

On Security and the Sociology of Intellectuals

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Dr. James McGann

Contributors

Sean Nadel (Lead), Manxian Zhang, Alexandra Cooper-Ponte, Katrina Youssef, Aaseesh Polavarapu, Kevin Corlett, Quentin Buckholz, Sarah Ameen, Tamar Poulsen, Steven Darbes, Casey Clark, Nina Gandhi, Clare Fletcher, David Layn

Table of Contents

I. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	3
ON EXPERTS	3
ON EXPERTS AND POLITICS	4
ON THINK TANKS	6
ON SECURITY.....	7
II. ACADEMIC OUTLINES.....	8
A. CHRISTIAN BUEGER.....	8
<i>"Reassembling and Dissecting: International Relations Practice from a Science Studies Perspective" (by Manxian Zhang)</i>	8
B. ROBERT EVANS	11
<i>"The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience" (Katrina Youssef)</i>	11
<i>"Experiment with Interactional Expertise" (by Aaseesh Polavarapu)</i>	15
C. GIL EYAL.....	18
<i>"From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Interventions" (by Sean Nadel)</i> ..	18
D. SAUL HALFON.....	22
<i>"The Disunity of Consensus: International Policy Coordination as Socio-Technical Practice" (by Sean Nadel)</i>	22
E. THOMAS OSBORNE	25
<i>"On Intellectual Critique and the Critique of Intellectuals" (by Kevin Corlett)</i>	25
<i>"On mediators: intellectuals and the ideas trade in the knowledge society" (by Kevin Corlett)</i>	27
<i>"Aspects of Enlightenment by " (by Quentin Bucholz)</i>	29
F. INDERJEET PARMAR	30
<i>"Think tanks and power in foreign policy: a comparative study of the role and influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939-1945 " (by Quentin Buckholz)</i>	30
G. PIKI ISH SHALOM	34
<i>"Theorizing Politics, Politicizing Theory, and the Responsibility That Runs Between" (by Tamar Poulsen)</i>	34
<i>"Theoreticians' obligation of transparency: when parsimony, reflexivity, transparency, and reciprocity meet" (by Tamar Poulsen)</i>	36
<i>"Theory as Hermeneutical Mechanism" (by Steven Darbes)</i>	39
H. TRINE VILLUMSEN.....	42
<i>"Beyond the gap: relevance, fields of practice and the securitizing consequences of (democratic peace) research" (by Casey Clark)</i>	42
<i>"Capitalizing on Bourdieu: Boundary-setting, agency, and doxic battles in IR" (by Casey Clark)</i>	46
I. OLE WÆVER	49
<i>"Towards a Political Sociology of Security Studies" (by Clare Fletcher)</i>	49
<i>"International Relations Scholarship Around the World" (by David Layne)</i>	51
<i>"After the return to theory: the past, present and future of security studies" (by David Layne)</i>	53

I. Literature Review

The following literature looks at a group of 21 articles that analyze the sociology of intellectuals relating to international relations and security studies. The articles react to the changing nature of expertise and the role of experts in the political process.

On Experts

One of the contested topics among the literature is the extent and nature of expertise. The debate revolves around the legitimacy and extension of experts. Though it is agreed that there is value to technical expertise and experience, there is much debate over the power of experts and the ability of non-experts to influence decisions and knowledge. Inderjeet Parmar discusses the historical influence of the Council of Foreign Relations, Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the Rockefeller Foundation. Adopting a Gramscian model, Parmar charts the influence of these groups to argue that a small group of foreign policy elite has historically had a disproportionately large effect on American and global policy. (Parmar; 2002) This view suggests that within the foreign policy community expertise is exclusive and legitimacy granted only to certain types of officials

This view is challenged by other writings on the sociology of intellectuals. Robert Evans argues, for example, that the size of the expert or intellectual community has been growing and that the characteristics of the intellectual community have changed since the period which Parmar discusses. He points out

“that the ‘problem of legitimacy’ has been replaced by the ‘Problem of extension” (Evan, 2007). He goes on to claim that easy access to information has brought experts and the public closer together than ever before and that new social science needs to balance this dilution of stable balance. Experiments by Evans with pitch and color have shown that people outside of a community can ‘pass’ as expert members of a community through immersion and acting. He applies this to the intellectual community where he believes laypeople can pass as experts through an understanding of the lexicon of the field.

Thus, the sociology of intellectuals has moved away the traditional ‘man of letters’ format and become more melded into society and politics as the discourse of expertise has broadened and come to include more voices.

On Experts and Politics

The transformation of the intellectual community and expansion of expertise has made socio-technical decision-making more accessible and has led to a convergence of social, political and intellectual entities. Specifically, the fusion of intellectual and political communities poses challenges to both respective communities.

Christian Bueger helps explain the expansion of international relations by arguing that scientific knowledge is directly connected to the social order and can be used to decipher the culture of fields. Using the example of environmental studies and climate change Bueger explains the bridge between policy and academics (Bueger, 2008). Since knowledge is socially constructed it follows that there is

substantial overlap between pragmatic social policy and theoretical academics. Accordingly the role of the expert shifts towards a policy-oriented approach and away from the ivory tower. Trine Villumsen elaborates on this point similarly articulating the divide between academics and policymakers. Villumsen connects this to the creation of academic fields and Doxic space, with an international emphasis (Villumsen: 2011).

Gil Eyal also sees the role of the intellectual as considerably transformed. In an effort to create a twenty-first century sociology of intellectuals, Eyal argues that a sociology of intellectuals has become a sociology of interventions. (Eyal; 2010) The intellectual is now a political figure, intervening in various methods from manifestos to truth production itself.

Piki Ish Shalom argues that the transition from academic theory to political action is problematic due to distortion. Ish Shalom used Democratic Peace Theories and examples of the Neoconservative movement and Israeli Right to illustrate how sound political theory is distorted by politicians. (Ish Shalom; 2009) The convergence of the communities discussed above has allowed a guise of legitimacy to be claimed by illicit policy. In other words, policy can be proposed which appear to be based on theory but have been changed by politicians for insincere purposes. This widening gap creates a disunity between theory and policy which is very dangerous. Ish Shalom suggests that theoreticians need to be gatekeepers of their theories. However, it appears as if think tanks can be a very viable alternative agent to bridge this philosophical chasm.

On Think Tanks

Though very few of the articles in question mention think tanks, it seems plausible that think tanks would serve a very pivotal role in the literature. Only three authors mention think tanks directly. As noted above Parmar looks into the historical significance of early think tanks. Moreover, Eyal mentions think tanks briefly as a potential form of political intervention but quickly moves on from the concept. Thomas Osborne deals the most directly with think tanks through a case study of think tanks associated with the London School of Economics. Osborne notes that this a new mode of knowledge focused on policy over knowledge itself, while still recognizing the proximity of this particular think tank to the 'ivory tower' of LSE. Osborne goes on to stress the importance of mediation and specific mediators in bridging academic and political goals (Osborne; 2004).

Osborne come the closest to explaining the great potential which think tanks have in this form. Think tanks provide an appropriate retort to the concerns of the literature about the divide and distortion created by the expansion of expertise and confluence of academic and public communities. Think tanks can provide a mediator role and operate as the gatekeepers for which Ish Shalom urges, can protect the integrity of both policy and theory. Think tanks are the bridge between policy and knowledge and thus the alternative to many of the problems raised through an in depth evaluation of the sociology of interventions.

On Security

Though very few of the authors mention security studies directly, many of their arguments which reference either intellectuals as a whole or international relations do seemingly apply to security studies. Ole Wæver directly traces the institutionalization of security studies and notes the incorporation of security studies into the greater international relations community (Wæver; 2007). Though security studies is a rather amorphous and broad specialties, security studies still do seem to fit into the framework developed by the literature.

That being said there are two potential distinctions that are worth noting with regards to security studies. First, the lack of transparency in security studies represents a distinguishing factor from other fields of international relations. Access to pertinent information regarding security studies is often classified and unknown to the public. Thus the expansion of expertise is most likely not as broad in security studies because it is more difficult to have access to the 'insider' information. However, due to the lack of transparency, distortion is more likely and dangerous. This leads to the second point: the grave and serious nature of security studies makes the distortion and divide between politics and expertise even more dangerous. Therefore, security think tanks provide an extremely important role in being the gatekeepers of knowledge and policy.

II. Academic Outlines

A. Christian Bueger

“Reassembling and Dissecting: International Relations Practice from a Science Studies Perspective” (by Manxian Zhang)

Bibliographical Citation:

Bueger, C & Gadinger, F. (2007). Reassembling and Dissecting: International Relations Practice from a Science Studies Perspective. *International Studies Perspectives*, 8, 90-110.

Summary: The article rejects an internal scientific IR world and an external social context (policy, society) by stressing how domains of practices in social sciences constituted the IR culture.

I. Introduction (p. 90-92)

Thesis statement: “While these conceptual imports and approaches are valuable, we argue in this article that the concepts and cases of science studies can complement these studies and help us to advance our thoughts on the [IR] discipline.”

Lead in sentence: “This paper picks a conceptual line of science studies to explore and to illustrate in what ways science studies can advance IR’s disciplinary sociology.”

II. Frames of IR’s Environmental Relations (p. 92- 96)

Topic Sentence: “A small but growing body of literature is addressing the question of how IR’s theories and theorists relate to policy.

1. There are at least 6 different problem frames of the IR- environment relation.
 - a. Frames 1-3: Irrelevance, bridging the gap, and expertise
 - b. Frames 4-6: Effects and consequences, disciplinary history and context, and threats of knowledge society.
2. All these frames struggle with a general problem: “the question in the way the production of knowledge relates to social context.”
 - a. Problem in discerning between way of knowledge production of experts as valuable and interest- free and the way as “an integral part of the political struggle”
 - b. Some argue that knowledge production cannot be separated from its context whereas others argue that context cannot be separated from knowledge production.
 - c. Link between context and knowledge production needs to be further explored.

III. The Science Studies Perspective and Key Concepts (p. 96- 100)

Topic Sentence: "Sociology of science or science studies- the term we prefer- can contribute to our general understanding of the linkages between IR and its environment."

1. Historical, organizational, and social context shape the set of practices that make up science and is influenced by as well as shape the social world.
 - a. Science is a cultural formation.
 - b. Social order (culture) is made up by the practices of multiple agents.
 - c. Scientific knowledge is a form of social order.
2. Careful analyses of practice of scientist are necessary to understand the production of scientific knowledge and relations between science and other enterprises. Therefore, key concepts such as practices, resources, and cultural formation requires some further clarification.
 - a. Practices cover both speech acts and material activities.
 - b. Resources are what scientists rely on to conduct their work. Bruno Latour emphasized 5 main domains of resources that are needed for sciences to produce knowledge.
 - c. Some scholars see science as a cultural formation and research as a social process
 - d. "... [IR scholars] have argued that the focus on practices can contribute to reducing structural biases in IR theory, to re-focusing on agency, and to preventing the over- intellectualization of practitioners' actions- which is the case for many discourse theory approaches."

IV. Systematizing Domains of Scientific Practice (p. 100- 105)

Topic Sentence: "Although awareness of the significance of the locality, contingency, and the large variety of practices is necessary, as in the case of diplomacy practices can be clustered."

1. Latour identifies 5 interwoven domains of scientific practice that constitute the cultural formation of science.
 - a. Domain 1 & 2: Practices of links and knots (which held all of the other domains together) and mobilization of the world (reduction of complexity of world and collection of data).
 - b. Domain 3. Autonomy (practices are needed to secure autonomy by setting up a self- organization and maintaining boundary to "non-science.")
 - c. Domain 4&5: Alliances (scholars need alliances to guarantee flow of resources) and public representation (scientists need to show work to outside world).

V. Conclusion (p. 106)

Summary of Main Idea: By using concepts from science studies, we can explore and advance IR's disciplinary sociology.

Summary of Main points: If a common heuristic is found, the six frames of IR-environment relations can complement each other. "To grasp the IR culture the task lies in identifying the resources and practices on which IR builds its knowledge." There are five domains in which the science of IR can be understood and from this perspective of science studies, we can reject the internal/ external dilemma of IR literature. An IR practitioner should reflect on the five domains and keep a balance between the different practices.

Suggestions/ Final Comments:

The article is very abstract and requires the reader to always think in the bigger picture as it deals with the shifting perspectives of the entire IR discipline.

B. Robert Evans

“The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience” (Katrina Youssef)

Bibliographic citation: *Rethinking Expertise* (2007, with Harry Collins), University of Chicago Press, “The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience” (2002, with Harry Collins), *Social Studies of Science* 32:2, 235-95.

Thesis/Main argument: “We argue...that the ‘Problem of Legitimacy’ has been replaced by the ‘Problem of Extension’—that is by a tendency to dissolve the boundary between experts and the public so that there are no longer any grounds for limiting the indefinite extension of technical decision-making rights. We argue that the Third Wave of Science Studies—Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE)—is needed to solve the Problem of Extension” (235).

Intro: The Problem of Legitimacy and the Problem of Extension:

“Should the political legitimacy of technical decisions in the public domain be maximized by referring them to the widest democratic processes, or should such decisions be based on the best expert advice? The first choice risks technological paralysis: the second invited popular opposition” (235-236).

“Though Science Studies has resolved the Problem of Legitimacy by showing that the basis of technical decision-making can and should be widened beyond the core of certified experts, it has failed to solve the problem of Extension: ‘How far should participation in technical decision-making extend?’ (237).

“Our problem is academic: It is to find a clear rationale for the expansion of expertise. But a satisfying justification for expansion has to show, in a natural way, where the limits are” (237).

Terms:

Technical decision-making – decision-making at those points where science and technology intersect with the political domain because the issues are of visible relevance to the public

Experience-based experts – members of the public who have special technical expertise in virtue of experience that is not recognized by degrees or other certificates

The Waves of Social Studies of Science

First Wave (1950s-1960s) – social analysts aimed to understand, explain, and effectively reinforce the success of the sciences rather than questioning their basis (239)

Second Wave (early 1970s - today) – referred to as ‘social constructivism’; believed that it was necessary to draw on ‘extra-scientific factors’ to bring about the closure of scientific and technical debates (239)

Third Wave (today) – involves finding a special rationale for science and technology while also accepting the findings of Wave Two—that science and technology are more ordinary than we once thought; Wave Three is meant to apply Wave Two to a set of problems in order to be prescriptive rather than descriptive (240-341)

Core-Sets, Core-Groups, and their Settings

In esoteric sciences: (242-243)

- there is a *core-set* made up of scientists involved in experimentation or theorization directly relevant to a scientific controversy
- The *core-group* is the solidaristic group that emerges after a controversy has been settled
- If a science is esoteric only members of the core-set can legitimately contribute to the formation of a consensus

Beyond the core there is the *wider scientific community* and beyond that is the *general public*: (246-248)

- Non-specialists and outsiders from the core group—the wider scientific community and the public—reach a consensus faster than the core group because **1-** they learn of the on-goings of core science through digested sources (i.e. media) that condense and simplify information;
- And **2-** because the consumers of scientific knowledge have no use for small uncertainties: decisions about action involve binary choices, such as whether or not to implement a certain policy
- Potential for damage occurs when the sciences are exposed to the public early on before a consensus has been developed within the core-set and scientists who argue with each other are no longer seen as a source of confidence

*Wave 3: (249-250)

- Separates scientific and technical input to decision-making from political input; in Wave Three the wider-scientific community should not play a

- special role in the decision-making process and should be indistinguishable from the citizenry as a whole
- It is believed in Wave Three that both certified (the core-set) and uncertified (or experience-based) experts should be responsible for technical-decision makings

The Nature of Expertise

Types of Expertise: (254-255)

- 1- *No Expertise*: insufficient to conduct sociological analysis of do quasi-participatory fieldwork
- 2- *Interactional expertise*: enough expertise to interact interestingly with participants and carry out sociological analysis
- 3- *Contributory Expertise*: enough expertise to contribute to the science of the field being analyzed

Interactions between certified (core-set) and uncertified (experience-based) experts: (255-257)

- Thesis 1: *Only one set of experts need have interactional competence in the expertise of another set of experts for a combination of contributory expertise to take place.*
- Thesis 2: *In such a case, only the party with the interactional expertise can take responsibility for combining the expertises.*
- Thesis 3: *In such circumstances the party without the interactional expertise in respect of the other party should be represented by someone to make sure the combination is done with integrity*

Two other necessary abilities for technical decision-making: (258-259)

- Translation (thesis 4): *A necessary but not sufficient condition of translation is the achievement of interactional expertise in each of the fields between which translation is to be accomplished*
- Discrimination: ability to make judgments between knowledge claims based on something other than scientific knowledge

Case Studies

Increasing interaction: (261-262)

- 1- *Cumbrian Sheep* – evidence for two different types of expertise (the scientists and the sheep farmers); also shows the problems of interaction
- 2- *AIDS Treatment in San Francisco* – shows two different types of expertise (scientists and gay community); success of interaction because gay community learned interactional expertise

Decreasing interaction in Wave Two: (263-264)

3- Crashing Fuel Flasks (British Electricity Generating Board)

4- Crashing Aircrafts (AMK)

→ In these cases better interpretation would have been accomplished by narrowing the group of decision-makers to certified experts alone

Conclusion/Sum:

- Wave Three of Science Studies is supposed to solve the Problem of Extension
- The Problem of Extension was caused by solving the Problem of Legitimacy in Wave Two
- In Wave Three the role of expertise (science) and the role of democratic rights are separate
- According to Wave Three, the right to contribute technically and legitimately to a technical decision is assessed by examining expertise; certification as a scientist has little or no importance
- The experts making the decisions must have some combination of interactive and contributory expertise; and they must also have the ability of translation and discrimination in order to communicate and form a consensus

“Experiment with Interactional Expertise” (by Aaseesh Polavarapu)

Bibliographic Citation: “Experiments with Interactional Expertise” (2006, with Harry Collins et al), *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 37:4, **656-674**.

I. Abstract/Overview

a. Definition of “interactional expertise”

- i. ‘Interactional expertise’ is developed through linguistic interaction without full scale practical immersion in a culture.
- ii. Interactional expertise is the medium of communication in peer review in science, in review committees, and in interdisciplinary projects. It is also the medium of specialist journalists and of interpretative methods in the social sciences.

b. Thesis/Main Point:

- i. We describe imitation game experiments designed to make concrete the idea of interactional expertise. The experiments show that the linguistic performance of those well socialized in the language of a specialist group is indistinguishable from those with full blown practical socialization but distinguishable from those who are not well socialized.
- ii. The imitation game can also be used to indicate whether an individual can enter an esoteric domain and master the interactional expertise, a skill required by interpretative sociologists of science, anthropologists, ethnographers, and the like.
- iii. The main aim of the research is to report the results of experiments on the nature of tacit knowledge. These experiments, we claim, show that it is possible to acquire the tacit knowledge of the language belonging to a specialist area without acquiring the tacit knowledge of the practices belonging to that area. In short, we argue that the degree of embodied activity needed to acquire the tacit knowledge pertaining to a specialist language is much less than that typically assumed in the phenomenological literature—it is, we claim, small to vanishing.

II. Introduction: The Idea of Interactional Expertise

- a. The idea of interactional expertise is readily exemplified by the skill required by a sociologist of scientific knowledge who learns to engage respondents in technical discussions of a scientific domain without being able to publish or carry out experiments; the sociologist develops interactional expertise without developing ‘contributory expertise’, the ability to contribute to the science.
- b. Interactional expertise involves mastery of a language and is characterized by rules that cannot be explicated; it is a tacit knowledge-laden ability that can only be acquired through immersion in the discourse of the community.

- i. It is usually thought that the tacit components of the language of a specialist domain can be acquired only along with full immersion in the esoteric form-of-life including its practical components.
- ii. Here we show that immersion in the sea of language alone is enough to enable the entire language to be acquired. The interactional expert does not thereby gain the ability to do anything practical within the domain, nor does the interactional expert share the experiences of what it is to be practically involved in the domain, but this does not adversely affect the interactional expert's ability to use the language fluently. The language is the same as the language of one who has shared the experiences. It follows that the interactional expert can make sound judgements and decisions that bear on practical matters
- iii. Clarifying analogy: Seeing people without sticks can, in principle, fully acquire the language of blind people with sticks if they talk to them long enough. Furthermore, such seeing people without sticks would be just as good as blind people with sticks at advising stick-manufacturers on the best kind of sticks to make for blind stick-using people and at guessing what it would be like to use some new kind of stick—such as one that vibrates—even though no-one had ever held such a stick. Of course, such a seeing person would not be able to try the experiment with authenticity and report what it really feels like to hold a vibrating stick, but once vibrating sticks had become common in the blind community the seeing person would be able to master the vibrating stick discourse and discuss their relative merits as effectively as blind people.

III. **Procedure and Results: The Proof of Concept Experiments**

- a. We use the imitation game to investigate the discourse of people who do not possess a certain skill but have been immersed in the language. To do this we use the imitation game to compare the domain specific linguistic abilities of interactional experts with those of contributory experts and those of non-experts.
- b. Use pitch perceivers (minority) and pitch blind(majority)/color perceivers (majority) and color blind (minority) for tests
- c. Background to use of imitation games – Turing Test
 - i. Alan Turing's famous definition of intelligence in a computer (Turing, 1950) turned on what has become known as the 'Turing Test:' a hidden computer and a hidden person would be interrogated by a judge via teletypes. If after five minutes or so of interchange the judge failed to identify the computer it would be deemed to be intelligent. Turing's test was based on the 'imitation game', a parlor game in which a judge asked written questions of a hidden man pretending to be a woman and compared these with the answers of a hidden woman who replied honestly. In our terms, if the hidden man succeeds in fooling the judge the man has

demonstrated the interactional expertise associated with being a woman though not the contributory expertise.

Table 1
Chance and identity conditions

Pretender is		Target expertise	Expected outcome
A: Colour blind	Imitates	Colour perceiving	Chance
B: Colour perceiving	Imitates	Colour blind	Identify
C: Pitch perceiving	Imitates	Pitch blind	Chance
D: Pitch blind	Imitates	Pitch perceiving	Identify

- d.
- IV. **Results**
- a. It does suggest, then, that a life-time's immersion in the discourse of a group with a certain contributory expertise enables a person without the contributory expertise to acquire the corresponding interactional expertise, at least as tested by the imitation game. The contrast with the results of the identify condition reinforces the point and shows that without such experience it is hard to acquire interactional expertise in the absence of contributory expertise.
- V. **Developing Interactional Expertise in a Science**
- a. Experience suggests that full blown research competence is not a prerequisite. This leaves us with the question of what it means to understand the framework of the actors being studied in sufficient detail to be able to do authentic social analysis of their world. The answer will differ according to the purpose of the study but it could be argued that an ideal target for those aiming to do competent fieldwork in sociology of scientific knowledge is the acquisition of interactional expertise
- b. Informal experiments to show interactional expertise is sufficient – had Collins act as a wave scientist and answer questions about it, fooling other wave scientists because of his language use
- VI. **Overall Conclusions**
- a. The entire set of results begs the question of why all those who claim to practice a research method that involves taking on the frame of reference of the actors should not base their thinking on the idea of interactional expertise and should not look to the possibility of using the imitation game to explore the extent to which they have acquired an understanding of their respondents' frame of meaning.
- b. The still wider significance for science studies of this approach lies in a move from studying truth to studying expertise as the touchstone of reliable knowledge. While the notion of truth remains elusive, prescriptive principles for the utilisation of scientific and technical knowledge can be founded on the exploration of expertise.
- VII. **If needed, additional sources concerning imitation games listed in appendix at end of article**

C. Gil Eyal

"From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Interventions" (by Sean Nadel)

Bibliographic citation: Eyal, Gil. "From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Interventions" (2010, with Larissa Buchholz), *Annual Review of Sociology* 36:1

- I. Introduction (118-120)
 - a. The literature regarding the sociology of intellectuals generally discusses the decline of intellectuals.
 - i. "For a reviewer, the problem is thereby not so much whether such diagnoses are correct or not, but how to characterize a literature of which one main principle of multiplication has been the claim that its object is dissolving. Is the very project of the sociology of intellectuals becoming more and more anachronistic and a review, therefore, redundant?" (118)
 - b. This demise seems to be a uniquely American/20th century problem.
 - i. **The goal of the article is to determine 'a twenty-first century sociology of intellectuals.'**
 - c. The primary struggle in the sociology of intellectuals is appropriate definition
 - i. All definitions of intellectuals are self-definitions.
 - ii. A sociology of intellectuals must understand its own positioning in the field.
 1. It is meta-reflexive
 - d. A 21st century sociology of intellectuals must be neither too broad nor too narrow.
 - i. It must replace the idea of intellectual decline with transformation
 1. How is the 21st century intellectual different than the 20th century intellectual?
 - e. Foucault's 'universal' v. 'specific' intellectual
 - i. Intellectual as 'man of letters' or 'specific expert in a political movement'
 - ii. Bourdieu:
 1. specialization of knowledge mandates collaborative thought
 - f. **"...the classical sociology of intellectuals needs to be reconstructed, converted into a twenty-first-century sociology of interventions." (119-120)**
 - i. Both types of sociology exist, not a complete transformation.
 - ii. The difference is the unit of analysis as 'social type' vs. 'movement of intervention itself'

- II. The Classical Sociology of Intellectuals (121-123)
 - a. Key contributions to the sociology of intellectuals from 1900-1980
 - b. The literature focuses on intellectual's role as politically radical agents
 - i. Party/nationalist intellectuals
 - ii. Intellectuals as 'new class between labor and capital'
 - c. "The classical problematic of the sociology of intellectuals was dominated by the question of allegiance" (121).
 - i. Are intellectuals allegiant to 'classes', 'politics' or solely 'truth'
 - ii. The origin of the term 'intellectual' during the Dreyfus affair presupposed a political nature which called allegiance into question.
 - d. The original literature was divided between explaining the historical origins of intellectuals and the modern decline of the intellectual.
 - e. The four part prototype of the classic intellectual
 - i. The intellectual as the opposite of the lay person
 - ii. Their work was dependant on abstract knowledge (not physical/sensory)
 - iii. Intellectuals were advocates of universal values
 - iv. Intellectuals were a new class/keepers of culture
- III. The Sociology of Intellectual Fields and Markets (123-128)
 - a. A rejection of all definitions of the 'intellectual'
 - b. Relative Autonomy
 - i. "It thereby demonstrates that even those intellectual activities that would seem the most autonomous and detached are preconditioned by the structure of the field in which they are embedded." (124)
 - ii. There have been geographically divergent changes with regards to the allegiance of intellectuals over the past 30 years.
 - 1. How much autonomy is there in the field?
 - iii. Many argue that media prevalence has decreased the autonomy of the intellectuals.
 - 1. Others argue that popular media intellectual outlets polarize rather than decreases autonomy.
 - c. Genesis and Circulation of Models of Intellectuals
 - i. This category of literature 'eschews global characterizations' to the intellectual (125).
 - 1. Specific approaches include:
 - a. Historical analyses of the origins of the intellectual
 - b. Connection of the intellectual to art
 - c. Connection of the intellectual to think tanks
 - i. **"Medvetz (2009,2010), for instance, documents the institutionalization of an interstitial field of think tanks in the United States, situated between the fields of politics, academia, the**

economy and the media. This hybrid space, he argues, has made possible a new figure of public intellectual whose authority is not so much based on a particular type...expertise..."not on the command of economic capital, political power or media access, but rather on the capacity to mediate an encounter among these forms of authority." (126)

ii. NOTE: Above Medvetz citation: Medvetz T. 2010. Think Tanks in America. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. In press.

d. The intellectual has become increasingly affected by increased transnational cooperation.

d. Modes of Intervention

i. Public intellectual can intervene politically in many ways.

1. Pamphlets, manifestos, modalities, prophesy or expertise

a. These modes work in different ways and have differing effects depending on outside political demand, symbolic capital, and degrees of specialization which tailors the audience.

ii. Eyal himself has developed four categories of intervention based on late communist Czechoslovakia: dissidence, internal exile, reform communism and co-optation

1. Intellectuals aligned themselves with different mode of intervention

IV. Sociologies of Expertise (128-132)

a. Distributed Agency

i. 'Epistemic communities' as a new form of the classic intellectual model due to the combination of truth focused knowledge and a strong moral stance. "The focus is not on individuals but on the network itself as a tool of intervention.

ii. "The question shifted from "who are the experts" to "what is expertise" (129)

b. Truth Effects

i. There are now many more ways to use truth-seeking measure to stage an intervention than in the classical era.

ii. The effect is that democratic politics are now dispersed across many spheres of influence.

c. Interstitial Domains

i. "Intervention is analyzed not as a daring plunge from one (tranquil, academic) world into another (agonistic, political), but as taking place in an interstitial domain of expertise." (132)

ii. Intellectuals are no longer expected to be merely theoretical but are seen as actors and/or mediators.

V. Conclusion (133)

- a. A sociology of intellectuals has transformed into a sociology of interventions which is transforming and finding its place as a 21st-century adaptation of the traditional intellectual mode.

D. Saul Halfon

"The Disunity of Consensus: International Policy Coordination as Socio-Technical Practice" (by Sean Nadel)

Bibliographic Citation: Halfon, Saul. "The Disunity of Consensus: International Policy Coordination as Socio-Technical Practice"(2006), *Social Studies of Science*, 36:5, 783-807

Topic : "Using the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development as a case study, this paper challenges standard approaches to understanding political consensus." (Abstract)

I. Introduction (783-785)

- a. The article argues that the Cairo Conference, signed by 179 countries, demonstrates rhetorical, meaning, and practice consensus, despite critiques of this argument.
 - i. What is consensus?
 1. "Only a view of consensus as structured disunity, rather than unity, can make a claim of international consensus seem even remotely plausible." (784)
 2. **THESIS: "The consensus developed at Cairo, I argue, suggests neither cognitive, strategic, nor practical agreement on basic facts, assumptions, activities or goals, but rather commitment to and enrolment in a common socio-technical net-work.: (784)**
 3. Consensus is a metaphor for networks creation.
- b. Scholarship on international policy coordination is moving away from Realism
 - i. New discursive, cultural and epistemic modes.
- c. **The Article will use international demographic surveys to demonstrate a 'commitment to a common socio-technical network' (785) with consensus at a metaphor.**

II. International Consensus as Socio-Technical Practice (785-790)

- a. With regards to women's policy and population policy a combination of cognitive and social consensus is usually adopted.
- b. A new theory of consensus: "A network theory of consensus, with its focus on structured disunity, suggests that interpretive flexibility and strategic deployment necessarily characterize the consensus, yet coordinated effects are reflective of broad commitment to the socio-technical network that makes a functional coherence possible." (787)
 - i. Social Worlds theory helps to explain how networks theory can function and people 'get work done' Itaces cooperation over

- competition which produces a 'functional consensus'
- ii. Discipline breakdowns have helped to stabilize the network approach to population dynamics.
- III. The Case: Cairo, Women's Empowerment, and Policy Action (790-791)
- a. **Cairo is a shift from 'population control' to 'women's empowerment' rhetoric.**
 - i. This shift of emphasis marks a change from prevention to choice.
 - ii. This consensus was only possible by expanding the socio-technical network to create compromises.
- IV. Building the Network (791-801)
- a. The article utilizes surveys of 250L women in 42 Third World Countries
 - b. *The Network Building Process*
 - i. The surveys in question built a network of technical experts with an understanding of
 - ii. Also it represented and empowered women who had been previously oppressed.
 - iii. Demographic
 - c. *Building Epistemic Communities*
 - i. An epistemic community has formed through the sharing of these surveys.
 - 1. In this case most members of the community are policy oriented NGO's.
 - d. *Constructing Demographic Practice*
 - i. "In providing a common data source for both academic and policy-oriented demographers, the surveys have helped to maintain the relatively transparent flow of personnel and language between these two spheres, thus reinforcing the strength of the community itself." (795)
 - e. *Capacity Building*
 - i. Spreading demographic principles across the world has increased socio-technical capacity building.
 - 1. Local implementation is key to survey success
 - ii. The surveys not only enabled but created the epistemic community around fertility.
 - f. *Standard Representations of Third World Women*
 - i. The surveys have created a standard profile of fertile Third World women which allows Western understanding and support. **This allows of a normalization of policy and discourse.**
 - ii. The surveys have made incredibly clear the need for contraception.
 - g. *Standards of Political Discourse, Legitimacy, and Accountability*
 - i. "Ultimately, the plausibility of the Cairo consensus relies on standardizing political discourse, which establishes a regime of

trust and allows policy actors to 'get along' in their work."
(799)

- ii. The standardization of discourse allowed for easy access to action.
 - 1. This is embodied by the 'women's empowerment' movement

V. Conclusion

- a. **"By helping to create an epistemic community, produce standardized representations of Third World women, and reinforce narrowed frames of political discourse and legitimacy, the demographic surveys have helped to discipline policy rhetoric and action."(802)**

E. Thomas Osborne

“ On Intellectual Critique and the Critique of Intellectuals” (by Kevin Corlett)

Osborne, Thomas. “On Intellectual Critique and the Critique of Intellectuals” (2004, with Gregor McLennan), *History of the Human Sciences*, 17:4, 103-107.

This article is a critique of a paper by Steve Fuller that raises issues about judging intellectuals.

Introduction:

General Statement: A paper by Steve Fuller raises important questions about the practice and responsibilities of intellectuals.

Thesis Statement: McLennan and Osborne find those arguments unconvincing.

Lead-in Sentence: Since Fuller focuses on the motif of “symmetries,” McLennan and Osborne have four sets of critical comments around that theme.

Body:

Topic Sentence: There is a parallel between the intervention of the ‘strong programmers’ in 1980s sociology of scientific knowledge and Fuller’s reconstruction of ‘critique of intellectuals’ as a field

Supporting Point: insistence that valid and false theories should be symmetrically subjected to sociological explanation is distinctly echoed in Fuller

Supporting Point: tension between the explanatory and normative dimension of sociological critique is tangible in Fuller’s article

Supporting Detail: results in moralistic guilt-tripping that is undesirable

Topic Sentence: Fuller never claims that an ideas origin are sufficient for assessment

Supporting Point: there is a sense that intellectual work can exist beyond their own “historical time” and be reinterpreted by other authors in other ways

Supporting Detail: Heidegger’s sympathetic interpreters included Nazis and victims of Nazis

Supporting Point: ‘humanist’ approach to textual significance where the meanings and purposes are judged through the grid of a single author’s point of view, but different texts emerge at different periods of an author’s life, in different contexts, and for different audiences

Topic Sentence: Fuller says that history itself judges the winners and losers

Supporting Point: the nomenclature of winners and losers obscures more than it reveals

Supporting Detail: no satisfactory formula for analysis and judgment

Supporting Point: In addition, the stakes are higher for high-profile public intellectuals

Topic Sentence: There is a further material difference in the character of intellectual responsibility between the cases of subscribing to the ideological norms of a society and actively signing up to specific political programs

Supporting Point: few intellectuals can be deemed to be responsible for a political movement

Supporting Detail: Nazis and Nietzsche.

Conclusion:

Summary of Main Idea: Steve Fuller has added a number of big issues to the revival of interests in ideas and intellectuals, but arguments are unconvincing.

Final Comments: paper deals with a specific authors ideas and criticisms

"On mediators: intellectuals and the ideas trade in the knowledge society" (by Kevin Corlett)

Osborne, Thomas. "On mediators: intellectuals and the ideas trade in the knowledge society" (2004), *Economy and Society*, 33:4, 430-447.

Introduction: p. 430-1

General Statement: This paper intends to contribute to the assessment of whether there has been a transformation of knowledge to a more organizational model instead of a traditional academic and linear type.

Thesis Statement: This paper takes a skeptical view of whether there is a novel 'organization of knowledge,' but instead argues there is an increasing salience of a certain kind of intellectual attitude called the mediator.

Lead-in Sentence: In order to sketch the deflationary approach to mode 1 and mode 2 of knowledge, this paper will address the relationship between a university culture and think tank culture at the London School of Economics and Demos.

Body:

Topic Sentence: think tanks may be regarded as being nicely emblematic of the Mode 2 knowledge in developing innovative ideas rather than to produce scholarly works for ivory towers.

Supporting Point: think tanks are, however, largely dependent on universities for their research

Supporting Detail: research centers at institutions like LSE are increasingly enrolled as think-tank-like institutions

Supporting Point: both universities and think tanks aim of research is to influence the media and the context of policy

Supporting Detail: once long-standing academic at LSE describes the change

Supporting Point: the network model suggests that ideas are seeded from the bottom up in an interactive process, while the brokerage model focuses on small-scale innovations to enhance particular kinds of outcomes

Supporting Detail: mediators bring ideas quickly and decisively into public focus.

Topic Sentence: There is a lack of models from the sociology of intellectuals to describe the transformation of knowledge

Supporting Point: lack of focus on the intellectual workers, such as researchers who are not part of the high intelligentsia

Supporting Detail: 20-25% of workforce are in these professional and related service sector

Supporting Point: ideas are not confined to great intellectuals

Topic Sentence: There are different epistemic forms that are drawn upon by different individuals or the same individuals at different times.

Supporting Point: Legislators, interpreters, experts and mediators have different combinations of substance, rationale, stylization, and strategy

Supporting Point: The mediator is the one who is the enabler, fixer, catalyst and brokers ideas

Supporting Detail: substance is to produce ideas, rationale is to bring about something new, stylization is an aesthetic attitude towards the new, and the strategy is to bring about a mobile, creative culture

Topic Sentence: This approach avoids dividing through epochalism

Supporting Point: it is possible, in fact to apply these different categories to people within different eras

Supporting Detail: during the Scientific Rev, Boyle fits the model of an expert, while Hobbes or Bacon fit the legislator model, etc

Conclusion:

Summary of Main Idea: The mediator role fits in nicely at the intersection of the legislator, expert, and interpreter, filling an void in the model.

Summary of Main Point: this article attempts to create an effective model for the creation of ideas.

“Aspects of Enlightenment by “ (by Quentin Bucholz)

Note: This text was not available and the below outline was thus derived from Google Books and reviews.

Thomas Osborne, *Aspects of Enlightenment* (London: UCL Press, 1998)

- Osborne explores social theory and the central role of enlightenment within it.
- Osborne argues that social theory can only fail when it attempts to describe or explain whole societies; rather than seeking to explain society, social theory should focus on understanding human nature.
- Social theory focused on understanding human nature would naturally concentrate on enlightenment, which is central to human nature.
- Defines enlightenment as the self-conscious, reflexive

F. Inderjeet Parmar

“Think tanks and power in foreign policy: a comparative study of the role and influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939-1945 “ (by Quentin Buckholz)

Note: This text was not available and the below outline was thus derived from Google Books and reviews.

Inderjeet Parmar, *Think tanks and power in foreign policy: a comparative study of the role and influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939-1945* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)

- Parmar explores the role of elites in shaping foreign policy, focusing specifically on the role of two think tanks (Chatham House in the UK and the Council on Foreign Relations in the US) in the major post-1945 shifts in British and American foreign policy.
- Parmar concludes that the two think tanks in question were influential in the American shift from isolationism to globalism and the British shift from empire to retrenchment in the post-war period.
- Parmar emphasizes that well-connected, well-organized think tanks can have a major impact on foreign policy.
- Using these think tanks as case studies, Parmar attempts to explore the question of whether or not a disproportionately influential “elite” can exist and determine policy in a democratic society. In order to answer this question, Parmar examines the socioeconomic and political background of the leaders and members of Chatham House and the CFR, concluding that a relatively small “cabal” dominated American and British foreign policy of the era.
- To gauge the influence of these think tanks on policy, Parmar examines six key foreign policy decisions of World War II and the immediate post-war period, concluding that the think tanks were indeed influential in these decisions.
- Ultimately, Parmar concludes that a foreign policy elite can and did exist, and can play an influential role, especially through think tanks.

'To Relate Knowledge and Action: The Impact of the Rockefeller Foundation on Foreign Policy Thinking During America's Rise to Globalism 1939-1945 ' (by Sarah Ameen)

Bibliographical Citation:

Parmar, Inderjeet. "To relate knowledge and action: The Impact of the Rockefeller Foundation on Foreign Policy Thinking during America's Rise to Globalism, 1939-1945" (2002), *Minerva* 40: pp 235-263.

Summary:

The article utilizes four models (Gramscian, Karl & Katz, Corporatist, and Statist School) in order to analyze the role and impact of the Rockefeller foundation on American foreign affairs and concludes that the Gramscian analysis is the most effective method .

Outline:

I. Introduction (p. 235-236)

a. Thesis: The Rockefeller foundation played a crucial role in the construction of a "globalist consensus" in US foreign policy. The article "explores the applicability of four explanatory models, which help to varying degrees in coming to terms with the Foundation and its place in American foreign policy" (236).

II. The Rockefeller Foundation and its Program (236-241)

a. Background info

- i.** Founded in 1913, the Rockefeller Foundation "claimed to confront scientifically (and, if possible, solve) the problems of modern industrial society" (236).
- ii.** According to Eldon Eisenach, the Rockefeller Foundation and other such organizations may be classified as "para states – private institutions that were at the same state-oriented" (237). These organizations were part of a "Progressivist movement".
- iii.** Progressives, through mobilizing public opinion, seek to shift American policy from an isolationist one to a globalist one in order to "extend America's power on the world stage." (237)

b. Gramscian Position

- i.** In a liberal democracy, hegemony is the predominant means of control
- ii.** hegemony – "intellectual and moral leadership" (237).
- iii.** "Gramscians perceive the Rockefeller Foundation to have been imbued with 'state-spirit' " (237).
- iv.** **Gramscians** argue that the main aim of the Rockefeller Foundation is "the legitimization of an intellectual community – part of an emerging foreign policy establishment – that has

championed the cause of liberal internationalism and helped undermine and almost eliminate its principal enemy, isolationism" (238).

- v. Private organizations "form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes" (238).

c. Karl and Katz Position

- i. argued that Gramscian theory do not apply to America.
- ii. These foundations concern themselves with academics, not research or politics

d. Corporatists School Position

- i. argue that the relationship between the state and private organizations changed when an 'organizational sector' emerged and "placed itself above political party and market competition and sought to solve social problems without overt reference to class or sectional interests" (240)
- ii. 'interpenetration' of large scale bodies such as private companies, big government and other functional blocs

e. The Statist School

- i. emphasize the autonomy of the state and its role is to "prepare the domestic society to face the challenges of global change and competition" (240)
- ii. Private groups are less powerful than the state

III. The Foundation's Role Among Policy Research and Propaganda Organizations (241-247)

a. Policy Research: Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)

- i. Between 1927-1945, the Rockefeller Foundation gave over \$443,000 to CFR for research purposes such as the War-Peace Project, which essentially had "far-reaching consequences for the United States" (243).
- ii. A CFR insider claimed that the relationship between CFR and the government during WWII was the "closest any private organization has enjoyed at any time in American history" (242).
- iii. CFR created a "Grand Area" concept that viewed the entire world on the basis of American national interest.
- iv. CFR "helped define America's national interest, wrote memoranda, and exercised considerable influence, notably in the realm of contingency planning" (243).
- v. Gramscian approach -The War-Peace Project was significant because it helped shift American foreign policy from an isolationism to globalism
- vi. Karl & Katz Approach - The War-Peace Project questions their notion that American foundations are not involved in Politics
- vii. Corporatist Approach - RF and CFR 'interpenetrated' the government

- viii. Statist Approach - The government was 'proactive' but it was dependent on private organization in order to help carry out its aims
 - I. Conclusion: Gramscian and 'modified corporatist' positions best help explain the impact of the foundation's initiative.
- b. Propaganda Organizations: The Foreign Policy Association (FPA) and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR)**
- i. FPA and IPR are "popular liberal-internationalist organizations" that focus on the "education of the public opinion" (245)
 - ii. FPA and IPR received significant grants from RF
 - iii. FPA, IPR, and RF were united in their aim to help construct a US foreign policy that featured the US as the leading power in the new world order.
 - iv. "The 'vertically-integrated' character of the RF's funding provides a useful verification of Gramscian 'engineering of consent' within a liberal capitalist democracy" (246).
- IV. The Rockefeller Foundation and the Yale Institute of International Studies (pp. 247-253)**
- a. RF financed university research programs
 - b. RF and the Carnegie foundation had a significant impact on the development of the field of international relations
- V. 'Skills and Knowledge Available for the Conduct of the War' : the Princeton Public Opinion Studies Program (pp. 253-260)**
- a. During the early 20th C, opinion polls "became a vital instrument of party and interest group politics in America" (253).
 - b. RF activities and funding projects were related to 'public opinion'
 - c. RF established the Princeton University of the Office of Public Opinion and Research
 - i. Findings of the program were useful to policymakers
- VI. Conclusion (260-262)**
- a. The Rockefeller Foundation played a crucial role in US foreign relations
 - b. "Rockefeller Foundation strengthened the intellectual credibility of globalism by funding specific lines of research, teaching and training" (260).
 - c. Gramscian approach best helps explain the role of RF: "Gramsci's concept of 'state spirit' in attempting to engineer the 'consent of the governed' for radical reform, bridges the theoretical divide between statism and corporatism and helps us better to understand the concerted efforts of the Rockefeller Foundation, in collaboration with the American state, to construct a new globalist consensus within academia, and between government and academic elites" (262).

G. Piki Ish Shalom

"Theorizing Politics, Politicizing Theory, and the Responsibility That Runs Between"
(by Tamar Poulsen)

Citation: Ish-Shalom, Piki. "Theorizing Politics, Politicizing Theory, and the Responsibility That Runs Between." *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 2 (June 2009): 303-316.

Thesis: Theorists do not bear moral responsibility for their theories' ramifications, but they do bear social responsibility for the actions of effects that derive from their theories. (blame responsibility vs. task responsibility)

Summary: The recurring pattern of political abuse of theory calls for exploration. Even though it is the politicized and misinterpreted version of a theory that brings about undesired results, the theorist holds the moral responsibility of forward-looking. It is their task-responsibility to plug up the loopholes that make their theories vulnerable to political abuse. This largely rests on renouncing objectivity.

- A. Theorists have a distinctive social role. (304)
 - 1. Theorists serve as the middle ground between *experts* who produce concrete knowledge and *intellectuals* who produce general, sometimes irrelevant, knowledge
 - a. Theorists are the "transmission belt" between the abstract general world of theory and specific knowledge required by policy makers
 - b. Theories indirectly, but substantially, contribute to policy making
 - 2. Theorists are more institutionalized in an occupational academic setting, giving them more viability than the intellectual.
 - a. Occupational ethic wrongly commits theorists to objectivity
- B. Theories and theorists don't affect reality; the public and political representation (which often distorts a theory to further an agenda) affect reality. (306)
 - 1. A theory's independent influence is diminished when it migrates to the public sphere.
 - 2. "Structural duality of accessibility and incomprehensibility overlaid with the prestige of objectivity," (304) explains how theories are susceptible to public misrepresentation and political abuse.
 - 3. Rhetorical capital of theories render theories vulnerable
 - 4. Uses example of **democratic-peace theory**: stable and consolidated democracies do not fight each other because of certain characteristics inherent in democracy.

- a. The theory was distorted to convey that democracies are overall peaceful and do not sponsor terrorism.
 - b. Political agendas argued that it is a vital security interest to promote democratization as it improves international stability by expanding the zone of democratic peace, justifying war in Iraq.
 - 5. The fate of theories is out of the theorists' hands because they cannot foresee how their theories will be conceived and utilized.
 - a. Whatever is beyond their control is beyond their responsibility. This also disallows us from praising outcomes of theory.
 - 6. Theorists do not engage in the policy process that use their theories.
- C. Theorists' task-responsibility to look for loopholes, find corrective measures, and then implement them
 - 1. Argues that searching for loopholes that allow political abuse (self-examination) is an ethical requirement of the theorist
 - a. Theory searches for explanation. In order to explain, theorists use objectivity because it makes their theories more appealing in the political world. Objectivity enables policy makers to devise plans and gain public support more easily. Theorists must renounce principle of objectivity in order to make it harder for politicians to abuse their theories.
 - b. Should establish morality over objectivity as the proper way to theorize
 - c. Should not interfere with accessibility as it is a positive quality of theory.
 - d. Should facilitate the understanding of theory by the public
 - e. Should warn the public of theory application's political ramifications as a social obligation
 - f. Because theorists are publicly identified with their theories, it gives them legitimate authority to renounce the objective nature and explain the moral groundwork, since they are most familiar with the theory

D. Conclusion

- 1. Cannot give an univocal 'yes' or 'no' to whether or not theorists should bear responsibility of ramifications of their theories in the real world.
- 2. Task-responsibility is a forward-looking social responsibility to correct the loopholes of a theory that allows political abuse.
- 3. It is more logical to blame the policy makers for the ramifications resulting from using a theory as the justification for a policy.

"Theoreticians' obligation of transparency: when parsimony, reflexivity, transparency, and reciprocity meet" (by Tamar Poulsen)

Citation: Ish-Shalom, Piki. "Theoreticians' obligation of transparency: when parsimony, reflexivity, transparency, and reciprocity meet." *Review of International Studies* (2010): 1-24.

Thesis: According to the moral and social principle of reciprocity, theoreticians have an individual and communal moral obligation to ensure that theory and theorizing are transparent, an obligation attainable and preceded by strong individual and communal reflexivity.

Summary: Theories are far from accurate. Theorists sort and filter data by ideological

inclination and moral conviction, a process that is not transparent. Because social scientists seek to explain patterns and regularity of our complex social world, they are obligated to demonstrate transparency of their own inner state of mind. The moral convictions and ideological inclinations of the *theoretician* enable the process of theorizing. These should be disclosed under the reciprocal obligation of transparency.

I. Introduction

- A. **Transparency** discloses hidden truths of society, explains, and finds causal relations. It is justified by reciprocity as a moral obligation.
 1. The social world of moral subjects must be made transparent by exposing the inner state of the human mind.
 2. Social structure and processes also shape/drive human states of mind
 3. Two levels of transparency: individual, communal
- B. **Reciprocity** is both a moral and social principle.
 1. Moral: treat others as we wish to be treated
 2. Social: understood as transforming actions into interactions founded on mutuality
 3. Reciprocity obligates transparency as a moral obligation of theoreticians to disclose and acknowledge moral convictions and ideological inclinations which enable theorizing.

II. Social science explanation depends, to an extent, on the study of **the inner states of human mind**. Inner states of mind also help shape the social world and human conduct.

- A. Searches for **patterns, logic** of human action, attaching meaning to objects and subjects as well as action in a **complex, incoherent world**.

- B. Theorists search for regularities of the inner state of the human mind by examining beliefs and desires of people. This renders the human mind transparent.
- III. The unbridgeable gap between theoretical and social worlds. (10)
- A. Rationality drives us to search for patterns and coherence that don't exist, enabling us to plan and map ahead for the real incoherencies of the social world.
 - B. Bridging the gap establishes the existence of moral commitments and ideological inclinations
- IV. Constructing theory
- A. Fundamental factor of constructing theoretical explanation is the theorist's
 - inner state of mind
 - i. Examine theory as a heuristic instrument. Self-reflection generates self-improvement. Theorist will draw lessons and amend the construction of theory.
 - C. Parsimonious nature of theory – Ish-Shalom has a loose interpretation of parsimony: selecting the simplest and sparsest form of an explanation
 - D. By focusing theory on **moral convictions** and **ideological inclinations**, theorists justify bridging between complex social reality and parsimonious, patterned theory (The simplest explanation used is the one that is chosen based on moral factors and ideological inclinations.)
- IV. Theory gets real (11-14)
- A. Theory can provide political actors with the tools to struggle against what they deem unwarranted socio-political processes. Self-refutation. Ex: Robert Putnam's theory of the decline of social capital allowed him to develop civil organizations that battled the decline.
 - B. Can be mobilized by policymakers and devise policies. Ex: Kennedy and modernization as a means to establish a positive relationship with Latin America, Nixon/Kissinger and the theory of balance of power leading to semi-tri-polar global powers.
 - C. Theories can shape the public's understanding of politics and the world - from academia to public sphere. Ex: democratic-peace theory dominated and distorted by middlemen (think tanks)
- V. Reciprocity, transparency, and strong reflexivity
- A. Nature and origins of principle of reciprocity
 1. Reciprocity is a generator of social interactions as well as a justification for establishing duties/obligations
 2. Crucial component in constructing theories of society, political, ethics
 3. Transparency is morally obligated by reciprocity, interactions

founded on mutuality

4. There is negative reciprocity. i.e. military retaliation against state

5. Does not guarantee identical reactions

6. Ish-Shalom refutes argument that the role of an actor may invalidate the principle of reciprocity, such as a parent feeding their child. Says that the modes that carry out reciprocity may be shaped by social context. Identical responses are not expected, and different social roles don't obviate reciprocity. Acts of reciprocity must be practical based on the role.

B. Prerequisite for transparency: strong reflexivity with its weaknesses and limitations. Two levels of strong reflexivity – individ. And communal

“Theory as Hermeneutical Mechanism” (by Steven Darbes)

Bibliographical Citation:

Ish-Shalom, Piki. “Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: The Democratic-Peace Thesis and the Politics of Democratization”. *European Journal of International Relations*, 2006, Vol: 12, pp. 565-598.

Summary: When theories migrate to public sphere, they become simplified and taken for granted, and then politicized for use in political agenda. This explains the influence of the Democratic peace thesis on politics.

Paper Outline:

I. Introduction (p. 565-569)

- a. Thesis: The influence of the democratic-peace thesis on policy can be explained through a “new understanding of theory: as a hermeneutic mechanism of attaching meaning to political concepts”. (p. 566).

II. Theoretical Framework (p. 568-575)

- a. Theoretical Constructs - Theories explain but also give meaning to political phenomenon and become *theoretical constructs*.
 - i. Theories are more than “mere explanations: they offer comprehensive readings of the phenomena under investigation”.
 - ii. Thus a theory “endows” the political thought with “meaning”.
 - iii. This is the “first stage of the hermeneutical mechanism”
- b. Public Conventions - *Theoretical constructs* migrate to public sphere and become *public conventions*, simplified “background knowledge” taken for granted that shapes behaviors and thinking.
 - i. Second stage of the hermeneutical mechanism
 - ii. Three changes occur:
 1. Loss of caution and criticism that is “built into academic discourse”
 2. Loss of “probabilistic nature” becomes “law like”
 3. “Laws of logic”, sense of conditionality that determines what is “valid to infer” does not necessarily work in public and political spheres.
- c. Political Convictions - Human agents transform *public conventions* into *political convictions*, a specific, opinionated, view in order to change the political environment and motivate political action.
 - i. Third and final stage of the hermeneutical mechanism
- d. Theory as Hermeneutical Mechanism – The understanding of the theory influences political practice.
 - i. Once the understanding of the phenomena is “framed” action taken on that understanding. The theory can “drive individuals to political action” and is thus a “hermeneutical mechanism”.

III. Democratic Peace Thesis (p. 575-587)

a. Democratic Peace as *Theoretical Construct*

- i. Researchers noticed an “empirical phenomenon: democracies never, or rarely ever, go to war with one another. Two theories were formed to explain.
- ii. **Theory 1: Structural** – the structure of democracies, checks and balances, accountability, slow and complex decision process, allows for peace agreements to be reached.
 1. Stems from ‘conservative outlook on human nature where human action driven by ‘perennial desires’ that drives ‘humans to strive for power’. The solution is to rely on democratic structures to stave off destabilization and concentration of power.
 2. Those with structural view of democracy will explain democratic peace as arising from the presence of democratic structures. Thus democratic peace is easy to build but also easy to dismantle.
- iii. **Theory 2: Normative** – internal norms of democracy, tolerance and openness, translate into external relations. Greater willingness to compromise.
 1. Stems from ‘liberal’ outlook on human nature where human action driven by rationality and while emotions and desires exist rationality keeps them in check. Thus focus on increasing political participation and ‘building the community’ and social norms.
 2. Those with a normative view of democracy will explain democratic peace as arising from democratic norms between states. Thus democratic peace is a long and difficult process but very hard to reverse.

b. Democratic Peace as *Public Convention*

- i. Democratic Peace thesis migrates to public sphere and becomes *public convention*. While first met with skepticism it now has “almost-indisputable standing”.
- ii. This is a result of two factors:
 1. American “collective identity and self image” as leader of the “democratic world in a quest for peace”.
 2. End of the Cold War and a desire to end the constant tension between powers that existed during the period.

c. Democratic Peace as *Political Conviction*

- i. Democratic Peace thesis as *public convention* politicized by human agents and made into *political conviction*. Two case studies.
- ii. **The Israeli Right** – Israeli right wing argues that peace with Palestinians only possible through democratization. Right wing switches between normative and structural theories. This had the effect of stalling for more time to build settlements. Thus the *public*

convention that democracies do not fight each other was transformed into a *political conviction* that the Israeli right could sue for its own political agendas.

- iii. **American Neoconservatives** - democratization seen as means of enhancing US security. Conservative view human nature leads to structural view of democracies and thus the structural theory behind the democratic peace thesis. This leads to policy of military intervention as the means to the goal of structural change to bring about democratization and peace.

IV. Conclusion(p. 587-591)

- a. Theoretical Framework - Theory, as *Theoretical Construct*, gives meaning and provides comprehensive interpretation political phenomenon. Theoretical Constructs migrate to public sphere and become Public Conventions which are transformed by human agents into Political Convictions used to further policy agendas.
- b. Democratic Peace Thesis - Such is the case with the democratic peace thesis which saw formation in academia (theoretical construct), migrated into the public sphere and became simplified background knowledge taken for granted (public convention) and was used by the Israeli right wing and American neoconservatives to further policy agendas (political conviction).
- c. Final thoughts and Implications proposed by the author:
 - i. Challenges separation between researcher and research and "objectivity of the sciences" – as theories can migrate out of academia and the understanding of the theory can effect the action taken.
 - ii. Theoreticians are "active and engaged participants in the sociopolitical world" and thus bear responsibility.
 - iii. Asking Theoreticians to anticipate or consider all possible moral consequences of their theories not practical, yet theoreticians should be aware of the potential for their theories to be politicized and warn the public of the dangers of a "distorted reading" of their theory.

H. Trine Villumsen

"Beyond the gap: relevance, fields of practice and the securitizing consequences of (democratic peace) research" (by Casey Clark)

Bibliography:

Buger, Christian, and Trine Villumsen. "Beyond the gap: relevance, fields of practice and the securitizing consequences of (democratic peace) research." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 10.4 (2007): 417-448. *Pro Quest*. Web. 5 June 2011.

<<http://proxyau.wrlc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.proxyau.wrlc.org/docview/217478061?accountid=8285>>.

Summary: In order to fully understand the relationship between policy and theory in international relations, it is necessary to create a new imaginary based on practice theory. A look at the impact and evolution of Democratic Peace Theory illustrates this necessity.

- I. Introduction: Rethinking IR-Policy Relations (p.2-3)
 - a. The discipline of IR has cultivated the idea that a gap exists between theory and practice.
 - i. This gap is related to the notion that a social scientist must be detached from the subject that he or she studies.
 - ii. This article seeks to avoid the further cultivation of this 'gap' concept and instead answer the question of how the theories of IR relate empirically to the practice of IR. (Villumsen 2).
 - b. The article also suggests a theoretical and empirical alternative to the gap theory that is based on 'practice theoretical' thought and which joins researcher's theories and policymakers practice.
- II. Discursive structures and bridging the gap: two IR imaginaries (p.3-8)
 - a. Imaginary 1: Mind the gap?
 - i. The idea of a gap between IR theory and practice is the most prevalent concept of IR-policy relations and modern theorists argue that it has become increasingly hard for information to traverse this gap.
 1. This can be construed as a positive phenomenon because the work of theorists consequently has an air of independence from political influence.
 2. This is also a negative phenomenon in some respects, as it keeps certain knowledge from ever reaching policy makers, and is inherently self-contradictory in its nature: knowledge cannot be independent if it subsequently becomes part of the world studied.

- ii. “The Gap imagery presupposes a ‘logic of diffusion’: a logic, in which knowledge is produced independently from its objects in a scientific sphere and then transported or diffused as readymade knowledge in a package to policy” (Villumsen 5).
 - b. Imaginary 2: A discursive structure?
 - i. The conventional division between science and philosophy is a socially constructed dichotomy and inherently flawed.
 - 1. Scientific knowledge cannot be fully objective- even the question of what a scientist should study is inherently shaped by social structure.
 - ii. In the social sciences the subjects of study are knowing subjects, which has the propensity to lead to self-fulfilling prophecies which in turn often have dire consequences in security situations.
 - 1. “Securitization leads to a ‘normative dilemma’ for the researcher, which consists of how to speak about security when security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes” (Villumsen 7).
 - c. Challenges for a new imagery
 - i. These two classifications of the relationship between science and policy necessitate the existence of a third imaginary in order to account for the gaps in knowledge presented in the first two imaginaries.
 - 1. The authors suggest a more sociological focus on social practices as a way to conduct a concrete analysis of how the normative dilemma of security plays itself out.
- III. Entangling for untangling: the social practices of IR and security policy (p.8-13)
- a. The third imagery should be developed from practice theory, or a family of theories that emphasizes how practice is important.
 - b. The practice theory vocabulary:
 - i. Pierre Bordieu’s work provides a good starting point to create the third imaginary but must be supplemented and adjusted.
 - 1. His theory places practice at the center of analysis, emphasizes the study of social sciences and argues that both theory and practice are social practices.
 - a. Bourdieu categorizes science as theory-practice and politics as practice-practice.
 - ii. Fields and webs of practice
 - 1. Social space webs of practice are called a field. The concept of a field provides insight into how certain practices uphold doxic understanding.
 - iii. Power, capital, resources

1. Actors need power in order to engage in and stabilize webs of practice. In this case, power is defined as being in possession of different types of capital.
- iv. Towards a practice imaginary
 1. The third imaginary rests on the assumption that practice-practice and theory-practice are in the same practice web and therefore connected to each other.
- IV. The practice perspective in practice: the field of democratic peace and practice (p.13-23)
 - a. The assumption of peaceful inter-democratic relations is widely accepted and has clearly impacted global politics. Its success lies in its ability to migrate outside of the sphere of academia and into practice.
 - b. Manufacturing the democratic peace:
 - i. "By creating a relation between a form of regime and peace, researchers created certainty about the relationship between a certain type of countries: democracies" (Villumsen 16).
 1. Consequently, the uncertainty between democratic and non-democratic countries was also increased.
 - c. U.S. Foreign Policy and the democratic peace
 - i. The Democratic Peace Theory found its way into all major national security policy documents in the 1990s and became the cornerstone of security rationale. It has since remained a constant in US Foreign Policy.
 - ii. The theory offered a chance for the US to unify its foreign policy around a single concept and make democratization into a necessity.
 - d. NATO's new strategy: the transnational institutionalization of the democratic peace
 - i. In NATO, the theory came to institutionalize the shift from peace to security.
 1. Democracy became the most viable way to create peace in security and eventually the link between democracy and security became a part of the military strategy of NATO.
 - e. Democratic Peace, theory, practice and securitization
 - i. By making the democratic peace theory a 'fact', researchers managed to establish a web of democratic peace practice. At the same time however, the normative dilemma came into play, and they also created a new security threat in the form of non-democratic nations.
- V. Conclusion: towards reflexive scholarship in the field of security (p.23-25)
 - a. In order to explore how theory and practice are related, it was necessary to create a third imaginary in the form of a practice theory. Furthermore, IR and politics must be understood as social practices in

loosely structured webs of practice in order to be successfully comprehended.

"Capitalizing on Bourdieu: Boundary-setting, agency, and doxic battles in IR" (by Casey Clark)

Bibliography:

Villumsen, Trine. "Capitalizing on Bourdieu: Boundary-setting, agency, and doxic battles in IR." Paper presented at ISA 2011, Montreal. *All Academic Research*. Web. 5 June 2011.

<http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/5/0/0/1/9/pages500198/p500198-1.php>.

Summary: This article seeks to utilize Bourdieu's sociological theory, specifically his capital-field-agency nexus, to better explain European Security Theory and the changes that it underwent in the wake of the Cold War.

- I. Introduction (p.2-5)
 - a. European Security underwent a profound transformation at the end of the Cold War and there existed a conflict between IR theory and practice.
 - i. "a Bourdieasian practice approach that focuses on the capital-field-agency nexus can serve as a framework for understanding the under-exposed connection between theory and practice in European security in the 1990s." (Villumsen 2)
 - b. In the context of International Relations, the concept of capital is defined as anything that allows access to a field for different types of agencies.
 - i. Sensitivity to capital helps to select agency and establish participation in a specific field as well as define the hierarchy of agencies within said field
- II. Bourdieu in IR: a growing research program (p.5-10)
 - a. Bourdieu's theories open the discussion of how to include a sociological dimension in IR; how to understand actors beyond states and power beyond traditional military and material power
 - i. Doxic practice
 1. Bourdieasian analysis infers that current international structures of global life are constructed, not naturally occurring. Therefore, a sovereignty based view of the world does not necessarily equate with truth.
 - a. Misrecognized domination is what makes security communities possible.
 2. In Russian-Atlantic relations, peaceful means of action have become doxic practice and military action unthinkable.

- ii. Security agents: Bourdieusian theory can be used to expand the primary actors from solely states to include experts and private military companies.
 - 1. Opens the field to 'insecurity professionals' and removes political control over what security means.
 - iii. The configuration of a field "depends on the types of valued capital and the doxic practice upholding it." (Villumsen 8)
 - 1. Unlike traditional IR theory, Bourdieasian theory accounts for the cultural strategies for security that have been at work for the past decade.
 - 2. Military and material power are still significant but have been repositioned in the broader cultural field of security.
- III. A capital framework for IR: the field, its capital and doxic battles (p.10-27)
 - a. All societal activities can be understood as playing out in a field, or "a domain of social life that has its own rules of organization, generates a set of positions and supports the practices associated with them." (Villumsen 12)
 - b. International fields: The idea of an international field can bring aspects of the theory into focus while remaining agnostic to the existence of a meta-field in international security.
 - c. Boundary-setting and Agency Selection
 - i. Capital allows us to set boundaries and select recognized agency in the course of empirical analysis.
 - 1. Traditional IR theory gives the most power to the security elites and doesn't account for newcomers and struggles over boundaries.
 - ii. Bourdieu's theory is more sympathetic to the role of non-state actors, such as Think Tanks, and accounts for their entry into and access to high ranks of the field.
 - d. Capital: The possession of capital is important for gaining access into a field and for explaining the hierarchy of a field.
 - i. Capital is what gives an agency power and influence in a field.
 - e. Capital-Field-Agency: An 'Action Framework' for Studying Change in International Fields
 - i. It is important to analyze how agents mobilize capital in their quest for centrality in a specific field.
 - ii. Doxic battles
 - 1. The most change occurs when the existing doxa has lost its power in the field and strategic moves such as conversions, redefinitions and the advent of newcomers occur as states try to exert their capital in order to gain the power to impose their own doxa.
 - a. In this context, doxa is defined as the faith or belief in the presuppositions of a field.

2. Capital became a tool in the hands of agents in the struggles for a redefinition of a doxa, which had lost its capacity to structure the struggles in the field.
- IV. Conclusion (p.27-28)
- a. After the Cold War, theory and practice were re-conceptualized as types of agents in a power struggle which helped reshape doxic understandings in the field.
 - i. The capital framework pushed people into thinking about how theory and practice can work together within a field.
 - b. The default selection of states and security elites in mainstream IR relied mainly on doxic practices in European Security prior to the end of the Cold War
 - i. The changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War made this reliance on doxic practices an invalid starting point for understanding fields, and Bourdieu's theories were utilized as an alternate starting point for comprehension.

I. Ole Wæver

“Towards a Political Sociology of Security Studies” (by Clare Fletcher)

Literature Academic Outline

Ole Wæver “Towards a Political Sociology of Security Studies” (2010), *Security Dialogue*, 41: 6, 649-658

Summary: This article suggests an analysis of the sociology of security studies like the connection between academe and policy and the context of scholars’ choices and motives in order to aid continual innovation of ideas.

Introduction – We should take a sociological approach to security studies

- a. Security studies now has a chronological history of itself (Buzan & Hansen, 2009), but a proper *sociology* of international security studies would explain how factors interact. (650)
- b. “One has to work inside-out, starting with scholars in their immediate social context, which is mainly other scholars in relation to whom they act strategically, then adding as a second layer, their working conditions, funding and academic institutions, and then finally larger political and economic processes.” (650-651)
- c. At least three kinds of analysis need to be developed and connected: interaction of scholars with policymakers, interactions within the circle of specialists (hierarchies, alliances and conflicts), and finally the relationship to different university disciplines. (653)

Body – How international security studies was carved out as a domain – institutionalization?

- a. International security studies emerged in the 1940s as an independent field, establishing civilian expertise on defense and defining security as a new concept of “military-plus”. (651-652)
- b. This knowledge was primarily a political expertise and only partly an academic specialty. So, internally, the struggle for policy influence was crucial. (652-653)
- c. In the 1970s, international security studies obtained its own formalized institutions like journals and associations, accepted knowledge stemming from both academic authority and expert status in policy. (653)

- d. International security studies got sucked into international relations in the 1970s during its phase of institutionalization. But there are differences. Although international relations is primarily theoretical, security theory derives legitimacy from relevance and policy work. (654)
- e. 'Optimal marginality'= academic innovation and productivity typically happens away from the centre of a discipline. The so-called Golden Age of game theory and deterrence emerged in an interdisciplinary, non-university setting, for example. (655)

Conclusion – The future of international security studies, why study sociology?

- a. Study the social system of scholars, centering attention on networks as regulated through journal editing, hiring, and citations with powerful factors being policymakers, media, and foundations. (655)
- b. Surges of funding often have the ironic effect of diluting integrated fields of scientific knowledge, easier access to funds weakening the need to fight for disciplinary commanding heights. "The risk is real that the present security boom will lead to a multiplication of uncoordinated theories, atheoretical policy analysis and theory disconnected from practice." (656)
- c. Public relevance and intrascientific productivity *can* stimulate each other, but to ensure this would today demand a high degree of self-reflective research informed by sociology of science. (656)

Main themes: sociology of science, institutionalization/funding, theory vs relevance

“International Relations Scholarship Around the World” (by David Layne)

Note: This text was not available and the below outline was thus derived from Google Books and reviews.

Tickner, Arlene B., and Ole Wæver, eds. *International Relations Scholarship around the World*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009

- It seems the reason for Wæver and Tickner's compilation of region specific IR articles is the idea that international relations theory “tends to gravitate to a number of theories ‘made in the U.S.’” and that access to the field of IR is asymmetrical between a defined “privileged core” of the scholarship surrounding IR and a “periphery” of what could be described in a Western bias as “less influential” contributors.
- There is a “canonization” of the core of current IR scholarship is not simply represented by a current “geographically defined frontrunner” but rather is the local product of a particular “geo-epistemological perspective” and the editors' goal is to challenge this perspective and show what IR truly is and can be.
- According to the editors, a better view of IR would recognize the discipline as an intellectual AND SOCIAL phenomenon and that political and social environments alike influence scholarship due to various “rules, rivalries, regulations”, etc. that are region, nation, or socioeconomic condition-specific.
- The editors go on to critique some theoretical approaches to IR as well because they promote IR as an “American social science” (3)
- They maintain that the field is moving “slowly and reluctantly” towards increasing sociological reflexivity, without the core/periphery structure that is currently engrained in it.
- They then go on to describe to relatively novel theoretical approaches: post-colonial theory and a theory of sociology of science in IR.
- Post-colonial theory is used to explain (as far as I can gather at least) the current prevailing “core/periphery” structure. The editors provide the example of how security studies almost canonize or at least emphasize disproportionately the impact of East/West warfare, while neglecting or downplaying North/South war and South/South conflict. I found it interesting how they go on to mention how scholars when describing E/W conflicts choose to call them “wars” whereas when N/S conflicts or S/S conflicts are described, we often call it “terrorism”. The editors are concerned that this shows how scholars have thus placed “southern resistance movements” on a “lower moral scale than Western war”.
- This is as far as Google Books will take us, it would be helpful to examine some of the actual case studies to see if they do indeed support what the editors describe as a fundamental problem in the current study of International Relations.

Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. 2007. "After the return to theory: the past, present and future of security studies." In *Contemporary Security Studies*, Alan Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 383-402.

"After the return to theory: the past, present and future of security studies" (by David Layne)

Note: This text was not available and the below outline was thus derived from Google Books and reviews.

Wæver, Ole. "After the return to theory: the past, present and future of security studies." (2007, with Barry Buzan), in Alan Collins (ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford University Press, 383-402.

- The 60's and 70's have been labeled by Buzan and Wæver as "the Golden Age of Security Studies", where the understanding of security became based on *national* security.
- Wæver suggests that in the 40's the concept of security came into the limelight, becoming the "guiding idea after previously supreme ideas like defense and national interest" (I am not sure how Wæver endeavors to separate those three ideas"
- Wæver was also cited for noting that in the 50's and 60's, the concept of national security led to the formation of the subdiscipline of security and strategic studies out of a previously "heterogeneous ensemble of military historians and history, weapons specialists, physicists, international lawyers, social theorists and political scientists."

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All requests, questions, and comments should be directed to

James G. McGann, Ph.D.

Senior Lecturer, International Studies

Director

Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program

The Lauder Institute

University of Pennsylvania



About TTCSP

Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program

The Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) of the Lauder Institute at the University of Pennsylvania conducts research on the role policy institutes play in governments and civil societies around the world. Often referred to as the “think tanks’ think tank,” TTCSP examines the evolving role and character of public policy research organizations. Over the last 30 years, the TTCSP has developed and led a series of global initiatives that have helped bridge the gap between knowledge and policy in critical policy areas such as international peace and security, globalization and governance, international economics, environmental issues, information and society, poverty alleviation, and healthcare and global health. These international collaborative efforts are designed to establish regional and international networks of policy institutes and communities that improve policy making while strengthening democratic institutions and civil societies around the world.

The TTCSP works with leading scholars and practitioners from think tanks and universities in a variety of collaborative efforts and programs and produces the annual Global Go To Think Tank Index that ranks the world’s leading think tanks in a variety of categories. This is achieved with the help of a panel of over 1,900 peer institutions and

experts from the print and electronic media, academia, public and private donor institutions, and governments around the world. We have strong relationships with leading think tanks around the world, and our annual Think Tank Index is used by academics, journalists, donors and the public to locate and connect with the leading centers of public policy research around the world. Our goal is to increase the profile and performance of think tanks and raise the public awareness of the important role think tanks play in governments and civil societies around the globe.

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Pennsylvania in 1740 to push the frontiers of knowledge and benefit society by integrating study in the liberal arts and sciences with opportunities for research and practical, pre-professional training at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Penn is committed to meeting the full-demonstrated need of all undergraduates with grant-based financial aid, making this intellectually compelling integration of liberal and professional education accessible to talented students of all backgrounds and empowering them to make an impact on the world.

TTCSP Recent and Forthcoming Publications:

Think Tanks: The New Knowledge and Policy Brokers in Asia (Brookings Press and Asian Development Bank Institute, 2019) <https://www.brookings.edu/book/think-tanks/>

Trends and Transitions in Security Expertise from Deterrence to Climate Change and Back Again (Routledge, 2017) <https://www.routledge.com/Global-Trends-and-Transitions-in-Security-Expertise-From-Nuclear-Deterrence/McGann/p/book/9781138304000>

Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and the Emerging Power Policy Networks (MacMillan, 2017) <https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9783319603117>

Think Tanks and Emerging Power Policy Networks (MacMillan, 2017) <https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9783319719542>

The Fifth Estate: Think Tanks Public Policy and Governance (Brookings, 2016) <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/chapter-one-the-fifth-estate.pdf>

Think Tanks and SDGs: Catalysts for Analysis, Innovation and Implementation (TTCSP 2015) <http://www.lulu.com/shop/james-mcgann/think-tanks-and-sdgs-catalysts-for-analysis-innovation-and-implementation/paperback/product-22563604.html>

How Think Tanks Shape Development Policies (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014) <http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15244.html>

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