his behavior and evaluating this behavior with respect to expressed motivations. I propose the concept of *preference* to circumvent this difficulty. I specify preferences with respect to the previously introduced concept of issue-dimension. Together, these two concepts allow capturing various types of motivations that actors have with respect to the regime dimensions that shape struggles between the incumbent and contenders.

In *Economy and Society*, Weber proposes four ideal-types to think about rationality (Weber, 1968). Practical rationality involves doing a cost-benefit analysis of available options given means in a person's disposition so as to figure out the best strategy to achieve some end. In more recent scholarship, this type of reasoning is called instrumental rationality (Knight, 1992; Levi, 1997; Lichbach & Zuckerman, 1997; Shepsle, 2006). Under theoretical rationality, observation and reasoning are used to explain and understand the world. Substantive rationality is the type of rationality, where individuals follow values and principles. Finally, formal rationality involves following rules, laws, and regulations (Weber, 1968).¹² Again, Weber reminds that these categories are ideal-types helping to simplify reality, whereas the boundaries between rationality types are muddier in real life.

Although human behavior and rationale are too complex to fall under one rationality type, we have seen in the previous section that bargaining theories of regime change reduce interests to a single dimension (economic or political) and thus ignores the complexity of the reasoning process. For instance, the axiom that lower classes prefer democracy because it generates more income for them reminds practical rationality (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). This axiom discards the impact of, say, partisanship on behavior. Conversely, classifying actors with respect to their ideological dispositions (such as Przeworski's hard-liners, soft-liners) implies a mixture of substantive and practical rationality (Przeworski, 2005). Yet, in reality, people experience a bit of all these types of motivation. Hence, rationality and behavior are too complex to be explained with preferences about a single regime dimension. It is worth reminding that there is an extensive literature on regimes that elaborates on how attitudes towards the regime affect regime stability and survival (Dahl, 1971; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Lipset, 1959). Given the critical role that they play in the fate of regimes, I contend that the complexity and multidimensionality of actors' stances on the regime need to be acknowledged.

More recent scholarship on rationality explores the processes whereby rationality is distorted. Individuals consciously or unconsciously turn to mental processes, such as biases, rationalization, or reframing, in order to preserve internal dissonance (Elster, 1983, 2007). For example, in *Sour Grapes* (1983), Elster uses the fable about a fox and raisins to illustrate how desires are readjusted to accord with the consequence of an action: The fox sees grapes on the vine and tries to reach them. Despite several attempts, he fails to grab them. The fox walks away telling himself that the grapes are not ripe anyway! This fable exemplifies how preferences are reversed to

¹² An alternative way of conceptualizing rationality is to distinguish between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentialism (Elias, 2000; MacIntyre, 1988; March & Olsen, 2006; March & Simon, 1993). Like Weber's practical rationality, the logic of consequentialism involves considering costs and benefits of actions given certain means and ends. The logic of appropriateness means to follow rules of a role or identity. In this type of logic, "the processes of reasoning are not primarily connected to the anticipation of future consequences as they are in most contemporary conceptions of rationality" (March & Olsen, 2011, p. 479).

deal with the undesired consequence of an action (i.e., the fact that the fox could not reach the raisins); the rationalization ‘they are not ripe’ helps preserving self-esteem (Elster, 1983, pp. 34–40).

In addition, “bounded rationality” theory suggests that rationality is inherently limited (Kahneman, 2003, 2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Under biases, heuristics, and fast vs. slow modes of thinking, individuals perceive reality differently and end up making suboptimal choices without even realizing it. In particular, individuals misjudge risks as the time frame elongates (Kahneman, 2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

Uncertainty embedded in real-life situations provides an additional challenge to the classical instrumental rationality (‘means to an end’ reasoning). In real-life, people lack full information or information is asymmetrically distributed among them. Under such circumstances, people refer to prior beliefs in making decisions. Prior beliefs alleviate uncertainty by serving as cues and focal points to individuals (Greif, 2006; Greif & Laitin, 2004). Thus, both cognitive and structural reasons bound rationality. By assuming that one type of reasoning is at work, bargaining models of regimes cast too perfect a picture of actors’ reasoning process.

Another difficulty in identifying the nature of motivations involves interpersonal interactions. To a group, people participate for different reasons. For example, a revolutionary movement includes “true believers” of a cause, forcefully admitted members, or opportunists (Heckathorn, 1993; Hoffer, 2010; March & Olsen, 2006). These different types of people interact. Interpersonal interactions alter the way people reason and perceive the movement, interests, and the cause (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). For instance, a forcefully admitted member may end up believing the cause or a true believer transform into an opportunist based on how his experiences in the movement went. Thus, a person’s motivation varies over time as much as via interactions. Therefore, the best we can do is to suggest that a particular type of motivation predominates others at a given time or circumstance.

These theories highlight three important points. First, we cannot know true motivations behind some observed action. In other words, we cannot say whether a person is pursuing, say, material interests or ideological causes, or simply making strategic calculations by comparing his observed behavior to the motivation he expresses. Not only expressed motivation might not be reflecting the real motivation, but also mental maps, heuristics, and biases might be distorting the process of reasoning (Elster, 1983, 2007; Kahneman, 2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

In this dissertation, I will not be relying on ideal-types given the abovementioned shortcomings. Second, different motivations coexist in human mind and simultaneously affect decision making, which makes it inappropriate to reduce preferences to a single dimension. Third, motivations evolve over time and via interactions. In this study, I acknowledge the fluidity and complexity of motivations and will not attempt to draw boundaries between material interests and

cost-benefit analyses, value/belief oriented reasoning and ideological causes. Preferences serve as an overarching concept to talk about different types of motivations behind actions at the same time.

Which preferences though? As mentioned earlier, various regime dimensions underlie the struggle between contenders and the incumbent and preferences on each dimension simultaneously factor in the shaping of behavior. I proposed issue dimension as a concept to capture the dimensions of the regime that affect dynamics of struggles on regimes. I also explained how historical analysis pinpoints the relevant issue dimensions—as opposed to defining preferences a priori. I suggest specifying preferences with respect to issue dimensions. That is, what is the issue dimension that is the most salient in a given debate over regimes? For example, in modern Turkey, one such dimension is secularism vs. religious liberties; another is minority rights and vs. nation-state.

Using contextual analysis, one can identify relevant issue dimensions and conduct a content analysis to find out each actor's position on these dimensions. I call the preference identified using this methodology as “preference of a group with respect to some issue dimension.” By doing this for every relevant actor, one obtains a multidimensional issue-space, in which some issues are perceived to be more important than others at a given time (and the level of importance varies by actor). Now, we need to find a tool to think about the relative importance of preferences by issue-dimension, which brings us to the notions of prioritization and de-prioritization. The next section introduces prioritization and de-prioritization as mechanisms to capture and classify preferences on issue dimensions.

Prioritization & de-prioritization

How do changes in preference relations affect coordination dynamics? As mentioned earlier, in reality, contenders process ideological pursuits and material interests. Actors also make strategic calculations during interactions (such as tit-for-tat). All these types of motivations factor in the shaping of behavior. Acknowledging that the ranking of an issue on preference relation varies over time and via social interactions, I expect actors who cooperate on a particular solution with others to either share similar preferences or be inclined to de-prioritize certain issues in the short-run so that conflict of interests does not get into the way. I further expect the actors who cooperate to de-prioritize *ideological* issues rather than the strategic ones because ideological preferences are relatively more inflexible over time. Why? It is difficult to imagine a leftist to turn liberal in the short run. Yet, this leftist may postpone his ideological preference at a given time to work with a liberal on an issue at a given time. We can say that the leftist de-prioritizes his preferences on ideological dimensions in the short run, because some other concern trumps that issue dimension.

On average, I expect preferences about strategic issues to be more amenable to be updated in the short run than preferences about ideological issues. As mentioned earlier, the reason is that

one's changing one's preferences on ideological issues means one's changing one's worldview, which is an extensive and costly endeavor. Then, in a context where actors hold different preferences on ideological issues, it is reasonable to expect conflict of interests hinders cooperation. In this vein, I advance the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *The higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among ideologically diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and the more likely there will be either regime change or significant concessions to the opposition.*

Yet, in daily politics, we often observe cooperation among ideological rivals. How does such cooperation happen? Ideological differences may not impede cooperation if actors postpone the resolution of these differences to a later time. This would mean to de-prioritize the issues on which actors disagree in order to achieve some other end that actors highly prioritize in the short-run. So doing allows people to preserve "internal consistency" between actions and beliefs (Elster, 1983, 2007). Hence, we can observe Christian democrats in the European Parliament cooperate with liberals and social democrats on some issue (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007). To put it in different terms, these actors *choose* to work together on some issue in the short-run regardless of their broader ideological differences. I hypothesize that the mechanisms of prioritization and de-prioritization allow actors to postpone ideological differences to cooperate on some issue with ideological rivals without having to sort out all their differences.

What makes actors prioritize and de-prioritize some issue? In the context of contended regimes, one main reason is perceived urgency. The sense of urgency may arise from environmental changes, such as the threat of interstate war. Environmental changes generate the sense of urgency by altering the timeframe with respect to which actors evaluate risks associated with some issue (Kahneman, 2013). Under temporal constraint, (on average) individuals tend to focus on avoiding some undesirable outcome that might come about if some immediate situation is left unattended rather than the ideal of way of resolving a broader conflict. For example, ruling elites might put aside internal disagreements and personality issues when facing a crisis (Haggard & Kaufman, 1995).

What types of disagreements are more amenable to be postponed or sidelined in the short-run? By definition, strategies are roadmaps or particular courses of action to be followed in order to achieve some end. Ideologies provide a worldview, a purpose, and an ideal solution to resolve some issue. However, they do not necessarily specify a course of action to pursue in the short-run. Under time constraint, when people's senses of urgency heighten, it is likely that most actors prefer avoiding an undesirable outcome in the short-run than resolving broader conflicts (because costs of not attending an immediate situation outstrip the dissatisfaction of not solving the issue in the optimal way).

It is worth noting that this proposition does not assume that all actors will act in the abovementioned way under time constraint. Nor does it assume anything about motivations and rationality of the actors who act this way. It simply suggests that a person might focus on solving an immediate problem via cooperation with those whose worldview differs from his own by de-prioritizing these differences in the short-run. Again, so doing allows preserving internal consistency and resolve an immediate problem. I advance the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: *Cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when challengers react to past failures and new opportunities by deciding to pragmatically revise the priority of preferences on strategic issue dimensions.*

One difficulty in deciding whether the mechanisms of prioritization and de-prioritization are at work is to distinguish them from preference convergence after some actors revise their preferences with respect to some environmental transformation. Observing some cooperative behavior and evaluating it with respect to some previously expressed motivation does not provide enough information to establish that the person prioritized or de-prioritized some disagreement. If that person later revised his preference in a way that the new one aligns with others' preferences on that dimension, it could simply be that preference convergence drives cooperation. Observed behavior would not allow us to distinguish one from the other. We would need to update information on the person's motivation to be able to separate one from the other. This leads us to the second mechanism: preference revision with respect to some environmental transformation.

Preference revision with respect to environmental transformations

While (de)prioritization refers to changes in the ranking of some preference, preference revision means to replace that choice with some other choice. Game theory captures this effect using the concept preference update. Preference update suggests that players reconsider their preferences as new information becomes available (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994; Tadelis, 2013). The act of substituting a preference is another way in which people respond to environmental changes. For example, in a PD game, a player might get the impression that his adversary is not a cheater based on the history of successive cooperation. However, once the adversary plays not cooperate in some next round, this impression would weaken and in the mind of the player the expected probability of cheating would increase.

In the context of regime contention, preference revision is hard but not unlikely. For instance, some militant may quit the guerilla group for which he has been fighting upon learning that that group's acts of violence against local population. This mechanism needs to be taken into

account, because it serves as a control variable helping us to separate between the change in the ranking of a preference and the change in the substance of the preference. We can do so by looking at the evolution of preferences over time (instead of assuming them to remain fixed over time). In this study, I use historical analysis and content analysis to see whether and how preferences on issue dimensions vary over time.

I conceptualize environmental transformations (stochastic or improbable) as an intervening variable that is capable of making actors revise their preferences. Preference revision may work to facilitate or hinder cooperation. Cooperation would become easier if challengers' preferences become more similar after revisions. In contrast, cooperation would become more difficult to obtain if challengers' preferences grow more dissimilar than before after revisions.

To recap our discussion, cooperation follows from aligned interests as established by cooperation theory (Axelrod, 1984). However, in a case where multiple issue dimensions shape the debate over regime type, preference alignment gets more difficult to obtain, because there are more issues on which preferences need aligning and actors rank issues differently in terms of priority. To surmount the conflict of interests on some issue, actors should either postpone the resolution of that conflict (de-prioritization) in view of resolving some other issue that seems to have precedence (prioritization) in the short-run or adopt preferences more similar to others. Otherwise, the intersection of actors' preference sets gets narrower or reduces down to an empty set, thus making cooperation unlikely. This, cooperation requires parties to either sideline their disagreements or be like-minded on the dimensions to which they attach high priority. Before proceeding to the operationalization of these mechanisms, let me present the last piece of the theory, the rise of an oppositional coalition.

The rise of the oppositional movement

The earlier discussion suggested that preferences on strategic issues are more prone to change and/or be re-prioritized than those on ideological issues. This difference affects the ease with which actors cooperate. How does this difference influence the formation of an oppositional coalition?

Earlier, I suggested that some oppositional coalition should signal unity and coherence to the incumbent by engaging in long-term cooperation if they want to give the incumbent enough observations that the coalition is united and coherent, and therefore to be feared. Otherwise, the coalition might not be able to put enough pressure on the regime, which would hurt their capability of carry out a transition or to extract significant concessions from the government. I further stressed the importance of leadership in the rise of such a coalition.

To signal unity, the oppositional coalition should cooperate on multiple instances, which may come about from preference similarity on issue dimensions. Again, preference similarity works if preferences are already aligned or if they are de-prioritized in the short run. If actors are to

prioritize long-term cooperation by postponing the resolution of some disagreements, the rise of such a coalition becomes more likely.

What do actors' preference sets in the coalition look like? Possibilities are as follows:

- (a) Actors hold similar preferences on all ideological and strategic dimensions.
- (b) Actors hold similar preferences on all strategic dimensions and some ideological dimensions AND sideline differences on the ideological matters on which their preferences are misaligned.
- (c) Actors hold similar preferences on all strategic dimensions but none on the ideological dimensions AND sideline differences on all ideological issues.

With the exception of the first one, all possibilities suggest that at least some actors are pragmatic on ideological dimensions. If all actors are pragmatic on all ideological dimensions, the coalition would be constructed as a result of preference convergence on strategic dimensions. Alternatively, if only some actors of the coalition are pragmatic on ideological issues but others are not (idealistic actors), we should expect cooperation to be easier to construct among idealists than between idealists and pragmatists (since preference similarity on ideological dimensions are likely to already have precipitated cooperation among the like-minded). It is worth reiterating that ideological agreement is more difficult to obtain since this type of preference is relatively more rigid in the short-run, hence prone to be de-prioritized or revised. Concomitantly, because strategic preferences are more amenable to be de-prioritized or revised in the short-run, preference convergence on strategic issues should be easier to obtain. This discussion also implies that without preference convergence on strategic issues, actors are unlikely cooperate in the long run, because this coalition should signal capability and resolve to overthrow the government if necessary.

Then, to be able to say that an oppositional coalition is formed, we need to look at the level of similarity between actors' preferences on issue dimensions. It follows that preference convergence on strategic dimensions is a necessary condition, but preference convergence on ideological issue is not.

Combining the two points, we can imagine the oppositional coalition to be composed of (a) all idealists, (b) some idealists and some pragmatics, (c) all pragmatics.

- If it contains all idealists or pragmatists, we should expect to all members to connect to all others.
- If there are some idealists and some pragmatics, we should expect to see a highly connected core group of idealists surrounded by pragmatists.

In either case, the coalition displays a core. In the first case, the entire coalition is a core. In the second, there is a distinct core surrounded by periphery. The first two hypotheses already capture the first case. I hypothesize the following for the second case:

Hypothesis 3: *Cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when peripheral actors align their preferences to those of an emergent ‘core.’*

I will call the actors constituting the core “the central actor(s).” I call those in the periphery “peripheral actors.” How does such a structure emerge?

This coalition is formed as a result of a process, since preference revision and (de)prioritization become effective in time. We should bear in mind that not all actors cooperate at the same time. Some might cooperate earlier, while others join them later. Also, cooperation might break down among some actors. This would mean that some bonds might untie, because disagreements hinder cooperation or some actors discontinue while others emerge, or because actors shift positions. If the coalition displays heterogeneity in preference sets, the coalition has a core and periphery structure, in which case we should expect some actors to begin cooperation earlier and attract late-comers (who join the core as a result of preference revision or (de)prioritization). Thus, the formation of an oppositional movement is a dynamic process, where composition and size of the coalition change over time. This dynamic nature requires taking into account changes in the inventory of actors and the repertoire of preferences. The next section recaps the argument.

The Argument in a nutshell

I argue that contenders are more likely to cooperate for regime change once they converge on a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if any). Such a coherent oppositional movement might set the direction of institutional change. The coherent movement becomes more likely when preferences of a subset of challengers become similar over time to create room for cooperation. At the onset, challengers have mismatching preferences many issues that they highly prioritize. This study shows that a phase of re-ranking of issue priorities ((de)prioritization) or preference transformation is necessary for the formation of an oppositional coalition. Specifically, I show that strategic issues are more likely to produce preference converge. I further show that convergence happens around the actor(s) who are idealistic in and attracts others that also adopt the same strategy (but not necessarily the same ideologies) in a network that contains both pragmatists and idealists. The probability of having a coalition of all idealists is low, because ideological convergence is hard to achieve. Once strategic convergence happens, challengers become more likely to form an internally consistent oppositional movement that is capable of overthrowing the authoritarian regime.

In most cases, challenger groups may lack ideological convergence and yet engage in long-term cooperation against the authoritarian government on the basis of strategic convergence. Long-term cooperation is distinguished from short-term cooperation because it is evident in iterated moves, with actors agreeing -despite their divergent ideologies- to repeatedly bring pressure to bear on the old regime using similar methods. Thus, unity among challengers is crafted. Regime change depends not only on destabilization of the status quo but also on potential challengers being willing to postpone their ideological disagreements so as to arrive at common strategies that allow for building a united coherent oppositional coalition.

How does strategic convergence promote cooperation for regime change? Cooperation unfolds in three stages. In the stage of disunity, each challenger advocates for a different set of transition strategies (how regime change should be carried out) and ideologies (what the future regime should look like). Differences of opinion on strategic and ideological issues get in the way of cooperation for regime change as long as challenger groups attach high priority to their preferences on the dimensions that they disagree with one another. In the second stage, environmental changes give actors a perception of urgency, whereby actors begin eliminating or postponing certain ideological differences or revise their preferences in light of the new information that becomes available. Once some disagreements are put aside and preference revision on some issues harmonize preferences, actors begin cooperating. Some actors engage in cooperation earlier than others; these form the core. As cooperation is sustained in the long run, the core begins attracting other actors based on preference convergence on strategic matters. In this process, preference convergence on ideological issues is helpful but neither necessary nor sufficient. Thus, the oppositional coalition tends to display a core composed of rather idealistic actors and a periphery of rather pragmatic actors. Thus, some level of pragmatism is a necessary condition for the emergence of cooperation among multiple actors who tackle with multiple issue dimensions. In the third stage, strategic convergence is finalized and challengers become more likely to form an internally consistent oppositional movement that is capable of overthrowing the authoritarian regime. They do so when the opportunity presents itself, the timing of which cannot be predicted.




Figure 1

Let X be the finite set of challenger groups between some year t and t_t .

$$\exists X = \{a, b, c, \dots, z\} \forall z \in \mathbb{N}$$

In this set, a, b, c, \dots, z denote group of challengers that contended the government from some year t to t_t . $z \in \mathbb{N}$ means that this number is finite. Then, let C_t be the set of challengers present in a given year t . C is a subset of challengers present over the entire time period $(t-t_t)$.

$$\exists C_t = \{a, b, c, \dots, f\} : C_t \subseteq X, t \forall \in \mathbb{N}$$

Let $P(a)$ denote the preference of a group a . I specify this preference on some dimension d . Preference dimensions are finite sets; that is, on a given dimension there is a limited number of choices that groups can select from. Also, the number of overall preference dimensions define a finite set. In other words, there is a finite (non-zero) number of dimensions that shape the debate on regime type.

$P(a)_{d1}$ denotes preference of group a on dimension 1. Similarly, $P(b)_{d1}$ denotes preference of group b on dimension 1. Figure 2 shows the preference array for some groups a and b .

The disunity stage: Preference dissimilarity




Figure 2

Groups *a* and *b* might hold similar preference on some dimension *n*. However, the entire set of preferences of groups *a* and *b* are not identical.

$$P(a)_{d1} = P(b)_{d1}$$

$$P(a)_{d2} \neq P(b)_{d2}$$

$$P(a)_{d3} \neq P(b)_{d3}$$

$$P(a)_{d4} = P(b)_{d4} \dots$$

$$\rightarrow P(a)_d \neq P(b)_d$$

The process of convergence: Preference revision in response to environmental changes & re-prioritization of issues




Figure 3

Environmental changes induce groups a and b to reconsider their preferences. At the end of this stage, groups a and b might shift to another preference on some dimension d_n or stick to their preferences on dimension d_m .

I note preference change on some dimension $d1$ for group $a \rightarrow P(a)_{d1'}$

If preferences do not change on some dimension, say, $d3$ for group a I use the same denotation $\rightarrow P(a)_{d3}$

At the end of the preference transformation process, groups a and b might harmonize their preferences on some dimension d_n but not on d_m .

$$P(a)_{d1'} = P(b)_{d1'}$$

$$P(a)_{d2'} \neq P(b)_{d2'}$$

$$P(a)_{d3'} \neq P(b)_{d3'}$$

$$P(a)_{d4'} = P(b)_{d4'} \dots$$

$$\rightarrow P(a)_d \neq P(b)_d$$

De-prioritization and prioritization work to eliminate the effect of remaining differences of opinion.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Dependent variable & unit of analysis

The unit of analysis in this study is organized groups of actors that make contentious actions to change the current regime (i.e., challengers or contender groups). The dependent variable is cooperation for regime change among regime contenders. Before reminding what I understand from cooperation for regime change, it is worth explaining how regime change is conceptualized.

In this study, **regime change** is defined as the overthrow of the incumbent's regime. It does not extend to consolidation of the new institutions associated with another form of government. Consolidation spans the period from the foundation of new institutions to the moment when citizens will have internalized rules of the new regime ("the only game in town" as Linz and Stepan put it, (Linz & Stepan, 1996a, p. 5)). This study does not go as far to explain consolidation of the new regimes --so doing would require also accounting for citizens' responses to institutions of the new regime to see whether the rules of the game are internalized. Thus, the scope of analysis is limited to the process from when demands for regime change arise to the emergence of a coherent oppositional coalition against the incumbent's regime.

Cooperation for regime change refers to contentious activities that two or more organized groups of challengers collaboratively undertake with the purpose of overthrowing the current government and his regime. The *indicators of cooperation* include co-participation in the organization of some protest activity (such as demonstrations, rebellions, riots, strikes), the process of mobilization of citizens against the regime, the generation of anti-regime propaganda, or the plotting and carrying out of a coup. It is worth noting that cooperation for regime change refers to "realized cases" of cooperation, where actors successfully undertake/finalize as one or more of the actions mentioned in the list of indicators. "Inconclusive attempts" of cooperation, in which actors fail to accomplish one or more of the abovementioned activities despite making efforts --such as broken negotiations or not carrying out the promise of participating in some protest activity-- do not qualify as realized cases of cooperation. I code successful cases of cooperation as "1" and inconclusive attempts as "0".

I operationalize cooperation using network analysis: The oppositional coalition that ensues from the cooperation process can be thought of as a cooperation network of challengers that are united on the basis of some shared preference. In this network, nodes represent challenger groups and ties represent pairwise relations of cooperation among challengers. For example, if two groups cooperate for regime change, there forms a tie (edge) indicating cooperation between them. If they do not cooperate, they are not linked by a tie (edge). I measure cooperation on a yearly basis. Also,

I count more than one instance of cooperation as one edge representing cooperation per year. I exclude the possibility of actors forming more than one tie (because they cooperated on various issue areas), because TERGM, which is the network model that is used in this study and will be explained later, does not allow for studying a network with multiple ties between nodes. On the other hand, break down of cooperation on some issue area is coded as 0 on that dimension and the lack of cooperation in one issue area does not cancel out cooperation on another issue (coded 1). Thus, tie formation does not follow a zero-sum rationale.

Long-term cooperation (cooperation iterated for at least three successive years and spans more than one issue) is operationalized as the observation of ties for at least three successive years between the same pair(s) of actors. Short-term cooperation (referring to cooperation that is limited on one issue area and lasts less than three successive years) is operationalized as ties that last less than three successive years between the same pair(s) of actors.

Operationalizing the oppositional movement as a network makes sense for the following reasons: The specific type of network I describe here has a core-periphery structure. Networks displaying a core-periphery structure feature a cluster of high-degree nodes in the core that are surrounded by a less dense periphery of nodes with lower-degree (Newman, 2010). Here, the central actor embodies the core and peripheral actors form the periphery. Network analysis provides tools like centrality and density to separate between the core and periphery.

Network analysis is convenient for studying the emergence and sustenance of network-based social systems, such as an oppositional network (Lusher, Koskinen, & Robins, 2012, p. 9). Specifically, longitudinal network models known as temporal exponential random graph models (TERGMs) are appropriate for measuring the effect of ideological and strategic preferences on convergence. As mentioned earlier, existing work relies on game theory in modeling the effect of preferences on cooperation, because game theory offers precise explanations as to how preferences and interactions co-determine the outcome, once the set of alternatives, relevant actors and preferences are identified (Colomer, 1995, pp. 5–8). Within this framework, bargaining models are designed as sequential games with a fixed number of actors and set of preferences. However, in the convergence process that is of interest to this study, the number of actor and the nature of preferences may not stay fixed –contrary to the assumptions made in game theoretical research. While it is possible to assume constancy of actors and preferences for modeling purposes, the family of exponential random graph models (ERGMs) allows for modeling without making this assumption. Specifically, as I explain in detail below, TERGMs are designed to incorporate dynamic processes that involve changes in the number of actors and nature of preferences (Newman, 2010).

In addition, TERGMs are longitudinal models, which makes them convenient for studying processes such as convergence among challengers. The family of time series models also capture temporality. However, time-series, like all other regression techniques, are based on the independence assumption. Yet, cooperation is an interdependent phenomenon and decision

making leading to cooperation defines an interdependent process. Network analysis, like game theory, grounds on the interdependence assumption; therefore, it is more adequate for modeling interdependent phenomena like cooperation. Network models have proved handy in studying cooperative and antagonistic relationships from policy networks to asymmetric and interstate conflicts (Berardo & Scholz, 2010; Corbetta, 2013; Desmarais, Cranmer, & Menninga, 2012; Gerber, Henry, & Lubell, 2013; Metternich, Dorff, Gallop, Weschle, & Ward, 2013; Staniland, 2014).

As mentioned earlier, convergence is a process whereby a particular cooperation network comes about as actors adopt similar strategies. Looking at the evolution of the composition of cooperation over years allows for establishing when an oppositional movement emerges, i.e., the timing of convergence.

Temporal exponential random graph models (TERGMs) are particularly well-suited for the purposes of this study, in part because they study network evolution over time. More importantly, TERGMs belong to the family of models called exponential random graph models (ERGMs), which allow for generating networks of a particular type –which is our purpose here. In that, the modeler generates networks that display a particular set of properties, such as the number of edges or degrees, but all other properties of these networks are random (Newman, 2010). The particular property that the modeler wants to simulate depends on the independent variable of interest. For example, Cranmer, Desmarais, and Menninga rely on ERGMs to study the formation of international military pacts based on a number of characteristics that states (nodes) display, such as regime type or geographic proximity (Desmarais et al., 2012). In this example, the formation of international military pacts between a pair of states indicates tie formation between a pair of nodes. Similarly, I am interested in studying the formation of cooperation for regime change among challengers (tie formation in the ERGM language) based on a set of ideological and strategic preferences that challengers adopt (node characteristics).

How do TERGMs generate random network of a particular property? TERGMs, like ERGMs, are stochastic models designed to make predictions about network structure based on tie formation and tie patterns (Lusher et al., 2012, p. 9). To make inferences, ERGMs treat a given network as a single observation drawn from a complex multivariate distribution and calculate the probability of observing networks similar to the one we study within the realm of possible network configurations. In other words, the observed network is compared to all possible networks controlling for the property of interests (Desmarais et al., 2012, pp. 292–296). Using the same approach, TERGMs model the evolution of a network over sequential observations. In that, there is a temporal dependency assumption, suggesting that a particular network observed at time t depends on networks observed at preceding time intervals. Based on this assumption, TERGMs estimate the probability of a network based on the variation in the effects of different topological features over time (Hanneke & Xing, 2007, p. 2). The probability of observing some network (N) is defined as

$$P(N, \theta) = \frac{w(N)}{\sum_{i=1}^m w(N^i)}$$

$w(N)$ is a shorthand for $\exp(\theta'h(N))$, where θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated, and $h(N)$ is the vector of network statistic; $\exp\{\theta'h(N)\}$ means that the model weighs the network statistic by θ (Wasserman & Pattison, 1996). The denominator is the normalizer that ensures a legitimate probability distribution (Hanneke & Xing, 2007).¹³

TERGMs use an MCMC algorithm, which simulates a Markov chain that constructs a new randomly selected network at each step. The algorithm selects the new network over the existing one if its configuration is more probable. If a pattern emerges among networks in the chain, the algorithm concludes that the Markov transitions have reached an equilibrium distribution. We infer that the model has converged;¹⁴ that is, most of the simulated networks look like the one we observe (Morris, Handcock, & Hunter, 2008, p. 16). The interpretation of parameters resembles regression: “A positive (negative) parameter value means we are likely to observe networks with larger (smaller) values of that statistic (e.g., number of triangles) than would be expected if the network were drawn at random from a uniform distribution of networks” (Desmarais et al., 2012, p. 293).

Measuring the effect of preferences

I hypothesize that challengers begin forming an oppositional movement once their preferences start converging on a particular strategy of transition and but ideological disagreements are either handled or postponed. Thus, independent variables are preferences, which break down into ideological and strategic preferences. I conceptualize preferences as nodal characteristics (i.e., properties of nodes representing actors). The number of nodal characteristics can be as many as the number of issue dimension. I derive preferences from the type of grievances that challengers have in a given context using in-depth case studies so as to establish the meaning of grievances as perceived by actors. As mentioned in the theory section, do not assume challengers to have preset preferences as in bargaining models.

ERGMs capture the effect of nodal characteristics in relational processes, which is convenient to test my hypotheses. As explained in the theory section, the concept of homophily conveys whether ideological or strategic compatibility precipitates cooperation. I had defined

¹³ For detailed information on the mathematical derivation of TERGMs see (Desmarais & Skyler, 2012; Hanneke, Wenjie, & Xing, 2010; Krivitsky & Handcock, 2010; Robins & Pattison, 2001).

¹⁴ The term convergence used in the ERGM theory has no relation to the convergence theorized here.

homophily as the propensity to establish contacts based on similar characteristics. In the language of the network theory, homophily refers to that two nodes displaying similar parameters will converge toward one another within the Blau space (McPherson, 2004).¹⁵ In other words, homophily looks at tie formation based on direct and indirect affinity in the social space. I use homophily to operationalize preference alignment along the ideological and strategic dimensions that I will derive from the case studies.

In the language of TERGM, if preferences have an independent effect on cooperation, their estimates should be statistically significant. Significant positive coefficients suggest that more ties (representing cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random in networks displaying the same number of nodes and edges. Significant negative coefficients indicate that fewer ties (cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random in networks displaying the same number of nodes and edges. The value of coefficients communicates the rate of change. If actors are weakly committed to some issue, we should obtain null effect, meaning that actors enter cooperation regardless of whether their preference aligns with their partner's on the issue in question. A significant positive estimate suggests that preference alignment on some issue drives cooperation. In other words, because the issue in question matters to them, actors refrain from cooperating with those that think differently. A significant negative estimate indicates that actors prefer not to cooperate with those who think like them on a given issue.

Studying the oppositional coalition

As mentioned earlier, an oppositional coalition is more likely to arise from a process whereby actors adopt similar strategic preferences and sideline ideological issues on which they disagree. I also mentioned that I measure cooperation on a yearly basis. Looking at the evolution of the composition of cooperation over years allows for establishing when an oppositional movement emerges, i.e., the timing of convergence. Network analysis helps us to identify which types of preferences are more likely to propel cooperation over time and to what extent.

Finding the central actor in an oppositional coalition

In order to understand which challenger becomes the center of the oppositional coalition, we want to identify when actors cooperate more and around this time which actor becomes more central – since being central to a well-connected network signals greater importance for a node than being central to a less connected network. This analysis has three-steps: First, I use the network metric

¹⁵ Due to space limitations, I do not go into the theory of homophily. Interested readers may see (Lusher, Koskinen, & Robins, 2012; McPherson, 2004).

density to examine the evolution of cooperation density and identify the years in which challengers were most disunited and when they reunified. The network metric density means how connected a network is taking into account all possible connections in that network. In other words, it represents the ratio of the actual number of ties to the number of all possible ties (Newman, 2010, p. Chapter 6). Thus, if a network has a lot of ties among its nodes, it is dense –the ratio of the actual number of ties over the number of all possible ties gets close to 1. If a network has few ties, most of possible connections are not made; thus, it is not dense and the ratio in question approaches to $-\infty$.

Second, I conduct a qualitative analysis of the evolution of actors' preference sets. So doing allows for preference similarity obtained by preference revision. Once we identify on which issues preferences were revised, we better distinguish the dimensions on which cooperation followed from (de)prioritization and those from preference similarity.

At the last step, we want to understand which challenger becomes the center of the oppositional coalition. To this end, I compare the importance of each actor in the oppositional coalition. Importance in a coalition means who is central to a coalition network. That is, who is picked by others more frequently as a partner, which can also be reworded as who has more collaborators than others. Having more partners than others in an oppositional coalition indicates that one is more in demand by others as a partner. I operationalize importance using the network metric degree centrality. Degree centrality conveys how well-connected a node is (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It is calculated as below:

$$\frac{di(g)}{(n-1)}$$

This formula measures the degree of a given node i in a network (g) divided by the total number of nodes in that network minus the one whose degree centrality is measured. For example, if a node has $(n-1)$ degrees it is connected to all others, thus is central to the network. A node with degrees $(n-2)$ would mean it is connected to everyone except for one node, hence still quite central. In contrast, if a node has but degree 1, we understand that it is only connected to one other node, thus is much less central to the network (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It should be noted that centrality in a network can be measured using other metrics such as closeness or betweenness, among others. However, given that cooperation network is not directional, that is, if node A is linked to node B the link from A to B also implies a link from B to A, since cooperation is reciprocal by nature.¹⁶ I finish the analysis by a qualitative study of the preference sets of actors who are part of the coalition network and those who are out. The qualitative differences between these two

¹⁶ For more information on centrality see (Borgatti, 2005; Easley & Kleinberg, 2010; Newman, 2010).

categories of actors will provide further evidence for the dimensions on which preference similarity was at work.

Case Selection

In order to identify the effect of strategies and ideologies on cooperation for regime transition, we need to compare cases where opposition groups have a higher level of strategic disagreements to cases where they have a lower level of strategic disagreements. Giving variation on the strategic diversity allows for establishing whether strategic convergence indeed precipitates actors to cooperate for the same cause.

To test my argument, I use the case of transitions from authoritarianism to constitutional government in the 19th century. Historical analysis presents challenges, but analyzing cases from the 19th century offers significant advantages for the purposes of this study. It was in the 19th century that monarchs around the world began facing demands for constitutional checks and parliamentary representation. From the 1830s onward, peoples in Western Europe periodically stood up against their monarchs attempting to maintain absolutism. By the 1900s, most European societies had succeeded in making their governments accountable (Dincecco, 2011). Constitutional demands began to escalate in non-Western societies in the second half of the century. As in the West, societal actors revolted against their rulers. By 1911, Iran, Russia, China, Mexico, and the Ottoman Empire had undergone constitutional revolutions (Sohrabi, 1995). Thus, in the 19th century, Western and non-Western societies were fighting similar battles against their governments. A gap has opened between Western and non-Western societies from the 20th century and onward. The former has been living under accountable governments for decades, whereas some non-Western societies are still struggling to tie the hands of their rulers. Comparing Western to non-Western cases has important theoretical implications. As Ziblatt notes, regime literature has been treating Western cases as benchmarks to evaluate non-Western transitions, often forgetting that European democratizations also presented uncertainties, fears, and concessions that are thought to be symptomatic of non-Western transitions (Ziblatt, 2006, pp. 311–312). Thus, Ziblatt stresses the need for normalizing Europe. To this end, I aim to contrast and compare Western to non-Western cases. The 19th century presents a uniquely convenient environment, where Western and non-Western societies were both undergoing similar challenges. Had I compared between successful 19th century Western transitions and successful 20th century non-Western transitions, my results would have suffered from anachronism.

In order to give variation to strategic diversity, I selected the cases of transitions from absolute to constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman Empire under Abdülhamid II (1876–1908) – a non-Western case– and Bourbon France (1815–1830) –a Western case. As I explain below in

detail, Ottoman opposition actors had significant strategic disagreements, whereas French challengers had fewer strategic disagreements but more ideological disagreements. Before discussing specifics of the cases, let me explain the spatial and temporal rationale guiding the case selection. The Ottoman and French transitions belong to the same era but to different geographies. As Bunce and Huntington note, geographical proximity may play a causal role in regime outcomes via spillover effects, such as in Latin America or Eastern Europe (Bunce, 2000; Huntington, 1991). By selecting cases from different geographies, I minimize effects of environmental conditions, which might otherwise account for similar outcomes.

The Ottoman and French cases are similar on the structure of transitions. Both the Hamidian and Bourbon authoritarianisms built on an imperial legacy. The Bourbon regime dwelled upon the remnants of the Napoleonic empire. Sultan Abdülhamid II took over a five-century old empire as he stepped to the throne in 1876. Both regimes briefly liberalized before reverting to authoritarianism. The Bourbon regime commenced with an ultra-royalist government and parliament, which employed oppressive policies and measures to silence non-royalists. These policies generating intense discontent, King Louis XVIII dismissed this ultra-royalist parliament and government the following year. Himself being a proponent of moderate government, the King feared that the royalist oppression might trigger another episode of violent uprisings led by the alienated segments of the society, such as the bonapartists and the republicans. Under succeeding governments, the regime experienced relatively liberal intervals but turned absolutist once Charles X took the throne. In the Ottoman Empire, Abdülhamid II stepped to throne in 1876 upon the promise of establishing a constitution and a national parliament –a promise, which he kept. One year later, the Sultan prorogued the Constitution and the Parliament on the grounds of the difficulties posed by the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War (Hanioglu, 2008, p. 120). Right from its inception, this war brought heavy casualties on the Empire. Despite the burden of the war, parliamentary sessions throughout 1877 were long and ineffective due to the tension between Muslim and Christian parliamentarians (Shaw, 1977, pp. 181–185). However, it was not slow legislative activities that led the Sultan to suspend the Constitution and Parliament. Non-Muslim parliamentarians called on their co-ethnics to not enlist to the army contra the Ottoman government's invitation of all Ottoman citizens to enlist in the army; whereupon the Sultan dismissed the Parliament. From 1877 to 1908, Abdülhamid II ruled the Empire with an iron fist.

Both the Bourbon and Hamidian regimes broke down as a result of rapidly unfolding revolutions –three weeks in the Ottoman case and three days in the French case. In both cases, a political crisis set these revolutions in motion. In France, the crisis broke out in March 1830 when the Chamber passed a vote of no confidence against the King's ultra-royalist cabinet. Charles interpreted the motion as an attack against the monarchy and dissolved the Chamber without specifying an election date. He also restored censorship and restrained the franchise to the quarter richest (Girard, 1985, p. 117; Pilbeam, 1982, p. 365). In response, journalists started a resistance,

and leftwing societies, disfranchised middle classes, students, and workers joined in (Girard, 1985, p. 118; Harsin, 2002, p. 41). As the King stood his ground, resistance turned violent (Girard, 1985, p. 117). On the third day, protesters declared a provisionary government. Leftwing and doctrinaire parliamentarians took over; they dismissed republican and bonapartist demands by declaring the Duke of Orleans the King of the French (Harsin, 2002, p. 42). Charles X was overthrown, and France transitioned to constitutional monarchy. In the Ottoman case, the revolution began due to an international crisis. In June 1908, Russia's and Britain's plans to partition Macedonia were divulged. A small local Young Turk group initiated a revolt in Resne (Macedonia) on July 3. Despite the Sultan's efforts to suppress it, this revolt expanded to the entire region. Next, the Sultan's commanders, who were sent to the region to restore order, joined the rebellious Young Turks. The leaders of the Young Turks took over the control of the revolt and sent telegrams to foreign representatives to announce themselves as the effective government of the Empire. On July 24, the Sultan relinquished power, and constitutional monarchy was restored (Akşin, 1980; Temo, 1987).

As regards differences, the Ottoman and French cases varied on the structure of the authoritarian rule and the way these regimes interacted with their domestic and international environments. Concerning the structure of the rule, the Hamidian and Bourbon regimes were both façade parliamentary monarchies with theocratic elements. In both regimes, the constitutional documents were non-binding, that is, the monarchs retained the right to abolish them if they so wished. One major difference was that the Bourbon regime remained a façade parliamentary monarchy throughout its lifetime, whereas the Ottoman regime became purely absolutist after 1877. Also, the French Parliament was not representative; only rich landowners were enfranchised (Alexander, 2004). In contrast, the Ottoman Parliament was representative (Shaw, 1977, p. 171).¹⁷

In terms of the balance between the executive and the legislative, both regimes had weak parliaments. The French Charter of 1814 centralized all powers in the King; the King designated the cabinet and the bicameral parliament lacked the competence to dismiss ministers ("Charte constitutionnelle du 1814," 1814, pp. 364–68). The division of powers between the cabinet and the parliament remained ambiguous throughout the Bourbon monarchy. This ambiguity lay in the root of the repetitive crises that impaired the functioning of the regime and raised discontent (Hudson, 1973, pp. 22–30). The tension between the cabinet and the parliament heightened under Louis XVIII, because the King was a moderate unlike the royalists in Parliament and his moderation spared him from being the target of discontent. During his reign, when ministers and parliamentary majorities belonged to different factions, policy making would frequently be blocked, because

¹⁷ According to Shaw, each district was represented by one Muslim and one non-Muslim. The European provinces were overrepresented, receiving one deputy for every 82,882 males, while the Anatolian provinces had one for every 162,148 males and those in Africa one for every 505,000. The Jews were given one for every 18,750 males (4 deputies in all); the Christians, one for every 107,557 males (44 deputies in all), and the Muslims, one for every 133,367 males (71 deputies in all) (Shaw, 1977, pp. 181–82).

parliamentarians would not support ministerial policies. Yet, lacking the competence to dismiss them, the latter would reject the bills that the latter would propose. Ministers would circumvent the parliamentary objection by issuing decrees. Such interactions rendered the suffrage the most controversial issue of the Bourbon regime. Each faction desired to maximize its own representation and minimize dissent. Therefore, all factions worked to restrain or extend the suffrage (restrain if they were already represented and extend if they wanted to be represented). Gerrymandering and electoral fraud became widespread in this environment. Accordingly, the Bourbon regime under Louis XVIII was characterized by violent confrontations between antagonist political factions and polarization. Once Charles X took the throne and imposed absolutism, the monarchy became the target of dissent. Despite its shortcomings, the French Parliament provided some room for dissent. As we shall see, this created a fundamental difference in terms of the strategies that challengers employed from the Ottoman case. In the Ottoman Empire, as in France, the Sultan designated the cabinet and the Parliament lacked the power to dismiss ministers (Tanör, 1997). Also, the Ottoman Parliament had considerable budgetary powers but on all other areas it played a consultative role (Gözler, 1999, pp. 30–50). As in France, parliamentary sessions caused tensions between antagonist political factions. However, because the parliament convened only for a year, the monarchy remained the target of contention from 1877 to 1908. As of 1877, the Sultan centralized decision making, imposed censorship, and exiled and persecuted all dissidents.

One common trait between the Hamidian and Bourbon regimes was the theocratic foundation of the rule. However, theocracy generated different reactions in Ottoman and French societies due to the different ethno-religious composition of these societies. The former was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society and the Islamist appeal targeted a portion of the population, excluding the rest. The latter that was a relatively homogeneous society; therefore, appeal to Catholicism only generated ideological debate but did not antagonize a certain segment of the society. Under Louis XVIII, the clergy appeared as the ally of the royalist faction.¹⁸ Under Charles X, they became the monarch's chief ally. In his rule, the clergy's competences in sociopolitical life widened and the Catholic Church generated royalist propaganda through its institutional network. However, the theocratic appeal undercut Charles' support among middle and lower classes and rallied the rise of an anticlerical front that encompassed both left and rightwing actors (Kroen, 2000, p. 283; Pilbeam, 1982, p. 355). Like Charles X, Abdülhamid II imposed a theocratic rule, but theocracy improved his societal support. The Sultan promoted Panislamism as the official ideology, which replaced the previous ideology, Ottomanism, preaching secular imperial citizenship and a multicultural society. He promoted himself as "the defender of faith and Muslims" and the caliph—a title that sultans had been holding since 1516 but that none before him had politicized (Karpas,

¹⁸ From 1813 to 1815, Catholic sympathizers and refractory priests (persecuted by the Bonaparte regime) collaborated with the royalists in building a nation-wide network (Alexander, 2004, p. 41).

2001, pp. 224–25). The Sultan made the theocratic turn for he had given up hope about gaining back Christians' loyalties, which led him to prioritize his long neglected Muslim subjects and recast the image of the society as a community of faith. This strategy successfully boosted the Sultan's popularity, because towards the end of the 1890s Muslims constituted the majority of the population, given that territorial losses had dwindled the number of non-Muslims living in the Empire while inflows of Muslim emigrants had enlarged the number of Muslims (Shaw, 1977, pp. 116–117). Thus, although both regimes leant on religion to improve support, this policy was fruitful only in the Ottoman Empire.

The French and Ottoman regimes also differed in terms of their interactions with foreign actors. In both societies, foreign powers had negative connotations in society. However, as we shall see, distinctly in the Ottoman Empire, foreign dislike took the form of anti-imperialism. In France, the monarchical regime was imposed by the European powers. Fearing the revival of imperial aspirations in the country, the European powers restored the Bourbon dynasty and remained supportive of the monarchy until 1830. However, this support did not translate into actual military or economic support. Nor did the latter interfere in France's domestic affairs. In contrast, the European Powers pursued colonial projects on Ottoman territories. They made invasions in North Africa and provided economic and political support to secessionist movements. The European Powers also interfered in the Empire's domestic affairs in order to provide diplomatic support to Christian minorities against the Sultan's government. They further used military defeats to extract further commercial or political concessions (Hanioglu, 2008). The Empire had been suffering heavy indebtedness well before Abdülhamid II took the throne. However, under his reign, successive wars and territorial losses together with soaring tax revenues had impoverished the Empire so much that the state was unable to service interests on its debts. In 1881, the Great Powers founded the Ottoman Debt Administration to collect payments. Through this administration, foreign governments obtained the right to direct control over imperial revenues (Birdal, 2006). Thus, differently than the French regime, the Ottoman Empire found its territorial integrity challenged by foreign powers.

Another difference was that the Ottoman Empire faced secessionism unlike in France. Secessionist movements had emerged in the 1820s, but these early movements were among Christian minorities of the Empire. As of the 1880s, secessionist movements spread to Muslim minorities, which came as a shock to the government and the citizens who maintained imperial allegiances. The latter felt "disappointed" and "betrayed" every time yet another Christian minority made independence demands (Boyar, 2007, pp. 45–55). Independence demands of Muslims came as additionally shocking, because they shattered the Sultan's societal project, the community of faith. Consequently, intercommunal relations grew particularly tense under Abdülhamid II. Thus, unlike the Bourbon monarchy, where the regime lacked foreign and domestic support, the Empire found its integrity was at stake.

Overall, the Ottoman and French transitions make an ideal paired comparison for a least similar systems research design. These regimes belong to the same era and follow similar episodes of rise and fall, but they differ on their geographical location, longevity, legal structures, and their interactions with their domestic and international environment. While France was a façade of parliamentarianism, the post-1877 Ottoman regime was purely autocratic. In France, confrontations between antagonistic factions caused unrest, whereas external and internal threats jeopardized the Empire's integrity. These differences, as I will show, differently affected the structure and nature of regime contention. Let us now see who the challengers were and what type of demands they made. This discussion will also explain the variation on the level of strategic disagreements.

Who are the challengers?

We have seen that the Ottoman Empire's integrity was threatened and its regime was an autocracy, whereas the French parliament provided some room for dissent. These differences structured challengers' ideologies and strategies differently. In France, no challenger group worked against territorial integrity. In the Ottoman Empire, some challengers were secessionist, while others worked for democratization and imperial integrity. Furthermore, democratization via reform had some viability in France. In the Ottoman Empire, repression practically invalidated the strategy of reforms. I will begin by explaining how the environment of the regimes generated different types of regime contention. I will show that engineering regime change was particularly difficult for Ottoman challengers. I will then introduce each actor and their particular demands from the regime.

Although the authoritarian regime faced challengers demanding liberalization in both cases, the Ottoman government found its integrity at stake due to activities of secessionist groups and the colonial powers. This contextual difference structured debates over constitutionalism differently.

In France, debates over constitutionalism revolved around absolute royal power, on which actors took for or against positions. The conflict between these two antagonist camps, neither of which was homogenous, dated back to the aftermath of the French Revolution. From 1790 onwards, these two camps had been alternating in power through successive revolutions, coups, and uprisings. Each time one of the camps got in power, it tried to annihilate opponents via oppression, which, in turn, caused radicalization among supporters of the antagonist camps (Bergeron, 1981; Brown, 2007; Crook, 2002).

The Ottoman context was characterized not so much by ideological radicalization but by antagonism between supporters of imperial integrity and groups demanding independence. Advocates of imperial integrity were constitutionalist groups, which identified the Sultan's authoritarianism as the root cause of imperial decay and secessionism. For these groups, executive arbitrariness caused maladministration and alienated ethno-religious minorities of the Empire (Mardin, 1983). Constitutionalists, like most statesmen, interpreted independence demands as another form of the rebellions that had been breaking out against the central administration for centuries. Rebellions, for them, channeled grievances about the impoverished quality of the government (due to corruption, disorder, ineffective taxation). Thus, most of these constitutionalists failed to comprehend that nationalism was not a fad, that it posited a novel conception of society and statehood, generating demands that could not be countered by simple administrative reforms (Boyar, 2007, pp. 45–55). Therefore, they thought that participation and parliamentary representation would help reinforce minorities' loyalty towards the Empire, while helping to mitigate hostility between Muslim and Christian groups. Overall, Ottoman constitutionalists saw regime change as a means to preserve integrity, whereas for secessionists, regime change was a dispensable stage towards founding their nation states. That is, these future nation states were to be founded on Ottoman territories. Parliamentary representation could facilitate secession by helping secessionists to mobilize support and maybe pass bills for local autonomy. Yet, it could also be cut short if secession could have been realized under the Hamidian absolutism. Therefore, secessionists had a fundamental conflict of interests with constitutionalists. On the other hand, secessionists' interests also conflicted with one other, since these independence movements often vied for the same territories—a consequence of living together for centuries—and/or coveted neighboring lands. Thus, secessionists had irreconcilable differences not only with constitutionalists and the Sultan's government but also with other secessionists.

The theoretical implication of this contextual difference was the variation in the strength of preferences. Actors of the Ottoman case faced higher sucker's payoffs, therefore had stronger objections to institutional arrangements alternative to theirs. For instance, secessionists stood to lose more from imperial integrity, as did the constitutionalists from secessions, which narrowed the room for compromise between these challengers. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the historical analysis, some challengers prioritized overthrowing the Sultan's authoritarianism more than their position on the issue of imperial integrity. Let us now see who the challengers are.

France

Challengers of the Bourbon monarchy included grassroots organizations and parliamentary factions. Grassroots organizations encompassed conspiratorial societies, civic associations like the Society of Friends of the Freedom of Press, newspapers, and freemason lodges (Alexander, 2004).

Parliamentary factions consisted of parliamentarians voicing a particular viewpoint. Lacking mobilizing structures, parliamentary factions collaborated with grassroots organizations in order to mobilize voters. Unlike other factions, the ultras enjoyed privileged access to the Church network given their ideological affinity with the clergy.

Following historians, I classify challengers using the left-right axis. The leftwing referred to supporters of popular sovereignty, while the right comprised advocates of royal sovereignty (Alexander, 2004; Girard, 1985; Hudson, 1973; Sauvigny, 1967; Thureau-Dangin, 1876). The rightwing involved royalist factions and the *constitutionnels*; the *doctrinaires* were in the center. Leftists included the bonapartists, republicans, federalists, and a heterogeneous group called the leftwing or the independents (Rémond, 1992).¹⁹ Given spatial limitations, I will focus on the differences between these factions.²⁰

Except for the royalists, who wanted royal sovereignty, all challengers advocated for national sovereignty. Absolutism found support among the ultra-royalists (the ultras henceforth), whereas the moderate royalists desired a moderate monarchy like the *constitutionnels* and the *doctrinaires*. However, while moderate royalists and the *doctrinaires* evolved towards British-style parliamentarianism, the *constitutionnels* preferred a strong executive. On the left, the bonapartists wanted a strong executive; the republicans desired a strong parliament, whereas the federalists and the independents supported a constitutional parliamentary monarchy. Except for the ultras, all challengers endorsed secularism.

Regarding suffrage, the ultras opposed the inclusion of middle classes, an idea supported by moderate royalists, the *constitutionnels*, and the *doctrinaires* (Girard, 1985, pp. 44–45). Leftwing challengers demanded universal suffrage. Decentralization found support with royalist factions and the left (with the exception of the republicans and bonapartists), whereas the *constitutionnels* and the *doctrinaires* endorsed centralization (Yvert, 2013, pp. 63–66). Decentralization was a hot topic, because extending local autonomy would prevent electoral frauds. The royalists desired it to reassert aristocratic privileges on the countryside. On freedoms, the *constitutionnels* believed that freedoms could be sacrificed for order, occupying a more extreme position than the ultras'. The *doctrinaires* and royalists believed in freedoms but their fear of disorder pushed them to support the latter's illiberalism until Charles' reign (Girard, 1985, pp. 76–78). After 1824, these factions joined the left in advocating for freedoms, while the *constitutionnels* softened their positions. Strategically, challengers debated the legitimacy of violence as a means of change. Grassroots organizations were generally more inclined to using violence as a means to an end. While some parliamentary factions condoned violence, others insisted on conventional means

¹⁹ Following the White Terror, the bonapartists and republicans turned passive until economic crisis resurfaced these demands; in-between, no group identified itself as republican or bonapartist (Alexander, 2004, p. 272).

²⁰ Interested readers should consult (Alexander, 2004; Girard, 1985; Hudson, 1973; Rémond, 1992).

against the grassroots organizations with which they collaborated. For instance, the leftwing or independents split into the moderates and radicals after the former renounced violent protests as an electoral strategy (Alexander, 2004). Note that challengers updated preferences on freedoms, parliamentary powers, and violence in response to authoritarian retrenchment under Charles X.

The Ottoman Empire

Ottoman challengers comprised secessionists envisioning a representative regime in their prospective nation states, and the constitutionalists pursuing constitutional monarchy and imperial integrity. Most secessionists operated in the territories that they lay claims to. The constitutionalists known as the Young Turks organized clandestinely in the Empire or worked from abroad to escape regime forces. As authoritarianism entrenched after 1897, the constitutionalists scattered across Geneva, Paris, Cairo, London, and Berlin (Mardin, 1983). Distance and regime persecution impeded communication and coordination between the constitutionalists. Therefore, they faced more complex mobilization problems than did the secessionists and French challengers.

The Young Turks emerged in 1889. Until 1897, they worked through an umbrella organization called the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which rapidly attracted disgruntled journalists, military officers, bureaucrats, and the ulema (members of the religious class) (Ágoston, 2008; Mardin, 1983, pp. 69–74). This means the CUP comprised numerous factions such as the ulema or military branches. Yet, these groups generally collaborated between 1889 and 1897 (Hanioğlu, 1981, pp. 25–42). After the CUP closed down in 1897, the few uncompromising factions continued constitutionalist propaganda in Geneva, Cairo, and Paris (Hanioğlu, 1981). Yet, cooperation was irregular due to differences of opinions. After joining opposition circles in 1900, Abdülhamid II's nephew Prens Sabahaddin organized the 1902 Congress of Ottoman Opposition to unify constitutionalists (Mardin, 1983, pp. 291–300). However, the Congress spawned novel factions: the Sabahattin faction, the minority, and numerous small organizations. The first two factions were the two leading factions. They never cooperated due to irreconcilable differences. Small factions initially worked with the Sabahattin faction—because unlike the minority, the Sabahattin faction was revolutionary—and joined the minority after this faction also became revolutionary. Once the Committee of Progress and Union (CPU) was founded in 1905, both the minority and minor factions gravitated towards the CPU. This coalition restored constitutionalism in 1908. Due to space limitations, here I focus on differences between challengers.²¹

An obvious difference between constitutionalists and secessionists concerned their position on imperial integrity. Secessionists sought to found their nation state and identified

²¹ Interested readers should consult (Aksin, 2009; Hanioğlu, 1981, 2001, Mardin, 1983, 2000; Temo, 1987).

themselves as nationals of their ethnicity. While all desiring imperial integrity, most older generation constitutionalists identified themselves as Ottoman despite coming from various backgrounds, such as Kurds, Arabs, Armenians, Circassians, and Jews, and advocated for imperial citizenship (Hanioglu, 2008, p. 145). Younger generation constitutionalists supported Turkish nationalism or ethnic Turkish nationalism known as Turkism. In the 1900s, Ottomanism lost support to Turkish nationalism and Turkism among constitutionalists as a result of territorial losses. Regarding secularism, most secessionists made religious propaganda because it mobilized their co-ethnics against the Muslim Empire. Of constitutionalists, the older generations and the ulema factions opposed secularism, whereas the younger generations endorsed secularism—which became increasingly popular after 1902. Of the secularist constitutionalists, many generated religious propaganda to mobilize the public who were yet to learn about national identity.

Strategically, Ottoman constitutionalists debated whether to use violence as a means of transition. With the exception of a few older-generation non-revolutionaries—such as Ahmed Riza who led the minority after 1902, most constitutionalists were revolutionary. The revolutionary constitutionalists, in turn, debated whether to seek foreign assistance to regime change, cooperate with secessionists, and instigate rebellions in provinces to weaken the Sultan's government. Those opposing rebellious tactics were concerned that unrest might have played into the hands of secessionists in the provinces that contained large Christian minorities, such as the minority or the CPU (Hanioglu, 2001). On foreign sponsorship, some constitutionalists thought it would ease the overthrowing of the Sultan's government, such as the Sabahattin faction; others feared that, once involved, the Great Powers would never leave and eventually partition the Empire, such as the minority or the CPU. Concerning cooperation with secessionists, the Sabahattin faction thought it would alleviate resource constraints, whereas collaboration with groups that worked against imperial integrity seemed unacceptable to the minority or the CPU (Mardin, 1983).

It is noteworthy that after 1902 support for non-revolutionary transition and foreign assistance declined, while support for secularism and Turkish nationalism increased in response to environmental transformations. Successive colonial invasions and the Great Powers' increasing involvement in domestic affairs and the administration generated a strong support for anti-imperialism and discredited foreign assistance. Non-revolutionary means also lost credit, as most constitutionalists acknowledged that they could not afford to wait for transition to come via reform when integrity was at stake (Mardin, 1983). The perceived urgency of transition led some constitutionalists to enter tactical cooperation with secessionists, while others found it unacceptable and unviable. Ottomanism lost popularity, since territorial losses and secessions had left fewer Christians in the territories. Most constitutionalists, like the Sultan, admitted the improbability of rewiring the remaining Christians' loyalty towards the Empire. Unlike the Sultan, most constitutionalists envisioned a secular state and society, keeping up with the global trend towards the nation-state model. However, most citizens were unaware of the concept of nation and

defined themselves by religion. Moreover, though they felt that autocratic monarchies were on their way to oblivion, most Ottomans maintained allegiances to the monarchy (Brummett, 2000, p. 117). As such, some constitutionalists continued to generate religious propaganda, others—like the Sabahattin faction—did not. Finally, the coalition that restored constitutionalism was revolutionary, supported Turkish nationalism and secularism, and opposed foreign assistance and cooperation with minorities.

Overall, internal debates of the French challengers principally revolved around ideological issues, whereas Ottoman challengers were more preoccupied with strategic issues. On the other hand, in both cases, grievances were multidimensional. Unlike the conceptualization of bargaining theory, they went beyond the authoritarian-libertarian axis and economic problems were not salient. Also, Ottoman and French challengers differed in the type of their ideological and strategic issues that they were concerned about. Yet, in both contexts, challengers updated their views over time. Given temporal changes in the content of preferences and their multidimensionality, it is more appropriate to conceptualize interactions among challengers as a case of coordination with conflicting interests rather than a prisoners' dilemma game with a single issue dimension determining payoffs. To reemphasize an earlier point, these interactions cannot be theorized as a unidimensional cooperation game, because variety of preferences shape actors' behavior. The case of coordination that I analyze here is more about on whose terms regime change will be carried out. I provide the details of the coding procedure in Appendix I.

CHAPTER 3 Transition to Constitutional Monarchy in the Ottoman Empire

What conditions enable diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their ideological preferences, to achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status quo? In this chapter, I will examine this question using the case of the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdülhamid II, who reigned from 1876 to 1909 until deposed by the military. I test the twofold argument that contender groups become more likely to cooperate for regime change if they converge on a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if any). Preference convergence on strategies and the de-prioritization of ideological disagreements (if any) prepares the rise of a coherent oppositional coalition that capable of signaling unity and coherence, hence potential to overthrow the regime if necessary or extract considerable concessions. This case study covers the period from Abdülhamid II's enthronement in 1876 to 1908 when the Empire transitioned back to constitutional monarchy with a revolution and focuses on the role of cooperation among challengers to the Hamidian regime on regime change.

We should say the Empire “transitioned back” to constitutional monarchy, because Sultan Abdülhamid II took the throne conditional upon adopting a constitution and a parliament, a promise which he followed through. The 1876 Constitution, *Kanun-i Esasi* (the Basic Law), was drafted by a commission composed of 28 commissioners, including two military officers, 16 bureaucrats (three Christians and 13 Muslims), and ten clergymen (ulema), and came forth on December 23, 1876 (Tanör, 1997, p. 133). In the same year, elections were held for the lower chamber of the Parliament, Chamber of Deputies (*Meclis-i Mebusan*), which convened on March 18, 1877. The Parliament remained in session until June 28, 1877 until prorogued by Abdülhamid II on the grounds of the difficulties posed by the Russo-Turkish War that broke out that year (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 120). After suspending the constitutional regime, the Sultan established a very personalized autocratic regime—the first of its kind since since Mahmud II (1808-1839) passed away.²² The prorogation of the Parliament and the Constitution generated uproar among proponents of constitutionalism, notably, the Young Ottomans who had been advocating for liberalization in the Empire since the 1860s (Mardin, 2000). Abdülhamid II silenced this opposition via censorship, arrests, incarcerations, and exiles. He also formed a personal spy network, which directly reported to the Sultan, to hunt constitutionalists.

²² It is worth noting that the Ottoman Empire rarely had autocratic rules. The traditional way of ruling consisted of consultation with the clergy, the military, notables, and the high bureaucracy. For more information see (Berkes, 1964; Findley, 1980; Shaw, 1976).

Repression restored “order” in the Empire and the Young Ottoman constitutionalist movement discontinued.

However, constitutionalist demands resurfaced in 1889, when a group of students at the Royal Military Medical Academy formed the Ottoman Union Society (*İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti*). The revival of constitutional demands did not escape the regime’s spies. However, despite censorship and spies in the Academy that reported any meetings of more than three, the Society was able to circulate handwritten papers to students of the School of Civil Administration, the War Academy, and later medreses²³. By 1895, this second generation constitutionalist movement had formed branches in Istanbul, Izmir, Cairo, Damascus, Tripoli, some Balkan cities, London, and Geneva (Hanioglu, 1981, pp. 25–42). These constitutionalists came from diverse backgrounds, including military officers, the ulema²⁴, intellectuals, students, bureaucrats, some Young Ottomans, and younger generations of constitutionalists, that is, all segments of the society that the Hamidian regime had been persecuting (Mardin, 1983, pp. 69–74). This group later came to be known as the Young Turks.

Besides their grudge against the Hamidian authoritarianism, the Young Turks had little in common. The constitutionalist movement, which adopted the name of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP from here on) in 1894, operated as an umbrella organization that coordinated actions of several branches across the Empire and ideological factions that envisioned different regimes after overthrowing the Sultan’s government. The ulema desired a constitutional regime compatible with the Sharia; the military wing focused on imperial integrity and opposed secularism but desired a less religious regime than the ulema, some intellectuals and bureaucrats, following positivist principles, demanded a secular constitutional regime (Mardin, 1983). On the top of this ideological diversity, the Young Turks also disagreed on how the Sultan’s government should have been overthrown. Older generations and some positivists opposed revolutionary means on the grounds that they might have caused societal disorder if transition were to come without people gaining awareness of their participatory and representative rights. Others disagreed; the Empire could not afford to wait until the society became aware of constitutionalism. A quick action was necessary to save the fatherland (Mardin, 1983).

²³ Educational institution where Islamic sciences were taught (Somel, 2011, p. 178).

²⁴ Members of the Ottoman religious class (Agoston, 2008).

Such disagreements stand in contrast with the word “union” in both the Society of Union and the Committee of Union and Progress. In both organizations, unity expressed the desired objective of restoring unity among ethno-religious groups of the Empire that had been crumbling since Greek independence (1821). The word “progress,” on the other hand, communicated the belief in science and modernity (Sohrabi, 2011, p. 54). The Young Turks sought to protect imperial integrity by modernizing the government according to principles of reason and science. As we shall see, there were disagreements as to how scientific and rational principles should apply to the government.

The Young Turks were convinced that imperial decay resulted from executive arbitrariness and constitutional government was *the* remedy. In this sense, there is a difference in the contextual meaning of constitutional demands in the Ottoman Empire than in Western Europe. In Western Europe, grievances about taxation induced societal began to challenge their monarchs (Tilly, 1993). In the Ottoman context, discontent about taxation generated local rebellions but not result constitutional movements (Mardin, 2000). Again, Ottoman constitutionalists desired to save their fatherland. We will see that this contextual difference shaped the dynamics of state-society bargains in a unique way.

The noble cause of saving the fatherland did not yet suffice to keep the constitutionalists united. As I will explain, different ideological and strategic agendas caused splits within the movement, while the Sultan turned several constitutionalists away from the cause via cooptation and repression (Hanioglu, 1981). In 1895, the Sultan coopted Mizancı Murat, the then leader of the CUP, to officially close down all CUP branches across the Empire. Nonconformist constitutionalists stayed in Europe to defend the cause. These perseverant constitutionalists formed numerous novel organizations. Yet, none was able to play the unifying role that the CUP had played. As I will explain, despite numerous attempts to reunite, the constitutionalists could not go beyond short-term issue-based cooperation against the Sultan’s regime for a decade. The Young Turks finally reunified when the Committee of Progress and Union (CPU from here on) was formed in 1905 and assumed the leadership role attracting small Young Turk organizations and a military constitutional organization, the Ottoman Freedom Society. This coalition carried out a revolution in 1908 and restored constitutionalism after a 31-year intermission.

It is worth noting that while the Young Turks were working on saving their fatherland, other organized regime contending groups were also challenging the Sultan’s government. These contenders were nationalist groups organized along ethno-religious lines operating within (and sometimes also without) the Empire to build their own nation

state, such as the Armenian Dashnak Party or the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. I will call these independence seeking groups “secessionists” as a shorthand. Obviously, secessionists had a fundamental disagreement with the Young Turks as regards imperial integrity. Nevertheless, most secessionists were and remained in contact with the Young Turks and these contacts occasionally translated into short-term issue-based cooperation against the Sultan’s government. Thus, challengers to the Hamidian regime subsumed both secessionists and constitutionalists, each of which, in turn, pursued different ends. The diversity in the means and ends makes the Ottoman context a perfect environment to test the hypotheses concerning the role of ideologies and strategies in cooperation.

The chapter is planned as follows: I begin by conducting a historical analysis to establish the nature of the Hamidian regime, its sociopolitical environment, and the issue dimensions shaping the debate on regime type. This section helps identify the specific meaning ascribed to these issue dimensions in order to comprehend the nature of the struggle over regime type. The second section uses historical analysis in combination with content analysis to identify who the relevant actors are and how their preference sets look like. I contrast and compare groups’ ideologies and strategies to pinpoint the roots of disagreements and comprehend why actors believed that a certain strategy or ideology to be *the* solution to the Empire’s problems. This analysis builds on a content analysis of memoirs, pamphlets, and articles by prominent figures of each group, as well as secondary sources written on groups and their members following the procedure that I detailed in the previous chapter. Specifically, I show that Ottoman constitutionalists understood constitutionalism as a solution to secessionism, imperialism, and secularism rather than a means to tie the hands of the Sultan as was the case in Western Europe (Tilly, 1993; Weingast, 1997).

The next section focuses on the patterns of interactions among challengers with the purpose of identifying which pairs of contenders engaged in which type of cooperation (short term vs. long term) and what the object of their cooperation was. This analysis helps establish when, if ever, challengers move from short-term to long-term cooperation and which type(s) of preferences were more likely to precipitate long-term cooperation. This section shows that despite various attempts at reunification, challengers failed to build long-term cooperation until 1905 due to the conflict of preferences on issue dimensions that they highly prioritize. Challengers could form a coherent united front only after a

subset of challengers aligned on their strategy of transition and postponed the resolution of certain ideological disagreements.

In the third section, I begin by examining the evolution of actors' preferences over time so as to control for preference revision. I look at the evolution of cooperation density over time in order to pinpoint temporal variation in the intensity of cooperative behavior with respect to temporal changes in the number of actors. So doing allows for normalizing cooperation density (whether we observe enough cooperation among challengers given the possible amount of cooperation in a given year), which, in turn, helps avoid spurious inferences, such as concluding that there are not enough observed instances of cooperation when there are not enough groups. I apply the findings from the historical analysis to longitudinal network models with which I measure the relative effect of preference convergence on each preference type (ideological or strategic) on cooperation. To identify which mechanisms were at work, I evaluate these results with respect to the findings of the analysis of the evolution of preferences over time. Finally, I examine the composition of the coalition network and preference sets of the core and peripheral actors in order to identify whether such a coalition involved all pragmatic actors or some pragmatists and some idealists. This analysis allows revealing the extent to which preference convergence on strategic issues and preference convergence on ideological issues were influential in the rise of an oppositional movement.

The nature of the authoritarian regime and its sociopolitical environment

In this section, I analyze the structure of the Hamidian regime and the type of policy problems that it faced. To examine the regime's problems, I trace their evolution from their outbreak and follow their development with an eye to detect how they tied into other issues. Findings from this historical analysis helps us understand the stakes related to each issue, which, then, I use to contextualize challengers' ideologies and strategies in the next section. This section shows that Sultan Abdülhamid II imposed an authoritarian rule and adopted a theocratic panislamist discourse as a means to preserve imperial integrity.

Democratic reversal & the Hamidian regime

The Hamidian regime embodied the classic definition of authoritarianism. After suspending the Constitution and Parliament in 1877, Abdülhamid II recentralized policy making and began personally appointing bureaucrats, generals, and police chiefs.²⁵ His diplomacy-based foreign policy allowed for circumventing the military and high bureaucracy that had been resisting sultanic authoritarianism since the formation of the Empire (Mardin, 1983, pp. 70–72). Abdülhamid II formed a personal spy network that directly reported to him in order to hunt down regime contenders (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, pp. 172–173, 212–216). To silence the criticisms that authoritarian revival generated, the Sultan banished and exiled the constitutionalists and their relatives living in the Empire (Shaw, 1977, pp. 215–16). He imposed tight censorship rules, which prohibited not only mentions of critical topics but even words like ‘nose’ –because it alluded to the Sultan’s large nose or capes in the Empire– or ‘bedbug’, *tahtakurusu* in Turkish –because in a rapid read it could have been understood as *tahtın kurusun* –may your throne be withered! (Boyar, 2006, pp. 419–20). These measures annihilated the constitutionalist opposition on Ottoman territories. Those who remained committed to the cause, on the other hand, had to withstand the Sultan’s spies and diplomatic actions with the European authorities. Despite the latter’s perseverance, the movement had lost momentum for about a decade and revived in 1889 with the rise of the Young Turks. At the societal level, authoritarianism (*istibdat*) and censorship generated discontent. The general sentiment in the society was that such autocratic rules were defunct (out of place in the modern era) even though citizens, who identified themselves with the Empire, continued to hold strong allegiances towards the Ottoman dynasty (Brummett, 2000a, pp. 113–189).

Persecution and oppression had helped the Sultan to defeat most domestic contenders, but he still had to deal with indebtedness and secessionism. By the time Abdülhamid II took the throne, public debt had risen to 1740.4% of the revenues (Shaw, 1977, p. 226). In 1881, the European Powers founded the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (*Düyun-u Umumiye*) to levy a certain portion of the Empire’s revenues as payments on interests on loans. This Administration provided them with direct control on Ottoman revenues and undermined economic sovereignty (Birdal, 2006). Given the state’s military and economic weakness and political instability, Abdülhamid II could not object to the formation of this Administration. However, the Sultan implemented a series

²⁵ For detailed information on administrative rearrangements see (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, pp. 216–17).

of financial and tax reforms and made certain investments, which rectified Ottoman finances. In 1905, the budget was finally balanced (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 226). Gradual financial recovery and authoritarianism allowed the Sultan to implement public construction works (such as roads, railways, postal services), agricultural and industrial reforms (such as the creation of industries like silk and institutions, such as the Agricultural Bank (*Ziraat Bankası*) to provide credit to agriculturists) without societal resistance. Furthermore, the Sultan's permitted European firms to build factories to exploit minerals and his commercial policy improved craft industries' competitiveness and trade (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, pp. 227–38).

A theocratic discourse shrouded the Sultan's authoritarianism. Abandoning Ottomanism, the official ideology of the Empire from the 1860s to 1870s –which advocated the revival of the multicultural society under the imperial identity, Abdülhamid II concocted a novel ideology combining the traditional Sunni Islamic discourse of Ottoman sultans with Panislamism and the caliphate. As regards the caliphate, Abdülhamid II unprecedentedly appealed to sultans' title as the caliph of Muslims –which the dynasty had been holding since the 16th century but none before him had politicized (Abū Mannah, 2001, p. 128).²⁶ This novel discourse recast the image of Ottoman society as a community of believers, where believers designated Muslims. On the other hand, despite its theocratic nature, the Ottoman Empire had never promoted Panislamism, nor had it tried to integrate Muslims in the Middle East. Although these Muslims were superior to non-Muslims under the Sharia, they were not considered to be 'Ottoman,' but only subjects of the sultan. Until the Rescript of 1839 named all subjects living in the Empire officially as 'Ottomans,' 'Ottoman' designated the dynasty and the ruling class (the ulema, the military, and the bureaucracy) (Findley, 1982, p. 14). Muslim provinces, such as Egypt or Syria, enjoyed administrative autonomy. The Empire would only appoint governors and collect tributes (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). Thus, Abdülhamid II's Panislamist discourse was unprecedented.

²⁶ This responsibility of Ottoman sultans found its expression in their title *gazi* (warrior for the Islamic faith) (Quataert, 2000, p. 177). *Gazi* derives from *gaza* or *cihad* and demands rulers to expand the realm of Islam through the Holy War (Barkey, 1994, p. 27; Itzkowitz, 1980, p. 38; Karateke & Reinkowski, 2005, pp. 53-55-163). Although Ottoman sultans had been using this title since the 13th century, they only became the leader of the Muslim world following Selim III's (1512-1520) conquest of Mecca and Medina in the 16th century. Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566) was the first to name himself the "caliph of all the Muslims in the world," but he used the title as foreign policy tool (İnalçık & Quataert, 1994, p. 20). It was with Abdülhamid II that the caliph title applied to domestic policy.

One reason behind this theocratic turn was shifts in the demographic composition of the Empire. As a result of territorial losses of regions populated by Christians and the influx of Muslim refugees, the Christian portion of the population diminished from $\approx 40\%$ in the early 1800s to $\approx 20\%$ to the late 1800s (Zürcher, 2010, p. 69). According to the general censuses of 1881/2–1893, the Muslims constituted 73.3% of the Ottoman population (Hanioglu, 2008, p. 130). In this context, Ottomanism would be ineffective according to Abdülhamid II. The state should reach out to Muslims in order to preserve imperial integrity. The Panislamist Sunni Islamist discourse referencing the caliphate served this purpose. In the same vein, Abdülhamid II extended freedoms of Sunni Islamist sects, undertook infrastructural projects to facilitate pilgrimage, and increasingly brought Islamic symbols into the public sphere (Karpas, 2001, pp. 224–25). These policies boosted the Sultan's popularity among devout Muslim citizens.

The other reason behind the theocratic turn was foreign policy. Since the 1830s, France, Britain, and Russia had been militarily or diplomatically intervening in intercommunal conflicts in the Middle East and the Balkans by conditioning loans and peace settlements on the recognition of demands for independence and autonomy of Balkan and North African regions. Shortly after the authoritarian revival, the British ceased to support the Empire's integrity and together with Russia and France channeled support to independence movements. Of these movements, the Armenian cause received most support and attention from Russia and Britain (Dündar, 2013, pp. 15–18). Such interventions encroaching on Ottoman sovereignty generated strong dislike and distrust towards the European powers among citizens feeling imperial allegiances. In the press, France, Britain, and Russia were characterized as evil hegemonic powers conspiring against the Empire (Brummett, 2000b, pp. 150–65). In this context, Abdülhamid II's Islamist discourse served to draw popular by casting the European powers as a Union of Crusaders united against the Caliphate (Hanioglu, 2001, p. 129). It should be noted that due to military and economic weakness, the Sultan could not stand up against the Great Powers. Rather, he followed a balance-of-power policy, playing Britain, Russia, and France against each other, and allied with Prussia following the rise of the German Empire.

On the other hand, this Islamic appeal had its limitations. First, independence movements had sprung to Muslim communities in the Balkans. Nationalist groups had been active since 1878 in Albania (the Albanian League) and 1893 in Macedonia (IMRO) (Eberhardt, 2003, p. 29; Knowlton, 2004, p. 356). In the Middle East, the Empire had either already lost or was about to lose the control of its territories by the time Abdülhamid

II took the throne. The French occupied Tunisia and Algeria, while the British controlled Egypt and Sudan. People living in these territories did not have strong allegiances to the Empire, in part because the Empire had never tried to integrate them and also because independence movements were flourishing. Demands for independence were unwelcomed by the Ottomans who preserved imperial allegiances. The latter felt “disappointed” by each time a community demanded independence, which they interpreted as treason to the fatherland (Boyar, 2007, pp. 45–55). To them, these communities showed ingratitude towards the Empire that had been looking after them for centuries. Disappointment peaked with Armenians’ demands for independence, because Armenians had been the favorite minority since Greek independence. Armenians had been overrepresented in civil service and mediating diplomatic and financial affairs (Hanioglu, 1991). These movements debunked the Ottomanist ideology. Disappointment peaked a second time when Muslim minorities in the Balkans raised demands for independence in the 1870s and debunked the idea of Muslim solidarity. Around this time, Turkish nationalism was still unknown, but religion had a strong appeal. Patriotic citizens continued to define themselves essentially as “Muslim.” “Muslim” conveyed both religious affiliation and the “Turkish” identity, understood to be a citizen of the Empire. In other words, “Turkish” and “Muslim” were used interchangeably in everyday parlance (Köker, 1990, p. 150). Despite the rise of Turkish nationalism as of the 1900s, the public, if not the elite, continued to understand “Turkish” as “Muslim” until the early republican era (Berkes, 1964; Feroz, 1993).

Overall, the Hamidian authoritarianism dwelled upon a theocratic panislamist discourse. We saw that this ideological change was a political maneuver in a society where the majority of the population was becoming increasingly Muslim and state-society relations were shifting to a novel ground. While the theocratic discourse improved the state’s relations with Muslim citizens, rising independence demands among Muslim minorities discredited the ideal of Muslim solidarity. Independence movements of minorities, which received the Great Powers’ support, triggered suspicion and distrust towards both Christian minorities of the Empire and European states. On the other hand, we have also seen that even though Ottomanism and Panislamism had lost their grounds, Turkish nationalism was yet to flourish. I will explain how these demographic and sociopolitical shifts influenced and shaped of the Young Turks’ agendas. However, before doing so, we need to dig deeper into the role and function of Islam in Ottoman politics. Without comprehending the place and meaning of Islam in the 19th century Ottoman

Empire, we cannot grasp the contextual meaning of debates over the role of religion in politics.

Legacy of past conflicts: The emergence of the main axes of conflict

Sunni Islam had been the official ideology from the foundation of the Ottoman state until the mid-19th century (Karpas, 2001, p. 224). Islam was the essence of the State and the State embodied religion; this symbiosis found its expression in religion-state (*din-ü devlet*) (Berkes, 1964, p. 7; Karpas, 2001, p. 224). Modernization, which Sultan Selim III (1789-1808) initiated with the purpose of reverting imperial decline, altered this relationship. In this section, I elaborate on the implications of modernization on state-society relations.

Religion-state rested on the Sunni Islamic doctrine of government, which preached total obedience and just rule. Rulers drew sovereignty from the law. In their capacity as defenders of faith, Muslims, and the Sharia, rulers legislated for the welfare of the community within the boundaries set by the Sharia. Subjects were to strictly obey just rulers but retained the right to resist unjust rulers called ‘despots’ in Islamic law (Hanioğlu, 1981, pp. 141–58). In other words, law granted rulers absolute sovereignty provided that they duly implemented laws for common good. This principle was the Islamic counterpart of the doctrine of just rule in pre-modern Western political thought.²⁷ In the Ottoman context, as in Europe, it had served to justify authoritarian reigns as well as depositions.

At the beginning of the 19th century, Mahmud II (1808-1839) relied on Sunni Islam to legitimize top-down modernization reforms against resistance by the military and the ulema. A Sunni Islamic vocabulary shrouded modernization reforms. For example, the reforms were designed to restore “*just* administration,” “bring regeneration into the Muslim community,” or implement “*fair* taxation” (Abū Mannah, 2001, pp. 8, 90–91). Thus, at the beginning, Islam and modernization went hand in hand. In the 1840s, Sunni Islam began to fall short in justifying reforms in that period when more independence movements sprung up in the Balkans and the European Great Powers increasingly intervened in the Empire’s domestic affairs. Foreign intervention took the form of

²⁷ For more information see (Goldie, 1995).

extracting commercial or diplomatic privileges from the Sultan, military intervention to coerce the Sultan to recognize independence or autonomy of some region, or imposition of reforms in provinces hosting predominantly Christian populations through treaties (Shaw, 1977, pp. 29–36, 133–64). Such ultimatums generated in society a strong distrust in the Great Powers, which can be likened to anti-imperialism but the Ottomans did not employ this wording. Reforms targeting Christian communities also weakened Muslims' support for the regime and plagued intercommunal relations in the Middle East and the Balkans. Nevertheless, lacking the military and economic power to resist the Great Powers' ultimatums, the Ottoman government adopted more reforms towards the Christians with the hope of appeasing them and rolling back secessionist tendencies among minorities. In a context where reforms had acquired a particularistic nature, Sunni Islam could no longer uphold modernization.

The first noteworthy reform package to be passed under the Great Powers' ultimatum was the 1839 Rescript of Rose Chamber.²⁸ The Rescript guaranteed the lives, property and honor of all subjects regardless of religion or ethnicity (İnalçık, 1964, pp. 56–57). According to Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha, designer of the Edict, the government adopted modernization reforms to enhance state power and preserve imperial integrity: *“We do not possess the necessary [military] power to maintain the territorial integrity of our state... If we are not able to produce a good administration [the foreign powers] will establish a joint administration [in Istanbul] too,”* said the Grand-vizier (Karpas, 2001, p. 190).

Devoid of Sunni Islam, Sultans Abdülmecid (1839–1861) and Abdülaziz (1861–1876) relied on bureaucratic expertise; they appointed highly skilled pashas as grand-viziers to ensure due implementation of reforms and divert the locus of societal discontent to another institution. Grand-viziers, such as Ali and Fuad Pashas, drafted, introduced, and monitored reform implementation and took charge of the administration. These Pashas had ample expertise, but were also rather arbitrary. They personally appointed, promoted, demoted, banished, and exiled each bureaucrat. This arbitrariness discontented not only civil servants but also citizens. In the eyes of citizens, the Sharia preached obedience only to the sovereign, while grand-viziers were mere civil servants whose legal status was no different than any other citizen of the Empire, slaves of sultan

²⁸ For contending arguments on Western origins of the Rescript see (Berkes, 1964, pp. 144–145; Findley, 1982; Shaw & Shaw, 1977, pp. 61–62; Tanör, 1997, pp. 88–96).

(Findley, 1980, pp. 14–18). As we shall see, this legitimacy deficit precipitated the rise of constitutional demands in the 1860s. In other words, the first generation constitutionalists, the Young Ottomans, targeted not the person of the sultan but his grand-viziers.

Discontent peaked with the adoption of the Imperial Reform Edict (*Islâhat Fermânı*). The Edict (1856) introduced secularization and equality reforms. The government had intended to modernize the statecraft and reinforce non-Muslims' loyalty towards the Empire. To their surprise, these reforms generated an unprecedented society wide discontent both among Muslims and non-Muslims, whose reverberations shaped the Young Turks' ideologies and strategies decades later. Specifically, the Edict replaced religious courts with mixed tribunals, introduced new penal, correctional, and commercial codes, and standardized rules of appointment, salaries, and finances applied to each millet (religious communities officially recognized by the state). In so doing, it deprived the ulema and heads of the millets of their judiciary power (Somel, 2011, p. 189). In particular, the clergy, including, patriarchs, archbishops, and rabbis, lost their discretion over the administration of their community. For Muslims, secularization had additional implications: In religion-state, the principle of the supremacy of the Sharia operated as a check on the executive, requiring that all laws to conform to the Sharia and charging the ulema of monitoring the conformity of laws (İnalçık, 1978, p. 562) (Berkes, 1964, p. 9; İnalçık, 1978, pp. 107–8, 562). By abolishing this principle, secularization reforms liberated the executive from this check and made secular law the only source of sovereignty, thus exposing the society unprotected against the state (Abū Mannah, 2001, pp. 123–125). Equality caused even more controversies.

The Edict's equality reform granted non-Muslims equal access to government positions, taxation, and military service.²⁹ Contemporary readers might expect equality, if not secularization, to please non-Muslims. Yet, the latter were most displeased of losing the privileges that they had been enjoying under inequality. Under the Sharia, Muslims were superior to non-Muslims or *zimmis* (people of the Book). The state granted the *zimmis* the freedom to practice their faith, guaranteed protection of their lives, liberties and properties, and accorded the judicial and administrative autonomy to regulate internal affairs of their communities if they held the millet status. Muslims and non-

²⁹ For more information on the 1856 Edict see: (Abū Mannah, 2001; Davison, 1963; Findley, 1980; Gözübüyük & Kili, 1982; Somel, 2012; Tanör, 1997).

Muslims held equal rights and obligations under the laws of property, contract, and obligation of the Sharia. However, non-Muslims were barred from positions of command, such as in the civil service and the military (Karpas, 2001, p. 76). Also, the *zımmis* paid the special poll-tax, land-tax, and a tax to obtain exemption from the military service. Exemption from the military service was particularly important to non-Muslims. By the mid-19th century, the majority of tradesmen and financiers were composed of the Jews, Greeks, and Armenians who made careers in finance and trade and prospered from lending money to the indebted Ottoman state instead of serving in the army.³⁰ Hence, the Muslims' superiority remained at the symbolic level; in practice, the *zımmis* held socioeconomic power.

Moreover, under inequality, most *zımmis* benefited from foreign protection and circumvented Ottoman jurisdiction by working as protégés. Protégés were Catholic, Greek, and Armenian mediators between Ottoman officials and foreign representatives. Embassies of the Great Powers would grant them immunity from Ottoman jurisdiction (*berats*) (Sonyel, 1991). By the mid-century, this practice had become increasingly misused with embassies selling *berats* for profit (Artunç, 2013). Equality eradicated the *zımmis*' privileges, such as exemption from the military service and rights to adjudicate their internal affairs. By implication, more non-Muslims turned to the protégé system so as to escape Ottoman jurisdiction and Ottomanism fell short of preventing their alienation from the Ottoman state. Hence, contrary to the expectations of the drafters of the Edict, neither equality nor multiculturalism enhanced non-Muslims' loyalty towards the state.

If non-Muslims were dissatisfied by equality, Muslims were traumatized. They had already been feeling neglected since the state had been exclusively adopting reforms in Christian provinces. Moreover, they were well-aware that they had lost socioeconomic power to non-Muslims.³¹ Muslims' superiority was symbolic but still compensated for the discontent about socioeconomic deprivation. By levelling them with the *zımmis*, the Edict made them feel like second-class citizens (Abū Mannah, 2001, p. 124). Some ulema formed a secret society to restore the Sharia, which the government soon discovered and thwarted (aka *Kuleli Vakası* (the Kuleli Incident)) (Davison, 1963, pp. 100–103). Also, a group of

³⁰ Christian and Jewish moneychangers (*aka* Galata bankers) borrowed cheaply in Europe and lent at high interest on short term to the Empire. For more information on the London-Constantinople financial network see (Cottrell, 2007, pp. 18–40).

³¹ The Muslims were on average poorer and employed in the agricultural and military sectors and small crafts. They shouldered the burden of taxation (Mardin, 2000, p. 18).

idealistic bureaucrats, the Young Ottomans, formed the secret society Patriotic Alliance (*İttifâk-ı Hamiyyet*) to promote constitutionalism against executive arbitrariness.

Overall, from the 1830s to the 1860s, the Sunni Islamic doctrine fell short of legitimizing modernization reforms. As Ottoman governments adopted more and more reforms towards Christian communities, the religious foundations of the traditional Ottoman state weakened. Islam decoupled from modernization and began serving as an instrument to mobilize discontented citizens against the regime. Concomitantly, intercommunal relations grew tense and the multicultural nature of Ottoman society degraded. In sum, when Abdülhamid II took the throne, the Ottoman state had alienated Muslim elites and masses as well as its non-Muslim subjects. It was in this context that Abdülhamid II promoted a theocratic doctrine. As I show in the next section, backlash against top-down modernization was the very reason why constitutionalists, such as Ahmed Rıza, insisted on evolutionary change.

The identity and preference sets of challengers

We have seen in the previous sections that secessionism and foreign interference with domestic affairs had been threatening the Empire's integrity by the time constitutionalist demands resurfaced. We have also seen that secessionism had discredited the ideals of multicultural society (i.e., Ottomanism) and Muslim solidarity, while religious and monarchical allegiances remained persistent despite discontent with authoritarianism. This section examines the type of ideologies and strategies that regime contenders developed to deal with the Empire's domestic and foreign policy problems, namely, disintegration of Ottoman society, the role of religion, and the question of the administrative apparatus with a focus on the Young Turks. I combine historical analysis with a content analysis in order to grasp the contextual meaning ascribed to each strategic and ideological issue dimension. I show that the popularity and feasibility of ideologies and strategies changed over time in response to the environmental changes outlined in the previous section. In response to environmental changes, some challengers revised their preferences, while others had to de-prioritize the issue dimensions on which they disagree with other contenders before taking part in the oppositional coalition. Specifically, the Young Turks perceived of constitutionalism as *the* solution to preserve imperial integrity –rather a democratic reform.

Visions of society on the brink of imperial disintegration

We have seen that the multicultural imperial society model fractured once nationalist movements mushroomed among Christian and Muslim minorities of the Empire but Turkish nationalism was yet to flourish. Through contacts with Western Europe, Christian communities, such as the Greeks, the Bulgarians, and the Armenians, among others, learned about nationalism and developed the ideal of their own nation-state. These communities saw the formation of nation state as the first step towards realizing themselves as a nation, after having been subject to the Ottoman yoke for centuries, which had left them with economic and political underdevelopment. To develop their people's consciousness about national identity, these nationalist movements appealed as much to myths and history as religion. Religious differences between their community and the Ottoman state, that is, Christianity vs. Islam, proved to be an effective tool in mobilizing people. Thus, religion complemented nationalism for non-Muslim secessionists.

On the flipside, Ottoman government officials also used religious identity/differences in framing independence movements (Boyar, 2006, pp. 49–51). This was, as noted before, a consequence of the millet system, for which religious identities constituted an administrative category. In addition, having been a bureaucratic empire for centuries, Ottoman officials evaluated independence movements within the center-periphery paradigm, and therefore, had hard time understanding and acknowledging that nationalist uprisings differed from the sort of unrests that the Empire had experienced before. The vocabulary used in the official historiography to describe nationalist movements and nationalists communicates us that officials perceived of nationalists as a few “ungrateful” subjects instigating disorder (Boyar, 2007, p. 43). That is, nationalists were called rebels (*isyancı*), conveying the idea of resistance against the state with the purpose of creating disorder, and nationalist movements revolts as uprisings (*ihtilal*)—the same wording used to describe the Kuleli Affair and tax revolts (Boyar, 2007, pp. 45–55). This mentality explains why Ottoman governments initially devised military strategies to suppress these movements and subsequently adopted special reforms for peoples of the ‘rebellious’ regions after military capacity declined. In short, Ottoman governments shifted from sticks to carrots strategy due to poor state capacity. As independence demands received foreign support, Ottoman governments promoted Ottomanism as a strategy to rewire Christians’ loyalties towards the Empire. We have seen that Ottomanism

never became popular among Christian minorities. On the other hand, Ottomanism was and remained popular for long time among the constitutionalists.

Ottomanism found support particularly among the Young Ottomans, the first generation constitutionalists, some of which played active roles also among the Young Turks. Although younger constitutionalists embraced Turkish nationalism, Ottomanism remained powerful until the early 1900s, which is interesting considering that the Ottoman public had begun turning away from this ideology. From their writings of Ottomanist constitutionalists, we understand that patriotism underlay the attachment to the imperial identity (Ateş, 2009; Mardin, 1983). These constitutionalists saw non-Muslims as fellow future citizens of a constitutional empire. As I will explain in the following section, both the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks came from diverse ethnic backgrounds, which, to them, was validation enough that the imperial society could be revived. That said, the Ottomanist constitutionalists were not unaware of nationalism spreading across the Empire. They hung on to this ideology, in part because they perceived themselves to be the essential element of the Empire, which ascribed to them the duty to save the fatherland. It follows that the constitutionalists, like Ottoman statesmen, evaluated ethnic nationalisms within the center-periphery paradigm. Also, embracing Turkish nationalism meant to acknowledge territorial losses in, particularly, the Balkans and the Middle East. Yet, most Young Turks, as most Young Ottomans, came from the Balkan regions. In other words, to them, the Balkans were the fatherland that they needed to save.

Ottomanism lost support at the turn of the century after independence movements sprung to Muslim communities in the Balkans. These developments forced the constitutionalists to acknowledge nationalism. It is important to note that what we call “Turks” today referred mainly to the Muslims in the Balkans and Anatolia. Of all peoples of the Empire, these communities were the last to develop nationalism. Unlike Balkan nationalisms, Turkish nationalism did not develop as a result of contacts with the West but of Tartar intellectuals in the late 1890s.³² Their contacts with the West had inspired the first generation constitutionalists to develop Ottomanism. On the other hand, even though Turkish/Turkish replaced “Ottoman,” both terms bore cultural connotations rather than ethnic ones (Hanioglu, 2008, p. 296). As I explain below, ethnic Turkish

³² For more information on the emergence of Turkish nationalism see (Akçura, 1991; Copeaux, 2006; Gökalp, 1959; Khalid, 1998; Shissler, 2003).

nationalists were in minority among Turkish nationalists. Most nationalist Young Turks used Turkish to mean Ottoman, which, as we have seen in the previous section, referred to the ruling class and the founding element of the Empire. To them, Turkishness constituted an overarching identity that encompassed the non-Muslims (Boyar, 2007; Hanioglu, 1981, p. 219; Mardin, 1983). In other words, Turkish nationalists were *not* assimilationist. Turkish nationalism outcompeted Ottomanism in the 1900s (Hanioglu, 2001). Nevertheless, Ottomanism survived until discredited by the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars, which lost the Empire a large portion of its lands in the Balkans, home to most Young Turks (Zürcher, 2010, p. 211).

Ethnic Turkish nationalism known as Turkism developed in parallel to Turkish nationalism. This variant of Turkish nationalism never became as popular as the mother ideology. It found most support among in the Balkans, namely, Kosovo, Monastir and Thessaloniki, because it was in these regions that Christian nationalist movements clashed most with Muslim peoples that also lived in the region. Having witnessed the rise of independence demands and how they received foreign support at the expense of the Muslims, these Ottoman constitutionalists developed an ethnicity-based version of Turkish nationalism. Ethnic Turkish nationalism saw assimilation as a long-term solution to suppress secessionist tendencies of minorities. Overall, the vision of an imperial society promoted by Ottomanism and the vision of a national society preached by Turkish nationalism and Turkism competed among the constitutionalism as potential solutions to societal disintegration.

A major difference between the Ottoman constitutionalists' nationalism and secessionists' nationalism pertained to the role of religion in politics. As mentioned above, religion complemented secessionists' nationalist propaganda given that the state that they challenged had been a Muslim one. The constitutionalists found themselves in a complicated situation. Most constitutionalists held the same religious identity as the government that they were rebelling against. Nevertheless, the first generation constitutionalists, the Young Ottomans, fervently believed that the Sharia was compatible with constitution and parliamentarianism (Mardin, 2000). Having witnessed how top-down secularization reforms adopted under Abdülhamid II's three predecessors had alienated both the Muslims and non-Muslims, these intellectuals believed that Islam could mitigate societal reactions to constitutional reforms. Theirs was a synthetic pro-reform position in the long-standing debate that Westernization had induced in the Ottoman

Empire, that is, whether it was possible to politically, technologically, and economically modernize while retaining one's own identity and culture (Berkes, 1964).

The belief in the compatibility of the Sharia and constitution received a first challenge during the drafting of the 1876 Constitutions. The constitutional committee, in which some Young Ottomans served, faced the following dilemma: how to accommodate national representation and ensure the supremacy of the Sharia. On the one hand, the whole purpose of constitutional parliamentarianism was to enhance the non-Muslims' loyalty by including them in the decision making. On the other hand, there was distrust in Christian communities; would/could Christian deputies use parliamentary channels to further their secessionist plans? For non-Muslims to truly engage in parliamentary politics, the Parliament had to be a veritable legislative organ. However, a powerful Parliament could also bypass the executive and pass laws in favor of independence demands and/or against the Sharia (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 114). These reservations had led commissioners to design a consultative legislative parliament (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 115). In other words, the constitutionalists had betrayed the very principles that they had been advocating for. While in sessions, parliamentary proceedings were frequently paralyzed due to the polarization between Muslim and Christian deputies (Shaw, 1977; Tanör, 1997). Christian deputies had indeed mobilized their co-ethnics against the Sultan's regime (see the closure of the Parliament in the previous section). This experience had discredited the parliamentary regime in the eyes of the Sultan and the public.

Against this backdrop, most Young Turks lacked the conviction in the compatibility of the Sharia and constitution. In addition, as I will explain in the next section, the Young Turks emerged from within the Royal Military Academy of Medicine, where they were exposed to positivism as a scientific method of investigation. They believed that the same positivist principles could apply to government; constitutional parliamentarianism could remedy imperial disintegration by checking the executive and providing participation and representation to Christian minorities. On the other hand, a rational government also demanded a secular approach (Hanioğlu, 1981, pp. 10–30). Consequently, some founding fathers of the Young Turks were fervent positivists and secularists, such as Abdullah Cevdet and Ahmed Rıza (Hanioğlu, 1981).

Regardless of their personal opinions about the role of religion, the Young Turks were aware that they had to mobilize people and that people continued to maintain strong religious allegiances to religion. They had observed Abdülhamid II to rebuild Muslim communities' trust using a theocratic discourse. Given the state of public opinion, some

secularist Young Turks generated religious propaganda. Others such as Abdullah Cevdet, Prens Sabahaddin, and Ahmed Rıza did not. Non-secularist Young Turks used religious propaganda to preach either Ottomanism or a society of Muslim believers. These included the former Young Ottomans who turned Young Turks and some older generation constitutionalists, such as Tunalı Hilmi. Thus, although secularism was popular and its popularity rose after the 1900s, the Young Turks embraced a religious discourse in order to mobilize people against the regime. However, this tactic had certain shortcomings. First, they competed with the Sultan who had the advantage of holding the caliph title and dominating the state's infrastructural power. The only way in which the Young Turks would turn the Muslims against the defender of the faith and the caliph was to persuade them that Abdülhamid II was a despot. As mentioned in the previous section, Sunni Islam demanded complete obedience to rulers and condoned resistance only in the case that rulers became despots and abused their powers. Unsurprisingly, most Young Turk journals and pamphlets depicted Abdülhamid II as a despot and called on to Muslims to resist despotism (Ateş, 2009; Hanioglu, 1981, pp. 141–158, n.d.; Mardin, 1983). It should be noted that even though the Young Turks felt no loyalty towards Abdülhamid II they had monarchical allegiances like the Ottoman public. Their criticism was crystallized in the person of the Sultan. Among them, republicans were rare. On the other hand, the constitutionalists were exiled in Europe; their anti-Hamidian propaganda could be effective to the extent that they could circulate their papers. The spy network, authoritarian pressure, and financial constraints often hindered the spread of constitutionalist ideas. Another problem was that appeal to Sunni Islam challenged the internal consistency of Ottomanist Young Turks' discourse. The Ottomanist ideal of multicultural multi-religious society conflicted with the Sunni Islamist propaganda that brought religious differences to the fore. These two complemented each other only under the Sharia and the millet system, which would be the old Ottoman societal structure that did not offer incentives to the non-Muslims in the first place. Overall, unlike the case of secessionists, religion did not fully complement nationalist propaganda.

In sum, saving the fatherland meant restoring the Constitution and the Parliament for the constitutionalists and gaining independence or autonomy for secessionists. We should expect this conflict of interests to give no incentives to either party from cooperation. Nevertheless, as I show in the next section, some constitutionalists cooperated with secessionists more than they cooperated with other constitutionalists.

How to overthrow the Sultan's regime?

For regime challengers, one chief difficulty lies in mobilizing support and resources. Compared to the constitutionalists, secessionists held certain advantages. First, most independence movements operated in the territories that they wanted to liberate. Thus, they were able to directly contact peoples inhabiting these territories. In contrast, the constitutionalists were exiled, cut from direct contact with peoples. Second, most secessionist groups, if not all, enjoyed foreign support to their cause, such as the Armenians and the Bulgarians. The Armenian groups also drew support from their diaspora in Russia and Western Europe. The constitutionalists, however, lacked foreign support to their cause, since France, Britain, and Russia had ceased to support imperial integrity. As I explain in the following chapter, the latter sought financial and political support from Britain and France; Britain showed modest interest. Third, secessionists had a clear ideology, nationalism. Moreover, religion complemented their nationalist discourse. As we have seen, the constitutionalists lacked a clear ideology with which to mobilize people and religion did not quite play into their cause. Finally, because secessionists received foreign support and that the military weakness did not allow the use of force, the Sultan could not do much to counter ethnic independence movements. Yet, he could inflict damages on the constitutionalists by exiling them, taking diplomatic action with the embassies of the host countries, chasing them via the spy network, and persecuting their relatives living in the Empire. Thus, the regime could hurt the constitutionalists' cause more than it could hurt secessionists' cause. Beyond these structural issues, there were resource constraints that applied to all regime challengers.

First, mobilizing people for regime change required time and resources. The issue of time posed a strategic choice: Challengers could wait until after people gained consciousness to carry out a popular revolution or make a smaller scale revolution or coup by rallying their supporters. As mentioned in the theory chapter, challengers in all contexts had to face this choice, such as the Bolsheviks vs. the Mensheviks. In the Ottoman case, secessionists' comparative advantage lay in that their peoples had already gained consciousness of their national identity, whereas most patriotic Ottomans considered themselves to be Muslim subjects of the Sultan. This difference meant that the constitutionalists faced a longer timeframe if they envisioned a popular revolution. Alternatively, they had to carry out a coup. This choice animated a heated debate among the constitutionalists: The evolutionary strategy referred to the idea that people had to gain consciousness about rights, liberties, and popular sovereignty first, then the Sultan

should be overthrown with a popular uprising lest rapid political change unsettled order. According to this 'evolutionary change' position, a popular movement should establish constitutionalism, which, however, required people gaining consciousness (Mardin, 1983, pp. 81–123, 177–223). As we shall see, proponents of this strategy included leaders, such as Ahmed Rıza and Mizancı Murat. The alternative was rapid change called the revolutionary strategy. For revolutionaries, the Empire could not afford to wait until people developed consciousness about constitutionalism, when separatism, wars, and colonial invasions threatened imperial integrity (Ateş, 2009). Also, there was the problem that Muslim communities were on average less literate than the non-Muslim ones. As one prominent Young Turk, Sabahaddin Bey, put it, "how can a society that does not read and looks down on serious studies achieve progress and carry out a radical change?" (Hanioglu, 2001, p. 86). Thus, the priority of saving the fatherland called for action.

Revolutionaries faced further difficulties. Resource mobilization and drawing support from local popular came at the top of the list. One way to handle this problem was to obtain foreign assistance. As mentioned earlier, secessionists received more sympathy and support in Europe; some—like the Bulgarians or the Armenians—already enjoyed foreign support, while others—such as the Macedonians—were actively seeking. As regards the constitutionalists, foreign support was limited due to the conflict of interests on imperial integrity (Mardin, 1983). Also, even if such cooperation were to happen, there was the problem of justifying a foreign sponsored coup to Ottoman public that featured strong foreign dislike! It should be noted that secessionists competed for limited foreign resources. Thus, even for these challengers, who had comparative advantage to the constitutionalists, foreign sponsorship was uneasy to obtain.

The alternative was to free ride on a more resourceful group or pool resources with an equally resourceful group. The benefits of cooperation/free riding comprised spreading resistance to peoples of vaster lands and access to more wherewithal. On the flipside, such cooperation made groups dependent on the more resourceful partner or their collaborator. There was also the problem of ideologically justifying this collaboration to supporters. In the case of secessionists, cooperation was problematic if groups competed on the same territories or if they envisioned different polities. For example, the Armenian Dashnaktsutjun or the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party (SDHP) did not collaborate for long time, because the ARF sought autonomy and not independence as did the SDHP, or Greek revolutionaries refused to work with the Macedonians for they coveted the lands that the latter claimed.

For the constitutionalists, resource mobilization was more difficult than any other challenger, since they were exiled and lacked foreign support (Hanioglu, 2001, pp. 5–7). These constraints rendered cooperation with secessionists appealing. Also, cooperating with secessionists allowed for mobilizing peoples in the territories beyond the constitutionalists' sphere of influence—which was not large to begin with. On the other hand, ideologically legitimizing such cooperation would be very hard for the constitutionalists due to deep public distrust towards the non-Muslims.

Overall, given the objectives, available strategic options often contradicted ideological principles of challengers'. For the constitutionalists, constitutional transition via evolutionary change required time, which the Empire did not have. Revolutionary change, on the other hand, required resources, which was hard to mobilize from exile while undergoing financial constraints. Therefore, the constitutionalists had to consider cooperating with foreign states or secessionists. These short-term issue-based alliances, however, had considerable audience costs. Secessionists faced similar audience costs for cooperation with the constitutionalists or another secessionist laying claims on the same territory. However, resource shortages were less alarming for secessionists, because they operated on the lands that they claimed and some received foreign support. Regardless of comparative advantages, I explain in the following section that strategic constraints forced all challengers to compromise their ideological preferences to a certain extent to build short-term cooperation against the regime.

Patterns of interactions among challengers

In this section, I examine the patterns of interactions among challengers in order to identify which actors engaged in long-term cooperation and among which others cooperation was limited to short-term issue-based cooperation. I also identify the purpose of each instance of cooperation. The discussion focuses on the constitutionalists, since the latter actually envisioned regime change unlike secessionists who pursued a state building project. Using the identified patterns, the next section conducts a longitudinal network analysis to test the effects of preferences on ideological and strategic issues on cooperation. This section shows that cooperation sustained only in the cases where challengers' preferences converged on strategies. Groups whose strategies mismatched also cooperated, but such cooperation did not sustain to propel long-term cooperation. I

further show that preference convergence on strategies responded to environmental transformations, which compelled challengers to revise and re-prioritize their preferences on issue dimensions.

The rise of a heterogeneous opposition front demanding liberalization

In 1889, a group of medical students at the Royal Military Medical Academy founded the Ottoman Union Society –which later became the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Not many documentation on the foundations of this Society have reached to this day, partly because the Hamidian repression and spies intimidated intellectuals of the period and forced them to live underground lives (Mardin, 1983, p. 32). As Mardin puts it, repression generated “collective neurosis,” making intellectuals feel guilty before even being accused by the regime (Mardin, 1983, p. 32). Because of this neurosis, we do not have detailed accounts of the precursors of the Committee. Still, historians agree that the Young Turks had links to the Young Ottomans, the first generation constitutionalists that first raised constitutional demands in the 1860s (Ahmad, 1999; Aksin, 2009; Hanioglu, 1981; Mardin, 1983; Ramsaur & Tunaya, 1982). As mentioned earlier, the Young Ottomans were dismissed and exiled after 1877, following the prorogation of the Parliament. Nevertheless, some Young Ottomans continued to pursue contentious activities from exile and those persistent challengers assumed important roles in the Young Turk movement (Mardin, 1983, pp. 34–35). Among them were İsmail Kemal, Sami Paşazade Sezai, and Mizancı Murad, some prominent members of the Young Turk movement. I will return to the Young Ottomans when discussing the Young Turks’ demands and ideas in the next section. For the moment, I will introduce the various Young Turk factions and relations among them.

The Rise of the Young Turks and the Committee of the Union and Progress as an umbrella organization

The Young Turks were heterogeneous in terms of ethno-religious identities as well as preferences. In terms of identities, Hanioglu notes that “none of the original founders of the committee was of Turkish origin” (Hanioglu, 2008, p. 145). Yet, they all came from regions wherein Muslim groups found themselves threatened by Christian communities, such as Albanians, Circassians, and Kurds ” (Hanioglu, 2008, p. 145). For example, of the founding members, Abdullah Cevdet and İshak Sukuti were Kurdish, Mehmet Reşit was

Circassian, İbrahim Ethem (Temo) was Albanian, Konyalı Hikmet Emin was an Anatolian Turk, while Ahmed Rıza, the future leader of the CUP was half Austrian half Turkish. Such ethnic diversity existed also among the Young Ottomans. Of the three constitutionalists that figured in both movements, Murad Bey was from Dagestan and Kemal Bey from Albania, while Sami Paşazade Sezai was half Ottoman half Georgian. Although Muslims were overrepresented among the Young Turks, non-Muslims, especially Jews, played non-negligible roles in the movement, but their number dwindled after 1902. There is also evidence of links between freemasons and the Young Turks (Hanioglu, 1989; Mardin, 1983). As mentioned earlier, the Young Turks, like the Ottoman public, displayed a certain level of mistrust towards Christian communities, which was partly a product of their personal experiences.

As regards socioeconomic origins, the Young Turks came predominantly from middle classes. However, this statement does not veritably convey the position of the Young Turks within the societal structure of Ottoman society and vis-à-vis the government. It would be more accurate to say that they belonged to middle and lower ranks of the ruling class. The Ottoman ruling class in the 19th century consisted of the ulema (or *ilmiye*—men of religion), the military (*askeriye*), and the civil bureaucracy (*mülkiye*—including *kalemiye*—the scribal service— and the palace service) (Findley, 1980, pp. 13–15). That most Young Turks belonged to ruling classes is significant in and of itself; it indicates the extent to which the Hamidian regime was alienated.

The heterogeneous socioeconomic composition of the Young Turks is quite telling about the extent to which the regime is alienated from the society: In spite of different grievances about the regime, these contenders from different socioeconomic and ethno-religious backgrounds came together and formed the Young Turks. How did they come to work together? The answer lies in the context in which Abdülhamid II stepped to the throne.

When enthroned in 1876, Abdülhamid II faced a constitutionalist coalition, which comprised high military officers, the Şeyhülislam (the highest rank of the ulema), and bureaucrats. This coalition had overthrown his uncle Sultan Abdülaziz in May 1876 with a coup, which had resulted in the Sultan's death and his brother Murad V's accession to the throne. This coup left significant impacts on Abdülhamid II, who replaced Murad V—who had to step down some months later due to mental instability, as well as on Ottoman politics. The 1876 coup was one of the rare dethronement incidents in Ottoman history. It followed from the cooperation between the then Young Ottoman leader, Mithad Pasha and

high military officers, while Şeyhülislam Hasan Hayrullah Efendi legalized the coup by approving Abdülaziz's forced dethronement. The coup constituted the final stage of long-existing discontent with the top-down modernization reforms program that Abdülaziz's grand viziers had been conducting —the previous section elaborated on the sociopolitical implications of the modernization program. It is worth looking at the dynamics of this coup and identify environmental constraints, which helps better understand how preference sets of the constitutionalists took shape.

The 1876 coup succeeded the Revolt of the Softas (the students of the religious schools). The softas, like most other groups in society, had been long dissatisfied with the Empire's declining economy and territorial losses. On May 8th, they took the streets accusing Sultan Abdülaziz's government of cowardice in the face of large-scale massacres of Muslims and European intervention that ensued from the revolts in Bulgaria. The softas demanded the dismissal of the Şeyhülislam and the grand vizier and succeeded in getting the Sultan appoint to these posts Mithad Pasha and Hasan Hayrullah Efendi, neither of whom the Sultan appreciated (Shaw, 1977, p. 163). These new appointees struck an alliance with the military and overthrew Sultan Abdülaziz. The same coalition offered the throne to Abdülhamid II on the condition that he proclaimed a constitution and a parliament. Abdülhamid II agreed and stepped to the throne.

Immediately his enthronement, the Sultan formed a constitutional committee to draft the 1876 Constitution, to which Mithad Pasha participated. We do not know for sure the extent to which Abdülhamid II wanted constitutional regime at that time. It could be that his hopes were crashed after the brief experience with the parliamentary regime or that he was an autocrat all along. What empirical evidence suggests is that he found himself in the face of a military-ulema-Young Ottoman coalition so powerful that it counterpoised the powers of the Sultan. Having seen his uncle murdered, he knew that his reign would only be secure if he compromised with these groups or if he curbed their power. Therefore, throughout his reign, he worked to weaken these groups by centralizing decision making, following a diplomacy-based foreign policy, and using censorship and exile. Of the ulema, Abdülhamid II was most suspicious —those who ran into the Şeyhülislam in the street had to pretend not having seen him (Mardin, 1983, p. 73). The Sultan excluded the ulema from its modernization reforms and left this institution to follow the course of its decay. Cut from the decision making, most members of the military, the bureaucracy, and the ulema found themselves in the opposition rank and populated CUP branches despite steep costs of regime challenge.

Shortly after its foundation at the Royal Medical School, the CUP attracted the regime's attention. Spies infiltrated schools. Personal correspondences were inspected. Conversations were monitored to the extent that it became impossible for a group of four to have a conversation without arousing suspicion. Nevertheless, CUP members successfully circulated handwritten papers among medical students and students of other academies. In the mid 1890s, the CUP started to circulate *Mechveret* (a French spelling of the Arabic word consultation) in Turkish and *Mechveret Supplément Français* in French, where prominent CUP members, such as Ahmed Rıza, Halil Ganem, Şerafeddin Mağmumi, Hoca Kadri, and Abdullah Cevdet penned articles. As such 'dangerous material' entered in circulation the regime intensified arrests and controls. Although the CUP was able to branch out, regime persecution induced the leadership to move its headquarters to Paris in 1896.

As mentioned earlier, the CUP was an umbrella organization. The Paris branch steered and oversaw activities of affiliated branches within and without the Empire. In 1897, Mizancı Murad took over the CUP leadership from Ali Şefkati, because the military and ulema wings of disapproved of Ahmed Rıza's strong positivist ideas. In the same year, Murad Bey compromised with the Sultan. According to this accord, the Sultan would implement reforms and the Young Turks would discontinue regime contention (Hanioğlu, 1981, p. 34). Murad Bey kept to his part of the agreement and officially closed down the organization and all affiliated branches in the Empire, including the Paris and Geneva ones (Hanioğlu, 1981, p. 34). Uncompromising Young Turks tried to pursue propaganda activities in Geneva and Cairo. Yet, they were uncoordinated and scattered. One group led by Ahmed Rıza contained proponents of positivism and non-revolutionary regime change. Another group included opponents of Ahmed Rıza and positivism (Hanioğlu, 1981, pp. 33–34). A third group comprised revolutionaries like Tunalı Hilmi and constitutionalist military officers (Ateş, 2009). The single achievement of the period was İbrahim Temo's founding constitutionalist branches in the Balkans (Hanioğlu, 1981, p. 34).

Over the next three years, Young Turk publications appeared as regularly as these challengers could finance them. The Sultan's government took diplomatic actions with the Swiss and French authorities requesting the deportation of the Young Turks and the cessation of their seditious publishing. The Swiss authorities did not comply with the Sultan's demands. The Sultan's government offered money and positions to some Young Turks, such as Abdullah Cevdet and Tunalı Hilmi. The latter took the money to publish more seditious material (Hanioğlu, 1981, p. 35). In 1898, the Sultan dissolved whatever

had remained from the Damascus branch. In 1899, the Cairo branch closed down after the khedive of Egypt withdrew his support from the Young Turks.³³ The remaining Young Turks, still disunited, worked from Geneva. One faction contained revolutionary Young Turks. Another faction led by Tunalı Hilmi was also revolutionary but it made Islamist Ottomanist propaganda. These two briefly worked together and parted ways in 1900 (Ateş, 2009). The revolutionary faction stayed in touch with Ahmed Rıza. However, the latter's objection to revolutionary change impeded a merger and cooperation. Overall, following the closure of the CUP, the constitutionalist movement lost momentum.

Attempts of unification

Contentious activities revived after Prens Sabahaddin, the Sultan's nephew, joined opposition circles in 1900. Prens Sabahaddin was a fervent defender of liberalism and secularism, and an Ottomanist (the ideology advocating for a multicultural society of Ottoman nationals), who envisaged modernizing the Empire by establishing a British-style representative government with checks and balances and promoting individualism and free enterprise (Mardin, 1983, pp. 291–300). These ideas challenging the Islamist authoritarian foundations of his rule, the Sultan persecuted Prens Sabahaddin, his brother Prens Lûtfullah, and his father Damat Mahmud Pasha. Seeing Abdülhamid II's resistance to political modernization, Prens Sabahaddin envisaged a coup to abdicate the Sultan. He began to sponsor Young Turk factions to garner support for the coup. Revolutionary factions were quick to respond affirmatively, but Ahmed Rıza was uninspired by Prens Sabahaddin. Prens Sabahaddin set out to organize a congress in order to unify scattered constitutionalists and draw a roadmap for overthrowing the Sultan's government. These efforts produced the 1902 Congress of Ottoman Opposition in Paris, which brought together representatives of regime challenging groups, including constitutionalists and secessionists.

During negotiations, disagreements on strategic and ideological issues trumped challengers' shared interests in collaborating against the government and impeded the formation of an oppositional coalition. Most participants left the Congress with the

³³ Cairo initially provided a suitable environment. Although still legally part of the Ottoman territory, Egypt had an autonomous administration. The khedive had allowed the constitutionalist movement to form a branch in Cairo, because he was cross with Abdülhamid II and had interest in supporting challengers to the Sultan's regime (Ateş, 2009; Hanioglu, 1981). However, this cooperation broke down once the conflict of interests between the constitutionalists, who wanted imperial integrity, and the khedive, who promoted Egyptian nationalism and envisioned independence from the Empire, surfaced.

conviction that certain irreconcilable differences were so insurmountable that a united opposition front was unlikely in the medium run. Irreconcilable differences centered on the acceptability of revolutionary regime change, the acceptability of foreign assistance to regime change, and the acceptability of cooperation with secessionist groups (Hanioğlu, 2001). With respect to these issues, two main factions and various small factions emerged from within the constitutionalist movement; the majority led by Prens Sabahaddin, the minority (also called the coalition for it subsumed the Ahmed Rıza faction and revolutionaries), and minor Young Turk groups (Hanioğlu, 2001).

On the subject of revolutionary vs. non-revolutionary change, the majority and most minor factions advocated for revolutionary change. The minority contained revolutionaries, but because Ahmed Rıza had the leadership this faction remained non-revolutionary until 1905. As regards foreign assistance to regime change, the majority thought that having the support of European Great Powers was useful in terms of both garnering resources and gaining international recognition for the new government. For the minority, expecting the Great Powers to leave once Abdülhamid II stepped down was a naïve idea considering the momentum of colonial invasions and economic exploitation via capitulations. Minor groups fell on both sides. Finally, on whether to cooperate with secessionists, the majority was in favor for similar pragmatic reasons as their argument for foreign assistance: Secessionist groups had wherewithal. The minority, on the other hand, opposed cooperation with secessionists, because the latter sought independence while the Young Turks worked for imperial integrity.

At its first meeting, the majority adopted the name *Osmanlı Hürriyetperverân Cemiyeti* (Ottoman Freedom-lovers Committee –OFLC from here on) and began to publish the periodical *Osmanlı* (Ottoman) (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 11–12). As mentioned earlier, the majority advocated for revolutionary change and was led by Prens Sabahaddin, who had been envisaging a coup against the Sultan's regime. As a first step, the majority contacted European embassies to seek support and financial assistance to their coup plans. Although they managed to get some recognition from Britain, most European states showed no interests. Meanwhile, the OFLC contacted the Albanian, Macedonian and Armenian secessionist groups. The Armenian and Macedonian groups refused to cooperate, whereas the deal with the Albanian groups caused tensions with the OFLC. Greek OFLC members strongly opposed the idea of a European intervention to accelerate Albanian independence (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 15–19).

While cooperation initiatives failed, the OFLC sought financial assistance to carry out a coup against the Sultan. The khedive of Egypt and some European bankers lent money to the OFLC, but the British government declined (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 20–21). Prens Sabahaddin sent İsmail Kemal to purchase a vessel with which to carry out a coup. However, İsmail Kemal later communicated the committee that he was duped, but sources indicate that this money went to Greeks who had interests in Albania (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 22–23).³⁴ In 1903, the majority was further challenged by the unexpected death of Damad Mahmud Pasha –Prens Sabahaddin’s father and Abdülhamid II’s son in law, whose position in the dynasty provided prestige to the movement– and Prens Sabahaddin’s brother Prens Lûtfullah’s arrest. By the end of 1903, the OFLC had lost momentum. Prens Sabahaddin announced that he would devote himself to scientific research. However, he later formed another committee.

While the OFLC plotted a coup, the minority was experiencing organizational problems. Ahmed Rıza aspired to become the leader of the Young Turks. However, most Young Turks disapproved of his positivist stance (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 29–30). Moreover, the minority involved revolutionary factions and followers of Ahmed Rıza, who was a fervent supporter of evolutionary regime change. In that, Ahmed Rıza believed that people needed to be enlightened about constitutionalism and rights lest top-down rapid change would create adverse societal consequences (Mardin, 2006, pp. 167–170). In this process, both Ahmed Rıza and the revolutionaries postponed the resolution of the acceptability of revolutionary change. Ahmed Rıza ended up dominating the minority and this faction began issuing non-revolutionary publication, *Şûra-yî Ümmet* (Council of the People) in May 1902 (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 30). *Şûra-yî Ümmet* was smuggled into the Empire through French post offices and Egypt. The Sultan’s government immediately pressured the French and Egyptian authorities to get them to cease this publication’s circulation, which indicates that the Sultan seriously feared that the minority might have become the basis of the constitutionalist movement. Neither the khedive nor the French authorities honored the Sultan’s demand.

Despite their mistrust in secessionists, the minority contacted the Armenian secessionist groups, Greek groups, and European liberals to discuss possibilities of cooperation against the Sultan. This initiative did not suffice to motivate secessionists for

³⁴ According to Hanioğlu, this coup attempt had a noteworthy impact although it failed; it was the only instance where the British support was obtained (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 26).

cooperation, who were disturbed by the nationalist and anti-Christian tendencies within the minority (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 45–47). Thus, although the minority behaved pragmatically secessionists continued to highly prioritize the issue of the society type, whereby the conflict of preferences on this ideological mattered hindered cooperation.

The minor Young Turk factions that emerged from the 1902 Congress included the Tunalı Hilmi faction, the faction of old CUP members of Albanian origin, la *Fédération Ottomane*, the Edhem Ruhi group, the Abdullah Cevdet group, old CUP members' group organized around the journals *Anadolu* (Anatolia) and *Türk* (Turk), and the Young Turk groups in the Balkans, including those organized around the journals *Muvazene* (Equilibrium), *Efkâr-î Umumiye* (Public Opinion), *Drita* (the Light) and *Islahat* (Reform), as well as the *Feryad* Committee (the Cry Committee), the Muslimanska Narodna Organizacija (The Muslim National Organization), and *Cemiyet-i İslâmiye* (the Islamic Society) (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 78–51).³⁵ Of these, Edhem Ruhi briefly cooperated with the majority then turned to the minority. Others gravitated around the minority. On the other hand, cooperation broke down between the minority and the Abdullah Cevdet group (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 53–56). Abdullah Cevdet tried to work with the majority but the latter turned him down (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 82). These minor groups issued 'seditious' publications that attracted the Ottoman intelligence's attention. They also organized and mobilized local population in the regions where they operated. One noteworthy development was the adherence of Ahmed Celâleddin Pasha, the chief of the Ottoman intelligence service (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 80–81).

In 1904, Prens Sabahaddin reappeared with a new committee and project that had a potential to persuade the secessionists —which had turned the minority down— for cooperation against the Sultan. His decentralization program, inspired by Britain's devolution and decentralized administration, involved establishing local elected governments in the provinces, through which all Ottoman subjects, regardless of ethno-religious background, would find representation according to proportional representation and participate in the decision making (Kevorkian, 2011, p. 27). Decentralization would create the conditions conducive to peaceful coexistence of the Muslims and Christians by moderating the Turkish element in the Empire and desist ethno-religious minorities from seeking independence (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 83–85). Prens Sabahaddin founded *Teşebbüs-*

³⁵ Not all these factions were formed immediately after 1902. Also, some discontinued. For more information, see (Hanioğlu, 2001).

i Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti (the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization) (LPID from here on) and began publishing the journal *Terakki* (Progress) in order to mobilize support for his decentralization plan. These initiatives deepened the minority's trust in Prens Sabahaddin. For the minority, decentralization plan would but accelerate separatism and serve Great Power interests.

The rise of a coherent oppositional coalition

In 1905, the constitutionalists had been fragmented for almost a decade since the umbrella organization the CUP closed down in 1897 and the constitutionalists found themselves fragmented. We have seen that since, the constitutionalists made successive attempts at reunification but none had succeeded due to disagreements on certain strategic and ideological issues. In 1905, a constitutionalist, Bahaeddin Şakir, developed a plan to build a revolutionary pragmatic organization to overthrow the Hamidian regime (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 130). Bahaeddin Bey shared his plan with the minority's top leadership -- excluding Ahmed Rıza-- and stressed the immediacy of overthrowing the Abdülhamid II lest the Great Powers and secessionists would disintegrate the Empire. The leadership of the minority had long been making this point, but had not been able to pass it by non-revolutionary Ahmed Rıza. The CPU thus emerged as a result of the collaboration between Bahaeddin Şakir and the revolutionaries within the minority, of which Ahmed Rıza was not informed.³⁶ The expressed objective was the resuscitation of the CUP. Yet, Bahaeddin Şakir envisioned a real revolutionary pragmatic organization. In an attempt to facilitate the overthrow of the Sultan's government, Bahaeddin Bey sought cooperation with other revolutionaries, including the Armenian committees and Prens Sabahaddin (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 130).

³⁶ The rise of the CPU owed essentially to Bahaeddin Şakir, who was a former graduate of the Royal Medical Academy, personal physician of Yusuf İzzeddin Efendi--the second Ottoman prince in the line of succession to the throne, and a close friend of Ahmed Celâleddin Pasha--the former head of the Ottoman intelligence service who became the protector of the Young Turks (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 130). Bahaeddin Şakir had been holding close ties to the minority and had financed the organization in 1905. After the Sultan's government discovered this relationship, he was banished and the doctor fled to Paris. In Paris, he began his career in the Young Turk movement as the emissary of Yusuf İzzeddin Efendi. Bahaeddin Şakir introduced his strategic shift plan to the top leadership of the minority without informing Ahmed Rıza. The plan found support among the leadership and this faction de facto founded the CPU. Once Ahmed Rıza found out about the CPU, he was enraged, since he considered himself to be the natural leader of the movement (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 132).

Bahaeddin Şakir first contacted Prens Sabahaddin to discuss possibilities of cooperation. Prens Sabahaddin turned this offer down, because he was hoping to cooperate with the Armenian committees himself in constructing an organizational network in Eastern Anatolia.³⁷ In June 1906, Bahaeddin Şakir approached the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party (SDHP) together with Diran Kelekiyan, responsible for the political section of the *Journal du Caire* and a close friend of Ahmed Celâleddin Pasha—the former head of the Ottoman Intelligence Service—and of Prince Yusuf İzzedin (Kevorkian, 2011, p. 30). This initiative initiated a negotiation process, during which the CPU and the SHDP tackled the issue of the status of Armenia. According to Kevorkian, the CPU delegation sincerely considered the project of autonomous Armeni. Yet, negotiations broke down after the CPU rejected the idea of an Armenian parliament, a local executive council to approve the governor, and right to participate to budget-making (Kevorkian, 2011, p. 33). Even though ideological disagreements hindered the possibility of cooperation, this initiative altered the SHDP's perception of the Young Turks, whom they thought to be all nationalists who could not tolerate ethnic minorities' demands for autonomy—they had the minority in mind. The CPU's openness to consider an autonomous Armenia made them receptive to future initiatives by the CPU.

After being turned down by the SDHP and Prens Sabahaddin, Bahaeddin Bey focused on building an internally consistent revolutionary committee (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 136). Ideologically, he was a pragmatist. Instead of drawing up a new framework to specify the stance of the group, he reiterated the program of the minority penned by Ahmed Rıza in 1902 (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 138). This program pursued a nationalistic and patriotic agenda advocating for a unitary Ottoman state, in which members of minority groups would have equal rights and freedoms as Turks on an individual basis (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 140). This program contradicted Bahaeddin Bey's views about cooperation with secessionists, and yet he accepted, because he needed to compromise in order to build a coherent revolutionary organization. However, the official program drove certain eminent members away. One such member was Ahmed Saib, who would become an influential leader mobilizing the constitutionalists in Egypt. This breakup turned out to be costly for the CPU. Due to this ideological disagreement, Ahmed Saib refused to help the CPU form

³⁷ Armenian committees had incentive to work with Prens Sabahaddin because the latter, unlike the CPU, already had some organizational basis on which they could expand upon.

branches in Egypt. Also, Ahmed Saib worked independently for a while before joining Prens Sabahaddin, Abdullah Cevdet, and the Armenian committees.

Between 1906 and 1907, the CPU formed semi-autonomous branches (in the model of the Dashnaktsutiun or the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF)) to distribute propaganda material, and recruit and train new members (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 146). The branches in Bulgaria, Romania, Crete, Cyprus, and Caucasus were responsible for mobilizing local population and developing ties with other revolutionaries. Within this framework, the CPU began cooperating with the Albanian Aromenis (Kutzo-Vlach) organization, Greeks in Macedonia, Tartar nationalist intellectuals (such as İsmail Gaspîralî (Gasprinskii)), as well as Azerbaijani and Bosnian Muslim intellectuals (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 147–65). On the other hand, the branches in the Empire were specialized to recruit “*fedayi*” (self-sacrificing volunteers) (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 144).

While the CPU significantly extended his organizational and alliance networks from 1905 to 1907, cooperation with other revolutionaries did not rest on solid ground. Some of its allies had conflicts of interests and discords among themselves, such as the Tatar communities and the Armenian Committees. Such conflicts forced the CPU to choose a side and choices came at the expense of losing a partner—in the Armenian-Tatar conflict, Bahaeddin Şakir stood with the Tatars against the Armenians (Kevorkian, 2011, pp. 43–44).

Rivalry for the leadership of the Young Turks

The CPU was not the only organization trying to reunite the challengers. As mentioned earlier, Prens Sabahaddin had been working on cooperating with others as well. The Prens Sabahaddin-led LPID began cooperating with the ARF and the SDHP on the basis of his decentralization plan in 1905, which would last until 1908 (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 95–121; Kevorkian, 2011, pp. 26–29; Sohrabi, 2011, pp. 96–98). These parties on built a bogus organization *la Ligue Constitutionnelle Ottomane* (the Ottoman Constitutional League—OCL from here on) in order to mobilize people in Eastern regions (Kevorkian, 2011, p. 27). This coalition further cooperated in mobilizing people in the Black Sea region.

As Prens Sabahaddin was enlarging his organizational network, Ahmed Saib, Abdullah Cevdet, and Tunalı Hilmi—who had parted ways with the minority—joined forces with Prens Sabahaddin and the OCL (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 142). This coalition reached out to the Macedonian independence groups like the IMRO, the Azeri socialists, and the Arabs (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 96–99). Furthermore, it played an active role in the

outbreak of rebellions in Eastern Anatolia against the Sultan's regime between 1905 and 1907 –the most influential one being the unrest in Diyar-ı Bekir (Diyarbakır today) and rebellions in Erzurum (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 91-94-108).³⁸

Turning to the CPU, Bahaeddin Bey resumed his initiatives to cooperate with the Armenian committees. In 1907, the CPU delegation met with the ARF's representatives. During negotiations, the ARF accepted to make concessions on the project of an autonomous Armenia and considered a centralized Ottoman state (Kevorkian, 2011, p. 43). However, negotiations broke down after one ARF member published an article in Prens Sabahaddin's *Terakki* journal accusing the CPU of pursuing an Islamist policy that neglected the Christian element of the Empire (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 192). Next, the CPU approached the SHDP. Yet, this initiative failed as well due to Ahmed Rıza's objections to consider the idea of an autonomous Armenia (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 192). On the other hand, the rupture between the CPU and the SDHP allowed for a rapprochement between the ARF and the SHDP, which had not been collaborating (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 193).

Despite the failed cooperation attempts with the Armenians and Prens Sabahaddin, the CPU had managed to develop a large enough his organizational network to attract other organizations. One such organization was *Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti* (the Ottoman Freedom Society –OFS from here on). Founded in 1906 in Salonica, the OFS had several high-rank military officers as members, including Talat Bey—an old disgruntled CUP member– and Enver Pasha—a high-rank military officer in the Third Army in Monastir. Enver Pasha was instrumental in recruiting military officers and bureaucrats in Macedonia and Thrace, including Niyazi Bey, who started the revolt that turned into the 1908 Revolution and Kazım Karabekir—one of Mustafa Kemal's leading companions during the Independence War and the republican period (Sohrabi, 2011, p. 90). The OFS did not pursue a specific ideological agenda other than constitutionalism and Turkish nationalism; its members were revolutionaries (Sohrabi, 2011, p. 90). Following the merger with the OFS in 1907, the CPU began infiltrating into state institutions. On the other hand, the CPU came to be seen as a distinctly a nationalist faction after the merger with the OFS.

³⁸ Kévorkian contends the Armenian-LPID coalition's role in the revolt in Diyar-i Bekir. For him, the revolt represented local discontent with pillage and other crimes committed in the villages by the chieftain of the Kurdish Milli tribe, İbrahim, whom Abdülhamid had elevated to the rank of pasha in 1902 (Kevorkian, 2011, pp. 28–29).

Bahaeddin Bey made a final attempt at reuniting challengers. He organized, in collaboration with the ARF, the Second Opposition Congress (December 27-29, 1907).³⁹ This collaboration rested upon the condition that the ARF should agree to maintaining imperial integrity and the Ottoman dynasty, abandoning collective terrorist tactics in Eastern Anatolia, and rejecting foreign assistance to regime change (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 194–95). In return, the CPU should invite a non-nationalist group, the Prens Sabahaddin faction. Of the invitees, The SHDP and most Armenian intellectuals, Bulgarian committees in Macedonia, the IMRO, Greek revolutionaries (*la Ligue Hellénique*), and the Albanian group Aromenis turned down the invitation. Macedonian constitutionalists, the committee of Ottoman Jews and the editorial team of the journal *Hilâfet -Khilafa* (the Caliphate) representing Arab revolutionaries of *Türk Anarşist Cemiyeti* (the Turkish Anarchist Committee) attended the Congress (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 200–2). The participants agreed to armed and unarmed resistance, non-payment of taxes, and generating propaganda in the Ottoman army (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 204).

Like the first one, the Second Opposition Congress failed to unite challengers under an internally consistent oppositional movement. Despite prior agreements and the CPU's revolutionary turn, the ARF and the CPU could not reach an agreement on the content of revolutionary means, while the ARF's socialist ideology alienated the CPU (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 204).⁴⁰ Regardless, the ARF and the CPU agreed to collaborate in distributing propaganda material after the Congress. However, the ARF-CPU cooperation did not play any role in the 1908 Revolution (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 209). This alliance strained the ARF's relations with other Armenian committees and intellectuals. The CPU got some acclaims in European states for its openness to working with ethno-religious groups. Later, the CPU struck a special alliance with the Albanian group Aromenis.

After the Congress, the CPU focused on strengthening its activist branches so to change the regime on its own. In 1908, the number of fedayis joining the CPU increased significantly, while the committee began coordinating local bands in the Balkans and forming an attack force within the military (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 119–123). The CPU was planning on overthrowing the Sultan's government in late 1908. However, the revolution happened earlier than the committee expected.

³⁹ Some sources attribute the initiative to the ARF. Hanioğlu, however, presents documents evincing that in fact it was the CPU that took the initiative (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 194; Kevorkian, 2011, p. 44).

⁴⁰ The ARF proposed forming revolutionary committees to spur local resistances. Yet, the CPU preferred controlling local bands so as not to create disorder (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 204).

In June 1908, Russia's and Britain's plans to partition Macedonia were divulged. A small local Young Turk group initiated a revolt in Resne (Macedonia) on July 3. Despite the Sultan's efforts to suppress it, this revolt expanded to the entire region. Next, the Sultan's commanders, who were sent to the region to restore order, joined the rebellious Young Turks. The leaders of the Young Turks took over the control of the revolt and sent telegrams to foreign representatives to announce themselves as the effective government of the Empire. On July 24, the Sultan relinquished power, and constitutional monarchy was restored (Akşin, 1980; Temo, 1987).

Overall, this survey of interactions among challengers conveys that from 1897 to 1908 numerous attempts to form an oppositional front successively failed. Although certain groups formed issue-based alliances, such as the ones between the CPU and the ARF or the LPID, ARF and SDHP, none of them was strategically consistent, that is, none grounded on a concrete roadmap for regime change. The exception was the alliance between the OFS and the CPU as well as the minor challenger factions in the Balkans. Why did only some of these initiatives fail? I had hypothesized that preference convergence on strategies rather than on ideologies precipitates cooperation. The next section tests this hypothesis using network analysis.

Testing the role of ideologies and strategies on cooperative behavior

In this section, I test the evolution of the role of ideologies and strategies on cooperation patterns among challengers. I use longitudinal network models known as temporal exponential random graph models (TERGM), whose properties were discussed in the methodology section of the theory chapter. This section proceeds as follows: I explain the operationalization of the dependent variable –cooperation for regime change between a pair of challenger groups– and the independent variables –preferences on ideological and strategic issues as identified by the historical analysis. In that, I explain the operationalization of the dependent variable --cooperation for regime change between a pair of challenger groups-- and the independent variables --preferences on ideological and strategic issue dimensions-- in the Ottoman case. In the second subsection, I test the null hypothesis that preferences on ideological and strategic matters have no effect on cooperation for regime change. The third subsection presents the results of the TERGM analyses of the Ottoman dataset and robustness checks. I show that Ottoman challengers

could form a coherent oppositional coalition only after they converged on carrying out a revolution without foreign assistance and cooperation with minorities.

Dependent variable & the unit of analysis in the Ottoman case

As discussed in the theory chapter, the dependent variable is cooperation for regime change in a given year. In the Ottoman case, this takes the form of cooperation for transition from the Hamidian regime in a given year. It is worth reminding that cooperation for regime change concerns all types of activities, legal and illegal, undertaken with the purpose of overthrowing the authoritarian government but does *not* specify the properties of the regime to come. As the historical analysis showed, actors desired different types of regimes, and testing the effect of such differences on cooperation for regime change constitutes the purpose of this research.

Indicators of cooperation comprise collaboration between a pair of challenger groups for generating verbal and written propaganda against the authoritarian regime (including the person of the Sultan, government policies, or the regime's ideology) or to disseminate anti-authoritarian ideas (such as liberty, freedom of speech, independence), and co-sponsoring contentious activities of a private or public nature (such as meetings, protests, uprisings, plotting coups, mobilizing people for revolution).

In coding cooperation, I did not weigh contentious activities by riskiness. That is, plotting a coup has the same value as co-publishing propaganda material. Social movements and regime literatures do not provide theoretical and empirical grounds to justify the assumption that high-risk activities, such as attempting a coup, have greater impact than low-risk activities, say, press campaigns. Rather, systematic low-risk activities might prove to be impactful on the long term. Also, I did not weigh cooperation by how many times a pair of challengers collaborated in undertaking the abovementioned contentious activities. This means, cooperation between some groups A and B to generate propaganda bears the same value 1 (indicating the realization of cooperation contra 0 indicating its non-occurrence) as cooperation between a pair of groups C and D which, say, generated propaganda and plotted a coup together. Concomitantly, some failed cooperation attempt does not cancel out a realized instance cooperation. That is, if groups A and B co-sponsored a small protest in year X but failed to co-sponsor a large-scale demonstration in the same year, I consider A and B in cooperation for that year. This is an implication of not counting instances of cooperation in a given year. The reason for doing

so is that the TERGM techniques do not yet allow for examining graphs with multiple edges between a pair of nodes (Hunter, Handcock, Butts, Goodreau, & Morris, 2008; Lusher, Koskinen, & Robins, 2012).

Another coding decision that I made was to assign information about individual challengers to their respective groups. In that, information in the sources sometimes pertained to groups sometimes to individuals. Since my unit of analysis is groups, I coded information by groups. That is, if sources indicated that some group X and group Y plotted a coup together, I coded this information as cooperation between X and Y. If the information concerned individuals, I transformed the individual-level data into the group-level data (to this end, I constructed a membership dataset to keep track of group affiliations). Also, if sources mentioned cooperation between some individual affiliated with some group G_1 and some group G_2 , I coded this information as cooperation between G_1 and G_2 ; members served as a link between organizations. I kept all relational data in an edgelist that I constructed for each year.

Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis in the Ottoman case is an organized group challenging the authoritarian government with the purpose of changing the regime. This means, unorganized citizens protesting the regime are not included in the analysis. In the Ottoman case, organized challenger groups comprised organized secessionists and constitutionalists. As discussed earlier, challengers founded new factions when their preference set deviated from preference sets of existing groups. Thus, I coded all Ottoman constitutionalists and secessionists voicing a distinct preference set of ideologies and strategies on the dimensions identified in the historical analysis section as one group.

On the other hand, I use a loose definition for “organized groups,” which encompasses institutionalized and weakly institutionalized groups. Institutionalized groups correspond to groups with a charter specifying the purpose of the organization, the scope of activities, and rules guiding its operation and member recruitment (such as the Committee of Progress and Union or the Armenian Revolutionary Federation). However, most challenger organizations did not reach that level of institutionalization. Even though many lacked an identity independent of their leaders, their contentious activities were influential enough to compel the Sultan to persecute and exile them, form a spy network and take diplomatic action towards the European governments to hunt them down, and attempt to coopt them. Weakly institutionalized groups refer to groups organized around

newspapers and publishing houses, as well as factions. I counted newspapers and publishing houses as weakly organized groups, because, besides making propaganda, they served as venues to hold regular meetings, draw up strategies for future opposition activities, and recruit members.⁴¹ Factions were composed of eminent figures and their followers, such as Prens Sabahaddin and his followers. Some emerged from within an organized group due to differences of opinion and insisted on keeping to their distinct preference sets instead of following group decisions—such as the Ahmed Rıza faction. Others were formed outside organizational frameworks, but they themselves did not institutionalize enough to compete with more institutionalized groups such as the CPU or the ARF. It is worth noting that institutionalized or weakly institutionalized, most groups, particularly the constitutionalist ones, survived less than five years. Because groups had generally a low institutionalization level, it was relatively costless for their clientele to found another group if the previous one failed to meet expectations, and they did so.

When there was more than one faction within some organization each retaining a distinct identity, I used ‘factions’ as the unit of analysis instead of the organization itself, because I did not want to miss data. For example, I disaggregated the Committee of Union and Progress into factions, such as followers of Ahmed Rıza or Mizancı Murad or the military and ulema wings, because the evolution of interactions between these factions became decisive in the Committee’s performance (Hanioğlu, 1981). If, however, one faction dominated an organization, such as the Committee of Progress and Union under Bahaeddin Şakir’s leadership, I used the organization as the unit of analysis.

Sometimes, faction leaders closed down some organization to form new ones without much change in the purpose and scope of activities, such as the emergence of the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization following the closure of the Ottoman Freedomlovers Committee by Prens Sabahaddin. So long as the purpose and scope of activities remained unaltered, I coded multiple organizations founded by the same faction as one organization. Yet, if a faction changed the purpose and scope of its activities I coded it as two different entities, such as the case of Tunalı Hilmi who shifted from Ottomanism to Turkism after 1902. Also, if two factions formed a novel institution while retaining their distinct institutional identity, I did not code the child organization as a separate entity. Using these criteria, I ended up with 28 groups, of which 20 were constitutionalist and 8

⁴¹ For more information on the role of press see (Hanioğlu, n.d.; Mardin, 1983, 2000; Tunaya, 1984).

secessionist factions. The table in Appendix II contains the list of groups and abbreviations.

Constructing networks

Using the edgelist, I constructed one cooperation network for each year from 1895 to 1908. Nodes represent groups struggling to overthrow the Sultan's government and edges represent cooperation between a pair of challenger groups.⁴² Since cooperation is reciprocal, networks are undirected. I took 1895 as the starting date, because sources do not provide information on the cooperative behavior of the Young Turks for earlier periods. Also, as mentioned earlier, the first transition came with top-down reforms and the Young Ottomans' activities were not the primary cause of liberalization (Hanioglu, 1981; Mardin, 1983). Therefore, I do not analyze the role of the Young Ottomans on constitutional transition. The analysis ends in 1908 when the transition took place.

Independent variables

As mentioned earlier, grievances in the Ottoman Empire concerned territorial integrity, societal integrity in the face of secessionism-nationalism, the role of religion in politics, and strategic issues. I operationalized territorial integrity as "state type," which is a categorical dummy that becomes "nation state" if a group envisioned nation state and "constitutional monarchy" if it envisaged constitutional monarchy. This variable captures the divergent objectives over imperial integrity, which roughly corresponds to the demarcation between secessionists and constitutionalists—it is worth noting that not all nationalist minority groups sought secession, some wanted local autonomy such as the ARF.

I operationalized the controversy over societal integrity as "society type," a categorical variable that becomes "ottomanists" if a group advocated for imperial citizenship, "Turkish nationalist" if it endorsed Turkish nationalism, "Turkist" if it supported assimilationist ethnic Turkish nationalism, and "minority nationalism" if it championed some nationalism other than these three. Note that society type and state type overlap but are different. As mentioned earlier, not all nationalist minority groups were secessionist and constitutionalist groups included individuals from different ethno-

⁴² I did not use individuals as nodes. Most organizations being clandestine, obtaining complete membership list was not possible.

religious minorities (Hanioglu, 2001). Also, not all constitutionalists envisioned the same society type. Thus, society type captures the difference between those that demand the same state type but different society types. “Secularization” captures preferences on the role of religion in politics. I coded a group’s position (1) if it was secularist or produced secular propaganda, (0.5) if it was secularist but generated religious propaganda, and (0) if it opposed secularism and created religious propaganda.

As regards strategic divides, I constructed the variables “means of regime change,” “noninterventionism,” and “cooperation with secessionists.” Means of regime change concerns preferences about how transition should be carried out. A group is coded as “non-revolutionary” if it proposed change via reforms, and “revolutionary” if it supported transition via revolution or coup but disapproved of terrorist tactics (such as instigating rebellion and disorder in provinces), and “rebel” if it considered revolution, coup, and terrorist tactics. Noninterventionism was about whether to seek foreign assistance for regime change. I coded groups as “interventionist” if they sought foreign assistance and “noninterventionist” otherwise. Cooperation with secessionist groups, which concerns only debates among the constitutionalists, captured positions on whether to collaborate with secessionists. It becomes “yes” if groups were acquiescent and “no” otherwise. Secessionists were coded as not available (NA).

I operationalized all categorical variables using the *nodematch* function and the continuous variables using the *absdiff* function in the *statnet* package (Handcock, Hunter, Butts, Goodreau, & Morris, 2003).

Control variables

I added three control variables in each case. The continuity of actors constitutes a challenge to longitudinal analysis, since factions form, discontinue, or merge. Not all factions coexist at the same time. “Out” controls for continuity, which is a dummy that becomes (1) if an actor does not exist in a given year and (0) otherwise. I operationalized “out” as a node attribute using the *nodecov* function.

Past cooperative behavior gives TERGM its temporality dimension. Theoretically, past cooperation affects future decisions on cooperation. Groups might engage in temporary issue-based cooperation with rivals, as they may renew effective partnerships and break unsuccessful cooperation that they form with groups that have a close position. The variable “past cooperation” indicates whether groups cooperated in the previous year and is operationalized as an edge attribute using the *edgescov* function. Finally, I added

“clustering,” which is a structural network metric capturing the propensity to collaborate with the partner of a partner. High clustering indicates that the network is hierarchical at the local level. That is, groups tend to form partnerships with the partners of their partner. Low clustering suggests that nodes make attachments freely at the local level (Lusher et al., 2012). In other words, some existing alliance with a partner does not induce alliance with the partners of a partner. This metric captures strategic alliances known as “the friend of my friend is my friend,” which might come at the expense of preferences on ideological issues (the friend of one’s friend may hold rather different preferences than one’s self). I measure clustering using the *gwesp* function (fixed).

Remember that the Sultan was able to fracture constitutionalists using cooptation and Sabahaddin’s financing revitalized the movement. To control for the effects of financing, I added “financing from the Sultan” and “financing from another contender.” “Financing from the Sultan” captures the Sultan’s cooptation attempts; it represents the number of times some contender received money from Abdülhamid II. “Financing from another contender” tracks the number of times some contender was sponsored by another contender. Both financing variables are operationalized as numeric node attributes using the *nodecov* function. A statistically significant decrease (increase) in degree means that financing hinders (promotes) cooperation.

The Specification of hypotheses on the Ottoman case

As explained in the theory chapter, this research mainly tests the hypothesis that “the higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among ideologically diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and the more likely there will be either regime change or significant concessions to the opposition.” I test it in three steps: First, I entertain the null hypothesis that ideological and strategic disagreements have no effect on cooperation. If rejected, this would mean that preferences about ideological and strategic issue dimensions affect cooperative behavior. I test this null hypothesis with a logistic regression using the variables ‘past cooperation’ and ‘out’ to control for temporality and ‘financing from the Sultan’ and ‘financing from another contender’ to control for the effects of financial dependencies and cooptation. Hypotheses on the financial variables go as follows:

Financing from the Sultan makes cooperation for regime change more likely.

Financing from another contender makes cooperation for regime change more likely.

I specify the main hypothesis, “*the higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among ideologically diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and the more likely there will be either regime change or significant concessions to the opposition,*” to the issue dimensions of the Ottoman case goes as follows:

Preference similarity on state type will increase the probability that challengers collaborate for regime change.

Preference similarity on society type will increase the probability that challengers collaborate for regime change.

Preference similarity on secularization will increase the probability that challengers collaborate for regime change.

Preference similarity on means of regime change will increase the probability that challengers collaborate for transition.

Preference similarity on noninterventionism (foreign assistance) will increase the probability that challengers collaborate for transition.

Preference similarity on cooperation with secessionists will increase the probability that challengers collaborate for transition.

I test the abovementioned hypotheses using TERGM. As explained in the theory chapter, these hypotheses ground on the preference similarity mechanism and are operationalized using the concept homophily. In the language of TERGM, if preferences have an independent effect on cooperation, their estimates should be statistically significant. Significant positive coefficients suggest that more ties (representing cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random in networks displaying the same number of nodes and edges. Significant negative coefficients indicate that less ties (cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random in networks displaying the same number of nodes and edges. The value of coefficients communicates the rate of change. If preferences on some issue makes no effect on cooperative behavior, we should obtain null effect (meaning that actors enter cooperation regardless of whether their preference aligns with their partner’s on the issue in question). A significant positive estimate suggests that preference alignment on some issue drives

cooperation. That is, on a prioritize issue dimension, actors refrain from cooperating with those that think differently. A significant negative estimate indicates that on that prioritize issue dimension, actors prefer to cooperate with those who think differently than on a given issue (it is worth reminding that Table 1 in the introduction summarizes the possible combinations of the indicator). That is to say, if preference alignment on some issue does not drive cooperation it does not hinder it.

It is worth reminding that I use preference revision as a control variable helping us to distinguish between cooperation that follows from preference alignment on now harmonized preferences and cooperation that follows from (de)prioritization. If preference revision harmonized preferences, we should expect preference similarity to propel cooperation on issues that actors highly prioritize. Controlling for changes in preferences, we want to identify whether preference convergence on strategic issues propelled the rise of an oppositional coalition (long-term cooperation for regime change). To this end, I examine the distribution of preferences of members of the coalition.

Using TERGM and findings from the analyses of the preference evolution and patterns of interaction, I test Hypothesis 2 suggesting that “*cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when challengers react to past failures and new opportunities by deciding to pragmatically revise the priority of preferences on strategic issue dimensions.*” I divide the period of interactions into two (before and after 1902) and explain the method of periodization below.

I test Hypothesis 3, suggesting that “cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when peripheral actors align their preferences to those of an emergent core. I conduct a descriptive network analysis to test this hypothesis, which compares the ideological and strategic positions of the members of the coalition that carried out the 1908 Revolution to those of the groups that stayed out of this coalition. So doing explains why it was a particular group (as opposed to its rivals) was able to spearhead the rise of an oppositional coalition for regime change.

Periodization: I break down the period from 1895 to 1908 into two, the periods between 1895 and 1901 and 1902 and 1908. 1902 is the cut point, because it corresponds to the date of the Ottoman Opposition Congress, after which new factions with new preferences emerged and certain existing factions updated their visions of society and strategies of transition. 1902 is also convenient because Turkish nationalism gained ground in the early 1900s and Ottomanism to the wayside. For example, we observe

Turkist factions only after 1902 –for the proponent groups were formed after the Opposition Congress– and not before. In other words, this periodization controls for such shifts in the preference sets across challengers with respect to a turning point, i.e., 1902. Finally, it is worth reminding that the analysis starts in 1895, because no data were available on constitutionalists’ behavior prior to 1895 (Hanioğlu, 1981; Mardin, 1983)

Effects of ideological and strategic preferences on cooperation for regime change

In this section, I test the effect of preferences with an analysis of the evolution of preferences over time. First, I test the null hypothesis that preferences on issue dimensions other than shared interests in overthrowing the government have no effect on cooperative behavior. Second, I run a TERGM analysis to identify whether and how much each preference influence cooperation among challengers, if ever. I show that preferences make a significant effect on cooperation even after controlling for the variation of their impacts over time.

The Evolution of preferences over time

I analyze the evolution of preferences across issue areas before and after 1902 (for the reasons explained in the previous section). This analysis identifies whether preferences changed over time, and if so, in which direction. Table 2 summarizes the results:

Table 2

	Preference distribution: The Ottoman Case					
	1895-1901			1902-1908		
secularization	min mean median max			min mean median max		
	0 0.45	0.5 1		0 0.53	0.5 1	
	value	counts	%	counts	%	
state type	nation state	4	0.31	5	0.25	
	constitutional monarchy	9	0.69	15	0.75	
society type	minority	6	0.46	6	0.30	
	ottomanism	3	0.23	2	0.10	
	turkish	4	0.31	8	0.40	
	turkism	0	0.00	4	0.20	
strategy of regime change	revolutionary	6	0.46	12	0.60	
	non-revolutionary	3	0.23	3	0.15	
	terrorist	4	0.31	5	0.25	
foreign assistance	no	14	0.64	12	0.60	
	yes	8	0.36	8	0.40	
cooperation with minorities	NA	NA	NA	7	NA	
	no	5	0.36	7	0.54	
	yes	7	0.50	6	0.46	

Table 2 suggests significant shifts in actor's preferences about society type, strategy of regime change, and cooperation with minorities. Changes in perceptions about the role of religion in politics, state type, and foreign assistance were modest.

The shift in preferences is the greatest on the issue of society type. The percentage of support for Ottomanism decreases by more than %50, while Turkism gains ground. We further observe more actors advocating for Turkish nationalism. These findings echo the findings of the contextual analysis. The finding from the analysis of the evolution of preferences enhances the inference that challengers abandon the idea of resuscitating the multicultural Ottoman society and acknowledge the fact that ethno-religious minorities of the Empire are not going to abandon their purpose of founding their own nation state in response to environmental changes (the spread of demands for independence to Muslim minorities). It is ironic that Abdülhamid II had come to this conclusion earlier.⁴³ That said, Ottomanism still finds support. On the other hand, Turkish nationalism finds twice more

⁴³ It is also worth noting that the Sultan was not unaware of the mobilizing power of nationalism in the fin-de-siècle. He could not have promoted Turkish nationalism, since so doing would conflict with his theocratic discourse and also alienate non-Turkish Muslim minorities of the Empire.

support than its assimilationist version, Turkism, after 1902. In other words, most Ottoman constitutionalists perceive minorities as fellow citizens of the future nation state rather than envisaging imposing their culture upon them.

The other significant perception shift happens on the issue of the strategy of regime change. From before to after 1902, support for the non-revolutionary strategy, i.e., the evolutionary strategy, declines from 23% to 15%. The increase from 46% from before 1902 to 60% after 1902 indicates that the revolutionary strategy gained ground. If we compare the number of groups, however, the number of groups advocating for the revolutionary strategy doubles, whereas there are still three groups supporting the evolutionary strategy as before, which indicates that some factions do not revise their preferences despite changes in environmental conditions. We observe a slight increase in the number of groups advocating for the terrorist strategy (from 4 before 1902 to 5 after 1902). This modest increase in support for terrorism has to do with the emergence of new minor terrorist constitutionalist groups.

Concerning cooperation with minorities, there is a significant shift in the percentage of those who oppose this strategic solution (36% before 1902 to 54% after). On the issue of foreign assistance, however, preference change is modest. On the other hand, the change in perceptions about foreign support is also modest, though the number of those opposing it slightly inclines.

We do not observe much perception change on the role of religion in politics and state type. On average, regime contenders become slightly more pro-secularization after 1902. Yet, the median actor continues to believe that religious propaganda is necessary to mobilize people even though they themselves endorse secularization. The shift in perceptions about state type was also modest. Support for constitutional state moved from 69% before 1902 to 75% after 1902, which can be explained by the emergence of new minor constitutionalist groups.

Overall, from before to after 1902, there are more regime contending groups. Of these groups, the majority embraces nationalism, meaning both minority nationalism and versions of Turkish nationalism. Concerning the role of religion in politics, challengers continue to be pragmatic --on average, contenders consider religion to be an effective tool to mobilize people. Shifts in perceptions on strategic matters are significant, however. We see the strategy "revolutionary strategy to change the regime without cooperating with minority groups and foreign states" gaining support. Next, I proceed to testing the null hypothesis.

I test the null hypothesis using a logistic regression (without the preference variables) and a TERGM analysis (with the preference variables). I compare the fitness of the logistic regression to that of the TERGM. Both models span the period from 1895 to 1908. I run the TERGMs using the *ergm* package (Krivitsky et al., 2016). One challenge to choosing between models is the problem of overfitting, that is, whether we are adding too many variables. The Bayesian approach suggests choosing the model with highest posterior probability, that is, the probability of an event after the conditional probability of its occurrence is taken into consideration. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) are two penalty scores to adding variables. The BIC relies on the Bayesian approach, while the AIC uses information theory to calculate the amount of information lost when a model is applied to a dataset. These scores operate in different ways and the penalty term is larger in BIC than in AIC.⁴⁴ Generally, BIC is a more conservative score than AIC. For both scores, the smaller the value the better the model. Table II summarizes the results for the logistic regression without preferences and the TERGM with preferences.

Table 3

⁴⁴ For more information see (Akaike, 1973; Haughton, 1988; Neath & Cavanaugh, 2012).

The period 1895-1908					
	Logistic regression		TERGM		
Variables	Estimate		Estimate	p-value	
edges	-3.55 ***		-4.43	<1e-04	***
	0.15		0.24		
clustering	1.21 ***		1.01	<1e-04	***
	0.13		0.14		
past cooperation	3.31 ***		3.16	<1e-04	***
	0.18		0.19		
financing from the Sultan	0.15 ***		0.16	0.00	**
	0.04		0.05		
financing by another contender	0.17 **		0.08	0.65	
	0.06		0.07		
state type			0.91	<1e-04	***
			0.19		
society type			0.15	0.92	
			0.17		
secularization			-0.65	0.01	*
			0.26		
means of regime change			1.01	< 1e-04	***
			0.16		
foreign assistance			0.75	<1e-04	***
			0.16		
cooperation with secessionists			0.16	0.51	
			0.24		
AIC:	-121653		-122806		
BIC:	-121611		-122724		
standard errors are below the estimates					
significance levels	0 '***'	0.001 '**'	0.01 '*'	0.05 '.'	0.1 ' '

Looking at the AIC and BIC scores, TERGM has smaller AIC and BIC than the logistic regression, which indicates that the former decreases information loss and therefore is a better model than the other. Specifically, there is considerable decrease in BIC—a conservative term, which indicates that the TERGM with which I include the effect of preferences is a better model than the model without the preferences. Based on this finding, we can reject the null hypothesis that preferences do not matter.

Having established that ideological and strategic preferences matter, I proceed to testing the extent to which preference alignment on ideological and strategic matters affect cooperative behavior. As mentioned earlier, I run two longitudinal temporal network models, one on the period before 1902 and the other spanning the period after 1902. To reiterate an earlier point, 1902 is the cut point, because it was only after 1902 that factions

began revising their preferences in response to environmental changes. Robustness checks of these TERGM are available in Appendix III.

Table 4

The Ottoman Empire				
(1895-1901)			(1902-1908)	
Variables				
edges	-4.48 ***		-4.66 ***	
	0.45		0.26	
clustering	1.11 ***		1.86 ***	
	0.23		0.19	
past cooperation	3.72 ***		3.06 ***	
	0.39		0.23	
financing from the Sultan	0.07		-0.29 **	
	0.06		0.25	
financing by other contender	-0.28		0.07	
	0.27		0.07	
state type	1.43 ***		0.24	
	0.36		0.21	
society type	0.32		-0.26	
	0.31		0.20	
secularization	-0.84		-0.86 **	
	0.44		0.31	
means of regime change	1.15 ***		0.21	
	0.28		0.18	
foreign assistance	0.29		0.29	
	0.32		0.18	
cooperation with secessionists	-inf ***		0.11	
	0.00		0.21	
Null Deviance:	9948 on 7176 DoF		3161 on 2280 DoF	
Residual Deviance:	-121570 on 7171 DoF		-15409 on 2268 DoF	
AIC:	-121560		-15385	
BIC:	-121526		-15316	
Note: Cell entries report TERGM coefficients, standard errors (in parentheses), and p-values				
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests)				

According to Table 4, there is a significant shift in the effect of preferences on cooperative behavior from before to after 1902. After 1902, the main predictors of cooperation for regime change are clustering, financing from the Sultan, and the role of

religion in politics. On the other hand, preferences on society state type and the strategic issues turn statistically insignificant from before to after 1902, which indicates that these issues are de-prioritized within the overall set of challengers.

To begin with the role of religion in politics, the estimate turns significant from before to after 1902 but is negative. This communicates that actors are 58% more likely to work with those that hold different views on this matter than themselves. In other words, the actors who hold similar views on the role of religion in politics disagree among themselves on another highly prioritized matter. We need to examine the distribution of preferences among members of the oppositional coalition in order to establish whether preferences converge on this issue or not.

The estimate for society type indicates that actors de-prioritized disagreements on this matter and cooperated with one another regardless between 1895 and 1902. In other words, actors are pragmatic on this dimension. This finding falls in line with the analysis of the evolution of preferences and the historical analysis. It is worth reminding that the analysis of the evolution of preferences found out that support for nationalism of all types increases, whereas support for Ottomanism weakens from before to after 1902. Moreover, the analysis of patterns of interactions revealed that challengers who held different views on the matter (such as Turkish nationalists and secessionists, secessionists and Ottomanists) engaged in cooperation. This falls in line with the hypothesis that de-prioritization of ideological disagreements makes cooperation for regime change more likely. On the other hand, these findings do not tell us anything about the effect of ideological preferences on long-term cooperation, for which we need to examine preference distribution of members of the oppositional coalition.

The estimate of state type turned statistically insignificant from before to after 1902. This means, while preferences alignment on this issue shaped cooperative behavior before 1902 (note that the estimate is positive indicating a preference to work with the like-minded), this issue ceases to affect behavior after 1902. This finding also suggests de-prioritization. The findings from the analysis of the evolution of preferences and that of patterns of interactions fall in line with this result: We know from the analysis of the evolution of preferences that preferences on this matter remain more or less fixed. Furthermore, the analysis patterns of interactions identified instances of cooperation between the constitutionalists and secessionists --e.g., the CPU-ARF-- despite the lack of revisions in preferences on this issue. Together, these findings suggest that this issue is

de-prioritized. In other words, actors postpone the resolution of this disagreement, which accounts for why the issue no longer affects behavior.

As regards strategic issues, preferences about cooperation with minorities and the means of change turn statistically insignificant from before to 1902, whereas preferences about foreign assistance are uninfluential on cooperation patterns all along.

The most significant shift takes place in the area of cooperation with minorities. The negative infinity ($-\infty$) estimate prior to 1902 indicates that disagreements on this issue perfectly predicts the absence of cooperation. Yet, preferences on this matter no longer affected cooperation after 1902. Similarly, actors disregard their disagreements on the means of change, which include revolutionary, non- revolutionary, and terrorist methods of regime change. This falls in line with the results of the analysis of patterns of interactions, which revealed instances of cooperation among those who hold different views on this matter (such as cooperation between minor groups and the minority). Finally, preferences on foreign assistance have null effect on behavior all along. Together, these results seem to imply de-prioritization on strategic matters. Again, as pinpointed by the historical analysis, actors engage in short-term cooperation regardless of their disagreements on strategies (as in the case of the CPU and the ARF). To re-emphasize an earlier point, these findings do not suggest anything about the distribution of preferences among members of the oppositional coalition. To test the effect of preference convergence on the coalition formation, we need to analyze of the distribution of preferences across coalition members, which comes in the next section.

Concerning financial ties, the results indicate that financing from another contender never affect cooperative behavior between 1895 and 1902 (as indicated by the statistically insignificant estimate). In other words, contenders do not feel obliged to work with a challenger simply because the latter finances them. On the other hand, financing from the Sultan is statistically significant and negative after 1902. The estimate indicates that receiving financing from the Sultan increases the likelihood of cooperation between a pair of challengers by 25%. In other words, the Sultan's cooptation attempt backfires as contenders use the money to pursue contentious activities. These findings on the financial variables indicate that when preferences are taken into account, financial dependencies no longer matter, which provides support to the thesis of this study that preferences on various regime dimensions affect dynamics of cooperation for regime change.

Results also identify past cooperation and clustering as strong predictors of cooperation. We understand that there is a strong tendency to cooperate with the partner

of a partner. Also, the estimate for clustering indicates that actors are twice more likely to cooperate with the partner of a partner.

Overall, the results of the TERGM analysis, the analyses of the evolution of preferences, and patterns of interactions together suggest the following: From 1895 to 1908, challengers behaved pragmatically on most ideological and strategic matters and cooperated with those with whom they had disagreements. In other words, actors are more likely to cooperate when they de-prioritize their disagreements on issue dimensions. The evidence is strongest on the issues of state and society types. On the other hand, these findings do not suggest anything about the effect of preference convergence on long-term cooperation, for which we need to analyze of the distribution of preferences across coalition members. In the next section, we will see that there were in fact two rival oppositional coalitions (the CPU-led one and a Prens Sabahaddin-led one) after 1902 and minor faction switch sides between them. This explains why most preferences seem to not affect cooperation.

Preferences of members of the oppositional coalition & the central actor

The TERGM analysis from the last section identified that some issues are de-prioritized. Yet, we are yet to see the distribution of preferences across members of the oppositional coalition to conclude whether preferences about strategic and ideological issues convergence within the coalition. To this end, this section begins with an analysis of the distribution of preferences across members of the coalition. Findings of this analysis complement the findings from the TERGM analysis. Together, they help us test the hypothesis about convergence of strategic and ideological preferences.

The next step is to pinpoint which challenger becomes the center of the oppositional coalition. To this end, I conduct a two-step analysis: First, I identify when actors cooperate more and around this time which actor becomes more central –since being central to a well-connected network signals greater importance for a node than being central to a less connected network. I use the network metric density to examine the evolution of cooperation *density*, with which I pinpoint the years in which challengers were most disunited and when they reunified. The network metric density means how connected a network is taking into account all possible connections in that network. In other words, it represents the ratio of the actual number of ties to the number of all possible ties (Newman, 2010, p. Chapter 6). Thus, if a network has a lot of ties among its

nodes, it is dense –the ratio of the actual number of ties over the number of all possible ties gets close to 1. If a network has few ties, most of possible connections are not made; thus, it is not dense and the ratio in question approaches to $-\infty$.

At the second step, we want to understand which challenger becomes the center of the oppositional coalition. To this end, I compare the importance of each actor of the oppositional coalition. Importance in a coalition means who is central to a coalition network. That is, who is picked by others more frequently as a partner, which can also be reworded as who has more collaborators than others. Having more partners than others in an oppositional coalition indicates that one is more in demand by others as a partner. I operationalize importance using the network metric degree centrality. Degree centrality conveys how well-connected a node is (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It is calculated as below:

$$\frac{d_i(g)}{(n-1)}$$

This formula measures the degree of a given node i in a network (g) divided by the total number of nodes in that network minus the one whose degree centrality is measured. For example, if a node has $(n-1)$ degrees it is connected to all others, thus is central to the network. A node with degrees $(n-2)$ would mean it is connected to everyone except for one node, hence still quite central. In contrast, if a node has but degree 1, we understand that it is only connected to one other node, thus is much less central to the network (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It should be noted that centrality in a network can be measured using other metrics such as closeness or betweenness, among others. However, given that cooperation network is not directional, that is, if node A is linked to node B the link from A to B also implies a link from B to A, since cooperation is reciprocal by nature.⁴⁵

Areas in which preferences converge within the oppositional coalition

In order to establish the distribution of preferences across members of the oppositional coalition, I take the factions that cooperated for more than three years

⁴⁵ For more information on centrality see (Borgatti, 2005; Easley & Kleinberg, 2010; Newman, 2010).

(engage in long-term coalition). Those that joined the coalition in 1908 thus fall outside the scope of this analysis, since instances of cooperation with the coalition after 1905 qualify as short-term cooperation (falling short of three years). Table 5 below examines the distribution of preferences across issue areas within the oppositional coalition led by the CPU, which carried out the 1908 Revolution, and compares it to that of the competing coalition led by Prens Sabahaddin.

Table 5

	Preference distribution				
	The CPU-led oppositional coalition			The Prens Sabahaddin-led coalition	
	min mean max			min mean max	
secularization	00.4 0.62 1			0 0.64 1	
	value	counts	%	counts	%
state type	nation state	0	0.00	2	0.4
	constitutional monarchy	5	51.00	3	0.6
society type	minority nationalism	0	0.00	1	0.2
	ottomanism	1	0.20	2	0.4
	turkish nationalism	4	0.80	2	0.4
	turkism	0	0.00	0	0.00
strategy of regime change	revolutionary	5	1.00	3	0.60
	non-revolutionary	0	0.00	0	0.00
	terrorist	0	0.00	2	0.40
foreign assistance	no	5	1.00	1	0.20
	yes	0	0.00	4	0.80
cooperation with minorities	NA	0	0.00	1	0.2
	no	5	1.00	1	0.2
	yes	0	0.00	3	0.6

According to Table 6, members of the coalition unanimously oppose non-revolutionary and terrorist strategies, foreign assistance, and cooperation with minorities. violence as a means to change the regime. It is worth remembering that the TERGM analysis identified these strategic areas to be de-prioritized (hence having no statistically significant effect on cooperative behavior). Yet, I noted that within the oppositional coalition there might be coherence. The analysis of preference distribution verifies this inference. Strategic convergence does not affect cooperative patterns between members of

the oppositional coalition and others --which explains why the TERGM estimate was insignificant. These findings approve the hypothesis that strategic convergence is necessary for contenders to build sustainable long-term cooperation. Let us now see whether preferences of members of the coalition converge on ideological issues.

On the role of religion, all coalition members prefer a secular regime to than a non-secular one. However, on average, coalition members believe that religious propaganda is necessary to mobilize people. We see that the minimum and maximum values vary between 0.4 and 1, which means that the extremist positions are either full secularism or close to a secular regime but using religious propaganda for mobilization purposes. Concerning state type, all members endorse constitutional regime. In other words, no secessionist is part of the CPU-led coalition that carries out the 1908 Revolution. It is worth reminding that the TERGM identified that this issue area is de-prioritized. Yet, as is the case with the strategic issues, it is still possible that the coalition holds coherent preferences on this matter. In line with this inference, the analysis of the preference distribution pinpoints unanimity on the issue of state type. In line with the hypothesis, preference alignment on this matter drives cooperation among the like-minded (i.e., members of the coalition). Yet, within the entire set of challengers, opinions on this issue do not affect cooperation patterns, since, as identified by historical analysis, coalition to engage in short-term cooperation with others but these instances do not turn into long-term cooperation. This explains why the TERGM estimate is insignificant and yet the oppositional coalition shows coherence on this matter.

Finally, on society type, we see that Turkish nationalism finds more support than Ottomanism. Hence, there is no preference convergence on this matter. It is worth reminding that the TERGM analysis identified this issue area to be de-prioritized under both periods. Together these two findings communicate that coalition members also postpone this disagreement.

Overall, the oppositional coalition shows convergence on all strategic issues, which falls in line with the hypothesis that strategic convergence is necessary for the rise of long-term cooperation for regime change. On the other hand, there is no convergence on all ideological matters. Members are like-minded only on state type and secularization. Preference alignment on these matter make a positive effect on cooperation. These findings enhance the argument that strategic convergence is necessary for the rise of an


oppositional coalition, but convergence of preferences on all ideological areas is neither necessary nor sufficient for factions to build long-term cooperation.

Let us compare this coalition to the one led by Prens Sabahaddin. Members of the Sabahaddin coalition show no convergence on strategic issues. Opinion is divided between revolutionary vs. terrorist means of regime change, as well as whether to take foreign assistance or to cooperate with minorities. On ideological issues, this coalition shows no coherence either. The coalition comprises both secessionists and those who desire nation state (see state type). As regards the role of religion, this coalition parallels the CPU-led coalition in that, on average, members of the Sabahaddin coalition prefer a secular regime but find religious propaganda useful for mobilization. On the other hand, the minimum and maximum values vary between 0 and 1 for this coalition, meaning that members come from all positions of the spectrum. As such, the Sabahaddin-led coalition shows convergence on neither strategic nor ideological issues. Therefore, it is unlikely to signal unity and coherence. As a result, the CPU-led coalition is more likely to emerge as the coalition that carries out regime change.

These results indicate that within some oppositional coalition, actors should be pragmatic on certain issue areas so as to be inclined to postpone their resolutions until after regime change. Evidence from the Ottoman case reveals that factions, which operate under the CPU leadership, share the same preferences on strategic issues but were pragmatic on some ideological issues. This pattern falls in line with the hypothesis that full ideological agreement is hard to achieve; and therefore, cooperation for regime change (long-term cooperation) requires some level of pragmatism. Who was the center though and why? The next compares the centralities of various factions so as to identify which one was more likely to arise as the one that signals unity and coherence.

Finding the center of the coalition

Table 6



According to the graph in Table 5, cooperation peaks in 1897, 1900, 1903 and 1907. Thus, from 1895 to 1908, cooperation density follows a downward trend. We know from the historical analysis that 1897 corresponds to the year when the CUP branches out and under this umbrella organizations different factions successfully cooperate. However, in the same year, the then leader of the CUP compromises with the Sultan and officially closes down the organization. Consequently, the number of active challengers drops significantly. It is worth noting that the calculation of the density takes into account the variation in the number of actors. In other words, I do not calculate density with respect to the number of factions that exist throughout the entire period from 1805 to 1908 — this would have meant to assume that some factions could have cooperated whereas they were even active and present within the same year.


The steep decline from 1897 to 1898 represents the adverse effect of cooptation. We further now that constitutional activities revive after Prens Sabahaddin joins the opposition circles and rekindles contentious activities, which explains the peak in 1900. In 1902, there is another steep fall in cooperation density, which mirrors fractionalization after the 1902 Opposition Congress. Cooperation density momentarily peaks in 1903, when actors attempt to take action together, but the latter's inability to work together results in de-intensification of network density.

Cooperation takes off as of 1906, which corresponds to the year when the CPU begins to reach out to other factions. In 1908, cooperation density shows a local maximum,

which reflects the formation of oppositional alliances among a subset of actors. Importantly, there is an association with the emergence of the CPU and reunification. There were other local maxima prior to 1906, but the graph shows a succeeding decline. Therefore, these peaks represent temporary issue-based cooperation. In contrast, cooperation density steadily augments after 1906, which reflects the rise of oppositional movements among a subset of actors.

The analysis of the distribution of preferences identified the CPU as the coalition that was more likely to signal unity and coherence than the Prens Sabahaddin-led coalition. Let us compare the degree centralities of rival coalitions to see whether our inference holds. As identified in the historical analysis, three eminent figures of the constitutional movement were Prens Sabahaddin, Ahmed Rıza, and the CPU in the period after 1897. I exclude the period before 1897, since the CPU operates as an umbrella organization until then. Table 7 represents the evolution of degree centralities of these actors.

Table 7



According to Table 7, Prens Sabahaddin is most central to oppositional coalitions in 1900 and 1901, which are the years when he joins the constitutionalist circles and begins to organize the 1902 Congress. His centrality declines after 1902, dips in 1902 and 1904, and re-escalates as of 1906. Ahmed Rıza's centrality to the constitutionalist movement declines steadily from 1898 to 1901. We know from historical analysis that the latter finds himself isolated due to his insistence on using an evolutionary strategy and positivism. From 1902 to 1905, he becomes central to the movement and his centrality surpasses Prens Sabahaddin's. After 1905, Ahmed Rıza again loses his centrality and joins the CPU

in 1907—which explains why this centrality score goes down to 0. The CPU’s centrality is zero until 1905, since it does not exist before. However, it starts off with a high centrality score right away, which equals Ahmed Rıza’s score in 1905 and 1906. All factions that are connected to Ahmed Rıza are also connected to the CPU in this year. In 1907, Ahmed Rıza officially joins the CPU and the CPU becomes central to the movement. We understand that the CPU takes over the leadership from Ahmed Rıza. In 1908, the CPU has the highest degree centrality –the modest decline from 1907 to 1908 results from the merger with the Ottoman Freedom Society.⁴⁶

High degree centralities of Prens Sabahaddin and the CPU indicate that two coalition formations are taking shape between 1905 and 1908, one led by Prens Sabahaddin and the other spearheaded by the CPU. Although both actors’ centrality increases in this period, the CPU surpasses Prens Sabahaddin in terms of centrality.

Let me reiterate the finding from the analysis of preference distribution within rival coalitions:

Members of the CPU-led coalition concur on Turkish nationalism and using religious propaganda for mobilization purposes. Moreover, the official program of the group (as copied from Ahmed Rıza) also advocate for these preferences. In contrast, the Prens Sabahaddin-led coalition involve Turkish nationalists, ottomanists, and secessionists envisaging to build their own nation states. Moreover, Prens Sabahaddin, himself, supports Ottomanism, which loses salience among both challengers and the public as of 1902. Thus, the CPU-led coalition is ideologically more coherent.

Strategically, the CPU’s official strategy has been advocating for the most salient preferences among challengers (as identified by the analysis of the evolution of preferences): revolutionary change without cooperation with secessionists and foreign assistance. All members of the CPU-led coalition share this strategy. Thus, the CPU-led coalition was homogenous in terms of preferences on strategic matters in addition to converging on preferences about ideological matters. In contrast, members of the Prens Sabahaddin-led coalition are divided between terrorist and revolutionary means of change (remember that the formation of the OCL is conditional upon the Armenians relinquishing terrorist means in Eastern Anatolia). On the cooperation with secessionists and foreign

⁴⁶ The number of actors goes down by one, but this change singularly affects the CPU-led coalition because the OFS belonged to that coalition. The PS-led coalition is unaffected from the change in the number of nodes, since the OFS was not part of that coalition.

assistance, preferences of the constitutionalists, who are part of the Prens Sabahaddin-led coalition, align. Thus, this coalition displayed preference similarity on some strategic matters but not on all. In addition, the strategic preferences that they argue for loses salience after 1902 as identified in the analysis of preference evolution in the earlier section. Thus, both the analysis of preference distribution and of centrality suggest the following: Compared to the Prens Sabahaddin-led coalition that lacks strategic coherence and advocates for unpopular preferences, the CPU is more likely to resonate with other factions and rise as the center of an oppositional movement.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the effect of preferences on ideological and strategic issues on regime challengers' ability to cooperate for regime change and form a coherent oppositional coalition. Combining historical analysis and network analysis, I tested the three hypotheses: *"The higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among ideologically diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and the more likely there will be either regime change or significant concessions to the opposition."* *"Cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when challengers react to past failures and new opportunities by deciding to pragmatically revise the priority of preferences on strategic issue dimensions."* *"Cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when peripheral actors align their preferences to those of an emergent core."*

The major finding was preference convergence on strategic matters after 1902: After 1902, a subset of challengers aligns their preferences about the revolutionary means of regime change without cooperation with secessionists and foreign assistance. This convergence follows in part from preference revision that respond to shifts in environmental conditions. It is worth reminding that the acceleration of colonial invasions and secessionism discredit the preferences "cooperate with secessionists" and "seek foreign assistance." That territorial integrity falls at stake precipitate actors to reconsider their priorities and update preferences. For example, after 1902, ideological disagreements on nationalism vs. imperial identity become obsolete, since territorial

integrity constitutes an urgent problem. Because of this urgency, actors shift focus on strategic matters.

Concerning the direction of preference shifts, the preference subset suggesting “carry out a revolution without cooperation with secessionists and foreign assistance” became popular after 1902. Other preference sets do not disappear. For example, Prens Sabahaddin advocates for “carrying out a revolution and using terrorist means if necessary and cooperate with secessionists and take foreign assistance.” However, by virtue of advocating for the most popular set of strategies, the CPU is a better position to attract other challenger factions than Prens Sabahaddin. Moreover, the Prens Sabahaddin-led coalition lacks coherence across preferences about means of regime change and those about society and state types. Both pieces of evidence from the composition of rival factions indicates that postponing the resolution of certain issues facilitates cooperation among challengers.

CHAPTER 4 Transition to Constitutional Monarchy in Bourbon France

What conditions enable diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their ideological preferences, to achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status quo? In this chapter, I will examine this question using the case of transition to constitutional monarchy in Bourbon France in 1830. I test the following hypotheses: Contender groups become more likely to cooperate for regime change if they converge on a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if any). Preference convergence on strategies and the de-prioritization of ideological disagreements (if any) prepares the rise of a coherent oppositional coalition that capable of signaling unity and coherence, hence potential to overthrow the regime if necessary or extract considerable concessions. This case study covers the period from the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty to the throne in 1814 to 1830 when France transitioned back to constitutional monarchy with a revolution. I focus on the role of cooperation among challengers to the Bourbon regime on regime change.

As was the case with the Ottoman Empire, we should talk about a transition back to constitutional monarchy, because the Bourbon regime was a relatively moderate parliamentary monarchy under its first King, Louis XVIII, but turned authoritarian once his successor Charles X took the throne. On the other hand, unlike in the Ottoman case, the parliamentary chambers continued to convene after the authoritarian revival. Challengers to the Bourbon regime did not seek regime change to save their fatherland as was the case in the Ottoman Empire. Nor did they engage in contentious activities because of grievances about taxation. Theirs was a struggle for survival; in a turbulent context where the regime consistently underwent regime crises, each political faction vied for power and once in power it worked to prevent other from accessing power and even annihilate them.

In a nutshell, the Bourbon monarchy was established in 1814 at the Congress of Vienna. In the same year, Louis XVIII promulgated the Charter of 1814. This Charter instituted a bicameral parliamentary system but also accorded the executive, legislative and judiciary powers to the king. The King organized elections for the chambers, which regularly held sessions from 1815 to 1830 when Charles X dissolved the Parliament without announcing an election date in early 1830. The dissolution of the Parliament triggered a regime crisis and unleashed the revolutionary process that ended with the

abdication of the King and transition to the July Monarchy, a constitutional parliamentary regime.

As in the Ottoman case, the 1830 Revolution represented the endpoint of a series of conflicts over different dimensions of the Bourbon Monarchy, including the limits of the suffrage, the role of religion in politics, the balance of power between the executive and the legislative branches, and civil liberties (particularly, the freedoms of expression and reunion). As we shall see, part of these grievances were the ramifications of the societal conflict between monarchism and republicanism, which rooted back in the 1789 Revolution. Some emanated from the imbalances inherent in the structure of the Bourbon regime. As I will explain, the Bourbon monarchy was a façade parliamentary monarchy. Ministers were responsible to the King and not to the Parliament. Therefore, any project of law proposed by a minister from a political faction that was not supported by the Parliamentary majority opposed the Chamber to the executive branch. Because the two branches of the government were rarely controlled by a same faction, tensions between the Parliament and the government systematically produced and reproduced regime crises, hence declining the regime's effectiveness and raising the public's dissatisfaction with the Monarchy. At the level of the political elite, the imbalance between the branches of the government rendered the issues of suffrage and administrative decentralization very controversial. Political factions vied for office and power to modify the limits of these regimes to their favor. Concomitantly, factions in power tried to prevent rivals from accessing office by any means possible, including the use of violence, gerrymandering, and conspiracies. In return, rivals also turned violent. Thus, the Bourbon regime regularly experienced illiberal episodes.

This chapter is structured as follows: I begin by conducting a historical analysis to establish the nature of the Bourbon regime, its sociopolitical environment, and the issue dimensions shaping the debate on regime type. The second section uses historical analysis in combination with content analysis to identify who the relevant actors are and how their preference sets look like. I contrast and compare groups' ideologies and strategies to pinpoint the roots of disagreements and comprehend why actors believed that a certain strategy or ideology to be *the* solution to France's problems. This analysis builds on a content analysis of memoirs, pamphlets, and articles by prominent figures of each group, as well as secondary sources written on groups and their members following the procedure that I detailed in the previous chapter. I show that French challengers gradually came to

endorse a regime of checks and balances because they understood that without putting constitutional limits on the executive no faction could ensure political survival.

In the third section, I examine I begin by examining the evolution of actors' preferences over time so as to control for preference revision. I look at the evolution of cooperation density over time in order to pinpoint temporal variation in the intensity of cooperative behavior with respect to temporal changes in the number of actors. So doing allows for normalizing cooperation density (whether we observe enough cooperation among challengers given the possible amount of cooperation in a given year), which, in turn, helps avoid spurious inferences, such as concluding that there are not enough observed instances of cooperation when there are not enough groups. I apply the findings from the historical analysis to longitudinal network models with which I measure the relative effect of preference convergence on each preference type (ideological or strategic) on cooperation. To identify which mechanisms were at work, I evaluate these results with respect to the findings of the analysis of the evolution of preferences over time. Finally, I examine the composition of the coalition network and preference sets of the core and peripheral actors in order to verify strategic convergence among members of the oppositional coalition and identify whether such a coalition involved all pragmatic actors or some pragmatists and some idealists. This chapter concludes that an oppositional movement took shape around the independents, because this faction advocated for the salient ideological and strategic preferences and its members had converged on a particular means of transition unlike others.

The nature of the authoritarian regime and its sociopolitical environment

In this section, I analyze the structure of the Bourbon regime and the type of policy problems that it faced. Specifically, I examine the 1814 Charter to pinpoint the imbalances in the structure of the Monarchy with which to make sense of the type of problems that the regime experienced. Next, I trace their evolution of these issues so as to comprehend the stakes (*enjeu*) related to them. This analysis reveals specific contextual meaning of each problem and how these different issues came to entangle. Specifically, it shows that

the problems that the Bourbon Monarchy experienced were all sequels of an unresolved conflict between republicans and monarchists since 1789. By polarizing and radicalizing factions, this ongoing conflict generated a struggle for survival in which each political faction often turned to violence to ensure survival, annihilate and/or prevent rivals' access to positions of power.

The Bourbon Monarchy: Efforts to restore societal unity in a war-wearied society

The Bourbon Monarchy was reinstated in 1814 at the Vienna Congress that convened following Napoléon Bonaparte's defeat at Waterloo. Shortly after taking the throne, Bourbon King Louis XVIII proclaimed the Constitutional Charter of 1814 (June 4, 1814). The Allies restored the Bourbon dynasty to the throne in an attempt to check imperialist and revolutionary tendencies in France (Bertaud, 2009, pp. 286–309; Meadwell, 2001, p. 172).⁴⁷ French royalist groups known as the Chevaliers de la Foi were already organizing demonstrations in Bordeaux and Paris to lobby for monarchical restoration before the war came to an end (Alexander, 2004, p. 2; Beck, 1974, pp. 53–55). These demonstrations were far from reflecting general sentiments in French society. In the mid-1810s, bonapartism and republicanism still found considerable public support.⁴⁸ In addition to not reflecting the general tendency of public opinion, the Bourbon Monarchy had a legitimacy problem: French society and the political class held mixed opinions concerning how well a foreign-made constitution, the 1814 Charter, could remedy France's problems.⁴⁹ Still, the Allies and royalists in France were optimistic that the Bourbon Monarchy could bring back political stability and societal reconciliation to war-wearied France (Rosanvallon, 2007).

The idea behind the Charter of 1814 was to induce political factions and citizens to turn to institutional means to resolve disputes rather than armed revolt as had been the trend since the Revolution (Alexander, 2004, p. 9). At the same time, the Charter would

⁴⁷ The Allies ruled out empire and republic among options for the post-1814 French regime because both forms of government had instigated wars in the European state system. For more information on the Allies' position towards the new French regime see (Jarrett, 2014; Meadwell, 2001; Schroeder, 1994; Vick, 2014).

⁴⁸ For more information on royalists and societal reactions in France after Waterloo see (Kroen, 2000; Resnick, 1966; Yvert, 2013).

⁴⁹ Most arguments against the incompatibility of a British-style constitution revolved around Britain's centuries-long experience with parliamentary checks on the monarch, which contrasted with French absolutism. Yet, Madame de Staël also pointed at religious differences. Herself a protestant, Madame de Staël contended that Protestantism was more compatible to a regime of liberties than Catholicism (Girard, 1985, p. 39; Staël, 2008).

relocate power in the king so that extremist tendencies would not affect policy making. Therefore, unlike all constitutions issued since 1789, the Constitutional Charter of 1814 restored authority in the king.⁵⁰ The king held the powers to command land and sea forces, declare war, and make treaties of peace, alliance and commerce, as well as the necessary regulations and ordinances for the execution of the laws and the security of the state ("Charte constitutionnelle du 1814," 1814, pp. 363, 365). What gave this monarchy its parliamentary character were the upper and lower chambers. The Chamber was bicameral and the king retained his veto power over legislation so as to preempt parliamentary tyranny ("Charte constitutionnelle du 1814," 1814, pp. 364–68). In addition, the Charter limited the Parliament's competences to checking the constitutional conformity of legislation while attributing the powers to nominate and institute judges to the King ("Charte constitutionnelle du 1814," 1814, pp. 368–69). Moreover, the Charter instituted a restricted suffrage where only the wealthy had the right to vote ("Constitution française du 1814," 1814, p. 367). These arrangements and particularly the disfranchisement excluded the Jacobins and bonapartist extremists from the decision making.

As regards state-society relations, the Charter reiterated the fundamental rights of citizens and the principle of religious toleration that all constitutions since 1791 had featured. Yet, differently from the previous constitutions, the 1814 Charter made Catholicism the official religion ("Charte constitutionnelle du 1814," 1814, p. 364). Also, the Charter was non-binding. Similar to the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, the Charter was granted to citizens as a courtesy of the king and its survival rested upon the latter's goodwill. By implication, the monarch could revoke his constitutional right to destroy the Parliament as well as and the freedoms that the Charter instituted whenever he wanted. As such, the Bourbon monarchy represented as a step back from the previous republican regimes that grounded on popular sovereignty and an irrevocable constitution.

Thus, the Bourbon Parliamentary Monarchy had numerous parliamentary and democratic limitations. We will see how these shortcomings bred and fed the problems that the regime experienced. Democratic limitations posed less of a problem under the first king, Louis XVIII (1814-1824). However, they served as leverage to authoritarian

⁵⁰ For more information on the king's competences under the previous constitutions see ("Constitution de la République Française du 1795)," 1795, "Constitution de la République française du 1799," 1799, "Constitution Française du 3 Septembre 1791," 1791, "Constitution Girondine," 1793, "Sénatus-consulte organique du 1804," 1804).

retrenchment under his successor Charles X (1824-1830), how had absolutist tendencies. We will see that Charles X's attempts to govern as a traditional authoritarian monarch met resistance from the Parliament and society. Over his 6-year reign, societal actors' frustration with the authoritarian revival accumulated and finally exploded with in July 1830.

Besides the problems inherent to the structure of the regime, the Bourbon Monarchy stepped in an unaccommodating political environment. Shortly after the Hundred Days –when Bonaparte had returned from exile and taken power– royalist and clerical factions in southern France rose up to persecute their ‘enemies’, which referred to supporters the Emperor, rich protestants, and the federalists (*les fédérés*)⁵¹ (Resnick, 1966, p. 116). These popular uprisings lasted about a year and caused the death of hundreds of civilians, because the army turned a blind eye to the massacres by intentionally remaining passive (Resnick, 1966). Therefore, this episode came to be known as the *Second White Terror* for reminding the Jacobin terror (*terreur*)⁵² under the First Republic and the First Constitutional Monarchy.⁵³ This appellation was more than a pun. It signaled that the Bourbon Monarchy would have to deal with societal polarization and confrontation over regime type. Having described the structure of the regime and its sociopolitical environment, I turn to the type of problems that the Bourbon Monarchy experienced.

Regime problems and grievances under the Bourbon Monarchy

In this section, I explain the type of problems that stemmed from the structural flaws of the 1814 Charter and how they played out in the unsettled political environment of the Bourbon society. I show that confrontation over regime type divided into a number of what might be called “technical issues” that galvanized parliamentary factions as well as grassroots organizations.

⁵¹ Members of the local federations that formed to prevent counterrevolution after 1789 and resurfaced during the Hundred Days. For further information on the fédérés see (Alexander, 1991; Edmonds, 1983; Hanson, 2003).

⁵² In terms of death toll, the Jacobin Terror outweighs the White Terror. For more information see (Resnick, 1966).

⁵³ For detailed information on the White Terror see (Alexander, 1991; Resnick, 1966).

The first regime crisis broke out as early as the Parliament convened with respect to the issue of ministerial responsibility. Ministerial responsibility referred to the question of whether the cabinet's role consisted of mediation between the king and the chambers—in which case ministers needed parliamentary support to remain in post—or due implementation of royal will—in which case they remain in post even in the absence of parliamentary backing. On this issue, the Parliament evoked its right as the representative of public opinion and demanded that ministers amend the projects of laws unsupported by the chambers. The cabinet retaliated by raising the issue of suffrage restriction. How could the Parliament claim to represent public opinion when only the wealthy held the right to vote? Deep down, the question of ministerial responsibility touched upon the legitimacy of the regime. In that, questioning ministers' legitimacy equaled questioning the legitimacy of the monarchy since the king appointed ministers and both legislative and executive powers emanated from the monarch. Thus, contending parliamentary powers was problematic for royalists who were the very supporters of the Bourbon Monarchy. We will see that over time many revised their position and endorsed a British-style parliamentary monarchy with checks and balances.

Thus, the issues of ministerial responsibility and suffrage restrictions were entangled right from the beginning. This issue bundle had other ramifications: Besides the issue of who would get to vote, election results varied by how much autonomy local authorities had in administering districts and organizing electoral campaigns. Hence, the suffrage, in turn, raised the issue of administrative centralization vs. local autonomy (I will call this issue the decentralization issue from here on). Centralized administration allowed the government to gerrymander, manipulate electoral lists, pass laws to hinder rivals' electoral campaigns, and take other actions to steer the electoral process according to its interests. In contrast, local autonomy strengthened rival factions by granting the freedom to duly conduct electoral campaigns and protection from the encroachments of the central administration. Intricate to the issues of local autonomy and the suffrage was the controversy over the Church's role in administration and education. Church network provided an effective tool for mobilization in provinces. It was through the Church network that royalists had mobilized towards the end of the Napoleonic Wars and during the Second White Terror. Also, when royalists were in power, the Church worked for the royalist cause even under local autonomy. For rival factions, the strategy to ensure political survival was to simultaneously institute local autonomy and restrain the Church's role in

sociopolitical life. Thus, ministerial responsibility, parliamentary powers, suffrage restriction, administrative decentralization, and the role of religion in politics played out in conjunction with each other.

One might not expect the seemingly technical issues like ministerial responsibility to preoccupy the average citizen. Yet, they did, because all of these issues had a history going back to the 1789 Revolution. The Bourbon regime inherited these issues from the previous regimes since the latter not only failed to solve them but also reproduced them only to further entangle them with each other. In order for us to fully understand the stakes attached to these issues, we need to know their contextual meanings. To this end, the next section conducts a historical analysis spanning from the aftermath of 1789 to 1814 with which to elucidate how each issue emerged and tied into the others.

Legacy of past conflicts: The Emergence of the main axes of conflict

The debate on parliamentary powers roots back to the ancient regime (*l'Ancien régime*). The ancient regime had accorded equal weight to votes of all estates. Yet, because the nobility and the clergy would always stick together, the Third Estate (*le tiers état*) systematically found itself outvoted, which created frustration among lower classes. The process whereby this frustration resulted in the 1789 Revolution will not be discussed here. Yet, the evolution of the debate on parliamentary powers in the aftermath of the Revolution is worth examining considering our purposes. By examining the evolution of the debate on parliamentary powers from the first constitutional monarchy to the fall of the First Empire, I will explain why the division of powers between the executive and legislative acquired so much importance. Specifically, we will see that the radicalism of the first republican regime left such a bitter taste that the republican group itself fractured into sub-factions and monarchists became more radical in return.

Founding a republic and abolishing the monarchy had not crossed the minds of the revolutionaries who carried out the Revolution in 1789 and worked in the National Assembly until 1791 (Fitzsimmons, 2002; Rosanvallon, 2007).⁵⁴ Back in the summer of

⁵⁴ Fitzsimmons' analysis of primary documents reveals that representatives of the Third Estate who attended the meetings on May 4, 1789 aimed to resolve financial difficulties and reform the voting procedure. Fitzsimmons evinces that neither revolutionaries nor the aristocrats and the clergy—who supported revolutionaries—had been planning a revolution (Fitzsimmons, 2002, pp. 33–68). For a similar

1789 and the aftermath of the Revolution, the idea was to reform the state to create a more equal and less arbitrary polity (J. M. Anderson, 2007, p. 9; Fitzsimmons, 2002, p. xiii).⁵⁵ Therefore, France was still defined as monarchy under the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Yet, under the new regime, sovereignty was conferred to the “nation” and was exercised through an elected National Assembly exercised popular sovereignty on behalf of people (Kley, 1994).⁵⁶ The executive power continued to lay with the king. Because revolutionaries had not envisioned a full-fledged transition to constitutional regime, the Declaration left the boundaries between the executive and legislative ambiguous. The Declaration also lacked provisions to induce cooperation between the King and the Assembly (J. K. Wright, 1994, pp. 226–29).⁵⁷ Consequently, all disagreements between the two branches of the government rapidly escalated into a crisis and generated public discontent in the period from 1790 to 1791. Regime discontent, in turn, fueled demands for abolishing the monarchy and sowed the seeds of republican radicalism at the grassroots level.

The origins of republican radicalism go back to July 1791. At the *Champs de Mars* protests on July 17, demands for abolishing the monarchy and a republic found voice for

interpretation of the French Revolution see (J. M. Anderson, 2007; François Furet, 1981; Hunt, 2004; Rudé, 1991; Tocqueville, 2004) (Anderson, 2007; François Furet, 1981; Hunt, 2004; Rudé, 1991; Tocqueville, 2004). The Marxist historiography offers a different interpretation: Revolutionaries acted as a united class with a clear class-consciousness against upper class oppression. For a survey of this argument see (Doyle, 1999; Ellis, 1978; Mazauric, 2009; Soboul, 1989). Furthermore, the legislative work and the 1791 Constitution indicate that revolutionaries understood regime change as checks on royal power, including the abolition of privileges, suspensive royal veto, and a unified assembly to replace the estates. Further, parliamentary debates suggest that the Assembly’s power grew at the expense of the king on an ad hoc basis. In that, following the abolition of privileges in August 4, 1789, the Assembly signed the Pact of Association (*le pacte d’association*) with which each province recognized the Assembly’s authority over the monarch’s. Next, the Assembly rejected aristocratic members’ proposal to preserve royal veto and institute an upper chamber in order not to provide grounds for the resuscitation of the society of orders and the king to obstruct legislation (Fitzsimmons, 2002, pp. 54–67).

⁵⁵ According to the cahiers de doléance sent to the Estate-Generals, the Third Estate demanded fiscal equality and judicial reforms to alleviate arbitrariness. As the nobility and the clergy denied these demands, the sessions came to a deadlock, which persisted for about two months (J. M. Anderson, 2007; Fitzsimmons, 2002)(Anderson, 2007; Fitzsimmons, 2002).

⁵⁶ The Declaration also declared all Frenchmen to be free and equal citizens (Fitzsimmons, 2002, pp. 56–58).

⁵⁷ For information on internal debates on the separation of powers among revolutionaries see (Fitzsimmons, 2002, pp. 47–68).

the first time when a Parisian crowd, led by the *Jacobin*⁵⁸ and *Cordelier*⁵⁹ clubs and the *sans-culottes*,⁶⁰ gathered to protest the Assembly's decision to reinstate Louis XVI following his unsuccessful flight attempt (Rose, 1983, pp. 141–145). What started as a peaceful protest turned violent after regime forces indiscriminately opened fire on protesters.⁶¹ In response, leaders of the Cordelier clubs called upon legislators to proclaim a republic (Alpaugh, 2014, pp. 75, 91). Empowered by public pressure, the Assembly forced the King into signing on to the Constitution of 1791 with which France officially transitioned to constitutional monarchy ("Constitution Française du 3 Septembre 1791," 1791, p. 201). These protests set an example in French society, teaching grassroots organizations how to use violence and radical discourse to influence policy making.

Grassroots organizations increasingly turned to radicalism and violence under the constitutional monarchy. Let us however look at the structure of the regime in order to understand the nature of the environment in which radicalization gained ground: The Constitution of 1791 had defined the role of the king a "civil servant of the state" and transferred his rights to veto legislation, declare war, tax, and administer local government to the National Assembly ("Constitution Française du 3 Septembre 1791," 1791, pp. 208–12). This clause had tilted the division of power between government branches in favor of the legislative, thus creating what we can call a Parliament-dominant regime. Furthermore, the 1791 Constitution had reaffirmed sociopolitical and administrative equality among citizens substituted the Ancient regime's provinces by 83 departments, each of which would have a local elective administration ("Constitution Française du 3 Septembre 1791," 1791, pp. 201–202–7; Hanson, 2004, p. 179). In this clause, we see the

⁵⁸ The Jacobin Clubs were the most influential of the popular societies that the representatives of the General-Estates were formed in October 1789. These clubs aimed to "debate and discuss issues before the Assembly, to support the drafting and acceptance of a constitution, and to correspond with like-minded societies throughout France" (P. R. Hanson, 2004, p. 160). They rapidly built a network that extended to provinces in 1790 and 1791. By July 1791, the Jacobins had had 934 clubs nationwide. Following the King's flight attempt, these clubs turned radical; they expelled the moderate Jacobins called the *Feuillants* and adopted a republican discourse. Under the leadership of Robespierre, membership doubled and the clubs played a chief role in the elections to the National Convention (Hanson, 2004, p. 161).

⁵⁹ The Cordeliers Clubs were one of the several district assemblies that Parisians founded during the Revolution. In 1790, they officially became a club and adopted the name *Cordelier* after the district where it was located. These clubs' objective was to monitor the respect of the rights ascribed to citizens with the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen and regularly hold popular deliberations (Cock, 2001, pp. 60–90).

⁶⁰ The *sans-culottes* referred to militant radical lower class supporters of the Revolution who demanded equality and the abolition of the monarchy and privileges (Soboul, 1980, pp. 5–19).

⁶¹ This day came to be remembered as the Massacre of the Champs de Mars (Mathiez, 1975, pp. 45–47, 135–36).

origins of the decentralization debate. This arrangement had aimed to contain the gentry's counterrevolutionary tendencies and consolidate the regime in the countryside.⁶² Despite their progressive aspects in an international state system where absolutism constituted the most popular form of government, revolutionary popular societies were still unsatisfied. The Jacobin and Cordelier Clubs continued to organize small-scale protests to call on parliamentarians to reassert the power of the Assembly against the monarch (Alpaugh, 2014, p. 100). The government condoned radical societies' protests for it needed their support to suppress counterrevolutionary resistance.⁶³

Radicalized grassroots organizations found their way into the Assembly with the elections of September 1792. The new Assembly comprised the *Feuillants*,⁶⁴ who supported a unicameral constitutional monarchy with a strong parliament (as described in the 1791 Constitution), the *Plain* –opponents of republicanism, and *Republicans*, which divided into the *Girondins*—that demanded a federal republic as in the United States of America— and the *Montagnards* –supporters of a centralized republic (C. J. Mitchell, 1988, pp. 15–19). The Montagnards subsumed the Jacobins—who demanded a strong centralized republican state— and the Cordeliers –proponents of local autonomy, direct democracy, and secularism (Hammersley, 2005, pp. 23–58). We understand that the rise of radical republicanism induced fractionalization within the republican camp and led to the emergence of moderate alternatives. On the other hand, such a wide range of preferences systematically raised tensions in the Assembly. Still, parliamentarians generally cooperated.

Cooperation in the Assembly failed with respect to the issues of the émigrés and refractory priests. The émigrés referred to the Frenchmen, mostly aristocrats, who had fled the Revolution and been generating counterrevolutionary propaganda in Prussia, Britain, and the Holy Roman Empire (Hanson, 2004, pp. 112–14). On these issues, factions in the Assembly (which I will call “parliamentary factions” from here on since they voted en bloc) divided into advocates of the revolutionary heritage who wanted to expel

⁶² For an excellent survey of resistance to the French Revolution on the countryside see (Hanson, 2003)(P. R. Hanson, 2003).

⁶³ Regime forces did not intervene to these small protests and protesters presented a united front and expressed solidarity with those who fell on July 17th (Alpaugh, 2014, p. 92).

⁶⁴ The Feuillants grew out of the Jacobin clubs due to their disagreement over the course of the Revolutions. Unlike the Jacobins, the Feuillants supported the constitutional monarchy as established by the 1791 Constitution (C. J. Mitchell, 1988, p. 15)

émigrés from the country and refractory priests from their posts and those who feared that these radical policies would drag France into a war against the European powers that had been hosting these émigrés and catholic supporters (Shusterman, 2013, pp. 75–76). On both issues, radical republicans voted out the moderates and Louis XVI vetoed the decrees that the Assembly passed. The veto impeding the legislative process, radical republican societies initiated violent protests that lasted from July to August. Republican parliamentarians held back the police and the National Guard, since dragging protests empowered their leverage in the Assembly (Alpaugh, 2014, pp. 106–116). In September 1792, republican parliamentary factions were powerful enough to abolish the monarchy and declare the Republic of France. In January 1793, they passed the law on regicide.

To recap, the process from the 1789 Revolution to the proclamation of the Republic is best described as an unintended consequence of confrontations between the executive and the legislative. We have seen that the 1789 Revolution was not planned. Because it was not planned, the revolutionaries that proclaimed the constitutional documents promulgated from 1789 to 1792 did not think of devising arrangements to induce cooperation between government branches; they only passed the arrangements that restrained the power of the executive power. This caveat, as we have seen, was the reason why disagreements escalated into crises, while ineffective government fueled public discontent and radicalism. One most important development in this process was that violence and protests became a routine practice that both the government and non-governmental actors began to employ. Also, radical societies emerged as a novel political player and a powerful ally to republican parliamentarians against the king and counterrevolutionaries. Hence, we understand that the debate on political violence emerged as a by-product of the controversy over parliamentary powers and the boundaries of the executive. Similarly, the issue of administrative centralization entered the agenda as a by-product of the confrontation between republicans and monarchists. It is important to realize that while these issues were debated separately they stemmed from the same root cause, which was the controversy over parliamentary powers and the boundaries of the executive. In the following section, I examine the evolution of the conflict between republicanism and monarchism under the republican and Napoleonic regimes and explain how republican radicalism contributed to the rise of bonapartism as a third way.

From republicanism to tyranny: evils of excess parliamentary power

In this section, I focus on the evolution of the conflict between republicanism and monarchism under the republican and Napoleonic regimes. Specifically, I explain how parliamentarianism and republicanism came to be associated with parliamentary tyranny in the eyes of the public and discontent with republican radicalism contributed to rise of bonapartism as a third way. I will show that the confrontation between republicanism and monarchism reproduced the debates on parliamentary powers, the boundaries of the executive, political violence, and decentralization. I will further show that the issues of suffrage extension, the Church's involvement in politics, and liberties vs. order entered the agenda following the bitter experience with Jacobinism.

From republic to parliamentary tyranny

We have seen that the King's evocation of his veto power induced republican parliamentarians of the first Constitutional Monarchy to abolish monarchy and proclaim the Republic of France. The most striking characteristic of this republican regime was the prominence of its Parliament. In this section, we will see how this Parliament-dominant regime evolved into tyranny and radical republicans infiltrated into the state. We will see that after radical republicans tried to annihilate their rivals via state institutions, all factions began to compete to control the state apparatus. As I explain in the remainder of this section, thereafter, whichever faction assumed power, it used the state infrastructure to persecute rivals in the name of "preserving order." This strategy generated the debate on order vs. liberties, making the French as suspicious of a strong legislative as of a strong executive.

To this day, the First Republic (1792–1795) resonates with Jacobin terror (*la terreur*). Although the terror tends to be attributed to the Jacobin regime, it is important to realize that other parliamentary factions and radical societies played a significant part (Brown, 1997, p. 666). We should rather see the terror as the outcome of interactions between the radicals in government and factions in the opposition.

The episode leading to Jacobin terror began in September 1792 when the sans-culottes took the streets to defeat enemies of the Revolution inside. With the help of some officers of the National Guard, protesters attacked prisons and massacred convicts (Francois Furet & Ozouf, 1989, pp. 521–22). Three months later, radicals set an extraordinary revolutionary tribunal to execute counterrevolutionaries (Alpaugh, 2014, p.

136). By then, military defeats by Britain, Austria, and the Netherlands had eroded support for the Girondin government. The erosion of support for moderate republicans played into the hands of radical republicans. Empowered by public dissatisfaction with military defeats, radical republicans took a series of drastic measures, including the transformation of the popular counterrevolutionary tribunal into an official organ of the state, the purge of the Girondins from the Assembly, and the foundation of the Committee of Public Safety with which to hunt down counterrevolutionaries (J. M. Anderson, 2007, pp. 17–18; Hanson, 2003, p. 8). With each of these measures, the level of regime oppression intensified and the radical republicans, now controlling the state organs, became more and more violent.

State violence met societal resistance. First, royalists, refractory priests, and peasants started a counterrevolutionary rebellion in the Vendée, which rapidly spread to neighboring departments (Tilly, 1976, pp. 226, 305–10). One striking pattern of this rebellion was the unification of regime contenders of different classes against the republican regime. With this cross-class opposition alliance, the issues of equality, the Church's role in politics, and liberties vs. order became connected. Second, the federalist uprisings broke out on April 29. Like the Vendée, federalist revolts rapidly spread to major cities, such as Bordeaux, Lyon, and Caen (Alpaugh, 2014; Hanson, 2003, pp. 8144–147). With the federalist uprisings, decentralization also added to the amalgam of issues. In addition, we see that other factions emulated the use of violence as a political strategy. Seeing the spread of uprisings, the Jacobins took over the executive power in September 1793. Under the leadership of Maximilien Robespierre, the Committee of Public Safety suppressed the federalist revolts and peasant unrest and executed several Girondins and Cordeliers, as well as hundreds of civilians suspected regime traitors, including scientists, peasants, priests, and workers (J. M. Anderson, 2007, p. 20; Hanson, 2003, pp. 163–73).⁶⁵

Although societal resistance to state violence was considerably strong and influential, the fall of the Jacobin regime came with the Girondin coup of July 1794, known as *the Thermidorian reaction*—Thermidor, 9 Year II indicating the date of the coup

⁶⁵ Robespierre enjoyed radical popular societies' support thanks to the press propaganda that he conducted (Gough, 1999, pp. 115–120). However, the execution of the Cordelier leaders, Danton and Desmoulins—whom were very close to Robespierre, turned the Committee against their leader (Hampson, 2006, pp. 170–73). Members of the Committee ousted Robespierre and his colleagues with a coup and condemned him to death sentence on July 27, 1794 (J. M. Anderson, 2007, p. 21).

according to the revolutionary calendar.⁶⁶ From September to July 1793, besides taking numerous drastic measures, the Jacobin government also issued the Constitution of 1793 (Hanson, 2004, p. 87). This Constitution fused the judiciary and executive powers in the hands of the legislative and made the government responsible before the Assembly (“Constitution Girondine,” 1793, pp. 239–54). This arrangement allowed the Jacobins to govern as arbitrarily as the king under the ancient regime. Once more we see one faction instrumentalizing the Constitution to annihilate its rivals. As regards state-society relations, the Constitution restored universal suffrage, granted citizens social rights (e.g., the right to education and the freedom of association), and instituted referendum to enact popular sovereignty (“Constitution Girondine,” 1793, pp. 231, 234–36, 296–97). Ironically, this Constitution was the most democratic of the revolutionary constitutions in the domain of civil liberties, but was never enforced due to provincial revolts and the Girondin resistance in cities. Once the Thermidorians took power, they issued a new constitution. The Constitution of 1795 abolished the fusion of powers so as to preclude another episode of parliamentary tyranny. Thus, we see that the controversy over parliamentary powers and the boundaries of the executive continued to shape the dynamics of the succeeding regimes.

The Jacobin regime had taught the French that excess parliamentary power was as threatening to civil rights and liberties as excess executive power. This experience also reinforced the society’s desire for civil liberties and justice (Jainchill, 2003).⁶⁷ In an attempt to prevent parliamentary tyranny and protect liberties, the Thermidorians introduced several veto points into the Constitution of 1795 (Baczko, 1994, p. 254). To preempt parliamentary tyranny, the Constitution established a strict separation of powers and bicameralism (“Constitution de la République Française du 1795,” 1795, pp. 304–7). Universal suffrage was abolished to exclude radicals from policy making; only taxpayers held the right to vote. Moreover, voters elected only one-third of new legislators in the

⁶⁶ For more information on the Thermidorian reaction and the purge of the Jacobins see (Baczko, 1994; Brown, 2007; Jainchill, 2003; Luzzatto, 1991; Woloch, 1970).

⁶⁷ There is an extensive debate on whether the Thermidorian regime represents a break with the Revolution or continues it. For the break argument see (Aulard, 1901; Brunel, 1999; Woloch, 1970). For the continuation thesis see (Baczko, 1994; Livesey, 2001; Palmer & Armitage, 2014)(Baczko, 1994; Livesey, 2001; Robert Roswell Palmer & Armitage, 2014)(Baczko, 1994; Livesey, 2001; Palmer & Armitage, 2014)(Baczko, 1994; Livesey, 2001; Robert Roswell Palmer & Armitage, 2014)(Baczko, 1994; Livesey, 2001; Palmer & Armitage, 2014) (Baczko, 1994; Livesey, 2001; Palmer & Armitage, 2014).

elections. This arrangement served to filter out royalist extremists.⁶⁸ As regards the executive, the Constitution of 1795 accorded the chambers the right to elect five directors –which gave this regime the name *le Directoire* (the Directory) (“Constitution de la République Française du 1795),” 1795, pp. 307–309). These five directors would use the executive power. Besides its complexity, this arrangement also lacked provisions to induce cooperation among the directors and between branches of the government as was the case with the previous revolutionary constitutions (Woloch, 2002, p. 3). Therefore, as in the previous republican regimes, disagreements rapidly escalated into crises and ineffective government rekindled demands for a strong executive. We will see that these demands prepared the Napoléon Bonaparte’s regime. In this regime, as in the previous revolutionary regimes, we see the government devising complicated arrangements to prevent others from accessing positions of power.

The experience with the Thermidorian regime reiterated the lesson from the First Constitutional Monarchy, that the separation of powers fell short to both restore order and protect liberties. The most difficult problem that the Thermidorian regime encountered was the lower class frustration with disenfranchisement. When the regime extended the election quota from one-third to two-thirds of the Assembly in 1797, both the 1797 and 1798 elections increased the royalist and Jacobin representation in the chambers (Bourdon, 1946, p. 218). In both instances, the Directory refused to honor the election results and accord representation to royalists and Jacobins fearing the revival of extremism. More drastic measures followed this one, including the arrest of prominent royalist and Jacobin leaders, the purge of some directors from the Directory, the closure of the royalist and Jacobin press and clubs, the reinstitution of the military commissions to execute returned immigrants and exiled clerics, deportations, and the trial of civilians accused of brigandage at military courts instead of civil courts (Brown, 1997, pp. 677–79; Palmer, 1959, pp. 255–64; Woloch, 1970, p. 5).⁶⁹ In so doing, the Directory repeated the Jacobin government’s mistake of curtailing freedoms and turning to oppression to restore order. As in the Jacobin regime, oppression generated societal resistance, which manifested itself as chronic violence against regime officials, banditry, and sporadic anti-

⁶⁸ Additional measures against extremism included, the closure of the Jacobin clubs, the abolishment of revolutionary tribunals, the prohibition of political gatherings, and the insertion of ‘the hatred for royalism and anarchy (implying Jacobinism) into the oath of loyalty to the Directory regime (Woloch, 2002, p. 4).

⁶⁹ For more information on the 1797 and 1798 elections and the purge of royalists and the sans-culottes see (Bourdon, 1946; Cobb, 1954; Dautry, 1950; Meynier, 1928; Suratteau, 1958).

republican uprisings especially in Western France (*la chouannerie*) (Brown, 2007; Devlin, 1990, pp. 199–223). As was the case under the Jacobin regime, societal opposition groups formed a cross-class alliance, encompassing royalists, Jacobins, Catholic supporters, and peasants (Brown, 2007, p. 268). Thus, ironically, regime oppression created more disorder. By 1799, many came to believe that France needed a new constitution (Brown, 2007; Lefebvre, 1984; Lyons, 1975; Woronoff, 2004). In this context, Bonaparte and the allied directors easily carried a coup known as *le 18 Brumaire* –marking the day of the coup according to the revolutionary calendar.⁷⁰

Thus, we see that the Thermidorian regime draws various parallels to the previous revolutionary regimes. In all these instances, the factions in power made complicated constitutional arrangements to prevent their rivals' excess to power or exclude them from decision making. Besides decreasing the government's effectiveness, these measures generated significant societal resistance that escalated to disorder when the governments used force to reinstate order. Dissatisfaction with the regime under both republican and Thermidorian regimes propelled demands for more effective government. We saw that the republican government issued the Constitution of 1793 to fuse powers. Similarly, the Thermidorian regime gave way to another dictatorial regime, the Napoleonic regime that I elaborate on in the next section.

The rise of the third way: Bonapartism & rebirth of excess executive power

Napoléon Bonaparte had come to power through an unconventional way; his ideas were equally unconventional for his period. Unprecedentedly since 1789, Bonaparte I abandoned the previous republican regimes' discourse of the need for protecting the Revolution. He was convinced that the ancient regime was not to come back; now, it was time to rationalize institutions and create a new society (Lyons, 1994, pp. 295–98).⁷¹ Unsurprisingly, such ambitious plans met societal resistance. Bonaparte I, like the preceding the Jacobin and Thermidorian regimes, turned to repression to restore order.

⁷⁰ Besides discontent, the lack of societal resistance is explained by state of siege, which placed 40% of the country under the jurisdiction of generals the (Brown, 1997, p. 677).

⁷¹ Historians depicted Napoléon Bonaparte's regime differently. For accounts that portrayed him as a despot or an enlightened despot see (Bluche, 2008; Doyle, 2009; Lyons, 1994; Tulard, 1983). For accounts that saw his regime as more liberal or democratic see (Brown, 1997; Dwyer, 2015; Francois Furet & Ozouf, 1989; Godechot, 1969; Lentz, 2012).

However, as we will see, his authoritarianism differed from under previous governments' authoritarianisms. Also, unlike in previous revolutionary regimes, his regime became more and more aristocratic finally resulting in the proclamation of the First Empire (Dwyer, 2015, p. 582). In order to comprehend the regime's evolution to the Empire, I compare the Constitutions of 1799, 1802, and 1804 and discuss the measures that the Emperor adopted. We will see that authoritarianism entrenched gradually and that the areas in which the Napoleonic regime turned authoritarian correspond to the issues that preoccupied the Bourbon Monarchy.

We can say that the Napoleonic regime's most effective move to gain legitimacy after the coup was to restore universal suffrage and alleviate previously excluded societal groups' frustration. Inclusion became official in the Constitution of 1799. This Constitution also incorporated the rights enumerated in the Declaration of Rights of Men into the main body of the constitution—whereby these rights became claim rights (“Constitution de la République française du 1799,” 1799, pp. 304–7). The 1802 and 1804 Constitutions preserved these clauses, reaffirming the seemingly inclusive feature of the regime. Inclusion was seeming, because the gradual increase of the first consul's powers systematically decreased the impact of these clauses. Extending the first consul's powers meant that the executive power was attributed to a non-elected body, which betrayed the very principle of popular will. Yet, on the surface, the regime remained bicameral until the transition to the Empire. Under both the 1799 and 1802 Constitutions, the regime had one elected Tribune and one Senate (“Constitution de la République française du 1799,” 1799, pp. 306–7). These arrangements did not disguise the fact that these chambers were becoming increasingly accessory. Bonaparte I coopted the Senate, the Tribune, and prefectorial corps in order to reduce dissent in the government (Woloch, 2002, pp. 46–53).⁷²

The extension of the executive's powers happened gradually: under the Constitution of 1799, Bonaparte I was only the first Consul, but *primus inter pares* of the three directors (“Constitution de la République française du 1799,” 1799, pp. 305–8).⁷³ In

⁷² Bonaparte also purged some senators, bureaucrats, and generals who rivaled him or challenged his regime. For more information on how Bonaparte defeated his dissidents see (Bergeron, 1981; Englund, 2005; Geyl, 1967; Lefebvre & Roberts, 2011; Woloch, 2002).

⁷³ In order to prevent constitutional violations, those who drafted the Constitution of 1799 created the consul system so as to design a third-party mechanism against extremism within the Assembly and the government. However, after becoming the consul and putting the 1799 Constitution to the referendum,

1802, he was the first consul for life (“Sénatus-consulte du 1802,” 1802, p. 315). In 1804, he finally became the emperor (“Sénatus-consulte organique du 1804,” 1804, p. 328). Under the Constitution of 1804, the emperor had the power to abolish the elected assembly, the Tribunate (“Sénatus-consulte organique du 1804,” 1804, pp. 331–35).⁷⁴ In 1807, Bonaparte I used this right. Thereafter, this executive-dominant Napoleonic regime was officially an authoritarian Empire.

Authoritarian turn did not go uncontested. French society manifested its resistance via brigandage, rebellions in the countryside, and federalist revolts.⁷⁵ Towards the opposition, the Napoleonic regime was equally repressive yet more *effective* than the Directory. Bonaparte I purged regime contenders within the bureaucracy,⁷⁶ widened censorship,⁷⁷ and restrained the freedom of association⁷⁸ (Sutherland, 1986, pp. 333–35; Woloch, 2002, pp. 3–9). On the other hand, administrative centralization, which had begun under the Consulate, allowed to directly appoint the administrative and judicial personnel in the countryside, including prefects, subprefects, mayors, and judges—designated by local elections after the Revolution (Brown, 1997, p. 684). Through the local administration, the imperial regime adopted easily controlled the countryside. Moreover, the Napoleonic Code followed by a series of legal reforms to improve administrative effectiveness, including the promulgation of the Civil Code (1806) and the Code of Commerce, the law authorizing troops to shoot brigands and rebels on site, the

Bonaparte imposed himself as the first consul, which allowed him to monopolized power in the following years (Woloch, 2002, pp. 30–31).

⁷⁴ Even though the regime had become personalistic, it adopted certain judiciary reforms to make this branch of the government more effective, such as the promulgation of the Civil Code (1804) (“Sénatus-consulte organique du 1804,” 1804, pp. 341–44).

⁷⁵ The character of federalist uprisings varied across departments. In some departments, royalists took the lead; in others republicans revolted. Evidence shows that the population was torn between royalists and republicans in some departments. For more information see (Alexander, 1991).

⁷⁶ More than 160 magistrates, who were officially appointed for life, were dismissed. Bonaparte also dismissed his consultants and dissenters among regime elites (Bourdon, 1970, p. 836; Dwyer, 2015, p. 282).

⁷⁷ By 1804, numerous papers had already been closed down or their sales had been limited, and censorship had curtailed the freedom of expression. In 1806, censorship widened; the imperial regime required every publisher to convey the ministry a copy of each publication (Woloch, 2002, pp. 206–208).

⁷⁸ The Penal Code of 1810 (article 291) prohibited gatherings of more than 20 people (Rosanvallon, 2007, p. 111).

establishment of Extraordinary Military Commissions and Special Tribunals (Brown, 1997, pp. 683–86).⁷⁹

Authoritarianism and repression were disguised under a revolutionary rhetoric and certain democratic practices. For example, the Napoleonic Code guaranteed open trials and equality before the law. After abolishing the law of *immigrés* and the law authorizing military courts to try cases of brigandage –the two controversial laws adopted under the Directory– the regime created the impression of resuming regular justice (Brown, 1997, pp. 687–84). Bonaparte I further created the image of involving people in decision making by maintaining certain popular democratic practices, such as plebiscite, publicly held trials in special and military tribunals, judges' oath to loyalty for the republic and the revolutionary principles (Brown, 1997, pp. 687–88). Moreover, the regime extended religious freedoms to all Christian sects and Jews, which alleviated dissatisfaction created by the confiscation of the properties of the church (Broers, 2006). Most importantly, the Bonaparte regime executed fewer people than the Jacobin republic or the Directory (Dwyer, 2015, p. 583). However, alongside democratic practices and revolutionary rhetoric, the regime had created its own elites, an imperial elite distinguished by wealth or expertise and loyalty to the regime, and another provincial elite from the successful revolutionary bourgeoisie of landowners, professional men and administrators, and of manufacturing elites (Lyons, 1994, p. 298). Thus, if the Napoleonic regime created less dissatisfaction than the ancient regime and the Jacobin regimes, it was because inclusive features, though ineffectual in practice, disguised exclusion.

Overall, the issue of parliamentary powers, administrative centralization, the role of the Church in politics, and freedoms vs. order preoccupied the Napoleonic regime. As we will see, the same issues would preoccupy the Bourbon Monarchy. While being equally repressive and authoritarian as the previous republican regime, the Napoleonic regime had more legitimacy than its predecessors. Military victories, on the one hand, and democratic practices, on the other hand, alleviated discontent with the regime (Jourdan, 2012). Discontent intensified once France began losing on the battlefield (Pilbeam, 2002, p. 34). As we saw earlier, royalist organizations mushroomed in Southern France, while uprisings in the Vendée resumed (Bertaud, 2009, pp. 286–309). The Empire fell following

⁷⁹ On the other hand, the Empire pursued some of the discriminatory and racist practices of the Revolutionary regime, i.e., the slavery, the interdiction on racial intermarriages, the denial of entry into France towards blacks and mulattos (Dwyer, 2015, p. 584).

the defeat at Waterloo (1814). At the Congress of Vienna, the Allies restored the Bourbons to the throne (Lyons, 2006). Napoléon Bonaparte was deposed with a brief decree of the Senate in 1814 ("Constitution française du 1814," 1814, "Décret du Sénat conservateur du 3 avril 1814," 1814).

To recap, we observe continuities across the republican, Thermidorian and imperial regimes. Underneath all problems that these regimes experienced lay the confrontation over republicanism vs. monarchism. In all regimes, one faction controlled the state, and while in power, it modified constitutional arrangements to prevent and preempt its rivals' access to power. This tendency created non-equilibrated (either executive or parliament-dominant) regimes. Moreover, all regimes adopted extraordinary means of justice and curtailed civil liberties in the name of protecting order. The Napoleonic regime exceptionally extended religious tolerance to draw public support, whereas all other regimes worked to roll back the Church's and monarchists' influence in politics. On the other hand, the Napoleonic regime paralleled the Jacobin regime in fusing powers (in the hands of the legislative in the latter and of the executive under the former) to effectively repress regime contention. However, the imperial regime looked more legitimate, given Napoleon's military victories and because complicated constitutional arrangements under the preceding regimes had created demand for government efficiency. Demand for effective government explains why bonapartism survived long after the Bourbon monarchy was gone. It is thus important to realize that the confrontation over republicanism vs. monarchism repetitively posed a tradeoff between government effectiveness and representation across different regimes in post-1789 France. Under the republican regimes, the Parliament predominated the executive, whereas under the Directory and the Napoleonic regime, the reverse was the case. Even though one was executive-dominant while other was Parliament dominant, democratic practices created the impression of involving people into decision making under both the republican and Napoleonic regimes. In contrast, the strategy of outward exclusion fuelled discontent under the Directory.

As regards issue areas, we see that the issue of the suffrage, liberties vs. order, the use of violence as a political strategy, administrative centralization, and the Church's role in politics remained on the agenda under Bonaparte I. For they remained unresolved, the Bourbon regime inherited these issues. This explains why the seemingly technical issues created so much controversy under the Bourbon Monarchy. On the other hand, the

Napoleonic regime left another important legacy that the Bourbon royalists could not quite grasp. Even though Jacobin violence had tarnished the image of the Revolution and republicanism, the continuing effectiveness of the revolutionary discourse under Bonaparte implied that the ancient regime was not to come back. Equality, universal suffrage, and nationalization –which I will elaborate on in the following section, had already eroded the sociopolitical foundations of the ancient regime. Another indication of the already eroded sociopolitical underpinnings of absolutism was the very emergence of bonapartism as a third way. We will see in the next section that the Bourbon royalists acknowledged the improbability of reviving the ancient regime only towards the end of the Bourbon Monarchy—a fact that Bonaparte I had correctly diagnosed more than decades ago. In the next section, I discuss the evolution of preferences about the issues of parliamentary powers, the suffrage, liberties vs. order, the use of violence as a political strategy, administrative centralization, and the Church's role in politics. As detailed in the methods section, I will be relying on secondary and primary sources (such as newspapers, petitions, protests, and apathy) to identify positions of grassroots organizations and citizens.

The Identity and preference sets of challengers

In this section, I discuss the type of grievances that the issues of parliamentary powers, the suffrage, liberties vs. order, the use of violence as a political strategy, administrative centralization, and the Church's role in politics engendered and the type of solutions that actors proposed to tackle them.

In the previous section, we have seen that radicalism, political violence, and political repression derived from government instability and that government instability stemmed from the imbalance between the executive and legislative powers. The republican constitutions had made complex arrangements to constrain the royal power, but such complexity had hindered decision making and eroded public support for the regime. In order to improve effectiveness, the republican regimes, like the imperial one, fused the legislative and executive powers and violated the spirit of popular will and parliamentarianism. The 1814 Charter similarly designated as the king the source of all powers. This clause, which aimed to preempt parliamentary tyranny, blurred the boundaries of the executive and legislative powers, thus providing the ground for constant

government instability. We also saw that some seemingly technical issues, all of which had a history going back to the 1790s, mobilized both societal actors and parliamentary factions. In this section, I introduce the relevant political actors of the Bourbon regime, discuss their origins and composition so as to understand their stance on each issue. In order to highlight where they differed from one another, I contrast and compare these actors' grievances and solutions that they proposed.⁸⁰ I show that the proposed solutions to the enjeu on regime type varied from absolutism to popular sovereignty. However, along this axis, Bourbon actors made demands for different regime types. I further show that even among those that advocated for the same regime type, there were nuances regarding the issues of liberties vs. order, the use of violence as a political strategy, and administrative centralization.

Bourbon actors & their stance

It is customary for historians to use the left-right scale in classifying political actors of the Bourbon regime (Alexander, 2004; Girard, 1985; Hudson, 1973; Sauvigny, 1967; Thureau-Dangin, 1876). This study follows this convention. Yet, it is worth reminding the meaning of the left and right in Bourbon France: As we have seen, in post-1789 French society, “leftwing” designated supporters of popular sovereignty, while “rightwing” referred to advocates of royal sovereignty. These connotations preserved their meanings under the Bourbon monarchy. However, the left-right axis does not fully capture nuances within the left/rightwing. For instance, despite both being classified as rightwing, the constitutionnels, unlike the ultra-royalists, advocated for national sovereignty. On the other hand, the royalists and the leftwing independents endorsed decentralization, whereas the bonapartists, also on the left, did not. In addition, between 1814 and 1830, most actors revised their stance in response to strategic interactions and environmental changes, which further challenged the left-right divide. Given these challenges, it is more appropriate to speak of “factions.” As mentioned earlier, I define faction as a group of individuals voicing a distinct preference set on the issues that shape the political agenda, which, in the case of Bourbon France, corresponds to liberties vs. order, the separation of powers, the role of the Church in politics, and decentralization.

⁸⁰ I identified relevant actors by conducting interviews with experts on 19th century French and a content analysis of primary and secondary sources (including papers, petitions, contentious activities like protests).

The rightwing consisted of the royalists and the ultra-royalists (the ultras from here on), the constitutionnels and the doctrinaires. The former sought to restore the ancient regime, whereas the constitutionnels and the doctrinaires aimed to reconcile revolutionary heritage with national sovereignty. The leftwing comprised a heterogeneous group called the liberals (also known as the independents or the left). These factions, in turn, subsumed various sub-factions that differed from each other on strategic terms.

In terms of organization, Bourbon actors operated on the ground or in the parliament. Some factions—such as the independents and the ultras— had foot both on the ground and in the parliament. When referring to organized actors on the ground, I will be using the term “grassroots organizations.” Grassroots organizations encompassed secret and conspiratorial societies, as well as NGO-like associations (such as the Society of Friends of the Freedom of Press), mutual aid societies, freemason lodges etc. I will be referring to actors operating in the parliament as “parliamentary factions.” Parliamentary factions consisted of deputies that together voiced a specific preference set across issue areas and voted en bloc. Unlike contemporary political parties, Bourbon parliamentary factions lacked mobilizing structures and therefore collaborated with local activists, grassroots organizations, newspapers, and secret societies.⁸¹ Only the independents developed a nation-wide party organization to mobilize the electorate. Also, the ultras uniquely benefited from access to the clerical network given their ideological affinity with the clergy. Let us now see what these factions were and what they demanded. This discussion is structured along the left-right axis.

The rightwing

The factions constituting “the rightwing” took dissimilar positions across issue areas. We will see that the royalists were passionate about royal sovereignty but also about liberties and decentralization, whereas the constitutionnels and the doctrinaires endorsed popular sovereignty and centralization. Also, the constitutionnels prioritized order over liberties more than absolutists.

⁸¹ Political parties would not emerge until after the 20th century (Duverger, 1992; S. E. Hanson, 2010; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967).

The Royalists

In terms of ideology, even though none of the Bourbon factions voiced a clear and unified body of thought on government, the royalists had significant variations in royalist theoreticians' views of government (Girard, 1985; Hudson, 1973, p. 16).⁸² Before examining ideological nuances, it is necessary to consider organizational differences across royalist actors.

Royalist organizations preceded the Bourbon Monarchy. As mentioned earlier, formed in 1810, the *Chevaliers de la Foi* had already been lobbying the Allies for the restoration of the monarchy before the Napoleonic Wars ended. The Chevaliers' lobby was effective thanks to the nation-wide network that they built between 1813 and 1815. By 1814, they held their strongholds in the Midi of France. Such rapid organizational expansion was a product of the collaboration between the royalists, and Catholic sympathizers and refractory priests that the Bonaparte regime and the revolutionary ones before them had persecuted (Alexander, 2004, p. 41). This organizational network came handy following the Hundred Days when Bonaparte had returned from exile and taken power. In an attempt to prevent the return to the Empire, royalist activists attacked the bonapartists and federalists in provinces and the royalist generals turned a blind eye on civil violence (Alexander, 2004, p. 45). Given the considerable death toll and terror, this episode came to be known as the White Terror (1814–1815) –to distinguish it from the Jacobin terror. During the White Terror, the royalists silenced or intimidated their ideological rivals using violence. The pushback against the leftwing allowed royalists to extend their support basis. On the other hand, the White Terror induced persistent leftwing members that went underground to respond violence with violence, whereby the use of violence as a political strategy began gaining ground. To the persecuted segments of society, violence as a political means seemed legitimate, since they were the victims of state violence. Also, being victim of political violence together with republicans ironically cleansed the tarnished image of Bonapartism. We will see that the republicans and

⁸² If we look at the memoirs and treatises by Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant, Joseph de Maistre, and François-René de Chateaubriand, we see different. These differences stemmed in part from dissimilar life experiences. Some royalist thinkers, unlike others, were émigrés; they observed alternative forms of governments in the host country but were also distanced from French politics. On the other hand, the works by the non-émigrés, especially if published prior to the Bourbon Restoration, were too theoretical lacking insights into the practical problems of the representative regime.

bonapartists later joined the liberals and honored Bonaparte as a “soldier of the Revolution” (Girard, 1985, p. 88).

In the aftermath of the White Terror, the royalists obtained an overwhelming parliamentary representation. In 1815 and 1816, grassroots organizations remained in close contact with royalist parliamentarians and this collaboration survived until the fall of the Monarchy. The foremost difference between the royalist grassroots organizations and the royalist parliamentarians pertained to the issue the use of violence as a political strategy. The former perceived political violence as an electoral strategy, whereas parliamentarians were less prone to using it. In referring to extreme royalist parliamentarians, I will employ term “ultras.” I will call the moderate royalist parliamentarian factions by the name of their leaders. The term “ultra” emerged as a shorthand for the royalist deputies who sat in the 1815 and 1816 Assemblies. As Louis XVIII put it, these parliamentarians were “more royalist than the King himself” (Lamartine, 1891, p. 213). This appellation resonating with rival factions, the royalist parliamentarians came to be called as the ultras.

The difference between extreme and moderate royalists concerned parliamentary powers. While both strands of royalism loathed popular sovereignty due to its susceptibility to the tyranny of people, the extremist branch argued for the indivisibility of royal sovereignty and opposed representative government (an argument best developed in de Maistre) (Hudson, 1973, pp. 18–22).⁸³ Constitution and checks and balances contrasted the principle of the indivisibility of royal sovereignty. Moreover, they were unnecessary in practice, since the aristocracy and the clergy both assisted and checked the king (Girard, 1985, pp. 57–58).⁸⁴ Therefore, the Monarchy needed to strengthen the Catholic Church’s and the aristocracy’s role in politics instead of working on a charter. In other words, they opposed administrative centralization for taking the control from the hands of the gentry only to place it in the hands of the state. This argument, which had developed in reaction to the republican vision of unitary society, constituted one distinguishing characteristic of royalists from the other rightwing factions (Rosanvallon,

⁸³ For a detailed account of this argument see (Maistre, 1814).

⁸⁴ For examples of this view, see (Bonald, 1843; Lamennais, 1817). Such views grounded on idea of the agency of the providence against the ideas of chance and the supremacy of reason (Hudson, 1973, pp. 18–20).

2007, pp. 107–118).⁸⁵ On the other hand, absolutist royalists divided on the limits of clerical influence in politics. For some, papal intervention constituted a check on royal arbitrariness—such as Joseph de Maistre, Louis-Claude de Saint Martin, and Félicité Robert de Lamennais. Others insisted on keeping the Vatican out of domestic affairs—such as like Louis Bonald (Hudson, 1973, pp. 16–17). We understand that all absolutists aspired to bring the ancient regime back even though, as we saw, the Revolution had already eroded its sociopolitical underpinnings.⁸⁶

Moderate royalists accepted representative government and constitution in principle. Yet, they opposed the 1814 Charter on the grounds that France lacked the sociopolitical foundations of a British-style government (Hudson, 1973, p. 47). Instead, these royalists thought, an aristocratic parliament, formed via limited suffrage and indirect elections, should check royal arbitrariness (Girard, 1985, p. 64). For fear of the revival of radicalism, moderate royalists opposed the enfranchisement of middle classes. They also endorsed censorship and institutional restrictions on press in an attempt to control public opinion that they considered to be whimsical and therefore prone to causing government instability (Hudson, 1973, pp. 33–45). As regards parliamentary powers, these royalists deemed parliamentary approval necessary in policy making. To them, ministers were mere intermediaries between the king and the parliament. As we shall see in the next section, moderate royalists had to revise this idea in response to governmental crises, because if ministers were mere intermediaries, parliamentarians happened to question royal sovereignty when critiquing ministers' policy proposals. By the reign of Charles X, moderate royalists, such as Chateaubriand and the Agier faction (known as the “defection” for splitting from the absolutist ultras) had embraced the idea of a British-style monarchy where the king ruled but not governed (Hudson, 1973, p. 71). This perception shift opened the door to collaboration with the leftwing against absolutism.

⁸⁵ For detailed explanation on the republican vision of societal unity see chapter one through four in (Rosanvallon, 2007).

⁸⁶ This theory represented an aristocratic reaction to the Revolution and the Individualist movement. Individualists, spearheaded by *la Société des individualistes*, contested the tyrannical culture of collectivity and unity, which had been reigning since 1789, and demanded that the State to assist individuals in cultivating their personal rights and freedoms (Rosanvallon, 2007, pp. 96–97). To the royalists, the individualist vision of society sounded like a collection of individuals with unbundled egoisms; they therefore believed that individualism jeopardized social unity upheld by traditions and Catholicism (Hudson, 1973, pp. 18–19; Rosanvallon, 2007, pp. 110–18). It is worth noting that the liberals, the *légitimistes*, the *doctrinaires*, and the Saint-Simonians also opposed the individualists due to similar concerns about social unity (Rosanvallon, 2007, pp. 96–98).

Concomitantly, it turned the absolutist royalists against them, thus making the latter a target to absolutist royalists' oppression. Thereafter, the defection also began to make demands for the freedoms of press and expression.

The constitutionnels (constitutionalists)

Historians classify the constitutionnels as the center-right because they ardently defended the 1814 Charter against royalists. After 1817, the independents (liberals) also called themselves constitutionnels, but in this essay, I reserve the term for the rightwing group that originally used the term (Alexander, 1991, p. 106).

The constitutionnels advocated for popular sovereignty and a moderate government. Because such moderation pleased Louis XVIII, some constitutionnels served in the cabinet against the ultra-dominated Chambers. The constitutionnels had acknowledged that seeking to bring the ancient regime was an unrealistic, if not romantic, quest. They, like the bonapartists and Bonaparte I before them, had understood that the socioeconomic foundations upholding this regime type had long disappeared (Hudson, 1973, p. 26). The constitutionnels focused on reconciling monarchy with the Revolutionary heritage, i.e., equality and national sovereignty. This objective found its best expression in Minister of the Police Decazes' program of "royaliser la nation et nationaliser les royalistes" (royalize the nation and nationalize the royalists (Girard, 1985, p. 61).

Like moderate royalists, the constitutionnels argued for a representative government, but advocated for the enfranchisement of middle classes contra the former. For the constitutionnels, representative government implied a parliament representing public opinion, which, in turn, meant that the inclusion of middle classes by which they understood small-property classes, industrialists, and tradesmen who, now, constituted the backbone of the modern economy.⁸⁷ Yet, universal suffrage was out of the agenda, for it was conducive to parliamentary tyranny (Hudson, 1973, p. 26). The constitutionnels, like the royalists, thought lower classes to be ignorant and prone to radicalism (Girard, 1985, pp. 44–45).⁸⁸

⁸⁷ For a detailed discussion of this point of view see (Constant, 1814).

⁸⁸ As Constant put it, they needed education and experience with the rules of representative government before they could participate (Constant, 1814). Rémusat also expressed concerns about the youth's

As regards parliamentary powers, the constitutionnels contended that the cabinet represented and expressed royal will, therefore needed not parliamentary approval to execute policies. Constitutionnel ministers as developed this argument against the ultra-dominated chambers under Louis XVIII. On the other hand, the constitutionnels were more authoritarian than the royalists, advocating for strict censorship and severe restrictions on the freedom of association when necessary, and administrative centralization (Yvert, 2013, pp. 63–66). In their minds, the *raison d'état* took precedence over liberties. As regards the Church's influence in politics, the constitutionnels endorsed secularization not necessarily because they were anticlerical like the republicans, but because they sought to undercut royalist support. Under Charles X, the constitutionnels softened their authoritarian position and left room for freedom of press and checks and balances.

The doctrinaires

The doctrinaires initially stood on the center-right before shifting to the center-left. While sharing many ideas with the constitutionnels, such as concerns about popular sovereignty, absolutism, and lower-class radicalism, the doctrinaires distinguished themselves from the constitutionnels by “their habits of conversation” as Barante, a prominent doctrinaire spokesman, put it (Girard, 1985, p. 41–46; 69; Rosanvallon, 2007, pp. 109–112). Thus, the difference between and the doctrinaires was one of tone. The former were pragmatic, whereas the doctrinaires made intellectuals and idealist statesmen, such as Royer-Collard, François Guizot, Barante, Rémusat, Pierre François Hercule de Serre (Girard, 1985, pp. 69–70). The doctrinaires saw their mission as instituting a government capable of finalizing the social transformation initiated by the Revolution.

That said, the doctrinaires left a significant legacy on French politics. By dissociating equality and liberties from the revolutionary heritage, they reframed freedoms as principles in themselves. This theoretical distinction served to weaken arguments in favor of authoritarianism: In that, if liberties were but mere values attached to the Revolution, one could justify the use of political violence as a means to defend the revolutionary heritage. If, however, liberties were principles in themselves, the high

indifference to traditions and traditional values like family and their attachment to revolutionary tendencies (Rémusat, 1958).

purpose of protecting the Revolution fell short to justify the use of violence (Girard, 1985, pp. 76–78). Another implication of *liberty as a principle* was that it left room for a gradual long-term transition to universal suffrage. In other words, unlike the royalists and constitutionnels, the doctrinaires accepted universal suffrage at least in principle. However, this transition should happen only after lower classes would become educated (Girard, 1985, pp. 73–76). It is worth remembering that we saw the same reasoning in the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks.

Overall, the doctrinaires distinguished from the constitutionnels by arguing for a moderate government, which resembled more to representative government at least in principle (Girard, 1985, p. 73). The doctrinaires grew less and less authoritarian over time. Under Charles X, they often joined liberal campaigns for freedom of expression and association. In this period, they also became increasingly vocal in endorsing checks and balances.

The leftwing

The leftwing comprised a heterogeneous group called the liberals (also known as the independents or the left), the republicans and bonapartists. Over time, republicans and bonapartists joined this group. Speaking of the liberals, it is worth noting that this term initially designated the constitutionnels and the doctrinaires, who coined the term to describe their objections to absolutism. when they emerged, the independents adopted this term to define themselves as anti-absolutists. Although the constitutionnels, the doctrinaires, and the liberals simultaneously used the appellation for a while, the term came to singularly designate the liberals, since the latter took the leadership of the anti-absolutist front.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Given its anti-absolutist connotations, some historians categorize all opponents of absolutist royalists as liberal, which disguises the variations between and within the left and right. Following Alexander (2004), I reserve the term liberals for the leftwing or independents, because, as we shall see, rightwing factions often joined the ultras in adopting arbitrary measures to suppress regime contention (Alexander, 2004).

The liberals (the left or the independents)

The liberals emerged in 1817 on the eve of the elections with the motto “rendre la parole à la nation” (give the floor back to the nation) (Girard, 1985, p. 87). This faction proposed candidates from middle classes, such as Gilbert du Motier Lafayette, Jacques Laffitte, and Casimir Perrier, all of whom appealed to the interests of financiers and industrialists while luring the bonapartists, republicans and the federalists (Girard, 1985, pp. 83, 85). Gradually, liberals subsumed all these policy losers and became increasingly heterogeneous. As mentioned earlier, bonapartists, republicans, and the federalists joined the liberals, since no group dared identify itself as republican, bonapartists, or federalist in the aftermath of the White Terror. On the other hand, we shall see that republican and bonapartist demands resurfaced as of 1827 at the popular level (Alexander, 2004, p. 272).

The liberal rhetoric was characterized by national sovereignty, suffrage extension to lower classes, anti-monarchism, and a fervent opposition to aristocratic and clerical preponderance (Alexander, 2004, p. 28–29,80). The liberals envisioned overthrowing the Bourbon regime to restore national sovereignty and equality by adopting a democratic constitution that made the king a civil servant of the state (Girard, 1985, p. 87). As such, this faction differed from and lacked any institutional affiliation to the old radical republicans even though they were often associated with them (Hudson, 1973, p. 56). Their most salient theme was patriotism constituted and they were the most successful ones to mobilizing voters with this discourse of all other factions that also appealed to patriotism. However, the liberals’ patriotism bore militaristic elements, which attracted bonapartists (Girard, 1985, p. 88).

The patriotic anti-absolutist discourse allowed the liberals to rapidly augment their vote share in the two years following the foundation and make Eastern France their stronghold. They owed their rapid success as much to grievances of middle classes and leftwing supporters as to the quasi-clandestine organizational network of liberals on the ground. The liberal grassroots organizations encompassed the federalist committees, salons and cafés, leftwing newspapers, such as *le Censeur*, *le Correspondant électoral*, *le Constitutionnel*, *la Minerve*, as well as societies like the Société des Amis de la Presse that brought together journalists oppressed by the regime, secret societies and salons like the

Carbonari,⁹⁰ and masonic lodges (Alexander, 2004, p. 85; Girard, 1985, p. 85; Hudson, 1973, p. 57). The liberals branched into moderates and radicals. Contra radical liberals, the moderates argued for forming strategic alliances and compromise. Despite disagreement on this issue, the liberals mostly remained united. This solidarity had followed from collectively being victim of repression in the hands of the royalists who had boxed the bonapartists, republicans, and federalists under a same category, *enemies of the regime* (Alexander, 2004, pp. 76–77). State violence sustained this solidarity (Alexander, 2004, p. 82). Moderate or radical, both liberal branches had foot on the ground as well as in the Parliament. Following Alexander, I will refer to the moderate factions as the center-left and the more radical factions as the left (Alexander, 2004, p. 28).

The liberals demanded a veritable parliamentary regime with a strong legislative assembly, elected by people to check the executive, and an independent judiciary (Alexander, 2004, pp. 106–7). Contra proponents of centralization, they demanded the reintroduction of elections to appoint local officials. The liberals also championed the freedom of press and expression. For them, the state had a duty to protect civil liberties and to ensure free fair elections (an argument used against electoral frauds under ultra governments) (Alexander, 2004, p. 108). The liberals appeared in the secularization coalition with the defection, the constitutionnels, and the doctrinaires (Alexander, 2004, p. 108). On the other hand, they opposed the 1814 Charter for it did not live up to the revolutionary heritage.

The bonapartists, federalists, and republicans

These three factions, officially discontinued in the aftermath of the White Terror, pursued regime contention within the liberal faction. While all classified as leftwing and proponents of the revolutionary heritage, the bonapartists, republicans, and federalists varied on their ideas about parliamentary powers, decentralization, and the Church's role

⁹⁰ The French Carbonari was a clandestine organization founded to overthrow the Bourbon regime with a coup or a revolution. Members of this organization came from the aristocracy, students, liberal professionals, workers, and within the military. They believed that by passing the Law of the Double Vote, which restrained the suffrage, and oppression, the King had violated the Charter, the social contract; therefore, a revolution was in order (Spitzer, 1971). Ideologically, the Carbonari brought together supporters of republicanism, bonapartism, and liberalism. Appealing to the tricolor flag and Bonaparte, who was seen as a liberal crusader since the White Terror in 1815, the Carbonari generated militaristic and patriotic propaganda (Alexander, 2004, pp. 175–77).

in politics. The bonapartists demanded a strong executive, universal suffrage, secularization, and centralization. While also endorsing universal suffrage, secularization, and centralization, the republicans wanted a strong parliament. The federalists advocated for a moderated but still strong parliamentary regime and decentralization so as to preserve local autonomies.

This section examined the range of preferences across issue areas. I identified that the differences across factions went beyond the left-right axis, since both along the left/right end of the axis, factions argued for different regime types. I showed the issues of liberties vs. order, the use of violence as a political strategy, and administrative centralization had utmost importance, because they nuanced factions that advocated for the same regime type. In the next section, I conduct a historical analysis to examine the evolution of patterns of cooperation among regime contenders in order to see whether and how strategic and ideological preferences impacted cooperation dynamics.

Patterns of interactions among challengers

In this section, I examine the patterns of interactions among challengers in order to identify which actors engaged in long-term cooperation and among which others cooperation was limited to short-term issue-based cooperation. I also identify the purpose of each instance of cooperation. Using the identified patterns, the next section conducts a longitudinal network analysis to test the effects of preferences on ideological and strategic issues on cooperation. This section shows that cooperation sustained only in the cases where challengers' preferences converged on strategies. Groups whose strategies mismatched also cooperated, but such cooperation did not sustain to propel long-term cooperation. I further show that preference convergence on strategies responded to environmental transformations, which compelled challengers to revise and re-prioritize their preferences on issue dimensions.

A fluid heterogeneous group of challengers

The Bourbon Parliament convened following the August 1815 elections, which, organized in the aftermath of the White Terror, allowed the royalists to obtain an overwhelming majority in the Chamber (Resnick, 1966, p. 116). These royalists were so extremist that Louis XVIII called this Chamber as *la Chambre introuvable* (unobtainable chamber meaning the dream chamber for a king) (Lamartine, 1891, p. 213). To counterweight this Chamber, the King appointed a cabinet composed of the constitutionnels and doctrinaires, such as Decazes, Guizot, Barante, Talleyrand, and Fouché. Thus, we see that in the absence of constitutional arrangements to clarify the boundaries between the two government branches, the King relied on the rivalry between political factions to strike a balance between the executive and the legislative.

Instead of operating as checks and balances, as Louis XVIII had hoped, rivalry between the ultras and the center-right caused tensions that rapidly escalated into crises. The ultras would not endorse the cabinet and ministers would circumvent the Parliament by issuing decrees. The Parliament called the legitimacy of this practice into question by drawing on its role as representatives of public opinion. The ministers ridiculed this argument by pointing at the restricted suffrage and bringing up the issue of suffrage extension (Girard, 1985, pp. 55–63). Thus, as early as the winter of 1816, ministerial responsibility, parliamentary powers, and the suffrage had impeded the regime's functioning and polarized the political elite. To surmount the crisis, the King charged Richelieu, an ultra, of forming a new cabinet.

Upon taking power, the ultra cabinet collaborated with the *Chambre introuvable* in adopting a series of repressive laws to restore order,⁹¹ including the law on seditious writings, the law on public security (allowing for the arrest of individuals suspected of conspiring against the regime), the law on *courts prévôtales* (extraordinary courts to try political crimes), and denial of amnesty to criminals indicted for treason (Hudson, 1973, pp. 61–65). This government of ultras purged numerous bonapartist civil servants and generals to populate these ranks with royalist supporters (Alexander, 2004, pp. 53–54;

⁹¹ Since the Hundred Days (July 1814), the ultras had begun to see conspiracy behind every protest and unrest (Girard, 1985, pp. 81–82). This fear was not completely unfounded. In southern France, leftwing secret societies, such as the Union, conspired against the regime. Other incidents included Didier revolts to reestablish Bonaparte and the assassinations of Prosecutor Fualdès, Marshal Brune (Alexander, 2004, pp. 54–84). On the other hand, the ultra repression forged solidarity among the persecuted factions.

Hudson, 1973, p. 75).⁹² Moreover, the government restricted the already limited suffrage and abolished the right to divorce. Such measures, which aimed to revive the ancient regime, did not please the King. However, Louis XVIII was still hoping to reach a national reconciliation. The discovery of a number of leftwing plots to overthrow the regime crashed these hopes. Of these, the rebellion in Grenoble in May 1816 had the potential of transforming into a counterrevolution. The extreme royalist General Donnadieu suppressed this rebellion with severe repression. Heartened with the discovery of leftwing conspiracies against the monarchy, extreme royalists in the Parliament and on the ground together organized royalist protests and the ultra parliamentarians began generating royalist propaganda via state institutions. Yet, more than the royalist generals' repression and ultraroyalist propaganda, it was the Allies' military intervention that suppressed rebellions (Alexander, 2004, p. 38). Concerned about royalist fanaticism, Louis XVIII scheduled new elections for September 1816.

The one-year experience under the government of ultras left a long-term legacy. On the one hand, opponents of the ultras joined forces to preempt the reelection of the *Chambre introuvable*. During election campaigns, the constitutionnels, the doctrinaires, and the liberals formed electoral coalitions in most departments; in a few others, the royalists compromised with the center-right and left in order to prevent the latter from forming a counter-coalition (Alexander, 2004, pp. 62–63). On the other hand, the solidarity among royalists began to shatter. The controversy over parliamentary powers and ministerial responsibility had persuaded moderates in the Parliament, such as the Chateaubriand faction, of the infeasibility of unbounded royal sovereignty. We will see that, ironically, the *Chambre introuvable* sowed the seeds of parliamentarianism (Barthélemy, 1904, p. 168). At the societal level, repression and conservative measures turned voters away from royalists. The 1816 elections produced a chamber dominated by the constitutionnels. To honor the parliamentary majority, Louis XVIII asked Decazes to form a new cabinet (Alexander, 2004, pp. 81–82).

Once in power, the constitutionnels drafted a project of law to enfranchise middle classes. The constitutionnel and doctrinaire majority in the Parliament passed the bill despite the ultras' objections (Alexander, 2004, pp. 82–83; Girard, 1985, pp. 64–658). On

⁹² According to de Sauvigny, the Ultras replaced between 50,000 and 80,000 civil servants with their supporters (Sauvigny, 1967, p. 136).

the other hand, the constitutionnel cabinet did not abolish the repressive measures that they had attacked under the ultra government. The constitutionnels, like the ultras and republicans before them, deemed repression unpleasant but necessary strategy to restore order. The persistence of the repression regime broke the electoral alliance between the liberals and the constitutionnels (Alexander, 2004, p. 82). The liberals decided to get organized to gain parliamentary representation upon seeing that they could not rely on the center-right to not undermine civil liberties. The electorate shared the liberals' feelings about repression. Discontented about repression, the electorate voted for liberals in the next elections and the ultras lost seats (Girard, 1985, pp. 65–66). However, the King did not ask liberals to form a new cabinet. He appointed constitutionnel ministers to counterweight the Parliament of liberals.

Contrary to the expectations, the major confrontation took place not between liberals and the center-right but between the center-right and the ultras. The conscription law abolishing the predominance of the aristocracy within the military and the bill on the freedom of press opposed the constitutionnel-doctrinaire block to the ultras.⁹³ Liberals sided with the constitutionnels on these two bills, but this short-term issue-based cooperation did not go as far to talk the constitutionnels into abolishing the repression regime. Moreover, it strained their relations with leftwing societies on the ground (Alexander, 2004, pp. 85–86). Towards the end of the legislative year, liberal parliamentarians had come to the idea that the constitutionnels' *raison d'état* posed a more imminent threat than the ultras' project of reviving the ancient regime (Alexander, 2004, p. 84).

The liberal-constitutionnel cooperation collapsed in 1820 following the assassination of the Duke of Berry, the only Bourbon heir capable of producing an heir. This incident triggered a crisis reintroducing regicide into the political vocabulary and sparking speculations about “a third Restoration.” The ultras agitated the public against Decazes, a prominent constitutionnel minister. Seeing the uproar, the King asked Villèle, a moderate royalist, to form a moderate cabinet. Even though the Villèle cabinet did not generate ultraroyalist propaganda in 1816, it used the assassination of the Duke of Berry to weaken liberal support. Specifically, it framed the assassination as a leftwing plot

⁹³ In an attempt to weaken this coalition, the ultras spread conspiracy theories against the King and the Charter, such as the Waterside conspiracy in 1818 (Hudson, 1973, p. 84).

against the monarchy, even though the murderer, Louvel, an ex-military, was unaffiliated to any leftwing organization (Malandain, 2011, p. 33). Meanwhile, royalists on the ground spread more conspiracy theories about prospective liberal coups and riots. Leftwing parliamentarians retaliated using a violent rhetoric, but leftwing radicals on the ground responded to violence with violence. Leftwing violence on the ground played into the hands of the ultra government; Villèle passed further restriction on the press law, persecuted journalists, and adopted the general security law authorizing the government to incarcerate individuals suspected of conspiracy without trial (Girard, 1985, p. 91; Malandain, 2011). Consequently, liberal and doctrinaire press lost ground, but royalist and constitutionnel press were unaffected (Hudson, 1973, pp. 97–98). We see that the doctrinaire-constitutionnel bloc also shattered on the issue of the use of violence as a political strategy. Meanwhile, the constitutionnels entered a short-term issue-based alliance with the ultras fearing that elections might produce another liberal Chamber and crimes committed during the White Terror might get inspected (Alexander, 2004, p. 92).

With the constitutionnels' support, the Villèle government passed the law of double vote, which gave a second vote to the 25% of the 100,000 voters who paid highest taxes and included some gerrymandering measures (Pilbeam, 2002, p. 39). This bill obviously aimed to deny liberals parliamentary representation. Although middle class enfranchisement was one of their top demands, we see that the fear of liberals pushing the constitutionnels to act against their ideological preferences. To contest the law of double vote, conspiratorial leftwing organizations, such as the *Union* and the *Chevaliers de la Liberté* (an umbrella organization), organized violent riots. Moderate leftwing supporters on the ground launched a petition campaign and collected 19,000 signatures from the recently disfranchised (Alexander, 2004, pp. 94, 141). In response, the ultras spread a rumor about a possible leftwing revolution. Rumors and the law of double vote suffrage allowed the ultras to secure a parliamentary majority at the 1821 elections. The liberals still got some seats, whereas the constitutionnels and doctrinaires lost seats (Alexander, 2004, pp. 136–37).

Between 1821 and 1824, the cabinet of ultras and ultra parliamentarians adopted a series of oppressive measures and laws, including the purge of non-royalist civil servants, the law of tendency (i.e., preliminary censorship to prevent crimes against public order, religion, the king, and the state), the law authorizing the state to try anyone for criticizing the government, the prohibition of the circulation of liberal Spanish newspapers, and the

law according bishops the competence to set the curricula at royal colleges (Alexander, 2004, pp. 138, 145–46; Hudson, 1973, p. 21). Consequently, it became impossible for anyone to contest the government via conventional means, such as petition and press campaigns. Radical liberals organized violent riots and uprisings sometimes in collaboration with the Carbonari (Alexander, 2004, pp. 175–79; Hudson, 1973, pp. 104–5). This strategy of violence distanced moderate liberals from radical liberals. At that point, they were unable to control radicals on the ground. The liberals paid a steep price for radicalization and violence at the 1824 elections. These elections produced another ultra majority in the Chamber (Alexander, 2004, pp. 153–55). The constitutionnels, the doctrinaires, and liberals together had but 17 seats (Alexander, 2004, p. 140; Hudson, 1973, p. 107). This electoral defeat taught the moderate left that violence undercut the electorate's sympathy to their cause (Alexander, 2004, p. 177). Therefore, as of 1824, the center-left banned the use of violence as a political strategy and distinguished itself from the radical-left. Following the dissociation, the center-left set out to build their own party network. Meanwhile, the royalist block in the Parliament fractured. Moderate royalists led by Agier and Chateaubriand split from the ultras, thus forming the defection (*la défection*). The defection could no longer acquiesce to sacrificing civil liberties to maintain order. This group joined forced the liberals to defend civil liberties (Alexander, 2004, p. 191; Rosenblatt, 2009, p. 161).

To recap, from 1815 to 1824, the structure of parliamentary and electoral alliances changed frequently. Sometimes it was issue-based agreements that produced temporary alliances among factions, but mostly factions worked together against a shared political rival. For example, at the onset, the leftwing and the center-right cooperated against royalists. Once the leftwing empowered, the constitutionnels turned to royalists. In such strategic alliances, the fear of the rival led factions to betray their ideological principles. Thus, alliances were fluid and temporary under Louis XVIII. We will see that alliances tended to solidify under Charles X.

The Rise of a coherent oppositional coalition

Charles X took the throne in 1824 following Louis XVIII's death. Charles X's reign started with a most controversial law on indemnity for confiscated properties of the émigrés. The question of the émigrés was controversial enough. The law on indemnity for the latter's confiscated property constituted an even more delicate issue. In 1793, the Jacobin regime

had auctioned the properties in question as national wealth (*les biens nationaux*) and lower and middle classes had acquired them. Compensating for these properties meant to dispossess the new acquirers, i.e., lower and middle classes. Upon returning to France in 1814, the émigrés had reclaimed their properties. Louis XVIII had rejected these demands because the issue risked turning lower and middle classes against the Monarchy (Jones, 1988, p. 155). In contrast, this controversial law was the first project of law that Charles X proposed, which signaled that the new King was not going to be a moderate as his predecessor and that he conspicuously sided with the aristocracy. This law on indemnity agitated the left that criticized the bill for bringing feudalism back (Jones, 1988, p. 155; Kroen, 2000, p. 114). This bill passed in 1825 despite uproar (Hudson, 1973, p. 112).

The second bill that Charles X proposed was as controversial as the first one. The Sacrilege Law introduced by his Minister Villèle in 1826 condemned perpetrators to hard labor for life and solitary confinement. In practice, this law would serve to persecute Protestants and nonbelievers, hence extend clerical support for the Monarchy (Kroen, 2000, p. 113). In other words, this bill clearly signaled the King's willingness to restore the ancient regime. This law met criticism from both the leftwing and the center-right. The government's response was brief: "the Christian King only desired to conserve the faith of ancestors" (*Recueil critique de jurisprudence et de législation*, 1829, p. 43).⁹⁴ Next, the government introduced the bill extending the clerical power to the domain of education and authorized nunneries to acquire property without legal confirmation (Kroen, 2000, pp. 115–17). This law clearly implied a theocratic turn. Charles X's theocratic reign also manifested itself through a religious discourse, the frequent use of religious symbols in the public sphere, and state-sponsored religious celebrations and festivals (Kroen, 2000, pp. 116–19).

Theocratic turn did not appeal to the public. Very few members of the lower class attended Charles X's coronation ceremony on October 24, 1826 and the attendees to lacked enthusiasm. Moreover, in major cities, such as Lyon and Reims, Molière's play deriding an absolutist monarch, *Tartuffe*, was staged on the very day of the coronation and attracted hundreds of citizens. Ridiculing a monarch who, claiming to his divine right to rule, ruled irrationally without restraint, *Tartuffe* became a symbol of resistance to "the clericalism" (Kroen, 2000, p. 283). Within the Parliament, the defection, the doctrinaires,

⁹⁴ For more information see (Ford, 2005; Hartman, 1972; Kroen, 2000).

the constitutionnels, and liberals formed an anticlerical block. This block launched a propaganda campaign to mobilize citizens for resistance to the encroachments of the Church and the affiliated networks of missionary organizations, such as *Mission de la France*, the *Congrégation*, and the *Chevaliers de la Foi* (inactive after 1826), into the domains of education and administration (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 354; Rader, 2013, p. 74). This campaign found strong support in eastern France where the majority of the population were Protestant (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 355).

Realizing that societal and parliamentary pushback against clericalism and absolutism might escalate into a crisis, Charles X toughened censorship regulations in 1826. However, the number of anti-governmental pamphlets in circulation augmented despite censorship.⁹⁵ In response, liberal societies launched a campaign for the liberty of press, including the *Société des amis de la liberté de la presse* (the society of friends of the freedom of press). Anti-absolutist societies were formed in society, such as the “Aide-toi, et le Ciel t’aidera” (help yourself, and Heaven will help you) (Hudson, 1973, p. 138). Most importantly, the *Société des amis de la liberté de la presse* and *Aide-toi, et le Ciel t’aidera* initiated an institutionalized cooperation with moderate royalists. Cooperation at the grassroots level precipitated a parliamentary alliance between liberals and the defection (Alexander, 2004, p. 191). Hence, an anti-absolutist opposition front began to take shape under the leadership of liberals.

1827 constituted a turning point for the absolutist regime. The 1827 elections declared a victory for liberals. From 1827 to 1830, the ultras would find themselves on the defensive side (Girard, 1985, pp. 102–3). Most alarming for extreme royalists was the shift of rich landowner support to liberals. In other words, royalists had lost their natural ally. The other disgruntled societal groups that voted the left included liberal professionals, industrialists, financiers, tradesmen, and middle classes (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 357).

The period from 1827 to 1829 was a prelude to the 1830 Revolution. Economic grievances added to political grievances. French economy had been in recession since the second half of the decade. Recession was most visible in the silk and wine sectors, two of the largest industries in France. Recession deepened following bad harvest in 1827. The

⁹⁵ To give an idea, in an epoch when papers did not sell by issue, the liberal press had 430,000 subscribers and the moderate royalist press reached 6,000 subscribers, while pro-government press had 14,000 (Girard, 1985, p. 101).

cabinet's economic measures fell short to remedy supply shortage, inflation, and high unemployment. Lower classes were most affected by the economic downturn; they started riots in provinces to contest the government's ineffectiveness. Liberal societies organized protests as well. By 1829, lower class riots had spread to cities and become violent (Gonnet, 1955, pp. 254–56). The government turned to repression to suppress riots and started a propaganda campaign blaming the downturn on concerted actions by the enemies of the Monarchy (Gonnet, 1955, p. 263). These policies backfired: Bonapartist demands resurfaced among urban lower classes, the societal segment most hit by unemployment, and industrialists. The propertied classes and producers petitioned the government for the eradication of indirect taxes and protectionism (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 262). Yet, the government ignored it. The regime's indifference turned upper-classes away from the monarchy (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 358). By 1830, almost all societal groups perceived the regime as being incapable of handling the situation. The conditions were ripe for regime change. The crisis over ministerial responsibility provided the spark for the Revolution (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 358).

The crisis over ministerial responsibility broke out right after the 1829 elections. The elections had produced yet another liberal majority in the Chamber. Utterly displeased with this outcome, the King asked Martignac, a moderate royalist, to form a cabinet in order to counterbalance the Chamber (Pilbeam, 2002, p. 40). By appointing a royalist cabinet, Charles X strained the relations with the parliamentarians before even the Parliament convened. Martignac's cabinet consisted of moderate royalists –such as Polignac– and the doctrinaires –such as Royer-Collard. By excluding the ultras, Martignac meant to smoothen relations with the Parliament (Girard, 1985, p. 104). Yet, we learn from the partisan press that this cabinet failed to amend relations with the leftwing, while also alienating royalists who perceived this move as a concession (Rader, 2013, pp. 43–45).

The Martignac cabinet was more compromising; it abolished censorship and the prerequisite of pre-publication inspection for the press and adopted measures to prevent corruption in elections (e.g., the establishment of permanent electoral lists, authorizing citizens to monitor voting registry procedures, and ordinances decreasing the Church's control over society) (Backouche, 2000, pp. 135–46). The cabinet made more concessions

by issuing the two ordinances that curbed the Church's influence in education.⁹⁶ This strategy backfired. The anticlerical opposition found these measures insufficient, while the Jesuits and Catholic activists thought that concessions went too far.

The bill on the reinstitution of elections for local civil servants prepared the fall of both the Martignac cabinet and the Bourbon Monarchy. This decentralization bill could have obtained liberal support had it not contained arrangements that worked to expand the aristocratic dominance in provinces (Alexander, 2004, p. 243). After the Chamber turned the bill down, Martignac resigned. This time, Charles X asked an ultra, Polignac, to form a cabinet. The Polignac cabinet contained notorious ultras like LaBourdonnaye and General Louis- Auguste de Bourmont. The liberals became even more agitated, interpreting the King's decision as a coup against representative regime (Alexander, 2004, p. 243). The liberal press in collaboration with *the Aide-toi, et le Ciel t'aidera* committees launched a campaign to defend the Charter and civil liberties. Also, liberal societies launched a petition campaign for the reinstitution of local elective councils (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 263). Liberal parliamentarians and the leftwing press also formed a society to call on citizens to not pay the direct taxes that the Chamber did not approve (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 263). Rapidly extending its network nation-wide, this and successfully dissuaded some citizens from paying taxes (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 264).

The trigger for the 1830 Revolution came at the day the Parliament reconvened. In their opening speech, liberal parliamentarians and the defection inveighed against the Villèle ministry and the King for undermining civil liberties (Rader, 2013, pp. 48–49). Charles X became very angry but did not react fearing an insurrection. Encouraged by the King's inaction, the Parliament passed a vote of no confidence against the Polignac cabinet in March 1830. Charles X took this motion personally and this time dissolved the Chamber without specifying an election date (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 365). To contain the backlash that his decisions would generate, he restored censorship and restrained the franchise to the quarter richest (Girard, 1985, p. 117). Journalists began a resistance, which turned into an armed resistance once the leftwing secret societies joined in (Girard, 1985, p. 117).

⁹⁶ The first one excluded all instructors and professors affiliated with an unauthorized congregation from educational institutions, which primarily addressed the Jesuits. The second reestablished regulations concerning seminaries, which made little seminaries illegal (Backouche, 2000, p. 136).

Initially, liberal parliamentarians did not openly support the resistance anticipating the army to intervene and protests to de-intensify (Girard, 1985, p. 117). However, the King's decision to restrict the suffrage had also mobilized the now disfranchised middle classes. The latter's participation to the resistance created a domino effect: The Bourse refused to discount bills; factory owners closed their factories and workers joined the resistance. On July 27, some journals, such as *le Temps*, *le National*, *le Globe*, *le Journal du commerce*, ignored the censorship and published issues accusing the King of violating the social contract (Mansel, 2003, pp. 238–39). The government seized these presses, but this intervention only exacerbated the public backlash. A group of skilled artisans, students, workers, peasants, and lower classes barricaded some streets chanting “save the fatherland” and waving the tricolor flag –a traditional symbol of the Revolution (Girard, 1985, p. 118; Harsin, 2002, p. 41). In this crowd, students made republican propaganda, while peasants and workers made bonapartist demands (Girard, 1985, p. 118). Regardless, protesters attacked clericalism and absolutism with one voice and called on liberal parliamentarians (Harsin, 2002, p. 41). The army intervened to restore order, which made the crowd even more violent. Several soldiers died during clashes with protesters (Mansel, 2003, p. 239).

On the second day of the uprisings, liberal parliamentarians officially sided with the resistance. Parliamentarians, such as Lafitte, Adolphe Thiers, and François Mignet, signed the petition drafted by the resistance. They further demanded Polignac's resignation and the annulation of censorship and suffrage restrictions. Charles X refused. On the third day, protesters captured the Palaces of Louvre and Tuileries and declared a provisionary government at the Hotel de Ville. At this point, leftwing parliamentarians officially took control of the resistance. They declared the Duke of Orleans the future king of France –provided that he acknowledged the Charter and the tricolor flag (Harsin, 2002, p. 42). Protestors most welcomed this declaration and the revolution came to an end.

At the end of this three-day insurrection known as *the three glorious days*, France transitioned to the July Monarchy. 496 civilians and 150 soldiers had lost their lives (Harsin, 2002, p. 41). On the other hand, despite the violent and revolutionary character of the resistance, liberal parliamentarians managed to establish their authority over protesters. This authority over protesters was crucial in setting the direction of the transition: in an environment where protesters called for a republic or an empire, France transitioned to another constitutional monarchy, because liberal parliamentarians had

endorsed neither of these options. Thus, liberal parliamentarians' leadership was decisive in setting the direction of the transition. The July Monarchy was a more democratic parliamentary regime than the Bourbon Monarchy.⁹⁷

Thus, under Charles X's reign, we see the rise of an anticlerical front and an anti-absolutist front both of which were spearheaded by the leftwing. In this period, the leftwing had the largest support among all opposition factions, because they had been long advocating for the freedom of press, civil liberties, and secularization. Moreover, the leftwing had the strongest support basis among lower classes, whereas the center-right and the defection, which figured in the anticlerical and anti-absolutist fronts rather appealed to upper and middle classes. However, the economic crisis also pushed these two classes towards the left. This explains why the oppositional front took shape under the liberal leadership. Liberal parliamentarians also proved their centrality in the oppositional movement by establishing their authority over protesters. Thus, we can conclude that alliances solidified under Charles X and liberals emerged as the leader of the oppositional front. The next section conducts statistical analyses to measure the impact of preference agreement on cooperation for transition to the July Monarchy.

Testing the role of ideologies and strategies on cooperative behavior

In this section, I test the evolution of the role of ideologies and strategies on cooperation patterns among challengers. I use longitudinal network models known as temporal exponential random graph models (TERGM), whose properties were discussed in the methodology section of the theory chapter. This section proceeds as follows: I explain the operationalization of the dependent variable –cooperation for regime change between a pair of challenger groups– and the independent variables –preferences on ideological and strategic issues, which were identified in the previous section– in the French case. In the

⁹⁷ The Charter of 1830 defined France as a monarchy and the King as the "King of the French" (instead of the King of France) ("Charte constitutionnelle du 1830," 1830, p. 389). The legislative was reinforced at the expense of the executive ("Charte constitutionnelle du 1830," 1830, pp. 391–93). With this Charter, the king lost his power to initiate legislation and to legislate by ordinances, which had generated governmental instability under the Bourbon Restoration ("Charte constitutionnelle du 1830," 1830, p. 390). The suffrage was extended and censorship was abolished ("Charte constitutionnelle du 1830," 1830, pp. 390, 392). Catholicism was no longer the state religion ("Charte constitutionnelle du 1830," 1830, p. 390). Symbolically, the tricolor flag, the legacy of the French Revolution, was reinstated ("Charte constitutionnelle du 1830," 1830, p. 394). For more information see ("Charte constitutionnelle du 1830," 1830).

second subsection, I test the null hypothesis that ideologies and strategies have no effect on cooperation for regime change. The final subsection presents the results of the TERGM analyses of the French dataset and robustness checks. I show that French challengers formed a coherent oppositional coalition only after having reached an agreement on a secular regime respecting civil liberties and achieving regime change without the use of violent means. This coalition took shape under the center-left's leadership, the faction that had been advocating these preferences.

Dependent variable & the unit of analysis in the French case

The dependent variable is cooperation for regime change in a given year. Cooperation includes all types of activities, legal and illegal, undertaken with the purpose of liberalizing the regime. I collected the data on cooperation from primary and secondary sources using the following indicators: co-sponsoring some bill in the parliament and the cabinet, creating verbal and written propaganda against the authoritarian government and its policies (including the King, his Charter, or the monarchy), and co-sponsoring or collaborating on some contentious activity of a private or public nature (e.g., meetings, protests, uprisings, plotting coups, mobilizing people for revolution). It is worth noting that regime change conveys the objective of overthrowing the authoritarian government but does not specify the properties of the regime to come. As the historical analysis has showed, actors desired different types of regimes, and testing the effect of such differences on transition constitutes the purpose of this paper.

Indicators of cooperation are collaboration between a pair of challenger groups for generating verbal and written propaganda against the authoritarian regime (including the person of the King, government policies, or the regime's ideology) or to disseminate anti-authoritarian ideas (such as liberty, freedom of speech, independence), and co-sponsoring contentious activities of a private or public nature (such as meetings, protests, uprisings, plotting coups, mobilizing people for revolution).

In coding cooperation, I did not weigh contentious activities by riskiness. That is, plotting a coup has the same value as co-publishing propaganda material. Social movements and regime literatures do not provide theoretical and empirical grounds to justify the assumption that high-risk activities, such as attempting a coup, have greater impact than low-risk activities, say, press campaigns. Rather, systematic low-risk activities

might prove to be impactful on the long term. Also, I did not weigh cooperation by how many times a pair of challengers collaborated in undertaking the abovementioned contentious activities. This means, cooperation between some groups A and B to generate propaganda bears the same value 1 (indicating the realization of cooperation contra 0 indicating its non-occurrence) as cooperation between a pair of groups C and D which, say, generated propaganda and plotted a coup together. Concomitantly, some failed cooperation attempt does not cancel out a realized instance cooperation. That is, if groups A and B co-sponsored a small protest in year X but failed to co-sponsor a large-scale demonstration in the same year, I consider A and B in cooperation for that year. This is an implication of not counting instances of cooperation in a given year. The reason for doing so is that the TERGM techniques do not yet allow for examining graphs with multiple edges between a pair of nodes (Hunter, Handcock, Butts, Goodreau, & Morris, 2008; Lusher, Koskinen, & Robins, 2012).

The unit of analysis is an organized group challenging the authoritarian government to change the regime.⁹⁸ In the French case, this definition refers to parliamentary factions and grassroots organizations.⁹⁹ I coded all parliamentarians voicing a distinct preference set as one group. Similarly, all grassroots organizations that shared a distinct preference set and worked together were coded as one group.¹⁰⁰

Constructing networks

I constructed one cooperation network for each year from 1814 to 1830. The analysis spans the period from 1815 when the Parliament convened for the first time to 1830 when the Monarchy fell. Nodes represent factions struggling to overthrow the Bourbon regime and

⁹⁸ I leave unorganized citizens that protested the regime aside.

⁹⁹ I collapsed ministers into parliamentary factions, because parliamentary factions and their ministers always acted in unison; setting ministers as a separate faction would cause correlation and degenerate the model. Also, grassroots organizations and parliamentary factions were affiliated but operated in different environments. Their preference sets resembled but were not identical to parliamentary groups.

¹⁰⁰ If some organization comprised factions with each holding a distinct preference set, I coded factions as separate actors and not the organization. If, however, one faction dominated and others followed, I coded the organization as one actor. Also, if some individual challenger founded more than one organization without changing the purpose and scope of its activities, I coded all such organizations as one group. Yet, the purpose and scope of its activities changed, I coded those organizations two different entities. Also, if two factions formed a novel institution while retaining their distinct institutional identity, I did not code the child organization as a separate entity.

edges represent cooperation between a pair of challenger factions.¹⁰¹ Since cooperation is reciprocal, networks are undirected.

Independent variables

As we saw in the historical analysis section of this chapter, grievances in Bourbon France related to the issues of parliamentary and ministerial powers, the role of religion in politics, decentralization, suffrage extension, civil liberties vs. order, and the use of violence as a political strategy. I operationalize these variables as follows:

Parliamentary and ministerial powers are operationalized as a continuous variable called “the executive-legislative balance,” which varies between (-1), indicating that the regime was executive-dominant and the parliament had at best a consultative role, and (1), meaning that the parliament retained all powers. Zero (the origin) refers to a regime of checks and balances. This continuous variable serves two purposes: Notice that at both ends of the axis, power is concentrated in the hands of one government branch. Hence, at the extremes, we observe parliamentary tyranny –if the Parliament predominates– or an empire or absolutist monarchy–if the executive predominates. This continuous scale allows for capturing overlaps in the separation-of-powers output of preferences of factions that stand on opposite ends of the left-right axis. For example, bonapartists and the ultras fall on the same end of the executive-legislative axis for both preferring a strong executive, even though they disagree on who should retain it. Second, this axis nuances within factions. For instance, the ultras want absolutism, whereas moderate royalists demand checks and balances.

I operationalize the issue of civil liberties vs. order as a continuous variable using the “authoritarian-libertarian axis,” which is a widely used measurement (Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Leconte, 2008; Shapiro & Hacker-Cordsn, 1999). This variable allows for capturing differences in degrees of tolerance for authoritarianism—for example, the constitutionnels surpassed the ultras in illiberalism. This axis spans from (-1), indicating a faction acquiesces to suppressing liberties to preserve order, to (1), meaning that it objects to sacrificing freedoms for order.

¹⁰¹ I did not use individuals as nodes. Most organizations being clandestine, obtaining complete membership list was not possible.

Suffrage extension is operationalized as a categorical variable called “suffrage.” Suffrage varies between “upper classes,” “middle classes,” and “universal”, corresponding to the limits of enfranchisement. Finally, I operationalize the role of religion in politics and centralization as categorical variables, respectively, “centralization” and “secularization.” Actors are coded “pro-decentralization” if they agree to electing local government officials and “pro-centralization” if they oppose. Similarly, actors are “theocratic” if they oppose the Church’s involvement in public policies and “secular” otherwise. I operationalize all categorical variables using the *nodematch* function and the continuous variables using the *absdiff* function in the *statnet* package (Handcock et al., 2003).

Control variables

French parliamentary factions and grassroots organizations operated in different environments, which must have affected the intensity and ease of communication and cooperation among challengers. Parliamentary sessions regularized and structured interactions among parliamentarians, whereas distance taxed communication among grassroots organizations and between grassroots and parliamentary factions. I constructed the “venue of operation” variable in order to control for these impediments. Venue of operation is a categorical dummy that is “parliament” if actors operated in the parliament and “grassroots” if they operated on the ground.

I use two control variables to control for network effects. The continuity of actors constitutes a challenge to longitudinal analysis, since factions form, discontinue, or merge. Not all factions coexist at the same time. “Out” controls for continuity, which is a dummy that becomes (1) if an actor does not exist in a given year and (0) otherwise. I operationalized “out” as a node attribute using the *nodecov* function.

Past cooperative behavior gives TERGM its temporality dimension. Theoretically, past cooperation affects future decisions on cooperation. Groups might engage in short-term issue-based cooperation with rivals, as they may renew effective partnerships and break unsuccessful cooperation that they form with groups that have a close position. The variable “past cooperation” indicates whether groups cooperated in the previous year and is operationalized as an edge attribute using the *edgescov* function. Finally, I added “clustering,” a structural network metric capturing the propensity to collaborate with the

partner of a partner. High clustering indicates that the network is hierarchical at the local level. That is, groups tend to form partnerships with the partners of their partner. Low clustering suggests that nodes make attachments freely at the local level (Lusher et al., 2012). In other words, some existing alliance with a partner does not induce alliance with the partners of a partner. This metric captures strategic alliances known as “the friend of my friend is my friend,” which might come at the expense of preferences on ideological issues (the friend of one’s friend may hold rather different preferences than one’s self). I measure clustering using the *gwesp* function (fixed).

The specification of hypotheses on the French case

As explained in the theory chapter, this research mainly tests the hypothesis that “the higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among ideologically diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and the more likely there will be either regime change or significant concessions to the opposition.”

This hypothesis is tested in three steps: First, I entertain the null hypothesis that ideological and strategic disagreements have no effect on cooperation. If rejected, this would mean that preferences about ideological and strategic issue dimensions affect cooperative behavior. I test this null hypothesis with a logistic regression using the variables ‘past cooperation’ and ‘out’ to control for temporality.

I specify the main hypothesis, “*the higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among ideologically diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and the more likely there will be either regime change or significant concessions to the opposition,*” to the issue dimensions of the French case goes as follows:

Similarity along the authoritarian-libertarian axis will increase the probability that challengers collaborate for transition.

Similarity along on the executive-legislative balance will increase the probability that challengers collaborate for transition.

Similarity on suffrage will increase the probability that challengers collaborate for transition.

Similarity on secularization will increase the probability that challengers collaborate for transition.

Similarity on centralization will increase the probability that challengers collaborate for transition.

Cooperation becomes more likely if both challengers work on the ground or in the parliament.

I test the abovementioned hypotheses using TERGM. As explained in the theory chapter, these hypotheses ground on the preference similarity mechanism and are operationalized using the concept homophily.

In the language of TERGM, if preferences have an independent effect on cooperation, their estimates should be statistically significant. Significant positive coefficients suggest that more ties (representing cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random in networks displaying the same number of nodes and edges. Significant negative coefficients indicate that less ties (cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random in networks displaying the same number of nodes and edges. The value of coefficients communicates the rate of change. If preferences on some issue makes no effect on cooperative behavior, we should obtain null effect (meaning that actors enter cooperation regardless of whether their preference aligns with their partner's on the issue in question). A significant positive estimate suggests that preference alignment on some issue drives cooperation. That is, actors highly prioritize this issue and refrain from cooperating with those that think differently. A significant negative estimate indicates that actors prefer not to cooperate with those who think like them on a given issue. That is to say, if preference alignment on some issue does not drive cooperation it does not hinder it.

Using TERGM and findings from the analyses of the preference evolution and patterns of interaction, I test Hypothesis 2 suggesting that *“cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when challengers react to past failures and new opportunities by deciding to pragmatically revise the priority of preferences on strategic issue*

dimensions.” I divide the period of interactions into two (before and after 1824) and explain the method of periodization below.

I test Hypothesis 3, suggesting that “cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when peripheral actors align their preferences to those of an emergent core. I conduct a descriptive network analysis to test this hypothesis, which compares the ideological and strategic positions of the members of the coalition that carried out the 1814 Revolution to those of the groups that stayed out of this coalition. So doing will explain why of all contender groups, it was a particular group that was able to spearhead the rise of an oppositional coalition for regime change.

Periodization: I break the period from 1814 to 1830 into two intervals, the reign of Louis XVIII (1814-1824) and the reign of Charles X (1825-1830). The reason for taking 1824 as the dividing line is as follows: We know from the historical analysis that the Bourbon regime turned absolutist after Charles X took the throne. I expect this authoritarian turn to change the sociopolitical environment and induce actors to reconsider their preferences. If preference revision harmonized preferences, we should expect preference similarity to propel cooperation on issues that actors highly prioritize. Controlling for changes in preferences, we want to identify whether preference convergence on strategic issues propelled the rise of an oppositional coalition (long-term cooperation for regime change). To this end, I examine the distribution of preferences of members of the coalition. That said, I run two sets of models, one looking at the entire period from 1814 to 1830, the other comparing the two reigns.

Effects of ideological and strategic preferences on cooperation for regime change

In this section, I test the effect of preferences with an analysis of the evolution of preferences over time. First, I test the null hypothesis that preferences on issue dimensions other than shared interests in overthrowing the government have no effect on cooperative behavior. Second, I run a TERGM analysis to identify whether and how much each preference influence cooperation among challengers, if ever. I show that preferences make a significant effect on cooperation even after controlling for the variation of their impacts over time.

The Evolution of preferences over time

I analyze the evolution of preferences across issue areas before and after 1824. This analysis aims to pinpoint whether and in which direction preferences changed over time. Table 8 below summarizes the findings.

Table 8

	Preference distribution: Bourbon France							
	Louis XVIII (1814-1824)				Charles X (1825-1830)			
	min	mean	median	max	min	mean	median	max
executive-legislative balance	-1	-0.23	-0.5	1	-1	-0.14	0	1
authoritarian-libertarian	-1	-0.9	0	0.75	-0.75	0.12	0.5	0.75
	value	counts	%		counts	%		
venue of operation	grassroots	8	0.57		7	0.46		
	parliamentary faction	6	0.43		6	0.54		
suffrage	upper class	3	0.21		2	0.15		
	middle class	4	0.29		5	0.38		
	universal	7	0.50		6	0.46		
secularization	theocratic	3	0.21		2	0.15		
	secular	11	0.79		11	0.85		
centralization	centralization	6	0.43		6	0.46		
	decentralization	8	0.57		7	0.54		
violence	no	5	0.36		7	0.54		
	yes	9	0.64		6	0.46		

In Table 8, we observe significant shifts in preferences about authoritarianism vs. libertarianism, the executive-legislative axis, suffrage, and the use of violence from the reign of Louis XVIII to the reign of Charles X. In contrast, changes in preferences on centralization, and secularization were modest.

The shift along the authoritarian-libertarian axis is striking. From one reign to another, the mean shifts from (-0.9) to (0.12), meaning that the average actor prioritizes order vs. liberties under Louis XVIII and liberties over order under Charles X. We observe

a significant shift also in the median. The median actor values order as much as equality under Louis XVIII, but clearly prefers liberties under Charles X. This shift reflects revisions in the views of the doctrinaires and the moderate royalists in response to authoritarian retrenchment under the ultra government and Charles X. It is worth reminding that these factions joined forces with the liberals to protect freedoms after 1824. This finding indicates that Charles X's absolutism mismatched demands of the majority political factions. It is also significant that the mean and the median appear on the same sides of the axis, but the mean is closer to the authoritarian end than the median after 1824. This means, the majority of the factions prioritized freedoms over order, but the few supporters of authoritarianism pull the mean towards the authoritarian end. In a nutshell, under Charles X, the political class does not want an illiberal regime.

Along the executive-legislative axis, the shifts in the means and medians from before to after 1824 indicate that actors distance themselves from a strongly executive dominant regime in response to their experiences under Charles X. Under Louis XVIII, the average actor prefers an executive-dominant regime, whereas under Charles X the average actor endorses checks-and-balances. The shift in medians from before to after 1824 further indicates that support for parliamentary checks on the executive increased ((-0.5) vs. (0.5)). On the other hand, the means under both Louis XVIII and Charles X are closer to checks and balances than they are to absolutism and they are even further away to a strongly legislative-dominant regime than they are to absolutism. This finding communicates dislike with absolutism and even stronger dislike with a strongly legislative-dominant regime —which indicates that republican regimes still resonates with parliamentary tyranny and violence in the eyes of Bourbon. This finding together with the shifts along the authoritarian-libertarian axis imply that Charles X's authoritarianism is unlikely to find support among the political class.

Another significant revision in preferences happens with respect to the use of violence. More factions prefer not using violence as a political means before 1824, while support for non-violent means of regime change finds more support after. We would need to examine the preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition to see whether strategic convergence propelled the rise of a coherent oppositional front.

Finally, preferences about suffrage seem to have been revised. Support for middle-class enfranchisement increases 29% before 1824 to 38% after 1824. Support for

restricting the right to vote to the upper class slightly diminishes from 21% to 15%. On the other hand, support for universal suffrage slightly declines. In sum, after 1824, suffrage extension is the most salient preference under Charles X, while support is divided between whether middle class enfranchisement and universal suffrage.

Preference revisions were modest in the areas of the role of religion in politics and the structure of the administration. On the former, support for secularization slightly increases from before to after 1824 (79% vs. 85%). Moreover, under both reigns, support for secularization among the political class overwhelms support for a theocratic regime, which indicates that Charles X's theocratic absolutist reign is unlikely to resonate with the political class. Concerning the structure of the administration, preferences seem to have remained more or less constant. Support for decentralization slightly surpasses support for centralization after 1824 (as in between 1814 and 1824). However, this difference is not large enough for us to say that the majority of factions takes either of the two sides. Rather, support is divided more or less equally.

We do not observe significant changes on organization type. Under both reigns, the majority of actors operated on the ground, meaning that the regime features considerable contentious activity on the ground. In other words, French society was neither dormant nor indifferent towards the political problems of the Bourbon monarchy.

Overall, we see the following preference set finding most support under Charles X: a secular regime of checks and balances that respects civil liberties and extends the suffrage from beyond the wealthiest. Importantly, most factions concur that regime change should come via non-violent means. I proceed to testing the null hypothesis that preferences on issue dimensions other than shared interests in overthrowing the government have no effect on cooperative behavior.

I test the null hypothesis using a logistic regression (without the preference variables) and a TERGM analysis (with the preference variables). I compare the fitness of the logistic regression to that of the TERGM. Both models span the period from 1814 to 1830. I run the TERGMs using the *ergm* package (Krivitsky et al., 2016). One challenge to choosing between models is the problem of overfitting, that is, whether we are adding too many variables. The Bayesian approach suggests choosing the model with highest

posterior probability, that is, the probability of an event after the conditional probability of its occurrence is taken into consideration. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) are two penalty scores to adding variables. The BIC relies on the Bayesian approach, while the AIC uses information theory to calculate the amount of information lost when a model is applied to a dataset. These scores operate in different ways and the penalty term is larger in BIC than in AIC.¹⁰² Generally, BIC is a more conservative score than AIC. For both scores, the smaller the value the better the model. Table II summarizes the results for the logistic regression without preferences and the TERGM with preferences.

Looking at the AIC and BIC scores in Table 9, the TERGM has smaller AIC and BIC than the logistic regression, meaning that the former decreases information loss and therefore is a better model than the latter. We can thus reject the null hypothesis that preferences do not matter, since adding preferences significantly improves the explanatory power of the model. The next section measures the effect if each preference on cooperation.

¹⁰² For more information see (Akaike, 1973; Haughton, 1988; Neath & Cavanaugh, 2012).

Table 9

The period 1814-1830				
	Logistic regression		TERGM	
Variables	Estimate	p-value	Estimate	p-value
edges	-3.11	***	-4.44	***
	0.14		0.35	
clustering	0.67	***	0.77	***
	0.11		0.12	
past cooperation	4.10	***	3.17	***
	0.16		0.18	
venue of operation			1.77	***
			0.21	
executive-legislative balance			-0.07	
			0.21	
authoritarian-libertarian			-0.87	***
			0.17	
suffrage			2.20	***
			0.27	
secularization			0.23	
			0.22	
violence			0.83	***
			0.19	
centralization			-0.48	*
			0.22	
AIC:	-63071		-63316	
BIC:	-63047		-63316	
standard errors are below the estimates				
significance levels	0	***	0.001	***
	0.01	**	0.01	**
	0.05	*	0.05	*
	0.1	.	0.1	.
	1		1	

Having established that ideological and strategic preferences make a statistically significant effect on cooperation, I proceed to testing how much each ideological and strategic preference affects cooperation dynamics. To this end, I run two longitudinal temporal network models, one on the period before 1824 and the other on the period after

1825. To reiterate an earlier point, 1824 is the cut point, because with the enthronement of Charles X, the regime took an authoritarian turn and democratic reversal led actors to update their visions of regime and strategies of transition. Robustness checks of these TERGM models are available in Appendix IV.

Table 10

Bourbon France				
	Model I (1814-1824)		Model II (1825-1830)	
Variables	Estimates	p-values	Estimates	p-values
edges	-4.32	***	-6.93	***
	0.42		1.13	
clustering	0.77	***	0.14	
	0.14		0.26	
past cooperation	2.78	***	4.87	***
	0.22		0.44	
venue of operation	1.56	***	1.69	***
	0.26		0.40	
executive-legislative balance	0.15		0.50	
	0.26		0.55	
authoritarian-libertarian	-0.96	***	0.11	
	0.21		0.46	
suffrage	2.11	***	2.49	***
	0.37		0.47	
secularization	0.28		2.28	*
	0.29		0.92	
violence	0.71	**	-0.01	
	0.24		0.40	
centralization	-0.20	***	-0.33	
	0.27		0.41	
AIC:	-23437		-4246	
BIC:	-23376		-4195	
Note: Cell entries report TERGM coefficients, standard errors (in parentheses), and p-values				
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests)				

According to Table 10, preferences about the authoritarian-libertarian axis, the use of violence, and centralization turned statistically insignificant from before to after 1824.

Noticeably, preferences about the executive-legislative axis are insignificant all along. In contrast, preferences about suffrage always affects actors' decisions about with whom to cooperate. The other striking finding is that preferences about secularization turns significant after 1824, meaning that agreements and disagreements over this issue affect cooperation dynamics under Charles X, unlike under his predecessor.

In terms of magnitude, preference similarity on the limits of suffrage makes cooperation among challengers 7 times more likely before 1824 and 11 times more likely after 1824. This means, actors that hold similar views on suffrage extension have a strong inclination to not work with those who hold different opinions on this matter. This finding falls in line with the finding from the analysis of the evolution of preferences, which had identified overwhelming support for suffrage extension beyond upper classes after 1824. Together these two findings indicate that preferences are revised and on this highly prioritized issue, preference alignment drives cooperation among contenders.

Concerning the authoritarian-libertarian axis, actors are 62% more likely to cooperate with those who hold different views on authoritarianism vs. civil liberties than those whose preferences resemble to theirs before 1824. That means that there is some other issue that actors prioritize more than this and the divergence of opinions on this more important matter trumps agreement on authoritarianism vs. libertarianism among the like-minded. After 1824, this issue ceases to affect cooperative behavior. It is worth reminding that the analysis of the evolution of preferences had identified a shift in preferences in favor of libertarianism. These two findings together indicate that this issue is de-prioritized but it is possible that within the oppositional coalition members share similar preferences on this regard.

As regards centralization, actors are 18% more likely to cooperate with those who hold different views on decentralization than those who hold similar preferences before 1824. As was the case in the authoritarian-libertarian axis, this means that this issue is prioritized but there is divergence of opinions another highly prioritized issue among those who have the same stance on (de)centralization and these disagreements trump agreement on centralization. After 1824, this issue makes no statistically significant effect on cooperative behavior. It is worth noting that the analysis of the evolution of preferences had identified no shift in preference on this dimension. Together these two findings

suggest de-prioritization (while preferences remained more or less the same, the issue no longer shapes cooperation patterns among contenders).

Preferences along the executive-legislative axis seem to have no statistically significant effect on cooperative behavior under either reigns. This issue is de-prioritized. On the other hand, the analysis of the evolution of preferences had identified more support for checks and balances. This means that while this issue is de-prioritized within the overall set of challengers, it is possible that members of the oppositional coalition share similar preferences about the matter.

Another interesting shift in the effects of preferences takes place with respect to the role of religion. After 1824, this issue makes a statistically significant effect on cooperative behavior (unlike before 1824). Specifically, preference similarity on secularization makes cooperation between a pair of actors 8 times more likely after 1824. We know from the historical analysis that the regime turned theocratic under Charles X. Together these two findings indicate that preferences are revised and on this highly prioritized issue, preference alignment drives cooperation among contenders. This finding also responds to falls in line with the hypothesis that actors pragmatically revise their preferences in response to environmental changes.

On the use of violence, preferences on this matter seems to cease affecting cooperation patterns under Louis XVIII. Interestingly, preference similarity on this matter makes cooperation 103% more likely between a pair of like-minded actors. It is worth reminding that the analysis of the evolution of preferences had identified preference shift in favor of the use of non-violent means of regime change. These two findings together indicate that this issue is de-prioritized but it is possible that within the oppositional coalition members share similar preferences on this regard. The next section examining preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition will tell us whether it is the case.

Finally, cooperation patterns are also shaped by organization type and clustering. Grassroots organizations are about 4 times more likely to cooperate with grassroots organizations rather than with parliamentary factions under both Louis XVIII and Charles X. On the other hand, after 1824, actors no longer show the tendency to cooperate with partners of partners, whereas this tendency makes cooperation 114% more likely before 1824. This finding falls in line with the hypothesis on preference convergence. Given the emergence of consensus on protecting civil liberties without turning to violence after 1824,

actors no longer need to form partners of partners with whom their views do not necessarily cohere. The emerging consensus allows for the rise of an oppositional movement among the factions that demand suffrage extension, a secular regime that protects civil liberties without turning to violence. Next, I examine the composition of coalitions so as to corroborate that preference alignment took place.

Preferences of members of the oppositional coalition & the central actor

The TERGM analysis from the last section identified that some issues are de-prioritized. Yet, we are yet to see the distribution of preferences across members of the oppositional coalition to conclude whether preferences about strategic and ideological issues convergence within the coalition. To this end, this section begins with an analysis of the distribution of preferences across members of the coalition. Findings of this analysis complement the findings from the TERGM analysis. Together, they help us test the hypothesis about convergence of strategic and ideological preferences.

The next step is to pinpoint which challenger becomes the center of the oppositional coalition. To this end, I conduct a two-step analysis: First, I identify when actors cooperate more and around this time which actor becomes more central –since being central to a well-connected network signals greater importance for a node than being central to a less connected network. I use the network metric density to examine the evolution of cooperation *density*, with which I pinpoint the years in which challengers were most disunited and when they reunified. The network metric density means how connected a network is taking into account all possible connections in that network. In other words, it represents the ratio of the actual number of ties to the number of all possible ties (Newman, 2010, p. Chapter 6). Thus, if a network has a lot of ties among its nodes, it is dense –the ratio of the actual number of ties over the number of all possible ties gets close to 1. If a network has few ties, most of possible connections are not made; thus, it is not dense and the ratio in question approaches to $-\infty$.

At the second step, we want to understand which challenger becomes the center of the oppositional coalition. To this end, I compare the importance of each actor of the oppositional coalition. Importance in a coalition means which actor is central to a coalition network. That is, who is picked by others more frequently as a partner, which can also be reworded as who has more collaborators than others. Having more partners than others

in an oppositional coalition indicates that one is more in demand by others as a partner. I operationalize importance using the network metric degree centrality. Degree centrality conveys how well-connected a node is (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It is calculated as below:

$$\frac{di(g)}{(n-1)}$$

This formula measures the degree of a given node i in a network (g) divided by the total number of nodes in that network minus the one whose degree centrality is measured. For example, if a node has $(n-1)$ degrees it is connected to all others, thus is central to the network. A node with degrees $(n-2)$ would mean it is connected to everyone except for one node, hence still quite central. In contrast, if a node has but degree 1, we understand that it is only connected to one other node, thus is much less central to the network (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It should be noted that centrality in a network can be measured using other metrics such as closeness or betweenness, among others. However, given that cooperation network is not directional, that is, if node A is linked to node B the link from A to B also implies a link from B to A, since cooperation is reciprocal by nature.¹⁰³

Areas in which preferences converge within the oppositional coalition

In order to establish the distribution of preferences across members of the oppositional coalition, I take the factions that cooperated for more than three years (engage in long-term coalition). Those that joined the coalition in 1830 or in 1829 remain outside of the scope of analysis, since falling short of three years, their cooperation with the coalition qualifies as short-term cooperation. Table 11 below examines the distribution of preferences across issue areas within the oppositional coalition.

¹⁰³ For more information on centrality see (Borgatti, 2005; Easley & Kleinberg, 2010; Newman, 2010).

Table 11

	Preference distribution of the oppositional coalition		
	Average	min	max
executive-legislative balance	-0.11	-0.4	0
authoritarian-libertarian	0.43	0	0.75
	value	counts	%
suffrage	upper class	0	0.00
	middle class	5	0.71
	universal	2	0.29
secularization	theocratic	0	0.00
	secular	7	1.00
centralization	centralization	4	0.57
	decentralization	3	0.43
violence	no	7	1.00
	yes	0	0.00

According to Table 11, members of the coalition unanimously oppose the use of violence as a means to change the regime. This finding supports the hypothesis strategic convergence is necessary for contenders to build sustainable long-term cooperation. Let us now see whether preferences of members of the coalition converge on ideological issues.

On the role of religion, all coalition members endorse secularization. However, opinion is divided when it comes to suffrage and centralization. On the former, support for middle-class enfranchisement predominates support for universal suffrage. Despite this disagreement, both sides join forces to demand suffrage extension beyond the wealthiest. The TERGM analysis had identified the structure of the administration to be a de-prioritized issue area. In effect, members of the coalition are divided between the two positions, centralization and decentralization. Regardless, they manage to build successful cooperation. Cooperation despite this ideological disagreement indicates that the resolution of this issue matter is postponed.

Along the authoritarian-libertarian axis, the analysis identifies no faction that supports authoritarianism. All factions are libertarian –notwithstanding that they are

libertarian at different degrees. The average is 0.43, which indicates that the majority of the coalition members demand a moderately libertarian regime. Finally, on the executive-legislative axis, the majority of coalition members want a regime of checks-and-balances with a slightly predominant executive (-0.11). The maximum and minimum vary between 0.4 and 0, which means that there are very few factions within the coalition that demand an executive-dominant regime. The rest endorses checks and balances.

Thus, the coalition shows convergence on strategic issues. Members are also like-minded when it comes to secularization. This finding echoes the findings from the contextual analysis and the TERGM. Together these three findings indicate that secularization is a prioritized issue on which coalition members are like-minded. Therefore, preference alignment drives cooperation. On the rest of the ideological issues, an unanimously endorsed position does not stand out. However, members of the coalition mainly are in favor of libertarian regime of checks and balances and suffrage extension beyond upper classes. Hence, there is convergence on strategic matters but no convergence on all ideological issues within the coalition. Even though preference alignment on certain ideological issues propels cooperation the postponement of the resolution of certain ideological issues also help with cooperation. These findings enhance the arguments that strategic convergence is necessary for the rise of an oppositional coalition and that ideological agreements help but are not necessary for factions to engage in long-term cooperation. Let us now see which actor was the center of the coalition.

These results further indicate that within some oppositional coalition, actors should be pragmatic on certain issue areas so as to be incline to postpone their resolutions until after regime change. Evidence from the French case reveals that factions came to an agreement on strategic issues but went pragmatic on some ideological issues. This pattern falls in line with the hypothesis that full ideological agreement is hard to achieve; and therefore, cooperation for regime change (long-term cooperation) requires some level of pragmatism. Who was the center though and why? The next compares between the centralities of various factions so as to identify which one was more likely to arise as the one that signal unity and coherence.

Finding the center of the coalition

Table 12





Table 12 shows the evolution of the density. According to the graph, cooperation density fluctuates frequently until 1824 but follows an upward trend after 1824 with the exception of the dip in 1829. Density peaks in 1821, 1828 and 1830 and dips in 1815, 1824, and 1829. It is worth noting that the density is calculated by taking the changes in the number of actors into account. In other words, I do not calculate density with respect to the number of factions that existed throughout the entire period from 1814 to 1830 —this would have meant to assume that some factions could have cooperated whereas they did not even active and present within the same year.

Cooperation is the least intense in 1815 due to the adverse effects of the White Terror and densest in 1821 and 1830. Cooperation peak in 1821 follows the assassination of the Duke de Berry, after which the royalists successfully rally centrist factions against the leftwing actors. Cooperation density declines in 1824 because the anti-ultras coalition fractures and the issue of violence divides the leftwing into moderates and radicals, but inclines again as of 1825. With the exception of the dip in 1829, we see cooperation to peak again in 1830. The fracture in 1829 follows from the fracture within the anti-ultra coalition with respect to the issue of violence as a political strategy. Radicals collaborate with radicals and moderates work with other moderates. The peak in 1830 represents the coalition formation for the 1830 Revolution. Let us look at the degree centrality to see which actors function as the pillar of the coalition. To this end, I compare the degree

centrality of all parliamentary factions after 1825. I exclude the period before the authoritarian revival, Table 13 represents the evolution of degree centralities of these actors.

Table 13



According to Table 13, degree centrality is the lowest for the ultras, represented in light blue line, and highest for the center-left, represented in dark blue line. The other three factions' degree centrality is the same; therefore, the lines overlap. These three lines are in the middle. We understand that the defection, the constitutionnels, and the doctrinaires belong to the oppositional coalition; they are not the center. Furthermore, the graphs indicate that ultras are the most isolated faction, whereas the center-left is the most popular one attracting the most number of challengers.

On the other hand, as we saw in the analysis of the distribution of preferences across coalition members, there are no ideological coherence within the coalition led by the leftwing, which is a heterogeneous faction in and of itself. This leftwing-led coalition includes the defection, the doctrinaires, the constitutionnels, as well as bonapartists and republicans that tag along in the last two years of the Bourbon regime. Strategically, the coalition displays heterogeneous preferences, which implies that preference alignment on strategic matters is necessary for the rise of an oppositional coalition but ideological convergence is not.

Turning to the most salient solutions, see that suffrage extension to middle classes, a secular regime of checks and balances respectful of civil liberties, and objection to using violence as a political strategy emerge found most support. It is worth remembering from the historical analysis that the center-left had been advocating for the strategy of ‘non-violent regime change’ as well as for secularism, checks and balances, and respect of civil liberties. In contrast, the defection, the constitutionnels, and the doctrinaires, who held different views on these matters, shifted to this point of view after pragmatically revising their preferences in response to environmental changes under Charles X. This finding approves the hypothesis that the actor that has been advocating for the salient preferences is more likely to rise as the center of the oppositional coalition.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the effect of preferences on ideological and strategic issues on regime challengers’ ability to cooperate for regime change and form a coherent oppositional coalition. Combining historical analysis and network analysis, I tested the following: *“The higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among ideologically diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and the more likely there will be either regime change or significant concessions to the opposition.”* *“Cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when challengers react to past failures and new opportunities by deciding to pragmatically revise the priority of preferences on strategic issue dimensions.”* *“Cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when peripheral actors align their preferences to those of an emergent core.”*

The most important finding was that strategic convergence happened after 1824 when a subset of challengers concurred on not using violence as a political strategy to change the regime. Convergence responded to shifts in environmental conditions, that is, the electoral defeat of the leftwing 1824 exposing public disapproval of violence and radicalism. Following this backlash, the center-left distanced itself from its radical wing and asserted itself as a non-violent political faction. Concerning the direction of preference revisions, the preference subset suggesting “transition to a secular regime of checks and balances respectful of civil liberties without using violence” became popular after 1824, the authoritarian revival. My analysis further identified that the center-left was uniquely

advocating for this set of preferences, and therefore more likely to emerge as the center of this movement.

Another important finding was that the postponement of ideological differences promoted cooperation on the executive-legislative and authoritarian-libertarian axes and centralization. On the other hand, the issues of the role of religion in politics and suffrage gained priority after 1824. On these matters, preference similarity drove cooperation among the like-minded. Overall, findings confirm the argument that an oppositional movement becomes more likely to materialize after political crises urge actors to reconsider their priorities and pragmatically revise some ineffective ones with the effective ones and postpone the resolution of certain disagreements.

Chapter 5 What have we learned about dynamics of cooperation for regime change?

This dissertation addressed the puzzle of the emergence of cooperation among challengers for regime change. Specifically, it sought to answer, “what conditions enable diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their ideological preferences, to achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status quo?” The start of this study was as follows: Studies that explain regime change by focusing on interactions among the government and its contenders assume, on the one hand, that challengers are unitary actors, and on the other hand, that the dynamics of these interactions can be modeled with respect to conflict and alignment of interests on one issue dimension. This issue dimension pertains to grievances about either economic issues (including welfare, taxation, or redistribution) or the ideological ones along the authoritarianism vs. democracy axis. Based on the aforementioned two assumptions, these studies argued that shared interests against the regime precipitated cooperation to overthrow the government or extract significant concessions from it.

These assumptions do not quite capture struggles between the government and contenders that we observe in real life. First, there often are more than one challenger groups and these groups do not act as a united front. One contemporary example is the Syrian opposition groups to the Assad regime. Not only did the Syrian groups not form a united front, but also they did not stand together at the Geneva Talks where they could have extracted concessions from the government. If shared interests against the regime foster cooperation, as bargaining models applying cooperation theory to regimes argued, why did this mechanism fail to foster cooperation among the Syrian opposition groups? One could say that the Syrian case is exceptional. However, cases from the history also display the same pattern. For example, the Russian opposition groups to the Tsar’s regime under Imperialist Russia or the opposition groups to Sultan Mehmed VI under the Ottoman Empire were several. So were the contender groups to the Shah Pahlavi’s regime and to the Qajar regime in Iran. Thus, the plurality of challengers could not have been specific to the Syrian case. On the other hand, unlike in Syria, contenders in these historical examples, though not all, successfully cooperated against the government. How did the challengers in these cases come to cooperate against the regime?

Second, in real-life, struggles between the government and contenders concerning regime type have multiple dimensions --from welfare to minority rights. These dimensions vary across cases. For instance, in the case of the Iranian opposition to the Pahlavi regime one major issue was anti-imperialism, which was understood as objections to foreign interference and political and economic predominance. In the case of the 1905 Revolution in Imperial Russia, one of the driving issues, among others, was the agrarian problem. Although one could argue that the agrarian problem can be captured as economic grievances, it would be diminutive to operationalize anti-imperialism along the authoritarian vs. libertarian axis (ignoring its international dimension). Moreover, in Iran, economic problems accompanied anti-imperialism. Similarly, Imperial Russia had ideological problems, such as the problem of nationalities or Jews, alongside economic problems. Thus, unlike how issue dimensions are modeled by bargaining theories of regime, struggles over regime type were multifaceted. Several regime dimensions mobilized groups of contenders in each case and groups attached different levels of priority across issue dimensions. These observations motivated the following theory, which I tested using the cases of transitions to constitutional monarchy in Bourbon France and the Ottoman Empire.

The theory that I advance to explain what brings contenders to cooperate goes as follows: Contender groups become more likely to cooperate for regime change if they converge on a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if any). Preference convergence on strategies and the de-prioritization of ideological disagreements (if any) prepares the rise of a coherent oppositional coalition that is capable of signaling unity and coherence. Together preference convergence and de-prioritization of ideological disagreements create the potential for contender groups to overthrow the regime if necessary or extract considerable concessions.

As highlighted above, de-prioritization of ideological disagreements for the oppositional coalition to signal unity and coherence. Unity implies that groups have been working together for a while and coherence refers to the capacity to stand together on various issue problems based on like-mindedness. These two characteristics of oppositional coalitions have a deterrent capacity vis-à-vis the government that tries to maintain power and employs cooptation and divide-and-rule tactics to weaken the opposition groups. Also, if there is an already existing oppositional movement, the society in question is more likely to undergo a successful orderly transition. The reason is the

following: Generally, transitions begin with contentious activity at the public level (if not happened via a coup), which may or may not succeed. For example, the 2013 Gezi protests in Turkey died down without achieving their purpose (respect of civil liberties). In contrast, contentious activity in Poland resulted in the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. One major difference between these cases, among others, relates to the capacity of an already existing oppositional movement in Poland (the Solidarity Movement). Once contentious activities erupted, the Solidarity Movement took the lead and successfully steered the transition process. In Turkey, no such movement existed. The Gezi movement lasted some months but eventually died, because the large crowd of contenders could not sustain the momentum in the face of the authoritarian government's reprisals. If there had been an oppositional coalition capable of taking the lead of the Gezi protests, could the regime have been liberalized? Maybe. We cannot know for sure. Yet, we can say that the Movement's capacity to extract concessions from the government would have increased given organizational capacity and leadership that an oppositional front provides (McAdam, 1982; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 1994).

The rise of oppositional coalitions that is capable of overthrowing the regime follows from a three-stage process. In the first stage, there is disunity. Each challenger advocates for a different set of transition strategies (how regime change should be carried out) and ideologies (what the future regime should look like). Differences of opinion on strategic and ideological issues get in the way of cooperation for regime change as long as challenger groups attach high priority to their preferences on the dimensions that they disagree with one another. In the second stage, environmental changes give actors a perception of urgency, whereby actors begin eliminating or postponing certain ideological differences or revise their preferences in light of the new information that becomes available. Once some disagreements are put aside and preference revision on some issues harmonize preferences, actors begin cooperating. Some actors engage in cooperation earlier than others; these form the core of the oppositional coalition. As cooperation is sustained in the long run, the core begins attracting other actors based on preference convergence on strategic matters. In this process, preference convergence on ideological issues is helpful but neither necessary nor sufficient. Thus, the oppositional coalition tends to display a core composed of rather idealistic actors and a periphery of rather pragmatic actors. Thus, some level of pragmatism is a necessary condition for the emergence of cooperation among multiple

actors who tackle with varied issue dimensions. In the third stage, when some popular contentious movement breaks out, the timing of which cannot be predicted, the now-unified oppositional movement to take action, such as overthrowing the government or extracting significant concessions.

Challengers transition from the stage of disunity to that of unification when they pragmatically revise their preferences and de-prioritize the issues on which they cannot reach an agreement. The mechanisms of preference-revision and de-prioritization increase preference similarity, whereby actors may begin collaborating. Specifically, preferences on strategic issues are more likely to produce convergence than those on ideological issues, since the latter are relatively more rigid in the short run. Convergence is centered around a core actor or core actors who is or are idealistic and attracts to themselves others pragmatic ones who agree with the core on the strategies but not necessarily on the ideologies to unify. Once strategic convergence is finalized, challengers become more likely to form an internally consistent oppositional movement that is capable of overthrowing the authoritarian regime.

In this chapter, I contrast and compare the Ottoman and French cases of transition to constitutional monarchy. It is worth noting that these cases are paired according to the least similar systems design. The evidence presented in chapters 3 and 4 shows that, despite the significant differences in initial conditions, historical contexts, and duration of the regimes, cooperation among challengers emerged in a similar manner over a series of similar stages in Bourbon France (1814-1830) and Ottoman Turkey (1876-1908). In what follows, I review the evidence and discuss the findings in light of the theory and discuss alternative explanations. This discussion follows the stages of cooperation presented in the theory. Overall, this study shows that cooperation among challengers is a dynamic process rather than being a mere outcome of convergent interests against the authoritarian regime as characterized by the existing literature on regimes and cooperation.

The stage of disunity

We have seen that the Ottoman and French cases differed in terms of the structure of the regime, the identity of challengers, the issue dimensions that shape the struggles over regime type, the geography and the time period. Despite these differences, these cases

resembled in their initial conditions, i.e., the constellation of actors and the structure of their interactions at the time of the rise of demands for regime change. The parallel between the initial conditions in both cases was twofold: There were many groups of organized challengers actively challenging the regime and various issue dimensions that structured the debate over regime type. Also, each defended a particular set of strategical and ideological solutions to remedy facets of the regime type problem. During the disunity stage in both cases, challengers remained divided, only engaging in short-term issue-based cooperation. Long-term cooperation did not arise because of the conflict of preferences on the issue dimensions that challengers highly prioritized. This pattern of short-term issue-based cooperation for regime change persisted until challengers began to revise the priority and content of their preferences to converge on a particular solution set.

The rise of demands for regime change & the structure of the authoritarian regime

The case studies spanned the Bourbon regime in France and the Hamidian regime in the Ottoman Empire. However, demands for regime change preceded the rise of these regimes in both cases. When both of these regimes settled in, French society and the international community expected it to be less authoritarian than the previous regime.

These expectations derived from the dismal experiences with authoritarianism and oppression under the previous regime. In the French case, the Bonaparte regime provided strict equality and universal suffrage, but disrespected basic rights and liberties were disrespected. Some republican and royalist groups had mobilized to constrain the executive arbitrariness and were violently oppressed by the Bonaparte government in the process. When the Bonaparte regime was finally ousted by the Allies in 1814, French society was significantly polarized and was experiencing violent disorder. In order to reconstruct societal peace and solidarity, King Louis XVIII enacted a constitutional charter that instituted a bicameral parliament elected with a restricted suffrage so as to check extremism on the left and right. The Parliament's powers and his authority over the cabinet were limited to prevent parliamentary tyranny. Nevertheless, the international community and French society expected the Bourbon regime to be a moderate parliamentary monarchy. Upon taking the throne, the King organized parliamentary elections.

In the Ottoman case, the Hamidian government also ushered in a polarized society experiencing violent disorder. Societal expectations from the new Sultan were similar to those in the French case, that is, the Hamidian regime was to bring constitutional parliamentarianism in the Empire. Constitutionals known as the Young Ottomans had mobilized to advocate for constitutional parliamentarianism to check executive arbitrariness under Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-1876). As was the case under Bonaparte, these constitutionalists were harshly oppressed and silenced. Shortly after his successor Murad V took the throne, a crisis emerged. In the midst of the crisis, some constitutionalists made an unsuccessful attempt of coup and died in the process. Abdülhamid II replaced Murad V upon the promise of instituting a constitution and parliament. Like Louis XVIII, Abdülhamid II issued a constitution, which established a bicameral parliament to be elected by universal male suffrage, and organized parliamentary elections.

When they assumed power, both the Bourbon and Hamidian governments faced a crisis. In France, the White Terror, during which royalist grassroots organizations attacked bonapartists and republicans and caused the death of hundreds of civilians. Meanwhile royalist parliamentarians passed laws to restrict rights and liberties and crash opposition groups. Although he did not stop the White Terror, Louis XVIII dissolved the ultra-royalist chamber due to his concern about the latter's extremism. In the Ottoman Empire, Russia declared war when the state was in a dire economic situation and on the verge of a civil war between its Christian minorities and Muslim populations. While the Empire experienced heavy war defeats, the Ottoman Parliament was torn apart by the polarization between Christian and non-Christian deputies and was unable to function effectively. What is more, when the Sultan invited Ottoman citizens to join the army, Christian deputies generated propaganda to dissuade their co-ethnics from enlisting. In response, Abdülhamid II prorogued the Parliament. Like Louis XVIII, the Sultan took a drastic measure to silence opposition. On the other hand, it is worth noting that Louis XVIII was a moderate unlike Abdülhamid II who was an autocrat. Thus, the Ottoman and French regimes took different paths after the dissolution of the first parliaments. France remained a parliamentary monarchy but the Ottoman Empire evolved into an autocracy.

Despite being a parliamentary monarchy on the surface, royalist extremism in the Parliament and on the ground created an authoritarian environment under the Bourbon regime. Oppression initially silenced opposition groups like the republicans and bonapartists. Yet, soon, they resurfaced as part of the independents or the leftists.

Similarly, the Hamidian regime had suppressed opposition via exiles, arrests, censorship and spy networks. Yet, as in the French case, the constitutionalist opposition reappeared by the end of the 1880s. Opposition groups in both cases resumed contention.

Importantly, in neither case were the Ottoman constitutionalists and the French independents the only challenger groups. The constitutionnels and the doctrinaires in France and secessionists in the Ottoman Empire were contending the regime. Characteristically, contender groups in neither cases did/could engage in long-term cooperation. Rather, their interactions were limited to short-term issue-based cooperation despite efforts to work together on the long term. Thus, evidence from both cases suggests that the number of challenger groups and issue dimensions were several and challengers did not unite contra the assumptions of bargaining theory.

The theory that I advanced here attributes short-term issue-based cooperation to conflict of preferences with respect to issue dimensions relevant to the regime type debate among challenger groups. In line with the theory, the case studies identified multiple issue dimensions that caused disagreements among contenders. In the Ottoman case, imperial integrity vs. national independence, the nature of society, and the role of religion in politics highlighted ideological dimensions. Strategic issues focused on revolutionary vs. non-revolutionary change, whether to seek foreign assistance, and whether to cooperation for regime change between secessionists and constitutionalists was acceptable given that the former sought to secede and the latter aimed to preserve territorial integrity. The varied issue dimensions emphasize not only the conflict of preferences, but also the complexity with the issues. Relatedly, in the French case, the balance between the executive and the legislative power, authoritarianism and *raison d'état* vs. libertarianism and respect of civil liberties and rights, the role of religion in politics, the structure of the administration, and the limits of the suffrage constituted the ideological dimensions of the debate. The strategic dimension of the debate concerned whether using violence to carry out regime change was acceptable.

In the Ottoman case, Ottoman challengers divided, primarily, into secessionists and constitutionalists depending on whether they endorsed territorial integrity. Within these categories, challengers further divided into 'secularists and non-secularists', 'supporters of centralization and its opponents', 'revolutionaries vs. non-revolutionaries', 'Turkish nationalists, Ottomanists, assimilationist Turkish nationalists and nationalists

seeking secession from the Empire', 'proponents and opponents of foreign assistance', and finally 'supporters and opponents of cooperation between secessionists and constitutionalists'. Different combinations of these categories created idiosyncratic preference sets. In France, challengers divided, mainly, into the leftwing and the rightwing. Yet, as in the Ottoman case, subdivisions occurred with respect to the abovementioned issue dimensions: 'authoritarians vs. libertarians', 'supporters of an executive dominant regime and supporters of a parliament dominant regime', 'supporters of universal suffrage, limited suffrage and advocates of suffrage extension to middle classes', 'proponents of non-violent means of regime change and their opponents', 'secularists and non-secularists', and 'supporters of centralization and its opponents'. Typically, in both cases, these categories cut across each other and each challenger group advocated for a different combination of preferences on these categories. In other words, no two challenger groups displayed the same preference set. Also, given contextual differences, the identity of challenger groups differed between the Bourbon and Hamidian regimes. A striking difference was that while the left-right axis partially captured the positioning of challengers in the French case it was not even relevant in the Ottoman case.

As regards the nature of issue dimensions, the legacy of past conflicts was decisive in the shaping of the main ideological axes over regime type. It is worth noting that the emergence of these issue dimensions dated further back than the rise of contender groups making demands for regime change. In other words, the sociopolitical environment in which these actors would operate had taken shape much earlier. In the Ottoman case, ongoing modernization efforts to improve state capacity, colonial invasions, and independence movements among ethno-religious minorities of the Empire made the issue of imperial integrity most salient. Imperial integrity was understood both as territorial integrity and social cohesion, whereby distinct ideological debates arose: the type of society, the type of the state (constitutional monarchy vs. nation state), and the structure of the administration. In the French case, the conflict over regime type originated from the confrontation between republicans (leftwing) and royalists (rightwing) over the nature of sovereignty. Due to this confrontation, post-1789 France underwent successive constitutional reversals and authoritarian episodes until the Bourbon regime set in depending on which faction assumed power. Regardless of political leaning, whichever faction assumed power it curtailed liberties of expression and reunion to preclude its

rivals' accession to power positions. As a result, the issues that accompanied the nature of sovereignty revolved around organization of power in Bourbon France.

The role of preference convergence on issue dimensions in the shaping of cooperation patterns among challengers

Concerning the type of cooperation, the theory that I advanced here suggests that building long-term cooperation is difficult in the first stage due to the dissimilarity of preferences on the issue dimensions that groups valued differently in the short-run. Even if they try, challengers are unlikely build long-term cooperation that might turn into an oppositional coalition in this stage, because preference dissimilarity on highly prioritized issues trumps preference similarity on issues with lower priority. Specifically, the theory expects the highly prioritized issues on which opinions differed to rather be of ideological nature on the grounds that ideological preferences stay rigid compared to strategies in the short-run. Concomitantly, preference convergence on strategic issues falls short to foster cooperation because these issues have lower priority. Let us turn to evidence from the case studies.

Evidence from both cases suggests that challenger groups engaged at best in short-term issue based cooperation. In the Ottoman case, the longest instance of cooperation between a pair of challengers lasted three years and spanned one issue dimension. In the French case, some challengers cooperate for more than three years, but the object of cooperation changes too quickly for us to deduce long-term cooperation. This pattern of short-term issue-based cooperation came forth in both contexts regardless of the differences in the identity of challengers and issue dimensions. If shared interests against the regime sufficed to unite challengers, we would not have seen this pattern to persist for a long time --about ten years in both the Ottoman Empire and Bourbon France. This finding makes the explanation of cooperation for regime change by bargaining theory untenable. An alternative explanation would be that contender groups prefer cooperating with the most resourceful group regardless of whether their preferences on issue dimensions aligned. That is, although contenders do not completely disregard compatibility of preferences on issue dimensions, preference compatibility comes as secondary to material gains. If this explanation holds true ideological differences should have no effect on cooperation patterns.

Yet, network models revealed contrary evidence to the resource-seeking explanation in both cases. The models identified that preference dissimilarity on ideological issues significantly hindered the formation of cooperation among contenders. For example, the most resourceful factions within the constitutionalist movement in the Ottoman Empire in the period between 1895 and 1901 were Murad Bey and his followers, Ahmed Rıza and his followers, and the activists (the activists being the less resourceful of the three). If the resource-seeking explanation held true, we should have seen less resourceful factions cooperate with one these or these three would engage in long-term cooperation in order to form an opposition front. Yet, the Murad Bey and Ahmed Rıza factions could not go beyond short-term issue-based cooperation. Neither could the activists and the Ahmed Rıza factions. The Murad Bey faction and the activists also engaged only in short term cooperation, because Murad Bey quitted the movement despite being one of the emergent leaders. On the other hand, the case studies reveal supporting evidence for the preference-compatibility theory presented here. In that, Murad Bey and his followers was non-revolutionary Turkish nationalist non-secularist and opposed cooperation with secessionists and seeking foreign assistance. In contrast, Ahmed Rıza and his followers were secularist Ottomanist non-revolutionary and opposed cooperation with secessionists and seeking foreign assistance. The activists were not ardent defenders of secularism even if they did not want theocracy. Also, they supported Turkish nationalism, revolutionary change and opposed cooperation with secessionists and foreign assistance. It is important to note that preferences of the Murad Bey and Ahmed Rıza factions aligned on strategic matters but differed on the ideological ones. Preferences of the Murad Bey faction and the activists had more overlaps on ideological issues, but were contradictory on the strategic matter, especially the revolutionary vs. non-revolutionary change issue. Preferences of the Ahmed Rıza faction and activists differed on the ideological and strategic front. These patterns fall in line with the hypothesis that preference convergence on all strategic matters does not suffice to promote cooperation when actors disagree on ideological matters that they highly prioritize.

We observe similar patterns between 1900 and 1905 despite unification attempts of one challenger group, Prens Sabahaddin and his followers. In this period, not only Prens Sabahaddin's efforts miserably failed, but also challengers found themselves further divided due to irreconcilable differences on strategies of regime change, namely, revolutionary vs. non-revolutionary change and whether to seek assistance from European

states and secessionist organizations, which actors highly prioritized. The two emergent factions of this period were the Prens Sabahaddin group and the coalition (led by Ahmed Rıza), which never cooperated. Let us look at whether ideological disagreements had an effect on this fractionalization.

The Prens Sabahaddin group endorsed Ottomanism and secularization and advocated for foreign assistance and collaboration with secessionists in order to carry out a coup or revolution in the short run. In contrast, the CPU-led coalition argued for Turkish nationalism, moderate secularism, and revolutionary change without foreign assistance and collaboration with secessionists. Opinions of minor groups divided more or less equally between Turkish nationalism or its assimilationist variant Turkism and between secularism and non-secularism. They prioritized revolutionary change in the short run. Although there seems to be convergence on revolutionary change, groups still disagreed on the two other strategies. Unlike Prens Sabahaddin, the coalition led by Ahmed Rıza found it unacceptable to cooperate with those working against imperial integrity. Both sides highly prioritized this issue between 1902 and 1905 and the conflict of preferences hindered the rise of the Young Turk coalition that Prens Sabahaddin worked hard to build. On the other hand, minor groups were able to temporarily cooperate with both the coalition and the Prens Sabahaddin group, because they were pragmatic on cooperation with secessionists, which allowed them to work with both camps. Thus, we see again in this period that short of preference convergence on all strategic issues cooperation among challengers tends not to last long. These findings also weaken the alternative explanation that contenders prefer working with the most resourceful groups.

Turning to the French case, major confrontations involved the royalists and the leftwing and the royalists and the constitutionnels from 1814 to 1824. The royalists and the leftwing were rivals because of their diverging preferences on the limits of the suffrage, the nature of sovereignty, the role of religion in politics, the executive-legislative balance, and civil liberties. Although both were technically on the right, the gap between the royalists and the constitutionnels was equally wide. These two held different opinions on the limits of the suffrage, the nature of sovereignty, the role of religion in politics, the executive-legislative balance, and civil liberties. As mentioned earlier, the constitutionnels were more authoritarian than the royalists, but the royalists desired a more executive-dominant regime with stricter suffrage than the constitutionnels. The royalists were the most resourceful group in this period. Yet, as was the case in the Ottoman Empire,

diverging preferences on ideological issues impeded the rise of long-term cooperation, even though these three actors' preferences on strategic issues did not contradict. Preference convergence on strategies did not suffice to overcome preference dissimilarity on highly-prioritized ideological issues, whereby actors could not sustain cooperation in the long run. Thus, as in the Ottoman case, cooperation was short-term and issue-based in this period. These findings do not support the most resourceful groups attract less resourceful groups.

A significant example of issue-based cooperation was the cooperation between the leftwing and the constitutionnels, between the constitutionnels and the royalists, and between the leftwing and the royalists. The leftwing and the constitutionnels cooperated against the royalists on suffrage extension beyond the wealthiest until the left obtained representation in the Parliament. Once they obtained seats in the Parliament, leftwing parliamentarians worked with the royalists against authoritarian projects of laws proposed by the constitutionnels. Also, against universal suffrage the royalists and the constitutionnels collaborated against the leftwing. On the other hand, leftwing grassroots organizations never approved of leftwing parliamentarians' tactical alliance to the center-right. This difference almost broke down the leftwing alliance. Similarly, radical royalists did not work with others. These findings fall in line with the hypothesis that, short of preference convergence on all ideological issues, similarity of preferences on some ideological matters does not suffice to form an oppositional coalition that is capable of sustaining cooperation among challengers in the long run.

Another striking evidence that preference convergence on some ideological issues was not sufficient to precipitate the rise an oppositional coalition came from the Ottoman case. In the Empire, religion had decoupled from the monarchy as of the 1860s when the government abolished the Sharia as the principle source of law. Thereafter, the ulema began working against absolute monarchy --it is worth noting that the ulema had formed a particular branch within the Young Turk movement between 1895 and 1900. This branch did not want secularization as was the case with the Murad Bey faction. These two cooperated for briefly, while the ulema refrained from working with the secularist Ahmed Rıza faction. Thus, we see that preference convergence on some ideological issues helped with cooperation and its lack hindered it. However, preference convergence on some ideological issues did not suffice to foster long-term cooperation.

To recap, the theory proposed by this study anticipated short-term issue-based cooperation among challengers as long as ideological differences are not sidelined and actors do not prioritize strategic matters for preference similarity to precipitate cooperation on this front. In line with the theory, we observed that cooperation could not go beyond short-term cooperation, primarily because of conflicting preferences on the ideological issues. Agreement on strategic issues did not suffice to overcome conflict of preferences on ideological matters, because ideological issues were highly prioritized. It is important to note that ideological issues had high priority in both French and Ottoman cases, because, in both cases, the legacy of conflicts on regime type made these issue dimensions of high priority. As a result, issue-based instances of cooperation on strategic issues did not translate into long-term cooperation as long as these ideological issue dimensions, on which actors had differences, preserved their high priority. This pattern lasted for about a decade in both cases regardless of contextual differences. This finding supports the claim that instances of cooperation based on shared interests on a singular dimension are not enough to unite challenger groups. The theoretical implication of these findings is as follows: The multidimensionality of issues makes a non-negligible impact on dynamics of cooperation among challengers regardless of contextual differences in the nature of axes of conflict, the identity of actors, and geographical and temporal boundaries across cases. Findings indicate that this pattern of “entrapment” in short-term cooperation may persist as long as actors continue to attach high priority on ideological issues. Hence, it is more appropriate to think of regime change as a case of coordination with conflicting interests. In other words, modeling interactions as a simple cooperation game, as most bargaining models do, causes significant information losses.

The stage of unification among challengers: the role of preference revision & re-prioritization

The theory of cooperation for regime change that I advanced predicts that environmental changes induce a sense of urgency in challengers’ minds and this change in the perceived urgency of matters precipitate them to revise and re-prioritize their preferences. This process is necessary for challengers to harmonize preferences on the highly prioritized issue dimensions lest the preference similarity mechanism cannot foster long-term cooperation, hence the rise of an oppositional front, as in the stage of disunity. The harmonization of preferences follows from revisions in the content of preferences in an

attempt to adapt to environmental changes and de-prioritization of some ideological disagreements that challengers cannot resolve in the short-run. Once a subset of actors harmonizes their strategies of transition and postpones their ideological disagreements, an oppositional coalition emerges. This coalition signals unity by demonstrating a capacity to engage in long-term cooperation and coherence between its members' preference sets, thus countering the government's incentive to employ cooptation and divide-and-rule tactics against them. As a result, the coalition counters the government's incentive to employ cooptation and divide-and-rule tactics. The theory suggests that the formation of such a coalition requires at least some pragmatic actors, since obtaining ideological convergence among all idealists is improbable in the short-run. Finally, this coalition is capable of steering the direction of regime change once contentious activities erupt and begin the transition process. What does the evidence from the Ottoman and French cases look like?

The role of environmental changes in the stage of unification

What do we understand from environmental changes? Environmental changes refer to processes and shocks that transform the balance of power between societal actors and the government in a polity, such as foreign invasion, migration waves etc. These changes induce actors to revise their preferences by bringing irrefutable evidence. The consideration of new evidence debunks the validity of certain ideological and strategic choices and. Once some choices from the solution set are eliminated, contenders find it easier to harmonize their preferences. Similarly, environmental changes give actors the sense of urgency, whereby the latter de-prioritize certain ideological disagreements that they cannot resolve in the short-run to pave the way for cooperation for regime change. Equally vital in this re-prioritization process is the prioritization of strategic issues. Together preference revision and re-prioritization facilitate cooperation for regime change among contenders by eliminating the conflict of preferences on certain issue dimensions.

Evidence from both the Ottoman and French cases falls in line with the theory. First, the process of preference revision commenced with authoritarian retrenchment in both contexts. The increasing level of oppression in the French and Ottoman societies made it more and more difficult for contenders to pursue contentious activities. In response, contenders in both cases began considering cooperation with others.

Characteristically, in both cases, strategic preferences were first to undergo revision. This pattern falls in line with the theory; as hypothesized, strategic preferences were relatively less rigid in the short run. Thus, actors began to pragmatically replace some ineffective ones as developments decreased the perceived feasibility of their own strategic preferences.

In the Ottoman case, this process began when the Sultan made a heavy blow on the CUP by coopting Mizancı Murad in 1897. After 1897, the Hamidian regime increasingly suppressed the constitutionalist movement, including sending more spies, more arrests, and taking diplomatic actions with the host European states, increased attempts of cooptation. Also, the regime increased attempts of cooperation. While these actions intensified efforts to unite, cooperation remained issue-based and short-term between 1897 and 1902. Specifically, the Ahmed Rıza faction and the activists intermittently cooperated between 1897 and 1899 but broke off relations afterwards due to irreconcilable differences. Similarly, Prens Sabahaddin and the activists collaborated between 1900 and 1902 but cooperation failed in 1902 when disagreements over whether to get foreign assistance and work with secessionists resurfaced. From 1902 to 1905, actors' gradually changed their preferences. Ahmed Rıza withdrew his veto to revolutionary change and collaborated with the activists who had been advocating for this strategy all along. This alliance was referred to as the minority. Some minor revolutionary Young Turk factions, such as the Edhem Ruhi group, initially allied with the revolutionary Prens Sabahaddin group, but the latter's willingness to work with secessionists and foreign states made them gravitate towards the minority. Progressively, in this period, factions embraced Turkish nationalism and Ottomanism lost support. This shift was most striking in the case of Tunalı Hilmi. By 1905, Turkish nationalism, revolutionary change without foreign assistance and collaboration with secessionists had found the most support among the Young Turks.

In the Ottoman case, the process of unification initiated by authoritarian retrenchment was able to sustain and move forward as a result of the rise of independence movements among Muslim minorities of the Empire. Specifically, the surge of uprisings among Muslim minorities in the Balkans as of 1899 gave contenders the sense of urgency. Contenders realized that they could not afford to wait longer, because the Empire was disintegrating, therefore they had to take action. Clearly, these uprisings completely debunked the feasibility of Ottomanism and Muslim solidarity, whereby Turkish

nationalism gained more credit. By 1905, most constitutionalists endorsed Turkish nationalism. Preference convergence on Turkish nationalism catalyzed cooperation among like-minded challengers. Moreover, ideological disagreements on the role of religion were sidelined to pave the way for cooperation to occur. As regards strategic issues, the Turkish nationalist coalition pragmatically de-prioritized its objection to cooperating with secessionists. On the other hand, objection to foreign assistance was prioritized such that like-minded groups began to form coalition networks.

Turning to France, contenders began reconsidering the validity of their preferences in response to authoritarian retrenchment initiated in 1821. In 1821, the leftwing obtained the majority in the Chamber and their electoral victory alarmed the royalists. Between 1821 and 1824, the regime of ultra-royalists consistently intensified oppression to silence regime contention. The government adopted a series of oppressive measures and laws, including the purge of non-royalist civil servants, preliminary censorship to prevent crimes against public order, religion, the king, and the state, the law authorizing the state to try anyone for criticizing the government etc. As the leftwing contested these oppressive policies by organizing violent protests, they lost public support to their cause, which manifested itself as an electoral defeat for the left in 1824. This defeat made moderate leftwing supporters realize that violent strategies harmed their cause more than they served. Thus, they distanced themselves from the radical branch and banned the use of violence as a political strategy after 1824.

The process of preference revision, which had started in response to oppression by the royalists, sustained in response to increasing authoritarian retrenchment following Charles X's enthronement. Charles X passed several controversial laws concerning the émigrés and the Sacrilege, which precipitated regime contenders from both the left and right to re-prioritize their preferences on certain dimension. As in the Ottoman case, increasing oppression made contenders realize that they had to take action against the Charles X regime. The role of religion in politics gained priority as the King relied more and more on clerical support. Because preferences of most challengers aligned on this dimension, preference similarity made it possible to form a secularization front including the doctrinaires, the constitutionnels, the defection, and the independents formed to contest the theocratic turn. Also, some center-right actors, such as the defection and the doctrinaire, became more and more disillusioned with a strong oppressive royalist regime and gravitated towards a liberal regime based on checks and balances respecting civil

liberties. As preferences converged on a regime of checks and balances respecting civil liberties this ideological dimension it became easier to form an oppositional coalition given that convergence on strategies had already taken place.

As for the structure of the oppositional coalition, coalitions in both cases began taking shape around a core actor. In the Ottoman case, it was the CPU. In the French case, it was the leftwing. In both cases, these factions (and none other) emerged as a core, because they were the only ones to advocate for the preference set on which the majority of contenders aligned. From its foundation to 1908, the CPU put emphasis on revolutionary change (without terrorist tactics), as indicated by the spreading cell-formations across the Empire and the recruitment of the fedayis. The CPU preached Turkish nationalism and a constitutional monarchy and objected to foreign assistance and collaboration with secessionists. His rival, Prens Sabahaddin, advocated in favor of these strategies even though they did not find the most support among regime contenders. The CPU's dedication to these salient ideological and strategic preferences attracted others towards it, such as the merger with the OFS, which allowed the rise of a coherent opposition movement.

Similarly, in the French case, the leftwing rose as the center of the oppositional movement by virtue of advocating for the preference set on which the majority of contenders aligned. To reiterate an earlier point, the leftwing had been opposing the use of violence and advocating for a secular liberal regime of checks and balances. Uniquely advocating this stance, the leftwing emerged as the core, attracting some center-right actors—such as the defection and the doctrinaire—to itself. As mentioned earlier, protesters that initiated the July Revolution called on to moderate leftwing parliamentarians (and none other) and listened to the latter's directives. Once the oppositional coalitions were formed, regime change unfolded rapidly in both cases. The next section discusses the link between regime change and cooperation among contenders.

What is the relationship between the rise of an opposition coalition and regime change?

In the cases studied in this dissertation, the transition process began in response to small contentious events that grew in size and intensity. We saw that neither in France nor in

the Ottoman Empire were the oppositional coalitions part of the contentious processes that put the transition process in motion at the beginning. They joined shortly after they observed that these events did not die down overnight. Evidence from both cases indicates that the opposition coalition took the lead and set the direction of change once involved.

In the Ottoman case, the 1908 Revolution began when a Young Turk officer, Niyazi Bey, started a local uprising in a small Macedonian village. Niyazi Bey took initiative to protest the European Great Powers' plans to partition the Empire. In June 1908, Russia's and Britain's plans to partition Macedonia were divulged. This uprising qualifies as a small event for two reasons: First, the CPU headquarters did not immediately take action upon the divulgence of the partition plans; rather, the leaders had been planning on overthrowing the Sultan's government later in that year. In other words, the event did not seem so important to the CPU leaders to induce them to spring into action. Yet, it seemed important enough to Niyazi Bey, a middle rank officer in the small Macedonian village Resne, to induce him to start an uprising. Second, the CPU did not immediately take responsibility for the uprising. It took responsibility for and control of the uprising only after it spread to neighboring villages and the region. Once the CPU headquarters joined in, it did not take long for the Sultan to relinquish power.

We see a similar pattern in the revolutionary process of the Bourbon case. Charles X had dissolved the Parliament without declaring an election date after the latter had laid serious criticism about his reign. Just like in the Ottoman case, parliamentarians did not immediately take action. Next, the King restrained the freedom of speech and the suffrage. Importantly, none of these actions made opposition parliamentarians to take action against the King. Yet, they induced journalists, civilians, and grassroots organizations in Paris to protest these illiberal acts. As was the case in the Ottoman Empire, leftwing parliamentarians did not join forces with protesters on the first day. They signed protesters' petition on the second day when protests enlarged and intensified. On the third day, leftwing parliamentarians had control over protesters. Empowered, they proclaimed the July Monarchy. It is worth reemphasizing that leftwing parliamentarians set the direction of transition. The protesting crowd was making demands for a republican or bonapartist restoration. It was upon the parliamentarians' initiative that France transitioned to the constitutional monarchy known as the July Monarchy.

To recap, similarities between the two cases are striking. Both revolutions began with a small-scale local event and organized opposition groups did not immediately claim responsibility for these contentious activities. They claimed responsibility only after regime contention proved robust and persistent. Their involvement was decisive in setting the direction of transition. In the Ottoman case, the CPU sought to restore the constitution and parliament. In the French case, leftwing parliamentarians wanted to found a constitutional monarchy. Importantly, other contender groups were making other demands for regime type.

These findings illustrate that the unification among challengers plays a causal role in the transition process because, in both cases, regimes transitioned to constitutional monarchy as the oppositional coalition had wanted so long. Yet, constitutional monarchy was not the only direction that regimes could take. For example, in France, there were demands for reviving the Empire or the republic. The oppositional coalition led by the leftwing succeeded in defeating these alternative directions without uproar and convinced the society in that constitutional monarchy was the best option. Similarly, in the Ottoman Empire, the CPU-led coalition took the local revolt in Macedonia under control and adopted the reforms that transitioned the Empire to constitutional monarchy, whereas alternative demands existed. Importantly, as in the French case, Ottoman challengers managed to get the outcome of the Revolution recognized by the international community and Ottoman society in 1908.

These findings are not sufficient to make a general claim on the causal role of the unification among challengers. However, they provide irrefutable evidence that the oppositional coalitions were the forces behind the direction of regime change. In other words, there is a link between the rise of an oppositional coalition and the likelihood of regime change.

One pushback to this argument comes from process-oriented studies of regime change, which associate the beginning of the transition process also to environmental changes. However, this literature focuses on big shocks, such as economic downturn or foreign invasion, at the end of which the incumbent government collapses. The role of environmental shocks in these theories is to weaken the incumbent government, hence to create an opportunity structure for contenders to overthrow the regime. Similarly, bargaining theories of regime change attribute the timing of transition to shocks. In these

theories, shocks serve to alter the power balance between the government and contenders and create a structural opening for transition.

In contrast, the theory that I suggest here starts the transition process earlier, when an oppositional coalition comes to life. Once such a coalition emerges, the polity enters a third stage where conditions become ripe for even a small contentious event to trigger transition. In other words, the rise of an oppositional coalition brings the polity to a fragile state, in which unless the power balance tilts in favor of the government, the presence of a united coherent oppositional coalition makes transition. It is important to stress that the rise of a coalition does not start the chain of events producing regime change. Like bargaining theories and process-oriented studies, I argue that the timing of change cannot be predicted. We can only identify the relevant short-term and long-term causes from the hindsight after examining the chain of events. My argument is that the rise of an oppositional coalition enters the polity into a state where regime change becomes more likely than before.

This argument has two implications on theories about regimes. First, small events can trigger regime change as much as big shocks. For example, the military intervention conducted by William began the Glorious Revolution that ended with regime change and regicide. However, the military intervention decision was taken after the news of the birth of a male heir to King Charles broke. Interestingly, relatively more important issues had happened before, such as the suspension of the provisions of the Test Acts or the arrest of the seven archbishops, none of which resulted in the military intervention. To give another example (this time from a case of an unsuccessful contentious movement), the 2013 Gezi Protests started as a small-scale local protests of a handful of environmentalist against the demolition of Gezi Park but lasted for months and spread across various cities in Turkey before it died down without extracting concessions from the government. The stimulus came in the night of May 31st 2013: The police sprayed gas on peaceful protesters; thousands of citizens took up the streets and protests dragged for months. As in the English case, the Turkish government had passed more controversial laws that the demolition of a local park and numerous police interventions had happened in protest activities. None of these bigger events triggered large-scale protests. The examples can be extended to the Arab Spring and the Eastern European Revolutions, some of which succeeded while others not.

These examples illuminate that attributing the timing of regime change to big shocks makes us discard a considerable universe of cases where small events also triggered regime change. The difficulty with small events is that they are more unpredictable in terms of implications than big shocks. In that, it is easier to imagine some economic shock or foreign strike to cause serious sociopolitical disorder. Yet, it is more difficult to imagine a small protest to start a chain of actions resulting in regime change.

The role of small vs. big events in my theory is as follows: Unlike bargaining theory and process-oriented studies that emphasize long-term structural causes, big shocks do not help us to understand the timing of the overthrow of the government. Rather, they affect the fate of regimes by initiating the process of preference revision and re-prioritization on contenders' side, which, in turn, makes them more likely to form a united front capable of overthrowing the regime or extracting concessions. Again, this is different than attributing the timing of the overthrow of the government to big shocks. The reason is that the regimes collapse less frequently than the frequency with which they are hit by shocks. Most of the time, regimes demonstrate a certain capacity to resist shocks, which scholars of democratization attribute to the nature of their institutional arrangements and the structure of their economy (Przeworski et al., 2000; Svoboda, 2008). Notwithstanding the validity of these explanations, I would like to emphasize the empirical fact that most cases of transition begin with a relatively small contentious event that unexpectedly grows in size and intensity. This brings us to the second implication of the theory for regime literature.

The literature tends to define consolidation as survival measured by observed longevity (Boix, 2003; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000; Svoboda, 2008). I contend that the longevity is not an indicator of the regime's robustness to contention. If that were the case, we would have to classify all regimes as robust to contention until after the collapse happens (because the specific timing cannot be predicted). Yet, contended regime facing a coherent oppositional coalition cannot be conceptualized as a consolidated regime, since such a regime is already in a fragile state (as in the case of Syria). It can be that the government is weak but surviving because opposition groups are unable to assume power. This situation fundamentally differs from suggesting that the regime is robust. Simply by looking at the longevity of some regime, we cannot tell the difference between the case where the regime

is robust and faces some contention and the one in which the regime is essentially weak but survives because the opposition cannot get in power.

This study provided evidence for us to establish that there is a link between the rise of an oppositional coalition and the likelihood of regime change happening. Conceptualizing some regime facing a united opposition front as in a fragile state amenable to collapse if the opportunity presents itself help avoid what Tilly calls a zero-sum explanation: That is, explaining regime change by the government's weakness and survival by the opposition's weakness. While a variety of reasons may account for why a regime becomes weaker or loses legitimacy, this dissertation has been motivated by the desire to better understand how contenders adjust their initial strategies and broader oppositional fronts emerge in the process of altering the dynamics between the government and its challengers. Two historical cases focused on the same outcome do not form the basis of a general theory. But, the parallel dynamics across two very different historical settings provide reason for a wider research agenda examining other cases, including contemporary ones, where we can trace the sources and implications of whatever cooperation emerges, or fails to emerge, among contenders initially motivated by different ideologies and interests.

APPENDIX I: STRATEGY FOR CODING

The unit of analysis for this study and dataset was organized groups. I constructed three sets of data for each case. The first set involved factual information about challenger groups: when and where they were founded, where they operated (location of headquarters and branches), whether they merged with another group, how long they remained active, their membership profile, whether they shared members with another group, and their sources of financing (who were the financers, how many times they financed another group, how many times they were coopted by the government). As noted earlier, I included all actors mentioned in secondary sources.

In the French case, challengers comprised parliamentary factions and grassroots organizations. In coding the French case, I followed three rules. First, I coded parliamentary factions and grassroots representing the same political stance as separate actors. Even though parliamentary factions relied heavily on grassroots, given the lack of professional party networks, they did not have authority over the latter. Consequently, there were occasional coordination failures. Grassroots did not mimic decisions taken by parliamentary factions, because they had their views of their own, which sometimes differed from those of parliamentarians. Also, on average, grassroots were more radical than parliamentary factions (Alexander, 2004). Thus, there were also variation in terms of the strength of preferences. Second, I coded all parliamentarians voicing a distinct preference set as one group. In the same vein, all grassroots and their affiliated organizations (such as publishing houses, newspapers, civil society organizations) voicing the same preference set as one actor. Some political factions, such as the independents or moderate royalists, had relatively more affiliated organizations than others. If I had defined each of these daughter organizations as a separate actor, some factions would have been overrepresented. Results of the analysis, particularly network models, might have been biased given the sheer number of actors doing the same move. Third, according to the 1814 Charter, the King appointed the cabinet. These ministers belonged to a certain political faction. The same political faction also had parliamentary representation. In order to avoid correlation, I coded ministers and parliamentary factions of the same faction as one actor. The reason was twofold: Parliamentary factions and their ministers always acted in unison. Even when some ministers belonged to some faction and some belonged to another faction, ministers would impose their own policies until dismissed by the King even if other ministers disagreed. In other words, because the French system did

not define collegial responsibility for members of the cabinet, ministers and parliamentarians of the same faction stood together.

In the Ottoman case, challengers comprised organized groups of secessionists and constitutionalists. I did not code individuals for two reasons, in part because a complete membership list was unavailable, which posed the risk of working with missing data. Also, individuals were fluid. While individuals sometimes appeared in more than one organization, organizations outlive individuals –with the exception of founders in some weakly institutionalized groups that I explain below. I employ a loose definition of ‘organized groups’, which encompasses institutionalized and weakly-institutionalized groups. Institutionalized groups have a charter specifying the purpose of the organization, the scope of activities, rules guiding its operation, member recruitment, and the headquarters and branches –such as the Committee of Progress and Union, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. However, most constitutionalist organizations were not institutionalized enough to develop identities independent of their leaders. Also, most of them survived less than five years; their clientele would found another organization if the previous one failed to meet expectations (Hanioğlu, 2001a; Mardin, 1983). Nevertheless, these groups undertook opposition activities influential enough to make the Sultan want to coopt them.

Weakly institutionalized groups refer to challengers organized around newspapers and publishing houses, and factions composed of eminent opposition figures like Ahmed Riza or Prens Sabahattin and their followers. I counted newspapers and publishing houses as weakly organized groups for two reasons. early and some late challengers relied solely on propaganda, because they believed in non-revolutionary transition –the rationale being that people would gain consciousness about constitutionalism and collectively claim accountability from the monarch, whereas if constitutional changes were imposed on people they might reject or fail to draw full benefit or some societal disorder might ensue (Mardin, 1983). Almost each challenger group published one paper and/or owned a publishing house to disseminate their distinct viewpoint. Therefore, authorship indicated membership to a faction. Although editors sometimes accepted articles by members of other factions, if such collaboration was not so frequent to bias coding. Besides, newspapers and publishing houses served as venues where regime contenders would hold regular meetings, draw up strategies for future opposition activities, and recruit

members.¹⁰⁴ Thus, they operated as organizations. As for factions structured around eminent opposition figures, some emerged from within institutionalized groups due to differences of opinion, while others were formed outside institutional frameworks.

As in the French case, I coded all weakly institutionalized and weakly-institutionalized groups with a distinct preference set as a separate actor. If some formal organization comprised factions with each voicing a distinct preference set and that the differences of opinions affected organizational behavior, I coded each faction as a separate actor instead of the organization itself in order not to miss data. For example, I disaggregated the Committee of Union and Progress into factions like followers of Ahmed Riza or Mizanci Murad, because the factions did not always act in unison (Hanioğlu, 1981). If, however, one faction dominated the organization and others followed –such as in the Committee of Progress and Union under Bahaeddin Şakir’s leadership, I coded the organization as one actor. Also, if some individual challenger founded more than one organization without changing the purpose and scope of activities, such as the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization and the Ottoman Freedomlovers Committee both founded by Prens Sabahattin, I coded all such organizations as one group. Yet, if the purpose and scope of its activities changed, I coded those organizations two different entities. Also, if two factions formed a novel institution while retaining their distinct institutional identity, I did not code the child organization as a separate entity.

It is important to note that not all groups coexisted at the same time due to mergers or discontinuations. I constructed a ‘structural zeros’ dataset to establish which groups existed in a given year and which did not. If a group existed only a few months in a given year, say, from January to March 1820, I coded that group as existent in 1820.

The second set of data included information about ideological and strategic positions of challenger groups with respect to the issue dimensions identified by preliminary surveys of political history, the state, society. I coded groups’ ideological and strategic positions on a yearly basis in order to take into account changes in preferences. While coding challengers’ stances, I relied on personal accounts, propaganda material, and secondary sources. Issue dimensions were different in each case. Therefore, I will explain the specific coding rules in the related chapters.

¹⁰⁴ For more information on the role of press see (Hanioğlu, n.d.; Mardin, 1983, 2000; Tunaya, 1984).

The third set contained information about cooperative behavior, that is, which challengers cooperated with whom in a given year. I used the following indicators for cooperation: joint authorship in a contentious publication, co-sponsoring some bill in the parliament and the cabinet, collaborating in creating verbal and written propaganda against the authoritarian government and its policies (including the Sultan, or the King, his Charter, or the monarchy), and co-sponsoring or collaborating on some contentious activity of a private or public nature (e.g., meetings, protests, uprisings, plotting coups, mobilizing people for revolution).

If challengers undertook one of these joint activities together, I coded it as cooperation. If they undertook more than of these activities –such as publishing together and organizing an activity, I coded them as a single instance of cooperation. I did not code multiple activities as different instances of cooperation, because collaboration on multiple fronts indicates sustainable cooperation. On the other hand, I do not downplay the importance of collaborating in a particular task, say, publishing. Each activity involving some risk, accepting to run this risk together counts as cooperation in regime contention. Also, I did not weigh activities by riskiness, because there was no evidence suggesting that some high-risk activity like attempting a coup had greater impact than repetitive low-risk activities like press campaigns. Yet, there was evidence for the effectiveness of repetitive low-risk activities in the medium/long run.

When dealing with missing information, I followed three rules. If sources indicate cooperation in some year, say 1890, and cooperation in some later year, say, 1892, and if in addition they note a pair of challengers generally working together, unless there is information to suggest otherwise, I consider cooperation to continue in 1891. Also, if sources indicate cooperation only in one year but not later, I code it as a single instance of cooperation. Finally, if two challenger organizations set a bogus organization, I coded the bogus organization as an instance of cooperation (and not as a separate actor as I explain above). I kept the cooperation data in the form of edge lists (one edge list per year).

APPENDIX II: OTTOMAN CONTENDER GROUPS' NAMES & ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Group
SDHP	the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party
ARF	the Armenian Revolutionary Federation
IMRO	the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
TSC	the Turkish Syrian Committee
TSCpost1902	the Turkish Syrian Committee after 1902
Bashkim	The Albanian Union Society
AR	Ahmed Riza and his followers
MM	Mizanci Murad and his followers
CUP_ulema	the ulema faction of the Committee of Union and Progress
CUP_military	the military faction of the Committee of Union and Progress
TH	Tunali Hilmi and his followers
activists	the activist faction of the Committee of Union and Progress
CUP_Berlin	the Berlin branch of the Committee of Union and Progress
PS	Prens Sabahattin and his followers
FO	la Federation Ottomane (Ittihad-i Osmani)
ER	Edhem Ruhi and his followers
AC	Abdullah Cevdet and his followers
SC	Dawn of Ottoman Union Committee (Safak Komitesi)
turk	Turk (newspaper)
muvaazene	Muvazene (newspaper)
MR	Mustafa Ragip and his followers (Feryad, Sark)
MNO	the Muslimanska Narodna Organizacija
CPU	the Committee of Progress and Union
OFS	the Ottoman Freedom Society
zionists	zionists under Theodor Herzl's leadership
AS	Ahmad Saib and his followers (Sancak)
IT	Ibrahim Temo and his followers

APPENDIX III: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS IN THE OTTOMAN CASE


The goodness of fit results for the periods 1895–1901 and 1902–1908 indicate that both models' predictions hit the observed values or are very close to them. This means the model makes a good job predicting cooperation patterns given the ideological and strategic variables at hand. Also, all p-values are large indicating the variables are significant. Furthermore, the MCMC diagnostics for each model indicate that the values are uniformly distributed around the mean values with the exception of financing from another contender. Similarly, the MCMC diagnostics for the model examining the period from 1895 to 1908 also show that the ideological and strategic variables successfully predict and explain cooperation patterns.

Goodness of Fit Results


	Goodness of fit results									
	1895-1901					1902-1908				
	<i>obs</i>	<i>min</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>max</i>	<i>MC p-value</i>	<i>obs</i>	<i>min</i>	<i>mean</i>	<i>max</i>	<i>MC p-value</i>
<i>edges</i>	128	108	126.49	142	1	264	217	266.00	305	0.98
<i>clustering</i>	100	81	98.63	119	0.92	230	179	231.59	271	1.00
<i>past cooperation</i>	82	74	81.62	87	0.94	180	154	181.30	197	0.80
<i>financing from the Sultan</i>	212	154	210.94	271	0.94	24	13	24.72	36	1
<i>financing by other contender</i>	62	50	61.67	72	1	282	219	285.75	347	0.96
<i>state type</i>	114	96	113.62	132	0.92	240	196	241.59	277	0.96
<i>society type</i>	56	43	55.79	68	1	94	75	93.86	111	1.00
<i>secularization</i>	47.8	35.1	47.202	58.1	0.88	86.4	71	87.09	100.6	0.92
<i>means of regime change</i>	68	55	67.43	83	0.88	184	157	184.06	209	0.98
<i>foreign assistance</i>	64	53	63.6	76	0.98	184.00	157	182.94	218	0.92
<i>cooperation with secessionists</i>						78	66	78.92	94	0.98

MCMC Diagnostics


Sample statistics (1895-1908)




Sample statistics (1895-1908)




Sample statistics (1895-1908)




Sample statistics (1895-1908)




Sample statistics 1902–1908




Sample statistics 1902–1908



Sample statistics 1902-1908



Sample statistics 1902-1908



APPENDIX IV: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS IN THE FRENCH CASE

According to Table 14 below, individual p-values for the independent variables and the joint p-value for the entire model are large, indicating that sample statistics for the TERGM model for the period from 1814 to 1830 are significantly different from the observed, hence the model is not degenerate. Individual p-values for the independent variables and the joint p-value for the entire model are large also for the TERGMs examining the periods between 1814-1824 and 1824-1830. These results imply that sample statistics for the TERGM model for these periods are significantly different from the observed, therefore the models are not degenerate.

Table 14

TERGM (1814-1830)	
Individual p-values	
edges	0.09
clustering	0.02
past cooperation	0.04
venue of operation	0.10
executive-legislative balance	0.01
authoritarian-libertarian	0.50
suffrage	0.03
secularization	0.03
violence	0.43
centralization	0.11
Joint P-value	0.01

Table 15


Individual p-values		
	(1814-1824)	(1825-1830)
edges	0.44	0.04
clustering	0.43	0.02
past cooperation	0.09	0.04
venue of operation	0.70	0.79
executive-legislative balance	0.98	0.03
authoritarian-libertarian	0.37	0.07
suffrage	0.41	0.04
secularization	0.44	0.07
violence	0.34	0.03
centralization	0.78	0.45
Joint P-value	0.47	0.02

Turning to the goodness of fit results, Table 16 presents model statistics for the TERGMs for the reigns of Louis XVIII and Charles X. According to the results, both models' predictions hit the observed values or are very close to them. This means the model makes a good job predicting cooperation patterns given the ideological and strategic variables at hand. Also, all p-values are large indicating the variables are significant. Furthermore, the MCMC diagnostics for each model indicate that the values are uniformly distributed around the mean values with the exception of financing from another contender. Similarly, the MCMC diagnostics for the model examining the period from 1895 to 1908 also show that the ideological and strategic variables successfully predict and explain cooperation patterns.


Table 16

Goodness-of-fit for model statistics										
	Louis XVIII (1814-1824)					Charles X (1825-1830)				
	obs	min	mean	max	MC p-value	obs	min	mean	max	C p-value
edges	300.00	278.00	299.42	323.00	0.88	200.00	187.00	200.91	220.00	1.00
clustering	220.00	183.00	220.49	257.00	1.00	164.00	143.00	165.17	193.00	0.94
past cooperation	230.00	217.00	230.82	242.00	0.94	166.00	156.00	166.12	174.00	1.00
venue of operation	166.00	147.00	165.48	180.00	1.00	134.00	124.00	134.22	145.00	1.00
executive-legislative balance	114.00	97.25	113.69	130.00	0.96	86.00	76.80	86.36	97.40	1.00
authoritarian-libertarian	133.00	110.75	132.91	150.50	1.00	79.50	68.25	80.09	96.75	0.98
suffrage	214.00	193.00	213.22	229.00	1.00	138.00	129.00	138.77	152.00	1.00
secularization	246.00	227.00	245.91	266.00	1.00	198.00	184.00	199.01	217.00	0.98
violence	154.00	139.00	154.03	169.00	0.98	130.00	118.00	130.51	142.00	1.00
centralization	218.00	199.00	217.82	234.00	0.88	112.00	103.00	112.43	128.00	1.00


Sample statistics 1814-1824




Sample statistics 1814-1824




Sample statistics 1814-1824




Sample statistics 1825-1830




Sample statistics 1825-1830



Sample statistics 1824-1830



Sample statistics 1825-1830



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