IMPOSSIBLE TERRAIN: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF POLICING IN ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY

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IMPOSSIBLE TERRAIN: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF POLICING IN ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY

To my parents,

Grant Bolan Young

1954-2013

&

Marie Nanette Young-Little

1956-2017

Acknowledgements

Looking over this work now, it seems funny that I should be the only author listed, as I'm sure I couldn't find a single sentence in this dissertation that did not in fact originate in a concrete exchange or encounter with someone else. This of course is not to presume that anyone else would want their name associated with this work. It is only to recognize that many thanks are in order.

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ABSTRACT

IMPOSSIBLE TERRAIN: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF POLICING IN ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY

Joseph Lee Young

Adriana Petryna and Deborah Thomas

In this dissertation, *Impossible Terrain: An Ethnography of Policing in Atlantic City, New Jersey,* I develop a novel conceptualization of the "productivity of policing" in Racial Capitalism. My analysis is in part structured by a problematization of the common tendency within Police Studies scholarship to pose social fragmentation and differentiation as somehow *antithetical* to the police mandate, that they are *encountered* by police as a problem, rather than *generated* by policing as one of its very products. To develop this critique, a deploy a "historically attuned ethnography" of the historical-material *facticity* of racialization to show how the durable racial geographies of Atlantic City have in large measure been generated through police practice. I then mobilize the analytic of Racial Capitalism to demonstrate how processes of spatio-racial differentiation have been, and remain, essential to the development of the resort economy since its emergence in the late 19th century. I conclude by arguing for a theorization of policing as a flexible principle of racialization underwritten by sovereign violence that is *intrinsic*, rather than incidental, to the processes of capital value creation and accumulation under racial capitalism. This work draws on over 18 months of intensive ethnographic fieldwork with the Atlantic City Police Department, including hundreds of hours of ride-alongs with patrol officers. I also draw on

various archival and media resources to situate my analysis. A timely contribution to the bourgeoning Anthropology of Policing, this work engages several diverse bodies of scholarship, including Police Studies and Critical Criminology, Critical and Black Geography, Critical Race and Ethnic Studies, Urban Ethnography and the Anthropology of the State. The work also makes important contributions to critical genealogies of policing and liberal governance, as well interventions into ongoing debates within Marxian scholarship on theories of value and the bourgeois state.

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Prologue: Impossible Terrain

"What researcher doesn't want an island?"

The dissertation project that I proposed nearly three years ago was to involve "an ethnographic investigation of the implementation of a novel risk-based policing technology, Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM), by the Atlantic City, New Jersey Police Department (ACPD)." I did not write that dissertation. I had every intention to when I moved to Atlantic City in early 2017 to begin fieldwork. But as is often the case with ethnographers first entering the field, and probably even more often the case with people who travel to Atlantic City, things didn't come together quite as I'd planned once I got there. Within a few months of moving to "AC" (as the locals call it), a primary preoccupation of my fieldwork had become figuring out *why* the thing that I had intended to study had largely failed to materialize. Don't worry—this dissertation is not a meta-ethnography about how fieldwork falls apart. All the same, it will be useful to provide a bit of background concerning the project that I intended to do, how it didn't work out, and how it eventually evolved into the project that I did do. I'll begin with a word on the thing that brought me to Atlantic City.

Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM) is one among several so-called "predictive policing" technologies currently available to law enforcement agencies. Policing data analytics has become something of a boom industry in recent years. The Department of Justice has invested heavily in these technologies as part of a larger reform agenda geared toward the development of "evidence-based" and "data-driven" approaches to law enforcement. Proponents celebrate these trends as emblematic of the "smart" governance principles of

proactive risk management and optimized resource allocation, while dissenters voice concerns over the potential for these technologies to reinforce entrenched practices of racial profiling. In response to these apprehensions, the creators and advocates of predictive policing technologies have tried to demonstrate how these *technical* innovations can be deployed to address, and redress, the eminently *political* problem of racial discrimination within the criminal justice system.

The RTM slogan, "Places, not people," is intended to signal just such an aspiration. For the developers of RTM, 'places' refers simultaneously to the type of data used to generate crime forecasts and the police interventions that they inform. In contrast to crime prediction approaches that draw on socio-demographic or social network data, RTM is designed to ascribe crime risk not to individuals or social groups, but instead to "criminogenic environments" defined by the clustering of infrastructural features that are statistically correlated with crime. These risk distributions are represented on a virtual map, or "risk terrain." The risk terrain then informs crime prevention strategies that are targeted at modifying the built environment in "risky places." The exclusion of "social" data (e.g. socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, arrest history) from the analysis is presented as a safeguard against the reinforcement of profiling, while an orientation to place-based risk mitigation is intended to signal a shift away from aggressive enforcement tactics that have accompanied other policing methods based on the identification of high-crime areas (i.e. Broken Windows and hot-spot mapping). As one of the creators of RTM explained to me, "Our goal is to teach police to see the city as a risk terrain, to stop seeing suspicious people and start seeing risky places."

I first contacted the academic criminologist-creators of RTM, Ryan Sumpter and Lewis Goodman, in the spring of 2015. I explained that I was an anthropology graduate student interested broadly in technologies of risk governance, and specifically in the bourgeoning field of predictive policing. I told them I thought that RTM might make for a fascinating case study. They agreed. One of the first things I learned from them was that they generally avoided the "predictive policing" moniker. "People think *Minority Report*," Ryan explained. I also learned that they did not think of RTM as a simple black-box computer program for making predictions about when and where crime was going to happen. Instead, they saw RTM as one essential component within a constellation of practices that they gathered under the heading of "Risk-Based Policing." They envisioned risk-based policing as a comprehensive law enforcement model that would entail extensive institutional reconfigurations, both within law enforcement agencies and in relation to the communities that they served. These transformations, I learned, would be centered around the ACTION meeting.

ACTION is an acronym that stands for: Assessment of the risk narrative, making Connections, Task management, Intervention planning/implementation, Outcome evaluation, and Notifying others. The details aren't important here. What matters is that the ACTION meeting is intended to provide a setting for the partial redistribution of police knowledge-making processes across a wider array of "community stakeholders," such that they become more open-ended, participatory, and dialogic. In ACTION meetings, the risk terrains generated by RTM are intended to serve as a forum for collectively interpretating data, defining problems, and developing solutions. As Ryan explained on more than one occasion, "The one thing that all crime has in common is that it happens somewhere on the

surface of the Earth. Geography is the common denominator." Here, the risk terrain provides the common ground, both literally and figuratively, on which the common good can be established through democratic procedures of "evidence-based" consensus-building. As I learned more, I began to think of RTM as an articulation of the core tenets of an ascendant liberal policing reform agenda.

A few months after those first conversations, I told them about my interest in conducting a long-term ethnographic study of RTM in an actual police department. They agreed to help, but it took over a year to come up with a field site where I might actually be able to study RTM "in action." Several police departments had begun using RTM, and Ryan and Lewis had been gracious enough to put me in contact with a couple of them, but nothing came through. Then, in the spring of 2016, Ryan called to let me know that he and Lewis had entered into a "researcher-practitioner partnership" with the ACPD. He was excited. "It would be the perfect place for you to do an ethnographic study of RTM," he told me, "because they're building it from the ground up. They've been using the same CAD/RMS [computer aided dispatch and record management system] since the 1980s, and now they're finally updating it to a brand-new system. And they're going from having zero crime analysis or crime mapping at all to getting RTM. They're starting from scratch, so we'll be in from the ground level. It's ideal. You'll be able to see it go from literally nothing. Plus, it's an island. What researcher doesn't want an island?"

The next month I accompanied Ryan and Lewis to a meeting with ACPD leadership. Ryan gave a brief presentation on RTM, took questions from several commanders, and then proceeded to discuss the terms of the proposed partnership. The first phase would involve gathering data, generating risk terrains, and measuring the accuracy

of crime forecasts. The second phase would comprise a pilot project that would initially be limited to directed patrols in high-risk areas, but that would eventually involve partnering with other municipal agencies and community members to develop interventions for mitigating underlying "spatial risk factors." The Chief agreed to the proposed timeline, but there was one problem. The college student who had been collecting data for the project had completed her internship, and now there was no one to do the data pulls. Seeing an opportunity, I volunteered to take over. That's how I became a "research intern" at the ACPD.

Shortly thereafter, I began making regular trips to the resort to gather crime data into spreadsheets that I would then email to Ryan. By the end of the summer, I had gotten to know Captain X, who was spearheading the RTM initiative, fairly well. I eventually asked him if he and the Chief might be amenable to me doing a long-term ethnographic study of the RTM implementation process. Within a couple weeks, I had a letter of support on ACPD letter head. In the meantime, the department had hosted its first ACTION meeting where the Chief had announced plans for a "full roll out" of the project by year's end. Ryan followed up with a presentation on RTM and then reviewed some preliminary crime forecasts. The audience, comprised almost entirely of officials from various municipal and state agencies, seemed to be on board. My project, it seemed, was coming together. A couple weeks later, I started my last semester of coursework, and by the following February had moved to Atlantic City.

But by June, the RTM project had all but fizzled out. After getting off to a very slow start, the department had finally started a program of targeted patrols and business checks within RTM-designated "risky places." Officers were instructed to document

checks by filling out the "sign-in sheets" that were placed at high-risk places. But it only lasted a couple months, and even when it was underway it was implemented so inconsistently as to make it almost impossible to determine whether it was having any effect. As for community ACTION meetings, which were supposed to occur every month, only three had been held in almost a year. I was still collecting the data and sending it to Ryan and Lewis, and they were still running analyses and driving to Atlantic City every month or two to present updated forecasts to an audience of commanding officers who showed little interest in the project, except for to voice their misgivings about the whole premise. At the same time, the public relations department had issued a couple press releases about the initiative, and a local news outlet had just published a big story on the project. Officers still referred to me as "the guy who's doing the RTM thing," even as I thought of them as "the cops who aren't doing the RTM thing."

Since there weren't many ACTION meetings to attend, or any "place-based policing" interventions to observe, I came up with other things to do. I spent most of my time in the department's new state-of-the-art surveillance center, or hanging out with officers from the IT unit as they worked on getting the new CAD/RMS system up and running, or following Captain X around to meetings, mostly with sales reps from various surveillance and security technology vendors. I was certainly learning things, but I wasn't sure what to make of any of it. Without a research question, I was beginning to feel somewhat adrift. But I was also determined not to waste the much coveted ethnographic "access" that the ACPD leadership had been gracious enough to grant me. And since my access to the department was predicated on a study of the RTM initiative, I couldn't really just abandon my original proposal to start from scratch. And so, I decided to make a pivot.

Rather than focusing on *how* RTM was "being taken up into and transforming police practice," as I had originally proposed to do, I began asking *why* it was failing to do so.

Ryan and Lewis certainly had a lot to say on the matter. They offered several interrelated explanations for why the program wasn't coming together. These included: police are not data literate, and so cannot understand data-driven approaches like RTM; police do not like to innovate because they are conservative; it is virtually impossible to change policing organizations because there is too much "bureaucratic inertia;" police are not given competitive incentives to "think outside the box;" police do not know how to relate what they do to outcomes, and so can't see the benefits that RTM can offer in the way of claiming credit for crime reductions. There is certainly something to all of this, as a substantial literature on police management studies will attest. But even after only a few months of hanging around an actual police department, I was finding reason to doubt the adequacy of these explanations on both conceptual and empirical grounds.

For starters, the idea that police do not innovate simply because they are conservative (i.e. do not innovate) is circular, and so fails to provide any explanation for why this should be so. Likewise, for the more general claim that bureaucratic organizational forms are inherently inertial. As for claims of a supposed "data-illiteracy" or "knowledge-gap," while there is undoubtedly a dearth of higher-level statistical reasoning among police officers, this type of explanation is limited by the fact that it describes policing only in terms of a lack, and therefore neglects to consider what positively constitutes police knowledge and technical expertise. That is, it substitutes a normative ideal of what police knowledge should be for what police knowledge actually is. Empirically speaking, the notion that the ACPD lacked competitive incentive structures,

or that police were not able to "think outside of the box" just didn't hold up to observation. The officers that I worked with were constantly competing with one another for all kinds of things: recognition and accolades from supervisors, scheduling requests, access to highly lucrative private details, opportunities for lateral movement into privileged units (e.g. investigations, the tactical team, Vice), all in addition to aspirations for an eventual promotion. And in many cases, they weren't just competing with one another, but with an assortment of other law enforcement agencies who threatened their tenuous monopoly on private details, and increasingly, routine policing functions. As for thinking outside the box, anyone who has spent much time observing police officers as they write incident reports, come up with charges, establish probable cause, or articulate reasonable suspicion after the fact, knows that they spend very little time thinking *inside* boxes. Much the same goes for data—while they may not meet certain standards of data *literacy*, they are highly data *competent*, if by that we mean that they are able to construct compelling representations and arguments using "data," construed in the broadest sense.

Again, the problem with all of these explanations is that they begin with a normative presupposition of what policing should be, and then proceed to a description of how police fail to realize that ideal. The result is that actual police are construed solely in terms of what they don't do and what they don't know, and so we learn only what police are not. And, paradoxically, the determination of what they are not is based on a presumptive definition of what policing is, such that actual police officers are revealed to be incapable of policing. What is missing is an account of what policing *does do*, and how such an account might problematize the assumptions that structure both RTM and the broader

liberal reform agenda of which it is a part. It is precisely here that ethnography becomes invaluable.

One day while I was having lunch with the Chief and Captain X, the Chief began lamenting the fact that the RTM project had largely failed to materialize the way he had hoped. He explained that morale was at an all-time low, what with the recent pay-cuts and personnel reductions. This in addition to the ongoing litigation between the local police union and the state, to whom municipal governing powers had recently been transferred through emergency fiscal stabilization legislation. "With all this going on, it's just ended up on the backburner. But I take full responsibility for not getting the buy-in from these guys from the very beginning." I told him that I had been talking to Ryan and Lewis a lot about the problem of officer buy-in, and that I was interested to learn more about it from the perspective of patrol officers. I asked if I could start doing regular ride-alongs to learn more about what they thought. The following month I started conducting two or three ride-alongs per week. I would continue do so for the next eight months. This marked the decisive shift in my fieldwork.

Impossible Terrain: A Tale of Two Cities, Set in A-Small-Town-with-Big-City-Problems, That the State has Taken Over

I don't think I ever found anyone in Atlantic City who would agree that geography is a "common denominator." In fact, the cops, city officials and residents among whom I conducted my fieldwork insisted that to understand the city required an appreciation of just how much geographic difference could be crammed onto one little barrier island. Very early on, I started to pick up on certain curious, but widely circulating spatial figurations

of the city. I'd hear, "What you have to understand, is that Atlantic City is really a tale of *two* cities…" or, "Atlantic City isn't really a city, it's just a small town, but it's got all the big city problems…" or "I guess we're all just the state now…" People would call upon different figuration in different contexts to explain specific problems, justify certain actions, or draw out certain relations. I began to think of these formulations as allegorical mappings that traced partially overlapping but discontinuous historical material geographies. As my fieldwork progressed, I began to attune to how these terrains have been, and continue to be, in large part produced through heterogeneous modalities of police practice.

This dissertation comprises the first part of a planned three-part project on policing in Atlantic City. Each part focuses on a different terrain—"The Tale of Two Cities," "A Small Town with Big City Problems," "Taken Over by the State"—in order to explore different aspects of what I characterize as the generativity of policing. Part I comprises the "Tale of Two Cities." Chapter 1 begins by introducing the "Tale of Two Cities" figuration as it is deployed in the contemporary to signal durable geographies of spatio-racial difference in Atlantic City. I end the chapter with a brief discussion of the widespread tendency in police studies scholarship to suggest that social fragmentation and differentiation are somehow *antithetical* to the police mandate, that they are *encountered* by police as a problem, rather than *generated* by police as one of its very products. In Chapter 2, I take up the question of how an unofficial policy of "two cities, two police" came to be a matter of common sense for police officers in Atlantic City. I begin with a review of the literature on the "police subculture," and then move to a critique of certain tendencies within that literature to undertheorize what I characterize as the imbrication of

the "police commonsense" within the Common Sense, and how this relation is mediated by durable material-symbolic geographies of spatio-racial difference.

In Chapter 3, I argue that an analysis of the *facticity* of racial geographies can elucidate the referential grounds of the common *sense perception* that officers call upon to legitimate an unofficial, though not unspoken, departmental policy of "two cities, two police." Through the rhetorical-performative gesture of *solvitur intuendo*, I show how *facticity*—understood as the empirical givenness of an unchangeable fact—structures officers' own experiences of always *encountering* spatio-racial difference as an alien and implacable burden; as never of their own making, but ever theirs to manage. In Chapter 4, I build on the argument introduced in Chapter 3 that the re/production of the experience of *facticity* obscures the generativity of policing through the occlusion of history and negation of relation. Here I pursue the phenomenological-existentialist notions of facticity as "thrownness" and the "practico-inert field" in order to open up a thematic constellation of affective attunement, historical consciousness, temporality, and the ethical plane of responsibility and disavowal. Chapter 4 ends with a consideration of the limitations of presentist ethnography and the necessity of historical attunement for an adequate theorization of the productivity of policing.

In Chapter 5 I develop a critical rereading of the historiography of black migration and settlement in Atlantic City. I argue that the tendency among historians to reduce the significance of black labor in the development of the early resort to a mere adventitious pool of cheap service labor obscures the intrinsic relations between racialization and value creation on which the mass leisure and recreation economy turned. I suggest a rereading of this history through the analytic lens of *racial capitalism* in order to show how the

production of capital value in the resort required the reproduction of racial difference, such that the dependence on devalued black labor was as much a result of its particular racialization as *black* labor as it was its status as *cheap* labor. I end by arguing that the ongoing creation and realization of capital value in the resort depended upon the simultaneous *emplacement* of the 'Negro servant,' and *displacement* of black subjectivity. This sets up Chapter 6, in which I consider the role of policing in the establishment of racial segregation in the resort, and what this reveals about the generativity of policing in racial capitalism. Namely, I argue for an understanding of policing as a flexible principle of spatio-racial differentiation underwritten by sovereign violence that is intrinsic to the imbricated processes of differential de/valuation, dispossession and accumulation under racial capitalism. In Chapter 7, I return to the contemporary to consider how policing continues to make and re/make spatio-racial difference through vectors of displacement, concealment, and illegibility. In the Epilogue, I provide a brief outline of the planned second and third parts of this larger project.

Chapter 1

Two Tales of a City Divided in Two

Street Signs: Learning my way around

Note—Meatloaf Day

My third trip to Atlantic City, I spend the morning sitting in a bare cubicle in the Special Investigations Unit pulling calls-for-service numbers from an antiquated desktop. As far as I can tell, the detective who helped me log in is the only other person on the floor. Or at least I think he's still here. It's quiet. By noon I can see through the dingy third-floor windows that the shroud of morning mist has finally lifted. It's a sunny day. And it's Thursday—"Meatloaf Day at the Gilchrist," Captain Y informs me, poking his head suddenly into the cubicle. "Me and Chief always do Meatloaf Day." I will come to learn that Captain Y usually knows where his next meal will come from, and that the Chief enjoys this immensely. "That's one thing I love about Billy—the man can eat! But the thing is, I don't see where it all goes!" I'll hear the Chief repeat these lines a dozen or more times over the coming months, always gesturing to the captain's compact, muscular build before looking down at his own great belly and throwing his hands up in good-humored consternation. Today, Meatloaf Day, I'll see this routine for the first time.

"You haven't been to Gilchrist yet?!" The Captain sounds shocked, or at least very disappointed. I remind him that it's only my third time in town. His expression tells me that this is no excuse. "C'mon, you can ride with me. We'll pick up Chief." I gladly accept.

Over meatloaf, I follow what I can of the conversation: a tangled web of credible rumors and dubious official reports, weaving together portentous acronyms with the names

of important people making important decisions concerning the possibility of promotions, the looming threat of pay-cuts and lay-offs, and the likelihood of securing more funding for a state-of-the-art surveillance center. I don't gather much. After lunch we drop Chief back at City Hall for another meeting. I climb into the front seat and we head back toward the Public Safety Building.

At this point, I don't know whether Atlantic City will become a long-term field-site. I haven't requested departmental permission for anything beyond the present "internship." I finagled that only a few weeks ago by extemporaneously volunteering to extract data for a crime mapping pilot project being conducted by a team of academic criminologists. I haven't read up on local history or politics. I haven't learned much about the resort at all, really. But given the town's small size and convenient street-naming conventions—avenues running parallel to the Boardwalk named for the world's oceans and seas, those running perpendicular named after states of the Union—I figure that at the very least I can start learning my way around, just in case. As we come to a red light, I read the street signs marking the intersection: Mississippi Ave and Fairmount Ave.

"Fairmount? I thought this was Baltic Avenue."

"Yeah, they change names when they go from the black part of town," the captain murmurs distractedly while looking down at a text message. When I don't respond, he looks up and apprehends my confusion. "Back when the city was segregated, I mean. They made the street names change when they crossed into the Northside where all the black people lived, so that tourists would know when they were going somewhere. . .You haven't read Boardwalk Empire yet?" I admit that I haven't, and he sighs in exasperation.

"You gotta read it. He's got a whole chapter in there called 'Plantation by the Sea' where he talks about how they went down to the South after the Civil War and recruited blacks to work in all the hotels. He's got another book called The Northside all about the African-American community here, but I haven't read that yet – it's like four hundred pages. But yeah, the whole city used to be segregated. They call it 'a tale of two cities.' You know Stanley Village that we just passed? That was the first housing project in the whole state, and it was all black. After they built it, all the poor whites were like, 'Hey! What about us?!' So then they built Pitney Village for the whites. It used to sit right here." He points back over my shoulder toward the Expressway at a grassy knoll bisected by an on-ramp. "They tore it down saying they were going to make a park, but…" He shrugs, then continues, "That place used to be a complete shithole. It got really bad before they tore it down."

I tell him that Steve, the detective who showed me around the Vice unit on my last visit, had shown me a poster-sized aerial photograph of Pitney from the nineties. He had likened policing there to "shooting fish in a barrel." The Captain nods and continues, "You know who grew up there? Drew, in Intelligence. He can tell you all about it." I respond that I thought he had just said Pitney Village was all white, and that I remembered the detective he introduced as Drew being black. "Well, after the city desegregated it turned black, too. Of course, the whole city's integrated now." Then he pauses, and offers a caveat, "Well, that is, black people live pretty much everywhere now. But you still won't see any white people up there!" He chuckles with this final observation, which I read as an admonition of sorts, something along the lines of: "You wouldn't catch me up there, no

sir!" I nod, appreciating that I've just learned much more than I would have anticipated from asking about a street sign.

Two Tales of a City Divided in Two

In early 2011, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed into law Senate Bill S11, establishing the Atlantic City Tourism District. Encompassing well over half of the main area of the city, the district includes virtually all of the primary revenue-generating properties—the beaches, Boardwalk, and all Boardwalk-adjacent areas up to and including Atlantic Avenue; all of the casino-hotels; the recently revitalized Gardner's Basin area; The Walk shopping district; the Convention Center; the Marina District; the defunct Bader Field municipal airport, the city's single largest land holding and most valuable asset; and all of the main roadways and corridors connecting these various entities. Under the new legislation, all land-use, zoning and eminent domain authority within the Tourism District, along with certain public safety and law-enforcement functions, were transferred from the municipal government to the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA, pronounced *cree-da*). Established in 1984 with the mandate to administer the allocation of casino reinvestment funds to both public and private redevelopment projects in Atlantic City and throughout the state, CRDA is a state agency whose directors are appointed directly by the governor. The new legislation effected a dramatic extension of the agency's governing powers.[1]

The events leading up to this legislation, as well as developments following upon it, will be taken up at length in Parts II and III of this project, but for now it is enough to say that the stated purpose of the law was to facilitate fiscal stabilization of the ailing city

through direct state intervention and increased capital investment within the Tourism District. Shortly after taking office in 2010, Christie had issued a dire prognosis. "Look, Atlantic City is dying," he said. "The question is whether you permit the same doctors to continue to treat the patient or bring in new doctors."[2] The "same doctors" meaning local government, whose incompetence and corruption, Christie was wont to argue, was largely to blame for the city's collapse. Lorenzo Langford, the city's mayor at the time, balked at the suggestion that local representatives were responsible for the faltering economy, pointing to new competition from the extension of casino gambling to other states in the region, the long legacy of noninvestment in the city by the casinos, and the general fallout from a global economic recession. Christie's crisis rhetoric, he argued, was merely a subterfuge for a planned state takeover.

The following year, when Christie signed S11 into law, Langford, in more provocative terms, decried the Tourism District as "modern day apartheid," arguing that it amounted to the state-sanctioned establishment of boundaries between two halves of the city, "one for the haves, and one for the have-nots." In an op-ed, Langford described the South African system of apartheid as one in which "the dominant indigenous people of color were subjugated and controlled by an imperialistic white minority." He asserted that "the creation of the Tourism District mirrors this dogma. The governor and the Legislature have further divided the city into a 'tale of two cities.'" Referring to the history of racial segregation in the resort, he wrote, "there was an imaginary line of demarcation that separated the black neighborhoods from the commercial district and white neighborhoods. Now, as a result of the Tourism District boundaries, real lines have been drawn to replace imaginary ones."[3]

Christie rebuked Langford for "playing to the lowest common denominator," while Senator Stephen Sweeney accused Langford of "racial baiting."[4] But Langford was apparently not the only resident to notice the uncanny resemblance between the new boundaries and the old borders that had demarcated the Northside ghetto prior to desegregation in the late 1950s.[5] And if his allusion to a "dominant and indigenous people of color" being subjugated and controlled by "an imperialistic white minority" seemed a bit hyperbolic, a few facts are worth noting. First, following an intensified period of so-called "white flight" throughout the 1960s and 70s, Atlantic City became what is known as a "majority-minority" city. As of the most recent census, published the same year that S11 was signed into law, the single largest "racial grouping" was "Black or African-American," representing just under 40% of the total population. The "White" category accounted for just over one quarter of the population, followed by "Asian" at 15%, while "Hispanic or Latino of any race" accounted for 30% of the population. Second, as already noted, CRDA directors are appointed directly by the governor. With the exception of one permanent seat designated for the standing mayor of Atlantic City, local representation has remained negligible throughout the agency's history, while elites from both the public and private sectors, including the casino industry, have always been well represented. It may not come as a surprise to the reader that the overwhelming majority of these appointees have been, and still are, white men who have never lived, nor have any intention of ever living, in Atlantic City.

Given this arrangement, Langford's colonial metaphor isn't nearly as strained as it might seem. Besides, he wasn't the first commentator to rely on such metaphorical flourish to characterize the history and legacies of racial inequity in the resort. Nelson Johnson, in

his 2010 best-selling history, *Boardwalk Empire*, had referred to the early resort as a "Plantation by the Sea."[6] A critically acclaimed documentary released in 2000 about policing and race relations in the city was entitled *American Babylon.*[7] Two decades before that, sociologist Franklin O. Smith had published a book chapter on the city's Northside neighborhood entitled, "The Northside: A Picture of Feudalism."[8] In any case, Langford certainly wasn't the first to invoke a "tale of two cities" to index the resort's durable geographies of conjugated racial and economic inequality. Beginning in the early 1980s, in the years following the opening of the first casinos, the trope started to gain currency—particularly among the local African-American community—and quickly became a cliché among residents, the media, and scholarly commentators alike who marveled at the juxtaposition of "bombed-out" and "blighted slums" crumbling in the shadows of gleaming casinos that were attracting millions of visitors per year and generating astronomical profits. While the casinos had brought thousands of new jobs into the city, critics complained that joblessness remained acute, as most of those positions went to people from other towns. And judging by the flat unemployment rate on the Northside, they observed, you'd have never even known the casinos had come at all.[9]

Still, as local historian Richlyn Goddard has observed, the earliest recorded depiction of Atlantic City deploying something akin to this "two cities" motif can be traced back even farther, to the early twentieth century.[10] Sometime in or around 1912, social worker Margaret L. Brett was dispatched to Atlantic City to produce an assessment of need and feasibility for establishing a settlement house there. She published a partial account of her findings in a brief article entitled, "Atlantic City: A Study in Black and White." The article begins, "Atlantic City viewed by the charity worker becomes a study in black and

white. On the avenues are the visitors served hand and foot by an army of blithesome Negroes. In the alleys throng Negroes who are taken care of when necessary, which is often, by the resident whites."

An economy based entirely on a tourism season that was never long enough meant that the majority of black residents who relied on service jobs, and who at the time of Brett's study accounted for "nearly two fifths of the whole [population]," were perennially underemployed: "Irregularity of employment, the most serious problem of modern life, reaches its climax in Atlantic City." Taking some poetic license, she reported, "The Negroes dwell in a state of intermittent prosperity. Always living from hand to mouth and with rents in arrears, they take refuge in the morrow. In winter, they reason with cheerful philosophy that it is the city's duty to care for them." Even so, she lamented, the resort's reputation as an "El Dorado" of work continued to attract increasing numbers of black migrants to the resort every year. "Atlantic City exists primarily for the visitor," she explained. "In his wake came thousands of Negroes and others looking for work of which there seemed to be an inexhaustible supply." Thousands of Negroes and others—to swell the charity rolls and drain the public coffers.[11]

I will return to the early history of black migration and settlement in the resort, but for now I want to underline the terms in which Brett poses "Atlantic City's unique problem of poverty;" namely, as a problem stemming largely from the presence of an underemployed and overly dependent black population. Such a figuration can be read as an inversion of the "tale of two cities" metaphor as described above. That is, rather than identifying white racism and racial injustice at the root of the city's problems, this rendition instead suggests that it is black irresponsibility and dependence that is to blame, even if in

a patronizingly sympathetic register. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this rendition of "the tale of two cities" motif has been faithfully recuperated in periods of economic decline throughout the history of the resort. As Levi and Eisenberg note, "the cheap black labor force was chiefly responsible for the speed with which Atlantic City evolved. In a hundred years the great-grandchildren of that work force would be blamed for the city's near-fatal decline."[12] They were writing in 1979, at the close of the most economically moribund decade in the resort's history. But it was also one year after the opening of the first casino, the success of which had surpassed all expectations, ushering in what promised to be an era of unprecedented prosperity in the resort. Death had been averted, at least for some, at least for a while.

I arrived in Atlantic City to begin fieldwork six years after Christie had issued his grim prognosis. While the city wasn't quite dead yet, by most all accounts the situation had indeed become terminal, and now it seemed much of the blame was being placed on the grandchildren of those same great-grandchildren who had been blamed the last time around. At least this was the impression I got from many of the police officers, public officials, and members of the business and redevelopment communities with whom I spent the majority of my fieldwork time. I heard it countless times, in corner offices and corner cafes, on sidewalks and in squad cars; eyes would narrow, heads would shake, lips would curl: political correctness be damned, if I really wanted to know what was holding this city back! *How is this city ever supposed to get back on track when half the people here would rather get free rent and food stamps than work for a living?! How are we ever going to get our property taxes under control when half the city lives in low-income housing and doesn't even PAY taxes?! Why would anybody ever want to bring their family here when you've*

got to drive past the hood and risk getting shot by a gang banger just to get to the Boardwalk?!

Or, as one local businessman and popular Twitter personality put it, "Where do you see a successful resort that's full of black people?" He had just walked into the front office of a motel where I was finishing an interview with his friend and business associate, whom we'll call Mr. N. Mr. N owns this motel, including the popular lunch spot situated on the ground floor. He also owns several other properties that he leases throughout the city. But he tells me that he is thinking of packing up shop and heading out west. "It's over. Just look at it," he sighs, gesturing toward the window.

When I ask what is driving him out after four decades of running a business (but never living) in the city, he shrugs, "I dunno, crime…?" He answers without conviction, as if my guess would be as good as his. Then, after a pause, he says "But really, I mean, back in the seventies when we got here, there was actually a lot more crime then than there is now."

"So then why now?" I ask again.

He shrugs and smiles, tilting his head to one side. Just then, his elderly mother, who has been sitting silently nearby, calls out in what sounds to me like an Easter European accent, "But they were *white* people!" Mr. N whips around and hisses something at her in a language I don't recognize, and she frowns like a scolded child who doesn't understand what she's done wrong. I pretend not to think anything of it and proceed with the interview. Later, when the other man arrives, we'll call him Mr. J, Mr. N nods toward him saying, "He can tell you what's wrong with this city." Mr. J glances at my voice recorder and offers, "We have a human capital problem." Then, more quietly, "Turn that thing off and

I'll tell you." I turn it off, and he gives the more candid assessment recorded above. Mr. N responds, "See, he can say that. I can't." I am given to understand that this is because Mr. J has what he describes as "A black girlfriend. Not just black. Like *black* black, from the islands." He likens this to the "magic talisman" on the popular reality TV show, *Survivor.* "I can say whatever I want, and I won't get kicked off the island," he snickers.

While people were seldom willing to put it in such bluntly racist terms as Mr. J—or Mr. N's elderly mother—the general sentiment that one of the city's greatest obstacles to renewal was the presence of a large, mostly poor black population was hardly a fringe point of view. Several months before I sat in Mr. N's cluttered office listening to his plans for retreat, I sat in the mayor's conference room where strategies for advance were being drawn up. About a dozen select individuals had been assembled to help "develop ideas [to] solve the most urgent problems facing cities today." The occasion was an "idea acceleration workshop" led by an "innovation expert" from the Bloomberg Philanthropies Mayor's Challenge Program, to which the city had recently applied.

When the mayor (not Langford, but Guardian, who had defeated Langford in the mayoral election in 2013) invited me to attend the workshop, he had told me, "It'll be good for you to see. It's going to be a room full of very smart people who are working at the front lines of our biggest challenges." A few days later, as we gathered around the conference table, it was announced that the attendees comprised "the heavy hitters," the "brain trust." It is worth noting that, of those attending, only the mayor resided in Atlantic City. Of the rest—including representatives from CRDA, city government, several state agencies, a mix of private development firms, utility companies, and construction companies, the local community college and a state university—there were no residents,

though the Police Chief, who attended much of the workshop, was born and grew up in Atlantic City before moving to another township many years ago. These people are tasked with setting agendas and implementing the policies that impact most directly on the lives of residents in the city. Not a fringe, but the "front line." Or, given that they for the most part do not belong to the constituencies whose interests they purportedly represent and administer, it might be more accurate, if more awkward, to say that this fringe forms along the front line.

After almost nine hours of lively discussion—facilitated by countless brain-storming, spit-balling, outside-the-box-thinking, problem-solving exercises—the group decided that the "innovation" to be entered into the competition (for the chance to win five million dollars) would be a smartphone "mentoring app" targeted at black youths in the community. This struck me as incomprehensible, considering that the "urgent problem" as originally posed was the need to diversify the local economy. The following day, as I was rewriting my notes, I tried to reconnect the dots that had culminated in what seemed to me an utter disconnect. I retraced the drift: from an opening consensus that the present fiscal crisis was largely due to an overdependence on a single industry (casino gambling); to a discussion of the barriers to attracting new industries to the city; to the problem of *building* a local "workforce for tomorrow's jobs"; to a discussion of *bringing* a "21st century workforce" to the city; to a unanimous agreement that what was needed was more mentoring in the black community.

It became clear that these iterations of concrete problems simultaneously traced a series of implicit shifts in the frame within which problems were being defined: from one that identified the "problems facing the city" with "the problems facing residents of the

city"; to "the problems facing the city" as "the problems facing the largely unemployed, unskilled, and mostly black residents of the city"; to "the problems facing the city" as "the problems that deter the would-be residents that we are trying to attract to the city"; to, finally, "the problems facing the city" as "the current residents of the city." Rereading my notes, I realized that such slippages had been foreshadowed at the outset by an otherwise bewildering comment made by the mayor during an "ice-breaker" exercise: "Sometimes when I look at the South and see how well they're doing with redevelopment and economic growth, I wish that we'd been destroyed along with the Confederacy, so that we could have just started over from a clean slate." Perhaps the most succinct way to illustrate what I'm talking about here is to present a pair of artifacts that were produced during the workshop, which condense and schematize the shifts I have just traced.

After the first several hours of discussion, punctuated by a few presentations from our "innovation expert," we broke into groups for the first "idea mapping" exercise: "What is the right-sized problem?" The purpose of the exercise was to break down a "big problem" into several component parts through a causal analysis, the ultimate goal being to define a root cause that could feasibly be addressed by a single "smart solution." Each group was provided with a 2'x 3' poster displaying a twelve-cell matrix positioned under the question, "What is the problem?" The twelve cells were arranged into three columns of four cells each. Downward pointing arrows linked each cell from the top-most, labeled "Cause [1, 2, 3]," down the column, with each descending cell labeled "Why?" Three posters were produced during the exercise. I will only reproduce the two that are most relevant to the present discussion, and that ultimately guided the group to the "mentoring app" solution (*see Figures 1 & 2 below*).

"Figure 1" most clearly illustrates the shifts I have described, reducing the problem of a resident population that is "unprepared for 21st century workforce" to a problem of social and cultural pathology signaled by "cycle of poverty." That is, financial irresponsibility, drug abuse, and dependence on public assistance. Their presence contributes to the negative "image of the city" that makes it difficult to "attract talent" from other places. "Lack of desirable housing," it was explained, was due to the high concentration of low-income housing in the city, which depressed the rental market while also driving up property taxes on market-rate housing. "The projects are a HUD problem that we're working on," the mayor assured the group. "But it's not just HUD. Some of these private landlords running Section 8 are just as bad," a code enforcement official responded. "We've got to get the right kind of owners in here, too." With the identification of "Lack of entrepreneurial opportunities," the group returned to the problem as originally stated: "Even if you want to open a business, there is nobody here to hire."

Tellingly, the only column to consider structural inequities, such as the lack of educational opportunities for residents, stalls (after one reduplication) against the impasse of an unfavorable cost-benefit analysis. Apparently, investment in current residents will not generate worthwhile returns. The vacant cell underneath suggests that to ask "Why?" is like asking what makes the world go 'round. Given that it's not worth the investment in current residents, the question becomes how to replace them, or at least "dilute" them, with more desirable people from elsewhere. As the mayor told me on more than one occasion, "We don't necessarily need *fewer* poor people, we just need to bring in *more* working people, people who are going to go out and buy a martini instead of drinking a pint of rail vodka on the couch, or on the sidewalk."

What is the problem?

Residents are not prepared for 21st century workforce

Cause 1	Cause 2	Cause 3
Cycle of Poverty	Not able to attract new talent to city	Lack of training/education
Why? Lack of life skills/ financial management	Why? Image of the city	Why? No early education in job skills/basic skills
Why? Drug Issues	Why? Lack of desirable housing & ~~entertainment~~ living amenities	Why? Cost vs ROI
Why? Lack of mentors ^Positive Dependence on Public Assistance	Why? Lack of entrepreneurial opportunities	Why?

Figure 1: "What is the Right-Sized Problem?[1]"

What is the problem?

SKILLSET MISMATCH

Cause 1	Cause 2	Cause 3
~~Social problems~~ Educational achievement	No Demand/No Motivation	Brain Drain
Why? Need early education e.g. preschool	Why? Job opportunities	Why?
Why? Nutrition programs	Why?	Why?
Why? Trauma	Why?	Why?

Figure 2: "What is the Right-Sized Problem?[2]"

"Figure 2" begins with a bold declaration of "Social problems" as the root cause of a "Skills Mismatch," before scratching that phrase and replacing it with the more modest, or "right-sized," "educational achievement." I was sitting with this group, taking notes as they completed the exercise. The members—two middle-aged women from a state agency involved in economic development, and one young man from the solicitor's office—were pursuing a theme that had become central to the discussion in the hour leading up to the exercise. An observation about the lack of vocational training for high school students who "are just not cut out for college" had prompted someone to observe that, "By the time they're in high school, you're already *way* too late. You got to get to them earlier, *way* earlier. We're talking pre-school." This led to a discussion of "broken homes," which the members in this group had seized upon with much zeal. By "educational achievement," they intended to explain poor individual performance in school. During the exercise, they argued that "children from broken homes can't learn in school," and that the failure to "get to them soon enough" meant that many of these children suffer from "poor nutrition, which they have shown makes it harder to learn," in addition to other "trauma from living in a bad home environment, with drugs and violence," which further encumbers educational performance.

The second column in "Figure 2," headed up by "No demand" and "No motivation," and followed by "job opportunities," similarly stemmed from an exchange directly preceding the exercise. When someone had blurted out in frustration, "The people who live here don't *want* to change the city," the Police Chief had responded, "It's not that they don't want change, it's just that a lot of them have given up hope. We talk about the

thirty thousand jobs we lost with all these casinos closing, but when those jobs left, the unemployment rate hardly even changed on the so-called Northside. A lot of people feel like they've just been left behind." To this, one of the women sitting next to the Chief, addressing the entire group, responded, "So then how do we get them *motivated* to take the job opportunities that *are* available to them, instead of just relying on public assistance?" The Chief sighed and looked at his phone. Finally, the popular phrase, "Brain drain," signals the inability to retain "the talent the we do have," who purportedly leave the city in search of things like desirable housing, amenities and entrepreneurial opportunities, leaving only the dregs behind.

For the remainder of the workshop, even as some participants pulled in various directions, the discourse seemed to always somehow circle back to the basic terms set forth in the "right sized problem" exercise—"broken homes;" "getting to kids earlier to get them out of broken homes;" "changing the values;" "getting people off of public assistance and into the work place;" and so on. Toward the end of the workshop, the mayor cleared his throat and solemnly posed to the assembly that most treasured of national riddles: "Why is it that the Asians, and Indians, and even the Hispanic kids come here and do so well in school, and get involved with the U.N. debate team, and win the science fair, and go on to do better than their parents, but the black kids, they don't get involved, and they continue to do poorly generation after generation?" A hush fell over the conference room, all eyes fixed on the mayor *cum* bow-tied sphynx. Maybe *he* had an answer. A different answer, that is, from the answer that is always already the question itself.

"There was a program I visited a few years ago," he began, "where they told a sixth-grade teacher at one of our worst schools to pick her very best students, who would then

be enrolled in a new summer program that they were trying at St. Augustine Prep, all for free. She chose six students. All of them were black kids—and they were surprised that they were all black, or, um, you know, that they were all from the same culture. And after three weeks in the program, these kids were saying, 'I am really bright, and I need to use my talents to do something good.' One of the kids I met when I visited said his favorite thing was chess, because it was a lesson, 'just like life,' he said. And after four weeks you had kids saying, 'I am smart, and important, and I have a great future.' And by the end of the program they all qualified for enrollment in St. Augustine preparatory school based on their test scores." Everyone at the table smiled. It seemed to me a smile of great relief, and I could feel them smile, without even looking, like you feel it in a darkened movie theatre.

"And you see," the mayor continued, "it gave them self-esteem, it pieced them back together. So then, they can go back and train their own communities. One thing that all of them have in common is location. The question is, how do you do that for all of these kids? How do we get to them with positive role models that can change the values, that can teach them the life skills, and motivate them to make the change?"

It took only a few minutes for the group to think up a "smart solution" to the mayor's pious hope: a smartphone application that would allow mentors to reach kids remotely, at the click of a button, without ever stepping into their neighborhoods. The questions of whence exactly these mentors would be enrolled, and whither exactly they would be guiding these youths, wasn't explicitly addressed, though talk of inviting leaders from black churches and representatives from the local Boys and Girls club to the next meeting (which, to my knowledge, never transpired) intimated the answer. General economic collapse reduced to individual moral failure, perennial joblessness reduced to a

lack of motivation, social dislocation reduced to broken homes. A century-old tale. "But we're linking it to tech. That's the innovation," beamed the state university administrator.

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Two tales of a city divided in two, two ways of figuring the same problem—that a city divided in two is a sick city. The first (to which I have only gestured here with the charge of 'apartheid,' and to which I will return) diagnoses white racism at the root of a long, ongoing history of exclusion and exploitation, oppression and occupation whose contradictions are manifest in a syndrome characterized by chronic, routinized and largely invisibilized suffering punctuated by episodes of acute and spectacular crisis that inflame the parasitic, cannibalistic "other city." The other diagnoses black dependence and social pathology at the root of an incapacity to adapt to changing times, an anomalous developmental delay that, despite all attempts at sequestration within the "other city," tends to generalize into a systemic temporal lag.

Each tale encounters the other as a symptom of the problem that it seeks to diagnose. The former reads the charge of black social pathology and dependence as an expression of the very racism it denounces. The latter reads the charge of racism and demand for redress as manifesting the morbid sense of passive victimhood and entitlement that underlies the inability to move forward. Neither position recognizes the legitimacy of the other, but rather encounters it as an intransigent antagonism; as that of the occupier, the despotic usurper who has no legal or moral standing to govern a city to which it does not belong; or, conversely, as that of the tenant or squatter-occupant whose claims to the city are dubious at best, inasmuch as mere inhabitation, absent the productive relations of

private property, has never constituted an adequate grounds for democratic inclusion, much less self-determination. For each, the ground on which the other stands is not theirs to stand on, as it were.

Such irreconcilable antagonism induces a dissonance in the collective unities presupposed by the mandates of democratic municipal governance—the public, the community, the citizenry, the corporation, the city itself—and unsettles the relational predicates that impart legitimacy to such governance—representation, participatory inclusion, consensus building, stakeholder cooperation—and the values that orient its aspirational horizons—common good, collective will, shared interest, community empowerment, public order, public safety, public welfare. Such fragmentation would be expected to present a series of problems for the police, that municipal agency whose primary Duty, as codified in law, is "To preserve the public peace," and whose official Mission Statement opens with "To promote public safety," and includes the creation and maintenance of "strong community partnerships" as an integral part of its "approach to solving community problems."[13]

For one, the "tale of two cities" signals a fragmentation of the territorially-defined jurisdiction upon which the police authority is predicated. This problem of territorial-jurisdictional heterogeneity became dramatically concretized when S11 ceded the most fundamental powers of municipal governance within the Tourism District to CRDA, while reserving certain enforcement functions for municipal agencies like Code Enforcement, Licensing and Inspections, and the Police. This subject will be taken up in greater detail later in this dissertation. Here I want to highlight a different set of problems that are at once theoretical and practical, philosophical and political.

The mandate articulated above in the Police Mission Statement is radically destabilized by the internal non-identity of the terms "public" and "community" that is performatively induced in contexts such as the Mayor's Challenge, via a negative valorization and delegitimization of *actual* residents and concomitant positive valorization of an aspirational, would-be *rightful* citizenry. It would seem that over a hundred years after Brett declared that "Atlantic City exists primarily for the visitor," the city today still does not exist primarily for the people who live there, at least according to many of those tasked with engineering its future. As plans are drawn up to "save the dying city," the question of for whom the city does, or *should,* exist remains the most pressing political question of the day.

And this provokes a further series of questions for police: Whose "peace" and "order" are they mandated to preserve, promote and protect? And whence the authority to enact this mandate? Does it emanate from below, from the collective will of residents whom they are bound to "serve and protect," or does it issue from above, from those "higher powers" of government who define problems, determine priorities and make policies that the police are obligated to follow? The foregoing discussion would indicate that to answer "both" is untenable. In short, the question becomes, *who is it that the police are policing for?*

Questions such as these have often been gathered under the heading of the "impossible mandate" of policing in a democratic society, one common formulation of which being that in an open and pluralistic society, police are called upon to serve many different interests, and thus "cannot make everybody happy all the time." More fundamentally, the impossibility of the police mandate has been construed as reflecting the

original aporia within liberal political philosophy between individual liberty and the necessity of social order, autonomy and heteronomy. This formulation necessarily holds out the possibility of an articulable and realizable "Common Good" to which individual wills must be subjected for the sake of preserving the greater "Community," which is the ultimate condition on every individual's (social) existence. It is in relation to this "Common Good of the Community" that the ideal of "democratic policing" is formulated. In practice, this requires, at a minimum, the definition of a "community" to be policed, which usually coincides with the territorial extension defining the police jurisdiction, and, if the police are to achieve legitimacy, a set of mechanisms for ensuring participatory involvement in the on-going, reflexive definition of "the common good" (democratic inclusion) which the police are bound to serve, in addition to adequate procedures for holding police accountable to it (the rule of law).[14]

As the foregoing materials suggest, the most obvious problem with this formulation is the assumption of a minimally homogeneous Community for whom the Common Good can be decided. This quandary is recognized in much of the literature on democratic policing and is usually posed in terms of "minority interests." But the problem that I would like to highlight is a different one, though it is related to questions of political dissent and "plurality of interests." The notion of "democratic policing" positions the police as posterior to the establishment of a primordial, self-constituting Community—understood in (contractarian) liberal political theory to be coterminous with civil society—whose Common Good the police are mandated to protect and preserve. At the same time, and relatedly, the construction of the "impossible mandate" suggests that social fragmentation and differentiation are somehow *antithetical* to the police mandate; that they are

encountered by police as a problem, rather than *generated* by police as one of its very products. In the remainder of this work, I will build upon the discussion developed thus far to suggest why this proposition is problematic.

Notes

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Chapter 2

Two Cities, Two Philosophies, Two Police: On Common Sense Arrangements

Two Cities, Two Philosophies, Two Police

It is well over a year after my initiatory Meatloaf Day when I finally sit down with the Chief for our first formal interview. I've already been living in Atlantic City for several months at this point, spending most of my days hanging around the police department, primarily in the new surveillance center or in departmental meetings. Since I haven't started ride-alongs yet, most of my time outside of the station is spent at different public and semi-public happenings: civic association meetings, city council meetings, campaign events for upcoming elections, public relations luncheons and other booster events hosted by members of the local business community. I've interviewed officials from City Planning and Licensing and Inspections, as well as a handful of entrepreneurs whom these officials recommended I speak with to learn more about redevelopment initiatives in the resort. When there's nothing else going on, I take walks around various parts of the city. So, by the time I knock on the Chief's office door in mid-summer of 2017, I've gotten a much better lay of the land, and I've gotten to know several officers fairly well, including the Chief. He calls me in, folds his hands on his desk, and says with a smile, "Okay, Lee, what've you got?"

"I got questions, Chief," I reply, affecting my best TV detective voice while holding up a slim notebook and a voice recorder. He humors me with a gentle chuckle and invites me to take one of the chairs across from him at his desk.

After asking him to tell me about his background, what it was like growing up in Atlantic City, and how he came to be a police officer, I move to a series of questions concerning the unique aspects of policing in Atlantic City. In particular, I want him to explain a distinction that I've heard repeated in most all of the contexts enumerated above; namely, between the *reality* of crime versus the *perception* of crime. I give him an example of a typical formulation of this distinction—an announcement made by the Executive Director of CRDA at a recent business association luncheon: "With new public safety initiatives like the Boardwalk cameras and the surveillance center, ACPD is making great strides to reduce not only crime, but also the perception of crime in this city, which, really, is more important for tourism than the actual crime." When I ask the Chief to remark on this assessment, he begins:

"Okay, yeah, the perception of crime is just as challenging as the reality of crime. And what I mean by that is, if you look at, say, Disney World, or even the Capitol District down in D.C., there are either manmade or natural barriers that separate the residential areas from the tourism areas. Alright, in Atlantic City, there are no barriers. Matter of fact, we have residential areas right smack dab in the heart of our Tourism District. And that, now, produces crimes of opportunity. Because, when you have the haves and the have-nots so close and intertwined together, crimes happen, and then the perpetrators can just blend right in. And that makes it difficult, really, to apprehend, or even prevent some of these petty type crimes from occurring."

I ask him whether the situation of problematic proximity that he is describing is a recent development, or whether it had anything to do with the period of dramatic decline in the 1970s that he had described earlier in the interview.

"Well, we always had those types of crimes, but what happened when casino gaming got here, it brought so many more people. And now you have victims of opportunity and, um, the criminal element, taking place, so—any time you have money, and the casinos are synonymous with money, it's going to breed those who are going to try to take that money. You know, the old saying goes, actually, it's in the Bible: 'The love of money is the root of all evil.' So, there's a spin-off now of thefts, robberies, prostitution, drug use, drug dealing—you can't separate those from the gaming industry. They're all intertwined."

The conversation moves to a discussion of the failure of the casinos, through CRDA, to reinvest in the city over the past four decades, which the Chief tells me has ultimately led to the city's present fiscal crisis. I ask him, given the relationships he has suggested between crime and economic hardship, wealth inequality, and public disinvestment, to describe his philosophy of policing, and how policing fits into this larger political-economic context.

"Okay, now, Atlantic City, I always call it—we're a 'tale of two cities,' okay. We have major urban issues like any other urban city in the state of New Jersey. We have shootings, we have murders, and everything else, there's poverty, everything that goes along with that, we have to deal with that, and have a policing strategy for that. But at the same time, we also have to have a tourism policing strategy to deal with the twenty-four million visitors who visit our town every year. And so, from my perspective, there's two different philosophies there. When you're dealing with your tourism population, it's a high visible police presence that you need. That uniformed presence, foot patrols, bike patrols, so that when folks come here, I mean, you look up, you see a police officer, you feel safe,

and actually, you are safe. And then, so there's not too much of a crime suppression strategy with that. It's just having a visible, costumer-friendly oriented police presence. But now, in the neighborhoods, there is a crime suppression strategy, that has to be, um, employed. So, we have to deal with both dynamics here in Atlantic City."

We are only about fifteen minutes into an hour-long interview at this point, when the conversation moves quickly on to other topics: the recent state takeover, the necessity of strengthening community support in order to avoid the disbanding of the municipal force and replacement by a county force, strategies for getting more line-officer "buy-in" for departmental initiatives in the context of low morale. I will return to each of these subjects, but for now, I want to take what the Chief has posed as the unique difficulty of policing two cities within a city as a point of departure for a consideration of how the police *appear to encounter* this division as a problem that is not of their making, but that they are nonetheless required to manage. To begin, let's further probe a couple of key moments from the Chief's discourse.

First, there is both a striking similitude and diametric opposition between the Chief's and former mayor Langford's aforesaid depiction of Atlantic City as a tale of two cities. Both describe "barriers" between the "haves and the have-nots," but whereas Langford had objected to the *presence* of such boundaries, for the Chief, it is the *absence* of these barriers that presents a problem for police. Furthermore, in posing this specifically as a policing problem, the Chief implicitly positions the police as surrogate for these missing boundaries. That is, the police are figured as occupying and holding, or at least trying to hold, the line separating the two cities: the haves from the have-nots, the tourists from the residents, the "victims of opportunity" from the "criminal element." It would

seem, then, that the Chief is confronted with, and embraces, the imperative of *containment*. Moreover, following from the analysis in the previous chapter, it is clear that the Chief's tacit identification of "have-nots" with "residents" is also a racial identification; given the context, it is understood to be the mostly poor black residents whom must be contained.

Then there is the Chief's surprisingly candid admission of "two different philosophies" of policing, which map two different populations and two different geographies of policing. Again, given the context, it would be difficult to read this as anything other than an explicit endorsement of what might be termed a "dual standard." This would, of course, seem at odds with the legal imperatives of equal treatment under the law, as well as the department's own "core values of integrity, respect, service, and *fairness*," as adumbrated on the departmental website. For as the Chief explained, these two philosophies inform very different practices. One strategy involves "high visibility" and a "costumer-friendly orientation," while the other is comprised of the much vaguer "crime suppression." For the present discussion and what follows, it is the latter that interests us. While the Chief did not elaborate the positive content of "crime suppression," we might infer from his contrastive framing that it encompasses something of a negative image of the "tourism district strategies." That is, rather than "high-visibility," it would entail low-visibility or stealth, and instead of "uniformed officers" on "bike patrols" and "foot patrols," it would involve more plainclothes officers and/or specialized units conducting operations that engage modes of mobility and mobilization that are different from routine, community-near patrols. And whatever one might suspect to be the opposite of a "costumer-friendly orientation" intended to signal safety and security, it would presumably involve that too.

A few weeks after my initial interview with the Chief, I began conducting regular ride-alongs with patrol officers. The hundreds of hours of field observations that I gathered over the following eight months largely confirmed that the Chief's "two philosophies" did, in fact, bear out in everyday police practice. But then, to phrase it this way, as the *Chief's* two philosophies, is somewhat misleading, as it risks giving the impression that the Chief personally authored this "two cities, two philosophies" schema. But in fact, by the time I interviewed the Chief, I had already heard this same idea so many times from so many different officers that it had begun to strike me as rote. No one person's model or mantra, the fact that a city divided in two should have two distinctive philosophies of policing seemed common sense, as did the basic strategies appropriate to each.

Of course, one could surmise that the *reason* this was the case was that the Chief had made it so by communicating this policy down the chain of command. After all, as the head of the department, the Chief has the first and final say on setting policies and procedures, just as he is authorized to speak for the department as a whole when addressing various publics. So, maybe everyone else was saying it *because* it's what the Chief was saying. But this seems unlikely for several reasons. For one, the current Chief only assumed his role as head of the department in 2013, and as detailed in the previous chapter, the "tale of two cities" idiom has been circulating for much, much longer. More importantly, among line-officers and sergeants, the opinion that commanders didn't know anything about "real police work" was pervasive. Most often, whatever commanders would say, line officers seemed inclined to say just the contrary, if just to be contrary. This was particularly the case with regard to the Chief, whom many officers, some commanders included, openly opined had been made Chief only because he was black; an unqualified figurehead

promoted for political optics. So, while it is particularly striking to hear the highest official in the department certifying "two philosophies, two strategies," the suggestion that everyone else who expressed this notion was dutifully reciting guidelines set down from the top of the department is not plausible.

The question remains, then, how this came to be an undeclared, if not unspoken, departmental understanding—a matter of common sense. To begin to answer this question, I now turn to the literature on the police (sub)culture and police organizational socialization as developed within Police Studies scholarship. After a brief review of contemporary debates within this literature, I develop a critique of a shared tendency among policing scholars to undertheorize the interpenetration of what Manning describes as the "commonsense theory of policing"—defined as the institutionally delimited occupational culture shared by police practitioners—and "Common Sense" more broadly construed as that which is called upon across diverse contexts to signal matters of natural, incontrovertible fact.[1] I argue that an elaborated conception of *police socialization* can help to remedy this omission. This critique sets up an ethnographic investigation, taken up in the next chapter, into how the police in Atlantic City encounter the *facticity* of the Northside by way of a *common sense geography*—that is, as an historically given, yet paradoxically ahistorical, matter of fact. I will ultimately argue that this represents a partial mystification of the *generativity* of policing which is mediated through a relation of alienation on the part of officers to the material geographies that are in large part produced through policing. This thesis will be developed throughout what remains of this dissertation.

Police Culture According to Police Studies: Common Sense, in the Police Sense

It has long been a commonplace of Police Studies that rank-and-file officers learn by and large from one another, "on the job," as they exercise a tremendous degree of autonomy and are subject to little supervision while engaging in routine duties. A now substantial body of ethnographic scholarship dating back to the mid-twentieth century on police occupational (sub)culture has revealed that the shared beliefs, norms, values and expectations that inform actual police practice are less an effect of top-down transmission through a rational, rule-bound bureaucratic structure, and more an outcome of informal processes of occupational socialization. The upshot of this work is that officers who face similar organizational (internal) and occupational (external) stressors cultivate and internalize collective modes of meaning making that engender common repertoires of practical adaptation. More recently, the police culture literature has been exposed to many of the same criticisms to which cultural approaches more generally have been vulnerable (i.e. the police culture concept is totalizing/homogenizing, essentializing/static, tautological/circular, resistant to empirical verification), leading some authors to argue that the concept has lost its analytic utility, if indeed it ever had any. In turn, still others have contended that this call to jettison the police culture concept *tout court* is overhasty, if not entirely misdirected.[2]

While there is undoubtedly much merit to drawing analytic attention to themes of internal heterogeneity and differentiation, interdepartmental and cross-jurisdictional variation, and temporal changes spurred by ongoing institutional transformations, police ethnographers nonetheless continue to be struck by the rather conspicuous consistency across contexts, stability across time, and durability in the face of institutional and

organizational changes of what the eminent police scholar Robert Reiner described as the "core characteristics" of the police culture. Waddington, summarizing Reiner, writes,

> The core referents of 'police sub-culture' are clear enough: its sense of mission; the desire for action and excitement, especially the glorification of violence; an 'Us/Them' division of the social world with its in-group isolation on the one hand, and racist components on the other; its authoritarian conservatism; and its suspicion and cynicism, especially towards the law and legal procedures.[3]

Whatever the pitfalls of deploying culture as *sui generis* causal explanation for individual action, there remains the unavoidable question of how such cultural reproduction occurs through time and over such vastly different contexts, and what this might disclose about something more fundamental to the modern institution of policing. In my own research, I was regularly taken by the almost comical fidelity of my interlocutors to the clichés of Police Studies. The above noted antipathy towards "the white shirts" or "the brass" (i.e. commanders) is itself a well-documented phenomenon.[4] On more than a few occasions, I was even compelled to ask officers whether they had not just directly quoted from one of the "classics" that I'd read in preparation for my oral exams. The answer was invariably negative, usually with a caveat: "Nah, that's you. I don't need to read about it. I *live* it." Of course, this isn't entirely true.

While I don't suspect anyone of dissimulating a potentially embarrassing passion for reading monographs, to insist on an insuperable gap between "living it" and reading about/studying it is, in this case, to protest too much. From its inception, Police Studies has

been an applied field, one of its primary audiences being police practitioners, administrators, and reformers of various stripes. This means that, whether they realized it or not, the officers among whom I conducted my fieldwork regularly encountered, consumed and assimilated insights and assumptions from this work—even if in an attenuated, decontextualized and modularized form: in the police academy, through ongoing accreditation modules and training workshops, and in the Criminal Justice programs within which the vast majority of the minority of officers who had some college experience had taken courses. So then, the potential for what, following Ian Hacking, might be called "looping effects" between police practice (as object) and Police Studies (as knowledge of that object) is significant, perhaps even more so than with other social sciences.[5] At the same time, as Jean-Paul Brodeur has observed, an almost identical dynamic obtains between Police Studies itself and the larger field of cultural production within which mass-mediatized images of crime-and-policing are produced, circulated and consumed. Both police scholars and police officers are consumers of crime fiction—which anthropologists Jean and John Camaroff have argued is the paradigmatic genre of popular cultural production in modernity.[6] This engenders what Brodeur describes as a "looping in and out" dynamic which composes a "low-definition environment" that comes to be reflected both in the empirical categories assumed by Police Studies scholars, and in the normative images of policing that actual officers draw upon for inspiration, expectation, motivation, justification, and otherwise explanation of their own practices and beliefs.[7]

Such observations have obvious relevance for how police culture is reliably reproduced across such diverse settings. Even in the context of high jurisdictional plurality and atypical localism, as in the United States, the incorporation of Police Studies

knowledges into increasingly standardized police pedagogies, combined with the ubiquity of crime-and-policing fictional forms, would be expected to engender such inter-contextual "family resemblances." In international context, these same knowledge practices have been translated into discursive, institutional and organizational norms (e.g. "best practices") at the same time that the crime-and-policing genre of popular culture has gained a global audience. Such developments have no doubt contributed to what anthropologist Willian Garriott has described as the emergence of policing as a "global form."[8] But for present purposes, this is probably getting ahead of things.

If the foregoing observations suggest that it would be overhasty to dismiss out of hand the police culture concept, a second line of criticism is based on the contention that this impulse has been misdirected. Robert Reiner has argued that the police culture concept as originally formulated in the context of ethnographic research on police (discretionary) practice was never intended as an argument for cultural determinism. Instead, it was deployed as a lens for understanding the context-specific, dialectical interplay between durable socio-historical structures and individual- and group-level patterns of meaning-making and practical adaptation. As such, recent criticisms of the police culture concept, particularly those pertaining to causal hypostatization and cultural essentialism, are ironically very much in line with the position that they purport to undermine.

Reiner argues that contemporary critiques of the police culture concept conflate the original idea with a version that has been "translated in simple form" in "textbooks, secondary treatments, and above all [in] policy debates." He maintains that early police researchers "saw culture not as free-floating ideas developed and transmitted by cultural processes alone, but as structurally rooted in the nature, stresses and strains of police work

in different contexts, as interpreted variously by officers as they sought to navigate the pressures and mandates of their roles." Describing this as a "structural approach," of which he is a proponent, Reiner avers that, "To a large extent, the structural sources of police attitudes or practices that are antithetical to liberal democratic values lie in constant and inevitable features of policing rather than organizationally variable ones. The root is the fundamentally bifurcated mission of policing an unequal society."[9] Even so, for Reiner the point is not to finally overcome the dialectical interplay between political-economic structure and meaningful human experience and action by deciding once and for all upon one determinism over the other. Whichever moment might be determining in the last instance, as the venerable materialist Frederick Engels would have it, in actual history "the last instance never comes." Culture is always already there.

Following from this, the work of Janet Chan, one of the most prominent detractors of the police culture concept, can be seen less as a critical rupture and more as an elaboration of the structural-dialectical approach initiated over half a century ago by scholars like William Westley and Jerome Skolnick. Chan has proposed a more dynamic, heterogeneous, structurally attuned yet agential model of police culture and organizational socialization based on a deployment Bourdieu's concepts of *field* and *habitus.* For Chan, police culture must be understood precisely as the *relation* that obtains between these two co-constitutive moments of social structure and action. Chan draws upon Sonja Sackmann's work on the "collective construction of social reality" within formal organizations, to argue that the policing *habitus* should be understood in primarily cognitive terms, as the "cultural knowledge" of the organization. Citing Sackmann, she writes,

> Her cognitive model encompasses all forms of shared organized knowledge: 'the forms of things that people have in their minds; their models for perceiving, integrating, and interpreting them; the ideas or theories that they use collectively to make sense of their social and physical reality' (Sackmann 1991: 21).[10]

Importantly, while Chan identifies the police *habitus* with cultural *knowledge*, she is careful to include preconscious cognitive schemata (e.g. "models of perception") that cannot be analyzed in terms of transparent intentional content, and that are therefore characteristic of the unthinking nature of embodied dispositions that Bourdieu signaled with the term *habitus.* Furthermore, the practical adequacy of any determinate *habitus*, Chan notes, cannot be abstracted from the *field* of "structuring structures" of which it is both product and constituent. It is here, in the *field,* that the "historical, structural relations between positions of power" are located.

In the context of her own research on the implementation of organizational reforms intended to improve "police/minority relations" in New South Wales, Australia, Chan notes three crucial "elements of the field." These include, "the social and political status of visible minorities, discretionary powers of the police and legal protection against police abuse."[11] The latter two elements highlight the enduring tension that police officers must navigate between discretionary power and accountability to the law, the ongoing negotiation of which seeks to more or less explicitly define the institutionalized limits on the police authority itself. The first element, by contrast, points beyond the institutionally delimited field of policing to the broader historical and political-economic contexts within which

policing occurs. Chan situates "police/minority relations" within histories of settler colonialism, frontier violence, indigenous dispossession, disenfranchisement and segregation, and white supremacist anti-immigration sentiment. She argues convincingly (and in alignment with Reiner's "structural approach") that reforms tend to fail to generate lasting, meaningful improvements in police/minority relations due to a one-sided focus on changing the organizational *habitus* (i.e. cultural knowledge) without addressing the larger *field* within which it operates. Meaningful change, then, would require a more radical transformation of the *field* itself, both within and beyond institutional boundaries. In the case of New South Wales, Chan argues, such changes might "include the restoration of land rights to Aboriginal communities in recognition of the injustices done in the past," among other substantive commitments to greater equity of resource allocation and political inclusion.[12]

The above indicates that the durability of the policing *habitus*, and therefore the "police culture," is directly related to the *empirical and practical adequacy* of these cognitive and corporeal schemata to the larger material-symbolic *fields* within which the police must operate (e.g. "on the street"). This further implies the interpenetration of the policing *field*, in the narrowly institutional sense, with the wider set of historical, political, economic and cultural relations that comprise the actual contexts of policing (i.e. the multiplicity of more or less autonomous *fields* which constitute the 'society' to be policed). This in turn suggests that the "cultural knowledges" comprising the policing *habitus*, or at least certain essential elements thereof, are not strictly coextensive with the institutional domain of police (i.e. the empirical set of individual persons who work as police officers), but rather necessarily partake of "mental and corporeal schemata of perception,

appreciation and action" that become incorporated and materially inscribed more generally. This has implications for understanding how the processes of police socialization—as the embodiment of the "commonsense theory of policing"— exceed and precede the formal induction of recruits into the policing profession.

Interestingly, in Chan's own work on police socialization, these implications remain decidedly undeveloped. After asserting that "environmental conditions [including] broader societal values, economic conditions, characteristics of the community in which the organization is located, regional norms … [do] influence the socialization process," she proceeds to focus almost exclusively on how changes in institutional configurations engender variations and contingencies in the police socialization process. Her earlier concern with the broader sociohistorical contexts of policing thus recedes, as her interrogation of the shifting police *field* is confined primarily to a discussion of internal organizational and managerial reforms. This restriction is reflected in her temporalization of the police socialization process, which is said to begin with the period of "anticipatory socialization" following the decision to pursue a policing career, when aspiring recruits begin to seek out more information and deliberately "take on values, attitudes, skills and knowledge of the organization." This initial phase is followed by a period of "encounter," beginning in the academy, and finally culminating in a "metamorphosis" of the recruit into a competent police practitioner.[13]

These phases of socialization are derived from Van Maanen's highly influential work on police socialization, as presented in his seminal 1973 article, "Observations on the Making of Policemen."[14] As originally set forth in that article, the first phase of

socialization, "Preentry," corresponds to the "Choice" to pursue a police career. Van Maanen's findings supported earlier literature showing "that police work seems to attract local, family-oriented, working-class whites interested primarily in the security and salary aspects" of the job. While he did not find evidence to support an alleged "authoritarian syndrome" among recruits, he did underline a pervasive desire to "make a difference," as well as the draw of anticipated adventure. After a series of initial interactions with the police organization designed to bolster the recruit's self-esteem and produce a positive impression of the police profession, the successful recruit enters the academy, thereby entering the second phase, "Admittance." It is here that socialization proper begins. As Van Maanen notes, "For most urban police recruits, the first real contact with the police subculture occurs at the academy." Cadets adapt to the alternately stressful and boring environment of the police academy by partaking in the "war stories" that veteran officers tell them, and "it is largely through war stories that the department's history is conveyed."[15]

The third phase of socialization, following the academy, is "Change," which corresponds to the initial "Encounter" with the complexities of actual police work "on the streets." During this phase, probationary recruits are trained by veteran patrol officers, or Field Training Officers (FTO), who advise them to disregard most everything that was learned in the academy. Van Maanen argues that it is this arrangement of patrolman-training-patrolman which facilitates "the flow of influence from one generation to another [and] accounts for the remarkable stability of the pattern of police behavior." During the "Encounter" phase, the FTO serves as a guide to the recruit, to whom, "like a visitor in a foreign land," "the streets appear to be a maze through which only an expert could maneuver." This lack of competence and complete dependence on the FTO, Van Maanen

argues, accounts for why "it is during the FTO phase of the recruit's career that he is most susceptible to attitude change. The newcomer is self-conscious and truly in need of guidelines." This explains why "the recruit begins to adopt the perspectives of his more experienced colleagues." The "Continuance" of this adaptation overtime comprises the final, ongoing phase of socialization, marked by the "Metamorphosis" of the recruit into a fully-formed, competent police officer who has assumed the "final perspective," which Van Maanen succinctly summarizes with the mantra, "lie low, hang loose, and don't expect too much."

Of the four phases, it is the third, "Encounter," that encompasses the most intensive and important period of individual transformation. More than the initial "Introduction" to police subculture in the academy, the "reality shock" experienced by new recruits undergoing training with an FTO induces a radical rupture and momentous conversion. Van Maanen makes this clear when he asserts that, "To a recruit, the whole world seems new, and from his point of view it is."[16] The initiate must rely entirely upon the FTO for guidance in what has become an alien world. Given such a depiction, one might even be tempted to apply the much-abused anthropological cliché, *liminality*, to describe this period of vertiginous transition. And it is here, I will argue, that lies the problem in Van Maanen's otherwise very insightful analysis. His characterization of the recruit as a "visitor in a foreign land" amounts to a problematic misrepresentation, and not in the trivial (and unfair) sense that any metaphor is a misrepresentation. Rather, I want to argue that Van Maanen's portrayal of the recruit in an entirely *new world* results in an overstatement of the degree to which the geography of "the street" is encountered as foreign. This obscures important continuities in recruits' experiences of geography, experiences whose basic contours are

largely formed *prior* to the decision to become a police officer. Such continuity suggests that a thorough understanding of police socialization must account for the ways in which the processes of socialization into the police culture exceed and precede any formal induction into the police profession. It is by attending to such continuity that we can begin to address the question, posed above, regarding the relation of interpenetration between the police organizational "commonsense" and "Common Sense" more broadly construed as the socio-historical relations that are materially and symbolically inscribed in the landscapes we inhabit in such a way that they are typically encountered as *natural*.

Interestingly, this contention is strongly supported by a crucial ethnographic vignette provided by Van Maanen himself. In order to illustrate the sense of utter perplexity and disorientation experienced by new recruits on the street, Van Maanen relays a field observation in which one such "two-day veteran" recalls to several of his fellow recruits an episode in which his FTO directed him to hand-cuff a man suspected of engaging in homosexual activity and place him in his patrol car. Several minutes later, to the recruit's chagrin, the man and his companion were released by the same FTO after being subjected to a thorough dressing down, including the threat of physical violence for any future transgressions. The recruit describes how when he told his FTO that he was under the impression that an arrest was being made, the veteran officer "laughed his ass off and told me that that's the way we do things out here." Clearly, the vignette is intended to signal to the reader how *lost* this recruit is, just as the recruit himself intends to convey to his colleagues his experience of "stand[ing] around feeling pretty dumb." But closer inspection of the recruit's own narrative, particularly the way in which he sets the scene, ironically belies Van Maanen's subsequent characterization of him as "a visitor in a foreign land."

The recruit begins thus: "We were down under the bridge where the fags hang out and spot this car that looked like nobody was in it."[17] While the repulsive homophobic slur is likely what catches the reader's eye, I want to draw attention instead to the larger sentence segment in which it occurs—"down under the bridge where the fags hang out"—closer examination of which, I will argue, reveals a hidden relation between spatialization and socialization which exceeds the institutional context of policing. Recognition of this relation suggests that geography is just as crucial, if more obscure, a medium of conveying police history and "commonsense" as the telling of "war stories."

The first thing to note about this utterance is that the definite article ("*the* bridge") signals what in linguistics is called a *definite description*, meaning that this utterance denotes not just any bridge, but one *particular* bridge. Definite descriptions can be categorized into two general types, attributive and referential, which have distinct functions in speech. As Donnellan explains, "A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing."[18] The function of any definite description can only be gathered from context (i.e. it is not deducible from semantic or syntactical elements but requires a meta-pragmatic analysis). In the present case, the status and/or qualities of the bridge itself are not at issue. Rather, the definite description is employed so that listeners can recognize under which particular bridge the events being relayed took place. This is a referential usage.

It is worth mentioning that the evaluative criteria for determining the truth status of any given definite description will differ depending on whether it is attributive or referential. Linguistic anthropologist, Asif Agha, has characterized this as a distinction between denotational (attributive) "correctness" and referential "success."[19] The important point here is that a definite description which is *incorrect* in the attributive sense (i.e. false) can be *successful* in the referential (i.e. true), and *vice versa*. For instance, in the present case, a listener could reject the attributive truth of the description by maintaining that there is no such thing as a 'fag,' and thus no such thing as a bridge under which 'fags' hang out, while at the same time affirming the referential success of the description by recognizing to which bridge the speaker refers. The importance of this for an understanding of common sense and policing will become clear later.

The second thing to note about the sentence segment under examination is that it represents a particular class of utterance comprising what Emanuel Schegloff has termed "locational formulations." He writes,

> The 'problem' of locational formulation is this: For any location to which reference is made, there is a set of terms each of which, by a correspondence test, is a correct way to refer to it. On any actual occasion of use, however, not any member of the set is 'right.' How is it that on particular occasions of use some terms from the set is selected and other terms are rejected?[20]

For example, in the present case, there are potentially countless locational formulations that in different contexts could successfully refer to the same bridge. The

bridge could be formulated by a proper name (e.g. "Memorial Bridge"), in relation to some other landmark (e.g. "the bridge by the stadium"), in relation to some event (e.g. "the bridge where Bill died"), in relation to a route (e.g. "it'll be faster to take the bridge during rush hour"), and on and on. The upshot is that the selection of any locational formulation requires "work" on the part of the speaker to select the "right" formulation. According to Schegloff, this entails a tripartite analysis of the relations between: (1) speaker's location, audience's location, and the location of the place referenced (location analysis); (2) speaker and audience (membership analysis); and (3) speaker, audience and topic (topic or activity analysis). While it is not my intention to undertake a proper conversational analysis, I want to suggest that important insights can be gleaned from a consideration of the analyses undertaken by the recruit in order to select the locational formulation, "down under the bridge where the fags hang out." The results of such consideration, I will argue, undermine several of the substantive premises of Van Maanen's periodization of police socialization, and by extension Chan's and that of countless other authors who have assumed this general schema. This has important implications for our earlier question regarding the relation between geography, socialization, police commonsense and Common Sense.

A further word on each of these three components of analysis is required before proceeding. Schegloff notes that a key dimension of *location analysis* is an assessment of whether the speaker and co-conversationalist(s) are co-present, and if so, in what sense, or at what scale (e.g. in the same room, at the same address, in the same neighborhood, in the same city, state, country). Importantly, the enumeration of hypothetical locations in the preceding parenthetical exhibits the concentric, hierarchical organization of what Schegloff calls the "common sense geography" that is typically assumed to be shared between

speaker and hearer within the cultural context of the United States. The establishment of co-presence, together with a tacit reliance on this "common sense geography" contribute to what Goffman called interactional alignment, or "footing," between interlocutors, which in turn provides for a frame of locational indexicality (e.g. the meaning of 'here' in the phrase "How long have you been here?").[21] *Membership analysis*, on the other hand, turns on the reasonable expectation of recognizability of a given locational formulation based upon "the categories of members of the society of which the hearer(s), in the first instance, but also the speaker, are members." Crucially, such membership analysis highlights the fact that "knowledge of places is…locally organized." Schegloff explains that, "Although the structure of knowledge of a 'sort of place' may be general and formal, everyone organizing knowledge in the same categories and on the same dimensions, the particulars that are so organized are assumed to vary with territorially-based memberships…The sharing of particulars at one or another of these levels is perhaps one sense of membership in a 'same community.'"[22] Third, and finally, *topic analysis* pertains to "the activity being accomplished in an utterance" and is thus undertaken to help the audience "find the relevant respects in which [a locational formulation] is used."[23]

It is clear that the utterance "under the bridge where the fags hang out" is a locational formulation. The question is, what can we infer from this particular formulation about the "work" that the recruit has performed to select the "right" formulation, assuming that this locational analysis was successful and that his audience did in fact "pick out the right bridge" in "the relevant respect." Perhaps the most salient moment of analysis here is that of membership, given Van Maanen's concern with *socialization* (i.e. the achievement of membership in some social group). It is critical to recognize that the purpose of the

recruit's retelling, and Van Maanen's retelling of that retelling, is precisely to convey that the recruit and his fellows are *not* (yet) police officers, properly speaking. This is essential because it indicates that the selection is predicated on the recognition of co-membership in some other group or community. Based on Van Maanen's profile of the typical recruit, this community is likely comprised of "local, family-oriented, working-class whites." The point here is that the speaker's expectation of recognition on the part of his audience is based in part on the presumption of geographic familiarity stemming from shared *localness*. That is, the speaker is not at all speaking like "a visitor in a foreign land," but rather as a local among locals. This also means that the interactionally achieved frame of co-presence between interlocutors is more likely defined with reference to something like "our city" or "our hometown," rather than institutionally mediated objectifications such as "jurisdiction" or "patrol district."

At the same time, topic analysis requires that the speaker choose a locational formulation for its relevance to the activity being discussed. Since his purpose is to demonstrate his lack of competence in policing matters, the recruit's formulation must achieve some indication of the relevance of the location to the topic of police activities. This is achieved by selecting a formulation constructed in terms of a relation to a specific social type that would be of interest to police. Here, the phrase "where the fags hang out" signals to the hearer the significance of the "car that looked like nobody was in it" as an object of police suspicion. This rendering could be interpreted as an instance of the recruit "adopting the police perspective." But again, given that the point he hopes to achieve is that he has *not* yet learned the police perspective, it seems that the relation between 'fags' and 'bridges' and 'police' is rather assumed to be a matter of Common Sense, and not

restricted to police "cultural knowledge." Schegloff notes that locational formulations such as this that construe a place in relation to the kind of people who are typically located there have a tendency to imply something about where people are presumed to *belong*; that is, the presence of certain members at the location is not accountable, but is taken for granted.[24] Here, that the recruit is not compelled to account for the presence of 'fags' under the bridge suggests that this much is already understood, and furthermore that this understanding is *not* a matter of police "cultural knowledge," but is rather knowledge that is available to anyone with Common Sense; or at least to any "local, family-oriented, working-class white"—which is perhaps the same thing.

There are a few points that I would like to draw from all of this. First, as already stated, it is apparent that for the recruit, the streets do *not* "appear to be a maze through which only an expert could maneuver." Instead, the recruit speaks as one who is *already* an expert navigator of this terrain. He already knows *where* to look for *what* (e.g. a car that looks like nobody is in it sitting under a bridge), and *how* to get there. Moreover, his narrative suggests that everything prior to the actions of his FTO—why the car was suspicious, why these men would be under this bridge, and why a cop should *do something* about it—was already Common Sense. His perplexity stems from not knowing what exactly to do about such things, *as a police officer*. Crucially, the lesson that he learns from his FTO during this incident is that official police procedure (i.e. what the recruit thought he knew about police practice) has little to do with "how we do things out here." So, the recruit's disorientation is actually in relation to the *police* and not in relation to the landscape, for which his prior categories of perception remain empirically and practically adequate, even in his new role as a police officer.

To give Van Maanen his due, his point is that a change in one's disposition to *act* radically transforms one's orientation to, and perception of, the environment. Here, the mandate, license and liability that come with being a police officer alter the disposition to act, and thereby transform the environment. This also means that his depiction of "visitors in a foreign land" is not entirely figurative. I would agree that the meaning of any object is inextricably bound to a subject's orientation to act upon, through, with or within it. In fact, inasmuch as perception is already an action, or enactment, I would agree that the very existence of a given object is inseparable from ways of (consciously or unconsciously) "doing" it. All the same, it seems to me that Van Maanen's conclusions are both overstated—that police socialization represents a radical rupture rather than a finite shift—and misallocated—that it is the perception of *geography* that has been fundamentally transformed ("the world seems entirely new") rather than the perception of *police* ("that's the way we do things out here"). One way to think about this is to say that the same thing for which this recruit might have before simply *called* the cops (e.g. "fags hanging out under a bridge") is now something that he himself must *do something about* in his role as police. This represents a pivot in relation to a rather stable perceptual category, which is adequate to both the calling of the cops and the doing of police. What confuses the recruit is the difference between what he had assumed happens after the cops are called and what he learns actually happens "out here."

That Van Maanen does not interrogate the background assumptions that structure the recruit's retelling of this incident suggests that they are transparent, reaffirming the degree to which the relation between "fags," "bridges" and "police" is taken as a matter of Common Sense, even to the analyst. So, for Van Maanen, it seems, the geographies that

the police act within are actually a given; they comprise the pre-constituted *contexts* of policing. It is merely the *interpretation* of and orientation to act on the things contained within these spatial relations, then, that differs between police and non-police. This brings me to my next point. It seems to me that Van Maanen's overstatement of police socialization as a radical break produces an understatement of the degree to which police commonsense is already imbricated in the Common Sense. Recognizing this might help explain the observation—documented across the Police Studies socialization literature—that FTOs usually advise their trainees to forget everything they learn in the academy and rely instead on their *common sense*. Even before beginning field training, police cadets tend to dismiss the academy as having nothing to do with "the real world." Similarly, the tendency of veteran officers to invoke "common sense" to explain their actions is widely reported in the literature. During my own fieldwork, the same officers who in some contexts insisted that a civilian could never understand what it's like to be a cop would just as often contend that "being a cop is ninety-nine percent common sense."

Such observations are difficult to level with Van Maanen's assertion that "for most urban recruits, the first real contact with the police subculture occurs at the academy." Indeed, the invocation and identification of "Common Sense" as "policing commonsense" by officers themselves performatively blurs the line that supposedly delineates a unique police subculture. Here, an observation made by Police Studies scholar P. A. J. Waddington is apposite. He writes of the police that, "Their culture might be less 'sub' than is often supposed and instead be the expression of *common* values, beliefs and attitudes within a police context."[25] While I take issue with Waddington's larger argument—namely, that what is called police subculture should be analytically reduced to a domain of expression

he calls "canteen talk," which provides a mere rhetorical strategy for meaningfully organizing experience, and which has little if anything to do with what police actually do in other settings (i.e. on the street)—I do believe that he has hit upon something important here. And I would add to his "*common* values, beliefs and attitudes" the category of preconscious habits of perception. This amendment highlights the necessity of common *sense perception* for the constitution of communities of practice (common "sense" in the pragmatic, referential aspect), and thereby shifts the focus from the one-sided concern with intentional content, interpretation and meaning making exhibited in much of the police culture literature (common "sense" in the semantic, attributive aspect). Of course, there are some notable exceptions to this tendency.

As already described, an emphasis on the historical and cultural constitution of preconscious perceptual schemata as a condition on the successful intersubjective coordination of social practice is central to Chan's concern with the relation between the *field* and *habitus* of policing. Other scholars writing on the constitution of the policing "commonsense" have drawn on different theoretical frameworks to highlight such quasi- or pre-conscious perceptual dimensions. For example, McNulty employs an interactionist analysis to analyze the "generation of common sense knowledge among police." She argues that officers demonstrate that they "have" common sense by *acting* decisively and unreflexively on perceptual cues from the environment. Such cues are typified as perceived incongruities in the landscape, the proverbial *something out of place*. Importantly, McNulty notes that officers often exhibit an inability to articulate exactly *what* was perceived as unusual in the moment, instead explaining that they "just knew," sometimes even appealing

to a "sixth sense." It is only in retrospect, and under questioning, that officers reconstruct such experiences as a chain of rational actions and reactions to conscious stimuli.[26]

Worrall has taken up this notion of the policing "sixth sense" to argue for a "dual process" model for understanding the relationship between tacit knowledge, preconscious cognitive processes and police competence. Specifically, he draws on Epstein's cognitive experiential self theory (CEST), which distinguishes between two autonomous but interactive cognitive processing pathways, experiential and rational. The relative balance of these two pathways is said to determine an individual's "thinking style." Worrall contends that "police officers, whether by design or development, exhibit a more pronounced experiential thinking style than non-police." The experiential style is summarized thus: "1. It emphasizes 'vibes' and emotions; 2. Problem-solving relies on life lessons and experiences; 3. It eludes logical analysis; 4. It is preconscious; 5. It is automatic, effortless, and more rapid than the rational system."[27] Worrall's proposed research agenda involves the determination of whether the police profession is selective for individuals who exhibit a natural proclivity for experiential thinking, or if this is a learned capacity that is transmitted via the formal and informal processes of police socialization.

Each of these authors underlines the extent to which police practice seems to involve unthinking, unreflective, preconscious habits of perception and action that are nonetheless collectively patterned. Their concern is to explain, from very different conceptual standpoints, *how* this comes to be so. For McNulty, police common sense is generated through shared work "routines" which "provide the stable context within which the generative process occurs." She thereby locates the origin of police commonsense

within the routines of interaction that constitute the organization itself. Routines perform the substantive work of socialization, as the "consistency of these routines allows the resulting common sense knowledge to appear constant and obvious." Worrall, by contrast, offers two scenarios. The first suggests that some people are innately suited to become police officers by merit of being born with the "sixth sense." The second scenario is more in line with that of McNulty; namely, that through some as yet unknown mechanism of socialization, police officers come to develop an "experiential thinking style" that is specifically adaptive to the work of policing.

For both McNulty and Worrall, the processes of socialization through which the policing commonsense (and therefore the police culture) is transmitted and reproduced are entirely endogenous to the institutional role of policing. That is, only police officers are socialized into the policing commonsense, and only in the organizational context of police work. Of course, Worrall's biologistic alternative does not share this assumption. Rather, it excludes the category of socialization all together, given that biological predispositions are by definition not an outcome of social processes. It is worth noting, however, that this also suggests inconsistencies in his larger predisposition hypothesis. Namely, it is unclear how, and in what sense, an irreducibly socio-historical category such as "police officer" could be shown to be biologically determined. Such an ontological leap is suspect, especially when we consider that the existence of "natural born cops" would also imply the existence of the negative complement, the "natural born criminal." Worrall himself suggests such a symmetry. Aside from the conceptual sloppiness of the position, the crypto-racism in such thinking makes this hypothesis dubious at best.

Returning, then, to the question of socialization, I want to suggest that both Worrall and McNulty share a problematic tendency to naively assume that the empirical boundaries of the object of inquiry—"police commonsense," along with the processes of socialization through which it is transmitted and reproduced—are coextensive with the institutionally defined boundaries of a self-contained organization, The Police. The world of policing is thereby posited to be enclosed within the institution of policing and so only disclosed by reference to this institution. An artefact of the close disciplinary linkages between Police Studies and Organizational Studies, this tendency produces the error, noted by Waddington, of "confusing a feature that is *common* to a group as a feature that is *distinctive* of a group." It also results in the adoption by the researcher of the organization's own definitions and categories, for instance, of things such as "competence." For example, Worrall argues that the "sixth sense" denotes the "officer's ability (whether pre-programmed or learned) to sense when something is amiss or out of place," which in turn allows officers to "*recognize*, typically from past experience, any number of danger signs," and then act in a way that is "effortless much of the time, and above all else, automatic." McNulty describes police common sense knowledge in practically identical terms. Both take at face value that police officers are exceptional in these capabilities, and that this is what defines police competence. At the same time, this means that they also accept that the "something amiss" that the officer perceives is in fact an instance of something being out of its "proper place." Neither questions the givenness of the perceptual categories that ground such judgements. That is, neither critically interrogates the relations between the determinate content of these preconscious habits of perception, how they are enacted, the conditions on their practical/referential adequacy to the actual contexts in which police act,

and the claim by police that they are only acting on Common Sense. Such questions break with organizational self-referentiality, and return us to what Reiner describes as the originary structural-dialectical impulse of the police culture concept.

As I have already suggested, it is here that Janet Chan's work can be helpful. By positioning the policing *habitus* within multiple, discontinuous but overlapping socio-historical, political-economic, and cultural relations that exceed organizational boundaries, she maintains that the adequacy, or practical appropriateness, of the policing *habitus* (i.e. the competence of the police commonsense) can only be ascertained in relation to the larger material and symbolic *fields* within which policing occurs. But, as described above, she fails to develop the implications of this for understanding how socialization into the police subculture can be seen to precede and exceed the institutional role of policing, and thereby misses something essential about police "cultural knowledge." By "precede," I mean the extent to which recruits already have a largely adequate "feel" and understanding of how policing pertains to "the real world," and the relevant categories mediating this relationship (e.g. "fags hanging out under a bridge"), *before* they decide to become police officers. This explains why they are able to reject the academy as "out of touch," even before their FTOs tell them as much. It also means that so-called *anticipatory socialization* should be viewed as beginning *prior to* the decision to pursue a policing career, and conceptualized less as a deliberate strategy and more as a quasi-conscious process of subjectivation that is not limited exclusively to aspiring recruits. This is what I mean by police socialization "exceeding" the institutional role of police. Even those who never consider pursuing a career in policing typically exhibit both an ability to recognize, evaluate, and perform operations on the fundamental categories of the policing commonsense (e.g. "someone or

something out of place," "suspicious person," "disorder"), and a concomitant tendency to take such categories as matters of Common Sense.

Here we can glimpse an important moment of what I have been describing as the interpenetration, or imbrication, of the police commonsense within the Common Sense. Indeed, much more so than with other domains of professional expertise—such as law or medicine—police officers seem to appeal to Common Sense to situationally explain and justify their (largely discretionary) decisions and actions, especially when these actions do not find explicit sanction in the law or departmental policy. This suggests that the policing commonsense might be understood as the specific enactment of Common Sense within the context of policing, which resembles Waddington's suggestion that police (sub)culture comprises *common* cultural content as expressed in a police context. But rather than take at face value the relation between police commonsense and the Common Sense, as several of the authors reviewed here seem to do (whether explicitly or tacitly), we must instead inquire into the precise relation that obtains between these two domains, and how it is re/produced. To do so raises important questions about the relation between police commonsense, Common Sense, and other categories, such as the Common Good and Public Order. It also allows for an attunement to the ways in which *anticipatory socialization* into the police culture extends beyond the institutional setting of police, which may even prove to be an essential condition on the ideological reproduction of *legitimacy* under so-called "democratic policing."

Throughout this discussion, I have argued for the salience of geography in the re/production of the imbrication of the police commonsense within Common Sense. Indeed, inasmuch as the policing commonsense is said to pertain to "matters out of *place*,"

it would seem that *spatialization* is an essential dimension of the reproduction and transmission of police culture, and therefore constitutive to the processes comprising the extended notion of *anticipatory socialization* to which I gesture above. Before we begin making our way back, in the next chapter, to the question with which we left off concerning how the "two cities, two philosophies" became a matter of policing commonsense in Atlantic City, I would like to state more clearly now the following provisional proposition: the *spatialization* of the organizing categories of police commonsense within durable, social-material landscapes mediates the imbrication of these categories within the Common Sense of people who variously inhabit and navigate policed geographies, such that these categories become shrouded in *facticity*. The power of police to authoritatively and coercively enact the categories of police commonsense *as* Common Sense, I will argue, produces an erasure of history which obscures the *generativity* of police, such that police themselves encounter the categories of police commonsense as matters of Common Sense; that is, as natural and timeless, or as historically given, but in either case not of their own making.

Notes

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Chapter 3

Solvitur intuendo: On Race, Space, and Facticity (in the First Sense)

facticity, n.

1. **The property of being a fact; factualness, givenness**; *spec.* (in existential thought) the fact of existing in the world or in a situation which is not of one's own making or choosing.
2. **An instance of this property; an unchangeable fact, a given.**

-Oxford English Dictionary

Note—"for obvious reasons"

It's already dark out, though not even 5:30, when a call comes over the radio—motor vehicle stop near 6-- Green St., requesting backup. "That's right by here—let's take it," Officer Q tells me. He flips on the blue lights as we swing left around a corner and accelerate off…in the wrong direction. He realizes his mistake, but only after zipping past the right turn that would have allowed us to circle the block and arrive at the correct intersection. He furrows his brow and speeds to the next light, only to find that he cannot make a right at the one-way intersection. "Damnit," he mutters, racing onward toward the next light. It occurs to me that a simple U-turn would be the fastest way to double back, and surely Q realizes this. I wonder whether he's avoiding this maneuver because he doesn't know that I know that he has gotten turned around and so doesn't want to betray his disorientation. As he drives on farther from our destination, I'm having a hard time constraining my grin, so I just stare through the passenger-side window at the blue-strobe montage of brick and vinyl siding that flashes out against the cold December darkness. To be sure, it's not the wrong turn that amuses me—anyone can have a momentary lapse. It's knowing that Q must really be feeling the irony of what he was just saying as the call came over the radio: "A lot of the guys might say it's a shithole, but they didn't grow up here,

and they don't live here, so they don't care. It's different when you're from here, when you live here."

It's only my first time out with Q, though we've spoken a couple times over the past few months since I started riding on "Bravo Platoon"—the 4 PM to 2 AM patrol shift. I don't want him to think that I'm laughing at his expense. But when I turn and look at him, he cracks a sheepish smile. Even in the dim glow of the dashboard displays, I can see his pink cheeks darken to crimson. He's clearly more embarrassed than frustrated. I decide that a good-humored wise crack would be the most appropriate thing to do on my part. I look down at my pocket-sized notebook, pretending to read back over what I've been scratching down, and say, "So, uh, you were telling me that you grew up here?"

He responds, rather matter-of-factly, "I did grow up here. I just never came up here—for obvious reasons."

"Right."

Right. Of course. Enough said. But how can this be? That is, how can a virtual stranger expect me to understand "the obvious reasons" for why *he*, personally, never came "up here"? Moreover, how can I be expected to "pick out" the correct location to which "up here" refers, given that he knows me to be a non-local? And how to decipher the utterly ambiguous claim to have both "grown up *here*" and also to have "never come up *here*"?

But I *do* understand, and I don't probe the matter further, instead taking his curt explanation for why he might be expected to get lost in this particular area of the very small town in which he was born and raised and now works as a patrol officer to be perfectly adequate. "For obvious reasons," he says, which is to say, in effect, that what he is saying

already goes without saying, thereby turning my question back on me so as to question the grounds of my questioning. I am being told to use my Common Sense so as to avoid asking stupid questions. This signals a rather dramatic shift in our respective "footing," inasmuch as throughout the roughly hour-and-a-half that Q and I have been acquainted, he has spontaneously offered an explication for virtually *everything* that he has said and done. In fact, I have been treated just like a "visitor in a foreign land," something which I have come to expect. Every time I ride with someone new, I am invariably quizzed on what I've learned so far about policing, most of it pertaining to technical terminology and local police vernacular (e.g. calls signs, acronyms, the criminal codex, slang). I'm also usually prompted to comment on the aspects of policing and living in Atlantic City that have by the officer's own estimation likely been most surprising to me as a civilian outsider. Anyone who has spent time abroad studying a second language has likely experienced an analogous ritual of making acquaintance. So then why am I suddenly addressed as someone who *ought to know*?

In the months following my first lesson in local geography with Captain Y ("you won't see any white people up there"), I quickly started learning my way around. Through a series of early interactions, primarily with police officers but also with residents and others, I began to construct a cognitive map of the city whose contours were based largely on where I was told I did and did not belong. This became particularly salient once I started looking for an apartment in the city. I spent weeks searching on Craigslist to no avail. It seemed that everything was either way out of my budget or was designated for subsidized housing vouchers. The first promising listing that I called about didn't go anywhere. When I explained to the brusque man on the line that I was a graduate student looking for a

yearlong rental in order to conduct research, he was incredulous. When I finally convinced him, he told me, "Okay, listen. You don't want it. Believe me, you don't want it. Look offshore." And then he hung up. So, I turned to asking the only people I actually knew in town, the police. Initially, I got the same sort of response: "You want to move *here* [i.e. Atlantic City]*?* No, you don't want to live here. You should look for a place offshore [i.e. in one of the suburban townships located on the mainland], or down in Ventnor or Margate [more affluent beach towns located on Absecon Island south/west of Atlantic City]." And when I persisted: "You still looking for a place in AC? Alright, let me call F [the retired cop who would become my landlord] and ask if he's got anything open up in the Heights [Chelsea Heights neighborhood]. It ain't what it used to be, but it's still pretty good, and you'll be safe." And once I moved in, "If you go out at night, just make sure you stay in the casinos or on the Boardwalk." And as I began conducting full-time fieldwork and spending more time out and about: "Where you goin'? Where? Nah, don't go up there by yourself. Hold on, we can find somebody [a cop] to drive you."

So, by the time Q tells me that he "never came up here," I understand this minimal locational formulation to mean that he never spent time specifically on the Northside. And without knowing virtually any of the particulars of his biography, I can recognize perfectly well the "obvious reasons" why by simply looking at him: Q is white, and "you won't see any white people up there!" Enough said. But I want to argue that there is something very important, if perhaps obvious, about my ability to read the empirical referents of Q's utterance without requiring any specification of the relevant aspects of the deictic terms "I," "here," "up here" and "obvious reasons." There are two points in particular that I want to emphasize: first, both his expectation of my recognition and my actual understanding

rely on the mutual assumption of shared habits of perception that organize empirically given "facts" (e.g. Q is white), such that they go without saying—they are there for all to *see*; and second, my interpretation entails a cognitive operation that amounts to an evaluation of "something out of place" (e.g. Q on the Northside). As I argued in the previous chapter, it is precisely in such instances of mutual recognition of something out of place that we can glimpse the imbrication of the police commonsense within the Common Sense, and the ways in which this relation is produced and mediated through material-symbolic geographies and the spatial practices that re/produce them. I should also point out that the present example has obvious bearing on a matter that I have so far gestured toward without naming explicitly: so-called "racial profiling." Indeed, it is in reference to this and similar discriminatory practices that the notion of "police culture" is most often invoked and problematized. In this chapter, I develop an analysis of the empirical grounds of such practices through the category of *facticity*, in order to further elaborate the relations that I have been tracing between police commonsense, Common Sense, and geography.

Note—"Everybody profiles"

It's past 1 AM. Officer O and I are idling through Carver Hall apartments. "See? It's quiet. There won't be anything else tonight," he tells me, sounding deflated. Earlier, a ShotSpotter alert had sent every car on duty swarming into the Stanley Holmes Village housing project. Officer O had explained at the beginning of the shift that the shooting homicide the night before meant that there was a high probability of retaliatory violence tonight, telling me with a grin, "so we might actually get into something." But when it is

ultimately determined that the same young man who had been sent to the hospital via ambulance for suspected drug-induced psychosis as soon as police arrived on scene was also responsible for firing the shots—apparently into the air—O looks dejected. "Just some stupid shit," he shrugs. This is after a dozen or so officers—some wearing SWAT helmets and shields, all of them holding AR-15 assault rifles—had cordoned off a perimeter around the apartment where it was suspected that the shooter was hiding. "Sorry, Lee. All that for nothing." I tell him not to apologize—that this seems to me a much better outcome than the alternative, and he smirks at me, as if to say, "Yeah, yeah, sure, me too." "We'll get into something good next time," he promises.

For the remaining five hours of the shift, we drive around, sticking mostly to District 5, cruising from one low-income housing development to the next, with O complaining that no one is even out now—on a Friday—because all the blue lights earlier in the evening must've driven everyone inside for the night. And so we just drive and talk—about why O wanted to be a cop, about the Role-of-Police-in-Society, about how liberal-media-fueled shifts in public opinion have made it impossible to do the job. He turns to the latter topic as we turn onto South Carolina Ave to pass through Carver Hall Apartments for what is probably the fifteenth time tonight.

"So everybody says they want us to be proactive and prevent crime, right? We can do that—but like I say, people got to understand what they're asking for. You can't have it both ways, Lee. It's like quote unquote 'profiling.' Of COURSE we profile! Everybody profiles, Lee. But that doesn't mean it's racist. You tell me—ok it's going on 2 in the morning and you see a white kid in a car sitting right here in Carver in the middle of the night. You tell me, Lee. What's he doing up here in the projects?" He waits for me to

answer, and I tell him that if I answer his question for him, I'm being a bad researcher, so I've got to let him tell me what he's getting at even though I think I get it.

"See! Right there! You know it but you won't say it! The only reason he's going to be up here in the projects is to buy drugs. That's profiling. That doesn't mean you're going to get arrested, or beat up or shot, but it's something out of place. So, if I want to stop him, does that make me a racist? Everybody profiles, but when a cop does it, it's 'Oh, okay, so I'm a racist.' That's what I was saying Lee, policing is mostly just common sense and having the balls to act on something that don't look right."

Everybody profiles. This wasn't the first time I'd been told this by an Atlantic City police officer, and it wouldn't be the last. And almost every time the lesson was framed in similar terms: I'd be given a hypothetical situation and asked whether I could recognize what (i.e. who) was incongruous, and then asked whether being able to do this made me a racist. The personal touch in O's story is that the subject of suspicion in his scenario is a "white kid," the unspoken point being that O, who is also white, cannot be acting from racial prejudice if he wants to target this person for questioning. But bracketing for now the preposterous suggestion that a supposedly equal opportunity racial profiling policy could achieve a nonracist racial profiling policy, I want to focus instead on the appeal to Common Sense. In his description of what policing is, O invokes Common Sense explicitly as it relates to "seeing something that don't look right." This same appeal is implied in the claim that "everybody profiles" through everyday judgements concerning what and who appear to be "out of place" based on what is empirically given in geographic context. My own ability to read Q's "obvious reasons" and correctly interpret the scenarios presented

by O and his colleagues suggests that there is something to this. Even if my understanding is predicated on an anticipation of what the police officer who is drawing the scenario intends, the fact that I can perform cognitive operations on the imagined scenario entails an (at least partially) overlapping empirical-referential frame. That is, whether I agree with the (racist) attributive content ("the only reason he's going to be up here is to buy drugs"), I do recognize the (racial) referential content ("a white kid up here") and understand the incongruity with typical (normative) perceptual experiences ("you won't see any white people up there").

Another way to think about this is to consider that for me to assert that an officer has targeted someone due to racial profiling requires that I recognize the subject of profiling in terms of race in geographic context. That is, to posit that an officer has stopped a person, e.g. "because he was driving while black in the suburbs," requires that I assume a shared perceptual schema with the officer, even if my purpose is to disavow and displace this perceptual schema in order to refute the interpretation that the officer has enacted (e.g. black people are more likely to commit crimes). Both readings, mine and the cop's, take race as empirically given and also entail a judgement of the relevance of race based on spatial context. Importantly, the very proposition that "*x* was stopped by police because *x* is black," performatively attributes causal efficacy to race, amounting to the reification of an *effect* of a social relation and thereby the ontological reversal that is characteristic of what Barbara and Karen Fields call "racecraft."[1] But here I want to stay with questions of common *sense perception*, referentiality, and the empirical-pragmatic adequacy of the perceptual schemata that organize our experiences of space and place in terms of race, and inversely, race in terms of spatial relations.

For my own part, it is not as if I was somehow naïve to the racializing organization of U.S. landscapes before I moved to Atlantic City. To be sure, I was not at all confused when I first heard the Captain refer to "the black part of town," but was rather struck by the nonchalance with which he told me that its boundaries were officially demarcated by street names, as if this were a common convention in all municipalities. Similarly, when I was told to avoid "the bad side of town" or "the rough areas" of Atlantic City, I understood these to be racial significations, which conjured in my mind images of these places before I had actually seen them—even more so when I was told to stay near the Boardwalk and casinos in order to avoid accidentally finding myself in the "hood" or "ghetto." Indeed, I have never lived in a place where such racial-geographic designations were not applied—as much so in Philadelphia, where I have lived for the past eight years, as in the rural Kentucky town of less than two thousand people where I spent the majority of my formative years. I have similarly consumed since early childhood, both actively and passively, mass-mediatized depictions of what Elijah Anderson has termed the "iconic ghetto"—images that serve to naturalize material-symbolic associations between blackness and particular landscapes.[2]

All of this is to say that the sedimentation of the preconscious perceptual schemata through which my own experiences of material landscapes are organized in terms of race began long before I moved to Atlantic City. And I've yet to meet anyone, at least among my fellow citizens and perhaps with the exception of some very young children, for whom the phenomenology of space and place is not inextricably bound to racial signification, even if only subconsciously. This is to be expected, for as geographers Kobayashi and Peake remind us, it is not only in contexts of overt racial segregation that the social

production of space is bound up in processes of racialization, but rather "the *entire* U.S. landscape is deeply racialized, even as [the] 'whiteness' [of racially homogeneous white suburban and rural enclaves] serves as the counterpart to the entrenched differences that mark more highly charged places of racialized conflict." In fact, the process of racialization itself necessarily entails the production of racialized places. They write:

> The material and the ideological … are not separate, nor are they alternative, explanations, but rather two dimensions of human action, ontologically inseparable. 'Racialization' is therefore the process by which racialized groups are identified, given stereotypical characteristics, and coerced into specific living conditions, often involving social/spatial segregation and always constituting racialized places. It is one of the most enduring and fundamental means of organizing society.[3]

This means that racial differentiation is always and everywhere produced in part through processes of spatial differentiation, and *vice versa*, at least in the context of the United States. This double movement constitutes the dialectical process described by George Lipsitz as "the racialization of space and the spatialization of race," a process that is enacted though "concrete policies and practices," the outcome of which is that "the lived experience of race has a spatial dimension, and the lived experience of space has a racial dimension."[4] Furthermore, following geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore, because the category of race is a relational effect of *racism*—"the process of abstraction" by which "particular kinds of bodies, one by one, are materially (if not always visibly) configured … into a hierarchy of human and inhuman persons that in sum form the category of 'human

being'"—the dialectical racialization-of-space/spatialization-of-race is always "structured in dominance," constituting a "fatal coupling of difference and power."[5] Inwood and Yarborough similarly note that this process always entails the construction of "particular geographic landscapes that help define and reinforce racialized social hierarchies, thus facilitating domination and exploitation."[6] There are several core insights that I would like to draw from the critical geography of racialization and the social production of space.

First, this scholarship underlines both the deep history and contemporary ubiquity of the racialization of space in the United States. Here, I would like to return briefly to an above-cited passage by Schegloff on the social construction of "common sense geographies." He writes, "Although the structure of knowledge of a 'sort of place' may be general and formal, everyone organizing knowledge in the same categories and on the same dimensions, the particulars that are so organized are assumed to vary with territorially-based memberships…The sharing of particulars at one or another of these levels is perhaps one sense of membership in a 'same community.'"[7] What I want to stress here is that my own experience of "learning my way around" the racialized geographies of Atlantic City was achieved in large part through the pragmatic particularization in local contexts of my own prior understandings of certain "sorts of places" as constituted through categories of a general "structure of knowledge," including habits of perception, that organize experiences of racialized space. That is, I was able to translate, through something like a series of empirical correspondence tests, general categories such as "the hood" and "ghetto" into more locally particularistic designations such as "the Village," because these general categories are adequate across contexts, and therefore could be assumed by my interlocutors and myself.

Here it may be useful to provide the reader with a lexicon of the "locational formulations" most commonly used by my police interlocutors to refer to the historic Northside area of the city. Figure 3 (*see below*) can be used as a geographic glossary of sorts to aid the reader in "picking out" the correct location when referenced in later ethnographic vignettes, thereby reducing the necessity of constant translation. At the same time, it also illustrates the larger point that I am trying to make here concerning general, or common, categories versus local, or particularistic, categories that organize perceptions of racialized space. The designations listed are roughly arranged in descending order from most general to most local/particular. The use of both metaphor (e.g. "the Wild, Wild West") and metonymy (e.g. "the Village") reveals much about the material-symbolic associations structuring perceptions of the "iconic ghetto," which will bring me to another point.

Glossary of Words and phrases used by police to index the historically segregated Northside of Atlantic City

"the hood," "the ghetto," "the projects," "the black part of town," "the bad areas"

"a warzone," "Iraq," "Afghanistan," "the Wild, Wild West," "The Third World"

"the city" – literally, Atlantic City in its entirety, but often used in phrases such as "you don't want the tourists and families to have to deal with scum from the city," or "I didn't want my daughter going to school with kids from the city" to refer specifically to the Northside and the people who live there

"the community" – most often used in the context of 'community relations,' which in turn most often refers to strained relations between police and black residents; sometimes used in distinction from 'businesses,' 'home owners,' 'the taxpayers,' etc.; often used sardonically to invoke black cultural pathology

"the neighborhoods" – literally refers to all residential areas, but is typically used to index the Northside, while individual proper names are used for historically white neighborhoods (e.g. Lower Chelsea, Chelsea Heights, Ducktown, the Inlet)

"The Northside" – the original name of the segregated black ghetto in Atlantic City, bounded by Atlantic Avenue to the south, Arkansas Avenue to the west, Connecticut Avenue to the east, and the "Back Bay" to the north

"The Village," or "Stanley" – literally refers to Stanley Holmes Village, the first housing project built in the state of New Jersey, it was designated exclusively for black tenants; police use it as a metonym for the Northside, and also as an icon for 'bad neighborhood' or 'high-crime area'

"Back Maryland" – neighborhood adjacent to the segment of Maryland Avenue running north of Atlantic Ave to the Back Bay, the location of a large low-income housing development; used by the police in the same way that 'the Village' is used;

"Carver"—refers to Carver Hall, a large low-income housing development adjacent to Stanley Holmes Village; sometimes used analogously to "the Village," though less frequently

Figure 3: Northside Glossary

The reader has likely noticed that I have yet to provide any concrete description of the Northside landscape. Instead, I have made easy reference to the area much as my interlocutors did when describing it to me. This has been deliberate. Now I would ask that the reader forgive a further postponement of such description and reflect on the images that have been conjured by the various "locational formulations" that have been deployed to reference the Northside throughout this dissertation, in both reported speech and my own narration. To be sure, I am *not* attempting a sympathetic recapitulation of the cop's "does that make you racist?" game. Instead, I am following the critical geographers cited above—as well as countless others who have stressed the inextricable linkages between the production of space and race in the United States—to signal the material and historical conditions on the enduring and pervasive imaginaries of the "iconic ghetto." The point that I would like to emphasize, following from the previous chapter, is that the perceptual categories that make such problematic policing practices as racial profiling both achievable and intelligible are *not* restricted solely to an isolable "police subculture." Rather, following Waddington, it seems that racial profiling might be better understood as the expression, enactment, or enforcement of *common* perceptual habits within a police context.

Importantly, to suggest that the perceptual categories that organize experiences of space and place in terms of race, and *vice versa*, are *common* is not the same as arguing that they are *universal*. In fact, as will be argued, the authoritative identification of the police commonsense with the Common Sense, and the ideological identification of

Common Sense with what is *natural* and thus *ahistorical* is essential to the misrecognition of the *generativity* of police. But this is getting ahead of things. First, we must ask how these shared perceptual categories are reproduced if they are not naturally given. This brings us back to the question of socialization, and to the second point that I would like to underline from the foregoing discussion of the inextricable relations between the production of space and race. As indicated by the above-quoted passage from Lipsitz, race and space are irreducibly co-constitutive at the level of lived experience. Inwood and Yarbrough similarly indicate the impossibility of abstracting race from space when they write that "a multifaceted relationship exists between place and race wherein places are racialized while places also structure, construct, and re-produce racialized individual identities."[8]

As Kathleen Kirby and others have argued, the manifold processes of subject formation are always enmeshed within processes of spatialization, both in the sense that the individuation of the embodied subject as a terrain and/or trajectory is itself a spatial process, and inasmuch as the subject is always necessarily constituted *in* space/place and through a phenomenological opening *to* space.[9] Crucially, this does not mean that space is an inert three-dimensional container within which the autonomous subject takes shape, but rather that subject formation is itself inseparable from and immanent to the material-semiotic spatial relations and practices within which it unfolds. By the same token, space is not *prior* to or independent of subject formation. Rather, as Katherine McKittrick writes, "material geographies are sites of possibility, which are discerned and unraveled by what Kathleen Kirby calls 'the space of the subject.' That is, the racialized, gendered, sexed, classed and imaginative body-self necessarily interprets space and place—in its limitation

and its possibilities."[10] Space itself is in part constituted through such interpretive practices. This means that the autonomous subject does not naively *encounter* spatial relations from a prior position of pure externality, nor does space constitute a transcendental Kantian category. Instead, as Kirby observes, a dialectical relation obtains by which "Space and where we are in it…determines a large portion of our status as subjects, and obversely, the kinds of subjects we are largely dictates our degree of mobility and our possible locations," and these constraints in turn condition and contour the social practices through which space and place are re/produced.[11] Neither space nor the perceptual categories through which experiences of it are organized can be taken as transcendent or naturally given.

As I have already intimated, all of this has implications for questions of police socialization. In the previous chapter, I criticized scholars of police socialization for neglecting to interrogate the relations of imbrication between the police commonsense and the Common Sense. I argued for a consideration of the ways in which socialization into the "police culture" both exceeds and precedes induction into the actual institution of policing, suggesting that an expanded notion of *anticipatory socialization* could aid in doing so. I should reiterate that the particular aspects of police culture that interest me for present purposes are those elements that pertain to racially discriminatory practices—as well as other modes of unequal treatment based on social difference—and specifically how these relate to the core competence of recognizing "something out of place." As explained in the previous chapter, many policing scholars have described the determinate content of the police commonsense in terms of the ability to pick out, even if preconsciously, instances of something or someone out of place. In addition, the widely documented prevalence of racial bias among officers (i.e. racism is also argued to be characteristic of the police

culture) means that race becomes a primary organizing category of such habits of perception. This, it is often argued, is what leads to practices of racial profiling and discriminatory enforcement. According to the policing studies tack, these practices are primarily transmitted through institutional routines and rituals that arise in the setting of shared occupational stressors. However, as argued above, the processes of subject formation—including the constitution of preconscious perceptual schemata through which the world is ap/prehended—are inseparable from the material-symbolic processes of spatialization. Furthermore, throughout American history, the social production of space has always been inextricably bound to the re/production of racial difference. This should make clear what I intend when I argue that *anticipatory socialization* both precedes and exceeds the police institution, meaning that the core organizing categories of the police commonsense (people out of place) are not restricted to the institutional setting of policing. This, in turn, should impel a closer examination of the claim that "everybody profiles."

In the previous chapter, I suggested that Janet Chan's engagement with the Bourdieusian concepts of *field* and *habitus* might offer an opening for an interrogation of the imbrication of the police commonsense within the Common Sense through an expanded notion of *anticipatory socialization.* Here, Bourdieu's own reflection on Common Sense is helpful:

> Common sense is a stock of self-evidences shared by all, which, within the limits of a social universe, ensures a primordial consensus on the meaning of the world, a set of tacitly accepted commonplaces which make confrontation, dialogue, competition, and even conflict possible, and among which a special place must be

> reserved for the principles of classification, such as the major oppositions structuring the perception of the world. These classificatory schemes (structuring structures) are, essentially, the product of the incorporation of the structures of the fundamental distributions which organize the social order (structured structures). Being, as a consequence, common to all agents participating in that order, they are what makes possible the agreement in disagreement of agents who are situated in opposite positions (high/low, visible/obscure, rare/common, rich/poor, etc.) and who are characterized by distinctive properties, themselves different or opposite in social space. In other words, they are what makes it possible for all agents to refer to the same oppositions (such as high/low, up/down, rare/common, light/heavy, rich/poor, etc.), to think the world and their position in the world, while sometimes giving opposite signs and values to the terms they counterpose…[12]

In this passage, Bourdieu clearly signals a socio-historical ontology (i.e. "within the limits of a social universe") of both the "structuring structures"—the categories that organize the perception of the world and which partially constitute the *habitus*—and the "structured structures"—the objectified, material-symbolic social relations comprising the *fields* in which those categories are incorporated and deployed. To transpose this relation of co-constitution onto the terms used above, this means that neither the subject nor the material-symbolic spatial relations through and in which the subject unfolds are transcendental or naturally given. Rather, they are mutually constituted through historically contingent social practices. What is crucial for the present argument is that it is precisely the category of Common Sense that, according to Bourdieu, obscures the socio-historical

constitution of both moments of this unfolding by producing the experience of "self-evidence." This *misrecognition* of what is historically contingent, and therefore politically imbued, for what is naturally *given* constitutes the phenomenological grounds for the achievement of the hegemony of structures of domination, or what Bourdieu terms "symbolic violence."

Bourdieu certainly overstates his case when he insists that the "stock of self-evidences" comprising Common Sense are "shared by all"—thereby discounting out of hand the political potentials engendered by those subjects for whom the experience of self-in-the-world is never a "self-evidence," but is rather always a problem. All the same, he does provide us with a provocative initial formulation for thinking about how the outcomes of political struggle become *naturalized* as matters of Common Sense. This in turn signals an analytic opening for thinking socio-historically about the imbrication of police commonsense within the Common Sense, even if only in the most abstract form. However, for an analysis that takes up precisely the terms pursued here—i.e. the spatialization of race and racialization of space—without committing the elisions that ultimately limit Bourdieu's account of politics, we must turn to the Black feminist geography of Katherine McKittrick. I reproduce the following lengthy passage on "commonsensical" geographies in order to highlight both the strong parallels and crucial divergences with the account provided by Bourdieu, as well as with the "commonsense geography" of Schegloff.

> If prevailing geographic distributions and interactions are racially, sexually and economically hierarchical, these hierarchies are naturalized by repetitively spatializing "difference."…Practices of domination, sustained by a unitary vantage,

> naturalize both identity and place, repetitively spatializing where nondominant groups "naturally" belong. This is, for the most part, accomplished through economic, ideological, social, and political processes that see and position the racial-sexual body within what seem like predetermined, or appropriate, places and assume that this arrangement is commonsensical. The naturalization of "difference" is, in part, bolstered by the ideological weight of transparent space, the idea that space "just is," and the illusion that the external world is readily knowable and not in need of evaluation, and that what we see is true. If *who* we see is tied up with *where* we see through truthful, commonsensical narratives, then the placement of subaltern bodies deceptively hardens spatial binaries, in turn suggesting that some bodies belong, and some bodies are out of place. For black women, then, geographic domination is worked out through reading and managing their specific racial-sexual bodies. This management effectively, but not completely, displaces black geographic knowledge by assuming that black femininity is altogether knowable, unknowing, and expendable: she is seemingly in place by being out of place.[13]

While the resonances with Bourdieu's account are clear, it is worth drawing out the crucial divergences. To begin with what is perhaps the most striking difference, consider the orientation to *difference* itself. Bourdieu presents a rather homogenizing picture of a social field whose classificatory schemata are "common to all agents," such that difference is reduced to variable *valorizations* of the *same* terms. McKittrick shows how treating the incorporation of the structuring structures as a *fait accompli* reproduces the unitary vantage

of a geographic management that "effectively, but *not completely*, displaces black geographic knowledges" by assuming a field that is fully transparent to power. In doing so, she reminds us that classificatory systems are by design never exhaustive, but always implement procedures of displacement and concealment alongside practices of categorization and fixation. That is, the performative knowledge practices of geo*graphy* require for their operation the differentially productive practices of multiplying the illegible, illicit, opaque—the *ungeographic*. "We make concealment happen; it is not natural, but rather names and organizes where racial-sexual differentiation occurs."[14] Attending to the radical subjectivities and alter-praxes that proliferate in these spaces of concealment allows McKittrick to elaborate a theory of political struggle that is not so narrowly circumscribed so as to almost vanish, as in Bourdieu's account. But it also allows her to attend to the originary and ongoing violence that always subtends the field of "symbolic violence," showing us how such violence is the condition on hegemony rather than its exception, residuum, or receding horizon.

As for Schegloff, we have seen that he usefully defines "commonsense geography" as a pragmatic-linguistic repertoire that defines a language community. He leaves as an open matter "whether there is a single layman's geography or alternative geographies," explaining that "these are empirical questions, and not ones to be settled by consulting geography books. Such geographies are a cultural fact to be discovered, and perhaps subjected to a sort of 'componential analysis' of space terms."[15] It would seem, then, that Schegloff's commonsense geography is, at least in principle, open to difference. But we should also note that a "componential analysis" requires the determination of a set of semantic features (terms) and their relations of correspondence (e.g. positive, negative,

neutral) to a pre-selected set of referents. The universe of terms and referents is delimited prior to the analysis, as are the possible modes of relation that can obtain between them. While it would be foolish to fault a linguist for relying on language to study cultural facts, we should note how this tends to reduce all possible spatial imageries and praxes to those that can be construed in a language that is intelligible to the researcher. We might ask, following McKittrick's engagement with Sylvia Wynter, how Schegloff's formulation of the "shared ('everyman's') geography" is epistemically complicit in the geography of 'Man.' That is, "long-standing geographic frameworks that materially and philosophically arrange the planet according to a seemingly stable white, heterosexual, classed vantage point."

Both Bourdieu and Schegloff provide accounts of Common Sense that preemptively delimit the terrain of social production, thereby partaking of a "partitioning of the sensible" that would circumscribe the field of political struggle to what can be *named* (i.e. rendered in *language*, *placed* in a classificatory schema). Such a partitioning effects an elision of both the necessary proliferation of difference *through* structures of domination and the violence of concealment, as well as the radical potentials for disrupting those same operations that this difference engenders.[16] This in turn occludes an analysis of the ongoing, iterative elaborations of novel techniques of suppression, domestication, containment, capture and capitalization that are required to continuously mitigate emergent threats, substantiate the Common Sense, and generate rising profits: "the profitable erasure and objectification of subaltern subjectivities, stories, and lands."[17] I argue in this work that it is precisely within this emergent matrix that we must situate the police in order to understand the *generativity* of policing. If we misrecognize police as only ever "arriving

on the scene of a difference" from without—as *encountering* social differentiation and fragmentation as that which must be responded to, repressed or otherwise resolved—then we obscure the intrinsic productivity of policing. So, rather than thinking of police solely in terms of the *repression* or *management* of difference, i.e. as incidental to it, we must also attend to the generative principles of differentiation, and therefore valuation, that are intrinsic to policing itself.

Of course, all of this leaves us with the question of *why* policing is so commonly understood in terms of the "impossible mandate" of cleaning up "society's messes," or, alternatively, as the mere "instrument of the interests of *x*." Both of these positions (liberal and critical, respectively) pose police as exogenous to hierarchies of difference which they ever only *encounter*. Perhaps even more important from the perspective of an ethnography of policing is the question of how police come to *experience* their own vocation in just these terms. That is, how do we account for the fact that so many officers report experiencing the broad powers that they exercise as paradoxically disclosing their ultimate *impotence*? How can we grasp the potent *generativity* of policing at the same time that we take seriously the *feeling* among officers that they are only hapless stooges tasked with managing the fallout of forces that are always and ever beyond their control?

One rather tempting answer is to simply call bullshit. And there is certainly much to this. For the fact is that the police do have a rather transparent professional interest in dissimulating the considerable private pleasures and public privileges that they enjoy. As with any profession under conditions of perennial resource scarcity, reaffirming constantly both the dire necessity and utter impossibility of fulfilling one's mandate under current constraints becomes vital to organizational survival. Combine this with the concomitant

ascendance of victimhood as the preeminent mode of political claims making (e.g. #BlueLivesMatter), and the bullshit thesis becomes undeniably resonant with (and redolent of) larger trends shaping our neoliberal contemporary. I will return to both of these themes in Parts II and III, but I also want to insist that they do not adequately address the phenomenological questions just posed. For one, they very problematically treat "the police" as a fully self-transparent Subject of interests whose actions are exhaustively determined by articulable *motives*. This reintroduces the same delimitation of the field of social production and political struggle that we seek to avoid. It also requires that we discount out of hand experiential aspects that officers emphasize, thus obviating the need for ethnographic inquiry in the first place.

So, I will put aside for now the considerable explanatory power of the bullshit thesis to instead pursue an analysis of the *facticity* of racialized space. Here, and in the next chapter, I argue that the generativity of police typically remains obscure—and is therefore experienced as always inappropriable—to officers themselves. The effect is that the social differentiations that are in large part produced through heterogeneous modes of police practice are experienced by individual officers as implacable dilemmas that are never of their own making, but which they must nonetheless somehow overcome, or at least contain. The analytic of *facticity*, as I will show below and in the next chapter, allows for further interrogation of the problematics that I have gathered under the rubric of Common Sense, while offering the advantage of foregrounding questions of historical consciousness and the phenomenology of responsibility, and therefore ethics.

'Just look *at it:' Facticity in the First Sense, Vision as Common Sense*

I'll begin by returning to the above passage from McKittrick in order to draw attention to her critical emphasis on the decisive role of *visuality* in the "naturalization of 'difference.'" In particular, I am interested in her critique of a "unitary *vantage*" that "*sees* and positions the racial-sexual body" in a "*transparent* space" in which "what we *see* is true," and therefore "*who* we *see* is tied up with *where* we *see* through truthful, commonsensical narratives." That the truthfulness of these visual narratives goes unquestioned (not by *all*, but by those interpellated into subject positions structured by the "self-evidence of consciousness" and therefore a unitary visual field) means that they do not *appear* as narratives at all, but rather as indisputable, unchangeable facts that serve to legitimate judgments of which bodies belong and which bodies are "out of place." The striking agreement of McKittrick's language here with the "something out of place" account of the police commonsense is, of course, not coincidental. It is precisely such productive enactments of difference through a power that disavows itself that she is interrogating. McKittrick's problematization of the veridical authority of naturalist-empiricist epistemologies brings her critique of the conjugated and power-laden processes of spatialization and racialization into productive dialogue with a diverse array of interdisciplinary interrogations of the socio-historical constitution of modern 'scopic regimes' through which visual fields, subjects-observers, and images-discourses are mutually constituted in social processes of organizing, partitioning, disciplining and differentially potentiating the practice of 'looking.'[18]

Of course, the productive power of racializing visual apparatuses has long been a core concern within Black critical and existentialist thought, from Du Bois and Ellison to Fanon and, more recently, Gordon and Mbembe.[19] Similarly, seminal critiques from Black

feminist scholars such as bell hooks, Toni Morrison and Hortense Spillers have provided indispensable deconstructions of the hegemony of a self-transparent 'white gaze.'[20] More recently, scholars working at the intersections of Black studies, postcolonial critique, media studies, surveillance studies, critical race theory, history and anthropology have problematized the enduring Eurocentrism of both Marxian and Foucauldian strands of the "visuality turn" of recent decades by showing how colonialism, chattel slavery and imperial domination provided both the material conditions and determinate historical contexts for the technical elaboration of modern visual regimes. While sociologies of race typically do stress vision as an organizing principle of a social order based primarily on *pheno*typic differences, what the above scholars have elucidated is the inadequacy of treating racial difference as one (intersectional/incidental) variation on a *theme* of visuality and social difference. Instead, these scholars excavate the *originary* imbrications of racializing violence and dispossession in the emergence of the heterogeneous constellation of material-semiotic practices comprising the social formations of modern ocularcentrism itself (e.g. surveillance, classification, cartography, population census, bell curve, biometrics, pornotroping, spectacle, iconicity, invisibility, concealment).[21]

It is within this problem space that I want to situate the first moment of the analytic of *facticity*, or facticity in the "first sense." As indicated by the epigraph that opens this chapter, the primary meaning of the term *facticity* is "The property of being a fact; factualness; givenness." It also refers to "An instance of this property; an unchangeable fact; a given." *Facticity*, then, pertains precisely to the "just is" of McKittrick's critical reading of "transparent space," and so denotes that which "is readily knowable and not in need of evaluation." This is the *facticity* of positivist empiricism—the *factum brutum*, that

which is unchangeable, outside of time and so outside of history, beyond debate and so beyond political struggle. I want to follow the above critiques of modern ocularcentrism to argue that *vision* is the primary *sense* (that is, the "*first sense*") through which the *facticity* of racialized space is phenomenologically implemented as Common Sense. But rather than attempt to trace the manifold techniques and ideological modalities through which these constitutive relations obtain, I instead return to my ethnographic materials to focus on how police officers *deploy* the *facticity* of the Northside in a rhetorical gesture that I call *solvitur intuendo*, or "it is solved by looking." The rhetorical and performative efficacy of this gesture, I argue, elucidates a first moment of the imbrication of police commonsense in the Common Sense.

We have already seen several instances of *solvitur intuendo*: when Q tacitly directed my gaze to the surrounds with a simple, "for obvious reasons." Or when O drew a mental picture of someone out of place in order to demonstrate to me that "everybody profiles." Or when Captain Y told me that "you won't see any white people up there." Or when I asked Mr. N why he was leaving town and he told me to "just look at it." And it is this last formulation that I heard most often on my ride-alongs on the Northside. "Just *look* at it." And I would look, and I would *see*. I would see dilapidated row homes with sagging porches and falling gutters; cracked sidewalks and flooded streets; corner bodegas with iron grates covered in graffiti and bullet-proof glass enclosing the register; dozens of boarded up houses, and many more dozens that the housing authority had promised to board up but that in the meantime were serving as illicit shelters for the homeless, *ad hoc* shooting galleries for drug users, and hang outs for teenagers. I would see low-income housing of every conceivable variety: two- and three-story low rises with exteriors of red

brick, vinyl siding, stucco or wood paneling; bungalow-style duplexes with narrow rectangular windows looking out onto grey asphalt lots; concrete high-rises with smudged-glass entry-ways; brand new mixed-income units, charming with wood-stained porches and light-blue and beige siding, but unmistakable in their modularity and already showing signs of shoddy construction. I would see lots of people: children running home from school, elderly people chatting on front porches, families grilling out in courtyards, young people gathered outside of corner stores and in parking lots, middle-aged couples walking out of churches, people with grey temples sitting on stoops drinking from brown bags, people lugging in heaping bags of groceries, teenagers laughing out loud and making faces at other teenagers making a comical show of their hurt feelings, tired people coming home late from a double-shift at one of the casinos, smiling people packing up trunks with fishing poles and folding chairs and coolers.

But I wouldn't see many white people, and when I would, I would *notice* them. I would notice the woman smoking just outside the door that said "Office" and think that she must be a property manager; I would notice the ruddy-faced, middle-aged man in khakis, collared shirt and hair gel talking into his cell phone while squinting up towards a security camera mounted high on a pole and think that he must be a contractor; I would notice the young woman in black slacks and flats leaning into the backseat of her car and producing a small black duffle bag and clip-board, and I would wonder whether she was a home health aide or social worker. I would notice the plainclothes cops driving slow down the block in a minivan, and I would notice the men and boys on the corner notice them, and I would notice the plainclothes cops notice them noticing. I would notice the men and women, aged well beyond their years in ratty jeans and greasy hooded sweatshirts shuffling

down the block and casting furtive glances before entering one of the more notorious bodegas, and I would wonder whether they'd be stopped and searched. I would also *notice* the neatly kept ranch style homes with new chain-link fences, well-manicured lawns and late model SUVs or sedans in their driveways, and I would think "Hey, this block is actually really nice." And at night when I couldn't see much at all I would notice how incredibly dark it gets when there are no streetlights.

So then it really *was* like Captain Y said. It really *was* obvious why Q "never came up here." It was just like O told me; I really *did* profile. As Althusser would have put it, "Yes, that's how it is, that's really true!" The Northside was right there for me to see. To deny it would have made me guilty of bad faith, or what my police interlocutors called "political correctness." And so they needn't even say *what* to look *at* or *for*, but to "Just *look* at it!" And often times they wouldn't say anything at all. For the most powerful mode of *solvitur intuendo*, both rhetorically and performatively, was the silent ostensive.

Like when I was riding with R and we responded to a call about an infant that had stopped breathing. When we arrived, a woman greeted us at the door. She was holding the child in her arms. Clearly shaken, her face stained with tears, she told us that the child had started breathing again right after she placed the call and was now acting fine, but she thinks he may have had a seizure. Paramedics arrived a minute or two after we followed her into her apartment unit. While they examined the child, R and I stood in silence. The room was almost completely dark, the only light coming from a cracked door in the rear of the apartment. There was no furniture in the room, only a light cotton blanket crumpled on the bare vinyl composition tiling. A man in a tank top was standing with his back against the far wall, a cigarette in his lips. He hadn't moved or spoken since we arrived, just stared

blankly into the middle of the room like it was miles and miles away. R looked at me, then to the woman, then to the man, then to the child, then to the blanket, and then back again, all in one smooth, sweeping glance. His look had changed when it returned to me, and it was unmistakable. "*See*?" it asked me. Or when I was riding with the tactical team and they had been instructed to sweep an abandoned house that neighbors reported was being used for drug transactions. We made our way in through a back door that had been kicked in. The officers told me to wait while they cleared the house. After a few minutes they called me upstairs. There was trash everywhere; mostly energy drink cans and a few malt liquor bottles, lots of snack packaging, and dozens of blunt wrappers. D looked at me, then to the trash all over the floor, and then to the wall where the name of a local set, suspected to have been involved in a recent shooting a couple blocks away, was tagged in huge red letters. I read the graffiti, recognizing the name, and looked back at him. His face was grave. "*See*?" it asked me.

Or when I was riding with G and we got a call about a possible domestic dispute. We were the third car to arrive and when we entered the apartment unit, we found a young woman sitting on a large sofa looking at the floor while an officer stood quietly before her in the middle of the room. We could hear other officers speaking to a man in the back room, telling him to "just calm down." The officer turned to us as we walked in. Then he looked with apparent amazement around the immaculately clean apartment, lingering especially on the plush sofa and enormous flat-screen TV. As he looked back to us, wide-eyed and shaking his head ever so slightly, G caught and deflected his gaze to an impressive tower of Nike shoe boxes sitting on the floor by a desk. They looked at one another and then at me with that unmistakable look. "*See*?" it asked me. When we returned to the patrol car, G

was grinning from ear to ear. "*See*? You probably thought we make all this shit up, but there they are, living in there for free, getting free food, not working, and they've got *all this amazing stuff!* It's crazy! I told you, they live better than we do! You really *can't* make this shit up!"

Yet another line straight out of police studies, "You can't make this up," or some variation thereof, has become something of a cliché, particularly in the substantial literature on so-called "police cynicism." The typical formulation in this context is that, because the police regularly see "the absolute worst in people, the worst of society" (i.e. things you just can't make up), they tend to become cynical, unable to trust and always primed to expect wickedness in every act. This is said to engender the well-known "us/them mentality," characterized by an almost paranoiac insularity within the ranks ("us") and an adversarial orientation toward both the public and 'management' ("them"). This account follows an "ethical erosion" etiological narrative in which *encounters* with alien and alienating social differences lead officers, who are "idealistic" at the outset, to "lose their faith in people." Like when R and I returned to the patrol car after EMTs decided to take the infant to the hospital by ambulance. He looked agitated, staring through the windshield in silence. "You know, until you see it, you really don't know. Like, I used to think, 'Yeah, let's legalize marijuana, set up dispensaries and tax the hell out of it.' But then you go into these places and see people who are just completely burnt out, like living dead, living in filth, they don't even know what day it is, and you always smell marijuana, and you see blunt wrappers and…Until you actually *see* it, how they live, what it looks like, you wouldn't believe it. Anyway, let's just say I'm not voting for legalization any time soon. The shit you see on this job will disabuse you of all kinds of really great 'social policy' ideas."

The corollary of *solvitur intuendo*, then, is *vide et crede*, "*See* and believe." Because, "until you actually see it, you really don't know." One must be careful not to prejudge, lest one's "idealism" lead one astray, into "political correctness," if not dire peril. In offering the formula of *solvitur intuendo*, I am adapting a response, attributed to Diogenes the Cynic, to a recitation of Zeno's paradoxes. After listening patiently through to the conclusion on the impossibility, and therefore *illusory* nature, of motion, Diogenes is said to have extricated himself from the conversation, muttering as he did, "it is solved by walking." Rendered in Latin, this gives the famous "*solvitur ambulando*." The phrase has taken on many valences, but as an early predecessor to the "pragmatic maxim," the principal meaning still indexes the power of empirical demonstration to neutralize seeming aporias of reason. Here, the path *intuited* by "reason alone" is shown to be errant, while the empirical path "about which one *walks*" can disabuse of such "idealistic" quandaries.

I have chosen the verb *intueor* here instead of the more common *spectare* in order to underline certain productive etymological ambiguities of the term *intuition* and how they relate to questions of visuality and reflection, empirical experience versus rational contemplation. I want to think through this sematic-etymological variability in relation to what I have been calling the *facticity* of racialized space, and what this might tell us about how police officers come to *encounter* the *unchanging givenness* of the very social difference that is (in part) produced *through* policing itself (though I have not yet provided adequate support for the latter argument, which will be pursued in later chapters).

Without attempting a thorough etymological study, I only want to draw attention to the semantic shifts between the Classical Latin *intueor* (prefix *in-* [in this case, "into, toward, or upon"] + *tueor* ["to look at, behold, gaze upon," but also "to care for, protect,

uphold, maintain"]) to the Medieval Scholastic *intuition* ("The spiritual perception or immediate knowledge, ascribed to angelic and spiritual beings, with whom vision and knowledge are identical") and finally to the Modern philosophical usage ("The immediate apprehension of an object by the mind without the intervention of any reasoning process; a particular act of such apprehension"). The *OED*, under this last definition, also includes an entry that reads, "Immediate apprehension by sense; a particular act of such apprehension," and includes the sub-note: "Esp. in reference to Kant, who held that the only intuition (*Anschauung, intuitus)* possible to man was that under the forms of sensibility, space, and time."[22]

It is perhaps obvious, but worth stating explicitly before continuing, that the gesture of *solvitur intuendo*, in the context under discussion, is deployed rhetorically as a refutation by empirical demonstration of the "politically correct" denial of the reality of racial difference; i.e. against those who would claim that race is "just an illusion." Importantly, this does not entail any necessary commitment to a given conception of the origin or underlying nature of racial difference, only that it is there for all to see. However, and perhaps less obviously, we can read the almost ritualized declaration of "You can't make this up!" (you really do hear it constantly) as a verification that the *origin* of that empirically given racial difference couldn't possibly be found in the *heads* of officers (either explicit racism or so-called 'implicit bias'), because this would mean that officers *are* in fact *making* (up) racial difference. But how can they be doing any such thing when even they have to *see* it to *believe* it (*vide et crede*)?

I am not straining to draw these interpretations. Many of the officers with whom I conducted my fieldwork had a great deal to say about the divisiveness of Obama's identity

politics, the menace of millennial multiculturalism, and above all what they viewed as the unfair and dangerous depiction of police as racists by the "liberal" or "left" media, which they argued was emboldening the "leftist agitators and criminals" who of late seemed to be gathering in ever greater numbers and taking to the streets with signs reading Black Lives Matter. Often times following an arrest on a black suspect, officers would call out sardonically things like, "Hey, why you pickin' on him? Man, you racist! You stopped him just 'cause he black! – Yeah! It wasn't because he came running out of an alley with bolt-cutters in one hand and a crack-pipe in the other! – You think that's why you stopped him, but really it's 'cause you racist, you just don't know it because it's in your implicit bias." Such comments, along with ongoing conversations on the above and related themes (of which I will have more to say in the next chapter) provided the extended co-text for the silent ostensive of *solvitur intuendo* described in this chapter.

What I want to point out here, moving to the etymological discussion just presented, is how the rhetorical power of *solvitur intuendo* rests on the identification of *vision* as the source of an "immediate knowledge," an "immediate apprehension of an object by the mind without the intervention of any reasoning process." As we have seen in the previous chapter, it is just such an "immediacy of apprehension" of "something out of place," that some police scholars have attributed to the police commonsense—an uncanny "sixth sense" that allows officers to *see* what is out of place and act on it even in the absence of explicit cognitive processing. Here *vision* collapses into an unmediated *intuition.* But as we have seen in this chapter, modern visuality is itself socially constituted, and therefore historically contingent and politically *mediated*. Neither transcendent nor naively given, visuality is inextricably bound to processes of racialization. Similarly, the sub-note above

reminds us that Kant posited space and time as the only "pure intuitions"—neither originating in the world of empirical experience nor as rational concepts of the understanding, but transcendental forms that are *presupposed* by every singular intuition. But just as with the givenness of vision, the givenness of space and time has been challenged by critical interrogations of the manifold processes through which space, place and time are re/produced through social practices, practices which have moreover since the sixteenth century been inexorably imbricated in processes of racial differentiation.

Crucially, all of this is not to say that space, place and time are mere *illusions*, like something out of one of Zeno's paradoxes. Indeed, when McKittrick argues that the naturalization of racial-sexual differentiation is "bolstered by the ideological weight of transparent space…and the *illusion* that the external world is readily knowable and not in need of evaluation,"[23] she is not asserting that racial difference, nor the necessary and constitutive spatialization thereof, are somehow figments of the imagination. They are very real, deathly real. Similarly, none of the critical scholars that I've cited here deny that the effects of racialization are available to empirical experience. In fact, their critiques presuppose that they are, but always and only as *effects* of ongoing historical processes, never unchanging facts in themselves. The *illusion* that McKittrick decries is not the illusion *of* an external world but rather the illusion *that* that world "is readily knowable and not in need of evaluation," that it is fully disclosed in all of its *facticity—solvitur intuendo*. Rather than a *solution* to a quandary, for the critical mind, facticity itself always presents as a quandary, the fundamental problem of the foreclosure of politics by way an occlusion of history. It is to questions of the disavowal of history, and the traces that it leaves, that we turn in the next chapter.

Notes

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Chapter 4

Untouched by Civilization:

On Disavowal, Responsibility and Facticity (in the Historical Sense)

facticity, n.

1. The property of being a fact; factualness, givenness; ***spec.*** **(in existential thought) the fact of existing in the world or in a situation which is not of one's own making or choosing.**
2. An instance of this property; an unchangeable fact, a given.

-Oxford English Dictionary

Note—"Legacy? No, not really"

"So, looks like my days here are numbered…maybe Friday," Captain S tells me as I slide into the booth across from him. It's the first I've seen or spoken to him since the mayoral election a couple weeks ago. I expected him to be disappointed with the outcome, but I never thought I'd see him looking so utterly defeated.

"Wait, really?"

He pretends to peruse a lunch menu that I know he can recite from memory. He always orders the same thing in any case. "Every month I stay, I'm losing fourteen-hundred dollars. And now with this election—well, let's just say it doesn't look like I'll be getting promoted any time soon. So, it's probably time for me to cut my losses."

He explains that the judge presiding over the ongoing litigation between the police union and the state is likely to move for an injunction on recent pay-cuts that would at least restore education and longevity incentives. This would mean a salary increase of twenty-nine thousand dollars for Captain S, including back pay. But even with the increase applied retroactively to the six months since pay cuts were established, he'd still be making close to twenty thousand less than he had been a year ago. And because pensions are based on

the most recent full year's salary at retirement, he stood to lose a lot by sticking around. "And who knows if that will even come through. It all depends—on whether they screw us in the details. So, anyway, retirement."

"Damn. I don't know what to say. Guess I didn't expect to hear it," I tell him.

"Well I don't want to, but you know with…" His jaw tightens. He leans in like he's going to whisper but instead raises his voice as he shares a rumor that the new mayor has gone to the County prosecutor claiming that Captain S "used the color of office to influence the vote" in recent elections. "And I'm thinking, 'Oh yes, oh please, PLEASE come after me,' because that would just be so purely political, he'd be jumping straight into a retaliation lawsuit. This guy's already got a criminal record. And my record would speak for itself. It would show that I'm the only ACPD commander who actually lives in the city—the only resident—I've got a masters, I've got a spotless record of service and I own two local businesses. Not that any of that has ever mattered around here. V [state appointee overseeing local police promotional process] saw my file and said, 'I guess we'll have to promote you won't we.' And I'm thinking, 'Hah! That's rich! Like merit has ever made a difference in this department!'"

He gnashes his teeth and shakes his head, then looks up to see that our server is about to decide for the second time that she should come back later for our order. His menacing grin morphs into a soft, paternal smile. He chuckles, looking over the menu, "Hmm, I think I'll try the…" He orders his usual. I do the same. She thanks us with a smile, spins on her heels and heads to the kitchen.

S continues, softer now, as if in a reverie, "Ah yes…and for that matter, when has the law ever made a fucking difference in this town? I mean just look at this illegitimate,

fraudulent, criminal election. And you've got everybody from the election board to the AG's office all in on it. And it's always been that way. Yet this city somehow functions in spite of itself." He sighs, "Well, until the state comes in here and…I can't even begin to overstate—heh, no pun intended—the lawlessness of this state takeover. And they just let it happen. I guess it hasn't affected enough people for there to be mass protests. And if it doesn't affect them…I mean, they're thinking 'Yea, fuck those cops! Fire 'em all!' And what we did to justify this, this ire, I dunno…And so they can just come in here and take away representation, take away thirty years of your life, take away all your protections. You know, if you get hurt in the line of duty now, your pay gets cut thirty percent. You got kids going to college? Sorry. Got a mortgage? Too bad. I mean, it's just incredible. But that doesn't matter. As long as it doesn't affect them, what do they care."

"Thirty years is a long time."

"It is a long time, and people don't understand that…it's almost…Heh, uh…Retirement from law enforcement, you know it's almost like you're…err…grieving." He smiles shamefacedly. "It might sound silly, but that's your identity, and you lose that, you know, whatever your reasons are for joining—unless it was always just to get a pension. You know, there's no other power like law enforcement. You're used to always checking people out, watching, listening, like situational awareness, ready to act…then, all the sudden you're just somebody waiting in line like everybody else. That's really hard."

"Probably a little insensitive to ask at the moment, but have you been giving any thought to your legacy?"

"Legacy…you know, like I always say, I'm just mowing the grass. You cut it down, but you'll just have to come right back and do it all over again. My motivation to be a cop

was to, you know, fly the flag of freedom, protect the constitution, lock up the bad guys!" He laughs as he shakes a righteous fist in the air. Our server giggles and pretends to duck as she slides two glasses of water onto the table. When she's gone, S continues. "I told you, I've had four family members victimized by violent crimes. It was always personal to me, I wanted…ah…But then, after a while you realize that you're only ever just fighting to hold back the tide. And it just keeeeeps on comin'. And now with Langford, the whole city is just moving backwards. I mean, his whole campaign was openly anti-police, openly racial, and they still voted for him. We're just moving backwards"

"You mean Gilliam?"

"What?"

"You said Langford."

"Oh, right, Gilliam." This is the second time in our conversation that he's called the new mayor 'Langford,' whose last mayoral term ended four years ago when he was defeated by mayor Guardian, the incumbent whom S supported in the most recent election. "But it may as well be. Whatever progress we've tried to make in the last four years is all erased now. We're going backwards. That's why I've tried to focus on long-lasting institutional changes, but it's always an uphill battle. Like this bail reform catastrophe, and now they want to legalize marijuana in the middle of an opioid epidemic. I mean, you've seen it with these rooming houses. It's almost impossible to make any real changes, and that's even with everybody who matters sitting at the table saying, 'Hey, these places are illegal,' but you still can't shut 'em down!"

"But they're still moving forward on that one, right?"

"Yeah, well, we'll see. But even if it does, nobody will remember how it happened.

Around here, once you're gone, they forget your name in seven days. Another blue suit just gets bumped up to fill in. And whatever I've done in the last two years as commander can be undone in two weeks. Unless it's brick and mortar change, it all just fades away. The only legacy that matters is a brick and mortar legacy. Look at Pitney Village. When they tore that down—it just shows that in one week a wrecking ball can do the work of a hundred police officers working hard for ten years."

Our food arrives. He silently stares into the depths of his little aluminum pale of french-fries for what feels like an uncomfortably long time. Now he looks up and chuckles—"Jesus, man! You're throwing me into a full-blown depressive crisis here!"

"Yeah, I've never asked a soon-to-be-retired cop the 'what's your legacy' question before. I'll think twice next time. That got really heavy, really quick."

He opens up with a boisterous laugh and says, "Hey, you asked!" He dips a fry in ketchup, then straightens his posture, affects a TV camera smile, clears his throat and says cheerily, "My legacy is to have been the very best cop I could be!" Then, dropping the fry and the theatrics, he says, "I've told you before, it's the old saying, 'I'm just out here arresting the grandkids of the people my granddad was arresting.' Nothing changes. We're mowing the grass—always just mowing the grass. So, yeah. Legacy? No, not really."

Facticity in the Historical Sense

In the preceding chapter, I emphasized vision as the primary sensory modality through which the facticity of racialized space is empirically implemented as Common Sense. In highlighting the socio-historical co-constitution of race, space and visuality, I sought to open up an interrogation of the police commonsense—typified as the

preconscious ability to perceive and act upon "something out of place"—beyond the standard "organizational sub/culture" approach. I argued that an analysis of the *facticity* of racial geographies can elucidate the referential grounds of the common *sense perception* that officers call upon to legitimate an unofficial, though not unspoken, departmental policy of "two cities, two police." Through the rhetorical-performative gesture of *solvitur intuendo*, I showed how *facticity*—understood as the empirical givenness of an unchangeable fact—structures officers' own experiences of always *encountering* spatio-racial difference as an alien and implacable burden; as never of their own making, but ever theirs to manage. In arguing that the re/production of this experience of *facticity* obscures the generativity of policing through the occlusion of history, I suggested that a problematization of *facticity* can also foreground questions of historical consciousness and the phenomenology of responsibility. It is to these questions that I turn in this chapter. To do so, I shift emphasis to the more specialized philosophical denotation of *facticity* indicated in the definition heading this chapter: "*spec.* (in existential thought) the fact of existing in the world or in a situation which is not of one's own making or choosing." Now, I'll let Captain S's requiem for a legacy that never was linger while I turn to a discussion of the existentialist-phenomenological idiom of *facticity* in order to draw out its salient aspects for the ethnographic materials that follow.

In their concise genealogical sketch, Raffoul and Nelson trace the idea of *facticity*, as taken up in twentieth century continental philosophy, to the hermeneutic 'life philosophy' of Wilhelm Dilthey, who against the dominant Neo-Kantianism of his time maintained a place for facticity as the inexorable "resistance of the world to consciousness and will."[1] Husserl, in the development of his transcendental phenomenology, initially

sided with the Neo-Kantians in barring such a notion, as it threatened to undermine philosophy's claim to a proper science. However, in his later research manuscripts, Husserl pursued the problematic of *facticity* precisely in order to "engage issues of passivity, alterity, and the ethical within subjectivity."[2] But it was Husserl's prized student, Martin Heidegger, who would take up facticity as the very ground of Being, and therefore of philosophical inquiry itself. Heidegger's 1923 lectures, entitled "Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity," provided the groundwork for what would become *Being and Time*.[3] In the latter, *facticity* appears most prominently in the figure of *thrownness*, Dasein's experience of always already being-in-the-world; the "that it is" of having been "delivered over" to the "there" of existence. Heidegger explicitly distinguishes the ontological-existential condition of facticity from the positivist-empiricist property of factuality, writing: "*Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein's Being—one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximally cast aside*. The 'that-it-is' of facticity never becomes something that we come across by beholding it."[4]

Sartre's reading of *Being and Time* would prove decisive in his own elaboration, in *Being and Nothingness,* of *facticity* as the necessary contingency structuring the "existential situation" of the subject.[5] In Sartre, the irreducible ambiguity of human existence is ontologically grounded in the originary and non-subsumable co-presence of facticity (the in-itself) and transcendence (the for-itself). As in Heidegger, Sartre's temporalization tends to identify facticity with pastness while locating transcendence in the projective future. But herein also lies a crucial divergence that pertains directly to the thematics of historicality and racialization that I pursue in this chapter. Steven Crowell

argues for a critical distinction between what he terms "facticity in the strict sense" versus "facticity in the weak sense." The latter, he argues, pertains to all those historical contingences in which one necessarily finds oneself. These include 'having' a language, a community, a body, a past, an ethnicity, a gender, a race, a time, a place, etc.; all the necessary contingencies of the Sartrean "situation." Such contingencies, however outwardly inscrutable in their totality, remain *in principle* available to both reflection and analysis. By contrast, *facticity* in the strict sense, according to Crowell, "designates that aspect of what situates us that is unavailable to reflection." He writes, "Facticity, considered as the *ground* of the subject, cannot be identified with *any* sort of situatedness: historical, religious, natural, or anything else. Reflection can only acknowledge the radical otherness at its basis—that is, the *fact that* it is incapable of getting to the bottom of what sustains it as a theorizing subject."[6]

Crowell complains that these two senses of *facticity* are too often run together, particularly within what he labels the hermeneutic narrativist tradition (exemplified by, e.g. Gadamer, Taylor, Carr, Dreyfus, Guignon), but also within the Sartrean notion of an authentic commitment to one's 'fundamental project.' He locates the origin of this elision in "an understandable but fatal interpretive slide that equates a moment of Dasein's original temporality with a dimension of historical time."[7] Heidegger, in his elaboration of Dasein as fundamentally temporalizing, delineates three moments of Dasein's ontologico-temporal structure: thrownness (past); fallenness (present); and projection (future). Facticity is identified with the experience of thrownness "as 'already' finding oneself in a world 'beforehand'" so that "'the primary existential meaning of facticity lies in the character of 'having been' [*Gewesenheit*]." Following Sheehan's exegesis, Crowell points

out that "[t]he translation of *Gewesenheit* as 'having been' is misleading, since the term names something that is 'not chronologically prior in any sense.'"[8] Rather than marking a *tense*, *Gewesenheit* instead designates an *aspect*. Namely, the "*a priori* perfect," which has "nothing to do with what I am 'in the process of becoming' or what 'occurred in the past and continues to impact my present.'" *Facticity*, in this reading, does not at all pertain to precedence and succession (i.e. historicality). Rather, "[i]t is what I *always* already am." The upshot, according to Crowell, is that "facticity, as *das Gewesene*, is anti-narrative and anti-historical."[9]

It should be noted that Crowell's intervention is to defend the possibility of a post-Heideggerian transcendental philosophy against what he views as the insidious ascension of philosophical "aestheticism." By recuperating *facticity* as that which remains forever and necessarily beyond reflection (and historical determination), Crowell hopes to salvage a transcendental-ontological ground from the vagaries of historicism. "The 'enigma,'" he writes, citing a famous passage from Heidegger, "here refers to facticity in the strict sense; it indicates to Dasein that in regard to its self-understanding *none* of its knowledge—not even its historical 'heritage'—can be assumed to ground its identity. Dasein is, in this sense, autonomous."[10] Similarly, Agamben argues that "Everything is complicated, in Heidegger, in that Dasein is not simply, as in Sartre, thrown into the 'there' of a given contingency; instead, Dasein must rather itself be its 'there,' be the 'there' (Da) of Being."[11] While it is not my objective to adjudicate in the purely philosophical debate diagrammed here (nor do I have the requisite intellectual credentials even if it were), as already suggested, the stakes that Crowell draws are not at all immaterial to the central concerns of the present work.

Indeed, it would seem that I have already taken a side on the matter of historicism versus transcendence by posing facticity in terms of 'historical consciousness.' This is true, but with several qualifications that I mention here only briefly, as they are treated at length in the theoretical addendum to this dissertation. First, in adopting what I characterize as a broadly historical materialist epistemology (*see* Theoretical Addendum, *esp.* Sec. 2), I reject any claim to a transcendental ground of subjectivity, and therefore knowledge-production (including philosophical knowledge). The correlate of the supposition of an ontological substance/foundation/condition that is prior to and beyond historical determination is the postulation of a transhistorical (i.e. pre-social) ground of subjectivity, which always leaves open the possibility (even when disavowed) of a Transcendental Subject of Knowledge. Instead, I take subjectivity, and thus knowledge, to be historically constituted and socially mediated (i.e. situated without remainder), inasmuch as they are conditioned by the historically determinate social formations within which they emerge. However, this does not entail the abandonment of any concern for truth as such. Indeed, this is the greatest fault that Crowell finds in aestheticist historicism, in which the norms of narrative *unity* and *coherence* displace a commitment to cognitive *validity*. For Crowell, this in turn threatens the conditions on ethical normativity, as *style* becomes the last value standing. While he does not pose it in exactly these terms, Crowell hopes to rescue the possibility of objectivity from intellectual and moral relativism. But a historical materialist epistemology can recuperate a commitment to objectivity against relativism (arguably necessary for ethical/political claims making) while maintaining that the conditions on objectivity remain historically determinate; that is, there can be objectivity within historical contingency. Furthermore, the formulation of "coexistence without contemporaneity"

within a relational totality determined by "structural causality" (*see* Theoretical Addendum Sec. 3) also allows for Crowell's assertion that the subject "is factic just in the sense of being unable to 'view itself from an external viewpoint,'" but without requiring any strong claim to the transhistorical or Ontological.

Second, and relatedly, because socio-historical processes and determinations are *a priori* excluded from "the strict sense of facticity" in which Crowell hopes to ground a transcendental philosophy, racialization becomes posterior and therefore purely accidental to Dasein as self-grounding. As discussed in the Theoretical Addendum (*see* Sec. 1)—and following Weheliye's trenchant critique of the concepts of 'bare life' and 'biopolitical substance'—this serves to relegate racial difference to the domain of 'ethnographic particularity,' such that it can never attain to an object of proper knowledge.[12] The result is that the plane of knowledge proper, and therefore the Subject of Knowledge, is taken to be prior to and independent of racialization. As elaborated throughout the Theoretical Addendum, this is entirely untenable. But does this mean that in order to address race and racialization through the idiom of *facticity* we must adopt a purely historicist-narrativist approach? There are indeed clear resonances between the latter and the currently dominant social scientific accounts of 'the social construction of race.' For if historicist narrativism would take up racial identification and transcendence as matters of creative self-interpretation and authentic disclosure through self-understanding, then social constructionist approaches to race tend to emphasize discursive performativity and the politics of representation. Again, as discussed at length in the Theoretical Addendum, neither can provide an adequate account of the durable and ever-shifting material conditions on the ongoing re/production of racial difference and domination.

But there is an alternative formulation of facticity that neither excludes racialization from the analysis (as merely *ontic* rather than properly Ontological), nor reduces the production of racial difference to narrativity/discourse. Indeed, it is against these two unhappy alternatives that Bernasconi situates his intervention in a provocative essay entitled, "Can Race Be Thought in Terms of Facticity? A Reconsideration of Sartre's and Fanon's Existential Theories of Race." There, Bernasconi worries (along with countless others) that any social constructionism predicated on the ultimate *unreality* of race "can be used to leave in place the gross inequalities of opportunity that are now thoroughly institutionalized" within durable material infrastructures that configure "the uneven distribution of resources" through racial differentiation. At the same time, he argues, "[Heidegger's] idea of facticity, understood both as thrownness and as the 'that it is' of human existence is still too thin to accommodate a notion such as 'race.'"[13]

In order to develop an account adequate to "the existential reality of racial existence within a racialized society," Bernasconi turns to what he describes as "[t]he richer, thicker, fundamentally less individualist and more political notion of race as facticity developed by the later Sartre with Fanon's help."[14] While race as a moment of facticity had been a central preoccupation in Sartre's earlier works, from *Being and Nothingness* and *Anti-Semite and Jew*, to "Black Orpheus," Bernasconi points out that these earlier accounts remained limited to the frame of the "situation" as staged though the "direct relations" of *encounter* between subject and Other. "As a result, his analyses of racism highlight the actions, speech and thoughts of individuals." Even more problematic is the immature Sartre's hyperbolic conception of freedom, authenticity and responsibility in regard to racial domination: e.g. "If it pleases me to consider the anti-Semites as pure objects, then my being-a-Jew

disappears immediately to give place to the simple consciousness (of) being a free, unqualifiable transcendence."[15] Fanon, whose existential analysis of the "Fact of Blackness" was grounded in a critique of the material relations of the colonial system, could respond, "The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man."[16]

Indeed, it was through his ongoing engagement with Fanon's critique (and the *Negritude* movement more generally) in combination with his eventual adoption and adaptation of historical materialism, that Sartre would come to a radical reformulation of his ontology, along with his conception of facticity, in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason.* There, Bernasconi observes, "[t]he existential notion of a 'situation' gave way to the dialectical notion of a system operating as a totality." The attendant reformulation of *facticity* marks a shift from an account of the unrealizable determination of the subject through the Other to the conception of the "contingent determination of the practico-inert field."[17] The latter describes the processes through which historically determinate social formations and their constitutive praxes become sedimented within durable material conditions. In his mature conception of race as facticity, Sartre follows Fanon in theorizing racism as a set of "practices supported by institutions" rather than solely in terms of ideas and attitudes. Concomitantly, his ethics shifts from a conception of authenticity versus inauthenticity to a political commitment to more radical social transformation.

It should be clear from all of this—and taking into account the analysis presented in the preceding chapter—that I am more sympathetic to Fanon's and the mature Sartre's existentialist-historical materialist conceptualizations of facticity than to the transcendental ontological version. However, the foregoing arbitration notwithstanding, it is also not at all

my purpose to distill from this discussion a *pure concept* of facticity that can be *applied* to the ethnographic materials that follow. Rather, I want to mobilize the *idiom* of *facticity*, as deployed in existentialist and phenomenological thought, to open up a broader thematic terrain. For while I have found it useful to address certain hazards of the transcendental ontological account in order to clarify my own position, it is also not at all my intention to dismiss *tout court* Heidegger's seminal meditations. Indeed, his phenomenological account of *thrownness* as disclosed through *mood* opens up a crucial engagement with recent anthropological interrogations of what Deborah Thomas describes as the "production, reception, and circulation of…affective fields."[18] I find these interventions indispensable to thinking the facticity of policing and racialization. But here, rather than signaling a transcendental ontological ground of the subject, I follow Thomas in thinking of affective attunements in terms of an embodied historical consciousness, never prior to or beyond the constitutive processes of racialization (*see* Sec. 3 of Theoretical Addendum).

A concern with questions of embodiment and affect also provides a productive linkage to the idea of *facticity* as elaborated by other thinkers within the existentialist and phenomenological traditions—from Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and Fanon to Lewis Gordon and Linda Martin Alcoff—and relatedly, a staging of questions of responsibility, conscience, and ethics. Crucially, both Heidegger and Sartre locate *responsibility* in the subject's *commitment* to taking up and *answering for* their thrownness into an existence not of their own making or choosing. Raffoul and Nelson remind us that, for Heidegger, the "inappropriable in existence"—*facticity* as disclosed in mood—"is primarily felt as a *weight* or *burden*."[19] For the mature Sartre, facticity as the practico-inert field "is never simply given, but is always something to renegotiate."[20] Though always already delivered

over to the world, the subject is all the same responsible for that world, and therefore answerable to all who share it. Finally, while the empiricist-positivist mode of *facticity* taken up in the preceding chapter privileges spatiality and visuality, the figures of *facticity* traced here—as existential *thrownness* and the material sedimentations of the *practico-inert field*—foreground questions of temporality and historical attunement (the '*historical sense*'), as well as the occlusion and disavowal thereof. It is this thematic constellation of affective attunement, historical consciousness, temporality, and the ethical plane of responsibility and disavowal that I have sought to draw out from this discussion. In what remains of this very long chapter, I rely primarily on ethnographic narration, not to *illustrate* the theoretical figures traced here, but to enliven the conceptual, ethical and affective fields that they inscribe.

Four Throws: On Attunement

1. "Chelsea what?! *Chelsea* who?!"—*Lost*

It's going on 10 when I walk into the surveillance center on a cold January morning. I'm glad to see that H and B are working first shift today. They never seem to mind me watching over their shoulders as they monitor the camera feeds, and they always oblige me when I ask them to narrate their thinking as they do. Even better, these "virtual patrols" often turn into occasions for sharing reflections on "policing back then compared to nowadays," how Atlantic City has changed since they grew up here, and what they miss most about the job. Both retired from ACPD within the last two years, and both were hired back a few months ago to work in the surveillance center as Class II officers. They tell me it's a pretty good retirement gig. They enjoy working together and like feeling close to the

profession again.

H is sitting at the "driver's seat"—the two-tiered, high-tech ergonomic convertible desk is replete with four massive monitors, as are all the others here, but is distinguished by the additional presence of a 'joystick,' dispatch radio unit, and a landline. It is positioned farthest from the glowing wall of 6' x 4' high-definition screens and sits directly behind the two rows of workstations. H and I greet one another, shaking hands. I walk over to B's workstation and repeat the ritual.

"Nothin' going on this morning," she tells me, "and I mean nothin."

"Boardwalk—empty. The Walk—empty. Village—empty. Carver—empty," H chimes in, clicking her mouse to manipulate one of the big wall monitors as she does, providing live footage to corroborate her report.

"So, we're just slackin' today," B grins. "Sorry." I look at the giant flat-screen television mounted to the side wall. It's tuned to "The Wendy Williams Show."

"You're talking to a 30-year-old man who's still in school. What do you know about slackin?" I respond.

"Hey, you said that, not me," B giggles, cocking her head to the side. I log into one of the workstations, continuing to make small talk as I begin updating the spreadsheets that will provide data inputs for next month's Risk Terrain. Within half an hour I've completed the task, and H and B have settled into silence as they busy themselves watching the monitors, checking emails, shuffling paperwork, and glancing at the TV. I don't think I've heard anything come over the radio since I got in. It seems that Wendy is the only one of us who's got anything to talk about. I start thinking it might be a good day to go home and write notes.

Then B calls out, “Man, get off your phone!” I look to the wall monitor that she has just addressed and see two officers from the Tourism District Unit—always conspicuous in their bright highlighter-yellow coats, but truly striking on an otherwise deserted Boardwalk—standing side by side, both with chins tucked to their chests, each with one hand stuffed into a coat pocket and the other holding an iPhone, both apparently as oblivious to one another as they are to the roiling sea behind them and the sedate grey sky above them and the eyes that look down on them and the voice that calls out to them to get off the phone.

“We’re not the only ones slacking today, B,” I tell her.

“Yeah, but you see me, I’m still looking. I’m always looking. And H, she’s always looking. That’s our training. We’re from the old school. I was an FTO my last eight years, and I noticed a big difference with these young guys, man. Like, they’re too relaxed. When we were on the streets, we knew never to relax—”

“Because you might not come home,” H interjects.

“Exactly, but these guys coming out today, you watch them from up here and they’re always on their phones, or they got their hands in their pockets, or they stand too close.”

“What changed?” I ask.

“Honestly, a lot of it is the technology. It makes ‘em lazy. Like all these cameras, it’s great, don’t get me wrong, I wish we had them when I was on the street, but at the same time, these guys out here today, they depend on it too much, so they get lazy. Soon as a call comes out over the radio, it’s ‘Hey, ya’ll get that on camera?’ So they’re not learning how to pay attention and figure it out. Or, like with this RTM, it’s a good idea, but when

we were cops you didn't need anybody telling you where the crime was in your district, because you knew, or telling you to get to know the business owners or neighbors, we did all that. Now it's like, 'Oh there's an app for that.' I mean you can't even get lost anymore, not with GPS and everything. I mean, obviously that's a good thing in a way, but used to if you didn't know where you were going, you had to figure it out, so you learned your way—"

"Mmhmm, like when they'd put us down in Chelsea to punish us," H offers.

B: "Oh my God, and we'd be like, Chelsea what? Chelsea who?"

Me: "Wait, what?"

B: "Yeah, when we first got on, if we screwed up, to punish us they'd put us in Chelsea and we'd be getting lost, not making it to calls—"

Me: "You'd get lost in Chelsea?"

B: "Ok, see, so when we were growing up, you didn't cross Arkansas Avenue if you were black. I mean, you had to, to go to school, 'cause the high school was over on Albany, but after school, you better get straight back home, 'cause if you get caught down in Chelsea—"

H: "Or Ducktown—"

B: "Ducktown—Ducktown, you get beat up. And people would be looking at you, asking you, 'Hey, what're you doing down here?'"

H: "And police…And if you lived on the Westside like we did, you couldn't go uptown either, across Illinois, well, MLK now, because then the project kids would beat you up. Those project girls were mean!"

B: "So yeah, anyway, when we first got on, if we screwed up they'd put us down in Chelsea,

and we'd get lost trying to get to calls, and people down there would be looking at you like, 'Wait, who are you? I've never seen you. Why do I got to listen to you?' And then you've got to be worrying too sometimes about, you know, if something does happen, is somebody going to be there to back me up?"

2: "They hate us up here."—Restless

After roll call, P tells me he's already pulled the patrol SUV around to the front of the compound. He hands me the keys and tells me I can wait for him there, that he'll only be a minute. A few minutes later, he's grimacing as he walks toward the truck. He looks across the lot toward a fellow veteran officer and turns his palms out to his sides and shakes his head. The other officer shrugs and calls back, "You'll be done with this shit soon."

He climbs into the driver's seat and slams the door. He looks annoyed. I ask what's up. "Nothin bud, just same bullshit. I already gassed up. Let's get coffee."

Three minutes later we're sitting at our usual spot in the back corner of Dunkin' Donuts. This is where Alpha Platoon Tour (6 AM – 4 PM patrol) begins. Day shift is comprised almost entirely of veteran officers with at least 10 years of experience. They remind me of TV cops. Not in the feature-length-fantasy-Hollywood-action-movie-spectacle kind of way that some of the younger guys on second shift do, but in the gritty, realist police procedural kind of way. Most mornings we talk about how the state is fucking with them, or how ex-wives are fucking with them, or how the police union representation is fucking with them, or how their old joints are fucking with them. This morning P tell us that Sgt. W is fucking with him by assigning him to District 5, the Northside. Everyone agrees that this must be the case, as Sgt. W "has got problems." I interrupt the surging

chorus of grumbles to divulge that it is I who requested that we be assigned to District 5. Everyone goes silent, and P looks at me like I'm crazy. "What?! Why?!"

"I've only ever ridden in 1, 2 and 3. I just wanted to see the other parts of the city. My bad." Everyone at the table chuckles. P's expression softens and he sighs, "OK, I'll do it for you, bud."

And with that, the jeremiad against Sgt. W recommences, my revelation apparently having no bearing on the suitability of this morning's object of vitriol. Why waste the momentum, I suppose. And so P twists his face into a scowl and picks right back up again, "I remember the last time he put me in 5, just to fuck with me," he recalls. "And when I asked him, 'Serg, why are you taking me out of my district?' [in a most polite and plaintive tone], He just blew up on me, and was like 'I'm your supervisor, and when I tell you to do something, you don't ask me why, you just do it!"

"He's on some kind of power trip," J offers, before relaying a story about how once when he and W were in the academy together, and W was serving as duty officer, he ordered J to "pick up a little piece of fuzz off the floor. And I was like, 'Fuck you! I don't take orders from you."

"Yeah, he's got problems," L replies, "Like at Big River." Everyone nods and grunts in affirmation. They relay the story to me, each interjecting without really interrupting, almost like they're singing a song in rounds and everyone knows their part. They tell me how a "huge black guy on PCP" was standing outside of the bar, Big River, "trying to fight the police, screaming 'I'm the incredible Hulk!" An officer from the K-9 unit arrived and was about to release his dog on the man, but Sgt. W ordered him to stand down. "He didn't want to put a dog on this guy, but he's willing to risk the safety of his

officers, so that just shows you where he's at." Someone else recalls, "Turns out the guy was the chief's cousin or something, so they just let him out of jail." The incident somehow resulted in the K-9 officer suing the department for discriminatory treatment. "And then W went and sued too!" Someone nods, "Yeah, he's always suing, he's got like three lawsuits right now." "Yeah, and then he goes on the news dressed up like Eazy-E, talking about how ACPD is all racist. But he's the racist one!"

Ten minutes later P and I are driving up Pennsylvania Avenue. He tells me he used to work District 5 all the time when he was younger. "Me and C worked it for years. You know C? He's Lieutenant now. Yeah, he's a great guy. We used to know every face up here. I don't know any now. When you don't use it, you lose it, you forget."

As we cross over Absecon Blvd, he tells me, "Well, you wanted District 5, here it is." There's an overgrown vacant lot directly to the right and a beige concrete high rise off a couple hundred yards to the left. The street stretching before us is flanked by low rise housing projects for several blocks. A woman in an old model white Ford Explorer makes a right turn in front of us. P accelerates until we are almost riding her bumper. She makes another right, and then another, before pulling up to the curb. As she exits the vehicle, P pulls next to her, asking through the passenger side window, "You ok?"

"I live here," she answers, looking to the door of an apartment unit where a middle-aged woman stands, nodding her head in agreement.

"Ok," P tells her, and we drive on. We've only been out for about thirty minutes and P is already fidgeting and sighing like a child ready to ask, "Are we there yet?" Then he says, "Oh, I know where we can go." He takes me to an intersection with a four-way stop sign hanging above the street. "I used to get one ticket here every shift back when we

got overtime for traffic court. People always run it." We pull up to the curb behind the corner of an apartment building where we can remain unseen from the main thoroughfare. As we sit and wait, he tells me a story of the time he responded to a homicide call at the convenience store up ahead. As I'm listening, a man passes on the sidewalk. We make eye-contact, so I nod and give a gentle wave. The man just keeps walking. P stops talking as he watches the interaction. He chuckles, "Heh, yea bud, you'll learn not to wave. It's not like in our district. They hate us up here. They teach their kids not to wave at us. When the little kids wave at us, their parents say, 'Don't wave to them, don't talk to them.' Isn't that crazy?"

"But still," I tell him, drawing on my admittedly limited experience riding in a patrol car on the Northside, "most people do wave back."

"I don't think so," he tells me.

"More people have waved back at me this morning than have run this intersection," I smile.

"Oh really?! OK, Lee thinks he knows!" he responds, laughing. "I bet you I can get someone running this intersection before you can get five waves. And I don't mean some half-ass rolling stop either, like run it run it."

"Three people have already waved at me just in the time we've been sitting here. The two older guys walking across the street when we pulled up, and that young guy that came by on the bike." P tells me he wasn't paying attention, but that he trusts me and will count the three, confident that he'll still get a good stop before I get two more.

Just then, a man probably in his twenties, comes walking around the corner and towards us. He seems to look directly at us, but I get the impression he can't see through

the silver reflection of an overcast sky on tinted glass. I nod and give a subtle wave, and he doesn't respond. Then, as he gets closer, P nods and gives a wave, and the man reciprocates. P bursts into laughter, "Oh mister wave can't get a wave," he sings. "I'll even let you have that one. So, you've got four now." Seconds later, another young man rounds the same corner. P watches him intently as he approaches. He stares hard through the windshield, clearly returning my gaze. I nod. He tilts his chin and spits through his teeth without breaking eye contact with me. Just then, a late model Saturn goes barreling through the intersection without even slowing down. P gives a whoop and a holler as we take pursuit, tires screeching and blue lights flashing. I look back to watch the man on the sidewalk turn a full hundred and eighty degrees as we round the corner, his expression unchanging, his stare unbroken. P glances at me, "Told ya, bud, they hate us up here."

3: "Thank God you guys are white cops!"—Abashed

It's past midnight. M and I are cruising down Pacific Avenue when a call comes over the radio: an on-view stop, suspect is a black male, juvenile, he was running with several other youths who were not apprehended. The officer reports that he and another unit are questioning the youth in the rear parking lot of one of the more notorious rooming houses in the city. M and I are only a couple blocks away. "Let's go see what they've got," he says.

When we arrive, we see two officers standing and talking calmly to the teenager, who is nodding his head and looking down at the pavement. He tells them that he is 15 years old and has never been in any trouble before, that he and his friends were not running because they saw the patrol car but were only running from each other for fun.

"Then why did you keep running when we told you to stop?"

"I dunno, everybody was running, and then when I saw ya'll chasing us I just got scared."

The officers seem convinced, and admonish him to always listen to police commands, "That's how people get hurt, man. You know?"

They are about to release him when a voice calls out, "They jumped me! They jumped me!" We turn to see a man marching across the street. He is slight in stature, gaunt and grey-haired in baggy jeans and threadbare tee shirt. He is carrying a broom handle. "I just want to fuck 'em up," he tells us as he approaches. "They stomped the shit out of me. Stomped me for five minutes. Look at me," he cries, pointing to a fresh strawberry on his temple.

The officers put the teen back in cuffs and place him in the car, but the man asks that the teen be handed over to him instead, repeating "I just want to fuck 'em up. The little niggers jumped me, they jumped me." The officers tell him to drop the broom handle and explain what happened.

"I was just walking home and they jumped on me from out of nowhere, just started stomping me. They stomped me good too. I think my nose is broken," he says, pointing to the blood running from his nose.

As one of the officers walks to the patrol car to question the teen, the man paces about, repeating "I just want to fuck 'em up. Look at my nose!" The officer returns and tells the man that the teen asserts that it was he who accosted them, asking if they wanted to buy some 'Heavy.' "That's bullshit. That's bullshit!" the man cries. "I worked at the Beachside Hotel for 17 years, and detective G is my uncle, I'll show you—look he's in my

phone, you know detective G! And my dad, he owns the rolling chairs, and detective G is my uncle, they jumped me! I just want to fuck 'em up!"

The officers tell him that they will not be turning the youth over to him, but that if he wants to sign a complaint, "He'll go straight to juvey tonight."

"Nah, I don't like that, signing charges and all, and then they know where you live, and I got kids at home with my girlfriend, you know? I was just coming home from the store when the niggers jumped me…Like, in the old days, you know, when somebody needed a lesson, didn't sign no charges, right? Aw man, just, thank God you guys are white cops, you know?"

One of the officers glances at me, looking somewhat embarrassed by this. The other two don't react, looking on as if they haven't heard. Just then the man's cell phone rings. He answers, saying "Yeah they got me good, the niggers jumped me—Yea they're here—Yea they got him, yea." He hangs up and tells us again, "Thank God you guys are white cops. Thank God!"

They repeat that if he is not willing to sign a formal complaint against the teen, they will take him home to his parents where maybe he'll "catch hell." "Nah, they don't do nothin" the man answers, clearly disappointed. But he relents, telling us that he understands and appreciates "the work you guys do out here. I know it ain't easy out here. And it ain't right what they're trying to do to you all." He thanks us once more and walks off in the direction whence he came, leaving his broomstick behind.

4: "You can't come in here!"—Unwarranted

It's going on lunchtime when a call comes over the radio: suicide attempt at -- N

Maryland Ave. L keys up his radio, "W1, we'll take that one, from unit south Pennsylvania." When we arrive at the address, a man waves to us from the door. We walk up the stone steps to the entryway where he stands.

"She's upstairs. She didn't do it bad, just a little bit, you know…" As he speaks, he scans the surface of his scalp with his yellowed fingers, ever so delicately, like he's lost something precious there among the straggly wisps of blond hair that hover like sea mist. As he traces with his fingertips, his glassy eyes jerk and bulge—never directed at us, or anything at all it seems—as if they receive only phantom visions transmitted from his ever-scanning finger antennae.

After a few seconds, L announces, "Well, we better go up and see her." With this, the man turns to face us for the first time, directing his shiny red nose first at L, and then at me, and scrunching his brows up like one who can't decide. He scratches his potbelly through his tee shirt and sighs, "Yea, ok, if you guys think we should, you know, I love her…"

We follow him into the landing and up a narrow stairwell to the second floor. The place stinks with the sourness of stale cigarette smoke and the acetone sweetness of alcoholic bodies. "Ya'll been drinking this morning?" L asks the man.

"Yea, I mean, we did…we drink so…she drank a little bit, but…," still scanning with his fingers.

The door at the top of the stairs opens onto a kitchenette with a small, round dining room table. Straight back is a bedroom furnished with a metal-framed, full-sized bed where a woman sits on a bare mattress crying softly. There are plastic vodka bottles all over the place, dozens of them, but arrayed in such a way—empty but upright with their plastic lids

screwed on and their labels still glued on neat and fast—so as to give the uncanny impression of hidden order. The woman holds her left wrist tight. There is dried blood between her fingers and on the legs of her pajama pants. I ask her if I can examine her wrist. "He's a doctor," L announces. "I'm not," I respond, "I'm just a med student. But is it ok if I take a look?" She looks up, her face pale, her eyes swollen behind her glasses. She slowly removes her hand from her wrist to reveal two shallow, horizontal lacerations that have all but clotted. "You're going to be ok," I tell her. "Do you remember what you cut yourself with?" She points with her chin to a plastic handled steak knife lying on the floor in the corner. "I'm sorry," she says. "We're just glad you're ok," I answer.

Meanwhile the man is shifting on his feet, muttering softly, "Why'd you…Why? Don't hurt yourself…We're just glad you're ok."

L listens over the radio and lets them know that EMTs have arrived to take the woman to the hospital. "I don't want to go, please, I don't want to," she begins to plead.

"Do you really think she needs to go, officers?" the man asks.

"Yeah, I think they better check her out," L responds. Then, turning back to her, he coos, "They have to make sure that you feel better and that you don't cut yourself no more, sweetie."

Almost in a whisper, the man tells her, "If they say …then you should go to make sure you don't do it again. We're just glad you're ok. You should listen to…they want to help you."

She continues to protest softly through tears as two female EMTs walk into the bedroom. I make my way into the kitchen to give them more room to work. I'm standing, looking back into the room where L and the man stand side by side watching the medics

examine her wounds. Suddenly, the man's body goes completely rigid and he bellows, "You can't be in here! Don't touch her!" Everyone turns to the man, startled, and sees him peering with great agitation through the kitchen to the door. I look over my shoulder and see that officer T has arrived. The man's face has turned a deep crimson, his nose now the color of an eggplant, as he repeats, "You can't just come in here! Don't you touch her! She's fine!"

Officer T looks bewildered. Apparently, he has just seen the man encouraging the woman in a soft quavering voice to "listen to them…they want to help." He shoots me a quick and subtle "cuckoo" face just as a first responder from the fire department comes up the stairs. As he enters, the man screams again, even louder, "No! No! NO! You don't TOUCH her!" Officer L, still standing next to the man, tells him that he needs to calm down, that she is going to be just fine and that no one is going to hurt her. Officer T looks at the first responder, and then back to the man, who is now panting in a rage as he stands staring at the two men by the door. Officer T and the first responder look at one another and a sudden look of apprehension flashes over their faces. "Ya'll all good?" the first responder asks. L and the EMTs say they are. Then he and T just shake their heads and turn to walk back down the stairs. This seems to calm the man.

"We are born into a world where race and class already exist;" Bernasconi writes, "they are '*the crystallized practice of previous generations*,' so that individuals find an existence sketched out for them at birth. What is petrified in past being also serves as a future sentence that has been imposed on one from the outside: that is to say, it is experienced as having a certain necessity."[21] In each of these vignettes, officers find

themselves thrown into terrains that are always already racialized, and in these encounters, they experience the facticity of race as their own, an interpellation-imposition from the outside, "having a certain necessity." Moreover, they experience their very authority *as* police officers to be refracted through and partially conditioned by the facticity of these racialized terrains. Indeed, as the first two vignettes reveal, this has even been quasi-formalized as a mode of institutional sanction, whether as "punishment for screwing up," or a way "just to fuck with us." So then, is it any wonder that an officer might find completely absurd the notion that they are in any way *responsible* for racial difference, as if policing could somehow be an *origin* of race when officers themselves, *as* officers, find themselves subject to the *facticity* of race?

But then, these vignettes also reveal that these same terrains are always already *policed* terrains. And they offer oblique openings and intimations of submerged historical connections that suggest that this always already being policed is perhaps not entirely accidental to always already being racialized. As when H mutters, "And police…" Or when a man recalls how it was "in the old days when someone needed a lesson" before blurting out, "Thank God you guys are white cops." But in these same moments, we glimpse attunements that are disclosed through what Heidegger might have described as a "turning away." H doesn't finish her sentence. M and the other officers deliberately disregard their interpellation as "white cops." P doesn't remember any faces on the Northside, because "if you don't use it, you lose it." T turns and walks away. In the next three chapters, I move to an examination of how the racial geographies of Atlantic City have been, and continue to be, in large part produced *through* policing, but in what remains of this chapter, it is this "turning away" that interests me. That is, I am concerned with questions of responsibility

and disavowal, with how the occlusion of history and the negation of relation engender an affective terrain in which a burdened conscience speaks from a submerged historical consciousness.

Untouched by Civilization: On Responsibility and Disavowal

Note: 'Untouched by Civilization'

It's well past midnight when K and I walk into Ducktown Tavern for our dinner break. The place is crowded for a Sunday night, mostly with faces I recognize. It turns out a sergeant from the vice squad is hosting his wedding after-party here tonight. "Well, now we know where A was headed," I tell K. On the drive over, as we sat at a red light, A had pulled up next to us in his pickup truck. Leaning from his driver's side window, wearing what appeared to be a tuxedo shirt, with blood-shot eyes rolling around in his ruddy face, he had shouted, "Wuh… wuh… whazzzzzup my niggaaaaaa!" before peeling off through the red light. "He's completely fucked up," K had chuckled. Indeed, he was, as were the several of his colleagues now standing before us. Understandably so, as they took turns hoisting shots in honor of a dear friend and respected colleague on his wedding day. I walk over to extend my congratulations and am greeted with hearty handshakes and 'manhugs.' No one greets K with much enthusiasm. When we get to our table he sighs and tells me, "See that? How they act towards me? It's because I'm not from here. They all grew up together over in the Heights [Chelsea Heights]. I'll never have that, man, and it sucks, because that's one of the reasons you become a cop is for the friendship and camaraderie."

After a couple minutes, Z comes over and joins us at our booth. "Man, I need a breather. I can't keep up anymore. I am drrr-RUNK!" He begins to tell us how he and

several of the men gathered there tonight, including the groom, had been "this close group of like, best friends, since we were kids, you know?"

"Yeah, K was just saying that you guys all grew up together over in the Heights?"

"Yeah but, you know that was a different place back then, now it's…Well, I mean, you know, you live up there. But you don't know what it was like back then, all families, you know, police families, fire families, teachers. It was a really great place to grow up…but now, you know…" His voice trails off. After a second he perks up. "So, what about you, man? You're almost done now, right? Like, getting ready to head off to write your paper and then go be a millionaire doctor. Like, what do you think you'll write about after all this, about all the craziness you've seen in this department and seeing what it's like for these guys out here on the street? Like, what's your paper going to say?"

"Honestly, in terms of an overall 'thesis,' I have no idea. I'll spend at least six months just going through these little notebooks that I've been carrying around for the last year. I've got lots of themes that I know I'll write about, and you already know what a lot of those are because it's the stuff that you all talk about all the time, but in terms of 'tying it all together'—I mean, if you think about it, to tie all this together into something perfectly coherent would already be a gross misrepresentation of the thing I'm supposedly writing about."

"Exactly! Like, what some of the higher-ups tell you is going to be completely different than what the guys that are actually on the street are going to say. I mean, you've been to these commander meetings, it's completely different planets! And then, even for patrol, the special unit guys are going to tell you something completely different than the patrol guys, and some patrol guys are going to tell you something completely different than

the other patrol guys. I don't know what you could say other than this place is a fucking circus and you'd have to go see it yourself to believe it. I mean, some of this stuff, people are going to think you're making it up!"

"Yeah, maybe. But not knowing what you're going to write about until you write it, that's kind of how this sort of research goes. You think, 'I'm going to go learn about this thing that is a thing and that I have lots of questions about,' and then you get there and the thing you wanted to learn about isn't really a thing, or at least not the thing, and the questions you were going to ask don't seem all that relevant anymore. So, you have to just see what happens and then try and put it all back together again after the fact."

"So, it's totally different than you expected, right? And that's what people don't get. They think they know what policing's all about, but until you've seen it, you have no idea. And even, I mean, no offense, but even after all the time you've spent out here, you still don't really know what it's like to be a cop."

"Yeah, of course. But then, based on what you were just saying, you don't really know what it's like to be any other cop, either."

"Hah! See?" he says, looking at K, "I told you. This is the smartest guy I know." Then turning back to me he says, "So, then, like, what did you expect? Like, how is it different than what you thought?"

"Well, I think you remember that I came here saying I was going to do an ethnography of the RTM project as a sort of case-study of what they're calling 'data-driven policing.' But since that never really got going the way I thought it would, part of the research has been to understand why that was the case. As in, why it never really got going."

"I mean, I can tell you part of the reason, and we've talked about this. I mean, I've told you, I'm all for it, honestly. I actually really like the idea of it, but—BUT, and this is going to sound really bad—not if you're going to be politically correct about it just because you're too afraid to say— because you'll offend somebody—so, you call it a laundry mat instead of the projects."

[Here Z rehearses what has become a veritable motto of anti-RTM sentiment among many of the officers in the department who find the consistent identification of laundry mats as a 'high risk geographic feature for crime' to be truly laughable. "Laundry mats," I would hear them say sardonically, "the number one threat to public safety in America."]

Z continues, "So, if you aren't going to be honest about it from the outset— You know where there're no laundry mats? Where there's money. That's just an honest fact. And where you have poverty…if you have that poverty, and you have people who—If that's all you know, and there's no way for you to see any way out, then— I mean, honestly, if I believed that there was no way to get out, because I'm told by everybody and everything and everywhere I look, I would probably be a criminal too, because that's all you know, and that's all you see. I mean, have you been in Schoolhouse [apartments]? I actually feel bad for the people who live there, man! Well, the kids at least. I mean, it's all cinder blocks, there're no windows, it's literally like a prison inside. Those kids are growing up in a prison!"

K chimes in here, "That way when they get to actual prison, they're like, 'Hey, this isn't too bad! I feel at home!'"

Z answers, "That sounds terrible, man, but it's true! So, what they've done, is they've taken these people, and they've made this, this little tribe who— It's like in

Inception, 'An idea is the most resilient parasite,' or something like that, you've seen it. I mean, it's like— Have you heard of Sentinel Island?

Me: "Err, don't think so."

Z: "Really? Oh man, you're an anthropologist, you'll love this. It's this little island off the coast of India, like literally right off the coast of India, and it's been untouched by civilization for sixty thousand years—for SIXY THOUSAND years it's been the same! And it's because the people don't want civilization! People have tried to go there to bring them medicine and tools and stuff, and they just chase them off with spears! Because the mind is the strongest prison— It's like in North Korea, where you see these people kissing the portrait of the dictator and thinking that he is their savior, because they don't know, they're completely cut off from the world! And an idea is a prison. So here you have these people who are told that there is nothing else, and they can't see anything else, so how could they know anything else. But then, THEN, it's all MY fault, and it's all HIS fault [pointing to K], because I'm the one who wants to keep you down. But no, man! I want you to rise up! But it's easier to just blame me, because I'm 'the man.' It's easier to blame it on the cop that you see every day instead of the guy who's up here." His hands hover between us, fingers spread, palms extended, like he's scanning an invisible force field over the tabletop where he has just traced with his finger, first School House Apartments, then Sentinel Island, then North Korea.

Z: "Because the mind is the strongest prison. An idea is a virus—once you believe, no proof can change that belief. And it's like that for everybody. It's like that for me too. I mean, I'm a highly religious person, and no proof is going to change that belief. You can't show me something and make me change that belief. And it's the same with— I mean, the

idea that these guys who have six years on and then have to kill somebody and then it's like, 'See! See! He just wanted to go kill an unarmed black person this whole time!' It doesn't matter that he's been policing for six years, and that he just walked by 10 other black people and didn't shoot them. If the public believes it, the facts don't matter— And that used to work in our favor, because people couldn't believe that a cop could be wrong, and so they had to think that maybe, just this once, this shitbag was in the wrong. But now, man has it swung the other way… Ahhh, anyway man, I'm just talking your ear off. I'm drunk. RTM…I've already told you what I think they should do with them. They should tear them all down and spread everybody out so that they can assimilate. But instead we say, 'Hey, let's do more targeted patrol at the laundry mats' because we're too afraid to tell the truth."

A Burdened Conscience

Z woke me the following morning with a phone call. "Hey, man, did I wake you up? Oh, man, I'm sorry. I just wanted to call and—Last night was crazy, right? I was just talking and talking—Hey man, I didn't say anything, like, you know, I didn't say anything like, crazy, did I? Because I was pretty drunk and, you know—I don't even really remember everything we were talking about, so I didn't know if I like said anything, like when you're just drunk and talking and you just say stuff that you don't really, you know?"

I told him that he didn't say anything I hadn't already heard from him, or any number of his colleagues, on several other occasions. "They call that data saturation in my line of work," I explained. "It means I have to go write my dissertation now." He laughed and then was silent again. "Although, your Sentinel Island metaphor was definitely a

signature spin on the Village," I told him. He laughed again, "Oh yeah, yeah, right. It really is …crazy." And then quiet again.

"Is something on your mind?"

"No, I just, you know—Just please don't use my name, you know, because you never know how people are going to try to take what you say and make you sound like some kind of racist or something, you know? Or, God forbid, you end up in court one day and they go looking for anything they can find against you." I assured him, for what was probably the twentieth time, that I would absolutely never use anyone's name and that the things he said could easily be attributed to any number of other officers and that I would deliberately mis-attribute direct quotations across composite pseudonyms in my dissertation. "You'll retain plausible deniability in aiding and abetting an anthropologist."

"Hah! Ok, thanks man. I just, you know…Hey, you're a really good guy. Let me know if I can do anything for you, seriously." I thanked him, and we hung up.

Such displays of "interlocutor's remorse" became something of a ritual throughout my fieldwork, not only with Z, but with several of the officers with whom I worked most closely. Someone would divulge something—an opinion, an anecdote, a secret, a conviction—and then tell me, "That can't go in your paper," or "Don't put my name on any of this." In the former case, I wouldn't record the disclosure in my notes (nor in these pages, of course), while in the latter I would assure them of their anonymity. But aside from these contextual caveats, I would routinely be questioned as to my trustworthiness in a more general kind of way: a half-joking, "Who you workin' for again?" or, "Look at him, always scratching stuff in his little notebooks." I would in such cases read directly from my notebooks, or simply hand them over to be examined, though this served mostly

to reassure them that my fieldnotes were entirely inscrutable, if not perfectly illegible, to anyone but myself. Or I would deflect with a joke, like "Well I have to write everything down because this stupid vest you guys make me wear rubs up against my mic and the feds can't even use the recordings." We'd have a laugh and move on.

One particularly dramatized inquisition into my ulterior motives was presided over by Z. It was only a couple months after I had started riding on Bravo Platoon. Several officers and I were standing and talking just outside the police-tape perimeter of a shooting. One of the officers was telling a ribald story about an infamous prostitute. At one point I turned away, pretending to take interest in the crime scene photographer, but really, I was tired and in a bad mood, having just returned the previous day from my mother's funeral service, and I was struggling to conceal my revulsion and anger. Suddenly, I noticed that Z was standing at a remove, watching me—not just watching, but *observing* me—and I was startled, and it showed. He walked over, passing through the circle of conversationalists and straight up to me. "You know what this is like, you being here? Have you seen that Netflix movie, *The Voyeur*?" I told him I hadn't. "It's this documentary about this guy who owns this motel where he spies on all the people who stay there, and he films them and stuff. And then this guy makes this movie about him, and he's just like, telling him all about it. I was watching it last night, and I'm thinking, 'This is Lee!'"

"So, wait. In this scenario, I'm a pervert who has a thing for cops?" I asked him, attempting to recompose a comedic comportment.

"No man! *I'm* the pervert! You're the really nice, trusting guy who's like, 'Hey man, yeah it's cool, tell me all about it.' And then you go and make a Netflix movie about how I'm a pervert!'" My heart began to race as everyone turned suddenly very solemn,

waiting for me to respond.

"Waaaait a minute—do you drive a black Infiniti with tinted out windows?" I asked Z, knowing this to be the case.

"Yeah…"

"Well shit! If I'd have known that was you out there every night when I'm getting out of the shower, I'd have opened the shades a little more!" One second, two seconds, three seconds, an eternity, then—

"Oooh, ok! Screw you man! Screw you!" Everyone erupted into laughter. Inquisition averted.

I would adopt this same strategy of neutralizing through humor dozens of times. As virtually every policing ethnography ever written has shown, cops really do have extreme paranoiac tendencies. *Pace* the heartfelt slogans of *esprit du corps* that police agencies circulate among their publics, most of the officers I worked with didn't even trust many of their colleagues and were very open about this. That, combined with a healthy dose of persecutorial thinking, made any pretense to 'ethnographic rapport' tenuous at best. Something as innocuous as a text message alert from a commander appearing on my phone during a lunch break would spur a precipitous litany regarding who I was 'reporting to' and who was 'paying me.' I learned very early on that to be at all dismissive of such anxieties was only to amplify them. So instead, I would acknowledge their very reasonable reasons for concern (given recent pay cuts; given the ongoing spate of excessive force lawsuits; given the state takeover and talk of dissolving the department, along with the union, and assembling a county force; given that promotions were no longer based on the civil service exam; given that they had disclosed things about themselves and their fellow

officers that might result in sanction), and then I would adopt their own tragi-comic orientation to dwelling in an atmosphere of nebulous dread by formulating it into a joke about the ubiquity of imposture and perversity.

That is, rather than insist that they should trust me, I conceded that they had no compelling reason to do so, but that at the very minimum, I was required by my institution to maintain their anonymity and not include things in publications that they had expressly prohibited me from reporting. "Otherwise, I could get jammed up," I'd explain, adopting their own idiom for getting in trouble for not following protocols and procedures. But I also never once had to directly dissimulate my motives—I'd tell them, "I want to hear it straight from you—see for myself what it's actually like for you guys instead of taking for granted what the press releases say, or what the internet says, or what the mayor says, or what criminologists say." And then they'd give it to me. Of course, they'd rarely give it to me *straight*. Their comfort with telling me things that were patently false and easily disproven—by way of a public records request, or through access to the records management system that the department had graciously granted me, or with a simple Google search—was truly remarkable. Some of this comprised the stock bullshit of the trade (e.g. "the average life expectancy for an officer at retirement is five years;" "policing is the most difficult job to get and the easiest job to lose;" "policing is the most dangerous job in America"), and so it was at least plausible that they themselves believed some of these things. In other cases, they were purposefully lying—about their salaries, about departmental policies, about various happenings to which I myself was a direct witness, about the terms of the state takeover, and on and on. All of this presents very obvious problems for evaluating the veracity (and therefore, sincerity) of *anything* that my

interlocutors told me—particularly in contexts in which I was asking for details or clarifications regarding technical matters or concrete incidents.

But here I want to emphasize a different mode of discourse. To wit, rather than focusing on the sorts of (mis)*information* that I *solicited* from officers through explicit questioning, and which were typically offered in the register of *data* collection—e.g. pertaining to discrete and concrete instances or events and evaluable in terms of factuality—I want to highlight utterances that might be construed as closer to what Agha describes as "nomic truths, or timeless truths."[22] Such formulations are characterized by context-independence and non-specificity of reference—as opposed to propositions whose truth conditions are constrained by narrow referential selectivity. It is to this family of utterances that I was referring when I reassured Z that his comments could be credibly attributed to any number of his colleagues (though not all of them). Such utterances circulated widely among my interlocutors and were rehearsed in highly stereotyped fashion across very diverse settings, such that they operated similarly to the inter-contextual 'linking principles' that anthropologist Jeffery Martin explores in his ethnography of 'police culture' in Taiwan.[23]

Crucially, such utterances were almost never prompted by anything like direct, topical questioning. Instead, they were offered up spontaneously, sometimes fervently—with the passion of the testimonial, the torment of the confessional—as if my very presence made them suddenly answerable to queries that I hadn't even posed. And of course, they weren't just talking to me, Lee, 'the college guy doing the RTM thing.' They were talking to 'the them'—the public, the liberals, the academics, the millennials, the students, the suburbanites, the democrats, the civilians, the protesters, the beneficiaries of their untold

sacrifices, the scrutinizers of their every move, the adjudicators of their vocation, the innocents who would never have to know the things that they knew. But the things that they wanted to say the most were the same things they knew "nobody wants to hear"—the "truth" that "everyone is afraid to say," but that they had no choice but to face. And so these same circulating utterances were taken up and then immediately disavowed—"Don't put my name on any of this." The following vignette of a conversation I had with several officers early on in my ride-alongs is exemplary; that is, it is entirely unexceptional.

Illicit Inhabitations

Note—"Communities?! That's not what those places are for!"

It's going on 10 pm. U and I are sitting in his patrol vehicle outside of the Emergency Room where a suspect has just been taken following a use-of-force arrest. V and Z are standing by our squad car chatting with us through the driver's side window. Several people have gathered in the parking lot by the ER entrance, including a woman who is on the phone crying, "Get down here now! The police just beat your daddy! We're at the hospital—get down here! Yes, just now! They beat him up!" A man is pacing back and forth next to her, his fists clenched by his sides, his whole body flexed. He's shouting, "Yo, what the fuck! What the fuck!"

Z calls out across the parking lot to him, "Hey, come on, man, don't do that, please. Just, come on, man, be cool. Don't get involved."

"Maybe daddy wouldn't get beat if he would get a job and stop selling crack and trying to fight the police," U volunteers, as if talking to himself. "But no, you're right—it's probably just because we're all racist."

Z looks at U uneasily, and then at me. “Everybody wants to use the race card for everything now, but humans are humans, man, we’re all the same.”

U replies sarcastically, “But we all have different ‘cultures’ and we have to respect all the wonderful cultures, even if in your culture all your role models are drug dealers and criminals.”

Z shoots him a look, like he should be more mindful of what he says. Then he tells me, “You probably think we sound terrible, right? But you know, this job is just really stressful, and you have to be able to blow off steam.”

“Oh yeah, the gallows humor thing—there’s a lot written about that in medicine too,” I tell him.

Z: “Exactly! I mean, it sounds awful, right? But you see how it is out here. Like that guy literally just tried to fight a cop, like tried to hurt a police officer, and now they’re standing over there saying, ‘Why’d ya’ll beat him up? Why are ya’ll messin’ with him?’ But I mean, that’s our job—if you’re breaking the law, I have to arrest you. I can’t say, ‘Oh, ok well I just won’t enforce the law because in your culture this is normal.’ What?! That’s crazy. I mean, the law is the law. Right? I don’t make the law. You could say that in Italian culture we’re all murderers and mafia guys, but I go to church and eat dinner with my mom…But I’m looking at you and I bet you’re thinking we sound terrible.”

Me: “That’s really interesting, actually, how you’re talking about it in terms of cultural difference. I was just reading a book about how multiculturalism in cities makes law enforcement more complicated, especially with things like nuisance property laws and stuff.”

Z: “Yeah man, exactly. Like, culture is great and all, it’s what has made this country great, but it can’t be this culture and that culture, you know, we need to be one big American culture. People have to assimilate, you know?”

U: “Like when my great-grandfather came here from Poland, he wasn’t Polish anymore. He was American. He assimilated. He decided he wanted to be American, which means there were things about his culture that he had to give up, but that’s the cost of living here.”

V: “People say, ‘Oh, we have the highest prison population in the world. It must be the criminal justice system. It must be the cops.’ Well has anyone stopped to think that maybe, just maybe, it’s the people?”

U: “It’s rap culture—their only role models are drug dealers and criminals. I was at a police community picnic in Brown’s park a few weeks ago and they’re playing music and I all the sudden I hear, ‘I stick it in my sock while I’m running from the cops,’ and I look up and it’s the fucking sergeant of the Community Policing Unit at the DJ booth. And I’m thinking, ‘Are you insane?!’”

Z: “But it’s not just rap culture. When you’re taught by literally everything around you that cops are the bad guys, you know— It’s the media, it’s the government, the President of the United States for the last eight years for God’s sake! You don’t just come up with values and morals. You have to learn that. But if you don’t know anything else.”

V: “But is that the culture, or is it society? You talk to these guys, and they’re like, ‘Okay, why would I go work for seven dollars an hour when I can make ten times that not working, and not lose my free housing or my food stamps, and then still work my side hustle so I can get my Jordans. And you see them out here wearing a twelve-hundred-dollar outfit. Their clothes cost more than I make in a month. They dress better than us! He’s got the

Jordans, the Gucci belt. But who's fault is that? Is it their fault for not working, or is it the society that allows that to happen?"

Z: "Exactly! I always think of this example. Every year when it snows, you see them coming out with their snow shovels, ready to shovel snow, right? But then, they don't shovel their own walks, because there is a company that comes and does that for them. Instead, they go around asking if they can shovel other people's walks for money! And it's like, 'Shovel your own snow!' But why would they ever do that when they've got somebody to do it for them?"

U: "A bulldozer five blocks wide and our crime rate would plummet. But anytime they tear one of these shitholes down they just build two more next door and move everybody in."

Z: "That's the thing—you have to spread them all out. Because you can't have them all just concentrated together, otherwise they can't assimilate. The way it is now, these places are basically just prisons for poor black people. You really have to just tear them down—But then you know what people are going to say?—'Oh, you're destroying black communities.' But, you know, I used to think that people lived in those places temporarily, while they were getting their lives together. But I started going to those meetings up there—you've seen me there, you know what I'm talking about—and you're sitting there listening to people saying, 'We want this to be a strong community for our children and grandchildren to grow up in, just like it was for our parents and grandparents.' And it's like, Communities?! That's insane! That's not what those places are supposed to be for!"

I sit listening, nodding, scratching things in my notebook, very openly, even repeating softly some of the phrases I'm jotting, trying to get everybody used to the idea.

Z: “Please don’t use my name in any of this, you know, or— People take stuff out of context and say that you’re some kind of racist or…But I mean, I didn’t even say anything about race, right? We’re talking about poverty. That’s what’s crazy—you never know how they’ll try to make you look two years from now when you’re in court.”

I tell them that they have guaranteed anonymity, and that they’re also not telling me anything I haven’t heard before from others in the department. “But if you want, I can also scratch these notes out and not use them.”

V: “I mean, it’s all true, so…as long as you’re not writing names in this shit, then— But fuck it, because really, people already know it anyway, even if they don’t want to say it because it’s not politically correct, right?

I don’t make the law, *right*? I have to do my job, *right*? It’s not me, it’s society, *right*? That’s not racist, *right*? But you already know all this, *right*? Clearly, these are rhetorical questions. But then, if I already know, why insist upon it? And if *they* already know, what does it even matter whether I know? Why the suppliant refrain? It’s not like I asked. Beyond the very obvious rhetorical function, might such exhortations signal a genuine, if submerged, questioning of one’s responsibility? Might we read in these strained repetitions the searching of one who feels answerable to a burdened conscience? *This isn’t my fault, right? Right?*

Surely, none of what has been documented here would come as a shock to anyone who has spent much time in a police department, or who is familiar with the police ethnography canon. For that matter, nothing here should surprise anyone who has been exposed to mainstream American conservative ideology: the idea that ‘entitlement

programs' breed dependence which then breeds criminality; the specter of self-propagating moral depravation and cultural pathology; the insistence that talk of racism ('the race card') is itself racist; and above all else, the scourge of political correctness. And it's true that I'd already heard these same sentiments expressed by ACPD personnel in several other contexts. On an early trip to Atlantic City, the year before I began full-time fieldwork, I had attended a commanders' meeting in which the RTM research team were berated for "not even putting the projects in the crime maps, when that's where all the criminals live!" When the researcher presenting the data explained that public housing had been included in the initial analysis but was not identified as a significant risk factor for crime, someone responded curtly, "You need to check your data." The researcher answered that they were only using the data that the police had themselves provided. The same commander retorted, now apparently annoyed, "Then the data is wrong!" It was also on this occasion that I first heard the prescription for a "bulldozer ten blocks wide."

But this isn't really the point I'm trying to make either. Instead, I am gesturing toward what might be read, borrowing an idiom from psychoanalysis, as a sort of *denegation* that runs through the ethnographic materials presented here. That is, I am concerned with what is disclosed through a disavowal of responsibility that gets articulated specifically as the occlusion of history and the negation of relation. By the occlusion of history, I mean the insistence that the Northside has remained unchanged since time immemorial; that the passing of generations there marks not the temporal flow that defines a community, but a holding pattern in which time itself stands still. Here, the Northside is paradoxically cast as historically given yet ahistorical. Historically given, inasmuch as it is in large part the outcome of state sponsored programs of socially engineered welfare

dependence over which the police have no control. Ahistorical, inasmuch as the Northside is devoid of its own history, a void *in* history. There is no development on the Northside: no cultural development, because "they can't assimilate," and "people don't just come up with morals and values;" no property development, "because why would you if you had someone to do it for you." Capital does not move through the Northside's public housing (so it is believed) and so time does not move either. All that can be done is to tear it down—bring on the wrecking ball, the bulldozer ten blocks wide. By the negation of relation, I mean the assertion that the Northside is "cut off from the rest of the world," "untouched by civilization," such that the police are figured as the civilizing process itself, while the Northside is marked off as a that which remains as yet untouched by this movement—an open frontier beyond civilization and therefore *outside* of police. By the occlusion of history *as* the negation of relation, I mean the claim that "arresting the grandkids of the people my grandfather was arresting" signals the *absence* of legacy rather than legacy itself.

On Inheritance and the Disinherited

Captain S had plans of becoming a doctor when he went off to college. But then, in his second semester, an upperclassman recommended that he take bacteriology. "It was a bunch of PhDs, and then me, a freshman. So yeah, I failed that." He took a new major in political science. "I liked politics," he tells me. After college he started a business venture with his brother. They would drive up and down the East Coast, stopping at all the little resort towns, "from Newport, Maine to Key West," selling their sister's hand painted souvenirs and trinkets, mostly depicting lighthouses. "It was awesome, every night in a

different great little town. But it didn't last, you know, making cold calls." This was after S had already sought out recruitment from the FBI, "But they told me that I was a dime a dozen, that I needed to get some real-world experience. I asked them the best thing to do, and they told me either law school, or get a CPA. So, after the whole selling art thing fizzled out, I took the LSAT and did really well. Like really, really well, like 85th percentile or something."

He hated law school. "And then, Desert Storm breaks out, and I'm thinking, 'Law school is the last thing I want to be doing with Desert Storm going on.'" A visit from a JAG recruiter convinced S that he should sign up for the Marines Corps Officer Candidate School. "But then I failed the physical because I had pins in both my legs—one from a soccer injury, and one from hauling a drum of ammonium while I was working here for my dad. But the doctors never took the pins out—so when I went back to the doctor, they told me that the pins make the bones even stronger, like rebar. But yeah, they didn't buy the rebar argument, so they told me I could join up with the enlisted men. And I'm thinking, 'Wait, sign up with the jarheads? Be the smartest guy there? I mean, I guess there's something to the big fish in a small pond thing, but, yeah, no." So, he returned to law school, only to finish the first year with a 'C-' GPA, "And they told me I needed at least a C+ to move forward. So, I was going to have to retake the whole first year. And I'm thinking, 'I've already got forty thousand in debt from this thing, and the last thing I want to be doing with Desert Storm going on is to be some lawyer.'" He dropped out.

At the time, his father had just bought a new boat and was running charters out of the Florida Keys. S joined him there to work as his skipper on deep sea fishing expeditions. "But the whole time, there was still this law enforcement thing in the back of my mind."

He had taken the civil service exam before leaving for the Keys. "And I scored in like the top ten or something ridiculous. So, I had been down there doing the fishing thing for about a year, and I still remember when the ACPD captain called to offer me a job, he said, 'You want to come back up here and start making sixty-thousand a year, or you want to stay down there catching fish?'"

He joined the force, but not just for the money. "Did I ever tell you about why I wanted to be in law enforcement? I had kind of personal axe to grind. Me, my brother, my sister and my dad were all victimized by violent crime when I was a teenager back in the early 80s. My dad used to gamble some, and when he'd gamble, he'd drink. One night he took a blackjack to the head and a metal pipe to the arm, and then they left him in the street to die. When I saw him in the emergency room all bloodied that night at two in the morning, I just lost it— I punched a hole through the wall. Then, when I was 15, my sister was waiting at a bus stop one night. Five grown men, well, four men and one woman, four black guys and a white woman—and you can bet they didn't report it that way in the papers—walked up to her and tried to take her bag, and one punched her in the face and broke her nose. And then, I got mugged just a few blocks from here on my way home one night. Somebody blackjacked me in the head and took my bike. And I was just, I was in shock the whole walk home. But by the time I got home I wasn't in shock; I was just angry. I picked up a galvanized steel pipe and I looked at my brother and said, 'let's go.' He took one look at my face and he understood. So, we jumped in the van and went out looking for the guy. We pulled up next to a bunch of people—we probably looked pretty terrifying, thinking back on it now—but we couldn't get a positive ID. You know, that's the thing with eyewitnesses."

"Not very reliable, eh?"

"Terrible. Anyway, I even remember pulling up to a cop, it was a black cop, and saying, 'We're going to find the guy and kill him,' and the cop said, 'No, you're going to get yourselves killed, you need to go home.' So yeah, that's why I joined. And you know, I've always wanted to, I don't want to say revenge, but I guess, validation, or, I just always wanted to catch somebody, you know, in the act, doing that to somebody, so I could finally— But, it never happens. You keep looking, but you always get to the victims after its already happened, after the heat of the moment, and it's just not there…"

We're sitting on his porch as we talk. Earlier, we walked the grounds of his several properties; seven buildings in total, spread across six waterfront lots, most of which had been in the family for at least two or three generations. As we walked, S gave me a brief history of each one. There was the little bungalow style house that originally served as a small chemical factory where his grandfather had worked. "Then he got tired of working in the factory, so he and my grandmother opened up a little café and bar called [--], down on [--] Ave and [--]. That placed burned down one day when a drunk deliveryman knocked down a powerline. Luckily they had a good insurance policy and got a pretty nice payout." I ask him what decade this was, playfully insinuating foul play by telling him that I've heard fire insurance pay-outs had become a boom industry beginning in the 60s and 70s. "Oh yeah, there was a lot of that over in the Inlet, but this one wasn't the Jewish lightning—this one was real. But it was when the casinos came in the 70s that property values just skyrocketed. They sold that lot, and that was the first, you know, 'Big Thing."

The bungalow building is just storage now, but he tells me, "It's where we all grew up until it was time for me to go to high school, and then my dad was like, 'Hmm, do I

really want my son to be the only white kid in his school?' So, we moved down to Ventnor and lived here just in the summer to run the business." S and his wife now own the business, after buying out his three siblings following a somewhat acrimonious mediation process. "Never agree to inherit any joint properties without getting all the formal contracts in order from the get-go. You think, 'Oh, we're family, it'll all work out.' It won't. Believe me." He and his wife had also just recently opened yet another small business in a large building that his father had purchased back in the 50s. We finished up the tour down at the old boat house that his great-aunt had purchased way back in the 1910s. "I lived there for free in the summers when I was in college. You can imagine the great parties we had." He owns the place now, but rents it out, as he does the big house that neighbors his own.

As we sit on the porch, finishing off our second round of beers, S has fallen into one of his silent, sullen moods. I've seen him this way before—almost every time we've spoken at any length, actually. It's the place of dark brooding to which his own voice always leads him—but only after tracing each time the same ecstatic arc. I've come to think of him as master of his own genre. Every time we meet to 'catch up,' he approaches me with the same caution, sizing me up, squinting at me while speaking in monosyllables that stretch and climb and dive over several seconds; the prosody of one who wasn't born yesterday. We start from the beginning, strangers. Then, a felicitous joke is made, his booming laugh explodes the distance, and we set off on one of his wistful remembrances. But these always pass vertiginously from droll chronicles of adventures past, to the frustrations and disappointments that it turns out were always already waiting there at the end. And just as his anger threatens to boil over, he offers up a stolid epigram to his oratory, an aphorism that suspends the climax, revealing it to have always already been in

suspension, and thus no kind of climax at all. The movement was only an illusion of the narrative the whole time.

This evening, as the sun goes down over the bay, I will hear for the first time one of his favorites: "I'm only arresting the grandkids of the people my grandad was arresting," he sighs. After a moment of silence, I ask him, "So then what do you do about that?"

He gives me a bemused look, like I'm a naïve child who has just said something precious. "Well, you'd have to start by getting to these teenage girls, and somehow get them to stop having more babies," he tells me. No longer brooding, he is now speaking with the purpose of someone setting out the details of a joint venture. "Because, if you think about it, every one of these guys is having at least 2 or 3 kids, and at least two thirds of them go the way of the father. So really, there's just no way you're ever going to get ahead of that unless you finally just say, 'Okay, look, after the second kid, if you're still on government assistance, you're done.' You know, they can do a…" He trails off now. He looks at my face and says, "But, you know, then I guess that starts sounding too much like the Nazi days."

"Right."

"So you've got to find some way to convince these teenage women not to have children until they can support them. You've got to say, 'Listen, there's a better way. You can get out of this.'"

"How?"

"You know, one of the greatest things that the State of New Jersey ever did was when they reformed the welfare policy so you don't get additional welfare benefits after

the second child. The rate of teenage pregnancies in New Jersey dropped dramatically after that."

"When was this?"

"Oh, back in the early two-thousands maybe—not too long ago. You'd have to look it up. Oh! I never told you about this. I used to have a scanner in my car, and I'd park up here in the projects and listen to the old radio phones and the baby monitors. Of course, I couldn't use anything I heard legally, but I'd just listen to see what I could get on people. Anyway, I was up there one night, listening, and I hear, 'Hey, you hee'ya bou' Jonique?' 'Wha'bou Jonique?' 'She havin' a'notha baby!' 'She doin' what? What she thinkin? That a no-money baby?' And I thought to myself, 'God, I wish I would have been recording that!'" He looks at me for a reaction to this testimony.

"Holy shit," I respond. [This is a psychological device I've developed, one that is of admittedly dubious ethical status—A cop will tell me something that I find reprehensible, and then prompt me to respond. In order not to disclose my distaste, which would be to foreclose any further candid conversation—and so, in the name of the suspension of ethical judgment in the service of 'scientific inquiry'—I would offer an ambiguous response which I could mentally attribute to the-cop-telling-me-the-thing but that I knew would be interpreted as a response to the-thing. Here, I am saying, 'Holy-shit-you-are-telling-me-very-candidly-about-spying-illegally-on-project-dwellers-just-to-see-what-you-could-get-on-them-and-you-also-just-spontaneously-endorsed-negative-eugenics-and-I-am-supposedly-someone-around-whom-you-are-very-guarded-and-god-*damn*.'] He looks satisfied with this rejoinder.

"But, short of getting them to stop having babies, you have to get more of these kids away from these unfit mothers. I mean, you go into these places and there're bugs everywhere, and shit piled up, and roaches crawling over the dirty dishes in the sink, and babies with full diapers, and you think, 'How do you animals live like this?' It's like there's no self-respect, no morals. And all of that goes back to the family, and to dependence on government hand-outs. Have you read, well I'm sure you have, you've probably read everybody, but do you know Charles Murray?"

"Bell Curve?"

"That's the one. You know he says that we have to put the shame back in government dependence. And it's true. I used to arrest these guys, and I'd say, 'Man, why don't you guys just get jobs?' And they'd say, 'They ain't no jobs out here, man, ain't no work!' And I'd say, 'Just get a job doing anything, picking up trash for Christ's sake! *Something*!' And they'd say, 'I ain't doing that shit!' And I'd think, 'So you'd rather be getting a hand-out from the government?!' Where is the self-respect? As terrible as it sounds, people need to starve to death in this country to, you know [moving his hands around his head as if he's voguing], reset the frame. If a mother has to look at her baby, starving, and realize, 'This is my fault, not the government's fault. Nobody else's fault. My fault. I did this.' Then they'll finally wake up. Because it all goes back to the family and the lack of morals, the lack of values and self-respect."

"What sorts of values? Because of course they value some things—everybody does."

"Oh, I dunno, maybe not having children out of wedlock for one thing! And don't get me wrong, we all know successful, good people that have had children out of wedlock,

but you to still have to at least have respect for the *ideal*. And you know, it's one thing if you've got the family support to do it. But self-respect means refusing hand-outs. If you're saying, 'I'd rather get a government check than earn an honest living,' then you're a scumbag and you're part of the problem."

Historical Attunement, Ethnographic Presence: Pessimism, Stultification and Responsibility

Here is a cop. He is looking at the projects. He is saying, 'Those people never change.' And here is a police ethnographer. He is looking at the cop who is looking at the projects. He is saying, 'Those cops never change.' Both participate in the occlusion of history, the negation of relation.

In the presentation of these first four chapters, I have attempted to unfold a certain cartography of attunement, the coordinates of which map the mood, or 'state-of-mind,' in which I found myself throughout much of my fieldwork. In the first chapter, an interminable repetition exposes the farce of innovation. Nothing ever changes in the mythical space-time of an eternal and implacable antagonism. Time and movement are mere illusions. Pessimism prevails. In the second and third chapters, I find that I might just as well have stayed at home, since it turns out that cops only say and do the things that we already know them to say and do from over half a century of police ethnography. Nothing changes: "Move it along, nothing [new] to see here." Stultification suffocates. Finally, in this chapter, misery finds good company; mowing the grass again, setting the same tired scenes again. We speak in aphorisms. The pointlessness of it all tempts fatalism, an ethical abandon into the freedom of futility. But still, something calls us to answer for this world…

In a recent essay, anthropologist Jeffrey Martin offers a compelling redefinition of *police culture* as "a process through which structural violence is translated into overt, tangible form."[24] He draws upon Galtung's seminal distinction between structural violence and personal/direct violence to interrogate how, in the context of police homicide, the deployment of the police culture concept "displaces agency from a specific individual onto contextual circumstances."[25] He takes as a case study the murder of Michael Brown by Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri and the investigative and juridical proceedings that followed upon the ensuing mass demonstrations. He writes,

> The "metaphysics" that allow structural violence to flourish beneath the moral pretensions of polite bourgeois liberalism are the absence or denial of self-consciousness…Police action marks a limit to this denial, the point at which invisible structural violence becomes visible as direct violence. To become an agent of state violence is to renounce the bourgeois comforts of denial. People like Darren Wilson exchange the moral comfort of false consciousness for a set of powers undeniably implicated in the dirty work of domination. When the circuits of visibility created by their overt violence threaten to expose the larger structure of domination, the system deploys "police culture" to protect itself.[26]

Central to Martin's analysis are questions of the responsibility for and disavowal of the "the weight of structural violence immanent in America's ongoing history of racialized dispossession." Specifically, he seeks to elucidate how the police culture concept is deployed to supplement the denial of consciousness in cases of spectacular racializing violence in which routine concealment becomes untenable. Echoing, but in a different register, the observation by Benjamin that police violence is a hybrid form that combines law-making with law-preserving violence, Martin argues that "[t]he police, as an order-

keeping institution, are situated at a specific juncture in the processes that mediate between the distinct spheres of personal and structural violence. They are engaged in violence as labor." Here he is following Galtung's observation that police violence always constitutes "a productive relation," the institutionalization of which also provides for the denial of authorship, and therefore culpability:

> The violence of the police is personal by our definition, yet they are called into action by expectations deeply rooted in the structure—there is no need to assume the intervening variable of intention. They simply do their job.[27]

I don't make the law, right? I have to do my job, right? It's not me, it's society, right? That's not racist, right? But you already know all this, right? This isn't my fault, right? *Right*?

"Racism," Bernasconi writes, "can be sustained without being owned: it can be sustained by a collectivity through always being the attitude of another."[28] This is because the facticity of race is undergirded by the "passive material syntheses" comprising the practico-inert field. He gives Sartre's example of the employer who beats his worker because "that is what one does," and the worker who submits to this violence for the same reason. But the practico-inert field is never simply given. It is sustained through durable, if always contingent, socio-material formations which are in turn constituted by praxes that necessarily outstrip the very structures that they iteratively reproduce. This is why the practico-inert field is "always to be renegotiated."

It is within the emergent and contested terrains potentiated by political praxes of renegotiation that Sartre locates both responsibility and freedom. Freedom does not mean

the power to choose one's situation—this is always already foreclosed by the necessary contingency of facticity. Rather, it means to take "responsibility for the situation in which one finds oneself, indeed the whole world, including the freedom of others."[29] It is the denegation of this freedom, and therefore one's responsibility for it, that Sartre identifies with the unethical. Here, we find clear resonances with Heidegger's own distinction between a proper and improper relation to one's facticity. For Heidegger, Dasein's most natural orientation to the facticity of existence is *fallenness*, the turning away from responsibility for one's thrownness; the dissolution into the crowd, into the 'they-self,' the self that does 'what one does.' *I'm just doing my job*. This is the improper mode of taking up facticity into existence by casting it aside, whereas the proper mode is defined by taking *responsibility*, and thus *answering* for one's thrownness. As Raffoul and Nelson argue,

> I am responsible because I am thrown in an existence that I do not originate yet which I have to answer for. To be thrown (facticity) means to be called (responsibility), they are one and the same phenomenon, such that Heidegger could speak of the "Facticity of Responsibility." Ethical responsibility is brought back to facticity as its most essential resource.[30]

I want to think this ethico-existentialist problematic of facticity-as-responsibility together with Martin's concern for how the 'police culture'—operating as the displacement of agency and recuperation of denial—mediates between structural and direct modes of violence. Here, the historically determinate terrains into which police officers are thrown can be formulated as practico-inert fields whose durable configurations in structural violence are always conditioned by the ongoing elaboration and deployment of more direct,

visible modalities of racializing violence which are enacted *through* policing. But it is precisely because such violence is constantly referred back to the facticity of the always already racialized terrains within which it is deployed (and through which, as we have seen, the imbrication of the police commonsense within the Common Sense is implemented), that the generativity of police remains obscure. I say generativity because, as a mode of praxis, policing always outstrips the "passive material syntheses" within which it is embedded. That is, police violence is *productive*, and not merely *reproductive* (i.e. repressive), even if this productivity is experienced as always inappropriable to officers themselves.

This concealment of the generativity of policing is coextensive with a disavowal of responsibility that is articulated through what I have described as the occlusion of history and negation of relation. This is where the ethico-existential "call" to *answer* for one's thrownness converges with the problem of historical consciousness. And it is here that the temporal frame of ethnographic presentism provides what, following Laurence Ralph, we might call a "methodological alibi." Ralph argues that, in asserting that empirical data on extralegal police violence is difficult to obtain because the object of inquiry is so rare (i.e. exceptional), policing scholars partake in the "knowing what not to know" that is necessary to the reproduction of the "public secret" of police violence. He writes, "This claim explains police violence by explaining it away."[31] My concern here is distinct, though not altogether unrelated. To wit, I want to argue that the synchronic temporal frame of ethnographic presentism risks reproducing the stultifying appearance of nonmovement which is essential to the concealment of the generativity of policing. The rehearsal of empirical accounts in which officers appear to be saying and doing "the same old thing"

(i.e. the content of an abstracted police culture) across time and space produces the illusion that police are only ever *reproducing* by way of *repression* that which was always already there, never of their own making.

It was this alibi that my interlocutors mobilized when they enrolled me as a witness to the empirical facticity of spatio-racial difference—*solvitur intuendo*—and, likewise, with their burdened entreaties for an expiation by proclamation of powerlessness—*I don't make the law, right?* While the former seeks to marshal the empirical veracity of ethnographic realism—*you can't make this shit up*—the latter summons the temporality of the ethnographic present—*untouched by civilization*—and the nonmovement of sociologic synchrony—*only mowing the grass*—to generate an image of eternal repetition without difference, without responsibility—*Legacy? No, not really*. This is what I mean when I say that police ethnography risks reproducing the occlusion of history and the negation of relation. So, what is to be done for an anthropology of policing?

This is precisely where Martin's intervention becomes vital. Following Paul Farmer, he reminds us that the empirical frame of presentist ethnography remains inadequate to a critique of police violence inasmuch as it lacks the historical depth necessary for an analysis of structural violence. In the presentist frame, police violence appears only to disappear in a paradoxical oscillation between *event* (spectacular, exceptional) and *repetition* (police culture, a nonevent), while the relation of police violence to the re/production of durable but ever shifting terrains of structural violence (i.e. the generativity of policing) remains ever obscure. Like Ralph, Martin is concerned with how police ethnography inadvertently participates in the exceptionalization, and therefore mystification, of police violence. He writes, "The less visible/legible aspects of structural

violence are systematically suppressed by the vivid pressures of self-evident emergency. Interestingly, such a presentist narrative structure is the explicit foundation for the impunity of police homicide: 'There was nothing else I could do under the circumstances.'"[32]

Martin—echoing Karpiak[33] and others—suggests that often this methodological hazard is ironically rooted in the political and ethical commitments of the anthropologist. "The reflex of anthropological ethnographers toward the project of studying police culture," he writes, "has been a kind of repugnance, marked by the political insistence that one must choose sides." Here, "taking sides" means that "we can only understand police from the *policed* point of view. To see police violence from the point of view of the police is to become complicit in the negation of the subjectivity of its targets."[34] However, we might also think of this same desire for moral distanciation as a particular mode of the negation of relation (i.e. repugnance) that serves the occlusion of history ("the cops never change"). This is why, Martin argues, an adequate theorization of police violence must cultivate "the scholarly discipline to reflect on how the political dialectic of a historically constituted friend-enemy formation is situated within the worlding projects that encompass and generate it."[35] This means that we must consider the "tactical narratives" that police deploy as "perhaps, something more than bad-faith dissimulation." That is, we must recognize the limits of what I called in the previous chapter "the bullshit thesis." This is absolutely not to suggest that we take what officers say at face value. That would be foolish. They lie incessantly. But it does require that we take cognizance of what the articulation of a lie might disclose beyond the mere dissimulation of a simple fact whose truth would be its negation.

Martin charts a space for a historically attuned ethnography of police that can

neither be subsumed by a critical historiography (or genealogy) of police, nor realized by way of a 'historical background' addendum to the sociology of policing. Indeed, the latter convention is common among the 'classics' of Police Studies. Typically, this takes the form of a chapter in which a historical overview of policing is provided (usually beginning with the establishment in 1829 of the 'New Police' on the Peelian model in London, though sometimes addressing earlier seventeenth and sixteenth century precedents). Here, history is deployed to pinpoint and abstract an *institutional form*, The Police, whose intrinsic organizational features explain contemporary phenomena. While the emergence and evolution of the institutional form is often 'contextualized' within various 'structural factors' (e.g. economic, political, legal, social), the latter are taken to be exogenous to the institution itself.[36] This tendency to externalize 'institution' and 'context' reflects the same Organizational Studies perspective, noted in an earlier chapter, which strictly distinguishes the organization (internal factors) from the 'environment' (external factors).

Similarly, a common convention in the policing studies tradition has been to strictly segregate the 'community' (e.g. jurisdiction, municipality, territory, population) from the police organization and to present the former as the *context* (demographic, political, cultural, economic) in which policing occurs.[37] The reports among officers themselves of occupational isolation, perceptions of a dangerous and hostile public, and feelings of social alienation no doubt encourage such delineations. But as I have been arguing, this also reproduces the negation of relation and occlusion of history by insisting that police officers only ever *encounter* (spatio-racial) difference as an implacable dilemma that is not of their own making—as the *outside* of police. Instead, following Kevin Karpiak, an anthropology of policing must elucidate the ways in which police practice "serves to constitute the very

communities it purports to serve."[38] Or, as Clara Han argues in a recent essay, we must understand how police becomes "a condition of life." Writing on the neighborhood in Santiago, Chile in which she conducts her fieldwork, Han argues that,

> Policing cannot be seen simplistically as an external force imposed on the neighborhood. Policing in the neighborhood is not simply a "part" of people's lives, it has become a *condition* of life—punishment, its realization and its anticipation; the experience of authority and state institutions; the politics of the family and the neighborhood and the very ways in which livelihoods are secured—all of these aspects of life and more have been shaped by and, indeed, constituted through policing.[39]

While Han is not writing from the perspective of the police, she does signal an opening for thinking the productivity of police in terms of the constitution of historically determinate terrains. To do so, she draws on Bernard Harcourt's Foucauldian critique of "broken windows" policing, arguing that "the very category of the disorderly cannot be seen as prior to punishment but emerges from techniques of punishment themselves."[40]

Indeed, such approaches have in recent decades become increasingly popular within historical scholarship on the performativity of policing. In this work, 'police' is taken up as a preeminent mode of liberal governmentality comprising a heterogenous array of *techne* that far exceed the modern institution of the public police force.[41] Similarly, recent neo-Marxian critiques have sought to move away from the 'police-as-repression' formulation to understand, in Neocleous' words, how policing comprises "a far more *productive* or *creative* force than many assume, pointing to policing as an *activity* rather than an institution, shaping order rather than passively responding to disorder: the

fabrication of order."[42] While indispensable, the theoretical insights generated by these deeply historical approaches to the genealogy of policing do not obviate the need for an historically attuned ethnography of policing, nor can we dispense of ethnographic engagements with police officers themselves by relying exclusively on the perspective of the *policed*. For, as Martin argues,

> We can learn something by taking the police subject seriously, by listening to their positioned experience as an embodiment of the violence inherent in the conservation of historically received order. There is a unique perspective on structural violence embodied in skills conditioned by vocational responsibility for doing what is necessary to mediate between the invisible dynamics of historically conditioned possibility, and visible events of reaction to apparent exigency. To study police culture in these terms promises to help us better understand the nature of human agency, as something always already emergent from a sociohistorical field.[43]

Here, we can think of the occlusion of history and negation of relation in *positive* terms, as the necessary conditions on the productivity of police. That is, following Martin, they are coextensive with the obscured mediation between practico-inert fields of structural violence and the ongoing generativity of more direct modes of police violence. An historically attuned ethnography of police can seize upon officers' own burdened disavowals of responsibility as paradoxically disclosing the concealed relations and submerged histories that constitute and configure the shifting terrains of policing in the contemporary.

The responsibility of the police ethnographer, then, is to refuse the methodological

alibi of ethnographic presentism by charting cartographies of attunement and disavowal that reveal the generative movements of policing. Such movements, and the terrains that they engender, can neither be *reduced* to repetition/repression nor *deduced* from the categories of institutional history or critical genealogy (whether Foucauldian or Neo-Marxian). This is where an anthropology of policing becomes crucial to a politically committed "anthropology of the otherwise."[44] "Realizing the possibility of another world," Martin writes, "begins by clarifying what seems impossible in this world, and mapping the set of problems immanent in our contextual circumstances which have been reduced to the form of naked physical violence."[45]

Here, the contrary to pessimism is not an optimistic faith in inevitable progress, but a political commitment to one's responsibility for this world and all the possible worlds that are foreclosed by it; we are answerable to the impossibility of the otherwise. And the antidote to empirical stultification is not a withdrawal into contemplative solipsism, nor a giddy embrace of futility, but a particular mode of attunement, a taking up by turning *toward* the hauntings of an embodied historical consciousness that is always a call to an ethics of relationality and therefore responsibility. In the next chapter, I answer the occlusion of history and negation of relation by turning to a critical rereading of the historiography of Black Atlantic City. This stages a consideration of the racializing productivity of policing as intrinsic to the ongoing elaboration of racial capitalism in the contemporary.

Notes

[1] François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson, "Introduction," in *Rethinking Facticity*, ed. François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2009), 3.
[2] Raffoul and Nelson, 3.
[3] Martin Heidegger, *Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, Studies in Continental Thought edition (Indiana University Press, 2008); Scott M. Campbell, *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language*, 1 edition (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012).
[4] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time.* (New York,: Harper, 1962), 174.
[5] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness : A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology /* (New York : Washington Square Press, 1992).
[6] Steven Crowell, "Facticity and Transcendental Philosophy," in *From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental*, ed. Jeff Malpas (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 111, http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=171286.
[7] Crowell, 113.
[8] Crowell, 114.
[9] Crowell, 114.
[10] Crowell, 101.
[11] Giorgio Agamben, "The Passion of Facticity," in *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*, ed. Daniel Heller-Roazen, 1 edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2000), 189.
[12] Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2014).
[13] Robert Bernasconi, "Can Race Be Thought in Terms of Facticity? A Reconsideration of Sartre's and Fanon's Existential Theories of Race," in *Rethinking Facticity*, ed. François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2008), 202.
[14] Bernasconi, 211.
[15] Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 527. *In* Bernasconi, "Can Race Be Thought in Terms of Facticity? A Reconsideration of Sartre's and Fanon's Existential Theories of Race," 205.
[16] Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox, Revised edition (New York : Berkeley, Calif.: Grove Press, 2008), 83.
[17] Bernasconi, "Can Race Be Thought in Terms of Facticity? A Reconsideration of Sartre's and Fanon's Existential Theories of Race," 207.
[18] Deborah A. Thomas, *Political Life in the Wake of the Plantation: Sovereignty, Witnessing, Repair* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2019).
[19] Raffoul and Nelson, "Introduction," 9.
[20] Bernasconi, "Can Race Be Thought in Terms of Facticity? A Reconsideration of Sartre's and Fanon's Existential Theories of Race," 207.
[21] Bernasconi, 210.
[22] Asif Agha, *Language and Social Relations: Structure, Use and Social Significance*, 1 edition (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
[23] Jeffrey T Martin, "Police as Linking Principle: Rethinking Police Culture in Contemporary Taiwan," in *Policing and Contemporary Governance: The Anthropology of Police in Practice*, ed. William Garriott, 2013 edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 157–80.
[24] Jeffrey T Martin, "Police Culture: What It Is, What It Does, and What We Should Do with It," in *The Anthropology of Police*, ed. Kevin G. Karpiak and William Garriott, 1 edition (London ; New York: Routledge, 2018), 34.
[25] Martin, 38.
[26] Martin, 39.
[27] J. Galtung, "Violence, Peace Amd Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 3 (1969): 179–80. *In* Martin, "Police Culture: What It Is, What It Does, and What We Should Do with It," 38.

[28] Bernasconi, "Can Race Be Thought in Terms of Facticity? A Reconsideration of Sartre's and Fanon's Existential Theories of Race," 209.
[29] Bernasconi, "Can Race Be Thought in Terms of Facticity? A Reconsideration of Sartre's and Fanon's Existential Theories of Race."
[30] Raffoul and Nelson, "Introduction," 9.
[31] Laurence Ralph, "Alibi: The Extralegal Force Embedded in the Law (United States)," in *Writing the World of Policing : The Difference Ethnography Makes*, ed. Fassin, Didier (Chicago, IL : The University of Chicago Press, 2017), 248–68.
[32] Martin, "Police Culture: What It Is, What It Does, and What We Should Do with It," 50.
[33] Kevin G. Karpiak, "Of Heroes and Polemics: 'The Policeman' in Urban Ethnography," *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 33, no. S1 (2010): 7–31.
[34] Martin, "Police Culture: What It Is, What It Does, and What We Should Do with It," 38.
[35] Martin, 37.
[36] Peter K. Manning, *Police Work: The Social Organization of Policing* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1977). Jerome H. Skolnick, *Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society*, 2nd edition (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1975). Robert Reiner, *The Politics of the Police*, 4th ed (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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[39] Clara Han, "Experience: Being Policed as a Condition of Life (Chile)," in *Writing the World of Policing: The Difference Ethnography Makes*, ed. Didier Fassin (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2017), 163.
[40] Han, 165.
[41] Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, 1 edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, eds., *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Rationalities of Government*, 1 edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). William J. Novak, *The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America*, 3rd edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996). Mitchell Dean, *The Constitution of Poverty (Routledge Revivals): Towards a Genealogy of Liberal Governance*, 1 edition (Routledge, 2013). Christopher L. Tomlins, *Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic*, First Edition edition (Cambridge England ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Mariana Valverde, *Everyday Law on the Street: City Governance in an Age of Diversity* (University of Chicago Press, 2012). Markus D. Dubber and Mariana Valverde, eds., *The New Police Science: The Police Power in Domestic and International Governance*, 1 edition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).
[42] Neocleous, Mark, "Theoretical Foundation of the 'New Police Science,'" in *The New Police Science: The Police Power in Domestic and International Governance*, ed. Markus D. Dubber and Mariana Valverde, 1 edition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 18. Mark Neocleous, *The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).
[43] Martin, "Police Culture: What It Is, What It Does, and What We Should Do with It," 40.
[44] Elizabeth Povinelli, *Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism* (Duke University Press Books, 2011).
[45] Martin, "Police Culture: What It Is, What It Does, and What We Should Do with It," 50.

Chapter 5

Some Kind of Evil:

On the Historiography of Black Atlantic City

THE COLOR QUESTION.

... speaking about hotel employees brings up the fact that Atlantic City this summer is confronted with a problem which has already been wrestled with more or less successfully at Asbury Park, Cape May and some other resorts. What are we to do with our colored people? That is the question. Atlantic City has never before seemed so overrun with the dark-skinned race as this season, probably because the smaller proportion of visitors makes their number more prominent. At any rate, both the boardwalk and Atlantic avenue fairly swarm with them, especially after sundown, and the beach is dotted with them during bathing hours, like the fruit in a huckleberry pudding. This has gone so far that it is offending the sensitive feelings of many visitors, especially those from the South, of whom there are more his year than ever before. The average Baltimorean or Washingtonian will not stand the idea of taking a bath in close proximity to a colored person, and even to the not so thin-skinned Northerner the idea isn't exactly delectable.

Therefore, the hotelkeepers, who are chiefly responsible for the evil, are beginning to realize that they must do something or hundreds of visitors who possess race prejudices will be driven away. Of the hundreds of hotels and boarding houses which stud the island from one end to the other, it is probable that not a dozen could be found in which white help is employed. And when to the thousands of waiters and cooks and porters are added the nurse girls, the chambermaids, the barbers and bootblacks and hack drivers and other colored gentry in every walk and occupation of life, it will easily be realized what an evil it is that hangs over Atlantic City. "Original Proprietor" Bradley has solved a similar problem at Asbury Park, by rigidly excluding the colored people from all but certain restricted areas, but there is no such one-man power here, and if any decisive action is taken in the matter at all, it must come from the hotel proprietors, who are largely responsible for the colored people being here.

The Philadelphia Inquirer, July 23, 1893

In this chapter I develop a critical rereading of the historiography of black migration and settlement in Atlantic City. I argue that the tendency among historians to reduce the significance of black labor in the development of the early resort to a mere adventitious pool of cheap service labor obscures the intrinsic relations between racialization and value creation on which the mass leisure and recreation economy turned. I suggest a rereading of this history through the analytic lens of *racial capitalism* in order to show how the

production of capital value in the resort required the reproduction of racial difference, such that the dependence on devalued black labor was as much a result of its particular racialization as *black* labor as it was its status as *cheap* labor. I conclude by arguing that the ongoing creation and realization of this value depended upon the simultaneous *emplacement* of the 'Negro servant,' and *displacement* of black subjectivity. This stages a consideration in the next chapter of the role of policing in the establishment of racial segregation in Atlantic City, and what this reveals about what I have been describing as the generativity of policing.

Building the Resort, Making a Market: On the Necessity of Cheap Labor

It was 1893 when Atlantic City's "Color Question" was posed in such alarming terms to readers of the *Philadelphia Inquirer*. That year marks the midpoint of a roughly two-decade-long period of rapid transition and development, at the end of which Atlantic City would stand as the nation's most popular tourist resort. Between 1880 and 1890, the city's total population increased by over 178 percent, from 5,447 to 15,168. By 1900, the population would grow an additional 83.5 percent to 27,838. At the same time, the resort's black population nearly tripled in the 1880s—from 763 to 2,113—and then over the next ten years did triple to 6,513. With the percentage black population growing to over twenty-three percent, Atlantic City at the turn of the century would achieve the highest proportion black population of any Northern city of ten thousand or more. By 1905, black workers would occupy a staggering ninety-five percent of the "hotel and leisure" jobs comprising the nation's first urban economy based exclusively on tourism, leisure and mass consumption.[1]

In the first two decades following the incorporation of Atlantic City in 1854, growth was sluggish. Well into the 1870s, it seemed unlikely that the settlement would ever develop into anything more than a quaint bathing village for middle- and upper-class Philadelphians. This was precisely what Jonathan Pitney, a physician from a neighboring township, had envisioned when in 1850 he petitioned the New Jersey Legislature for a railroad charter. His intention was to lay tracks along a straight line cutting through the Pine Barrens of South Jersey to connect Philadelphia to the nearest shore point. This point happened to be a sparsely populated and largely undeveloped barrier island, Absecon Island, located just under fifty miles from the urban center. A man of modest means and little political consequence, Pitney was rebuked by legislators who asked why they should charter a "railroad with only one end." Only after Pitney found a powerful partner in Samuel Richards, the thirty-year-old scion of one of South Jersey's wealthiest and most influential families, would lawmakers be convinced that such a venture could prove profitable.[2]

The Richards family fortune was derived from the bog iron and glassworks industries that dominated the South Jersey economy. Samuel Richards owned a large glassworks himself. He argued to the legislature that a railroad would greatly reduce shipping costs for the products of these industries, while at the same time dramatically increasing the value of undeveloped land—of which he owned fifty thousand acres—along the rail line. As these tracts were sold and developed, he claimed, even more revenue would be generated by the railroad. Pitney's proposed development of Absecon Island was, according to Richards, entirely secondary. Legislators were convinced, and the men were granted a charter for the Camden-Atlantic Railroad Company in 1851. Over the next two

years, Richards and Samuel Osbourne, the engineer hired to oversee the railroad project, were able to secure the required investment capital primarily from a handful of individuals with interests in glass and iron, most of whom also had large land holdings along the proposed track. Under Richards' direction, the Railroad Company immediately began buying up land at such a pace that the Legislature soon barred them from acquiring any more. In response, they formed the Camden-Atlantic Land Company and proceeded with purchases. They acquired virtually all of Absecon Island, comprising approximately seventeen square miles. From the start, Richards viewed the undertaking as a speculative venture, and it paid. Within a short time of the arrival of the first train to Atlantic City on July 1, 1854, lots that had been purchased at $17.50 an acre would be sold for over $300 dollars per acre.

From the inaugural expedition, the train ride to the shore was exceedingly popular among well-to-do Philadelphians, as well as the bourgeoning middle and professional classes. Tickets sold out, despite the earliest hotels' lack of basic amenities like running water and plumbing, and the wild, rugged environment that greeted visitors upon arrival. And so things largely remained for two decades. Through several near-fatal setbacks, including the Panic of 1857 and the Civil War, the railroad steadily gained passengers, and eventually paid dividends to investors. Every spring, a handful of new wood-frame hotels and boarding houses would spring up from the sand, and at the end of every summer, the owners of these businesses would return home to Philadelphia and New York, leaving the resort a ghostly hamlet for most of the year. Very little was invested in infrastructure, public works or land development, even as the number of seasonal visitors to the resort was exceeding 100,000 by the early 1870s.

Then, in 1875, Richards resigned from the Camden-Atlantic Railroad amid a frustrated campaign to convince his fellow directors that even more revenue could be made by offering more so-called "excursion rates." Excursion rates were reduced-price, one-day round-trip fares marketed to working class people who could not afford the standard $3 fare, let alone an overnight stay at the resort. Sunday excursions to the shore offered industrial laborers the rare opportunity to escape the city and partake of leisure pursuits. Furthermore, Atlantic City's saloons, excursion houses and hotels had from the beginning openly ignored the Bishop's Laws that forbade the Sunday sale of alcohol in Philadelphia and throughout New Jersey, making it one of the few places factory workers could get a public drink on their only day off. Excursion tickets always sold out, but these trips were limited and did not generate significant revenue in early years.[3]

Richards and Osbourne recognized in the steadily rising wages of the post-Civil War industrial class the potential to turn greater profits. They also understood that to capture a meaningful surplus from the paltry savings of Philadelphia's growing proletariat would require an enormous increase in volume; that is, a mass market. In 1877, they, along with two partners who had followed Richards' defection from the Camden-Atlantic, secured a charter for the Philadelphia and Atlantic Railroad. The narrow-gauge track they proposed was significantly cheaper to build and was completed in a remarkable ninety days. Offering round-trip fares at less than half the price of the Camden-Atlantic, the immediate success of the Philadelphia and Atlantic drove their competitors to lower their rates as well. Then, in 1880, a third line was built with the express purpose of meeting the growing demand of the "middle and lower classes." In 1883, Richards' narrow-gauge line was bought by the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, while the original Camden-Atlantic

was acquired by the nation's largest interstate system, the Pennsylvania Railroad. This linked Atlantic City directly to far-flung midwestern urban centers like Chicago, in addition to rapidly growing cities throughout the mid-Atlantic and Northeast. Pamphlets advertising the resort suddenly appeared in train depots across the country. As more and more tourists poured in, more hotels and rooming houses sprang up to accommodate them, along with restaurants, saloons, dance halls, and assorted amusements. As the owners and employees of more of these new businesses settled permanently in the booming resort, supporting businesses began to emerge and prosper as well, and with them, new public works projects. Streets were covered with gravel for the first time, towering dunes were graded, and stagnant, mosquito-breeding ponds were filled in with sand. Atlantic City began its dramatic transformation into a proper "City by the Sea."[4]

It was during this same period that black people began arriving in the resort in much greater numbers. To be sure, there were African-Americans in Atlantic City even before the Civil War. They worked alongside Irish immigrants to build the Camden-Atlantic Railroad and served as common laborers on the earliest construction sites in the resort. Local historian Richlyn Goddard has presented evidence that many of these people were enslaved. After the Civil War, blacks from the Upper South were recruited to work in the resort during summer months. Most returned home at the end of each season, while some settled permanently. But up until 1870, the permanent black population never reached two-hundred, and actually seems to have trended downward before taking a dramatic upswing in the late-1870s and early 1880s. It is, of course, not accidental that this coincides perfectly with the resort's initial boom period.[5]

While the early historiography of the resort renders black people virtually invisible, the consensus among latter-day historians is that the explosive development of Atlantic City would have been simply impossible without the cheap labor provided by African Americans. The basic terms of this account can be summarized as follows: In Northern urban centers like Philadelphia and surrounding factory towns, blacks were largely excluded from industrial wage labor. Most were relegated to "domestic and personal service" or miscellaneous unskilled labor for which they were irregularly remunerated. In the post-Reconstruction South, the vast majority of recently emancipated blacks who were not employed in domestic service were reduced to debt-peonage through sharecropping. This extreme devaluation of black labor proved vital to the generation of surplus value in Atlantic City's emergent economy of mass consumption. The monthly wages paid to waiters, bellhops, dishwashers, cooks, porters, and chambermaids working in the resort were a fraction of those earned in Philadelphia's factories. For most, tips made up a much larger proportion of earnings than base pay. Even so, these quasi-waged service positions provided the rare opportunity to earn actual cash money, and possibly even accumulate modest savings, while also granting more autonomy than personal and domestic servitude. These same jobs were scorned by whites who identified them with dependence, degradation and servility. In particular, the reliance on gratuities and on-site room and board was anathema to the sanctity of the wage contract that underpinned an ascendant free labor ideology.

This racializing hierarchy of labor value opened up the spaces in which a surplus could be captured by the hoteliers, restauranteurs, boarding house keepers and amusement operators whose employees were overwhelmingly black and whose patrons were almost

exclusively white, or at least aspiring to be. As has been underlined in many historical accounts, the resort's hotel and recreation industry could not have profitably competed for white laborers even if whites had not refused service work on principle. Competitive wages for the many thousands of seasonal workers needed to support an emergent economy of mass consumption would have obviated the potential for seizing profits from the meager disposable incomes of working-class visitors. And as Paulsson notes, "Despite its elitist pretentions, the lifeblood of the city's economy had always been the middle and lower classes who sought in its breezes and amusements a brief respite from the grime and monotony of the industrial world."[6] All of this is to say that the resort depended absolutely upon devalued black labor for its prosperity. But this economic dependence also presented an apparent quandary that provoked the profound anxiety registered in the 1893 clarion call to take "decisive action."

The first historian to offer any substantive reflection on the vital role of black people in the development of Atlantic City was Charles E. Funnel. Noting the absence of any detailed accounts of black lives in the early historiography of the resort, he concluded that this elision was likely strategic on the part of chroniclers who were also dedicated boosters of the local tourist economy, and thus "anxious not to advertise the presence of blacks to potential white costumers."[7] The *Inquirer* article can be construed as lending contemporaneous support to this interpretation. The looming economic implosion signaled there implies a conundrum at the very root of the emerging tourism market. Namely, it would seem that the same processes of degradation and exclusion that reproduced the devaluation of black labor—upon which the profitability of the mass consumption of leisure depended—in turn depended upon the reproduction of anti-black sensibilities and

affects on the part of whites who, in being repelled by the very presence of blacks, were dissuaded from patronizing the resort.

There is clearly much truth to this reading. There is, moreover, a compelling irony to a scenario in which a rational economic expedient—here a dependence on cheap black labor—inadvertently imperils the entire enterprise—in this case by "offending the sensitive feelings of many visitors." But this story of a poisoned chalice also risks composing a kind of liberal morality play that ultimately does more to obscure than explain the generative relations between surplus value creation and racialization on which the resort economy turned. For one, the staging of its protagonists—on the one hand, "the hotelkeepers who are chiefly responsible for this evil," and on the other, the "hundreds of visitors with racial prejudice [who] will be driven away"—misconstrues the intricate and constitutive relations of both to the category blackness.

To see this, we can make explicit what is tacit in this story. In the case of the resort's business owners, the reproduction of anti-black racism *per se* is cast as external to the rational calculus of capital accumulation in the resort. While they do rely on black labor to generate huge profits, it is merely the *cheapness* of that labor that is seized upon by capital. The category of blackness itself—its specific symbolic, social and political content—is incidental as far as business owners are concerned. In fact, inasmuch as intractable anti-black sentiment poses a significant business hazard, it would be preferable to employ white labor, if only it were less costly. Racism itself is thereby relegated to the subjective field of irrational sentiment. The figures of the Southerner with "sensitive feelings" and the "thin-skinned" Northerner serve as foil to the hotelkeeper who is driven solely by a rational profit motive, and for whom the devaluation of black labor produces a mere *objective*

advantage in terms of a low-cost input. But this agonistic framing relies on what I will later argue is an illusory decoupling. Namely, the reproduction of the objective advantage of devalued black labor appears to occur at a remove from the resort economy itself, in Northern factories and on Southern tenant farms, via the exclusion of blacks from the wage labor market. But this same devaluation also requires the continual reproduction of a specific *subjective* content—anti-black racism—which engenders an affective excess that reappears in the resort as a sort of profit-endangering negative externality of the production of devalued black labor. This implies that the surplus value potentiated by the objective advantage of devalued black labor may ultimately—at least in the case of the mass tourism and leisure economy—be negated by the subjective byproduct of its own production.

All of this would suggest the possibility that, from the perspective of the resort's capitalist class, racism might in the long run prove incompatible with maximizing profits in the leisure economy, even as it is a condition on profit-potentiating labor devaluation in the short run. Such an apparent contradiction opens up the possibility that the market itself might eventually compel the rational capitalist to use his power and influence to campaign against the propagation of such irrational and pernicious sentiments, even if it means recognizing the rights of black employees to a higher wage and better standard of living. Alternatively, the business owner could simply replace cheap black workers with more costly white ones, which would result in initial losses, but would in the long run prove advantageous as more whites would be inclined to patronize the resort in the absence of blacks, thereby expanding the market. But given that the hotelkeeper has already invested heavily in the recruitment and hiring of black workers, and that to entice whites to such positions would necessitate a similarly broad-based public-opinion campaign in order to

change their attitudes towards service labor, it could easily be argued that the former is the more efficient and therefore most rational alternative. Thus, the invisible hand might compel the resort's "benevolent despot" to lift the black worker up from a place of degradation.

In reality, neither of these two scenarios would win out. Black workers were not replaced in any significant measure (at least not until much later), nor did they see their white employers take up a campaign against racism. Instead, as prescribed by the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, business leaders and city officials would pursue a strategy of "rigidly excluding the colored people from all but restricted areas," while at the same time relying on a steady increase in their numbers to sustain economic growth. To account for this seemingly irrational and inefficient course of action requires an explication of how the dual processes of value creation and racialization came to be conjugated in the resort economy in much more profound ways than the story of an adventitious pool of cheap labor would suggest. As already described, the cheap labor account poses the processes of capital accumulation in the resort as occurring at a remove from the production of racist affects and attitudes, rather than being part and parcel of that production. At the same time, it suggests that anti-black sentiment could only diminish the desire to consume leisure in a resort staffed almost exclusively by black people, rather than partially constituting the affective grounds of that desire. I will argue that both are misrepresentations. To do so, I'll begin with a detour through the work of W.E.B. Du Bois, who around this same time (and place) was initiating what would become a sustained interrogation of the constitutive relations between racial differentiation and capitalist development.

Du Bois on the Necessity of the Reproduction of Racial Difference in Capitalism

While the foregoing allegory of an enlightened capitalist who struggles against racial injustice in order to ensure continued wealth production might seem forced, it is not my intention to set up a straw man. After all, the fable of an amoral market that blindly optimizes the public good while maximizing wealth has long animated liberal political and ethical imaginaries, perhaps never more so than in the present. The young Du Bois was himself still largely convinced of the progressive potentials of this social mytho-theory when he was called to Philadelphia in 1896 to conduct a comprehensive study of the city's "Negro problem." Writing many years later, he would recall how he undertook the project in good faith, confident in the capacity of scientific inquiry to reveal the ruinous follies of racist thinking and thus convince those in positions of power to seek remedies:

> My vision was becoming clear. The Negro problem was in my mind a matter of systematic investigation and intelligent understanding. The world was thinking wrong about race, because it did not know. The ultimate evil was stupidity. The cure for it was knowledge based on scientific investigation.[8]

Dubois' study of the Seventh Ward of Philadelphia was published as *The Philadelphia Negro* in 1899. His first major sociological text, the work also represents the earliest example of American Urban Sociology—combining ethnographic methods with statistical, demographic and cartographic analysis.[9] Looking back, Du Bois would himself maintain the irrefutable scholarly merits of the work:

> Yet, I made a study of the Philadelphia Negro so thorough that it has withstood the criticism of forty years. It was as complete a scientific study and answer as could have been given, with defective facts and statistics, one lone worker and little money. It revealed the Negro group as a symptom, not a cause; as a striving, palpitating group, and not an inert sick body of crime; as a long historic development and not a transient occurrence.[10]

Even before the study was completed, however, Du Bois would find reason to doubt the power of scientific inquiry to effect the kind of political mobilization that he had envisaged on the part of Philadelphia's "better [i.e. capitalist] classes." Instead, he would find that employers, who "as a class [represented] the best average intelligence and morality of the community," were themselves "not altogether blameless" for the reproduction of the color bar in the trades.[11] While he observed cases in which white workers constrained employers by threatening to strike if blacks were hired (ostensibly in order to protect against wage depression), he also witnessed cases in which employers deliberately stoked racial animus as a strategy for guarding against worker cooperation, thereby ensuring overall wage suppression. Recognizing the self-interest on the part of employers to reproduce racial prejudice in such circumstances, Du Bois attempted to demonstrate that in the long run it was nonetheless in the interest of "all concerned" to ensure against the degradation of black labor. For one, less taxes would be required for "the suppression of crime and vice."[12] At the same time, providing greater opportunities for blacks to acquire new skills and use the skills they had would ensure an optimally efficient labor pool. This would in turn ensure the truly competitive labor market required, in theory, for maximum wealth generation in capitalism. But his appeals to a "benevolent despot" would go unheard:

> There was, however, no benevolent despot, no philanthropist, no far-seeing captain of industry to prevent the Negro from losing even the skill he had learned or to inspire him by opportunities to learn more. As the older Negroes with trades dropped off, there was little to induce younger men to succeed them. On the contrary, special effort was made not to train Negroes for industry or to allow them to enter on such a career.[13]

Even worse, Du Bois' work would soon be taken up by exponents of the very white-supremacist pseudo-science that he sought to dispel.[14] The years following the publication of *The Philadelphia Negro* would mark Du Bois' gradual disillusionment with the "racial uplift program" of the Progressive Era's *petit bourgeois* Black *intelligentsia*. By his own account, his understanding of racial prejudice during the early decades of the twentieth century transitioned through three phases. Beginning with the conviction that the problem was "a matter of knowledge" and its remedy "a matter of scientific procedure in a world which had become scientific in concept," he would come to realize that beyond sheer ignorance, "there was evidently evil and hindrance blocking the way of life."[15] The sadistic impulses enunciated through a post-Reconstruction regime of racial terror to which Du Bois bore witness exceeded any mere lack of understanding. He would recall the precise moment of his full apprehension: While walking to the office of the *Atlanta Constitution* to deliver a "reasoned statement concerning the evident facts" of an alleged murder by a black man, Sam Hose, of the wife of his landlord, he learned that Hose had been lynched, and that the his "knuckles were on exhibition at a grocery store" located on the same street along which Du Bois was walking. He did not deliver his statement to the editor of the *Constitution.*

> Two considerations thereafter broke in upon my work and eventually disrupted it: first, one could not be a calm, cool, and detached scientist while Negroes were lynched, murdered and starved; and secondly, there was no such definite demand for scientific work of the sort that I was doing, as I had confidently assumed would be easily forth-coming.[16]

Du Bois recorded this terrible remembrance in a chapter of his second autobiography, *Dusk of Dawn*, in a chapter entitled "Science and Empire." It was through the critical lens of *empire* that Du Bois began to refine his understanding of race in the years leading up to the World War. The "color line" that cut across the United States, he realized, had been drawn across the entire globe as European and Euro-American powers vied for imperial dominion over Africa and Asia. In this context, he could begin to glimpse the dreadful ties binding the terrorizing exhibition of a lynched man's body parts to the awe-inspiring display of novel and exotic commodities—"Rubber, ivory, and palm-oil; tea, coffee, and cocoa; bananas, oranges, and other fruit; cotton, gold and copper—they, and a hundred other things which dark and sweating bodies hand up to the white world form pits of slime"—perhaps even in the same shop window.[17] Du Bois would come to understand that a world economic system that had been built upon Native dispossession and African slavery and that was now being vitalized by "that breath of life" of "expansion overseas [and] colonial aggrandizement" required for its reproduction and growth "the necessary despisings and hatreds of these savage half-men, this unclean *canaille* of the world—these dogs of men."[18]

Perhaps the ultimate evil *was* in some sense stupidity, but it had become clear to Du Bois that this was not a matter of the blameless ignorance that he had set out to allay

through science. Instead, "a deliberately educated ignorance" indexed the extent to which the reproduction of global white-supremacist hegemony relied upon pedagogy in the service of empire. In the third stage of his intellectual development, Du Bois would conclude that, in addition to "ignorance and ill-will," there were still deeper, more entrenched barriers to dismantling the color bar: "There were economic motives, urges to build wealth on the backs of black slaves and colored serfs; there followed upon these unconscious acts and irrational reactions, unpierced by reason, whose current form depended on the long history of relation and contact between thought and idea."[19]

This period of intellectual transformation overlaps with Du Bois gradual political radicalization. His recognition of the inextricable relation of white supremacism to capitalist exploitation led him to regard the Black freedom struggle in the United States as one necessary moment in a global struggle against industrial-colonial-imperial capitalism. But his brief association with the American Socialist movement followed by a longer engagement with Marxist-Leninist Communism would ultimately reveal to him the inadequacy of these intellectual-political traditions to account for the originary and irreducible relations between racial domination and capitalist development. While the interests of imperial capital in the reproduction of white supremacist ideology were transparent enough, what vexed Du Bois more were the repeated failures of labor to unite across the color line in solidarity against capitalist exploitation. In the postbellum United States, he observed, the convergence of black and white workers' position within the material relations of production had not realized any solidarity of class consciousness. The fact that the obvious identification of the *objective* interests of labor against capital was continuously undermined by the *subjective* alignments of racialization forced Du Bois to

devote greater attention to what Cedric Robinson would later describe as "the non-objective character of capitalist development."[20] It was here that Du Bois located those "unconscious acts and irrational reactions, unpierced by reason, whose current form depended on the long history of relation and contact between thought and idea."

These ruminations would come to inform Du Bois' sustained interrogation of the category of whiteness, which would in turn provide a key analytic for the critique of historical materialism developed in his magisterial *Black Reconstruction.* It was here that Du Bois first articulated his now famous formulation of the "public and psychological wage" of whiteness—that peculiar, non-pecuniary recompense that white proletarians received for their ongoing alienation and exploitation under capitalism:

> It must be remembered that the white group of laborers, while they received a low wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage. They were given public deference and titles of courtesy because they were white. They were admitted freely with all classes of white people to public functions, public parks, and the best schools. The police were drawn from their ranks, and the courts, dependent upon their votes, treated them with such leniency as to encourage lawlessness. Their vote selected public officials, and while this had small effect upon the economic situation, it had great effect upon their personal treatment and the deference shown them. White schoolhouses were the best in the community, and conspicuously placed, and they cost anywhere from twice to ten times as much per capita as the colored schools. The newspapers specialized on news that flattered the poor whites and almost utterly ignored the Negro except in crime and ridicule.[21]

This idea of a public and psychological wage indexes both the subjectif*ying* and objectif*ied* aspects of what Du Bois had earlier described as "the discovery of personal whiteness."[22] As both a political formation and emergent mode of consciousness—even if a necessarily 'false' racial consciousness—constituted through "the long history of relation and contact between thought and idea," whiteness could neither be reduced to nor negated by "actual," objective (i.e. economic) interests. No matter how "unpierced by reason," white subjectivity had over the course of the long nineteenth century emerged as a powerful historical force, an undeniable social and political fact that had ultimately driven white labor to align with white capital, and thereby "ruined democracy."

Having arrived at Du Bois' analytic of whiteness, we can begin making our way back to the resort and the questions with which we left off. Namely, how did the relations between surplus value creation and racialization in the early resort economy exceed the logic of a mere objective advantage of cheap labor? Why would business leaders and public officials pursue the inefficient and seemingly contradictory strategy of actively recruiting increasing numbers of black workers while simultaneously expending resources to exclude them from all but restricted areas within the resort? And relatedly, how did a resort that was staffed almost exclusively by black workers—and which had the highest proportion black population of any Northern city—become the country's most popular tourist destination during the same years marking the popular embrace of a fanatical white supremacism? The foregoing sketch of the development of Du Bois' thinking concerning the multifarious relations between the production of race and capitalist development suggests that it was an engagement with just such seemingly irrational and contradictory developments, and the inadequacy of both liberal and mainstream socialist frameworks to

account for them, that led him to reflect on the emergence of whiteness, and the "race concept" more generally, as categories of immense socio-historical importance. Likewise, the analytic of whiteness can help elucidate the specific character of the early resort economy by allowing us to ask novel questions concerning the particular kinds of value being produced, circulated, and consumed in Atlantic City. Such intervention is imperative to understanding the shifting racial geographies that have, and continue to be, a primary object, and outcome, of policing in Atlantic City. With that in mind, I will sketch a provisional rereading of the resort's early history that underlines whiteness and the production of race as categories of analytic priority.

The Value of Whiteness: On the Necessity of Black Labor

A proper historical investigation of the early resort through the lens of whiteness and racial formation would entail deeper contextualization within several partially overlapping and interrelated developments spanning the nineteenth century from the advent of Jacksonian democracy through the Gilded Age and into the Progressive Era: mounting contestation over the boundaries of democratic participation; ongoing controversies over the juridical and scientific definition of racial categories; the Civil War and Emancipation; the evolving political mobilizations of the Black freedom struggle; rapid urbanization, proletarianization and the attendant labor and social movements; the dramatic expansion of mass consumerism and markets for leisure and recreation; Western expansion; the rise of U.S. Imperialism; and the popular embrace of white-supremacism. Such a thoroughgoing history is well beyond the scope and genre of this work. However, an engagement with such concerns, even if an admittedly cursory one, is crucial if we are

to apprehend the specificity of devalued black labor in the early resort as *black* labor, rather than solely as *cheap* labor. This offers a corrective to certain perplexities produced by a tendency found in several recent histories of Atlantic City to appraise black labor as a sort of "necessary evil"—that is, as both a necessity and impediment to surplus creation and accumulation in the early resort. This conceit is most plainly articulated in Johnson's historiographic rejoinder to the 1893 *Philadelphia Inquirer* article: "The evil hanging over the city was a necessity. . . Absent the cheap labor provided by Blacks, a tourist economy could never have developed and Jonathan Pitney's beach *village* would have remained just that." He goes on to say that since "there was no chance … to attract the numbers of White workers needed for such menial work…[the] resort had no choice but to pursue Black workers."[23] That is, a necessary (cheap) evil (black).

Johnson describes the *Inquirer* article, and others like it that "express White attitudes" of the time, as having an "unreal quality." How could whites depend on black workers "for the most personal of services" yet still find them socially intolerable? Johnson apparently finds this to be utterly incongruous, unreal even. This is what I mean by perplexity, and Johnson is not the only historian to come up against it when trying to make sense of "race relations" in the early resort. Foster similarly notes that "*despite* the dependence of the resort on its black work force," anti-black racism among white residents and tourists was rampant. Such a "contradictory attitude," he observes, "was often expressed in the press. On the one hand, the resort was highly dependent on its black work force and complaints about their performance never surfaced, but on the other hand, the press thoroughly reported incidents of black crime often with derogatory racial references."[24] Both Johnson and Foster echo the earlier work of Funnel, who had pondered

"the contradictory mentality of a white culture which employed blacks for every personal service, and yet was revolted by the idea of mingling with them in the surf."[25]

What is common across such readings is the supposedly untenable conjunction of economic dependence and social/psychological contempt. But why must these two relations be viewed as incongruous? Might dependence and disdain in this case be understood as in some sense coextensive, co-constitutive? Much of the perplexity that results from the above readings might be remedied by considering how the value of black labor issued as much from the fact of its being racialized as *black* labor as it did from the fact of its status as cheap labor. I don't mean merely in the sense that, as already described above, the *devaluation* of black labor was predicated upon and enacted through racialization. While this is undeniably the case, it is not the whole story. There is also the distinct question of the *valuation* of black labor in the resort economy—a racializing movement continuous with, but also not identical to, the movement of devaluation. And this *valuation* itself was inextricably bound to the very racist contempt that the above authors imply might *negate* the objective advantage of employing cheap black labor. By unsettling a formulation that rigidly separates and opposes the-objective-necessity-of-cheap-labor from the-subjective-evil-of-racism, we might avoid the kind of resigned perplexity expressed by Johnson in a more recent text:

> Why Atlantic City's white residents, who had so much in common with its black residents…felt threatened by their increase in numbers will never be fully understood. Racism alone is too simplistic an answer. The explanation lies in an emotional brew comprised of folk history, religion, sexual taboos and myths from the old South concocted in the slavery era together with the fallacious dogma of white supremacy. It's part of the

> American psyche that historians have yet to fully explain. Despite the superior position of whites in Atlantic City society and politics, they *feared* blacks; while the fear had no basis in reason, it was real just the same.[26]

There are several problems with this assessment, not the least of which is Johnson's tacit identification of '*the* American psyche' with a '*white* American psyche.' Then there is the dubious suggestion that racism is a *simple* matter—presumably understood as a fully self-conscious, articulable, intentional and individual attitude that can be separated from such things as 'folk history, religion, sexual taboos' and even the 'dogma of white supremacy' itself. Such a circumscribed notion of racism does indeed reduce its historical explanatory power to almost nil. Importantly, it also replicates contemporary juridical determinations of racism and racial discrimination that are predicated on the demonstration of racially motivated individual intent and that place the burden of proof on injured parties, thereby sanctioning the reproduction and further entrenchment of institutional racism under the supposedly agnostic and therefore procedurally equitable position of 'color-blindness.' It should be noted that Johnson's primary vocation is law, and that he currently serves as Superior Court Judge in Atlantic County, New Jersey. This might in part explain his tacit deployment of a narrowly legalistic definition of racism in his historical analysis, a move that leads him to aver that the development of racial inequality and segregation in Atlantic City "can never be fully understood," inasmuch as it is related to aspects of the "American psyche that historians have yet to fully explain." But something like this transposition of a juridical burden of proof onto the evidentiary standards of socio-historical analysis is evident in the ubiquitous tendency to analytically separate racism and racial formation from other supposedly more fundamental 'social factors,' such as 'economic anxieties' and

‘concerns over changing cultural values,’ and summarily bestow the latter with greater explanatory priority. Ironically, the significance of racism itself is minimized in such analyses that ostensibly set out to explain racial inequality but end up mystifying it.

Pace Johnson’s submission that the reasons for whites’ scorn towards the black laborers upon whom they depended will “never be fully understood,” the foregoing discussion of Du Bois’ more penetrating analysis of the constitutive relations between racialization and capitalist development would suggest that such perplexed resignation is unwarranted, or at least premature. Du Bois’ formulation of the ‘public and psychological wage’ is especially helpful in the context of the resort economy, in particular his observation concerning the “public deference and titles of courtesy” paid to whites, as well as their free admission “with all classes of white people to public functions [and] public parks.” The metaphor of a wage indicates that whiteness has come to assume value in its own right, value that is perhaps not reducible to economic value in the strictest sense (i.e. it is psychological and public, not monetary), but that is nonetheless socially *and* materially forceful, and that is necessarily contingent upon the debasement of blackness. This suggests an answer to the question posed above concerning the specific *valuation of black labor* in the early resort, and so illuminates a path forward, beyond the supposed unintelligibility of ‘a contradictory mentality’ among whites.

Interestingly, in the above-quoted work by Johnson, there are several passages that are strongly suggestive of the argument I want to develop here. For instance, he writes

> Black hotel workers added to the town’s mystique among the tourists streaming out of Philadelphia. There was no better means by which to reinforce the illusion of being part of the upper class crust than to be doted over by obliging ‘colored servants’ dressed in

> uniforms. While the money required to transform the quiet beach village into a bustling city based on tourism was supplied by eager out-of-town investors, the muscle and sweat needed to create a full-fledged resort were provided by African-Americans. Black workers were the indispensable ingredient in making Jonathan Pitney's and Samuel Richards' experiment a success.[27]

On the very same page, Johnson even cites Du Bois, writing "Domestic work was thought to be peculiarly 'Negro work,' and the attitude of most whites was that 'Negros [sic] are servants; servants are Negros [sic].' If Atlantic City's hotel industry was to flourish, 'servants' were needed."[28] The phrase, "Negroes are servants; servants are Negroes" is from an essay in Du Bois' *Dark Water*, the same work in which his essay "The Souls of White Folk" appears. But it seems likely that Johnson came upon this citation secondhand, from an earlier work by Foster, which he cites liberally. There Foster writes

> It just so happened that the service labor needs of the resort were within the occupational realm to which prevailing custom restricted blacks, but the industrial needs of other Northern cities were not. W.E.B. DuBois [sic] best described the white conception of "Negro work" in the expression that "Negroes are servants; servants are Negroes."[29]

Foster locates the origin of this conception of 'Negro work' in the institution of racial slavery, and usefully situates 'prevailing custom' within a discussion of the obdurate social 'vestiges' of slavery in the post-Emancipation era. But even as these authors emphasize the centrality of 'Negro work' in the development of the early resort, both Johnson and Foster downgrade the significance of *black* labor *per se* by positing it as

incidental to the constitution of the local service labor economy. Foster goes so far as to say that "*It just so happened* that the service labor needs of the resort were within the occupational realm to which prevailing custom restricted blacks." And Johnson, after making quaint reference to black workers adding "to the mystique" of the resort while "reinforcing the illusion" of social mobility, proceeds to reduce the unique contribution of black labor to so much "muscle and sweat," just as when he argues that hotel and rooming house keepers "understood that to make their guests happy, *many hands* were needed to do the pampering, and the more helpers, the better." The effect of such synecdoche is to reduce black labor to a quantum of pure physiological labor, thus rendering it devoid of any social quality, including racial markedness. This in turn implies that the value produced by black labor issues directly from the self-evident, objective use-value of service work, which is thereby similarly rendered independent of, and prior to, any process of racialization. Funnel had earlier followed this line of reasoning when he argued that an "essential need of a mass resort…was a large work force to fill the hundreds of service positions which the operation of a resort economy demanded. *Atlantic city found that blacks were the answer* to a substantial part of its labor requirements."[30]

In each case, the demand for service labor is taken to be *prior* to any actual assemblage of the mass tourism market through the enrollment of black laborers and white tourists. This would suggest that the objective value of the mass leisure and tourism economy could be established, at least in theory, entirely independently of any process of racialization. The problematic inclination to alternately equivocate then delineate between 'Negro work' and abstract 'service labor' is perhaps why none of these authors can explain the seemingly contradictory co-occurrence of anti-black racism alongside economic

dependence on black laborers, as discussed above. In abstracting an idealized (i.e. non-racialized) market of mass leisure and recreation from the historical actualities of the development of the first mass tourism market and service economy, these authors end up posing racialization as incidental, and racism as aberrant to a counterfactual, anachronistic, and normative model. This is curious, given that each of these authors seeks to establish the historical centrality of Atlantic City in relation to several broader national developments—the emergence of consumerism, the assembly of the first markets in mass leisure and recreation, and the concomitant growth of service sector wage labor—and in order to do so is compelled to emphasize the centrality of black labor in the development of Atlantic City.

Oddly enough, the foreword to Johnson's *Northside*, the same text quoted here, contains a compelling indication of what a corrective to such lapses would entail. There, noted African-American historian, Clement Price, writes:

> As a place carved out to serve modern leisure conceits, Atlantic City might be far more important than better known communities that race and racism forged. Consider this: when slavery ended as the longest experience involving the engagement of blacks and whites in America, the future of race relations, especially for whites and those seeking to become white, was uncertain. In a sense, Atlantic City was an experiment, a bold one to be sure, that prepared a post-Emancipation America for freedom with the white over black equation still very much intact. *White leisure was a corollary to black freedom and black second class status.*[31]

Where others equivocate, Price—a close reader of Du Bois—is abundantly clear: *the emergence of the mass leisure economy was thoroughly racialized, and racializing, from the start*. The very meaning of leisure—and thus the desire to consume it, and therefore, its *value*—was for a new class of wage-earning whites—and critically, *those seeking to become white*—inextricably bound to the anxieties and aspirations that constituted the affective grounds of a racial order in vertiginous flux, both symbolically and materially. To speak of the resort's 'service labor needs' and the black workers who 'happened to fill them,' then, is untenable. We must instead attend to the co-constitution of the new white tourist and the new black service worker as a historical outcome of the actual, concrete assembly of a novel market, and the emergent values comprising it.

The scholar who has pursued these themes most extensively in the context of Atlantic City is urban historian Bryant Simon. In *Boardwalk of Dreams*, Simon analyzes the tight coupling of race making and performances of class ascendance within what he describes as the resort's exclusive publics of consumption. To understand the basis of the resort economy, Simon argues, is to appreciate that "the fantasy of leveling up [was] Atlantic City's most important product." Crucially, this entailed a double movement: "the public spectacle of acting rich, while holding others down. Both things had to happen for the fantasy to work." Race, Simon notes, was always the fundamental category of exclusion structuring the resort's public spaces. He deploys a dramaturgical metaphor to analyze the casting of African-American workers in highly scripted performances of black servility and white dominance:

> Indeed, the inclusion of African Americans in the story was central to the fantasy for sale in Atlantic City, a fantasy like the minstrel show, built around Jim Crow characters. Local

> business people hired local blacks to do jobs that had them, as Robin D. G. Kelley has observed, squeezing "nickels and dimes from white men who longed for a mythic plantation past where darkeys liked to serve." Middle-class white people—people who during the rest of the year generally did not have servants—came to Atlantic City to rise above the masses and to show that they were not ordinary. To many, taking the next step on the American economic ladder meant having black people wait on them. In this public production of race making, whites, particularly the children of women and men from Gdansk, Palermo, and Budapest, made claims to whiteness, giving up their status as immigrants and becoming full-fledged Americans. This made Atlantic City, then, a crucial site of race and nation making.[32]

This passage underlines several themes in Simon's work that are relevant to the present argument. First, the useful concretization of the productivity of black service labor following from the specification of what it is that is being produced and consumed; namely, a fantasy. Second, the assertion that the value of this fantasy is predicated on the production of racial difference, which means that there is an intrinsic, rather than incidental, relation between the value produced by black labor and the racialization of that labor as *black* labor. Thirdly, the suggestion that whiteness, as a historically contingent formation, is fungible and subject to claims and contestations, even as the extension of whiteness necessarily entails the reproduction and exclusion of a racialized Other. Finally, the claim that race making becomes conjugated to national belonging, indicating that whiteness maps a domain of public recognition, civic inclusion and social entitlement. Crucially, this public domain is increasingly identified with the consumer marketplace, as citizenship tends to be

enacted through public consumption rather than political participation in the traditional sense.

Each of these assertions has obvious bearing on the questions posed above concerning the relations between value creation, racialization and the early development of the resort economy. However, these ideas remain largely undeveloped in Simon's work—at least in the terms in which I have framed them here—and so require further elaboration for our purposes. This is not to level a criticism, but rather to indicate that the intervention Simon is trying to make is very different from the one that I intend here. A brief discussion of these differences in objective and orientation will be useful for further distinguishing the stakes of the present argument.

Simon is writing against the tendency among prominent proponents of New Urbanism to hold up mid-twentieth-century Atlantic City as an exemplar of the open public spaces that are posited as constitutive of the truly democratic city. Such appraisals, he argues, effectively erase the actual histories of racial exclusion that gave structure and meaning to these spaces, writing that "the public space of the past is largely a myth, an illusion." Then, as now, he argues, "only when there are clearly marked walls does the great middle-class public take shape."[33] The subtitle of his text, *Atlantic City and the Fate of Urban American*, signals a cautionary tale about "the limits of American democracy" as they pertain to the *future* of urban redevelopment. He is less concerned with explaining how exactly Atlantic City came to depend on the devaluation and degradation of black life and labor. For his purposes, it is enough to show that Atlantic City during what he calls the 'halcyon years' was indeed characterized by rigid racial segregation and public exclusion. So, unlike the other historians I have discussed here, Simon begins his story much later, in

the period of 1915-1960, over a quarter century after the *Inquirer* article was published, when Jim Crow style segregation was already a *fait accompli* in the resort. Interestingly, while the notion of race making is central to his analysis, Simon has less to say about the histories and legacies of racial slavery than any of the other authors discussed.

In my own rephrasing of Simon's assertions regarding race making, I have underlined the categories of *labor, production* and *value*. This is somewhat of a misrepresentation, as these are not the terms of Simon's analysis. Rather, his examination turns on the categories of *democracy*, *the public* and *consumption*. While he defines the central historical subject of his investigation in terms of class formation (i.e. "the great middles-class"), he does not adopt a Marxian idiom. Instead, he tends to define class-formation one-sidedly, in terms of habits of consumption. This makes sense given that his primary theoretical engagement is with Urban Studies scholarship on the relationships between consumerism and urban development in the twentieth century. Moreover, the citation of Robin Kelley in the above passage notwithstanding, he makes scant reference to the intellectual traditions of Black Radicalism, Critical Race Theory or Black Studies more generally. When he invokes the "limits of democracy in America," he does not have in mind a radical critique of the constitution of civil society in capitalism. His goal is not to refute the fundamental merits of the bourgeois ideal of public life, but rather to indict those members of the middle-class who have "always preferred exclusion over inclusion," and who have thus foreclosed the full realization of that ideal. This suggests that, ultimately, political change is primarily predicated on the transformation of consumer preferences. What is absent is an examination of how these consumer preferences—and

the modes of subjectivity that they enact—emerge from and are imbricated within larger political-economic and cultural processes of racialization.

Simon's dramaturgical analysis of the performance of white identity through public acts of consumption tends to reduce racial differentiation to something of a symbolic interactional achievement, even as his oblique references to national belonging and democratic inclusion suggest that racialization is as much a political as symbolic phenomenon. These insights, while crucial, are ultimately inadequate to an understanding of how, returning to Price, "white leisure" emerged in the nineteenth century as "a corollary to black freedom and black second class status." As I have already suggested, the answer to that question requires an analytic framework capable of accounting for the intrinsic relations between processes of racialization, value creation and accumulation under capitalism.

In *Black Marxism*, Cedric Robinson elaborates just such an analytic by adapting the notion of *racial capitalism*—as originally deployed by analysts working in apartheid South Africa to describe a *particular case*—to provide a *general* account of world capitalist development. Robinson argues that Marxism has inherited certain "theoretical and ideological weaknesses" from the very bourgeois political economy that served as the object of its (partial) critique. Chief among these is the Eurocentric, racist and developmentalist tendency to posit chattel slavery, along with other modes of racial differentiation and domination, as anachronistic social forms that would be overcome by the eventual universalization of the wage system and concomitant rationalization of social relations under capitalism. Against such misconceptions, Robinson argues that capitalism is from the outset *racial capitalism*—i.e. it is thoroughly racialized when it emerges and

remains intrinsically racializing into the contemporary. The tendency of capitalist development, he argues, is thus "not to homogenize, but to differentiate."[34] Robinson follows the seminal critiques of Du Bois, C.L.R. James and Eric Williams to show that the originary and ongoing modes of racializing violence inaugurated by chattel slavery, settler colonialism and imperial domination are *foundational*—rather than aberrant or accidental—to the capitalist world-system, and thus liberal modernity itself.

"By these lights," Nikhil Pal Singh writes, "we might begin by rewriting Marx's axiomatic statement, 'Capital ceases to be capital without wage labor,' in the following way: *Capital ceases to be capital without the ongoing differentiation of free labor and slavery, waged labor and unpaid labor*. This differentiation provides the indispensable material and ideological support, prop, or pedestal on which capitalism's development depended and on which it continues to depend."[35] Race, then, is not an irrational distortion of the workings of the market (as liberalism would have it), nor does it describe a set of adventitious or epiphenomenal disparities to which capital can avail itself, nor, finally, is it an instrumentality that is restricted to a discrete period of 'so-called primitive accumulation' (as orthodox Marxism would have it). Rather, as capital's indispensable principle of differentiation, racialization is immanent to and constitutive of processes of value creation and accumulation. As anthropologist Hannah Appel argues, markets "do not merely deepen racialized and gendered postcolonial disparities; they are constituted by them."[36]

But here we must hasten to add that the notion of racial capitalism is not intended to provide a mere race-based account of 'the economy,' much less so a narrowly economistic account of race and racism. For if the procedures of racialization—understood

here as the differential and relational (de)valuation of human life through heterogeneous and flexible modes of state sanctioned and extralegal violence—are necessary to ongoing capital accumulation, Thomas reminds us that they have also throughout modernity configured "what it means to be a human, and potentially, a citizen."[37] That is, the material hierarchies of differential human value that map the ongoing differentiation of waged and wageless life also produce the shifting boundaries between full personhood—the domain comprised of the freedoms and rights, juridical and legal recognition, and conjoined privileges, prerogatives and protections that are coextensive with liberal citizenship—and the ever-proliferating zones of exception that mark some bodies as disposable and exposed to dispossession and premature death—whether by the slow violence of biopolitical abandonment and toxic environmental exposures or the more spectacular modes of violence by police action, perpetual war and the engineered crises of neo-liberal disaster capitalism.[38]

As a robust analytic of political economy, racial capitalism allows us to see how racial differentiation is not only intrinsic to capital value creation/accumulation, but is also immanent to the formation of the modern state apparatus (i.e. the 'racial state') and constitutive of the domain of liberal democratic inclusion that defines civil society, as well as its excluded outside. This is why Singh writes that "the ongoing racial differentiation of society over several centuries—which now includes the accretive rejections of formal, legal racial ascription beginning in the second half of the twentieth-century—has been continuously remade as the quasi-democratic counterpart to publicly sanctioned private accumulation and the social costs, divisions, and crises that it engenders." This formulation provides an analytic hinge linking the questions posed earlier in this chapter—regarding

the intrinsic relations between racial differentiation and value creation in the resort economy—and Simon's concern with the conditions on democratic inclusion and national belonging, but in a radically reconfigured idiom.

And again, it is to the inimitable Du Bois that we return for a characteristically prophetic and incisive analysis of this inextricable relation in the US context—written in the same years that Simon marks as the beginning of Atlantic City's 'halcyon years.' As noted above, several historians of the early resort economy have cited Du Bois' characterization of the predominant white understanding of 'negro work' in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as 'Negroes are servants, servants are negroes.' This phrase appears in a chapter in *Darkwater*, entitled "The Servant in the House," in which Du Bois provides a scathing critique of the dual degradation of the black laborer and the debasement of Personal Service (understood to denote something like 'care work') under the quasi-waged configuration of menial servitude. While he betrays a residual developmentalism in his characterization of menial service as a feudal "anachronism," he also suggests that the ongoing reproduction of degraded black labor through menial servitude is inextricably bound to the consolidation and democratization of personal whiteness, and thus to the constitution of post-Emancipation American democracy itself. He writes,

> All of this because we still consciously and unconsciously hold to the "manure" theory of social organization. We believe that at the bottom of organized human life there are necessary duties and services which no real human being ought to be compelled to do. We push below this mudsill the derelicts and half-men, whom we hate and despise, and seek to build above it—Democracy! On such foundations is reared a Theory of Exclusiveness,

> a feeling that the world progresses by the process of excluding from the benefits of culture a majority of men, so that the gifted minority may blossom. Through this door the modern democrat arrives to the place where he is willing to allot two able-bodied men and two fine horses to the task of helping one wizened beldam to take the morning air.[39]

This essay—taken together with "The Souls of White Folk," which also appears in *Darkwater*—provides the groundwork for the formulation of "the public and psychological wage" that appears fifteen years later in *Black Reconstruction*. There, as we have seen, Du Bois suggested that over the course of the long nineteenth century, personal whiteness emerged as a material force; in Singh's words, "a status conferring distinct—yet conjoined—social, political, and economic freedoms across a vertiginously unequal property order." Understood through the analytic of racial capitalism, the "wages of whiteness" thus links the differential valuation of human life and labor to the conjugated processes of racialized subject formation and the political constitution of an emergent, post-emancipation racial order. It also provides the key to understanding the *value of 'Negro work' in the early resort economy in terms of the value of whiteness*.

As a now substantial body of historical literature on the formation of an industrial proletariat in the nineteenth century United States has shown, the ascendance of free labor ideology and the expansion of the wage system were inextricably bound to processes of racial differentiation. The valorization of wage dependence as "free white labor" required the ongoing re/production of blackness as the field of total degradation, dependence, political exclusion and wageless life. In this context, what Roediger calls *herrenvolk* republicanism "had the advantage of reassuring whites in a society in which downward social mobility was a constant few—one might lose everything but not whiteness."

> Crucially for our purposes, the dissemination and consumption of mass-mediatized depictions of blackness through novel cultural forms like the minstrel show were vital to the popularization of white-supremacism among the white working class. That is, forms of entertainment and leisure were central to the dual processes of class and race formation.[40]

What all of this suggests is that a rereading of the early history of the resort economy through the lens of racial capitalism allows us to understand why replacing black workers with white workers was never a viable option, nor was providing black workers with equitable wages. At the same time, blacks could not be granted access to public amusements and venues of leisure and consumption because the value of these goods was, for whites, inextricably linked to the exclusion of blacks. So, the problem facing Atlantic City at the turn of the twentieth century was the simultaneous *emplacement* of the constructed and commoditized 'Negro Servant,' and the *displacement* of black people's claims to equality, inclusion and recognition. The answer to this dilemma, as already intimated above, was the elaboration of a rigid system of Jim Crow segregation. It was in this context that the Northside ghetto emerged. In the next chapter I take up the role of policing in the establishment of racial segregation in order to show how, rather than marking the eternal *outside* of police, the Northside emerged largely as an outcome of police. It is here, I argue, that we can see a decisive moment of what I have been calling the generativity of policing, both in terms of capital value creation and the sedimentation of the practico-inert fields that comprise the durably racialized terrains of policing in the contemporary.

Notes

[1] James Herbert Foster, "The Urban Experience of Blacks in Atlantic City, New Jersey: 1850 - 1915" (Rutgers University, 1981).

[2] Martin Paulsson, *The Social Anxieties of Progressive Reform: Atlantic City, 1854-1920* (New York: NYU Press, 1994). Nelson Johnson, *The Northside: African Americans and the Creation of Atlantic City*, First Printing edition (Medford, N.J: Plexus Pub, 2010). Nelson Johnson, *Boardwalk Empire: The Birth, High Times, and Corruption of Atlantic City*, TV Tie-in edition (Medford, N.J: Medford Press, 2010). Charles E. Funnell, *By the Beautiful Sea: The Rise and High Times of That Great American Resort Atlantic City*, 1st edition (New York: Knopf : distributed by Random House, 1975).

[3] Paulsson, *The Social Anxieties of Progressive Reform*; Johnson, *The Northside*.

[4] Paulsson, *The Social Anxieties of Progressive Reform*; Foster, "The Urban Experience of Blacks in Atlantic City, New Jersey: 1850 - 1915"; Funnell, *By the Beautiful Sea*.

[5] Goddard, Richlyn F, "'Three Months to Harry and Nine Months to Worry'': Resort Life for African Americans in Atlantic City, NJ (1850 - 1940)'" (History, Howard University, 2001); Foster, "The Urban Experience of Blacks in Atlantic City, New Jersey: 1850 - 1915."

[6] Paulsson, *The Social Anxieties of Progressive Reform*, 5.

[7] Funnell, *By the Beautiful Sea*.

[8] W. E. B. Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, ed. Henry Louis Gates, 1 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 197.

[9] W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study*, Reprint edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995).

[10] Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, 9.

[11] Du Bois, *The Philadelphia Negro*, 89.

[12] Du Bois, 89.

[13] Du Bois, 88–89.

[14] Khalil Gibran Muhammad, *The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America*, 31909th edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011).

[15] Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, 2.

[16] Du Bois, 34.

[17] W. E. B. Du Bois, *Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil* (Pinnacle Press, 2017), 44–45.

[18] Du Bois, 44.

[19] Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*, 2–3.

[20] Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*, 2nd edition (Chapel Hill, N.C: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

[21] W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880*, unknown edition (New York, NY: Free Press, 1998), 700–701.

[22] Du Bois, *Darkwater*.

[23] Johnson, *Boardwalk Empire*, 37.

[24] Foster, "The Urban Experience of Blacks in Atlantic City, New Jersey: 1850 - 1915," 212.

[25] Funnell, *By the Beautiful Sea*, 39.

[26] Johnson, *The Northside*, 40.

[27] Johnson, 21–22.

[28] Johnson, 21.

[29] Foster, "The Urban Experience of Blacks in Atlantic City, New Jersey: 1850 - 1915," 29.

[30] Funnell, *By the Beautiful Sea*, 20.

[31] Price, Clement, "Foreword," in *The Northside: African Americans and the Creation of Atlantic City*, First Printing edition (Medford, N.J: Plexus Pub, 2010).

[32] Bryant Simon, *Boardwalk of Dreams: Atlantic City and the Fate of Urban America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 41.

[33] Simon, 17.

[34] Robinson, *Black Marxism*.

[35] Nikhil Pal Singh, "On Race, Violence, and So-Called Primitive Accumulation," *Social Text* 34, no. 3 (128) (September 1, 2016): 37, https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-3607564. Jodi Melamed, *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism* (Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2011). Melamed, Jodi, "Racial Capitalism," *Journal of the Critical Ethnic Studies Association* 1, no. 1 (n.d.): 76–85.
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[37] Deborah A. Thomas, *Political Life in the Wake of the Plantation: Sovereignty, Witnessing, Repair* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2019), 3.
[38] Singh, "On Race, Violence, and So-Called Primitive Accumulation." Nikhil Pal Singh, *Race and America's Long War*, First edition (S.l.: University of California Press, 2019). Thomas, *Political Life in the Wake of the Plantation*. Deborah A. Thomas, *Exceptional Violence: Embodied Citizenship in Transnational Jamaica* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011). Chandan Reddy, *Freedom with Violence: Race, Sexuality, and the US State* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2011). Jodi A. Byrd et al., "Predatory ValueEconomies of Dispossession and Disturbed Relationalities," *Social Text* 36, no. 2 (135) (June 1, 2018): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-4362325. Melamed, *Represent and Destroy*. Melamed, Jodi, "Racial Capitalism." Sylvia Wynter, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument," *CR: The New Centennial Review* 3, no. 3 (2003): 257–337, https://doi.org/10.1353/ncr.2004.0015. David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment*, 1 edition (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2004). David Scott, "The Re-Enchantment of Humanism: An Interview with Sylvia Wynter," *Small Axe* 8, no. 120 (2000): 173–211. M. Trouillot, *Global Transformations: Anthropology and the Modern World*, 1st edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2015). Ruth Wilson Gilmore, *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California*, American Crossroads 21 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). Ruth Wilson Gilmore, "Fatal Couplings of Power and Difference: Notes on Racism and Geography," *The Professional Geographer* 54, no. 1 (February 2002): 15–24, https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-0124.00310. Adriana Petryna, *Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl*, Revised ed. edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). João Biehl, *Vita: Life in a Zone of Social Abandonment*, First Edition, Updated with a New Afterword and Photo Essay edition (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2013). Elizabeth Povinelli, *Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism* (Duke University Press Books, 2011).
[39] Du Bois, *Darkwater*, 120.
[40] David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*, Rev. ed, Haymarket Series (London ; New York: Verso, 2007). David R. Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White: The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs*, Reprint edition (New York: Basic Books, 2018). David R. Roediger and Elizabeth D. Esch, *The Production of Difference: Race and the Management of Labor in U.S. History*, Reprint edition (Oxford University Press, 2014). Alexander Saxton and David Roediger, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth Century America, New Edition* (London ; New York: Verso, 2003). Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). Saidiya V. Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America*, 1 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Chapter 6

Emplacing the Negro, Displacing Black Life:

Police and the Making of the Northside

A few days after the *Philadelphia Inquirer* alerted readers to the "great evil" hanging over Atlantic City, the *Weekly Tribune*, a black paper out of Philadelphia, sent a correspondent to the resort to see what all the fuss was about. The following week, the Atlantic City *Daily Union* published what was presented as the black correspondent's firsthand account:

> He found no serious "problem" agitating the public. His people were here in great numbers because they were needed and had been sent for as servants. As a rule, they kept in their place becomingly, and did not intrude to offend those who were over-sensitive as to race prejudice. The colored people are natural servants, take bossing more meekly and gracefully, than white help, and are for these and other good reasons, generally preferred. Most of them take pride in appearing and conducting themselves so acceptably as to remove the prejudice that exists against their race, so as to improve their fortunes and to win referment.[1]

What to make of such markedly discrepant accounts of the resort's 'color question'? Was the *Inquirer* author making much ado about nothing? Not according to Funnel, who writes of the *Daily Union* report that it "certainly represented the wishful thinking of the resort, though [it] may or may not be what the correspondent thought."[2] Foster similarly argues that the *Inquirer's* histrionics, considered alongside the *Daily*

Union's sanguine riposte, signals the extent to which the proper "place" of blacks in the resort at the turn of the century was anything but settled. He adduces another *Daily Union* article "as early as 1891, which reported that the *State Journal*, a black newspaper, charged that a 'color line' was drawn in the city by denying wealthy and respectable blacks seats along the beach front and permitting black servants to sit in the pavilions." Then, as late as 1900, the same *Daily Union* published a front-page story concerning the "invasion" of blacks into "every section, even those patronized by the best visitors. 'After the colored waiter serves his master's supper,' the article continued, 'he can go out and elbow him on the Boardwalk, crowd him in the cars, or drink at the very next table to him in any café.'"[3]

As all of this would suggest, at the turn of the century, racial segregation was implemented through diffuse and informal mechanisms—public vigilance; appeals to custom and racial propriety; the constant threat, and often actualization, of direct violence, harassment, and humiliation. And so, the color line remained, at least to a considerable degree, open to negotiation. However, as Paulsson notes, "[a]fter 1904, the color line, though unofficial, carried all the weight of municipal ordinances." As Jim Crow settled in the resort, black people saw even the limited (and always tenuous) access to public spaces, amusements and amenities that they had once enjoyed stripped away. Moreover, while black people had lived dispersed throughout the resort up to the turn of the century, by 1905—four years after the resort's elementary schools first segregated—over ninety percent of black residents would come to live in the strictly demarcated Northside ghetto.

In the second half of this chapter, I sketch an outline for a history of racial segregation in the resort that focuses specifically on the role of policing in the first decades of the twentieth century. In doing so, I move to finally make good on the claim that the

racial geographies comprising contemporary terrains of policing in Atlantic City have in large part been produced through policing. But before proceeding, it will be useful to draw together several of the conceptual strands laid out in preceding chapters in order to situate the materials that follow. This will provide occasion for a discussion, comprising the first half of this chapter, of how the arguments developed here resonate with, and depart from, more prominent social scientific approaches to the study of policing and/as spatio-racial governance. I'll begin with a rather schematic recapitulation of the main conceptual points put forth in previous chapters.

First, the social re/production of space and place has long been, and continues to be, inextricably bound to the re/production of racial difference, and vice versa. This is the historical material dialectic of the *racialization of space and spatialization of race* that was discussed at length in Chapter 3. Second, racial differentiation and hierarchization are *intrinsic* (rather than accidental or aberrant) to the dynamics of capital value creation and accumulation. This is the analytic of *racial capitalism*, as introduced in Chapter 5. Third, and following from these first two points, the racial differentiation required by racial capitalism is necessarily a principle of spatial differentiation as well. And so, the reverse is also true. That is, the 'spatial fix'—as put forth by Harvey in his incisive elaboration of the principle of 'uneven development' under capitalism—is also, and always, a spatio-*racial* fix. As a bourgeoning body of interdisciplinary scholarship produced at the intersections of critical and Black geography, postcolonial and critical race/ethnic studies, history and anthropology has shown, the 'production, reproduction and reconfiguration' of spatio-temporal heterogeneity that is required for the resolution of capitalism's crisis tendencies and ongoing accumulation is coextensive with the materialization of shifting

terrains of *racialization*. Thus, the 'conglomerate of sociopolitical relations' comprising what Weheliye has termed *racializing assemblages* (*see* Theoretical Addendum sec. 3) is necessarily productive of spatial and temporal heterogeneity (e.g. negatively racialized/differentially devalued populations and the historically determinate, material-discursive terrains with which they are co-constituted are typically produced, problematized and governed as both temporal lag and spatial frontier or externality, as we have seen in the case of Atlantic City's Northside in Chapters 1 and 4).

The upshot for our understanding of policing is twofold. To wit, if 1) policing has long been and remains essential to the ongoing re/production of racialized terrains—what I've described in terms of the material sedimentations of the *practico-inert fields* of racial geographies—then 2) policing is also intrinsic to the processes of value creation and accumulation under racial capitalism. The first claim is by now hardly controversial—a substantial and growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship on modern policing as spatio-racial governance will attest to this. The second assertion, that policing is itself intrinsic to the generation of value under racial capitalism, is perhaps more contentious. Indeed, if liberal conceptualizations posit police as *protecting* private property while ensuring the smooth flow of commodities, then critical theorizations have tended to reduce policing to the *management* of poverty, *repression* of dissent, and *control* of laborer-subjects. In either case, policing is positioned as incidental to the processes of capital value creation proper. Instead, I will argue that policing—understood as an indeterminate, heterogeneous and flexible array of practices underwritten by sovereign violence—is generative of value in its own right. What is more, I want to argue that the second claim is not merely an addendum to the first, but rather requires a fundamental reconfiguration of how we

understand the relations between policing, racialization, and spatio-temporal governance. To illustrate why, I now turn to a critical examination of an increasingly prominent approach to the study of policing that takes *containment* to be the primary function of police in relation to racial and spatial governance. This will prepare us for our return to the resort.

'Keeping them in their place': The Limitations of Policing as Racial Containment

It should be noted at the outset that my intention here is not to provide an exhaustive review of the literature on policing, space and race. Instead, I limit my critical attention to social scientific approaches that can be gathered broadly under the rubric of *policing as racial containment*. I focus primarily on studies of urban policing, racial segregation and mass incarceration in North America, with some consideration of parallel scholarship in other contexts. Similarly, I gloss over important theoretical and methodological differences in order to emphasize a core set of conceptual assumptions and analytic motifs that have come to be widely accepted ('hegemonic,' perhaps) across diverse disciplinary settings—from police studies, criminology and legal studies, to sociology, history and anthropology. In doing so, I seek to underline the decisive limitations for an adequate understanding of the generativity of policing that these tendencies reproduce.

Most succinctly, and at the risk of some overgeneralization, the *policing as racial containment* approach posits that the primary functions of policing in relation to race are *spatial confinement (of the socio-racially marginalized and stigmatized), neutralization (of the real or perceived danger that racial minorities represent), invisibilization (of mainstream society's outcasts and undesirables) and total exclusion (from the productive circuits of the market and civil society)*.[4] In recent decades, this important body of

scholarship has made several key interventions. In the US context, arguably the most crucial contribution is reflected in the growing recognition within mainstream academic discourse that North American policing must be situated within the constitutive histories and legacies of chattel slavery and its afterlives. The *racial containment* approach traces a genealogy of North American policing that begins with the slave patrol, which eventually evolved into the public police force, thereby persisting as the principal institution for controlling the movements of black people through enforcement of the Black Codes and later Jim Crow laws. These patterns of enforcement in turn engendered the racial segregation and ghettoization of urban landscapes that today comprise the context of ongoing racially targeted policing under regimes of 'War on Drugs,' 'broken windows' and 'stop-and-frisk.'

Such historicization is invaluable, but it is also here that we glimpse one of the major limitations of this approach. To wit, the increasingly standard history of policing as spatio-racial control tends to promote a paradoxically transhistorical, and therefore ahistorical, understanding of anti-black racism and white supremacism in the United States. This is signaled by the ubiquitous rhetorical strategy of recuperating and redeploying the designations of presumably bygone regimes of state authorized racial domination to describe the contemporary. Sandra Bass, in her seminal article, "Policing Race, Policing Space: Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decisions," adopts this device with headings like, "The War on Drugs—The New Jim Crow?" and "'Quality of Life' and 'Zero Tolerance' Policing: The New Black Codes?"[5] Michelle Alexander's more recent characterization of mass incarceration as "The New Jim Crow" has garnered much positive attention (deservedly, in my opinion) among both scholarly and public audiences.[6]

Similarly, Loic Wacquant has argued in a number of highly influential publications that "the task of *defining, confining, and controlling* African-Americans in the United States has been successfully shouldered by four 'peculiar institutions': slavery, the Jim Crow system, the urban ghetto, and the novel organizational compound formed by the vestiges of the ghetto and the expanding carceral system."[7]

If drawing out such historical continuities is indispensable, it also risks reproducing a rather static picture of racialization. Thus, both Wacquant and Alexander define race in the US as a "caste system" that is periodically (and partially) dismantled only to be reconstructed anew following cycles of "political backlash" and "the (re)activation of the stigma of blackness as dangerousness."[8] This in turn suggests that policing, and criminal justice institutions more generally, are only ever *reactionary* and *conservative* in relation to racial differentiation. Here an important emphasis on continuity risks obscuring the dramatic reconfigurations and discontinuities within the historically determinate material conditions on continued accumulation under racial capitalism, and thus the ceaseless elaboration of novel modalities of racializing violence, valuation, expropriation and dispossession that it requires. As Singh has argued, "[c]hange in racial orders is as important as what arguably remains the same; it corresponds to spaces of politics and struggle, resistance and flight."[9] Similarly, in her genealogy of twentieth century US racial governance—from official white-supremacism to post-war racial liberalism, to liberal multiculturalism and, finally, neoliberal multiculturalism—Jodi Melamed[10] elucidates how shifting material and discursive terrains of racial capitalism have required reorganizations and innovations of racial governance that cannot be reduced to political backlashes or atavistic resurgences of the 'same old' white supremacism. At the same time, she eschews

a linear temporality of successive rupture and progress by highlighting how material-discursive modalities of racialization comprise historical repertoires whose elements are available to recombination and partial transmutation within novel assemblages (*see also* sect. 3 Theoretical Addendum). Such fine-tuned historical analysis is essential to understanding the intrinsic generativity of policing within differential configurations of racial capitalism.

Speaking somewhat heuristically now, if the foregoing reveals the racial containment approach to be lacking in its *historical-temporal* aspect, we can also identify certain related limitations in its *geographic-spatial* aspect. Consider again the operative lexicon of spatial governance that this literature mobilizes: *containment, confinement, enclosure, isolation, exclusion, exile, banishment*—the subjects of which are the *marginalized outcasts* who are pushed to the very *periphery*, if not beyond, of the *state*, *economy* and *society*. Such figuration is particularly pronounced in scholarship written under the heading of 'punitive neoliberalism,' of which, again, the work of Loic Wacquant is emblematic. Take his characterization of the prison and hyperghetto as mutually enmeshed "institutions of forced confinement:" "Both are entrusted with enclosing a stigmatized population so as to neutralize the material and/or symbolic threat that it poses for the broader society from which it has been extruded."[11] He elsewhere describes how the two institutions "work jointly to invisibilize problem populations" while "pushing them into the peripheral sectors of the booming secondary labor market."[12] The prison-hyperghetto "carceral continuum" thus achieves the "great confinement" of the "rejects of market society" while also enabling "political elites to reassert the authority of the state and shore up the deficit of legitimacy."[13] Crucially, Wacquant repudiates both the

Foucauldian notion of carcerality as disciplinization and the neo-Marxist formulation of the Prison Industrial Complex, arguing that both the rehabilitative and productive pretenses of the carceral system have been entirely shed as prison and ghetto become spaces for merely *warehousing* the racially stigmatized urban "subproletariat."[14]

I quote Wacquant liberally here because his language is exemplary of contemporary sociological theorizations of "punitive poverty management" and its concomitant neoliberal (or "late modern") political and cultural formations (e.g. "culture of fear," "culture of control," "popular punitiveness").[15] While the authors referenced here differ in their respective theoretical underpinnings—with some avoiding the term 'neoliberalism' all together—all reproduce a familiar geometry of power and domination. This geometry is structured by a spatial axiomatics of insides and outsides, inclusions and exclusions, borders and boundaries, centers and peripheries. And from this geometry, several conceptual problems arise. For starters, talk of a heterogenous "bureaucratic field" or decentered "techne of governmentality" notwithstanding, this portrayal replicates a "spatiality of the state" that is perfectly consonant with the state's own authoritative (i.e. ideologically imbued) self-representation. That is, it risks reaffirming a normative figuration in which spaces of disorder and illegibility mark an absence or diminution of the state-and-civil-society. It thereby re-inscribes a political telos of inclusion within—and thus the necessary extension of—the liberal bourgeois racial state.[16] To address this theoretical cum political blind spot, Das and Poole have argued that anthropologists must attend to the constitutive "margins of the state," not simply as inert spatial peripheries and/or political boundaries, but as ever-shifting and productive contours of power that "run through the body of the state like rivers."[17]

A parallel criticism can be leveled against the geometry of 'the neoliberal market economy' that these theorists deploy. By figuring the racially stigmatized and marginalized as entirely superfluous—"rejects of market society" who compose a totally unproductive quantum of "social waste" that must be sequestered away in spaces of "pure confinement"—these analysts assume a self-evident (i.e. ideologically imbued) relation between productive and nonproductive spaces and the people who respectively inhabit them. The ghetto and the prison mark the *outside* of the circuits of value creation and accumulation, while simultaneously demarcating the boundaries of legitimate state violence under "neoliberal penality." Taken together, these domains are coextensive with *society in toto*, such that the racially stigmatized and marginalized are *outside* of society. I will return to the question of the supposed nonproductivity of these spaces in relation to capital accumulation in a moment, but first I want to draw attention to how the spatial relations that structure this geometry of power actually reproduce an ideology of *antirelationality*.

In a trenchant critique of the "bifurcation-segregation" analytic of racist spatial violence—the same that undergirds the policing as racial containment approach—Katherine McKittrick shows how such accounts require the classification of black geographies "as imperiled and dangerous, or spaces 'without'/spaces of exclusion, even as those who have always struggled against racial violence and containment populate them."[18] These analyses become inadvertently complicit in the violence against which they are directed. "More specifically," she writes, "when racial violence is the central analytical query (in the humanities and social sciences), the dead and dying black/non-white body becomes the conceptual tool that will undoubtedly complete, and thus empirically prove,

the brutalities of racism."[19] She describes these accounts as having a certain "eeriness" to them that is "disclosed upon reflection that the geographies of dead and dying communities, and those who inhabit spaces of otherness, are actually not connected to us (those 'with' who study those 'without'), precisely because they are dead and dying, because they live in slums and prisons, and thus are radically outside the conceptual boundaries of emancipation, humanness, and global citizenry and, in most cases, disconnected from the land itself."[20] This analytic disconnection thereby partakes of the "destruction of a black sense of place," inasmuch as, "because they are dead and dying, the condemned and 'without' apparently have nothing to contribute to our broader intellectual project of ethically reimagining our ecocidal and genocidal world. Put differently, it seems eerily natural that those rendered less than human are also deemed too destroyed or too subjugated or too poor to write, imagine, want, or have a new lease on life."[21]

Patently, this is not a matter of generating more "positive representations of black spaces" (the sort of "good news from the ghetto" against which Wacquant has polemicized[22]), nor is it a matter of merely *including* (authorized) "black representations of space" within or alongside *authoritative* geographies (in the name of multicultural diversity, let's say). Instead, what McKittrick calls for is an insistence "that our racial pasts can uncover a collective history of encounter—a difficult interrelatedness—that promises an ethical analytics of race based not on suffering, but on human life."[23] For McKittrick, "a black sense of place can be understood as the processes of materially and imaginatively situating historical and contemporary struggles against practices of domination and the difficult entanglements of racial encounter,"[24] which in turn open "an analytical pathway that pays attention to geographies of relationality and human life without dismissing the

brutalities of isolation and marginalization."[25] McKittrick offers the figure of "planation futures" to signal "the insistence that spaces of encounter, rather than transparent and completed spaces of racism and racist violence, hold in them useful anti-colonial practices and narratives."[26] [Here I must note, as something of an aside, that McKittrick's redeployment of the plantation in her 'plantation *futures*' offers a powerful reconceptualization of spatio-temporal *entanglement*,[27] as opposed to the more static or recurrent 'racial caste' signaled by "the new Jim Crow." Other scholars, such as Clyde Woods and Deborah Thomas, have similarly taken up the plantation (and the garrison in Thomas' case) to elaborate accounts of nonlinear spatio-temporal relationalities that refuse liberal bourgeois ideologies of progress and positivist causality in order to open up submerged terrains of connection, ethical responsibility and political struggle.[28]]

For the social scientist, an insistence on relationality and connection over "bifurcated systems of dispossession and possession" means that, "[i]nstead of pointing to those 'without' and citing injustice, we might imagine how we are intimately tied to broader conceptions of human and planetary life and which demonstrate our common and difficult histories of encounter."[29] For a model of what such an analysis might look like, McKittrick points to Ruth Wilson Gilmore's *Golden Gulag*. In that work, Gilmore refuses "the common view that prisons sit on the edge—at the margins of social spaces,"[30] and along with it the mystifying assertion that geographies of spatial domination exist *outside* of the productive circulations of racial capitalism. Gilmore's luminous analysis of the "prison fix" as one contingent apparatus within a broader constellation of strategies for resolving historically determinate crises of overaccumulation through novel modalities of

racializing violence gives lie to the supposed nonproductivity of what have been figured as spaces of "pure confinement" and "human waste."

But at this point, the familiar reader might protest that my portrayal of the policing as racial containment approach has been deliberately obscurantist, or at least not entirely fair, inasmuch as none of the authors cited here would claim that the institutions of criminal justice are entirely *unproductive*. Indeed, Wacquant argues that we must attend to "punishment as a device for (re)generating, marking, and enforcing symbolic boundaries."[31] Here, the prison and ghetto (and so, by extension, policing) are integral components of the state's capacity to "trace social demarcations and produce social reality through its work of inculcation of efficient categories and classifications."[32] That is, policing partakes of the symbolic re/production of social order. This idiom of policing as social order maintenance has long been a mainstay in the more critically inflected reaches of police studies. In his now classic 1982 ethnography of police patrol work in Canada, Richard Ericson identified the primary function of policing as "the reproduction of social order."[33] More recently, Didier Fassin has taken up this trope in his ethnography of French anti-crime squads working in the *banlieues*. Fassin, who adopts rather whole cloth the policing as racial containment thesis, writes, "In reality, by virtue of the power relation that is instituted during the stops and frisks and through the humiliations accompanying them, these interactions accomplish something very different from maintaining public order. They are a recall to the social order. They remind each individual of his place."[34] Note the deliberate entendre here, as spatial containment becomes isomorphic with the symbolic order (in which each has his place).

In Chapter 4, I mentioned two prominent critical approaches to the genealogy of policing, one Foucauldian and the other Neo-Marxist. Both emphasize the social productivity of policing, whether understood as a distributed *techne* of liberal governmentality or an encompassing process of "fabricating the social order" of wage labor.[35] In both cases, the object and outcome of policing is an augmentation of *order* mediated by the discipline/subjectification of docile, productive liberal subjects/proletarians. What the policing as racial containment thesis adds to this perspective (besides an engagement with race at all) is the prominent place of *disorder* (whether actual or spectral) in the productivity of policing. For example, noting that every urban riot in France over the last several decades has been instigated by an officer-involved fatality, Fassin argues that this presents a "sort of self-fulfilling prophecy." He writes that "the consequences of their own actions led the anticrime squads to feel affirmed in their role of controlling urban disorder and preventing juvenile delinquency. If they had not existed it would have been necessary to invent them, if only to prove that they were socially useful."[36] Here Fassin, like Malcolm Young and Peter Manning before him, draws attention to the centrality of dramaturgy in the construction and legitimation of the police mandate.[37] He also notes that the highly dramatized spectacles that the police mobilize to justify their existence tend to spill over, engendering an increasingly pervasive culture of fear. The latter, when seized upon under the banner of "law and order," can pay enormous political dividends, thereby symbolically constituting the legitimacy of the state itself.

So, while Fassin begins his monograph with a discussion of the complementarity of Althusser's dialectic of *interpellation* and Foucault's duality of *subjection/subjectification*, he ultimately arrives at Durkheim, and a reflection on the social

symbolic constitution of "moral communities." He is not alone. Wacquant similarly argues that it is Durkheim's analysis of the constitution of social order through symbolic ritual—what he describes as the "expressive" moment, as opposed to the "instrumental" perspective offered by Marxist materialism—that reveals the productivity of racializing punishment in the contemporary.[38] For the most nuanced and incisive meditations on crime-and-policing along this Durkheimian tack, we should look to Jean and John Comaroff and their sustained interrogations of the "phenomenology of fear" and "metaphysics of disorder" in late modernity.[39] But for present purposes, I only want to indicate what I view as a major limitation that is shared by these authors, and which is signaled by Wacquant's aforementioned distinction between the *instrumental* (i.e. material) and the *expressive* (i.e. symbolic) moments of punishment. This will bring me to a final word on the supposed nonproductivity in relation to capital valuation and accumulation of geographies of racialized spatial violence.

Each of these authors is concerned to show how contemporary regimes of racialized punishment remain symbolically productive (of racial difference; of social order; of the boundary between citizen and anticitizen, friend and enemy; of moral communities; of sovereignty, etc.) even as they have largely shed their historical role in the accumulation of capital. But this line of reasoning ultimately compels the very decoupling of the "symbolic" (broadly construed as the socio-political) from the "material" (narrowly construed as "economic") that each of these authors hopes to transcend. The consequence of this tacit decoupling is that *racialization* becomes (at least partially) unmoored from, and therefore incidental to, capital value creation. This in turn reproduces an ontological gap between the domains of "economy" and "society," and so between the objective field

of class formation and the subjective field of racialization. This is more or less explicit in Wacquant and Fassin. But it is even true for the Comaroffs, who among these scholars are unique in their invocation of racial capitalism, but who also speak of, e.g. "*race-inflected* class warfare," presumably in contradistinction to class conflict that is independent of racialization.[40]

Though space does not allow for a thorough treatment here, I want to suggest that this problematic analytic disconnect stems from a particular notion of "surplus population" that conflates the *condition of disposability* with the *position of externality*. This in turn seems to originate from the assumption that the singular productive relation of capital to racialization can be reduced to *labor exploitation*. At bottom is a highly circumscribed version of the labor theory of value in which the sole vector through which capital can produce and extract value from human life is by "putting it to work;" that is, as a quantum of abstract labor power mediated by purposeful, commodity-determined activity. By this reckoning, once one has been permanently "decommissioned" and made "human waste"—as have the millions of people who are currently being "warehoused" in heavily policed ghettos and prisons, according to the racial containment approach—one is entirely expendable to capital (i.e. *external* to because "extruded" from). Therefore, the hyper-ghetto and prison are *outside* of the productive circuits of valuation and accumulation, and so are only productive in the symbolic sense, if at all.

The figure of the human as "waste" under neoliberalism/late modernity has been gaining analytic currency in recent years.[41] And for good reason. Indeed, I do not take issue with the claim that disposable life proliferates under contemporary regimes of racial capitalism.[42] It always has, though the sheer magnitude today is arguably unprecedented.

My disputation is rather with the failure of the "human waste" figuration to properly account for the *indispensability of disposable life* to the ongoing accumulation of value under racial capitalism. Consider a recent formulation by Marxist scholar, Michelle Yates: "The formation and growth of [the global] permanent surplus population can be theorized as a kind of disposability and throwing away within capitalism. Once relegated as permanent surplus, meaning that capital no longer needs these populations as labor, these populations are little more than human-as-waste, excreted from the capitalist system."[43] Thus excreted, these populations are "separated partially or fully from domains of capitalist exchange and social life." Yates grounds her "immanent critique" in the "fundamental social categories of capitalism (i.e. value, labor, the commodity form, and capital)" in order to argue that the "excretion" of "the human-as-waste" reveals "the natural and historical limits of capital" and therefore the inevitability of "capitalism's overcoming."[44] Good news.

It should be noted that while Yates argues for the intrinsic production of human disposability under capitalism, she does not include race or racialization among the "fundamental social categories of capitalism." She even argues that scholars who examine human disposability in terms of racialization are "focusing on social class as a function of identity," which deflects attention from the inherent dynamics of capitalism. Now, consider the following formulation from Nikhil Pal Singh, who similarly takes up the essential production of disposable life under capitalism, but specifically through the analytic of *racial capitalism*:

> The production of race as a form of devalued collectivity has depended upon managing valuations and devaluations of black social and biological reproduction in the interests of

> capital accumulation and its social reproduction. Medical experimentation, crime statistics, debt peonage, labor market manipulation, rent harvesting, infrastructural exclusion, and financial speculation—the racial differentiation thought extrinsic to capitalism's postslavery itinerary has been both directly productive of value and integral to the technical development of capitalism on its alleged frontiers, where new specializations in violence can be field-tested free from ethical judgment, setting off new rounds in which peoples separated from land and resources can be consumed within the web of capital.[45]

For Yates, the relation of the "human-as-waste" to capital is ultimately one of radical exteriority, of *nonrelation*. Therefore, by an implicit zero-sum logic, as the ever-expanding permanent surplus population dilates the *outside* of capitalism, there is a concomitant contraction of "the capitalist system" towards an ultimate vanishing point. Against this, Singh opens up an ever-expanding *frontier* of racial capitalism that traces historical horizons of ongoing iterations of predatory accumulation and accumulation by dispossession, modes of racializing ex-propriation that cannot be reduced to labor exploitation but that are nonetheless essential to capital's ongoing subsumption of "the web of life." In this sense, the shifting lineaments of differential disposability that define racialization do not demarcate *boundaries* or *peripheries*, but instead, adopting the Deleuzian idiom, trace the cutting edges of *deterritorialization and re-territorialization,* comprising what we might call the "axiomatics of racial capitalism." And it is in this sense that we can understand the *indispensability* (i.e. non-externality) of the *disposability* of differentially devalued human life *and the spatio-temporal terrains with/in which it is co-constituted*. And so, it is also here that we can begin to appreciate the productivity of policing—understood as a flexible principle of racial differentiation through sovereign

violence which, as we have seen, is as productive of *disorder* as it is order (i.e. a generative principle of deterritorialization/re-territorialization).

To conclude this discussion, I want to reiterate that my purpose has not been to *disprove* the racial containment approach, nor to *negate* the vital insights that it has contributed to our understanding of policing, racialization, and spatial domination. Instead, I have sought to indicate certain *limitations* of the racial containment thesis which, I've argued, originate from specific conceptual and analytic *delimitations* and *delineations*. First, I have suggested that the racial containment thesis tends to characterize regimes of spatio-racial differentiation through state-sanctioned and extralegal violence as recurrent and anachronistic, rather than iterative, flexible and at times highly innovative. Second, and relatedly, I have argued that this approach reproduces a spatio-geographic axiomatics of insides and outsides, centers and peripheries, which paradoxically partakes of the *antirelationality* that racial capitalism requires for its ongoing reproduction and elaboration. For as Jodi Melamed argues, following Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Cedric Robinson, and echoing McKittrick's above critique of the "segregation-bifurcation" analytic,

> Processes of differentiation and dominant comparative logics create "certainties" of discreteness, distinctness, and discontinuity—of discrete identities, distinct territorializations and sovereignties, and discontinuities between the political and the economic, the internal and the external, and the valued and the devalued. In the drawing of the line that constitutes discrete entities and distinguishes between the valued and the devalued, people and situations are made incommensurable to one another as a disavowed condition of possibility for world-systems of profit and governance.[46]

As we have seen, by placing geographies of racializing domination *outside* of the productive circuits of racial capitalism while simultaneously posing them as the *boundaries* of the state (even if under the sign of the 'constitutive outside'), the policing as racial containment thesis obscures a crucial moment of the intrinsic generativity of policing. At the same time, as McKittrick has shown, this same conceptual delimitation truncates a political and ethical engagement with the historical geographies of entanglement and interrelatedness that constitute these very terrains of racializing violence and encounter. The result is a failure to consider how geographies of domination always engender and are exceeded by discontinuous geographies of struggle.

If we take the observations outlined above to reveal the limitations of racial containment as a *conceptualization* of policing, then we might also take the last point, concerning geographies of struggle, to signal the limitations of racial containment *as an approach to policing itself*. For it is undoubtedly the case that more or less flexible and heterogeneous strategies of racial containment have long been and remain fundamental to the 'vocabularies of motives' of urban policing in the US and elsewhere (whether explicitly endorsed, coded or vehemently disavowed). But even so, it would be an error to assume that these practices produce "transparent and completed spaces of racism and racist violence," just as it would be mystifying to take for granted that the ultimate achievement of such spaces is the true *telos* of policing. In the first case, there is an elision of a "black sense of place," the radical material praxes of freedom that "hold in them useful anti-colonial practices and narratives."

As McKittrick would remind us, following Wynter, grounds of domination are always and everywhere *demonic* grounds, opening lines of flight and modes of relationality

that are never fully determined or exhausted by the vectors of domination/resistance. But this also reveals why it is inadequate to assume that the realization of isolation, exclusion, and externalization are the ultimate *telos* of policing. For the lines of flight set loose by ongoing struggles against racializing domination also trace the movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization that racial capitalism itself requires, even as they also hold out an irreducible potential, however slight or fleeting, of a more radical undoing. In this sense, the proliferation of *disorder*, which so many anthropologists have in recent years identified with policing, becomes more than a symbolic resource for the reproduction and legitimation of *police*. While it certainly is that, *disordering* also becomes a generative principle of both violent *deterritorialization* and (equally violent) *recapture*, an indeterminate and value-potentiating movement that is never reducible to mere repetition, reversible oscillation, or reactionary backlash.

In the remainder of this chapter, I sketch a provisional outline for a history of racial segregation in Atlantic City that focuses specifically on the productivity of policing. I build upon the previous chapter to argue that policing was essential to the generation of spatio-racial difference in the resort and was thus intrinsic to the processes of capital value creation and accumulation. By figuring the emergence of the Northside in terms of a double movement of *emplacement* and *displacement*, I seek to open up a space for historical analysis that can engage the core thematics of the racial containment thesis—i.e. order/disorder, (hyper)visibility/invisibility, transparency/illegibility, enforcement/neglect—while avoiding the pitfalls of the "bifurcation-segregation" analytic. That is, by gesturing to historical geographies of connection, interrelation, and entanglement, my goal is to remain heedful to McKittrick's call to "[pay] attention to

geographies of relationality and human life without dismissing the brutalities of isolation and marginalization."[47]

A Most Troublesome Year: Atlantic City, 1893

A quick consideration of several key developments occurring in and around 1893 can help us better appreciate the general atmosphere in which the *Inquirer* and *Daily Union* articles were published. First, that year marks the earliest in a long line of state investigations into allegations of voter fraud in the resort. Both municipal and general elections had been held the previous year. In March 1892, the city elected a Democrat, Willard Wright, for mayor, along with two Democrats for city council. The remaining two council seats went to Republicans, the historically dominant party. Local historian and chief editor of the *Daily Union*, John Hall, rejoiced at the Democrats' upset victory, writing "the coons and the gamblers no long run Atlantic City." Later that same year, in the November senatorial race, local Democratic candidate William Riddle lost to the Republican candidate, incumbent mayor of Atlantic City Samuel Hoffman. After his defeat, Riddle called on the Democratic-controlled senate to investigate, claiming that Hoffman had "colonized the colored Republicans" in the resort. A probe was conducted, but Hoffman ultimately kept his seat.[48]

As for Hall's assessment of the outcome of local elections, it should be noted that 1893 also marks the year in which a decisive triumph was heralded by the exponents of the city's first concerted anti-vice campaign, which had been initiated in 1890. The motley crew of Evangelical and secular civic organizers of the campaign, using the local *Bulletin* as their sounding board, had railed against the proliferation of open gambling and

prostitution throughout the resort, but special attention was given to places of alleged "race mixing." As Paulsson has shown, Progressive Era fears of "race suicide" by "miscegenation" were brought to a fever pitch in the resort in the last decade of the nineteenth century, as the *Bulletin* took special care to report the most terrifying, and titillating, accounts of incidents occurring in the city's openly interracial dens of ill repute.[49] It seems then that neither whites nor blacks could be trusted to keep to their respective places becomingly.

Indeed, even the resort's putative "natural servants" were beginning to show definite signs of a disinclination to take their bossing "meekly and gracefully." Just six weeks prior to publishing the reassuring testimony that opens this chapter, the *Daily Union* reported that the black wait staff at the Windsor Hotel had staged a strike. A black waiter, after deciding that the staff meal was simply inedible, had ordered a lunch from the restaurant's headwaiter, a white man. The headwaiter placed the order with the kitchen, but when he learned whom the meal was for, he informed the black waiter that he would only be served the help's food in the help's cafeteria. The waiter rounded up his colleagues, who had similarly found their scourings unfit for human consumption, and they informed the headwaiter at supper time that they were on strike. This would be the resort's earliest recorded labor demonstration. It did not go well. The *Daily Union* reported that the headwaiter "cooly [sic] told them to strike out for another job and summoned all the chambermaids attired in their nobby [sic] white caps and aprons to wait at supper and the next morning he had a new force of colored waiter."[50]

And it wasn't only in their capacity as service laborers that black people were finding the places assigned to them unduly restrictive. As the *Inquirer* story indicates, 1893

was the year that racial segregation was officially implemented in Asbury Park, a smaller beach resort located some seventy miles up the coast from Atlantic City. Like Atlantic City, Asbury Park relied almost entirely upon black service labor to support its much smaller, but still substantial hotel and leisure industry. And like Atlantic City, Asbury Park had up until 1893 relied upon informal mechanisms of segregation based more or less on appeals to racial propriety to maintain a somewhat fluid color line. But throughout the late 1880s and early 1890s, black residents and tourists alike began organizing to insist upon their rights to equal access. Indeed, as Goldberg has recently argued in a short and illuminating historical work entitled *The Retreats of Reconstruction*, the Jersey shore at the turn of the century emerged at the vanguard of a national Civil Rights campaign centered on the protection of equal rights to public accommodations and leisure venues. Beginning in the 1880s, black activists started staging demonstrations in Asbury Park and Atlantic City, including a campaign of "wade-ins" organized by local religious and Civil Rights leaders to protest the informal segregation of beaches and pavilions. As black activists exposed the inadequacies of traditional methods for refusing their legitimate claims, other measures were quickly drawn up. Of course, Atlantic City would follow a full decade behind Asbury Park in the consolidation of its own Jim Crow system, a system that would require the elaboration of a distinct set of strategies.[51] The reasons for these differences are important and will be discussed further in a moment.

There is one last historical circumstance that we should consider before summarizing the significance of this very brief survey for an understanding of the resort's 'color question' at the end of the nineteenth century. As the *Inquirer* author notes, the summer of 1893 had been a disappointment, with far fewer visitors to the resort than in

previous years. This is understandable, given that this was the first year of a devastating and protracted economic depression, the magnitude of which is reflected by the sweeping political changes that it engendered—i.e. a major political realignment that ushered in the Fourth Party System and the victory of president McKinley and the new Republicans over an emergent anti-capitalist, agrarian socialist movement. Then, as now, the consumer economies of leisure and entertainment were the first to suffer during bad times. And so, while I won't have more to say about it here, we should keep in mind that the racial crisis in Atlantic City was bound inextricably to a capital crisis of global proportions. And as Ruth Wilson Gilmore would have us remember, while in good times the state tends to recognize and provide formal remedies for exclusion "by, for example, extending the vote, banning discrimination in public-sector employment, or constructing the legal apparatuses through which injured persons may seek courtroom remedies," during "bad times, when deepened differentiation pacifies widespread insecurity among the herrenvolk, the 'fix' formalizes inequalities."[52]

In the preceding chapter, I argued that the key to understanding the early resort economy lie in an appreciation of the production and valuation of *whiteness*, understood, again following Singh, to signify a set of "distinct—yet conjoined—political and economic freedoms across a vertiginously unequal property order."[53] Following from this, it is not difficult to see that the developments surveyed here presented a truly dire threat to capital accumulation in the resort. If black workers were to successfully organize, it would not merely mean a loss of profits in the form of higher wages. More importantly, the recognition of black servitude *as labor* would be an egregious affront to *free white labor*, and thus a depreciation of the value of whiteness (i.e. "the wages of whiteness").[54] As Du

Bois observed a century ago, "The rules of the labor union are designed, not simply to raise wages, but to guard against any likeness between artisan and servant. There is no essential difference in ability and training between a subway guard and a Pullman porter, but between their union cards lies a whole world."[55] That is, the *value* produced by service labor was inextricably bound to its racialization as *black* labor—quasi-waged labor whose relation to the *contract*, and the formal equality presupposed by it, was void.

Du Bois also wrote at length on the mounting anxieties among whites in the post-Reconstruction period that black suffrage would mean the ruination of democracy through graft and corruption, as blacks who remained dependent on white patronage would sell their votes to the highest bidder.[56] But given that political patronage (i.e. 'corruption') was the norm in municipal politics throughout the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, we must also appreciate how black political participation represented a debasement of the entitlements and prerogatives of civic life that in the nineteenth century had been made coextensive with whiteness. Again, black inclusion threatened a depreciation of whiteness, and thus the disruption of capital valuation and accumulation. Hence the rising popular efforts to delegitimate and restrict black political participation in the resort, as throughout the rest of the country.

As for blacks demanding access to public amusements and leisure venues, we saw in the last chapter that the very value of these goods was predicated upon the exclusion of black people. As Goldberg argues, whites viewed their leisure pursuits as "rewards for a year of hard work, careful savings, and negotiations with employers for time off. At the same time black workers who seemed to occupy such spaces without the prerequisite planning and hard work discredited the cultural values they assigned to leisure venues and

the legitimacy of free labor ideology."[57] Like Simon, Goldberg adopts the language of *fantasy* to characterize what was on sale in Atlantic City, writing that "by the 1880s, white vacationers clashed with increasing numbers of black tourists and seasonal workers who appeared on the same beaches and boardwalks and in the same restaurants, bars, and dancing halls as whites, threatening with their presence to upset the idyllic fantasies that white tourists had fashioned for summer vacation spaces."[58] I should note here that Goldberg's analysis of the early resort economy comes very close to my own when he writes that, "Occupying spaces white citizens had deemed off-limits to black visitors, African-Americans stripped those spaces of their cultural value and, as a result, their economic value."[59] He also provides an incisive cautionary tale against the sorts of consumer-driven politics that Simon seems to endorse. But in the end, his analysis remains limited by his own insistence that the processes of racialization can be separated from the domain of market forces, a habit that his own materials make highly dubious.[60]

So, having considered the foregoing, I will restate the assertion put forth at the end of the last chapter; namely, that the resolution of the crisis facing the resort at the end of the nineteenth century required a double movement of *emplacing* the commoditized "Negro servant," on which the continued creation of surplus value depended, and *displacing* black life, as that which threatened to exceed and thereby undo the entire apparatus of accumulation. In the remainder of this chapter, I suggest that it is through this double movement that we can understand the generativity of policing in the resort. Furthermore, and following from the first half of this chapter, I argue that the power to "keep in one's place" as a mode of *disciplinization and labor exploitation* does not exhaust the material productivity of policing in relation to racialization and value creation. That is,

displacement is not the negation of *emplacement*, as labor *exclusion* would be to labor *exploitation*, but rather marks a terrain of generative *concealment* and *disordering* that is essential to ongoing capital accumulation in its own right. Rather than marking the space of an extruded and externalized *surplus*, displacement traces a terrain of productive *excesses* engendered though geographies of domination and struggle. In this sense, rather than taking emplacement and displacement as oppositional binaries, we must think of them as two moments in the ongoing and iterative elaboration of racial capitalism along its frontiers.

Police Power, Police Force

Lest the foregoing argument concerning black life as a vector of capital devaluation be taken as overly speculative, we should note that it was precisely in these terms that business owners would come to justify the necessity of racial segregation in Atlantic City. During the Civil War, black activists had led successful campaigns in cities like Washington D.C. and Philadelphia to desegregate public transportation by appealing to a common law tradition that protected access to public accommodations. Following the war, civil rights agitators in Northern cities extended their campaigns to restaurants, hotels, theatres and other entertainment venues and amusements. Even after the Supreme Court reversed public accommodations protections in 1883 by deeming the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional, black activists were able to bring successful discrimination suits under states' civil rights legislation. In 1884, New Jersey's own Civil Rights Act made racial discrimination in public accommodations unlawful. Enforcement of these protections was lax, and initially black people largely avoided challenging customary

boundaries. But as we have seen, by the late 1880s, growing coalitions of black activists were making demands for equal access.

As Goldberg has shown, much of the legal maneuvering mobilized to deny black people access to public amusements in resort towns revolved around contested remappings of three juridical domains; namely, the "private," the "public," and the "social."[61] The "public" defined the jurisdiction of state and federal law, and thus the domain of civil rights protections and guarantees, while the "private" delimited that jurisdiction by defining the rights of individuals against undue encroachment. The "social" served as an indeterminate and fungible category that mediated between the two, redrawing the lines between state sovereignty and individual rights. Goldberg cites Saidya Hartman's observation that the "nineteenth-century social is best described as an asylum of inequality, for the practices and relations allowed to flourish in this domain were liberated from the most nominal commitment to equality."[62] Indeed, the clarion call of "social equality," coupled with the specter of "miscegenation," emerged as a powerful ideological device for mobilizing whites against black people's claims to equal rights in the post-Reconstruction era.

So, in order to legitimate their claims to access, black activists defined their rights to leisure and entertainment venues as an extension of their economic rights, taking up the free labor call of "eight hours for what we will" and the banner of "the fruits of one's labor."[63] To undermine charges that they sought legal enforcement of social equality, which the courts had already pronounced a constitutional nonstarter, black activists framed their claims to access in terms of consumer rights, following in the tradition of the common law through which they had secured earlier victories. But this down-shifting to the domain of economic and consumer rights would prove decisive for the eventual legal sanctioning

of segregation in resorts like Atlantic City. Business owners argued that, because the economic well-being of black laborers ultimately depended upon the continuing prosperity of the resort, their economic and consumer rights were subordinate to the *property rights* of owners. In doing so, proprietors mobilized the category of the *social* as an index of market forces and consumer preferences in an attempt to redefine *public* amusements and entertainment venues as falling under the legal domain of the *private*, meaning that they were not subject to the legal protections of federal and state laws.[64]

In Asbury Park, where "original proprietor" and mayor James Bradley held the entire beach front as his private property, the mediating category of the social wasn't even required legally. In 1893, when police ordered black people to vacate all beaches except for the one designated for their use, Bradley was merely acting as a private citizen exercising his private property rights. All the same, fearing that black activism might escalate to a proper insurrection, he tried to convince black residents and tourists that the measures were only taken with the welfare of the entire community in mind. In Atlantic City, the situation was very different, and so would require different measures. There, municipal authorities and property owners partnered to elaborate a strategy that would circumvent the courts by relying on local ordinances and bylaws that dealt with "disturbances," "annoyances," "dress codes" and "nuisances," all of which fell outside of both state and federal jurisdictions. In doing so, local officials were merely exercising the police powers delegated to them by the state in order to protect the capital assets on which the public welfare depended.

Here it becomes necessary to distinguish the *police power* from a *police force*. In US constitutional law, the police power encompasses the domain of states' rights and local

sovereignty, and so is defined as the limit on federal governmental powers and protections, as specified by the Tenth Amendment. While the police power marks the limit on federal sovereignty, the positive limits on the police power itself are undefined. Deriving from the common law, the substantive content of the police power is indeterminate and open-ended. As Ernst Freund explained in an early treatment of the subject, it is "not a fixed quantity" but is rather "the expression of social, economic and political conditions. As long as these conditions vary, the police power must continue to be elastic, i.e. capable of development."[65] It is traditionally defined with reference to the sovereign right of a territorially bound community to govern itself for the promotion of "the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the public." The police power pertains to the conditions on the legitimate restriction on individuals, property and behaviors inasmuch as they are deemed to affect negatively upon the public welfare. As Marianna Valverde has argued, the tendency in constitutional law to designate the police power as "the police power of the state" obscures the fact that these powers are typically exercised at the most local levels of municipal governance. Police power regulations are essential to municipal regimes of spatial governance, pertaining largely to what Valverde describes as "time, place and manner" rules. Here we find land-use authority, zoning and eminent domain, as well as regulations on acceptable uses of public facilities (from parks to sidewalks) and restrictions (often narrowly aesthetic) on private property. In so-called home rule states, like New Jersey, municipalities exercise exceptionally broad governing and regulatory powers.[66]

The municipal *police force*, understood as the local, uniformed law enforcement agency, is not identical to, nor simply a subset of, the police power of municipalities. Criminal law in the United States is retained by states and the federal government, and so

is not extended to municipalities. When municipal police officers enforce statutory criminal law, they are not acting as agents of the municipal police power, strictly speaking, but are enacting either the nondelegated police power of the state or federal law, and so are restricted in their actions by state law and federal due process. On the other hand, when police officers enforce local ordinances and bylaws, they are acting under the authorization of the local police power. Of course, in actual situations of enforcement, a "police power" matter can quickly evolve into a matter of criminal sanction. And because local ordinances can limit individual freedoms that would otherwise be protected under state and federal statute, when police officers enforce municipal ordinances, they may enjoy a paradoxical augmentation of their powers in relation to those granted for criminal investigation and law enforcement. In this sense, police officers are an embodiment of US legal pluralism, defining the junction of state, federal and local sovereignties, oftentimes serving as a principle of fungibility between them.

While the distinction may seem like a rather pedantic one, I am going through the effort here because I do not want to overstate, and thereby detract from my case for the productivity of policing by conflating the police power with the police. As was already indicated above, it was indeed under the municipal police power that Atlantic City's officials were able to devise a system of Jim Crow that would fly below state and federal jurisdictions. Even so, it is still my contention that the *police force* was essential to the production of spatio-racial difference in the resort, both in the capacity of criminal law enforcement, and as agent of "peace keeping" and "order maintenance." Even more specifically, I want to argue that by attending to the differential and discretionary application of these two moments of police practice—that is, criminal law enforcement, on

the one hand, and order maintenance through local ordinances, on the other—we can begin to trace the earliest iteration of a philosophy of "two cities, two police" in Atlantic City. This in turn illuminates the productivity of the double movement of emplacement and displacement for the constitution of durable historical geographies of spatio-racial difference.

By 1904, Atlantic City police officers were ordering black patrons to vacate the Boardwalk attractions and entertainment venues. By invoking city-sanctioned dress codes and bylaws prohibiting public annoyance, officers could forcibly remove black patrons at their discretion. Similarly, local ordinances prohibiting public disturbances allowed officers to arrest black activists for demonstrating outside of Boardwalk businesses, or individual would-be patrons for simply protesting the refusal of service. Likewise, black labor demonstrations were forcibly broken up by police. Along the beach, bylaws concerning the propriety of public behavior could be invoked to remove black bathers from areas outside of the beach at Missouri Avenue, historically designated the black beach. At the same time, beachfront hotels were permitted to exclude black patrons from "their" beaches by invoking property rights, which the police could be called upon to enforce. All of these ordinances were, of course, race neutral in letter, but were designed such that the color line could be rigidly enforced. By 1905, unless going to work or bathing at the designated beach, black people venturing south of Atlantic Avenue could expect to be scrutinized, harassed, fined and even forcibly removed by the police.[67]

North of Atlantic Avenue was a very different story. I emphasize again that residential segregation was implemented through municipal police powers; namely, racial zoning ordinances drafted at the beginning of the century, which would later be replaced

by restrictive covenants and redlining practices. However, policing was all the same essential to the actual shape that racial geographies took in Atlantic City. For if south of Atlantic Avenue the experience of black people was one of constant surveillance and intensive enforcement, policing on the Northside was characterized by routine neglect punctuated by occasional, but spectacular, vice raids. As Paulsson notes, an investigation in 1890 had found that black residents contributed little to the emerging vice economy. But following the anti-vice campaigns of the 1890s, the vice industry became increasingly concentrated in an area of the Northside that would become known as the "tenderloin."[68] Local law enforcement officials justified a policy of non-enforcement in the Northside by arguing that black people had a natural proclivity for gambling and fornication which could not be eliminated, only contained. As Khalil Muhammed has shown, this same scenario played out in most major Northern cities at the turn of the century. In this case, it was actually the non-enforcement of criminal statutes that contributed to the naturalization of black criminality by ensuring the high concentration of criminal activity in black residential areas.[69] So, by the turn of the century many locals used the terms "Northside" and "tenderloin" interchangeably.

When certain local progressive factions would periodically clamor for a crackdown on open vice, the few well-known, upscale gambling houses on the Southside would be tipped off by police prior to city-wide raids, and the only arrests would be made on the Northside. But even these were mostly just for show. Within a day, the same brothels and gambling houses would be up and running again. The tenderloin was slowly becoming a major attraction for white and black tourists alike, and so was turning into an important revenue stream for the resort, and for the emerging Republican political machine. Local

officials, including police, took payoffs in exchange for protection. In 1908, when Governor Fort dispatched the attorney general and several state detectives to Atlantic City with orders to close down the vice trade, the detectives were arrested and charged by local police officers with inciting a riot on the Northside. In this striking example, local police actually used their power to obstruct state agents from enforcing the criminal law.[70]

Meanwhile, Northside residents could expect very little in the way of police protection from victimization. In 1881, a group of residents, both black and white, had petitioned city council to hire a black police officer. In 1886 the first black officer was hired, but by the turn of the century, there were still only three black officers on the force.[71] Three officers to serve over six thousand residents, not to mention the thousands of white tourists and residents who came to the Northside looking to, as one observer described it, be close to what was prohibited while being protected from its dangers.[72] Moreover, the same nuisance ordinances that would have provided some official recourse and protection from the predatory landlords to whom black people were subjected through racial zoning went entirely unenforced. And so, most black residents lived in overcrowded slum conditions with little or no access to public services and utilities. Infant and maternal mortality rates soared, tuberculosis was endemic, even as the resort advertised the health-giving effects of sea air and sunshine against the ills of industrial pollution and urban crowding.

Paulsson describes Atlantic Avenue at the beginning of the twentieth century as "a boundary line between two distinct and separate worlds."[73] Indeed, in this admittedly limited historical sketch, we can see the early emergence of a policy of "two cities, two police." South of Atlantic Avenue, police deployed surveillance and coercive force, largely

under the authority of local ordinances, to keep black residents and laborers "in their place" by displacing their attempts to occupy space in ways that exceeded the narrow role of "Negro servant" assigned to them. Similarly, black tourists were confined to a few restricted areas where they could be monitored, not only by police, but by white spectators who had long made a sporting event of watching black leisure seekers, as revealed by newspaper reports dating to the early 1880s. This double movement of emplacement and displacement was mirrored on the Northside, where the displacement of black people's claims to "the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the public" was continuous with the emplacement of criminal activity in black residential areas where it was said to belong, naturally.

In a speculative essay entitled "The Whiteness of Police," Nikhil Pal Singh specifies the relation between policing, racialization and value as follows,

> Whiteness carries a tremendous price accrued from the debt burdens assumed by blackness most visibly, as well as other forms of racialization. But such valuation is made concrete and realizable through the work of policing, both the quotidian surveillance that ensures the maintenance of racially valorized and devalorized space and the exemplary spectacles by which forms of overt police violence tutor publics in the value of whiteness as a domain of safety and self-preservation, regardless of whether they derive pecuniary benefits from such a relation.[74]

Following Singh, and giving some empirical purchase to his account, we can read the movements of emplacement and displacement described here in terms of "the maintenance of racially valorized and devalorized space" on which the resort economy

turned. In fact, we can make the stronger claim that these same movements were in large part *generative* of these spaces, inasmuch as it was through these vectors of policing that the historically determinate racial geographies of Atlantic City took shape. Through the differential and discretionary deployment of heterogenous powers of law enforcement and order maintenance, police both produced and coordinated spaces of order and disorder, transparency and illegibility, security and danger. By tracing the constitutive relations between these spaces, and the movements that produced them, we can dispense with the figure of "two distinct and separate worlds," and instead attend to practico-inert fields of ongoing spatio-racial differentiation and entanglement. Rather than stark "boundary lines," what emerges are shifting and flexible *axes* of policing that organize and deploy vectors of differential (de)valuation of human life.

I have already argued at length that processes of capital value creation and accumulation in the resort were inextricably bound to the production of whiteness, and therefore the devaluation of blackness through movements of violent displacement and emplacement. In Atlantic City, inasmuch as police were not merely *managing* racial difference, but were a generative principle of racial differentiation, policing was intrinsic to capital valuation and accumulation. But by focusing exclusively on the value of whiteness and the necessity of black servitude for the prosperity of the Boardwalk economy, we risk obscuring other moments of the productivity of policing in relation to racialization and capital value creation. That is, by reading police solely as a vector of black *labor* devaluation and exploitation, we risk casting the Northside itself as an unproductive space of isolation and exclusion, even if we concede its necessity for the production of value elsewhere. But in order to understand the productivity of policing in racial capitalism,

we must also attend the productivity of those spaces of racializing displacement, disordering and concealment that are typically taken to be outside of the productive circuits of capital and beyond the bounds of political struggle. To this end, and to conclude this chapter, I provide a brief and somewhat impressionistic sketch of historical developments on the Northside in the first decades of the twentieth century.

The Northside: City in the Black Atlantic

And so the black man said to God,

"Lord, why is my skin this dark?"

And the Lord replied,

"My Son, it is so the intense sun in Africa will not burn you."

And then he said,

"Lord, why is my head covered with a large mass of kinky hair?"

And the Lord replied,

"My Son, that is so the mosquitoes and other insects in Africa cannot bite your head."

So this black dude says,

"Then God, Why the fuck am I in Atlantic City?"

Melvin Edward "Slappy" White[75]

My primary object in this chapter has been to argue that, rather than marking the *outside* of policing, the Northside emerged in large part as an *outcome* of policing. But just leaving it at that risks presenting the Northside as a "transparent and completed space of racism and racist violence," rather than an open historical terrain of relation, encounter and human life. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the occlusion of history and negation of relation are principle discursive technologies for structuring the Northside as an object of policing in the contemporary. That is, the Northside is taken to be a void in history, devoid of moral and cultural development just as it is beyond the productive circuits of capitalist development. Here I want to very briefly take up these claims in order to, first, signal the ways in which black life on the Northside has always exceeded geographies of spatial domination and racial containment, and second, to gesture toward the processes through which these same spaces of concealment and displacement came to chart novel terrains of capital recapture, appropriation and dispossession.

In 1935, Leroy "Pop" Williams purchased Fitzgerald's, which was at the time the Northside's longest running concert hall. He reopened the venue under the name Club Harlem. When asked how he had decided on the new name, he responded, "That's where a lot of black people live."[76] By the 1930s, the Northside's Kentucky Avenue ("K-y at the curb" as it was known) had emerged as a premier destination for black entertainment, and the Club Harlem would soon gain the title of crown jewel of the nightclub scene. But even before the turn of the century, a handful of juke joints and concert halls had already begun sprouting up on the Northside. Some were owned by whites, but many represented the early investments of a small but growing cadre of black entrepreneurs in the resort. While the Boardwalk venues hosted minstrel shows for white audiences (up until the 1940s),

Northside saloons and taverns brought in vaudeville acts featuring blues and ragtime musicians, dancers and comedians, mostly from the South. Their audiences comprised a mix of Northside residents and black tourists from New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore. Fitzgerald's opened in 1890, hosting dance troupes and black orchestras for packed audiences. In 1907, Eubie Blake played his first Northside show at Fitzgerald's. He returned every year through 1915.[77]

Of course, Atlantic City had from the very beginning been plugged into far-flung circulations of black movement in the form of migratory labor, from both the North and South, and even the Caribbean. But during the years of the Great Migration, the Northside gained a reputation as a world-class black resort whose clubs showcased the very best talent that the Jim Crow era had to offer—from Count Basie and Duke Ellington, to Moms Mabley and Cab Calloway, Billie Holiday and Sarah Vaughan, Aretha Franklin, Sam Cooke and James Brown, and on and on. Some big stars even got their start in Northside clubs—Sammy Davis Jr., Carmen McRae, and local drummer Chris Columbus, who was the leader of the Club Harlem house band in the 1930s and 40s. Many of these same entertainers were leading voices in the Civil Rights Movement. From the vantage point of a transparent and two-dimensional Jim Crow cartography of containment, bright red lines strictly demarcated the Northside's boundaries. But as an iconic destination-relation within the so-called Chitlin Circuit, Kentucky Avenue intersected 125th Street in Harlem to the north, while to the south it crossed over Baltimore's Pennsylvania Avenue before stretching all the way down to the Mississippi Delta, where it turned upriver toward Chicago, and eventually back home again. Clearly, to pose the Northside as an inert spatial container is to obscure complex relational geographies of black life, sociality, and movement—

geographies that were indeed shaped by common experiences of racist oppression, spatial domination and struggle, but that also exceeded these violent forces.

These same displaced spaces of black sociality and creative culture would also become important terrains of racial entanglement and encounter. If the early crowds at Fitzgerald's had for the most part remained all black, by the twenties and thirties the clientele on the Northside had changed. Chris Columbus recalled playing shows at the Paradise Club, the most popular nightclub on the Northside before Club Harlem opened: "The entertainment was 90 percent black. The trade was 90 percent white. They'd all come down from the Traymore at night in rolling chairs like a regular parade. There were so many whites slumming to see black entertainers they just didn't leave any room for us."[78] Here we glimpse an early iteration of the paradoxical displacement of black people by way of a positive *valorization* of black cultural production. As Gilroy reminds us, the early twentieth century marks the emergence of a black consumer market as well as major transformations in the modes of consuming blackness among whites. "Blackness, which for so long had been entirely worthless," he writes, "could be recognized as becoming endowed with symbolic value that nobody appears to have anticipated."[79] In a well-known (and ongoing) saga of capitalist capture, the same 'symbolic values' of vernacular expression produced within spaces of black sociality would come to be appropriated within novel circuits of capital valuation, dispossession and accumulation.

Columbus' choice of the term "slumming" above should remind us that this was not entirely new, as white tourists had been seeking out illicit encounters with racial others in the Northside's tenderloin district since before the turn of the century. But the emergence of mass markets, both white and black, in abstracted and commoditized forms of "authentic

blackness" was indeed new. And it had important political ramifications. Again, Gilroy writes,

> Gradually, it became possible for some of North America's racial inferiors to buy and to enjoy things that they were not supposed to have. Indeed, forbidding legitimate access to those desirable objects often made them all the more attractive. Rendered valuable, and employed as a medium that transmitted the pleasures, dangers, and opportunities of transgression, blackness could be offered slyly to whites as well as blacks. Its double appeal should be seen in the historical context created by emergent consumer culture and the social and political forms which corresponded to consumerism while racial segregation endured.[80]

This "double appeal," as it turns out, has important implications for our understanding of the productivity of policing as well. As Gilroy makes clear, the *value* of consumer goods for black people, particularly entertainment and leisure, was bound to proscriptions on black consumption within mainstream markets. At the same time, the desire of whites to engage in novel modes of consuming blackness was predicated upon the play of racial danger and transgression. In both cases, the production of value required ongoing spatio-racial differentiation through regimes of segregation.

In Atlantic City, as in cities across the country, black entrepreneurs realized opportunities for capitalizing on the captive markets that Jim Crow produced. By the turn of the century, they began investing heavily in hotels, boarding houses and entertainment venues on the Northside, and gradually white investors began following their lead. Northside business owners, along with a growing black professional class, began urging

residents, tourists and activists to cease their demonstrations for equal access, calling on them to instead "spend your money with your own people." To protect their assets, many even called for more stringent Jim Crow restrictions. Adopting the same economic logic of Boardwalk hotel owners, they argued that political agitation only threatened the overall prosperity of the resort, including the bourgeoning Northside entertainment district. Goldberg has shown that these political maneuverings proved crucial to the consolidation of segregation in the resort, as the right to consume came to supersede more radical demands for equality, recognition and the freedom to occupy space.[81] Predictably, as the Northside was penetrated and transformed by new flows of capital, it also transformed as a terrain of policing. But I'll leave off with this history for now. In the next chapter, I consider the ways in which policing continues to make and remake the Northside in the contemporary through productive vectors of emplacement and displacement, ordering and disordering, making transparent and making illegible.

Notes

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[1] "Daily Union," *Daily Union*, August 1, 1893.
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Chapter 7

Getting Paid for what We Don't Do: Policing the Northside

Mapping Problems, Problems Mapping

Problem 1: Impossible Burdens—"They just don't get it"

A few months before I moved to Atlantic City, *National Geographic TV* sent a film crew to the resort to shoot a segment on the ACPD's new "predictive policing" initiative, to be featured in a series called "Breakthrough." The footage would appear in an episode entitled "Predicting the Future," alongside other innovative big data applications—everything from assessing the risk of a catastrophic terrestrial asteroid impact, to tracking swarms of rats in Chicago's sewers, to one tenacious man's AI solution to cats pissing on his lawn. I arrived early on the morning of the second day of filming to the historic Carnegie Library, where the crew would be filming a community ACTION meeting. I sat in the back of the auditorium watching a team of grips and camera operators as they positioned cameras, microphones and lighting units. Along the wall closest to the entrance, a line of police officers, mostly commanders of various ranks, stood and greeted attendees as they began to trickle through the door. After a few minutes, it became clear that this ACTION meeting would be better attended than the last—which had also been the very first—held only a few weeks prior at the same location. It also became clear that Ryan, the lead researcher from the RTM team, would be addressing a very different audience.

Ten days prior to the first meeting, an email invitation providing an overview of the RTM project had been sent out to sixteen individuals identified as "key stakeholders,"

all but one of whom were representatives from various municipal, county and state agencies—the odd one out being the general manager of The Walk shopping outlets. Only about half of those invited had shown up, but those who did seemed for the most part receptive to the general idea of RTM, even if somewhat skeptical of the "places, not people" slogan. As I sat watching people file into the auditorium on the morning of the National Geographic shoot, I didn't see any of those key stakeholders, though several faces were vaguely familiar. The evening before, as the crew was wrapping up the first day of shooting, the Chief had asked me if I'd like to accompany him to the monthly meeting of the local chapter of the NAACP, explaining that he wanted to invite members to the community ACTION meeting. I gladly accepted, not realizing that his intention was to have me explain and rally support for the initiative. He stood at the front of the fellowship hall, said a few words about the importance of police-community relations and the imperative of rebuilding trust in order to prevent crimes and ensure public safety, and then, without warning, beckoned me to the front of the hall, saying, "And so, with that in mind, we are starting a new initiative that we are very excited about, and I am going to have Lee, who is, and I hope I get this right, an MD *and* PhD student at University of Pennsylvania, Lee's going to come up here and tell you all what we're doing."

Caught off guard, I walked awkwardly to the front of the room, said hello, and then began stuttering and stumbling through an explanation of my position as an independent researcher, followed by a rambling description of some of the questions guiding my project. I, of course, somehow neglected to say anything at all substantive about RTM itself. A woman sitting in the front row smiled and nodded at me encouragingly, but everyone else just looked at me and then at one another in an obvious state of bewilderment. Finally, a

man in the back stood up and called out to me, "If you want the trust of this community, you need to change the culture of this department, and put an end to the years of brutality and corruption and abuse and misconduct!" People nodded as he spoke. With this, the Chief, clearly disappointed, motioned for me to return to my seat as he returned to the front of the room. "Listen everybody, I know that we've made mistakes and that we need to make changes, and that is what we are trying to do with this program. But it will only work with the support and participation of you, the community. And that is why we are asking all of you to attend a community meeting tomorrow morning at 10 am at the Carnegie Library where we will be talking more about this program and how you can get involved to help us serve you better, and keep your communities safe and free of crime." As we were leaving, the smiling woman from the front row squeezed my hand and told me that it made her proud to see a young person staying in school. "You keep studying hard—education is the most important thing."

She was one of seven people from the NAACP meeting who attended the filming the next morning. They represented roughly a quarter of those who had been invited the previous evening, but given the last-minute notice, and the fact that the ACTION meeting had been scheduled for 10 am on a weekday, this was still a decent turnout. The Chief seemed satisfied anyway. Also in attendance were two representatives from the Housing Authority, four from various social service organizations, one city council member, six preachers who volunteered with the police chaplain program, and the dozen or so cops. Ryan paced about near the podium at the front of the auditorium looking very nervous—understandably so, given all the lights, cameras and action. I walked over to greet him and told him that I thought his presentation was going to be well-received. The Chief overheard

and turned to us, saying in a low tone, "Ryan, they are going to eat this up—the places, not people, the community policing, all of it—this is what the community wants." Ryan nodded, then noticed that the Chief was grasping a copy of his most recent book on risk-based policing. "Chief, you might want to take the plastic off of the book." The Chief grinned, "Right, right."

As people settled into their seats, the Chief announced that National Geographic would be filming, and asked that all in attendance please sign the release forms that were being distributed by crew members. Then he began his opening remarks, commencing with a litany of the financial struggles facing the city, and how not only law enforcement, but all municipal agencies and public services had suffered. "But I also believe that this is going to be the time that Atlantic City finally turns around. I see great things in our future, and I see a lot of hope for this community. And one of the things that I am most excited about is a new program that we have started with Dr. Ryan Sumpter from Rutgers University. The program is called Risk Terrain Modeling, and it is a way of bringing together problem-oriented, evidence-based strategies with community policing. The idea is to stop always focusing just on people, with all the tension that that has caused in our communities, and to start focusing on places, and the things in the environment that are causing criminal behavior to happen in the first place. We have come to realize that when it comes to crime and public safety, we cannot just arrest our way out of our problems. Matter of fact, we have come to realize that sometimes, just arresting people might even make our problems worse. So we are committed to finding a different way to reduce crime and keep our communities safe while building stronger relations and trust in the community, and that is what this program is all about, and you are going to be hearing a

lot more about it as we prepare to roll out this program in the coming months. And today, we want you to be honest with your feedback and questions. So, with that, I want to introduce Dr. Ryan Sumpter who has prepared a presentation for us."

Ryan thanked everyone for attending and for the warm welcome, and then proceeded with his presentation. He opened, as he always did, by asking his audience to imagine a place where children were known to play, and then to consider what sorts of things one might expect to find there—slides, monkey bars, swing sets, and so on. Then, he moved from the playground to a consideration of the "proverbial dark alleyway," explaining that, just as in the case of the playground, the dark alleyway could be thought of as "a unique behavior setting, whose features are attractive for certain kinds of behaviors, but in this case instead of playful behavior, it is criminal activity." From the dark alleyway, he moved to explain the core tenets of RTM: the idea that data could be used to identify "high risk places" with the goal of addressing the underlying environmental features that contributed to crime risk "without just assuming that everyone who happens to be in a high crime area is a criminal." With this, several audience members nodded in agreement. "With RTM," Ryan continued, "you don't just tell officers where to go, but what to focus on once they get there."

I had seen Ryan give this same presentation a dozen or more times over the past year, and every time he impressed me with his enthusiasm and earnestness. Now looking more confident, his audience apparently onboard, he described how, using RTM, the ACPD had been able to identify "an area of less than five percent of the entire city that accounted for over half of all the target crimes in the last year, including robbery, burglary and violent crimes." He presented a series of slides with maps of the city accompanied by

statistical analyses of crime incidents and locations, explaining how RTM was able to identity several unique features that contributed to crime risk—laundry mats, vacant lots, corner stores, and abandoned buildings. He explained how police would be working with other agencies to take measures to mitigate against these "spatial risk factors," everything from targeted patrols, to prioritizing the boarding up of abandoned houses, to installing better lighting and enforcing code violations. He then concluded by explaining that the ongoing input of community members, as facilitated by ACTION meetings, was absolutely essential to the overall RTM process, as it kept the data unbiased and transparent, ensuring that residents and other stakeholders participated directly in both interpreting data and developing approaches to problem-solving. He thanked everyone and then opened the floor for questions.

A tall slender man, whom I recognized from the previous evening's NAACP meeting, raised his hand and asked Ryan to return to an earlier slide depicting a map of the city, with red cells marking the highest risk areas. He pointed to the map and said, "I live there at North -- Avenue and -- Avenue, and I wanted to know why there is a red box there on this map. I don't know of any recent crimes there." Ryan responded that the high-risk places do not necessarily mean that crimes have occurred, only that crime is more likely to occur there based on the location of high-risk features. "There is a vacant lot there, and two abandoned houses over that way too," the man observed. Ryan responded, "So that explains it. What that means is that we would want to address those risks *before* crimes happen there, instead of just waiting and reacting after the fact."

With that, several people raised their hands, the crowd showing more enthusiasm than the attendees of the previous ACTION meeting. One woman asked, "What about

working with our educators to get to children early to engage them in school, and to keep them in school? And what about job training—these local contractors should be providing our young people with training and jobs, to get to them early with prevention before they ever steal that first candy bar." Ryan provided a thoughtful response on how recent studies had shown that "eagerness to learn" and "school attendance and retention" were impacted by the environmental features that children pass each day on the way to and from school. "By making the areas that children pass through safe, we make them feel secure, which helps them not only stay in school, but it also improves their readiness to learn in the classroom." The woman nodded her head and thanked him for this response.

Then another woman asked, "Isn't there some way that we can develop a pamphlet or something that teaches our kids all of the laws and codes and all of that in a way that they can understand? I mean, for most of these kids, the first time they learn anything about the law is when they get sent off to juvenile." Another woman chimed in right behind, saying, "We are talking about the problem with all of these vacant properties. If we aren't going to fix them up, then we need to tear them down, right? Either way, that is a lot of jobs that could go to our young people, and those are the kinds of jobs that could provide them with skills. So, it's a double benefit. You reduce the problem properties and make them create their own jobs for the community." Ryan responded that these were all very strong observations and that the role of RTM would be to provide the evidence that they needed to build these arguments, develop interventions and test their success. The chaplain sitting next to me responded, "There is one thing that seems to be missing here, and that is the economic aspect. I mean, these same things exist in other communities, you know, without all of the problems—Brigantine, right across the bridge, they have laundry mats

too. The difference is the economic situation." Ryan answered that what was most useful about RTM is that it considered the "local social relevance of a given feature, meaning that every city is different, so what works in one city might not work in another. That's why we need the input of the community who are most familiar with the local dynamics to help us make sense of what the data tells us. That's also why it's not only about the police—it's about code enforcement and the Housing Authority, the business associations, it's about bringing everyone together to develop solutions that share the burden of public safety across a variety of stakeholders."

Another chaplain raised his hand and asked, "What about the parenting? Have you looked into it?" With this, a woman stood and said, "You know, we should have our rights back to raise our children. We don't want the courts and the police raising our children. We want to raise our children and we should have the right back to raise our children. What about studies of all the people here who have lost their jobs? Or can't even get jobs?" With this the Chief stepped in and said, "Listen, we hear what you all are saying, and we know the economic struggles happening here, and we know that many people have lost their jobs and have lost their place, but you have to remember that we are just the police, so the economy and the jobs and all of that, those are things that we can't do anything about—doesn't have anything to do with us. What we are trying to figure out with this program is what we *can* do to reduce crime and increase public safety without placing an impossible burden on the police. And that is what this RTM is going to help us to do. And now, I want to thank Dr. Sumpter one more time, and then I have Captain X here who is going to tell you a few things about some other initiatives that we are very excited about starting here in Atlantic City to improve public safety." Captain X announced the opening of a new

"state-of-the-art surveillance center," scheduled to be completed in coming months, as well as an initiative that would allow business owners and residents from around the city to share live security camera feeds directly with the ACPD in order to better monitor and prevent criminal activity. He thanked everyone again for attending, and with that, the meeting ended.

Back at the Public Safety Building, I ran into Lieutenant L, who had just returned from the community ACTION meeting as well. "So, err, yea—sorry about that," he told me.

"What?"

"I mean, I know that wasn't very helpful for what you're trying to do. But that's what I was telling you about this town. It's like the twilight zone down here. You got some lady saying, 'We don't want you raising our kids, we want to raise our kids.' And I'm thinkin, 'Lady, I don't want to raise your kids. I want *you* to raise your kids.' But, this town…they just really don't get it."

Problem 2: Policing Services—"But how do we *get on the map?"*

The "Predicting the Future" episode aired about eight months later, four months after I'd moved to the city. Ryan invited me over to watch the airing at his house a few towns over. Depending on how RTM was portrayed, he was considering showing the segment at a community ACTION meeting that had been scheduled for the following week. This would be only the second such meeting since the episode was filmed the previous year. The RTM initiative had been slow to get off the ground. Indeed, there was something surreal about watching the episode, not just because it is always peculiar to see people you know on TV, but because it produced the uncanny experience of watching a high-definition

facsimile of a memory that seemed at the same time a hazy, oracular vision from some future yet to come. Ryan hoped that the national broadcast would stir up some media attention, which might in turn encourage the police to get moving "on this thing that they've supposedly been doing now for the last eight months." Things *were* starting to pick up. The police had recently begun a program of recording officer sign-ins during targeted patrols of businesses located within "risky areas," and there was some evidence that the intervention might be having some effect. Plus, the community ACTION meeting was an encouraging sign.

The next week Ryan presented to a small audience—three property managers from various low-income housing developments, two members of a local civic association, and one city council member, along with about nine police commanders. The meeting was held in the glass-walled conference room of the new surveillance center, which had just hosted a press day two weeks prior. Ryan focused on recent crime reductions and emphasized that credit was due to recent targeted patrols. He also reported that both the Housing Authority and Licensing and Inspections were moving forward with targeted property abatements, while the city was planning on using the RTM data to prioritize the installation of new LED streetlamps in the highest-risk places. At the end of the presentation, one of the civic association members stood and thanked Ryan, and then turned to address the officers sitting along the perimeter of the room, saying, "Hello, my name is Miss Rena from the Bungalow Park Civic Association—but you all know me, because I always wave at our police officers. We love our police. But I have to ask, what is being done about all of the drugs and the violence in other parts of the city, especially the Back Maryland violence?"

Captain X stood up and responded, “Thank you for asking that, and I want to say this to everyone here—Please do not leave here today with the impression that we have taken patrol away from other areas of the city that are not shown on the maps. In fact, Chief has sent some units specifically to Back Maryland in order to address the recent gun violence and problems there. But what this is doing is really just adding a new element of targeted patrol to what we’ve already been doing to address crime in the city.”

Miss Rena thanked him for this and said, “You know, these new tools, they can do a lot of good, but they can do bad too, because they have to be used in the right way, and I am so happy to see that you all are using them in the right way to make a positive change here in Atlantic City, and I want to thank you.”

After that, the lights were turned down so that the National Geographic segment could be shown, but something was amiss with the sound system, and after a few moments of watching a seemingly random montage of images in silence, people began to lose interest. Captain X invited everyone to tour the new surveillance center. I caught up with Miss Rena and her friend and introduced myself, asking if they would be amenable to me attending one of their Civic Association meetings. “Of course! We are having one tomorrow—we’d love for you to come.” She gave me the time and address and told me she’d see me the following day.

I arrived a few minutes early the next evening to find a small, cinderblock building that had at some time served as a police substation. I waited outside until a middle-aged woman with a blond bob approached. I introduced myself and told her that Miss Rena had invited me, and she told me to follow her in and make myself comfortable. Within fifteen minutes there were another ten people present, including Miss Rena, who said she was

happy that I could make it. She told me that they had a very short agenda for the meeting and so would run through those matters quickly and then give me an opportunity to introduce myself and talk to the group. Over the next ten minutes, they discussed plans for an upcoming "beautiful neighborhood" project, in which several improvements would be implemented, including a new sign to welcome visitors to the neighborhood and a large mural covering a bare wall of a long-abandoned industrial building. The group was particularly excited about the new sign. "People don't even know we're back here," someone offered. "They think it's just Back Maryland and blight, and they're afraid to come. But we have a wonderful neighborhood and we want people to see it and know about us." Everyone agreed. Then someone mentioned an overgrown lawn whose owner had ignored repeated requests that it be mowed. "So I'm going to just have to call code. They can mow it for him and then he'll get the fine," a man offered. Everyone in attendance agreed that this was appropriate.

Miss Rena asked if anyone had anything else, and when no one volunteered anything, she turned and asked me to introduce myself to the group. I did so, telling them that I was a graduate student writing my thesis on the implementation of RTM by the ACPD, and asked who had heard of the initiative. Only Miss Sharon, the woman who had attended the ACTION meeting with Miss Rena, raised her hand. So, I gave a very brief description of the basic idea of using statistical analysis to identify features of the built environment that were conducive to crime and then designing interventions to address those features. "So, basically, what I am trying to figure out is what that actually looks like. And part of that is understanding how it affects the people who live in these places," I concluded.

"Well what we want to know," Miss Rena retorted, "is how *we* can get on the map."

"How do you mean?" I asked

Then, addressing the entire group, she explained, "They are using this program to find the areas that need improvements, like new streetlights, and boarding up these abandoned houses and taking care of these vacant lots. I went to a meeting yesterday at the public safety building, and this is a very exciting program that they're starting. They're also putting up cameras around the city to prevent some of these crimes and to catch the people who are doing some of these things—they've already got the cameras all along the Boardwalk. But I looked at the maps that they are using, and we weren't even one of the areas on the map, even though we've got *all* of those problems, with the abandoned buildings and the vacant lots, and the drugs and crime around here." Then she turned back to me and said, "So how do *we* get on the map?"

Just then a Lieutenant from the patrol unit walked in. He greeted everyone as he made his way to a chair against the back wall. "I guess we should ask him," I offered. I explained to the Lieutenant the conversation we were having as he walked in, and that Miss Rena was just asking how their neighborhood could come to be designated for RTM interventions.

"You have to call everything in," he responded.

Someone answered, "When we call, nothing happens. We've been calling about these kids riding through here on these dirt bikes, and running through the streets after school over to Back Maryland—someone is going to get run over and killed."

"The minibike problem, we're actually not even allowed to pursue them, and that's by law, because heaven forbid if something happened and one of them got killed, then that's on me."

"Well what about the car breaks around here, and all the homeless? I mean, I feel like people have just stopped even bothering to call, you know? When it takes so long to even get someone here."

"I understand that, I do, but right now, you have to understand that we are so shorthanded—I barely have enough guys to fill a shift anymore. With the low priority calls, and I know it's not low priority when it's your car, but when we're running constantly from call to call, you know, with something like a break on a car, if you don't catch them in the act or get an eye witness, it's almost impossible to catch them. But at the same time, you still have to call everything in—even if we aren't going to be able to get to the call quickly, or even if we can't necessarily solve the problem right then, every call matters because that's how we can say, 'Look, we need more guys out here,' because right now we don't have the resources that we need."

Miss Rena nodded and told the group, "See? If we don't work with them and tell them when something happens, we can't get on the map. So, call everything in, whatever it is."

Problem 3: Illegible Spaces—"That'll be in the next version."

The day after the civic association meeting, I began work on editing the shapefiles for the GIS database that the police department's new CAD/RMS (computer-aided dispatch/record management system) required for its GPS functions. I had volunteered to

do this the previous week when it became clear that the shapefiles that the IT unit had recently acquired from some county department were incomplete and, in some cases, error ridden. Initially, it seemed that the job would only require a few hours work, and since I had taken a course in GIS, I offered to help.

The first step was to identify street segments and point addresses that were either missing or improperly formatted in the GIS database. Sitting at a workstation in the surveillance center, I used Google Maps as a reference and went about making a list of problem addresses. It became immediately clear that huge swaths of the Northside had been omitted from the original shapefile. It seemed that virtually none of the subsidized and public housing developments had been included. I called Captain X to ask if they had site plans anywhere that would include those addresses. He told me that he would reach out to the Housing Authority to request maps of the handful of properties that they owned, but that for the majority of them, which were corporately owned and managed, we would probably need to reach out on an individual basis. He asked which ones I didn't have. I told him I didn't know, since I didn't know how many there were, and where they were located. I asked if there was a list somewhere of all of the low-income housing developments. He told me that there wasn't as far as he was aware. So, I decided to use Google Satellite to scan the city and make a list of all of the developments, which would then allow us to reach out to property managers to request site plans. Easy enough, so I thought.

As it turns out, Google didn't include names for many of the properties that, based on satellite imaging, were large apartment complexes. So, I couldn't find listings for them to call property managers. Furthermore, satellite images of the city were several years old,

and I knew that a handful of low- and mixed-income housing developments had been constructed in the past year or two. On Google Satellite, I located several sites that had been graded for construction, many of them already showing the recognizable geometry of apartment complexes and subdivisions, even absent any actual building. I made note of the intersections marking each of these sites, as all as the ones bordering the unnamed housing developments. Then, I turned to the pair of IT officers that worked full-time in the surveillance center, and asked, "Hey, could you guys help me figure something out?"

"Sure," E replied, "Whatta ya got?" As I explained the situation, he puffed his cheeks out and opened his eyes wide, nodding his head slowly. "Yeah, it's crazy up there," he told me.

"Right, so, I've made a list of all of the developments and housing projects that I can't find a name for, and I've also got the intersections of all the construction sites. If I go through them, could you guys help me come up with the names, or at least let me know which ones are apartment complexes so I can reach out to the property managers for site plans? Google doesn't have the actual point addresses for the units."

"I mean, we can try, but I don't know, it's crazy up there. A lot of those places don't even have a name…"

I spent the next twenty minutes or so asking, "What about this one?" And each time, the response was something along the lines of, "Oh jeez, you know, that one *might* be the Cedar Apartments, or, wait, no, ah…who knows? I don't think that place even has a name." Or, I'd say, "Hey, the new construction on Lexington Ave, are those houses or duplex units?" To which U, the other IT officer, would look up from his text messages to

respond with something like, “Yeah, all of that is Section 8 and low-income shit, it’s disgusting…”

I found this complete and utter lack of interest remarkable. The GIS issue was supposedly the very top priority of the IT unit at the time. Just three days earlier I had watched E and U spend over two hours sitting at a computer terminal trying to geolocate a utility pole out in the marshes somewhere off of Route 30. They had come up with some surprisingly sophisticated strategies for figuring out the location of the pole relative to the city line and a known mile marker, before eventually calling a patrol unit and asking him to drive out and find the pole. I was never able to get an explanation as to why this was such an urgent matter, and remain convinced that they were just excited for a chance to problem solve. But on the day that I, the only person in the room *not* getting paid a comfortable salary to be there, asked them to help with something that seemed eminently more useful, that enthusiasm was nowhere to be found. I gave up and started gathering my things.

“Where ya goin?” E asked.

“I’ve got all the intersections. I’m just going to drive up to the offices.”

“Hold on, don’t go up there. We can get somebody to drive you.”

“I’m good, but thanks.”

“Nah, don’t go up there by yourself. Hold on, when L gets back, we can have somebody drive you up there.”

It was still early in my fieldwork, and so I didn’t feel like I was in a place to argue. I sat back down and began piddling around on the computer. Two hours later the shift ended. L had never returned. I was told that someone would be able to drive me tomorrow

or the next day. I drove up to the Northside, but of course by then all of the property management offices were closed for the day.

It took me about three weeks to finally gather up all of the site plans I needed. Those that I couldn't get, I sketched by hand. Once I had them all, I started showing U how to add all of the addresses to the shapefiles. While he rarely looked up from his phone to watch what I was doing, he did somehow manage to figure it out, and after about two weeks the files had been updated.

The next and final step was to use the GIS utility of the CAD/RMS system to merge the new, edited tables to the old one that was currently serving as the database. We had run this software before using small samples of Boardwalk addresses, and it had worked well. But when we attempted the merge with the housing developments, we kept getting error messages for many of the new addresses. After three attempts, we tried to just push the addresses through to see what would happen. After the program finished running, we tried a GPS query of one of the new addresses, but we kept getting error messages. Frustrated and out of ideas, we submitted a "heat ticket" to the IT helpdesk of the CAD/RMS software company. Unsurprisingly, this initiated a long back-and-forth, in which the IT rep would email to ask, "Have you tried *x*?" Then we would try *x*, and email back to say that it didn't fix the problem. After five weeks, the IT rep finally diagnosed the problem. The addresses weren't working because they contained alphanumerics in some cases (e.g. Apartment 1A), or redundant addresses distinguished by building numbers in others (e.g. Apt 3, Bld 1 vs Apt 3, Bld 2). The CAD/RMS was not able to process these address types. But not to worry, "That will be in the next version," she assured us.

Illegible Spaces, Ungeographic Places

Each of these vignettes traces a different moment in the production of the Northside's illegibility. In the first, a nonnegotiable delimitation of what counts as a proper police matter results in the displacement of an entire constellation of concerns into the category of "impossible burden." The illegibility of residents' claims on police is then inverted—it is *they*, those who would make such unrealistic demands of police, who "just really don't get it." If this first moment turns on a willful contraction of the legitimate domain of policing, then the second vignette betrays this disclaimer by revealing police to be an organizing principle for the distribution of a broad array of public goods and services. In a striking example of what anthropologist William Garriott would describe as the turn to "governance-as-police,"[1] Miss Rena and her neighbors learn that in order to gain access to scarce governmental services—property abatements, infrastructural improvements, police patrol services—they must "get on the map." But they also learn that the only way to get on the map is to become a particular kind of police problem; namely, a "criminogenic environment." And that's the rub—at the same time that she and her fellow civic association members attempt to rebrand their neighborhood in order to attract investments that might stem the flow of capital flight, property abandonment, asset depreciation and soaring taxes, they must also actively participate in the process of making their neighborhood a "high crime area," a designation that is sure to deter investment by would be new residents for whom such a label would mean higher insurance premiums and poor prospects for capital asset appreciation.

Bungalow Park makes for a particularly interesting case because it is not technically within the historic boundaries of the Northside. In fact, it was one of the first areas to

desegregate beginning in the 1950s. That was a trying time—there was at least one report of a cross being burned on someone's front lawn. But soon the neighborhood emerged as an enclave for middle- and professional-class black families. Today the neighborhood prides itself on a history of interracial harmony and inclusion, with civic association members themselves reflecting that legacy of diversity. In the 1910s when Bungalow Park was first developed, it was restrictively zoned for single-family detached homes. Following desegregation, one or two light industrial businesses were located in the neighborhood, but for the most part the neighborhood has to this day remained almost entirely residential. Even if many of the homes now stand vacant, you can still find their individual addresses on Google Maps, and in the new CAD/RMS.

So, in a very important sense, Bungalow Park was already "on the map," it just hadn't been designated a high-priority intervention area. As we have seen in the third vignette, this was not the case for the housing projects in the adjacent Back Maryland neighborhood. If, following James C. Scott's well-known formulation, we think of the CAD/RMS system as a technological infrastructure for "seeing like a state," then much of the Northside was quite literally unseen.[2] Here, spaces are concealed and made *ungeographic*[3] through processes that might be formulated in terms of technical distinctions that have nothing to do with race, or any other social category for that matter, inasmuch as the CAD/RMS software was merely reading *places, not people*, by distinguishing between address types. Of course, given the deep histories of racializing spatial segregation and economic dispossession that have shaped the resort's racial geographies, we would do better to read this as a rather salient moment in the ongoing historical material dialectic of the spatialization of race and racialization of space.

George Lipsitz's heuristic distinction between white and black spatial imaginaries is apropos here. While the former is organized by a private property logic of spatial homogeneity, exclusivity, and the augmentation of exchange value, the latter describes practices of being in and making space that are organized through modes of public sociality, connection and the collective enjoyment of spatial use values. He reminds us that the same geographies of uneven accumulation that are mapped by these distinct logics also map differentially valorized moral-political geographies of recognition and civil inclusion.[4] So, while we may be tempted to read the illegibility of the Northside as potentially liberating, inasmuch as illegibility would seem antithetical to the sorts of totalizing surveillance regimes often associated with police power, two considerations should give us pause.

First, there is the relationship, already noted above, between "getting on the map" and gaining access to governmental goods and services. Indeed, the GIS database that was being constructed by the police was the same database that would be used by other municipal agencies to identify and locate problems and monitor and coordinate operations—from the Fire Department and Public Works, to the Health Department and Licensing and Inspections. Here, making illegible entails the displacement of political claims by way of socio-spatial concealment.[5] Second, the production of illegibility in no way precludes or negates practices of surveillance—on the contrary, illegibility serves as a justification for ever-intensifying surveillance of spaces that are deemed socially disordered, and therefore dangerous. And so, several of the housing developments on the Northside do have security camera systems—both indoor and outdoor—with live feeds that are monitored from the ACPD surveillance center. Similarly, the Vice Unit has

conducted several large-scale operations on the Northside in recent years involving such technologies as wire taps and targeted video surveillance, and on a regular basis deploys tactics of covert on-site surveillance, the use of confidential informants and undercover agents.

Here, following Singh, we might think of spaces of socio-political illegibility not as escaping surveillance, but rather as marking a domain which, "[f]rom the standpoint of power…has no knowable properties beyond its criminal propensity and open-ended threat potential," and thus "require[s] rigorous and ongoing applications of 'legitimate' violence along a potentially limitless vector."[6] But we must also be careful here not to overstate the case by presenting the Northside as a perfect *terra incognita* of policing, as if it were some *no-place* in which nothing could ever be *in place*. Indeed, a couple of the officers I rode with knew every back alley, every vacant lot, and every unlocked garage on the Northside. And almost every officer I rode with could point out landmarks on the Northside that inscribed a landscape of memories and personal meanings—the hollow of an old tree where a gun was once recovered, the corner where a suspect had been shot, the apartment where someone's very first drug arrest was made, the alleyway where they themselves had been shot at. And every officer I rode with had a sense of what did and did not belong, what was in place and what was out of place, and thus what did and did not qualify as a legitimate police problem on the Northside. As would be expected, such spatial attunements and assumptions informed and were enacted through geographic patterns of differential enforcement and non-enforcement, police presence and police absence, advance and withdrawal.

Like when Y, speaking to several of his colleagues, offered up the following plan to "fix the city." "I got a plan that would fix this city overnight. No, not even overnight. If you started right now, by 9 o'clock tonight the city would already be better. You have a zero tolerance Tourism District. You put a Class II [officers of the Tourism District Unit—they have all of the enforcement powers of a sworn officer, but go through an expedited police academy (eleven weeks rather than five months), are paid hourly with no benefits, are not indemnified by the city, are not PBA union members, are not allowed to carry service weapons off-duty, are not allowed to work over-time, and whose maximum hours are determined seasonally, i.e. full-time in summer months and part-time throughout the rest of the year] on every single corner in the Tourism District, and you write tickets for everything. Jaywalking—ticket. Begging—ticket. Open container—ticket. Homeless—ticket. You want to do that shit? Go up to the Village. But then, if you fuck up, you got to deal with real cops [Y works the Northside]. There, I just fixed the whole city." Everyone present expressed their enthusiastic assent for this solution.

Or, when Captain S described Back Maryland as "our Hamsterdam." He and several officers from the Vice Unit and Tactical Team had just finished a raid on a rooming house located along a beach block (adjacent to the Boardwalk) right in the of the Tourism District. Technically, the sweep had not been a raid, as the police had not secured search warrants. Instead, they piggy-backed on a visit from code inspectors, who do not have the same restrictions on entering certain properties, and whom tenants are typically eager to speak to about predatory landlords and poor living conditions. By "accompanying" the inspectors, Captain S and his colleagues found a way to circumvent the legal requirement of a search warrant while also taking tenants by surprise, thereby increasing the chances of

spotting contraband through a voluntarily opened door, which would then justify a "full search" by "plain view" doctrine. But alas, no such contraband had been discovered during this particular "inspection," and Captain S voiced his disappointment as we exited the building. One of the code inspectors responded, "Well, if you want drugs, I can get you drugs. I can get you into a place up in the Terraces where they've been complaining about drug dealers for months."

"Where?" The Captain suddenly perked up.

"The Terrace Apartments, up in Back Maryland."

"Oh," he answered, waving his hand as if to swat at a gnat, "Nah, that's okay. That's our Hamsterdam." He was referring to an episode from the third season of the HBO miniseries *The Wire*, in which a "free zone" of non-enforcement is established by Baltimore police in order to corral drug activity into a cordoned area of the city.

This was not the first time that I'd heard an area of the Northside referred to as "Hamsterdam." One day when I was riding with P, we passed by Brown Park, which had only recently reopened after an eighteen-month renewal project. "It does look really good," he noted of the shiny new playground equipment and landscaping, "but it kind of fucked us. That was our Hamsterdam. Now they're all down on Atlantic Avenue by the library and Renaissance Plaza, and walking around right on Pacific Avenue. In a lot of ways, it was better when they just stayed up here where nobody could see them." Of course, lots of people *could* see them. Brown Park (named for Walter Brown, the first African American from Atlantic City to be killed in WWII) is situated at one of the busiest intersections on the Northside. To the north it is adjacent to Stanley Holmes Village, to the south,

Schoolhouse Apartments, to the east, the local community college. The four-lane MLK Blvd marks its western border.

For years, Northside residents watched as dozens of people, mostly homeless, gathered daily in the park to socialize, drink, and buy and use drugs. The ground was always littered with cans and bottles, injecting paraphernalia, and the miscellaneous detritus cast off by those who used the park as an encampment. One night, W recalled how he first learned of the unofficial non-enforcement policy in the park. "When you're a rookie, you know, you want to make a difference and you're just excited. So, I used to love hammering hot spots. Like at Brown's Park, I got sick of watching people shooting up, all the drinking, and nobody was doing anything about it. So, I would go up there and write them all tickets, and pour out their beers, run 'em all for warrants. I was getting like three arrests per day just on warrants. And the jail *hated* me—but you know, I made the county *so* much money that year. And the bums and junkies were all like, 'Hey, what the fuck, we've been coming here for years cause the cops told us too.' But I told them I didn't care, that they could pour out their beers or they'd get a ticket. And then I'd set up on surveillance and get the dealers. It was awesome. But then, all the guys [i.e. veteran officers] were like, 'Hey! What the fuck! What are you doing this shit for?! Do you want them on the fucking Boardwalk?' And they'd give me a hard time about it, telling me that I was going to get jammed up on one of my reports or something and that no one was going to help me out. It was crazy!"

But soon it wouldn't matter. Later that same year a man posted a video on Facebook in which he could be seen pistol-whipping a homeless woman in the park, knocking her unconscious. Apparently, his only motivation for the violence was to provide entertainment

for a friend who cheered him on as he filmed. Local media picked up the video and started running stories on the crisis in Brown Park, starting something of a PR scandal for the city, and especially the police department. Within a few weeks the park had been fenced off as the city announced that contracts for a major renewal project would soon be put out to bid. It seemed that suddenly the wrong people had seen Brown Park. But according to local residents, the park had been that way for decades, and violence was nothing new. One person told reporters that the only reason the video had caused such a stir was because a white woman had been attacked by a young black man. It made for bad optics, and something had to be done.[7]

The foregoing material suggests a spatial logic of enforcement by which the Northside was taken to be an inherently disordered place, such that disorder was taken to be *in place* when it is was on the Northside, and *out of place* when it was not. During our first lunch meeting, Captain S described a recent initiative that he was spearheading in the Tourism District in precisely these terms: "The idea is to get all of these rooming houses, and Section 8, and all these social services, and the methadone, the needle give-away, the soup kitchens, all of it—to get it moved out of the Tourism District and onto the Northside where it belongs!" But if the Northside was a taken to be a space in which disorder did not pose a police problem, at least up to some indeterminate extent, it was also the place where "real police work" happened. As was intimated above by Y's oblique reference to "real cops," and as could be predicted based on most every police ethnography ever written, most of the officers I rode with distinguished what happened on the Northside as "real police work," as opposed to the "bullshit" that occupied the "ticket writers" in the Tourism

District. When asked what "real police work" entailed, the answer was invariably "guns and drugs," with one officer adding to this list, "door-kicking."

In an earlier chapter I described the widely held conviction among officers that "all the criminals live in the projects." This made the Northside a dangerous place, a place where "real crime" happened. And it was the latter category that constituted the domain of police problems on the Northside. That is, we can think of the distinction between "real crime" and "bullshit" as tracing an invisible threshold of enforcement. If a given event or incident did not cross this threshold, it was dismissed as bullshit, and thus not worth an officer's time. However, if something did cross that threshold, it was automatically upshifted to the category of "real crime," either actual or potential, and treated accordingly. We have already seen that most so-called "quality of life" offenses, those sanctioned through local ordinances by way of fines, are taken to fall within the "bullshit" purview of "ticket writers." But it is also the case that any call for service could eventually turn out to be bullshit, just as any "bullshit" offense might be doggedly pursued if there was reason to believe that it might result in the revelation of (or escalation to) the category of "real crime."

Orders of Disorder

"I'm trying to do the right thing"

One night around 10 o'clock, Y and I respond to a call for a domestic disturbance at Carver Hall Apartments. We arrive on scene just as T and C are exiting their patrol vehicle. A middle-aged man stands in the front yard, apparently waiting for police to arrive. He greets us and thanks us for coming, and then begins to explain that it was he

who had called, as he had just been assaulted by his girlfriend's brother. "I admit that we've been drinking a little bit, and we got into a little bit of an argument, but then all the sudden he just sucker punched me right in my face, and then he kept throwing hands."

A woman standing in the doorway behind the man calls out through the screen, "It's true officers. He didn't do anything, and then my brother just started beating on him."

"And that's why I called ya'll," the man continues, "because, I'm not trying to—," he stops short and points over C's shoulder, "There he comes right now." We look up to see another man approaching the yard.

"Uh oh," T grins. "Square up!"

The man who is approaching hears and begins pounding his fist into his palm, calling out, "Let's go then you little bitch ass snitch. I'll beat you down right here, little bitch."

"Uh oh!" T repeats, giggling.

C steps between the men and very respectfully requests that the aggressor step over to the side of the building with him and explain what happened. The man who called the cops has now become upset. "Yo, man, why are you doing that? I'm trying to do the right thing here—"

"It's only a simple assault—that's a misdemeanor," Y interrupts. "We can't arrest him for a simple assault unless you want to go down and fill out an official report at the station."

"Or just settle it here," T tells the man, still giggling.

"Yo, man, what the fuck!" The man is now irate. "I'm trying to change my life and do the right thing calling ya'll! I ain't no fucking punk! Ya'll know me! I'm a fighter! I'll fuck somebody up, but I'm trying to do it a different way in my life now!"

Suddenly the woman calls out from behind the screen, "You a little pussy ass nigga! How you supposed to take care of me when you can't even defend yourself?! You little bitch ass!"

The man stares at her in silence with a mix of disbelief and rage. She sticks her tongue out at him and gives him the finger. He looks at her, and then back at T, as if he is trying to decide who he will attack. Meanwhile, a young man has walked up quietly to the scene and is gently beckoning the man to follow him instead, "Yo, fam, it's cool. Let it be. Just walk off, fam."

"Why it gotta' be walk off?!" The man shouts, turning violently to face the passerby and assuming a fighting stance.

"I didn't even mean like that, loved one. Let's me and you just walk, please, come on, let's just walk." The man, who has begun to tremble and whose eyes are now welled with tears turns reluctantly, his head hanging in humiliation, and walks away with the Good Samaritan.

Later that night, as Y and I are heading back to the compound to end the shift, a call comes out for a domestic at Carver Hall. "Wait, is that the same apartment as earlier?"

"Who knows," Y yawns. "And who cares. Third shift can have fun with that one."

<u>"But it's not funny to us"</u>

I'm riding with Q on dayshift when a call comes over the radio for an unspecified domestic disturbance. As we pull up, we find a man dressed in a bathrobe, leopard print tights, fuzzy boots and an enormous pair of sunglasses. He is standing on the sidewalk by a bicycle, gesticulating jerkily and talking loudly, apparently to himself. "Oh man, this guy is hilarious," Q tells me, grinning. As we exit the patrol car, two other units, B and J, arrive. Q looks at them smiling from ear to ear, giving a double thumbs up. The man greets everyone cordially, and then begins to perform a series of comical dance moves. Q and B laugh heartily, as Q calls out, "Yo brotha, Halloween was last night—did you forget to change your costume?"

"Costume? Costume??" The man retorts. "That's Gucci baby! I'm Gucci baby!" He opens his bathrobe to reveal an enormous replica WWE Championship Wrestling belt wrapped around his bare torso. "That's Gucci baby," he calls out again. Then he turns to face no-one and scowls. "SHUT UP!" he snaps, stamping his foot on the pavement. Then he turns back to us and gives an over-drawn and somewhat sinister smile as he takes a regal bow. This earns another round of hearty laughter form Y and B. J looks less amused, perhaps recognizing that the man is clearly in a state of florid psychosis. "Ok, ok," he says gently. "Listen, where are you staying? They called because you're out here dancing and carrying on, man. You can't be out here like this scaring people, you know that. Where are you staying?"

"Look at my bike!" the man responds.

"Damn! What happened to the low-rider?" Q chuckles, looking at the man's beach cruiser bicycle. "He's got two flat white walls on the cruiser!"

"I got two phones," the man calls out.

"You do? Well you should get J's number right here so you can call him when you need something!" Q laughs, nudging J with his elbow. "Right, J?"

"Yeah, yeah!" The man answers, pulling not two, but three phones from a plastic bag hanging from his handlebars. J begins to recite his number as Q and B cackle.

Suddenly a woman calls out from a front porch, "Excuse me—we know that this is funny for you, but this is not funny for us. He is out here every day from six in the morning, trying to come in the house, and it's not funny when he gets mad. When he is on that stuff, he gets scary. We have children in the house who are afraid, and they can't even go outside. He needs help." This apparently puts a damper on the mood, so Q sighs and tells the man to move it along and to not be "coming back up here anymore" or next time they will have to arrest him. But as it turns out it wouldn't come to that. Three weeks later, I learn from another officer that the man's body had just been found floating in the frigid back bay near the bridge by the house where we had watched him dance that morning.

<u>"Oh, he must be reeeeal bad"</u>

One afternoon when I'm riding with A, we respond to a call about a disorderly juvenile who is refusing to leave a bodega. When we walk into the store, it appears that the only people there are two middle-aged women and one young man, probably in his twenties. "He left?" A asks the man behind the register.

"No! He is there," he shouts, pointing toward the pick-up window at the back of the store. "I want him out of here! He disrespect me! He throw this trash at me! He must

go! He cannot be in my store!" He is waving an empty Cheetos bag, apparently the offending missile, furiously in front of his face as he speaks.

We walk toward the pick-up window and find a child of about eight or nine years old looking over the counter on his tippy-toes, pretending not to have noticed all the commotion. "You need to leave, NOW!" A commands in a stern voice.

The child looks up plaintively and asks, "What did I do?"

"You know what you did. You threw trash at that man, and now he doesn't want you here, and you need to get out, now!" A responds, raising his voice.

"I was just asking him to throw that away…Can't I just wait on my food?"

"Bullshit! You disrespected him—you don't have any respect, and now you're going to get out of here, right fucking now! Now MOVE!" he has begun to shout.

We turn to see that three more officers—T, W and M—have now arrived. The child tucks his chin and begins walking to the door, deliberately dragging his feet.

"Move!" T shouts, giving the child a nudge toward the door.

"Lord, lord. All these police here for a little boy," a woman says to herself as she passes through the door, "He must be bad. He must be reeeeeeal bad—all these police here."

M grabs the child by the arm and pulls him through the door. As he releases him, the child ducks onto the wheelchair ramp and leans against the wall. "Listen," M yells at the boy, "You come up here again and I'm putting you in cuffs. You think I'm fucking playing? Try me. Now MOVE!" The boy cowers and slinks down the ramp, and M grabs his arm again pointing to the stairs and yelling, "NO! THAT WAY, NOW! WALK OFF!"

"But I didn't even do anything," the little boy protests softly. M takes him by the shoulders and bounces his body off the wall a couple times. A looks at me uneasily. M releases the boy and he makes his way down the stairs and along the sidewalk. But about thirty feet from the store, he stops and leans against a wall. M sees him and begins marching toward him.

A passerby, a man probably in his thirties, calls out to the boy, "Go on, man. Walk off. These ain't your teachers. This ain't the principle. Go on lil' bruh!" The boy turns and walks away just before M reaches him. Walking back, M tells me, "With these kids, you've got to be rough."

"These kids are better armed than we are"

I'm riding with S one night around 9 o'clock when a call comes out about juveniles with paintball guns shooting at cars and houses in the Village. He flips on the siren and hammers on the accelerator. As we speed up MLK Blvd from Atlantic Ave, he presses the release button in the middle console that unlocks the gun rack mounted between our seats. He reaches over his right shoulder and takes the AR-15 assault rifle into his lap, pulling the shoulder strap over his head. "Yeah, the dispatcher says it's a paintball gun," he tells me, "but what the hell do they know. These kids are better armed than we are. I'm not taking any chances with my life."

Residents had been calling frequently over the past several days to report teenagers playing with paintball guns in and around the Village. The day before, when I was riding with S, someone had called to complain that a small child had been shot in the face with a

paintball by someone riding by in a car. "Okay, that's it," S had told me, "these little shitbags need to catch a serious beatdown." Tonight, S has already made several references to the paintball gun problem. Not even twenty minutes before the call to which we are responding, he had pointed out a man rolling by in a wheelchair. "See him? He used to be a big drug dealer. He shot himself in the spine trying to hide a gun in his pants. Some criminal behavior really is self-correcting. Like with these paintball guns. You point one of those things at somebody with a real gun who doesn't know it's just a paintball gun, and boom—self-correcting."

The dispatcher calls out a description of a vehicle. Another unit replies over the radio that a witness claims to have just seen the car headed down Sewell Avenue, just as S turns onto the same street. There in the tiny parking lot of one the Stanley Village complexes we see a car that fits the description. The engine is not running, and the lights are not on, but the windows are completely fogged up. S pulls directly behind the vehicle and gets out of the car, AR-15 in hand. I get out and stand by the passenger side door of the patrol car as he approaches the vehicle with the butt of the rifle against his shoulder. There are dozens of people, most of them teenagers or in their twenties, standing around the parking lot talking and listening to music from a boom box. As S approaches the car, a man from the crowd yells, "Yo, man, why the fuck you walkin' up on my fuckin' car?!" S ignores the man as he circles the car. Then he walks to the driver's side window and speaks into his radio, giving his location and confirming that he has the suspects there. He is aiming his weapon just to the left of the vehicle as he speaks. "Yo, man—that's my car! You can't be getting in my car without a warrant," the man calls out. "What the fuck?!" He calls out as he takes a few steps towards S.

"Get the fuck back!" S shouts at the him. The people standing around begin cursing, laughing and jeering at S and myself. My heart is pounding, my palms are cold and sweaty, my mouth goes dry and my ears start to ring. "Jesus, I'm freaking out," I think to myself. I try to calm myself down, but I can't stop thinking, "Somebody is going to get killed right now." After what seems like several minutes, but is probably only a few seconds, several other units arrive. Two teenagers are ordered to exit the vehicle and are placed in handcuffs. S looks through the cabin of the vehicle, and not finding anything, pops the trunk. There are three paintball guns and several cans of paintballs there. Z arrives and S debriefs him. Z tells him to take one of the two teenagers to stand by his patrol unit while he speaks to the other. S leads the teen over to the car by the arm and tells him to stand there while they figure out whether he was under arrest. The teenager just nods and doesn't speak. S notices that the young man's jeans are sagging well below his waist. "Did you lose your belt?" he asks. The young man just stares, not giving any reaction. "Do you need us to get you a belt," he repeats. Again, the teen just looks on like he hasn't heard. We can hear Z telling the other young man, who he has just learned was only recently released from juvenile hall for a drug charge, "Man, with you just getting out of juvey, I know it doesn't seem like a big deal with the paintball guns, but that's a gun charge man!"

The teen looks shaken, "Gun charge?! It's just paintballs—"

"Yeah but it's still a weapon, and with you on probation—see what I'm saying? That could get you into a lot of trouble." The teenager nods his head and says he didn't realize it was that serious. Z tells him that he seems like a good kid, and so he doesn't want

him to get in any trouble, so instead of charging him and his friend, he will simply confiscate the paintball gear and give them a warning.

S loads up the paintball equipment into the back of his vehicle and we drive back to the station where it will be entered into evidence. On the drive over, he explains that Z knows the law very well and certainly understands that paintball guns couldn't result in a gun charge, but that he was just trying to scare some sense into the kid. After we arrive, he opens the trunk and begins appraising the paintball guns, reciting the make and model along with what he describes as "some pretty decent specs." He tells me that he is an avid paintballer and has toured parts of the country on a competitive circuit.

"Maybe they should open a paintball course here so that—"

"No," he interrupts, "it wouldn't make a difference." Then, as if to acknowledge that he has just cut me off in the middle of a sentence, he continues, "Sorry, but I just know what you're thinking. But it's not about opportunity with these scumbags. They just truly don't give a fuck."

"Right, well, I need to get in here," I say, looking to the back door of the station.

"You've got to piss like crazy, right? Ah, yes, that's the adrenaline—the old fight or flight response. That's what a hot call feels like."

What to make of such dramatic oscillations between complete and utter disregard, on the one hand, and what can only be described as absolute overkill, on the other. And "dramatic" is precisely the word here, for if slamming a nine-year-old against a wall and threatening to make an arrest for throwing a snack wrapper at someone makes for a rather spectacular show of force, then seizing upon a mental health crisis for an opportunity to

have a good laugh makes for an equally theatrical display of indifference. But we would be in error to read these scenes as demonstrating the pure arbitrariness of policing. Instead, I want to argue, we might do better to consider how all of the practices described here are perfectly consistent with, and so constitutive of, the same organizing principle; namely, the illegibility of social life on the Northside. In the first two cases, calls for assistance in contexts of domestic disturbance do not register as legitimate police problems because these same domestic spaces are assumed to be always already disordered. They are *inherently so*. This means that, unless the situation reaches the critical threshold of real police work, it can be either disregarded, or, as we have seen, encouraged toward that same threshold by police themselves. In the second two cases, we see that once a matter is taken up as a police problem, it is automatically treated like a *real police problem*. Just as the Northside's domestic spaces are taken to be inherently disordered, the children who grow up in those spaces are assumed to have an inherent lack of values, the most important of which being respect for authority. This means that they harbor an inherent criminal propensity, such that when they do the sorts of stupid things that all children are wont to do, it is a proper threat and requires "getting rough" while also "not taking a chance" with one's own life.

And so, on the Northside its either "bullshit" or its "real crime," with little in between. Or, as one resident told me following a meeting of the Westside Civic Association (the Westside is a historically middle-class enclave within the original boundaries of the Northside), "It's like up here, we never see *any* police, until something happens, and then we see *all* the police." During the meeting, which both the Chief and Captain S had attended, she had stood and said, "We need to go back to the old days of the foot patrols.

We don't see any police up here anymore. Some nights I sit on my porch and I don't see a patrol car go by for *hours*. And when they do go by, I don't know any of them anymore. How are we supposed to feel safe when we don't even know our police?" The Chief nodded his head solemnly as she spoke, and then answered, "Listen, we are really short on guys right now. With the state takeover and the lay-offs and budget cuts, these guys really are out here doing everything that they can. And I've been talking to the people who are in charge right now, and we are very close to getting some more people hired, because they know that this is just not sustainable with the numbers that we have. But, with that said, I want you to know that even when you don't see us, we are there, I can assure you that. You are safe." The man sitting next to me muttered sarcastically, "*What* did he just say?"

I caught up with the woman outside and introduced myself. She told me that her name was Miss Sara. I told her about my research and asked if she'd being willing to talk sometime about some of the issues that she had brought up during the meeting. "Well, we can talk right now," she smiled. We sat on a bench and chatted for about fifteen minutes about her thoughts on policing, beginning with the above observation regarding the all-or-nothing approach to policing on the Northside.

"So then what's the right amount of policing," I asked her.

"You know, I really don't even know. It seems like a lot of the time they end up causing more harm than good! Driving through here eighty miles an hour, running every stoplight, not watching the road, looking at their phones—they're going to cause an accident! Or they come chasing after everybody with guns out like they're a bunch of cowboys on the TV, cursing at whoever they please. That's not right. You're supposed to *serve and protect*, not come up here scaring and disrespecting people."

"Sounds chaotic," I told her.

"That's *exactly* what it is—chaotic. But your job is to *diffuse*, that's what you are there for, and then maybe, *maybe*, make an arrest. But you know, I remember not long ago there was an arrest made over here, I won't say, but over near here. And they were taking this guy out of his house, and the officer saw the neighbors looking out the window, and he said, 'See? Your neighbor called on you.' Now why in the world would you *do* that? How are we supposed to trust our police when that's how they behave? And we remember that. We see a lot of these officers driving through here, and maybe they're older now, but we remember them. I tell my children, 'Just don't give them any excuse.' But with these plainclothes, you know, they pick on *everybody*, doesn't matter what you're doing."

"Actually, that's the first thing that came to mind a minute ago when Chief said, 'You might not see us, but we're there.'"

"Yeah! But the seeing them is *everything*. That uniform, that's supposed to make you feel safe and know somebody is there to help if you need it. Not all of this spying and sneaking. Let's not make people *afraid* of police. We need policing every day, but policing that is in the community, not just some white guys who don't give a rat's ass about the people who live here—excuse me, and no offense."

Getting Paid for What We Don't Do

As we saw in Chapter 3, Officer O would likely be inclined to tell Miss Sara that she is trying to "have it both ways." There is indeed a deep ambivalence running through Miss Sara's ruminations. Hers is the peculiar predicament of both too much and too little, all at the same time. And so, she ends up asking for more police, and closer police, while

at the same time admonishing her children to keep their distance. Such ambivalence among residents of lower-income minority neighborhoods has become something of a hobby horse in police advocacy literature in recent years. The basic line runs something like this: "People ask the police to do the impossible by demanding that they reduce crime while at the same time insisting that they don't resort to overly disruptive methods in order to accomplish this goal. But the only way to stop crime before it happens is by adopting precisely the kinds of aggressive, proactive tactics that these same residents deplore." Or, as O would have it, "You've got to know what you're asking for." With this we have returned, yet again to, the impossible mandate. In this figuring, the only reason the police ever resort to dubious methods in the first place is because the public demands it of them. But then, as soon as things get ugly, they're the ones who catch the blowback.

"They've made it impossible to do the job anymore," T explained one night as we sat parked in one of the Northside's "hiding spots"—secluded places where officers can go to take a piss, or just relax and check social media, or send texts messages, anything really, just to get away from "all the bullshit" for a little while. T was telling me that there were just too many risks involved in policing now, "with everybody putting a fucking phone in your face, not that that even matters now with these fucking things [slapping his body camera with his glove], and the public hates us, and all the higher-ups are going to just throw you under the bus because all they care about is their own little careers. I'm telling you, I still love this job, but it's just not worth it anymore. That's why you look around out here and nobody is doing anything. Nobody is making stops, nobody is doing surveillance on shit, nobody is forcing anything happen. Nobody is doing shit. I mean, look around—you never see any police up here [on the Northside] anymore, because nobody wants to

risk losing everything or going to prison over something that nobody is going to back you up for and that some judge is probably just going to throw out anyway. That's what they say about policing these days, 'You don't get paid for what you *do* do, you get paid for what you *don't* do.'"

Here, T was probably thinking about Jim Glennon, a former police officer who now runs a company called Caliber Press and an associated police training seminar series entitled "Street Survival." His writings and training seminars were immensely popular among the officers with whom I conducted my research. In the years since the Ferguson Uprising, he has written a series of articles in which he issues "a warning to the public we serve, that they might just get what they claim to want." He writes,

> PLEASE UNDERSTAND THIS CITIZENS: Police officers don't have to work in order to get paid! Yeah, they have to show up, answer calls, write some tickets, but there is virtually no external motivation for them to initiate and be proactive. That comes from within, from a place only they understand. A place that compels them to stop the bad guys before they hurt others, even when they know it could damage their own careers.
>
> I believe this: Keep demonizing the police, call them names, assign ill-intent to their motivations and they'll eventually get the message. They'll do what you want—NOTHING! And then what?![8]

In a more recent article, he suggests that the "*then what* may be here. And it may be Baltimore." Glennon goes on to suggest that following the murder (though he does not call it that) of Freddie Gray and the ensuing riots, Baltimore police officers were so

demoralized at being incessantly "demonized" by residents, the media, and local politicians, that they lost the will to lay it all on the line in order to prevent crime and protect citizens. According to Glennon, this withdrawal explains the fact that Baltimore shortly thereafter experienced an alarming upswing in homicides. He concludes by arguing, "And we circle back to my point I made over a year ago: Proactive police work is the difference between chaos and order."[9]

I'm not an expert on Baltimore, but if Atlantic City is any indication, then the relation of police to "chaos and order" is not at all as clear cut as Glennon would have it. Indeed, as Miss Sara noted above, and as the materials presented throughout this chapter suggest, the police are just as often a vector of *disorder* as they are a principle of order. And this dynamic of differential ordering and disordering is not reducible to a simple calculus of police presence versus police absence. That is, the police are present and productive both when they (excessively) deploy their powers to intervene and when they (selectively) *withhold* those same powers. These are differential modalities of police productivity that exceed a mere quantitative logic of increases and decreases in some homogenous police power.[10] That logic would read the demands that people like Miss Sara make on policing as a blatantly contradictory request for both *more* and *less* of the *same* thing. This is to make those claims illegible—"they just really don't get it"—inasmuch it goes without saying that to have both more and less of the same thing at the same time is impossible. But if we consider such requests not in terms of more or less, but as articulations of a desire for an entirely *different* policing, then the question of why such a different policing is *impossible* becomes a political matter, rather than a logical one.

This might also impel us to think differently about T's assertion that the police are getting paid for what they *don't* do. That is, rather than take for granted that the negation here marks an *absence* of policing—which would again in this case be to place the Northside *outside* of police—we might consider how it articulates a deeper truth about the relationship between policing and the production of dis/order. In the previous two chapters, I suggested that the analytic of racial capitalism might provide for an historical materialist account of the ways in which policing is intrinsic to the processes of spatio-racial differentiation that are in turn required for the ongoing elaboration of racial capitalism along its ever-shifting frontiers of valuation, dispossession and accumulation. In the last chapter, I provided a historical sketch of how these processes played out in the early resort. There, we saw how policing, through racializing vectors of emplacement and displacement, was essential to the production and coordination of differential geographies of order and disorder, transparency and illegibility, valorization and devaluation—geographies whose contours imperfectly trace the racialized terrains of Atlantic City today. The materials presented in this chapter have revealed similar movements of displacement, disorder and illegibility.

But does this mean that, in all these years, nothing has changed on the Northside after all? Or, perhaps, that things *did* change, but that what we are witnessing in Atlantic City today represents a repetition, a return to an earlier police? The answer, in both cases, must of course be 'no.' The Northside has necessarily undergone, and continues to undergo, transformations, just as the political-economic infrastructures on which the resort turns today would be entirely unfathomable to anyone who lived there a century ago. Indeed, one of the primary contentions of this work has been that the tendency to treat

police as unchanging results in a mystifying concealment of the generativity of policing. Rather, my purpose in drawing out historical continuities has been to open up an attunement to the ways in which spatio-racial differentiation through policing has in the past engendered emergent terrains of capital valuation, dispossession and accumulation—as well as geographies of struggle and entanglement that exceeded these processes—so that we might in turn come to reconsider the generative potentials of police practice in the contemporary. But to do this would also require that we bring the Northside, and this "Tale of Two Cities," into relation with other historical material terrains of policing in Atlantic City. In the Epilogue, I provide a brief sketch of Parts II and III of this larger project, in which two such terrains will be taken up.

Notes

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[1] William Garriott, "Introduction - Police in Practice: Policing and the Project of Contemporary Governance," in *Policing and Contemporary Governance: The Anthropology of Police in Practice*, ed. William Garriott, 2013 edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 1–30.
[2] James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, Nachdr., Yale Agrarian Studies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2008).
[3] Katherine McKittrick, *Demonic Grounds: Black Women And The Cartographies Of Struggle*, First edition edition (Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press, 2006).
[4] G. Lipsitz, "The Racialization of Space and the Spatialization of Race: Theorizing the Hidden Architecture of Landscape," *Landscape Journal* 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 10–23, https://doi.org/10.3368/lj.26.1.10.
[5] McKittrick, *Demonic Grounds*.
[6] Nikhil Pal Singh, "The Whiteness of Police," *American Quarterly* 66, no. 4 (2014): 1096.
[7] Lynda Cohen and John V. Santore, "Atlantic City Battles Problems, Perception at Brown's Park," *Press of Atlantic City*, October 22, 2015, https://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/atlantic-city-battles-problems-perception-at-browns-park/article_2fd0ddf4-7922-11e5-abcb-2faf93b79248.html.
[8] Jim Glennon, "Stop Working: Are We There?," Calibre Press, May 27, 2015, https://www.calibrepress.com/2015/05/stop-working-are-we-there/.
[9] Jim Glennon.
[10] Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, *The Truth about Crime: Sovereignty, Knowledge, Social Order* (Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2016). Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, "Criminal Obsessions, after Foucault: Postcoloniality, Policing, and the Metaphysics of Disorder," *Critical Inquiry; Chicago* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2004): 800–824. For extended discussion on policing as generative of disorder see the contributions in William Campbell Garriott, ed., *Policing and Contemporary Governance: The Anthropology of Police in Practice*, First edition. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).; Veena Das and Deborah Poole, eds., *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*, 1st ed, School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series (Santa Fe, N.M. : Oxford [England]: School of American Research Press ; James Currey, 2004).; Didier Fassin, ed., *Writing the World of Policing: The Difference Ethnography Makes*, 1 edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).

Epilogue:

On Ruins and Repertoires

"Allegories are, in the realm of thought, what ruins are in the realm of things."
- Walter Benjamin[1]

Ilustration 1: Mappings: (left) Boundaries of the Northside in 1905 (shown in black), from Paulsson (1994); (center) Detail of 1940 HLOC Redlining Map, from "Mapping Inequality; Redlining in New Deal America," American Panorama, Richmond University; (right) Boundaries of Atlantic City Tourism District, as established in 2011 (area of Tourism District represented by red shading), from The Press of Atlantic City, (2011)

If the power of cartography lies in its ability to abstract space from time, producing atemporal and therefore objective representations of the world "as it really is," then the seduction of the allegory lies in its ability to suspend, and thereby spatialize, the flow of time itself, presenting an image of the eternal, and so truth itself. It should perhaps not be surprising then that the map emerged very early as a privileged pictorial genre of allegory.

Consider the above figure, which comprises three panels arranged side-by-side. Taking each panel individually, we have three separate maps, each one depicting a distinct set of geographic relations on a two-dimensional surface upon which movement is reversible and relative positions are static. There is no temporal dimension, and each map is self-contained, complete. But we can also consider the three panels in relation to one another. Doing so in the manner of simple comparativity immediately reveals that all three maps are in fact representations of the "same place;" namely, Atlantic City. This allows us

to deduce further geographic relations between the specific phenomena depicted in each map. For instance, we might observe that the area designated "Northside" on one map overlaps with the area designated "Hazardous" on another. It is crucial, if obvious, to note that this cognitive operation involves the superimposition of maps, which in turn entails that they be taken as pure, transparent, two-dimensional surfaces, such that no depth is introduced by their addition. Instead, a composite map is generated, in which the elements from all three maps can be represented "at the same time," which is to say, outside of time. And so, both the tabular space of comparativity and the composite space of superimposition, just like their component parts, are purely synchronic.

But we can also consider the three panels as a *series*, noting that each map has a different date, and thus corresponds to a different *time*. In this case, moving from left to right represents a *succession*, from 1905, to 1940, and finally 2011. Reading the figure this way allows for a different set of relations to come into view. For instance, we can note that the same area that was designated as the Northside ghetto through restrictive zoning in 1905 was later subject to redlining in 1940. Then, in 2011, that very same area was excluded from the boundaries of the newly formed Tourism District, thereby being denied the benefits of targeted public and private capital investment. By these lights, we might be tempted to argue that, taken as a whole, the three-panel figure provides for a *history* of the Northside. That history would be a familiar one, tracing a *linear progression* of systems of racial exclusion and containment. Each panel would represent a moment of partial rupture and succession, while the Northside itself, being the "same place over time," would provide for the principle of continuity (i.e. stasis) defining the continuum. The problem with such a formulation of history, as was argued at length in Chapter 6, is that it risks paradoxically

evacuating the Northside of history by placing it—under the sign of exclusion and containment—*outside* of history. Here, the flow of time itself is reduced to a linear succession; that is, it is spatialized in the form of a *telos*. This produces an image of history as *progress*, which in turn requires the nonmovement of the Northside as its point of reference. That is, the Northside, as temporal lag defines the (spatial) frame of reference of succession, and therefore progress. The relation of the Northside to the progression of history is itself timeless. It marks the eternal outside of history.

But there are yet other ways to bring these maps into relation that don't require the simultaneity of superimposition nor the *telos* of linear succession, both of which empty out time and therefore evacuate the work of history. For instance, instead of two-dimensional superimposition, we might instead think of these three maps as constituting a "palimpsest" of spatiotemporal "entanglement."[2] Here, rather than simultaneity or succession, each map would embed a historical material repertoire of praxes and relations whose elements have their own *speed* and *time*. Or, we might think the connections across these maps not in the synchronic mode of comparativity, but as openings onto submerged terrains of "difficult interrelatedness," "human relationality," and "racial encounter," and therefore, ethics.[3] Or again, following Benjamin, against the image of linear succession, we might think of these three panels as staging a dialectical encounter between the 'then' and the 'now.' "It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present," he writes, "or what is present its light on what is past; rather, an image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words: image is dialectics at a standstill."[4] In Benjamin's historical materialist recuperation, the essence of allegorical thinking lies not in the immediacy of the eternal, but in the revolutionary potential of the "flash."

In thinking of the "Tale of Two Cities" as one "allegorical map" of policing in Atlantic City, I have attempted to capture the ideological work that this figuration performs—via the occlusion of history and negation of relation—while at the same time endeavoring to show how it might be productively put into motion through different modes of historical attunement and practices of bringing-into-relation. When I say put into motion, I mean that having begun with the image of an implacable and timeless antagonism in which policing could only ever be an endless repetition (Chapters 1 - 4), I sought to demonstrate the generativity of policing itself as a flexible principle of racialization in racial capitalism. To do so, I turned to a rereading of the history of racial segregation in Atlantic City in order to show how policing was essential to processes of spatio-racial differentiation, and thus intrinsic to the processes of capital value creation and accumulation (Chapters 5 – 6). Finally, I returned to the Northside in the contemporary in order to consider how policing continues to operate as a vector of spatio-racial differentiation through movements of concealing, displacing, and making illegible (Chapter 7).

However, as I noted at the end of the last chapter, the dialectical encounter between the 'then' and the 'now' risks breaking down here, as the image of a pure repetition reemerges—the police still doing the same old things in the same place. But it is the phrase "same place" that reveals the source of this short-circuit. That is, the problem arises when we take the Northside to be a fixed "place" across (or outside of) "time," rather than an open terrain of ongoing processes of bringing-into-relation that are themselves spatio-temporalizing. This results in the vey homogenization of time against which Benjamin warns, and thus neutralizes the encounter between the 'then' and 'now.' But just as an

understanding of the meanings and material conditions on the production of whiteness and blackness, and thus the productivity of policing at the turn of the century, required situating the resort within shifting relational geographies of race- and nation-making, major political reconfiguration, capital circulation, and diasporic movement, the productivity of policing today cannot be understood simply "in light" of the "Tale of Two Cities" as it emerged in the early twentieth century. To understand the generativity of policing in the contemporary requires that we bring the "Tale of Two Cities" into relation with other allegorical mappings, the historical terrains which they both conceal and reveal, and the repertoires and ruins of policing through which they are in part constituted. Below I provide a very brief outline of Parts II and III of this larger project, in which two such terrains are taken up.

Part II: Small-Town-with-Big-City-Problems

I first heard this figuration from the Chief, when he was explaining what he characterized as an unfair assessment of his department's effectiveness due to the city's artificially inflated crime rate. This number, he explained, was based on the permanent population of the resort, which was under forty thousand people. But given the roughly twenty-four million tourist visits per year, the actual number of people in the resort on any given day was anywhere between 150 thousand to over 350 thousand people. "So, it makes us look bad, and it makes the city look more dangerous than it really is, and that scares people off." He went on to explain that the casino industry presented unique challenges for law enforcement—the 24/7 sale of alcohol, the market for prostitution and illicit drugs, a large transient population with no familiarity with city, a general "anything goes" kind of

attitude. “And when you add to that all the social services, the homeless mission, the needle exchange, the methadone clinic, the soup kitchens, and everything that brings—you can start to understand where that perception of Atlantic City as a dangerous place comes from.”

Every officer I worked with would in one way or another bemoan this same set of challenges to fighting the “perceptions” of danger and the devastating effect it had on the tourism industry. And it became obvious that for most, the notion of “small town” wasn’t a simple descriptor of the population size and land area of the resort, but was rather evocative of a nostalgic and aspirational *community* that had been lost—lost to the alienation, estrangement, and vertiginous moral and cultural fragmentation signaled by the phrase “Big-City-Problems.” But it wasn’t just lost, it was destroyed by forces emanating from outside—the undesirables that flooded the city in search of social services, the addicts who came seeking out cheap drugs and free needles, the economically dependent and unproductive who moved to the city to take advantage of the high concentration of low-income housing, the mentally ill that were abandoned in the city by family or shipped in from other jurisdictions on “Greyhound therapy,” and every manner of predator that set up shop in the city to take advantage of the former. The “Small Town” maps onto an imagined, internally homogenous moral community assailed on all sides. This as opposed to the internal heterogeneity signaled by the “Two Cities” figuration. Here, the crime problems generated by casinos are framed as problems of “opportunity,” as potentiating the victimization of tourists based on sheer probability in relation to the high number of anonymous interpersonal interactions. On the other hand, social services are defined as criminogenic in their own right—that is, as attracting the criminals that threaten vulnerable

tourists. The sense of security required for the sort of public performances of mass consumption on which the city has always depended is expressed most clearly in the phrase "Clean and Safe." This is the official mandate of the Tourism District Unit of the ACPD. This unit of 80 Class II officers is nominally administered through the municipal police department, but is funded directly by CRDA and is mandated to serve exclusively in the Tourism District. The TDU was only started in 2016, but the longing for a "Cleaner, Safer Atlantic City" was first enunciated almost fifty years earlier. In 1971, a local organization comprised primarily of business leaders hired a consulting firm to generate a report on the city's fiscal standing and make recommendations for cost-cutting measures and strategies for reinvigorating the resort's economy. The full title of the report was "A Cleaner, Safer Atlantic City at A Lower Cost to Taxpayers – A Report on an Operation's Review Sponsored by TEARS." TEARS stands for Taxpayers Emergency Association for Relief, the aforementioned business organization.

I call attention to this overtly pathetic figuring of the *aggrieved taxpayer* to illustrate an operative moment of partial overlap between the "Tale of Two Cities" and the "Small-Town-with-Big-City-Problems." This overlap helps us understand such seeming inconsistencies as many officers' insistence that crimes in the city are committed by people "not from here," while also maintaining that "all the criminals live in the public housing." Keeping in mind the conviction that project-dwellers do not pay taxes, and therefore have questionable claims to membership in civic life helps us understand how the Northside is at one and the same time framed as "a city *within* the city" while also being emblematic of the "Big City Problems" that mark the threatening *outside* of the aspirational "Small Town" community. And it's not just the police who think so. An official in the Planning and

Development department explained, "The tourists, you know, they're mainly from the suburbs, and when they get here, they see these, you know, cultural differences that they're not used to, and it *is* scary!"

In Part II, I begin by taking up contemporary police practice in the Tourism District. I draw on the "Clean and Safe" slogan of the Tourism District Unit to open up an analysis of the dual mandate of civility-and-security. Using the TEARS study as an opening, I situate the thematics of civility and security within post-war historical trajectories of partial desegregation, white flight, urban decline, fiscal crisis and the eventual introduction of casino gambling to the resort. As in Part I, I show how policing has been intrinsic to the reconfigurations of the material conditions on racial capitalism that these transformations signal. Part II extends the analytic of racialization to analyze modes of differential (de)valuation of human life that are not perfectly mapped by a "color line." Attending to the fungibility between the categories of incivility and insecurity, I examine how certain populations are constituted as police problems. Ethnographic materials comprise descriptions of the daily practices of quality of life enforcement in the Tourism District, efforts by police leadership to have certain social services closed down or moved from the resort, and a set of recent initiatives involving the "evidence-based" identification of "at-risk" individuals—defined in terms of 'overutilizers'—which are used to justify exceptional enforcement and sanctioning measures. I also consider the fantasy worlds of police officers, and how these are structured by visions of pervasive incivility and insecurity, as articulated by the common saying, "We don't get paid for what we do, but what we might have to do."

Part III: Taken Over by the State

In November of 2016, only a few months before I moved to the resort to begin full-time fieldwork, Governor Chris Christie signed a bill that effectively transferred the powers of municipal government from Atlantic City's local representatives to the State of New Jersey. The "state takeover," as it came to be known, was enabled by legislation passed earlier that year under the Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act. The legality of that Act was predicated specifically upon the State's sovereign right to enact its police power, as signaled by the law's opening declaration:

> The short and long-term fiscal stability of local government units is essential to the interests of the citizens of this State to assure the efficient and effective provision of necessary governmental services vital to public health, safety, and welfare, including the fiscal health of our State's municipalities.[5]

One of the very first measures under the state takeover was the dissolution of civil service in the resort. This allowed for the nullification of the police department's labor contract (which had already expired amid labor disputes but was still active in abeyance under a "in perpetuity until another contract is devised" clause), which in turn provided for dramatic reductions in personnel, salaries and benefits. The local police union immediately sued the state on constitutional grounds. This suit was ongoing throughout the majority of my fieldwork, with a judge eventually ruling in favor of the state, with a few minor provisions to the union. Before I left Atlantic City, two more police lawsuits (that I know of) had already been initiated against the state. In the meantime, there remained throughout

a distinctive possibility that the state would dissolve the municipal police force and replace it with a county force.

In Part III of this project, I begin with a consideration the state takeover as a context for reflecting on the place of municipal police forces within a complex fabric of US legal pluralism. Against the normative Weberian notion of the police as the institution entrusted with the state's monopoly on legitimate violence, or the Marxian notion of the police as a specific instrumentality of the state, in this case, we find police positioned explicitly "against the state." I open a discussion of the tradition of police localism in the United States, and then move to a description of local police union politics. The police officers I worked with characterized the state takeover in terms of an unconstitutional usurpation of local representative government. In doing so, they identified their own rights with the sovereignty of the local community. However, as residents were wont to point out at city council meetings and other public forums, over ninety percent of ACPD officers did not live in Atlantic City.

I move to a consideration of the "wages of policing," situating the police profession as a "good job" within the local economy. After casinos, local government has long been the second highest employer in the city, making civil service positions highly coveted. The police make on average three times the median income of the city by salary alone. This does not include access to lucrative details, overtime, and handsome public benefits including health insurance, vacation and sick time, worker's compensation and a full pension after only 25 years of service. Under the state takeover, the police became a primary target of fiscal austerity measures, with state monitors arguing that the department's pay and benefits structure amounted to an exorbitant public burden. In doing

so, they essentially framed the department as a something of an undue public entitlement program. Here I take up recent scholarship at the intersections of critical race theory, black studies, geography, and anthropology to argue for an analysis of the racialization of Atlantic City *in toto* through technologies of state abandonment followed by punitive fiscal responsibilization. That is, the same racializing discourses of public entitlement and government dysfunctionality that police officers deployed to characterize residents as unworthy and incapable of self-government were now being mobilized against them. But rather than engendering emergent terrains of solidarity between residents and police, officers instead blamed local residents—and the local leaders they had elected—for the ongoing financial predicaments that now imperiled their own interests.

In this context, the question of how to replace residents with a would-be rightful citizenry (with which this dissertation began) became even more exigent. I end with an extended ethnographic examination of one police initiative to help "make a place" for the "right kind of residents" whom they hoped to attract to Atlantic City. This initiative involved forging "community partnerships" with a team of developers who were attempting a revitalization project on a Boardwalk-adjacent block that had become notorious for drugs and prostitution. Here, the police were able to mobilize ambiguities within partially overlapping fields of jurisdiction in order facilitate the transfer of certain properties (at a highly discounted rate) from the "wrong kind of owners" to the "right kind of owners." In doing so, they participated in a movement of accumulation by dispossession that required novel technologies of racialization, thereby charting yet another novel frontier of differential valuation, dispossession and accumulation.

Notes

[1] Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama* (London ; New York: Verso, 2003), 178.
[2] Deborah A. Thomas, "Time and the Otherwise: Plantations, Garrisons and Being Human in the Caribbean," *Anthropological Theory* 16, no. 2–3 (September 1, 2016): 177–200; Deborah A. Thomas, *Political Life in the Wake of the Plantation: Sovereignty, Witnessing, Repair* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2019).
[3] Katherine McKittrick, "On Plantations, Prisons, and a Black Sense of Place," *Social & Cultural Geography* 12, no. 8 (December 2011): 947–63.
[4] Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1999), 462.
[5] State of New Jersey 217th Legislature, "Municipal Stabilization and Recovery ACT," S1711 § (2016).

Theoretical Addendum: Notes for an Ontology of Racialization

Reality of a Kind: The Metaphysics of Race

Perhaps the easiest way to begin is by stating an admittedly unsophisticated (but also exceedingly popular) version of the strong thesis for the social construction of race. It goes something like this: "Race is not real. It is an irrational belief that has no objective foundation. It is an arbitrary social construct, i.e. an illusion." Of course, the object of this well-intentioned (though certainly not always so) line of argumentation is to refute the existence of racial *essences* (biological, cultural or otherwise). Here, the word "real" denotes attributes of *naturalness, objectivity, necessity* and *fixity*, properties typically associated with objects of the natural sciences. Because racial categories do not exhibit any of these qualities, this argument goes, race can only be the object of pseudo-science at best, or feverish hallucination at worst. While I agree that racial categories are indeed social constructs which lack the properties of so-called "natural kinds," I also agree with those scholars who have shown that this particular formulation of the social construction of race thesis misses the mark on several counts. It will be helpful to briefly mention a few of these closely related criticisms in order to clarify what I intend when I argue for the *reality* of racialization.

First, and as implied above, the assertion that "race is not real" can be construed to mean that race is "only in our minds." By identifying race with mere ideational content, this argument reduces the field of analysis to individual beliefs and attitudes, thereby evacuating the potential political terrains composing the larger social and institutional conditions on the reproduction of racial differentiation and domination. As several scholars working in Critical Race Studies have shown, this position is perfectly compatible with the

ascendant neoliberal ideology of "color-blindness," which denies the possibility of racism absent individual racist intent while also barring mobilizations predicated on shared experiences of racial domination.[1] Second, as Ruha Benjamin argues, by asserting that race is an "irrational belief," this social constructionism too often takes for granted the ideological distinction between "pseudo-science" and "sound science," while also reproducing the supposition that "ideas and actions grounded in racial thinking are aberrant, rather than foundational to the social order."[2] Third, and relatedly, the notion that race is an "illusion" presents the question of how the perception of—and belief in—racial difference emerges in the first place. This introduces the risk of re-naturalizing racial difference, not as a biological essence, but rather as a universal perceptual category through which humans classify one another based on objective physical differences.[3] Here, the *perception* of phenotypic (i.e. real, biological) differences among human groups is naturalized, while specific (arbitrary) *interpretations* of these differences as indicating innate, group-based distinctions (e.g. differential intelligence, sexual proclivities, natural talents, emotional dispositions, violent tendencies) is historicized and shown to be ideological, i.e. not based in fact. Thus, phenotypic difference and the perception thereof are taken to be conceptually and ontologically prior to the symbolic significations arbitrarily ascribed to them via subjective processes.

Each of these criticisms is directed at some aspect of the unsophisticated racial constructionist's assumptive partitioning of the world into that which is real and objective, on the one hand, and that which is unreal and subjective on the other. Namely, objective reality is understood to include: concrete individuals with objective phenotypic variations; entities and properties that can be demonstrated by the protocols of natural science; and

that which is empirically given to the immediacy of sense perception prior to any interpretative elaboration. Concomitantly, this partitioning relegates to the domain of the unreal: abstractions such as social structures and relations; phenomena that are incompatible with the methodological tenets of the empirical natural sciences; and everything pertaining to interpretation, meaning, value. This presents a rather positivistic picture of reality. This may seem ironic, given the anti-realist iconoclasm often associated with social constructionism. But, as Ian Hacking has pointed out, it is precisely the failure to state explicitly one's metaphysical stance that often leads the social constructionist to theoretical inconsistency, or at least redundancy and triviality, as is more often the case by his estimation.[4]

In his analysis of the "social construction of science" literature, Hacking concludes that the constructionist position is actually "a species of nominalism," one that he argues is in fact very closely related to Kantian idealism. Namely, the position holds that our classificatory categories are entirely subject-dependent (i.e. are ideational) and are not determined by the external world (i.e. reality) but rather by the (social) practices of representation themselves. To avoid the very loaded moniker of *realism*, as originally defined against *nominalism*, he proposes the term *inherent-structurism*, which posits that the natural world is inherently structured in ways that our categories capture, or at least approximate. This is only one of many terminological substitutions that Hacking makes in order to avoid the vagaries of contemporary social construction talk. For instance, in place of *natural kinds* and *social kinds* we get *indifferent kinds* and *interactive*/*human kinds*, respectively.[5] While the former constitute the domain of the natural sciences, to which Hacking maintains a more-or-less scientific realist stance, the latter comprise the ever-

dynamic purview of the human sciences, in relation to which Hacking coins his own well-known variety of social constructionism, *dynamic nominalism.* It is this philosophical position that grounds his historical-philosophical work on the heterogeneous processes of "making up people."[6]

While Hacking has not developed a sustained genealogical critique of the category of *race*, I mention his historical ontology of human kinds here because it offers a general sketch of the broader conceptual terrain that has occupied much of the burgeoning metaphysics of race literature, particularly in the Anglo-American analytic variant of philosophical social constructionism.[7] To wit, and at the risk of some overgeneralization, this work is largely concerned with the ontological status of social kinds; the causal relations and dynamic interplay between classifications and their group members; the compatibility of a social ontology with objectivism, realism and naturalism; and the meaning and referential content of the notion of *race* in ordinary language. Much of this work draws upon the same conceptual resources of post-positivist analytic philosophy and the philosophy of language (e.g. Austin, Searle, Putnam, Kripke, Davidson) that Hacking deploys. Some similarly share an affinity for Foucauldian discursive performativity, while variously leveraging elements of other positions such as feminist and Marxist epistemologies. All of the proponents of this position, which I will here gloss as *analytic realist-constructionism*, refuse the ontological partitioning associated with the unsophisticated constructionism described above. In Charles Mills' formulation, what this project attempts to demonstrate is that "race can be ontological without being biological,

metaphysical without being physical, existential without being essential, shaping one's being without being in one's shape."[8]

Again at the risk of some oversimplification, a general statement of this analytic realist-constructionist position, with which I am sympathetic, would read as follows: *Race is not a natural kind, because there is no such thing as transhistorical racial essence; however, race is an objective social fact (i.e. it is epistemologically objective) inasmuch as it is not dependent upon any one subject's intentions/attitudes/beliefs/knowledge/actions, and it is thus truth-apt and a potential object of knowledge proper. Furthermore, because race is a social kind with social efficacy, any adequate ontology of the social world must include race as both a causal and explanatory category (i.e. race is not reducible to or epiphenomenal of any other category, such as class, nation or ethnicity).* My own understanding of the material and symbolic dynamics of racialization are informed by this scholarship, particularly its elaboration of discursive performativity and referentiality. But I also want to depart in certain respects from this approach. Namely, the primary concern with the ontological status of social kinds in this analytic approach results in the prioritization of entities (i.e. groups and their members) and properties (i.e. those qualities that define a given instance of racial membership) over relations and processes. That is, this approach tends toward a substantivist/constituent ontology, even if one that allows, as Hacking's historical ontology and dynamic nominalism do, that "kinds" can come in and out of existence with their members "like hand in glove."[9] I want to instead rely on a relational-processual ontology that privileges ongoing processes of coming-into-relation over quasi-static categories and entities.

To be sure, none of the philosophers that I am here describing as analytic realist-constructionists can be said to entirely neglect relations or dynamics. To the contrary, many explicitly incorporate relations of oppression and/or domination into the definition of race itself, going so far as to describe race as a relational, dynamic category. However, it would not be accurate to describe these positions as true relational ontologies inasmuch as the distinction between extrinsic-relational properties and intrinsic-nonrelational properties is maintained, either explicitly or tacitly. Here, race is defined as an extrinsic-relational (i.e. accidental) designation or kind in opposition to those properties, entities and individuals whose existence is self-sufficient (i.e. necessary). A relational ontology proper recognizes no such intrinsic properties or entities that can be said to exist outside or independent of the ongoing unfolding of constitutive relations themselves. I will have more to say about the philosophical cum political import of this distinction later, but for now it is enough to indicate that such a separation of the extrinsic-relational from the intrinsic-nonrelational recuperates the ontological privileging of essence/permanence/presence/necessity over existence/flux/absence/contingency, and thus maintains a metaphysics of presence which holds out the possibility of purity and perfectibility. Similarly, the shared concern among these scholars for how racial classifications interact with the people they variously designate, and *vice versa*, must be understood in dynamic, even dialectical, terms. However, the conceptualization of process itself remains somewhat subordinated to the ontological status of entity-outcomes. This is evinced by the usage of the concept of *racialization* within this literature, which is most often rendered in the participle form, 'racialized' (e.g. "racialized society", "racialized structure", "racialized housing market").

Several have even argued for substituting "racialized group" for "race" in order to underline historical contingency.[10] For instance, Sally Haslanger writes,

> A group is *racialized* (in a context) if and only if its members are socially positioned as subordinated or privileged along some dimension—economic, political, legal, social, etc.—(in that context), and the group is 'marked' as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links to a certain region.[11]

This definition is consonant with that of other philosophers of race, such as Paul Taylor and Charles Mills, who in different ways define race as positions within a political system organized by white supremacism.[12] This formulation does provide a definition of racialization, but only as a residuum of the category of analytic priority; namely, the real social kinds referenced by the term 'races' and the putative properties that define them (or their paradigms). As Hochman argues, by defining "racialization" as "the process by which social races are formed," this definition introduces a circularity whereby the process of racialization is ontologically grounded in the existence of races, or racialized groups.[13] This explains the preferred usage in this literature of the past participle form 'racialized,' which functions grammatically as a modifier of the nominal group-entity term (i.e. in "racialized group"), and which further implies the (contingent) *completion* of the process of stable group constitution. This prioritization of quasi-stable groups, kinds, identities and identifications risks obscuring the ongoing processes of racialization that ceaselessly generate the *appearance* of these constituted unities *as* unities of identity/identification

even as they are partially and perpetually disaggregated, reconfigured and made non-self-identical across time, space, and heterogenous domains of knowledge and practice. This definition thereby misses how processes of racialization always outstrip and overtake the category of race.

Temptations of Ontology, Seductions of Transcendence

Of course, the call for a relational-processual ontology is by now hardly novel, much less radical, among social scientists, as recent decades have seen a transdisciplinary proliferation of such orientations. In anthropology, one immediately thinks of the seminal work of Marilyn Strathern on partible persons, dividuals and networks, as well as Roy Wagner's holography and fractality of personhood and Tim Ingold's ecology of materials.[14] These authors have been key interlocutors in the discipline's so-called "ontological turn."[15] This heading gathers a disparate array of theoretical and ethnographic trends, notably—the Amazonian perspectivism of Viveiros de Castro, as well as several other authors working under the label of "ontological anthropology" including Descola, Kohn, Holbraad, and Pederson; certain strands of Science and Technology Studies (STS), most prominently the material-semiotics of Latour and colleagues' Actor-Network Theory and Haraway's cyborgology; and a recent flourishing of novel empirical engagements, including multi-species ethnography and the ethnography of infrastructures.[16] Such work has drawn variously upon the broader theoretical developments of "new materialism," "post-humanism" and the adjacent "affective turn" within the social sciences and humanities. These latter trends have been elaborated primarily within the philosophy of science—e.g. Barad's agential realism, Stenger's cosmopolitics, Grosz's post-human

materialist feminism[17]—political philosophy—e.g. Bennett's vital materialism, Braidotti's affirmative materiality of difference, Massumi's ontogenetics[18]—and metaphysics proper—e.g. the speculative realism of Meillasoux and object-oriented ontology of Harman.[19]

Unlike the analytic approach discussed above, these theorists marshal a much more diverse (and sometimes seemingly incongruous) array of interlocutors. A truncated list would include: Deleuze and Guattari (*especially* Deleuze and Guattari); the post-structuralisms of Foucault and Derrida (though they are often deployed as 'culturalist' foil to a 'return to matter'); Spinozism and Bergsonism (often by way of Deleuze); the process philosophy of Whitehead; the pragmatist empiricism of James and Dewey; Peircean semiotics; the relational monadology of Leibniz; the anti-humanism of Nietzsche; as well as much more ambivalent engagements with the phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. While such eclecticism makes any meaningful generalization difficult, several overarching thematics can be identified. The most important is a rejection of the organizing binaries of Modernity and Humanism: Nature/Culture, subject/object, mind/matter, fact/value, individual/society, animate/inanimate and human/nonhuman. This refutation of dualism in turn undergirds a repudiation of any ontological partitioning that uniquely bestows humans with agency and living organisms with vitality and experience while rendering inanimate matter entirely passive and inert. The watchwords here include ontological multiplicity, immanence, virtuality and emergence; socio-technical assemblages, networks, rhizomes and collectives; companion species and interspecies entanglements; distributed agency and thing-power.

In my own thinking on racialization, I have drawn several key insights from interdisciplinary engagements with these various problematics, including ongoing theoretical developments in the anthropology of materiality, infrastructures, and affect. Particularly engaging are the emphasis on heterogeneous material-semiotic assemblages that cannot be reduced to one-sided discursivity, the attentiveness to processual flux over static entities, and an attunement to the extra-linguistic, affective registers of experience. Indeed, these are among the principle features that distinguish these theoretical orientations from the analytic constructionist approach described above. But at the same time, it seems to me that several of the core theoretical conceits and methodological tendencies within new materialist, post-humanist and adjacent thinking are uniquely unsuited to the task of diagnosing the shifting realities of ongoing racialization in the contemporary world, much less providing a workable vision of a truly emancipatory politics. Of course, the internal heterogeneity of this work means that any broadly leveled criticism risks the very sort of obscurantist caricaturing that several critics have located within the "founding gestures" of these various "turns."[20] Still, at such hazard, I will briefly present several such critiques in order to justify this evaluation and to better clarify my own position. This is necessary for at least two reasons.

The first I can only describe as something of a disciplinary obligation that reflects the ascendant position of these contemporary trends within the academic mainstream. As these self-announced turns—ontological, post-humanist, new materialist, affective—have enjoyed a meteoric rise across the social sciences and humanities, an increasingly programmatic assertion of privileged access to matters of materiality, immanence, becoming, emergence, reality, and all things ontological (as opposed to 'merely'

epistemological, i.e. Modern and/or 'critical') has become an increasingly routine signal of demarcation. This means that to speak of the "ontology of racialization" is, for most anthropological audiences, already to invoke an engagement with the "ontological turn." Likewise, any reference to the "materialities of racialization" is likely to signal to any social scientist in the know an affinity for "new materialism." It becomes necessary then to state explicitly any significant theoretical disjunctures in order to avoid the confusion that such assumptive readings might engender.

The second reason is more important as it pertains directly to the substantive materials presented in this dissertation. To wit, it is precisely through consideration of the ongoing reproduction of racializing domination, dispossession and differential valuation of life and exposure to death across the globe that certain tendencies of these assorted "turns" are revealed to be inadequate, regressive even, to the intellectual, social and political mobilizations required for repair. It is worth repeating one last time that these criticisms are not aimed at the entirety of scholarship that has been gathered under these rubrics, nor is the intention to identify each of these turns one with the other. Rather I focus on a particular stance that has been taken more or less explicitly by several prominent scholars across these turns. I locate this position at the intersection of two temporally inflected headings: "post-critical" and "post-human." While space does not allow for a detailed excursus, I will briefly treat each of these moments in turn, indicating several signposts in the literature and encouraging the unfamiliar reader to pursue them. I will then proceed to a presentation of several related critiques, specifically as they apply to questions of racialization.

Post-critical. The obvious place to start here is Latour's "Why has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern."[21] In that highly influential essay, Latour presents his well-rehearsed polemic against (dare I say critique of) what he terms the "critical barbarity" of the contemporary social scientific landscape. The "critical scene" of the latter he portrays thus: "Antifetishists debunk objects they don't believe in by showing the productive and projective forces of people; then, without ever making the connection, they use objects they do believe in to resort to causalist or mechanist explanation and debunk conscious capacities of people whose behavior they don't approve of."[22] Aside from the self-satisfied arrogance of this position ("The critic is always right!"), what concerns Latour most is that all of this debunking simply adds more "deconstruction to destruction," all for the sake of "fighting enemies long gone" and "conquering territories that no longer exist."[23] And so he calls for a transformed critical urge that is adequate to the post-science/culture-wars contemporary, one that is committed to the *addition* of reality to the world, rather than the *subtraction* from it: "The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of the naïve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to gather. The critic is not the one who alternates haphazardly between anti-fetishism and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by Goya, but one for whom, if something is constructed, then it means it is fragile and thus in great need of care and caution."[24] For Latour, the task of the social scientist is to always *multiply* associations, thereby partaking in the ongoing process of "reassembling the social."[25] It is precisely here, through participation in the *due process* of composing the *collective* (i.e. the "common world"), that the sociology of associations becomes politics.[26]

This same post-critical, affirmative stance towards social-science-as-"world-making"-as-politics is endorsed by several of the leading proponents of so-called "ontological anthropology." Echoing Latour, but citing for support Deleuze rather than Whitehead, Viveiros de Castro writes, "Anthropology's role, then, is not that of *explaining the world of the other,* but rather *of multiplying our world*, 'filling it with all of those things expressed that do not exist beyond their expression.'"[27] This is precisely why the anthropologist must avoid critique, which, echoing Latour, Viveiros de Castro is concerned can only take away from existence rather than adding to it. "Anthropologists are butterfly collectors after all…We are always dealing with, we are only dealing with, butterflies. Delicacy (and elegance) is required; too much historicizing will crush the butterfly."[28] Similarly, Holbraad and Pederson assert that ontological anthropology as post-critical anthropology represents "a sort of reverse deconstruction," which operates "not by making the world less real by taking it apart and thus exposing the processes that made it into what it is, but by adding to it—taking it 'too seriously'—and thereby making it 'more' or differently real. Again, critique happens here, not as skeptical acts of debunking, but by performing analytical operations that turn things into what they could be, but still are not."[29]

The starting point for each of these authors is a rejection of the (putatively unitary) ontology of Modernity. Inaugurated by Cartesian mind-body dualism (and the endless series of organizing binaries purportedly engendered by that originary dualism: Nature/Culture, individual/society, subject/object, human/non-human, animate/inanimate, fact/value, etc., etc.), the "Modern Constitution"[30] undergirds the Kantian privileging of epistemology (questions concerning the conditions on knowledge/representation of what

is) over ontology (questions of what is 'in itself'), which in turn determines the binary coordinates (phenomenon/noumenon; appearance/essence; language/object; sense/reference; discourse/body) of all Modern modes of critique that rely on a so-called 'correlationist metaphysics' of representation, whether dialectical, structuralist, or poststructuralist. The refusal of this metaphysics entails a refusal of the assumption of "one Nature [reality/ontology], many cultures [representations/epistemologies]," which is replaced by the notion of ontological multiplicity (multiple worlds which cannot be reduced to different 'world-views').[31] Here, the subject/object binary also collapses, as both the position of an inert Nature/matter/object and that of the active subject are overtaken by a multiplicity of quasi-objects/subjects, hybrids and distributed agencies, while the gap between words and world is closed by the "thing-concept" (that is, the concept that is the thing itself). It is here that ontological anthropology and Latourian experimental realism are most closely aligned with the affirmative project of new materialism and certain currents within the so-called 'affective turn.' I will return to the problematic notion of "matter itself" that animates much new materialist thought, but the rejection of the subject/object binary also provides a transition to our second heading.

Post-human. What the preceding discussion makes clear is that, for all this commitment to a post-critical, affirmative social science of world-making, some long-cherished conceptual habits will still need to be dispensed with in order to get the project off the ground (though *not* by negation—as Latour would have it, some things are better ignored, "like a once formidable castle now in ruins").[32] Chief among these is the whole tradition of Humanism and its organizing category of "the human"—that is, Man, the constituted transcendental Subject of Reason, and his (always *his*) political counterpart, the

self-possessed, sovereign individual of inalienable Natural Right. It is in the name of Man that Modernity has wrought utter devastation to Earth's ecosystems on such an unfathomable scale as to bring us to planetary crisis. Our only hope for building a livable world, then, is to move finally "beyond the human."

This call would seem to align this scholarship with a long line of anti-humanist thinkers—Freud, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Althusser, Foucault. While this tradition has provided crucial theoretical resources for much post-humanist scholarship, particularly Nietzschean genealogy as elaborated by Foucault, the contemporary *post*-human should be distinguished from these various anti-humanisms on several counts. Most importantly, according to several post-humanists, the Foucauldian account of the subject as discursive formation is limited by its intractable logocentrism.[33] Indeed, the linguistic turn of post-structuralism provides an even more proximal target of much post-humanist ire than does Marxian critical theory. The problem, it is argued, is that these approaches, which can be roughly glossed as 'constructionist,' remain thoroughly entrenched within the Nature/Culture binary inasmuch as they impart agency and creative potential only to discursive performativity (that is, Culture) while rendering matter/body/Nature entirely inert. A thoroughgoing anti-anthropocentrism, it is argued, requires a wholesale dissolution of both sides of this binary. Hence, matter becomes "lively," "vibrant," "animated," "intelligent", while the subject is distributed across networks of human-nonhuman actants or dispersed into a multiplicity of heterogeneous machinic assemblages and shifting interspecies entanglements. No longer the privileged distinction of the human, agency is attributed to all existence—in fact, agency and existence become indistinguishable.

To be sure, I see much to be valued in these interventions. The commitment to methodological experimentation and an attunement to the possibility of radical alternatives opened up by ethnographic engagement aligns well with what Povinelli has termed an "anthropology of the otherwise"[34] and should be commended. Similarly, only a reactionary could deny the devastation wrought in the service of Man. All the same, I have serious reservations about several of the claims made in the name of a post-critical post-humanism, specifically as they relate to questions of racialization. First, the call for a *post*-humanism risks performatively presupposing both the achievement and exhaustion of the potentials of humanity by those who would now move on, beyond the human. As Weheliye argues, "post-humanism and animal studies isomorphically yoke humanity to the limited possessive individualism of Man, because these discourses also presume that we have now entered a stage in human development where all subjects have been granted equal access to western humanity and that this is, indeed, what we all want to overcome."[35] With the imperative to move beyond the human, any aspirational claim to full humanity by those who have been denied this status might be read as politically regressive. As Haritaworn argues, "There is a certain temptation to scapegoat critical race theorists as anthropocentric, correlationist dupes of the species binary with an irrational investment in humanity and a lack of acknowledgment that objectification and animalization remain necessary objects of investigation."[36] But it is precisely here, in the domain of an "embattled humanism," to use anthropologist David Scott's phrase, that any political ontology of racialization must be positioned.[37] This is why, Haritaworn asserts, it remains "essential to interrogate the nonhuman alongside the dehumanization of 'Man's human Others' and to understand what disposes them to becoming animal's other (or object's other)."[38]

It is this same set of concerns that motivates Jackson to caution that "appeals to move 'beyond the human' may actually reintroduce the Eurocentric transcendentalism this movement purports to disrupt, particularly with regard to the historical and ongoing distributive order of race—which … authorizes and conditions appeals to the 'beyond,' maybe even overdetermining the 'beyond's' appeal."[39] There are clear echoes here of Spivak's response to the announcement that "There is no more representation." This declamation was intended to signal the death of the signifier, and along with it, the sovereign subject. This disavowal, according to Spivak, effectively evacuates the space of ideology by identifying interest with desire, and in so doing renders the politically oppressed capable of 'speaking for themselves.' But in rendering the would-be subject of oppression transparent, the prophets of a post- representational politics also render themselves transparent, and thus stealthily reinstate a sovereign subject, 'the Western Subject of knowledge.' Spivak, writing over three decades ago, pointed out that "This foreclosing of the necessity of the difficult task of counterhegemonic ideological production has not been salutary. It has helped positivist empiricism—the justifying foundation of advanced capitalist neocolonialism—to define its open area as 'concrete experience', 'what actually happens.'"[40] One thinks of the numerous critiques of Latour's rejection of non-demonstrable explanatory categories of the *social* (read: racism, capitalism, patriarchy, empire, domination, etc., etc.) in favor of an empiricist "descriptivism" ("Follow the network!").[41] It is here that we note the insidiousness of the post-critical impulse in the post-human.

Indeed, Jackson's concerns seem well-founded when we read from leading figures of "ontological anthropology" that this approach pertains to the "the comparative,

ethnographically-grounded *transcendental deduction of Being* (the oxymoron is deliberate) as that which differs with itself (ditto)—being-as-other as immanent to being-as-such."[42] Or, again, when ontological anthropology is specified as that methodology "by which the material may *itself* enunciate meanings" such that "the things encountered in fieldwork are allowed to dictate the terms of their own analysis."[43] This is of course potentiated by the same death of the signifier, and with it, representational mediation, such that now "no ontological distinction between 'discourse' and 'reality' pertains in the first place. In other words, concepts can bring about things because concepts and things just are one and the same."[44] This self-ascribed "radical constructivism" has strong resonances with both ANT and various strands of new materialist thought. The "post-representational performativity" of Karen Barad's agential realism immediately comes to mind.[45] Similarly, the call to attend to the ontological "thing in itself" is clearly aligned with the new materialist imperative to move beyond discursivity so as to "return to matter itself."[46] But as Lemke writes, the "one-sided and often distorted critique of the alleged 'culturalism' of poststructuralist accounts is sometimes coupled with the idea that 'matter' can be separated from interpretation, meaning and discourse. As a result, the relational vocabulary stressing interactions (or intra-actions), entanglements and dependencies tends to give way to the ontological notion of a solid and stable matter characterized by agential powers, inventive capacities and unpredictable eventfulness."[47]

While Lemke, a Foucauldian, does not explicitly introduce the problematic of ideological mediation, his flagging of the notion of matter per se as separable from discourse and interpretation clearly stages such an interrogation. Toscano, writing from a Marxian perspective, makes this ideological critique of new materialism overt: "A

materialism that is not reflexive about its political, polemical and pedagogical function, as well as about its social rather than metaphysical character, can only repeat the idealist gesture that hypostasizes, divinizes and abstracts an unmediated ground."[48] William Mazzarella draws upon a similar critical repertoire when he writes that "the major flaw besetting contemporary affect theory is its romantic (and complicit) attachment to a fantasy of immediacy—or as I prefer to put it, immediation."[49] Mazzarrella's critique is addressed to authors who, following Massumi's theorization of the "autonomy of affect," register affect in terms of an ontological plane of immanence, an undifferentiated flow of pure virtuality that is not "presocial," but "asocial."[50]

Such post-critical "fantasies of immediation" have clear implications for questions of racialization. We might ask, along with Jackson, whether the call to move beyond the human might not conceal a desire to move beyond race. "What 'the beyond's' rising momentum largely bypasses," she writes, "is a more comprehensive examination of the role of race in 'the human's' metaphysics, or the philosophical orientation of Man. Given Man's historical horizon of possibility—slavery, conquest, colonialism—the Western metaphysical matrix has race at its center in the form of a chiasmus: the metaphysics of race ('What is the 'reality' of race?') and the racialization of the question of metaphysics ('Under whose terms will the nature of time, knowledge, space, objecthood, being, cause and effect come to be defined?'). In other words, the question of race's reality has and continues to bear directly on hierarchies of knowledge pertaining to the nature of reality itself."[51] Here, Jackson's interrogation of post-humanist metaphysics converges with Weheliye's critique of the ascendant discourses of bare life and biopolitics which take the substance of *bios* as ontologically prior to racialization, thereby rendering race as

accidental to a more fundamental movement of biopower within Liberal Modernity. This has the pernicious effect of relegating critiques of 'the human' from within Black studies and post-colonial scholarship to the domain of "ethnographic particularity" which can then be linked to a limited identity politics.[52] It is worth noting here the unconditional scorn for the category of identity (there is no identity, only translation, difference and becoming!) held by many Deleuzians as well as Latour. To be sure, specific critiques of the multifarious ways in which identity-based politics function to reproduce neoliberal hegemony are indispensable. However, such critiques must be distinguished from an unqualified designation of any discussion of racial domination as 'mere' identity politics which can be summarily dismissed.[53]

Jackson's staging of the "historical horizon" of Man also draws attention to the actual *material* relations of Modernity—settler colonialism, chattel slavery, empire, global capitalism—that are strangely absent from Latour's account and which cannot be reduced to, but are rather the *condition on*, his "Modern Constitution" of Nature/Culture dualism. This also directs us back to Toscano's observation above that new materialism is, paradoxically, in many ways indistinguishable from idealism.[54] Several commentators have made similar observations regarding ontological anthropology, which ironically tends to reduce the Nature/Culture binary, and therefore Modernity itself, to an epistemology that can be dispensed with by something of a voluntarist fiat. But as Bond and Bessire note, this stance "misses the varied ontological status of nature and culture today. They matter not in their guises as crumbling bastions of a modernist, European cosmology but as hardening matrices for sorting out what forms of life must be defended from present contingencies and what must be set adrift. . . . Nature and culture matter not as uniform

epistemologies but as dispersed political technologies."[55] This problematic tendency is most striking in the claim by several of its leading practitioners that ontological anthropology is "a political end in its own right," inasmuch as "ontologically-oriented analyses render political the very form of thinking that they involve, such that 'being political' becomes an immanent property to the mode of anthropological thought itself."[56] This assertion follows form the rather specious syllogism that "to think is to differ," "to differ is itself a political act," and therefore to *think* is to *do* politics.[57]

Graeber[58] locates in such pronouncements a potentially insidious conservatism, while Bond and Bessire[59] describe this notion of politics as "speculative futurism" and complain that it underwrites a "deferral of critique." They argue that, "the advance praise of a civilization to come is reduced to farce if it dampens criticism and disavows history."[60] To be sure, none of these critics of the ontological turn deny the importance (and perhaps even necessity) of an attunement to the possibility of alternative worlds opened up through the ethnographic encounter. The argument is rather that the post-critical affirmation of *thinking* alterity cannot be equated with actual political change, which necessarily requires the ongoing critical diagnosis of the "dispersed political technologies" comprising the "hardening matrices for sorting out"[61] whose lives are valued and cultivated and whose lives are made disposable (of which, we must add, the matrices of racializing differentiation and domination remain eminent and immanent in the contemporary). Not butterflies, but durable regimes of differential valuation, domination and immiseration.

We could say, following Frederick Jameson, that this "thinking difference as politics" formula "omits Hegel's famous 'labor of the negative'" by attempting to overleap the gap between this (Modern) world and an alternative one by an act of "sheer

willpower."[62] We should ask then, is there any reason why negative critique must be antithetical to an anthropology of alternative worlds? Here we might return to Povinelli's formulation of an "anthropology of the otherwise," which Holbraad and colleagues favorably cite. What is important for our purposes is that Povinelli affirms negative critique as a necessary moment of what she terms the "positive sociography" of potentiality. She argues that "it would do us well to begin by addressing whether negative dialectics is in fact *negative*, and in what ways potentiality emerges from actuality."[63] Povinelli reminds us that the imperative of negative critique has never been the diminution the world through a self-satisfied debunking (as post-critical caricatures would have it), but rather the imperative to "rigorously demonstrate the noncorrespondence between what is claimed and what is, and the techniques of power that allow the claimed world to appear not merely as the actual world but the best of all possible worlds. One must unwork this identity—make it unworkable—transform it from the background that allows an ease of copying for some but not others."[64] This work of unworking identities is what Luc Boltanski describes as the "hermeneutics of contradiction," the cultivation and elaboration of which he argues is necessary to any sociology of emancipation in the context of increasingly diffuse regimes of domination in late capitalism.[65]

The point is that any affirmation of potential worlds absent the abolition (i.e. negation) of the actual structures of domination and regimes of power that foreclose those worlds remains an idealist (and therefore politically idle) exercise. The negation of actually existing structures of domination is itself the positive condition on, or potentiation of, viable (i.e. livable) alternatives. This recalls Galtung's original formulation of structural violence as the probabilistically distributed differential between human potentiality and

actuality, a formulation which identifies politics with the progressive abolition of the structures that reproduce such differentials.[66] And we must reassert that the structures here referred to comprise historically constituted material relations and social determinations, not mere epistemological habits that can be dispensed with at will. Again, we might look to Povinelli's ongoing meditations on the materialities of endurance and exhaustion, corporeality and carnality, for a reminder that any politically viable anthropology of the otherwise must be thoroughly materialist.[67] But, as the preceding discussion makes clear, and as Povinelli would attest, this materialism cannot be predicated on an ontology of substance that takes matter per se as the grounds for an unmediated plane of virtual becoming. Such a metaphysics closes the gap of ideological critique and, as we have seen in the case of certain strands of post-humanist thought, thereby enacts the ideological reinstatement of the Subject of Knowledge. As Weheliye[68] shows, this movement "beyond the human" results in the demotion of racialization to the domain of the accidental, the particular, and thereby denies race the status of proper object of philosophical contemplation and political engagement. As Jackson argues, the same movement

> …effectively ignores praxes of humanity and critiques produced by black people, particularly those praxes which are irreverent to the normative production of 'the human' or illegible from within the terms of its logic. Rather than constitute a potentially critical and/or generative (human) outer world to that of Man, potentially transformative expressions of humanity are instead cast "out of the world" and thus rendered inhuman in calls for a beyond that take for granted Man's authority over the *entire* contested field pertaining to matters 'human.' Those

> praxes of humanity illegible from *within* the logic of Man are simply rendered void or made to accord with Man's patterned logics by acts of presupposition—any excess or remainder disavowed.[69]

Remarking on the historical context of post-60s French thought and the "then-au courant disenchantment with Marxism and grand-narratives," Weheliye observes,

> Nevertheless, notions such as power, ideology, gender, coloniality, identity, and race jingingly dawdle in the margins of Deleuze and Guatarri's putatively asubjective and disinterested universe, since otherwise, as Stuart Hall remarks, "there is no reason why anything is or isn't potentially articulable with anything," while the "critique of reductionism has apparently resulted in the notion of society as a totally open discursive field."[70]

Following Hall and Spivak, Weheliye asks us to consider "the stakes of evacuating seemingly retrograde concepts such as identity, especially within contexts of 'societies structured in dominance.'"[71] The question of domination brings me to my final point, which pertains to the notion of totalization. As Boltanski[72] shows, the very concept of domination requires for its coherence the positing of a totality (e.g. social order) that allows for the adequate description of the given mode of domination in its generality, as well as the specification of the immanent contradictions thereof, which in turn provide the basis of critique. But it is precisely here, in the categorical proscription on thinking with/in totality, that much Deleuzian and Latourian scholarship most clearly overlaps. Mazarrella writes of

the post-60s rejection of dialectics in French thought that, "For all the subtlety of its elaborations, the rebellion bequeathed to the philosophies it spawned a crudely romantic distinction between, on the one side, all-encompassing form (whose totalizing ambition must be resisted) and, on the other side, the evanescent forms of affective and—it is often implied—popular potentiality (which must be nurtured and celebrated). This reductive binary opposition between (in Deleuze and Guattari's terminology) 'molar' structures and 'molecular' potentialities continues to inform Massumian affect theory today in a way that undercuts considerable power."[73]

Postone compellingly argues that both of these positions are in fact liable of the same one-sidedness. He writes, "those positions that assert the existence of a totality only to affirm it [i.e. the Hegelian Marxism that poses Labor as the Subject of history], on the one hand, and those that recognize that the realization of a social totality would be inimical to emancipation and therefore deny its very existence, on the other, are antinomically related. Both sorts of positions are one-sided, for both posit, in opposed ways, a transhistorical identity between what is and what should be."[74] Instead, he argues for a historical critique of totality that "neither affirms ontologically the transhistorical existence of totality nor denies that totality exists (which, given the existence of capital, could only be mystifying). Rather, it analyzes totality in terms of the structuring forms of capitalist society."[75] Toscano levels a similar critique concerning the relation between the ontological rejection of totality and ideological mystification in his assessment of Latourian empiricism. While acknowledging the crucial insights to be gained through the tedious empirical tracing of the actor-networks comprising the distributed 'centers of calculation' and 'oligopticons' of concrete markets and financial systems, he cautions,

> That a theory of crisis, for instance, could be dismissed due to its inevitable incapacity to trace *all* the 'canals,' seems to move beyond an important methodological polemic to a lobotomy of the relation between social research and political action, as well as to a *de facto* muzzling of 'actors', rising in number, who seek such explanations. And, though they constitute an important part of the story, treatments of the performative effects of economic theories on crisis, or descriptions of the precise connections between centres of calculation, do not obviate the need to provide totalizing *explanatory* accounts that do not cleave to ANT's simultaneously ascetic and plethoric demands.[76]

To be sure, none of these critics would suggest a return to the finalist teleology of the Hegelian "expressive totality" or the economic determinism of a Stalinist "dialectical materialism." Instead, what is called for is a theorization of the open, relational totality, "full of contradictions, unevenness and tendencies."[77] While it may seem that we have drifted from questions of racialization to questions of capitalist exploitation, the above authors' observations concerning the necessity of theorizing totality are just as relevant to the former as to the latter, both analogically and substantially. By analogically, I mean that, for instance, it is easy enough to see how Toscano's concerns with the empirical evidentiary standards of ANT might be extended to questions of racial domination (e.g. "Show me the 'canal' that leads from this one police shooting to 'Racialized State Violence'? It is worth noting the striking resemblance between the empirical demands of ANT and the evidentiary standards of contemporary US jurisprudence concerning racial discrimination).

By substantially, I mean that, while race is not epiphenomenal to class, historically, racialization and capitalism have been and continue to be inextricably bound, such that any adequate theorization of capitalism is a theorization of Racial Capitalism. I will discuss this concept of racial capitalism further below. Having completed this critique, I will now move to the ontology of racialization as pursued in this dissertation, but only after a brief discussion of epistemological considerations.

Epistemological Considerations: Historical Materialism without Racial Reductionism

Before proceeding, given the above criticisms, I should perhaps offer a few last preliminary remarks in order to clarify what I intend by an ontology of racialization. The first thing to emphasize is that I intend just that—*an* ontology (indefinite article, count noun, lowercase *o*) of racialization, rather than The Ontology of Racialization. While the latter would pertain to "the nature or essence of being or existence," the former, which I pursue here, is more akin to the information sciences usage: "a set of concepts and categories in a subject area or domain that shows their properties and the relations between them."[78] Indeed, one of the primary reasons for offering such an ontology at the beginning of this work is to provide glosses for several key terms and the relations between them in such a way as to avoid equivocation throughout the substantive chapters while also obviating the need for that ubiquitous but always unsatisfying practice of deploying scare quotes to signal intellectual skepticism and/as moral distanciation. So, if I use the term *race*, I mean *race* and not *racism* (e.g. distinct but shifting, non-equivocal though relationally entangled semantic spaces and referential fields), and also not "race" (e.g. having no distinctive semantic space or referential field, as signaled by scare quotes).

Relatedly, I am deploying *ontology* in a sense similar to that of the analytic tradition, which is to say that I am asserting an 'ontological commitment' to these terms and their referents. That is, I take them to *exist* inasmuch as they are irreducible to other existents and are also necessary to any adequate account, descriptive or explanatory, of the substantive matters pursued in this work. Of course, what the analytically minded philosopher would then likely dismiss as idle speculation (i.e. metaphysics) would be a further strong specification of the very nature of existence (transcendent, transhistorical), which is to say Being itself (i.e. Ontology). While I would have little else to say to the logical empiricist, I do share this particular reluctance.

By the standards of much of the ontology-oriented work discussed above, these qualifications would suggest that what I am calling an ontology—categories, terms, concepts, their interrelations and semantic spaces and referential fields—would more accurately be described as an *epistemology* of race. And because my reluctance to stake a stronger claim to Ontology (the essence of Being in itself) is in part reflective of what could be called my epistemological commitments, it is worth offering a characterization of these. The epistemological position assumed in this work could be described broadly as historical materialist, but with several qualifications. First, this is not the tirelessly caricatured version of economic reductionism that posits a simple economic base of which the superstructure (i.e. institutional, cultural and mental formations, including race) is a mere (ideological/ideational) reflection. For one thing, as Jameson notes, even within this base/superstructure topology, there is no *simple* base inasmuch as the base is already of a dual (read: dialectic) character (forces of production *and* relations of production).[79] Or, to adopt the Deleuzian idiom, the base (as stratum) is just as much a double articulation of

forms of expression and forms of content as the superstructure, with neither plane determining but each presupposing the other.[80] So, the vulgar notion that material conditions *determine* human cognition (as simple ideological reflection) must be dispensed with (though it could be argued that it had already been dispensed with in the formulation of the base/superstructure relation as one of overdeterminations, articulations, and the structural causation of relatively autonomous instances comprising a unity of difference—talk of "the last instance" notwithstanding).[81] Secondly, according to such an economic-reductionist position, the very notion of an ontology of racialization, if coherent at all, could only be a mystification of what is actually the ontology of class relations. Of course, I do not intend to present a deliberate mystification.

It remains, then, to specify a historical materialist epistemology that is compatible with a non-reductionist, non-epiphenomenal ontology of racialization. As a starting point, we can turn to Moishe Postone, whose *Time, Labor and Social Domination* offers an extended exegesis of the specifically *epistemological* aspects of Marx's mature works, in which, he notes, "Marx has moved away from the subject-object paradigm and epistemology to a social theory of consciousness."[82] The upshot, according to Postone, is that Marx "changes the terms of the epistemological problem. He shifts the focus of the problem of knowledge from the knowing individual (or supra-individual) subject and its relation to an external (or externalized) world to the forms of social relations, seen as determinations of social subjectivity as well as objectivity. The problem of knowledge now becomes a question of the relation between forms of social mediations and forms of thought."[83] The implications are radical, as this move opens up "the possibility of analyzing

socially and historically the classical epistemological question itself, predicated as it is on the notion of an autonomous subject in sharp contradiction to an objective universe."[84]

It is here that we can identify the fundamental kernel of a historical materialist epistemology; namely, that all "forms of thought" are conditioned (though never simply or exhaustively *determined*) by the "constituted structure[s] of social relations" to which they are immanent and within which they emerge. That is, knowledge is historically constituted and socially mediated, including knowledge that is posited as *transhistorical* knowledge about Being as such, and also Knowledge as such. The latter brings us to a further qualification. While I have just written of "*all* forms of thought," this would seem to result in a paradox (i.e. if *all* knowledge is historically determinate, then the claim that all knowledge is historically determinate is also historically determinate, i.e. not transhistorically valid, and so, if true, leaves open the possibility that a transhistorical knowledge might be possible under different historical determinations, which would contradict the first claim). This can be avoided by following Postone when he reminds us that, as immanent critique, this epistemology is only valid under the historical conditions and social relations within which it emerges; namely, those of capitalism, which, as I have already said and will elaborate shortly, is and always has been racial capitalism, even if this was misrecognized by Marx. This entails not simply that the historical materialist epistemology (and its decisive dialectical dynamic) might not be valid under some other set of historical determinations, but that, in so far as this epistemological position is conditioned by, and indeed immanent to, determinate social relations (those of racial capitalism), it does not make sense to speak of a historical materialist epistemology under

radically different determinations inasmuch as this presupposes a subject that would transcend historically constituted social formations.

There are several crucial points here. First, there is a clear rebuttal of the idealist position that would take thought (Idea, Intuition, Language, Discourse) to transcend and/or determine the social and historical, as if from a position of exteriority and/or priority (transcendental Subject). Second, there is a concomitant rejection of any materialism that would posit a (transhistorical) notion of matter *per se*. Instead, this "materialism without matter"[85] refers to those historically constituted modes and structures of social mediation (i.e. constellations of heterogeneous material-discursive practices) that condition forms of thought, forms which in turn dialectically reinforce those same structures while also giving rise to novel practices (including critical theoretical practice itself) that potentially disrupt or even transform them; but never from without, always from within. Critique is necessarily *immanent* critique. And this brings us to a third point, that of self-reflexivity. As Postone writes, this "analysis of the relation of theory and society is such that it can, in an epistemologically consistent manner, locate itself historically by means of the same categories with which it analyzes its social context."[86] This allows for the historically specific critique of the conditions on knowledge production vis-à-vis a determinate historical subject, both in the impersonal sense (e.g. subject as discourse effect, the enunciative "I") and in the personal sense ("me," the concrete, historically constituted biographical subject writing this particular dissertation). Such reflexivity requires a theorization of ideology, which as we have seen, is necessary to avoid the reinstatement of the transparent Subject of knowledge.

Even with the abandonment of any transhistorical grounds of Absolute Knowledge (what Althusser named the "guarantee"), there remains the question of whether a totalizing knowledge is possible from *within* the historically determinate social formation of racial capitalism—that is, a position from which one could see the totality of racial capitalism *as* a totality, "all at the same time" (Althusser's Science as knowledge without a subject, as distinct from ideology). It seems that the answer must be no. For one, as already discussed above, while it is appropriate to speak of racial capitalism as a totality, it is necessary to immediately specify that this is a totality characterized by multiple contradictions, unevenness, and spatiotemporal heterogeneities. To *see* it all at once would be like seeing the duck and the rabbit in the same instant. This means that contradictory or incommensurable forms of thought are conditioned by the material contradictions engendered by the social formations of racial capitalism itself. Historical materialism can therefore account for epistemic incommensurability through a materialist perspectivism without resorting to radical ontological multiplicity (i.e. the mystifying rejection of totality as such). This mode of perspectivism, which salvages a commitment to objectivity against extreme relativism while also insisting upon the finitude of any positioned subject of knowledge, is very closely aligned with Haraway's materialist critique of the "God-trick" of white bourgeois masculinist science.[87] To see *all* space-times within the totality at *the same time* would require being *outside of space and time.* This suggests that even if "every point of view" could be "added up," the result would necessarily be "fragmented, opaque, and contradictory." But this does not obviate the theoretical task of constructing the synthetic—though always partial, always strategic—representations of the totality that are necessary to coalition building and political mobilization. Second, and relatedly, if there is

no single position from which one could "see it whole," there is also no fixed "it" to see. This would seem to contradict the very notion of totality, but not when conceived as an open totality of multiple processes of bringing-into-relation. We should recall that Marx defined capital as both a *relation* and as a *process* (self-valorizing value) rather than a substance or static structure. Similarly, to speak of so many "structures of domination" is to signal the myriad *processes* through which heterogenous ensembles of practice iteratively constitute relational fields of domination.[88] The dynamics of such structures are governed by immanent *tendencies* that are durable but contingent rather than determined by any supervening Law or immanent Logic. There remains an irreducible indeterminacy that is both the condition of possibility for the ongoing reproduction and expansion of racial capitalist aggrandizement and the possibility for its abolition. This processual nature means that the totality is always in relational flux, always a moving target. The moment of any "complete" knowledge of the totality would therefore always come just too late, while perfect prediction is rendered impossible by the aleatory nature of the unfolding. The "unity in difference" must therefore be understood as ceaselessly *differentiating*.

This brings us to the question of difference, or *alterity*. Long an organizing principle of anthropological inquiry, alterity is increasingly valorized in contemporary literature as not only the primary object of analysis, but also the explicit normative *objective* of the discipline, as indicated in the above discussion of the anthropology of world-making. There is a tendency in certain strands of this literature to locate radical alterity *outside* of Modernity, or somehow *beyond* capitalism.[89] I see two problems here. First, locating alterity outside of Modernity tends to render the Modern homogenous/homogenizing rather than heterogeneous/differentiating. As Deborah Thomas has shown through her ongoing

ethnographic elaborations of the multiple "temporal alterities" of post-colonial sovereignty in the Caribbean—"a region that has always-already been modern"—the casting of alterity *outside* obscures the ongoing generation of alterity *within* the Modern, as well as within the category of the human itself.[90] The second problem I see here pertains to the (often celebratory) affirmation of worlds "outside of," "beyond," or "after" capitalism. To be sure, I do not want to argue simply that "there is no outside of capitalism." Instead, I want to suggest an essential distinction between two forms of the genitive case: "outside *of* capitalism" (i.e. radical alterity, the trope of the pristine) and "*capitalism's* outside[s]" (i.e. the axiomatics of capital requiring the ongoing reproduction of an outside). This is not to say that every (e.g. indigenous) mode of being human is always already (negatively) *determined* by capitalism/modernity, but rather that, under the aspect of capital, these outsides are in a sense only ever potential "constitutive outside[s]"—that is, racial capitalism's frontiers. Whether the outside is *produced* by capital itself and then recaptured (e.g. industrial reserve army, disaster capitalism, emissions trading) or *discovered* by capital (e.g. colonial expansion) does not matter from the vantage point of capital. This does not mean that these outsides are always already *inside* capital and therefore harbor no revolutionary potential. It is only to say that the abolition of real structures of domination remains essential to any emancipatory politics committed to the actualization of the other-worlds ceaselessly generated, recaptured and foreclosed by the violence of racial capitalism.

In this discussion of historical materialism, I have been privileging Epistemology over Ontology in order to avoid having to make any transcendental claims about the nature of Being in itself. In doing so, however, it could be argued that I have left myself open to

charges of dissimulating a tacit Ontology; namely, the Modern Ontology of Cartesian mind/body, Nature/Culture, subject/object, human/nonhuman dualism. To this I can only answer, "Modern, yes. Cartesian, no." But this only makes sense if we deidentify the former from the latter. Taking Modernity, it follows from the historical materialist position elaborated above that to reduce Modernity to a specific ideational matrix, in this case Cartesian dualism, is an Idealist mystification of the determinate social and historical formations that constitute the material conditions on the emergence of that same ideational form. The constitution of the Modern world is not reducible to the "Modern Constitution." Instead, Modernity identifies the historical emergence of the uneven and heterogenous material matrices of Conquest-Genocide-Settler Colonialism-Racial Slavery-Capitalism (i.e. Racial Capitalism), the ongoing mutations and elaborations of which comprise the abiding structures of domination in the global contemporary. In this view, Cartesian dualism is no doubt a Modern ontology, but no more so than Spinoza's monism, Nietzsche's will to power, Bergson's Absolute Duration, Whitehead's processualism, Deleuze's difference in itself, or Latour's actor-network. Even Amazonian Perspectivism *as* ontological anthropology (i.e. not indigenous genres of the human per se, but indigenous cosmologies *as* '*indigenous cosmology'*) is thoroughly Modern. Not merely because the anthropologist brings cultural-ideological precepts into the field that overdetermine representational practice (politics of representation), but because the field as material relation is a Modern relation. One is reminded of Fanon's profound observation that "every ontology is made unattainable in a colonized and civilized society,"[91] which we must of course extend to those places and peoples figured as perpetually beyond civilized society

and for whom Modernity has meant only a "death foretold" by genocidal violence, biopolitical abandonment, and 'world-ending' ecological devastation.[92]

All of this is *not* to suggest that all of these philosophies boil down to the same thing. Again, there is much alterity *within* the Modern, and how could it be otherwise, given the ceaseless drive to differentiation and articulation, contradiction and totalization, coding and de-coding, deterritorialization and reterritorialization—the axiomatics of Racial Capitalism—comprising the historical material horizons of Modernity. With this specification of the Modern, and following from the self-reflexivity criterion of immanent critique, I must admit that the forms of thought deployed in this work are necessarily, inescapably Modern. But not dualist, and certainly not Cartesian. In fact, I find absolutely crucial the larger project of dismantling the organizing binaries of Modernity (understood here as heterogenous material-discursive political techniques that are necessarily ideological but never reducible to pure ideational categories or *epistemes*). And no one could doubt that recent ontology-inflected social science has provided important theoretical insights and invaluable methodological innovations in the service of just such a critical project. Likewise, I share with much post-humanist thinking a commitment to the abolition of Man, the organizing figure and normative principle of Liberal Humanism, even if, for reasons elaborated above, I reject the call to move "beyond the human." Indeed, my core theoretical concerns remain inextricably bound to both the category of the human and the constellation of problematics that some of these scholars would have us leave behind—questions concerning subjectification, objectification, dehumanization, representation, mediation, signification, identification, mystification, and domination. And these differences do seem to pertain to those matters that have been described as ontological. So,

while I can offer no account of Being as such, I will end this discussion by tracing what might be described as the ontological parameters assumed by the historical materialist epistemology outlined here.

First, the very idea of ideological critique requires an account of mis/recognition and therefore representation (e.g. Povinelli's above-cited "noncorrespondence between what is claimed and what is"), which in turn necessitates some reckoning of the non-identity of thing and concept, essence and appearance, subject and object. Such distinctions organize what is often described as a "depth ontology," as opposed to the "flat ontology" of Actor-Network Theory and ontological anthropology (e.g. the "thing-concept"). Of course, what ideological critique does *not* entail is the transparent, constituted Subject, nor a naively given nature that is prior to and independent of history, nor that essence be timeless while appearance be changeable and illusory, nor even that any of these terms refer to entities that are extractable from their unfolding constitutive relations. In fact, dialectical thinking allows for the historically specific critique precisely of the latter. But with the appeal to dialectical thinking come several additional ontological categories—contradiction, negation and the interiority of relations—which are explicitly prohibited by both Latourian (at least the first two) and Deleuzian ontologies. And finally, historical materialism obviously requires an ontological commitment to the reality of certain "real abstractions" (e.g. social formations, modes of domination, totalities such as the value form), which are never empirically available (in the strict sense of directly observable) but are nonetheless causally efficacious.[93] This is the "social stuff" that Latourian empiricism prohibits from the analysis (or at least demotes to the status of mere 'intermediary,' i.e. that which is no longer of any interest to the sociologist of associations).[94]

Such seemingly irreconcilable ontological differences aside, I have found engagement with certain conceptual and methodological insights from both ANT- and Deleuzian-inspired works highly fruitful, indispensable even. Without suggesting that the differences traced here can be resolved or 'subsumed' by 'incorporation' into the framework I am proposing, it is worth noting that a historical materialist epistemology can account for the simultaneous incommensurability and mutual indispensability of these forms of thought by referring again to the real contradictions generated under Racial Capitalism, and by allowing that, inasmuch as every form of thought is conditioned by the real material social formations within which it emerges, each partial (i.e. ideological) view of the totality does contain something of truth. As Benjamin would say, quoting Baudelaire, "These things, because they are false, are infinitely closer to truth."[95]

What follows is presented at the level of a conceptual outline, and therefore remains highly abstract and provisional. I have avoided illustration by empirical example, as this is reserved for the substantive, ethnographic chapters of this dissertation. I have tried to indicate places in which various theoretical and methodological contributions from the social science of race can be deployed within this outline. Such abstract presentation risks a problematic image of systematicity and closure while also giving the impression of a pure conceptual scheme that is *prior* and available for *application* to the ethnographic materials. All the same, for reasons outlined above, I have thought it expedient to place this ontology of racialization at the beginning, as preparatory material for what follows. It should be kept in mind, however, that this presentation somewhat reverses the order of things.

An Ontology of Racialization

The ontology of racialization outlined here is organized by three central terms, or conceptual moments: *racialization, race* and *racism*. Each moment is assigned to a different level of ontological priority (e.g. index of effectivity). However, as each moment embeds one processual plane within an open totality of unfolding relational determinations (i.e. structural causation) characterized by asymmetric, reciprocal and iterative causal vectors, no single moment can be considered entirely independently of the others. Therefore, as the presentation develops, and sequential moments are introduced, qualifications will be added to initial determinations. As with any conceptual-representational schema, the outline presented here cannot coincide with nor exhaust the real relations that it attempts to render thinkable, and that are simultaneously the conditions on its production. It is rather an attempt to specify those real relations in such a way as to suggest both their *necessity* with respect to the conditions on knowledge production itself and also their *contingency* as revealed by the finitude of the knowledge so produced (i.e. immanent critique).

Racialization designates the moment, or plane, of highest ontological priority. For our initial determination, I follow Alexander Weheliye in defining racialization "not as a biological or cultural descriptor but as a conglomerate of sociopolitical relations that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans."[96] Essential to this definition is the stipulation of racialization as a conglomerate of *sociopolitical relations* that is simultaneously *differentiating* and *hierarchizing*. Weheliye further specifies that racialization is irreducibly *processual*, writing that these "ongoing sets of political relations…require, *through constant perpetuation* via institutions, discourses,

practices, desires, infrastructures, languages, technologies, sciences, economies, dreams, and cultural artifacts, the barring of nonwhite subjects from the category of the human as it is performed in the modern west."[97] It is important to note the sheer *heterogeneity* of these elements, as it is vital to Weheliye's deployment of Deleuze and Guattari's figure of the *machinic assemblage* in his own formulation of *racializing assemblages.* As already indicated above, Weheliye finds certain tendencies within Deleuzian thought to be inadequate to the theorization of power relations and structures of domination. Therefore, he brings components of assemblage thinking into "robust conversation" with the repertoire of Marxian ideological critique, particularly as developed by Stuart Hall in his elaborations of the Althusserian thematics of *articulation*, *overdetermination*, and "the necessity of thinking…difference in complex unity, without this becoming a hostage to the privileging of difference as such."[98] It is worth specifying then what is to be gained from the figure of the *assemblage.*

First, as already noted, thinking with assemblages allows for an account of complex relational totalities whose heterogeneous elements are inextricable from the constitutive processes of bringing-into-relation comprising the assemblage itself, even as relational components can be taken up (and thereby partially transformed) by other assemblages via lines of flight and processes of recapture. Second, because the organizing principle giving consistency to any concrete assemblage is not strictly deterministic (neither transcendent Law nor immanent Logic) but rather contingent, there remains an irreducible element of indeterminacy in any assemblage.[99] This is true, Weheliye notes drawing on Hall, even as there are always more or less durable "tendential combinations" or preferred articulations

which "insert historically sedimented power imbalances and ideological interests" and thereby iteratively reproduce and transport "structures of dominance" through ongoing movements of "deterritorialization and reterritorialization." This last conceptual couplet brings us to the final advantage of assemblage thinking, that of an emphasis on the *productivity* of machinic assemblages, which never merely *express* or *reflect* a singular principle, but rather generate and multiply forms of *content* (e.g. bodies-in-relations; the plantation, the prison, the ghetto) and forms of *expression* (e.g. "collective assemblages of enunciation;" Spillers' hieroglyphics of the flesh) comprising the stratified space of the territory. As Weheliye writes, "Assemblages are inherently productive, entering into polyvalent becomings to produce and give expression to previously nonexistent realities, thoughts, bodies, affects, spaces, actions, ideas, and so on."[100] At the same time, this productivity is never exhausted by mere *reproduction*, as the assemblage necessarily produces *lines of flight* along the "cutting edge" of its own undoing through the inherently destabilizing and generative processes of *deterritorialization* and *reterritorialization*.

It should be noted here that Weheliye does not provide a proper definition of racializing assemblages as distinct from racialization. In fact, he uses the terms interchangeably throughout the text. However, he does give some indication of a conceptual distinction when he enumerates *examples* of racializing assemblages (for example, "…the histories of racial slavery, colonialism, Jim Crow, the prison, and the like, which all *represent different racializing assemblages in Man's extensive armory*…").[101] This allows us to think of racializing assemblages as comprising the open totality, or "conglomerate of sociopolitical relations," that *constitutes* racialization. There is another

way to figure this relation, whose precise terms Weheliye does not pursue, but that is not incompatible with the tacit formula of totality-of-racializing-assemblages = racialization. Here I draw on Deleuze and Guattari's characterization of the *abstract Machine* as the *diagram* which is *effectuated* by a given *concrete machinic assemblage*. This allows for the specification of discrete racializing assemblages (i.e. concrete, historical, denumerable) while also stipulating the organizing principle that determines each racializing assemblage *as* a racializing assemblage (the abstract Machine as *diagram*). I introduce this terminology because it allows for a dialogic opening with the Marxian thematic of *real abstraction*, which I will pursue below. It also allows us to identify "the category of the human as it is performed in the modern west"[102] (i.e. 'Man') as the organizing principle of hierarchization of the abstract Machine. As diagram, the abstract Machine envelopes every concrete racializing assemblage in its process of *stratification* while at the same time "[*performing*] *conjunctions of flows of deterritorialization*" which are "constitutive of destratification." As Deleuze and Guattari write, "the abstract Machine exists *simultaneously* developed on the destratified plane it draws, and enveloped in each stratum whose unity of composition it defines, and even half-erected in certain strata whose prehension it defines."[103] That is, Man as diagrammatic principle envelopes and embeds each racializing assemblage—the plane of stratification and hierarchizing territorialization (Ecumenon)—while at the same time drawing the "plane of consistency" on which it develops and which "cuts across all stratifications," thus providing the principle of absolute deterritorialization (Planomenon)—the undoing of Man.

There are three distinctive advantages that we can take from Weheliye's definition of racialization. First, and perhaps most obviously, his formulation avoids deterministic

reductionism (racialization is not epiphenomenal) and theoretical closure (racialization articulates an *open relational totality*). Second, it avoids the circularity, noted earlier, of the common practice of defining racialization in terms of the formation of racialized groups, which ontologically grounds processes of racialization in the existence of identifiable races. Instead, Weheliye's formulation of racializing assemblages requires that racialization necessarily overtake and outstrip racial categories, populations and identifications. The political purchase of this difference lies in the ability to register emergent vectors of racialization even when a constituted *race* cannot (yet?) be designated or demonstrated. The requirement of a *recognizable* group-based identity upon which claims to racializing injury and political redress must be predicated reaffirms the hegemony of the Liberal State's politics of recognition through Man's "grammar of comparativity."[104] As for the potential of a radical critique of racialization, the requirement that a constituted *race* or racial identity always be stipulated would mean that critique must forever arrive on the scene of racialization just too late, coming in the door right behind the liberal state of recognition itself. This is not to say that racializing assemblages are *not* productive of *race(s)* (a point to which I will return), but that racialization is always in excess of any extension of discrete (i.e. denumerable in the grammar of comparativity), concrete (i.e. historically determined) *races* or racialized groups. As Weheliye insists, "racializing assemblages are not autonomous, ethnographic categories but articulate how *the human functions as a relational whole.*"[105] It is not *races*, then, but the relational *totality* of the human that constitutes the unfolding "ideological and ontological battleground" that racialization articulates and embeds.

While this formulation escapes the circularity and belatedness of "racialization as the formation of particular races," it risks a different pitfall. To wit, the grounding of racialization in the articulation of the totality of *humanity itself* would seem, prima facie, to presuppose something of a transhistorical essence defining the category "humanity;" that is, either a philosophical anthropology with something like the "species-being" as its object, or a notion of biological essence. But this would be at odds with the historical materialist position elaborated above. However, on closer examination, we will see that no such transhistorical presupposition is required, which in fact brings us to the third and final advantage of Weheliye's formulation; namely, the possibility of a proper *historicization* of racialization and, concomitantly, the relational totality of the human that it articulates. This will require further elaboration, but such historicization is necessary to avoid the naturalization of race as a cognitive category (e.g. "People have always distinguished groups based on phenotypic differences"). At the same time, historicization, inasmuch as it requires the determination of the actual material relations and social formations that are the conditions on racialization, protects against what Goldberg describes as the depoliticizing conflation of antiracialism with antiracism.[106]

The historicizing imperative is made explicit in Weheliye's above specification of "the category of the human *as it is performed in the modern west*." Here Weheliye follows Sylvia Wynter's[107] masterful genealogy of the "now globally hegemonic ethnoclass"—'Man,' the historically determinate, Western bourgeois "genre of the human." For Wynter, Man and the "overrepresentation of its 'descriptive statement' as if it were the human itself" is coextensive with and constitutive of Modernity. The terms in which Wynter describes the "self-description of Man" (e.g. "the governing master code of symbolic life

and death;" "modality of adaptive truth-fors;" "matrix identity;" and "episteme") may tempt a vulgar constructionist reading of racial differentiation as a matter of pure discursivity, and thus racial struggle as reducible to a battle over signification ("the politics of representation"). Such a one-sided reading would be amiss, however, as it cannot apprehend the most penetrating and novel moments of Wynter's thinking, which function precisely as a contribution and corrective to radical ideological critique. We must therefore situate her intervention within several overlapping concerns: a specification of the actual ideological conditions on the ongoing reproduction of a global social order defined by racial domination (i.e. hegemony); an elaboration of the conditions of possibility for a critical consciousness in this context; critical consciousness as a condition on the possibility of cultivating radical praxes of *being human*, which are in turn necessary for the abolition of durative orders of racial domination; and finally, the specific and necessary role of the intellectual within this field of praxis. In this regard, Wynter follows and extends the work of other radical thinkers (e.g. Du Bois, Fanon, Quijano, among others) who have interrogated the inextricable relations between colonial conquest, racial domination, global capitalist expansion, recurrent political violence, and what Quijano terms "the colonization of the imagination."[108] It is within this problematic that we must understand Wynter's characterization of "the struggle of our new millennium" in terms of "a *redescription* of the human outside the terms of our present descriptive statement" and the opening of "a new frontier … onto a nonadaptive mode of *self-cognition*."[109]

This account in no way requires that the Modern episteme be taken as a free-floating and self-determining discourse, abstractable and transposable across, indeed fully determinate of, actual socio-historical (i.e. material) relations. As Ferreira da Silva notes,

Wynter's account of the great epistemological ruptures of both the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods is faithful to the core tenets of historical materialism, inasmuch as she specifies the socio-historical conditions—e.g., "made possible only on the basis of the dynamics of a colonizer/colonized relation"—on those (partial) intellectual revolutions.[110] At the same time, Wynter's ideological critique of Man does not *reduce* race to *economic* relations (e.g. class). As Weheliye observes, "To be precise, Fanon and Wynter locate racializing assemblages in the domain of being rather than the realm of epiphenomena, showing how humans create race for the benefit of some and the detriment of other humans."[111] But this particular phrasing also intimates what I view as two potential limitations of Wynter's ideological critique as it pertains to a *genetic* account of racializing assemblages and, thereby, an historical determination of Man. Both are related to Wynter's tacit deployment of a particular theory of *alienation*, for which she draws most prominently upon the work of Marxist anthropologist Maurice Godelier. The first problem is that this notion of alienation relies on the presupposition of a universal species-being, i.e. a philosophical anthropology. The second is that it is liable to assume the image of *mental projection* (i.e. fetishization) as the operative dynamic of ideological production. I will return to the former, but for now I focus on the latter, which is most evident in Wynter's account of language/culture/ideology as a material force—what she terms, adopting and adapting Fanon, *the sociogenic principle*. It is in this context that we find Wynter's strongest constructionist formulations, for example: "transformed *meanings* have led to transformed *matter*, to a transformed mode of experiencing *self*" and "the transformation of subjective experience is, in the case of humans, culturally and thereby socio-situationally determined, with these determinations in turn, serving to activate there physicalistic

correlates." [112] As Ferreira da Silva notes, "What is important in this argument…are the ways in which the relationship between the economic and the symbolic, between material production and ideological production, are inverted, with the latter (symbolic/ideological production) rendered determinant."[113]

Certainly, such an inversion would seem at odds with Wynter's assertion that transformations in determinate material relations (i.e. social formations, though not necessarily of the narrowly 'economic' variety) are the conditions of possibility for epistemic rupture. At the same time, such an account of ideological production presents a challenge for any historical materialist explanation of the *origin and emergence* of racialization, as it remains open to a reading that posits the symbolic-cognitive-epistemic matrix (i.e. racist ideology) as being ontologically *prior* to racialization as a conglomerate of unfolding sociopolitical relations. The latter, then, would refer to the determination of social relations via processes of ideological projection and discursive construction. I want to suggest that this ambiguity can be resolved by delineating two moments in Wynter's analysis; namely, between the originary violence that founds the colonial relation as the material condition on the emergence of the episteme of Man, on the one hand, and the self-description of Man (i.e. the constellation of truth regimes comprising the Modern episteme) as the ideological condition on the iterative *reproduction* of the structures of racial domination that ensue upon that originary violence, on the other. This allows for a distinction between the *emergence* of racialization as the material basis for the episteme of Man (i.e. social formations) and the ongoing elaboration of strategies for the ideological resolution of the real contradictions that the "overrepresentation of Man" engenders in the durative present (i.e. hegemony). There is of course a clear drawback in this interpretation

if we locate the originary, founding violence of racialization strictly at "the beginning," which would suggest the tendency for hegemony (e.g. domination by consent) to gradually replace the excesses of racializing violence. Similarly, it makes it difficult to account for how ongoing racialization in the present is never exhausted by racist ideology, but rather necessarily exceeds *racism* just as it must outstrip *race* through the ceaseless movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, as indicated above.

I will return to these concerns below, but for now I want to say more on the relation of historicization to ideological critique. To summarize the argument thus far, following Weheliye and Wynter, we must identify the advent of racializing assemblages as the sociohistorical condition on the emergence of Man as Modern episteme—and therefore as coextensive with the historical horizons of Modernity itself. At the same time, we must take cognizance of how the ideological overrepresentation of Man as "the only universally applicable mode of being human"[114] functions in the ongoing reproduction, justification and legitimation of durable orders of racializing differentiation and domination across heterogeneous, globally articulated architectures of juridical, political, economic, military and humanitarian governance. Given this relation, and because the historical-material conditions on the universalizing claims of Man must necessarily be disavowed in its self-description *as* universal, the contingency of Man must be disclosed through ideological critique. A historization of the social formations and material-discursive practices constituting the conditions on the rise of Man is perforce a historicization of racialization itself. This is why so much critical effort in postcolonial, Black, and critical race and ethnic studies has been dedicated to the excavation, provincialization and historicization of Modern truth regimes—in the critical literature variously gathered under the rubrics of

Liberalism, Humanism, Political Philosophy, Law, Science, Western Metaphysics, The State.

Patently, the point of such ideological critique is not to reduce Modernity to a *monolithic epistemology* that can be simply dispensed with (the postmodern impulse), but rather to reveal it as an unfolding "conglomerate of sociopolitical relations" that is *inherently* racializing and so always structured in domination (i.e. *differentiating* and *hierarchizing*). It is precisely by tracing the disjunctures and incoherencies, the stutters, stalls and supplementations, silences and elisions—that what is articulated strictly by denegation, disclosed precisely by its concealment—*within* Modern enunciative regimes (i.e. episteme as heterogeneous but articulated constellation of discourse and practice) that the originary and ongoing violences and ever proliferating contradictions of these sociopolitical relations stand partially revealed. Accordingly, perhaps the most vital contribution of the anti- and postcolonial critical tradition has been to specify the erasure of what Mignolo calls the "colonial difference" as the very organizing principle of Man's self-description as the transparent and universal Subject of Modernity.[115] That is, drawing on the somewhat tired but still indispensable dialectical formulation of the "constitutive outside," we must recognize that the condition on Man's universalizing claim to the human is predicated upon the "occlusion of the periphery" that "surrounds…and is thus part of its self-definition" [116]—that is, colonial alterity. The Eurocentric (i.e. standard, hegemonic, Liberal, Marxist) account of Modernity posits Europe as the first self-constituting, self-determined and self-conscious Subject to arrive on the world historical stage, and whose advent inaugurates a series of what Trouillot[117] has described as "North Atlantic Universals:" Universal History (Telos, Dialectic, Evolution, Development), Universal

Subject (Reason, Spirit, Market); Universal Knowledge (Science, Metaphysics); Universal Law (Natural Right, Laws of Nature). While even the most cursory review of the many postcolonial deconstructions of the Modern episteme is beyond the scope of this chapter, what I want to focus on here is the determinate historical conditions on what Quijano describes as Modernity's defining imposition of "a provincialism as universalism."[118]

Following Ferreira da Silva, we begin by observing that Europe's epistemological achievement of universality was predicated upon what she describes as a novel *ontological* context—namely, *globality*.[119] Here she follows other postcolonial scholars in insisting that Modernity has always named a *planetary* situation rather than an autochthonous European accomplishment. As Deborah Thomas reminds us, "New world plantations…provided the basis for modern social and economic arrangements, not only in the Western Hemisphere but everywhere."[120] The emergence of the mercantilist world system in the late Renaissance period, Dussel's[121] "first modernity," inaugurated what Thomas describes as "a modernity generated through the movement of Europe (with Africa, conscripted) toward the Americas and the establishment of new forms of genocidal violence as the basis of a changing transnational capitalist political economy…[thereby initiating processes] that indelibly linked the 'New World' and the 'Old' in a common project of defining modern humanity in racial terms."[122] This means that, along with 'the West' (i.e. Europe), capitalism, and the modern state system, all of which Trouillot stresses were "global from the start," we must count racialization as a necessarily *global* relational totality. Herein lies the key to the historicization offered by Weheliye's definition of racialization as a set of "sociopolitical relations that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans." The play of universality (*humanity* as a global, relational totality) and

particularity (full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans) is crucial here. But to understand the full import of this argument for a historical materialist determination of the conditions on the emergence of racialization, we have to further specify the relationship between universality and globality. To do so, I want to draw attention to the distinction noted above in Ferreira da Silva's characterization of *globality* as an emergent *ontological* condition, as opposed to universality as an *epistemological* formation (organizing what she terms the *transparency thesis*). Thomas deploys a similar idiom when she writes, "Modern, liberal democratic political arrangements have been designed to hide these *ontological* processes," referring here to the originary and ongoing violent dislocations described above.[123] I want to pursue, perhaps at the risk of some confusion, a heuristic distinction suggested by these authors between *epistemological universality*, on the one hand, and *ontological globality* on the other, in order to argue that racialization is ontologically irreducible to *race* and *racism*.

Dussel argues that "the fundamental determination of modernity" was the advent of "the centrality of Latin Europe in world history" inaugurated by the replacement of the Mediterranean by the Atlantic Circuit in the early 16th century. "The other determinations," he writes, "such as constituent subjectivity, private property, or freedom of contract, all took shape around the centrality of Latin Europe. The seventeenth century (as exemplified in the work of Descartes and Bacon) must then be seen as the result of one-and-a-half centuries of modernity: it is a consequence rather than a starting point."[124] Most important for present purposes is that what are usually taken to be the founding enunciations of the Modern European Subject actually arrive relatively late on the scene. The Modern episteme then, "is the fruit of these events, not their cause. Subsequently, the *management* of the

centrality of the world-system will allow Europe to transform itself in something like the 'reflexive consciousness' (modern philosophy) of world history."[125] Ontological transformation *precedes* epistemological formation.

The language in Dussel's account of Modernity as the management of the world-system has clear resonances with Trouillot's description of "two North Atlantic geographies." The first, 'the West' as *geography of imagination*, refers to "the projection of the North Atlantic as the sole legitimate site for the universal, the default category, unmarked—so to speak—of all human possibilities."[126] This is the geography of Man's self-description, mapping universality. This geography of imagination, Trouillot tells us, has always been conditioned by a *geography of management*, or modernization, which "made possible—and was in turn refueled by—the development of world capitalism and the growing power of North Atlantic states."[127] Echoing Dussel's assertion regarding the non-simultaneity of these two moments, Trouillot insists that these two maps are not perfectly coextensive in time or space. What I want to argue here is that these two geographies can help us conceptually map the relation between the ontological globality of the unfolding relations of an emergent world-system and the epistemological universality of Man as Modern episteme. Here I quote Trouillot at length to illuminate the spatio-temporal relations between these two discontinuous but inextricable geographies. He writes, "To speak of modernization is to put the accent on the material and organizational features of world capitalism in specific locales. It is to speak of a geography of management, of those aspects of the development of world capitalism that reorganize space for explicitly political or economic purposes."[128] What is crucial is that this reorganization of space is always *productive* of place*;* the "geography of management creates *places*: a

place called France, a place called the Third World, a place called the market, a place called the factory or, indeed, a work-place." He continues,

If modernization has to do with the creation of place—as a relation within a definite space—modernity has to do with the projections of that place—the local—against a spatial background that is theoretically unlimited. Modernity has to do not only with the relationship between place and space but also with the relation between place and time. In order to prefigure the theoretically unlimited space—as opposed to the space within which management occurs—one needs to relate place to time, or address a unique temporality, that is, the position of the subject in that place. Thus modernity has to do with those aspects and moments in the development of world capitalism that require the projection of the individual or collective subject against both space and time. It has to do with historicity. [129]

In this characteristically luminous passage, Trouillot gestures to the contradictory spatio-temporalities of capitalist development as simultaneously all-engulfing and always in need of an open frontier (i.e. a *totalizing* space-time of management set against a background of a theoretically *unlimited* space of expansion). There are clear resonances here with the development of Cassirer's triadic spatial typology within the Marxist geography of Lefebvre, Harvey and others: the absolute space of the world-system as planetary container, the relative spaces of entangled "planetary flows" that have emerged since the 16th century, and the terrain of the subject as a complex field of relational space.[130] It is this final moment, the emergence of the modern western subject in the context of ontological globality (and therefore colonial alterity) that interests us here. While this formulation of *the* modern western subject is admittedly much too unitary, in this sketch I am following Trouillot when he writes that "we may note as markers of modernity historical moments

that localize the individual or collective subject while opening its spatial and temporal horizons and multiplying its outside references."[131] The details of Trouillot's analysis of the emergence and development of the private individual beginning in the Renaissance and continuing through to the "global production of desire spurred by the unification of the world market for consumer goods"[132] in more recent times is beyond the scope of this discussion. What I want to focus on here is: "That this moment of global production of desire as a moment of modernity parallels globalization as a moment in the spatial history—and thus management—of capital suggests that although modernity and modernization should not be confused, they are inherently intertwined."[133]

We can apply our heuristic of ontological globality and epistemological universality, standing in here for the imaginary space of the subject, to see how the former exceeds and is the condition on the latter, even as the latter is always taken up into and drives ongoing reconfigurations of the former. In Trouillot's words, "Just as the imaginary projection of the West refuels managerial projects of modernization, modernization itself is a condition of possibility of modernity."[134]

Trouillot's excavation of the sociohistorical conditions on the emergence of the modern western individual is animated by a central concern within much postcolonial critical scholarship; namely, how the emergence of the subjective spaces of interiority, intimacy, and private life are indissolubly conditioned and intricately prefigured by the colonial encounter and ongoing elaborations of the planetary imperial stage. Lisa Lowe's brilliant heuristic deployment of intimacy in her genealogy of "the intimacies of four continents" provides a powerful framework for illuminating how what we are here calling ontological globality serves as the necessary condition on the elaboration of Liberalism's

bourgeois universalisms.[135] Her intervention is to "employ the concept of intimacy as a way to develop a 'political economy' of intimacies," what she describes as "a particular calculus governing the production, distribution, and possession of intimacy."[136] Such an understanding, she maintains, "unsettles the meaning of intimacy as the privileged sign of liberal interiority or domesticity, by situating this more familiar meaning in relation to the global processes and colonial connections that are the conditions of its production."[137]

Now I want to return to the suggestion, outlined above, that racialization can be fruitfully conceptualized as the abstract Machine that simultaneously draws and embeds the relational totality of the human under Man's universalizing descriptive statement. In order to bring this figuration into conversation with the historical materialist critiques presented here, I introduce the Marxian category of *real abstraction* as elaborated in the work of a number of Marxist philosophers including Althusser, Sohn-Rethel, Finelli, Postone and more recently Virno, Cillario and especially Toscano.

The wellspring of this literature is, of course, Marx's famous characterization in *Grundrisse*[138] of bourgeois society as that determinate social formation in which individuals come to be "ruled by abstractions." While space does not allow for a full excursus of this concept, for our purposes it will be enough to focus on the central place that this term occupies in the historical materialist epistemology already outlined. Namely, it specifies the relationship between determinate social formations comprised of concrete practices and the emergence and elaboration of specific modes of thought. More specifically, it provides for an account of how, in the context of capitalism, "real abstractions" are the condition on conceptual/ideational abstraction. For perhaps the most

succinct formulation of this relation we can turn to Bhandar and Toscano, paraphrasing Sohn-Rethel's[139] classic *Intellectual and Manual Labor: A Critique of Epistemology*

> Abstraction is therefore the effect of the action of men, and not of their thought. In reality, it takes place 'behind their backs,' as the blind spot, so to speak, of human consciousness, that is there where the thinking and efforts of men are absorbed by their acts of exchange.[140]

This account is highly reminiscent of that elaborated in Simmel's *Philosophy of Money.*[141] Whereas both Sohn-Rethel and Simmel locate the origin of conceptual abstraction (e.g. cognitive operations of equivalence, fungibility, identity, comparison) in the real abstraction of *exchange* via the money form, Finelli and Postone instead identify the totality of commodity-determined production, the value form itself, as the organizing real abstraction at the center of capitalist social formations. While important, this difference does not concern us here as both accounts allow for the grounding of ideological forms in determinate social relations and practices without reducing the latter to a mere reflection of the former. For example, in his masterful *Time, Labor, and Social Domination*, Postone provides an historical materialist account of how the organization of commodity-determined labor in the early modern period served as the material condition on the emergence of *abstract time* (i.e. empty, homogenous, absolute clock-time) as a conceptual category.[142] Similar arguments have been developed for the concept of abstract space.[143] What is essential in these accounts is that, having emerged in concrete practices, these conceptual abstractions become materialized in further practices and therefore become

forces in their own right, inasmuch as they take on the reality of quasi-objectified principles of capitalist organization, management, and competition. This dynamic drives further transformations within capitalist social formations, as when, for example, these same organizational principles become ends of production in their own right, assuming exchange value with the rise of so-called "informational" or "cognitive" capitalism.[144] As they are taken up into the dialectical dynamics of capitalist development, they themselves assume an "index of effectivity," becoming imbricated in material practices and thereby retrenching and further extending the "abstract domination" of capitalist society.

Having arrived back at the "elevator word," *reality*, I should clarify. Perhaps the best way to do so will be by way of comparison with a highly resonant but ultimately opposing analysis of the emergence and ontological status of "abstractions" in the modern era. In his well-known analysis of what he terms "state-effects," Timothy Mitchell argues that "both capital and the state can be seen as aspects of a common process of abstraction."[145] Drawing on Foucault, he asserts that what appear to be autonomous social structures are actually so many *effects* of local disciplinary techniques: "the organized partitioning of space, the regular distribution of bodies, exact timing, the coordination of movement, the combining of elements, and endless repetition, all of which are particular practices."[146] The upshot of Mitchell's analysis is that "We must analyze the state as such a structural effect. That is to say, we should examine it not as an *actual* structure, but as the powerful, *apparently* metaphysical *effect* of practices that make such structures *appear to exist*"[147] (my italics). It is with this final phrase that Mitchell's Foucauldian analysis departs definitively from that of the Marxist philosophers above. Whereas both ontologically ground abstraction in social practices, Mitchell reduces abstraction to an

effect, or *appearance*, while the concept of real abstraction insists that the abstraction is both real and causally efficacious.

To drive home the crucial difference, an admittedly oversimplified illustration will be useful. Consider the phrase, "To live and die by the clock." This familiar assessment of the existential condition of those (un)fortunate enough to survive by wage labor is also a profound expression of the experience of domination by abstraction. Now, consider the refusal to work under capitalism. When *one* person refuses to work, she learns very quickly the *objective reality* of the *fact* that "one must work to make a living." Clearly, both the wage system and the value form itself cannot exist independently of all of the social practices that comprise them (as a totality for the Marxist, as a heterogeneous multiplicity of *techne* for the Foucauldian). All the same, for the person who refuses to work, the consequences are often deathly real. We could say, following Hacking in following Searle, that this situation best describes an arrangement that is ontologically subjective (e.g. human-dependent) but epistemologically objective (e.g. institutionalized).[148] But even this seems inadequate if we now move to consider a *universal* refusal to work, or the general strike. Whereas *one* person is readily replaced, if *everyone, everywhere, all at the same time* refuses to work, the entire *system* collapses and stands revealed in its social nature. But herein lies the crucial difference—namely, the question of where we position the *who* of "everyone," the *place* of "everywhere" and the *time* of "the same time." Only if the time, place, and people are taken to be ontologically *prior* to the social relations themselves can the abstraction be said to be a mere *appearance* of structure, an effect of *local* techniques. That is, such a reduction requires that we assume that social practices occur when

preexisting subjects enter into coordinated action within a preexisting container of absolute space and time.

Ironically, this requires that time, space and the subject be always already *given*, thereby grounding social practice in the very sorts of metaphysical abstractions that were supposed to be explained away as mere appearances. However, if we follow critical geographers in arguing that the real abstraction of the wage-system is *itself* spatio-temporalizing, objectifying and subjectifying, then we cannot say with any consistency that it is *reducible* to the local practices whose very space-time it determines, even if we agree that it is ontologically grounded in those practices. Instead of reducing social structures to "the *apparently* metaphysical effect of practices," we might follow Toscano when he writes, "to put it in hyperbolic, but I think pertinent terms, while the essence of capitalism is not metaphysical, the essence of metaphysics is capitalist."[149] Of course, we must qualify this with the stipulation of *racial* capitalism, which allows us to bring this "materialism without matter" into alignment with the above critical excavations of the material conditions on the emergence of Man, i.e. racialization.

The reason I have chosen Mitchell as an interlocutor here is that he offers an incisive analysis of the emergence of social structures from social practices that is in many respects perfectly parallel to that of the Marxist philosophers cited above. How is it, then, that following these analyses will lead us to diametrically opposed conclusions—on the one hand, reducing social structures to epiphenomena, and, on the other, raising same to the level of the real, causal, and generative? This disjuncture, I argue, is in fact already there at the very outset, and has to do with the place of *totality* in these theorists' respective ontologies. Turning to the question of totality here will also allow us to return to the

questions of ideology, alienation and the necessity of a philosophical anthropology signaled above.

Interestingly, Mitchell's starting point is a refusal of any account that posits the state as an ideological *projection*. The problem, he argues compellingly, is that such an explanation assumes a *prior* delineation between the subjective and objective, rather than interrogating how the latter emerge "as two aspects of the same process." Here, he is addressing Abrams' influential distinction between the "state-system" as concrete, empirical *object* and the "state-idea" as symbolic (i.e. *subjective*) *reification*.[150] But as we have just seen, by reducing the abstraction of the state (and also capital) to epiphenomenal *appearance* where only local practices actually exist, Mitchell risks reintroducing the givenness of time, space, and the subject. That is, these are ultimately taken to exist prior to and independently of the disciplinary techniques he traces. It seems that this paradox stems from the *a priori* rejection of totality that Mitchell takes from Foucault. By *a priori*, I mean that, because any conception of totality is excluded from Mitchell's ontology, his analysis must begin and end with empirically localizable practices, with everything else necessarily being reduced to epiphenomenon, or mere appearance. Ironically, Mitchell's end point is in many respects indistinguishable from the account of ideology that begins and ends with the *a priori presupposition* of a totality—namely, the human as that transhistorical species-being in whose nature is the capacity to symbolically project *social* agency onto a (super)natural order, which then results in the alienation from human nature itself. This is the philosophical anthropology of Feuerbachian alienation already noted in Wynter's adoption of Godelier.

What is crucial is that both positions end with the conclusion that social structures are only *apparent* effects of what is actually real—either the ideological *projection* of the (individual/collective) *subject*, or the *effect* of an *asubjective* discursive field of disciplinary *techne*. Here we can return to the passage from Postone, cited above, in which he illuminates how the *a priori* rebuttal and presupposition of totality are "antinomically related," writing that, "Both sorts of positions are one-sided, for both posit, in opposed ways, a transhistorical identity between what is and what should be." This is precisely where I locate both the analytical and political purchase of the category of "real abstraction" for an ontology of racialization. As we have seen, Mitchell's analysis would lead us to the conclusion that globally articulated structures of racial domination are only the *apparent effects* of what are actually discrete, local practices. That is, without an adequate theorization of the relational totality of the human as productively differentiated and hierarchized by racializing assemblages, "race" vanishes into a multiplicity of local struggles with no inherent relation. Here we note a clear affinity for Latourian empiricism. On the other hand, the alienation as projection-inversion formulation that has been adopted more or less straightforwardly by certain Marxist and social constructionist theorists of race similarly reduces race to epiphenomenon, only here positing race as the *apparent effect* of what is *actually* racist ideology. For a sophisticated version of this ideological projection thesis, we can turn to Barbara and Karen Fields' *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life.*[151] In that work, Fields and Fields provide a triadic conceptualization of racial inequality organized around the terms: *race*, *racism*, and *racecraft.* It is worth reproducing the definitions they provide for each of these in full.

Race is defined by Fields and Fields as "the conception or the doctrine that nature produced humankind in distinct groups, each kind defined by inborn traits that its members share and that differentiate them from the members of other distinct groups of the same kind but of unequal mark."[152] *Race*, they assert, also provides "the principal unit and core concept or *racism*." In turn, they define *racism* as "the theory and the practice of applying a social, civic, or legal double standard based on ancestry, and to the ideology surrounding such a double standard."[153] Crucially, Fields and Fields are careful to stipulate that racism is reducible to neither attitudes nor ideational content, but rather is "first and foremost a social practice, which means that it is an action and a rationale for action, or both at once."[154] What distinguishes racism is that it "always takes for granted the objective reality of *race*, as just defined, so it is important to register their distinctness."[155] To fail to register this difference is to risk transforming "*racism*, something the aggressor *does*, into *race*, something that the target *is*." Such "sleight of hand" is the signature of *racecraft*, which the authors explain is "distinct from *race* and *racism* [as it] does not refer to groups or to ideas about groups' traits, however odd both may appear in close-up. It refers instead to mental terrain and to pervasive belief."[156] The words 'mental' and 'belief' here do not mean that racecraft is purely subjective, however. The authors explain that, "like physical terrain, racecraft exists objectively; it has topographical features that Americans regularly navigate, and we cannot readily stop traversing." The crucial difference here is that "unlike physical terrain, racecraft originates not in nature but in human action and imagination; it can exist in no other way." [157] As a final distinction, the authors stipulate that "*racecraft* is not a euphemistic substitute for *racism*. It is a kind of fingerprint evidence that *racism* has been on the scene."[158]

The first thing to note here is the *a priori* distinction between what is given by nature and what originates in "human action and imagination," which, taken together, exhaust *reality* (e.g. "it can exist in no other way"). This has the effect of producing a closed ontology of racialization. *Racism* is taken as the category of ultimate ontological priority (i.e. causation), so that *race* is understood to be the *effect* of racism. In turn, *racecraft* denotes the process of ideological inversion by which this casual relation is *misrecognized*, and what actually originates in human action is taken for something that is given by nature. The problem is, if racism is "an action and a rationale for action, or both at once" that presupposes the "conception or doctrine" of race as its "principal unit and core concept," it becomes impossible to account for how this dialectic gets off the ground in the first place, inasmuch as the *racist* subject has to have always already been there. That is, without someone to *do* racism, there is no race. By the same token, this model is unable to account for historical transformation, inasmuch as it presents a closed circuit between the two poles of racism and race, with racecraft standing in for a relation of mediation that is in itself unproductive. As we would expect, to resolve this impasse of origin and evolution, Fields and Fields must ultimately displace the generative principle of racialization elsewhere—namely, to the dynamics of capitalist class formation. In doing so, they take the orthodox Marxist tack of instrumentalizing race as an ideological formation that is posterior and therefore accidental to the emergence of capitalism. The problem of genesis vanishes as we discover that it is the capitalist class that comes up with racism, in bad faith of course, only to foist it upon an unsuspecting proletariat. The original racist subject is in fact no racist at all, inasmuch as he recognizes race for what it truly is, a deliberately engineered construct. Not a racist, but a cynic, a charlatan—that is, a specter

in an ideological mirror. Historical transformations in the forms of racial domination, then, must also be pegged to and ultimately determined by the class struggle.

Two problems arise. First, this putative inventor of race (i.e. the collective capitalist subject, already a contradiction) must be taken to be fully self-determined, self-transparent, and autonomous *vis-a-vis* the constitutive processes of racialization. Otherwise, we cannot say that it was he who *invented* race/racism. But this requires that we posit a pre-racial Subject of modernity, which, as we have seen, is untenable. We can call this first limitation the problem of philosophy, while the second, related problem, is that of history. Namely, the assertion that race represents a post hoc (and so incidental) ideological justification for capitalism is anachronistic. As we have already seen, the advent of the mercantilist world-system on the material basis of trans-Atlantic colonial conquest and chattel slavery is coextensive with the emergence of racializing assemblages. It follows that racialization antedates by almost two centuries the development of capitalism proper as marked by the progressive formalization and expansion of the wage system (i.e. the formation of a European proletariat). But we must be mindful here in our characterization of this reading as anachronistic, for no less insidious than the practice of positing race as posterior to capitalist development is that of posing racial slavery and colonial domination as pre-modern anachronisms that are *overcome* by capitalist development. Instead, we must understand how racialization, as the productive differentiation and hierarchization of the relational totality of the human, has always been and remains *intrinsic* to processes of capitalist value creation and accumulation—from the so-called primitive accumulation of violent conquest, settler colonialism and chattel slavery that inaugurated modernity, to the ongoing movement of accumulation by dispossession and militarist and carceral crisis

management in our contemporary. This is precisely what Cedric Robinson intended when he adapted the term Racial Capitalism—as deployed by analysts working in apartheid South Africa to describe a *particular case*—to provide a *general* account of world capitalist development. In doing so, Robinson showed that the critical praxes and freedom practices comprising what he termed the Black Radical Tradition cannot be taken as ancillary (at best, regressive at worst) to the global struggle against capitalist domination, but instead constituted the very terrain of a truly abolitionist politics.[159]

Returning to the analytic of *real abstraction*, we can now see how it might offer an historical materialist account of emergent material relations that are comprised of *social* practices even as they *exceed* their explicit conceptual formulations and ideological elaborations. Here, practices are taken to be relational processual assemblages that *overtake* action and conception—as we have seen in the case of globality as the material condition on universality, and the geography of management as the material condition on the geography of imagination. Here we might think of Dussel's description of "Columbus's existential impossibility, as a Renaissance Genoese, of convincing himself that what he had discovered was not India."[160] One could say, 'Yes, but all the same, it was not India that he discovered, it was America.' But this ideological back projection of 'America' misses the point, which is that the ideological interpellation of 'America' comes after the material relational formation of a new *place* that is not yet 'America,' even as it was also never 'India.' If we agree that the voyage of 1492 marks the *birth* of the world-system, then we must also allow that the discoverer of the New World died before America was *conceived*. Thinking of such a paradoxical *discovery*, we might say, inverting Sohn-Rethel, that the real abstraction of racialization (the originary violence of colonial conquest which

ushered in the first planetary system, birthing Europe at its center) did not occur 'behind the backs' of men, but rather along an open horizon, Man, carving thereupon a new *place* (recalling Trouillot, the geography of management is always productive of *place*) for a *new* subject. But what we must also add, following Althusser's reading of Machiavelli, is that in the simultaneously world-destroying and world-making conjuncture of the colonial encounter, the place of the new subject—the modern subject—stands as a *void* that must be filled. In the conjuncture, the space of the new subject is *empty*, even if upon fulfillment it is revealed to have always already been occupied by its subject ("It was *really* America all along!"). The crucial challenge is to think in the lapse—here between *racialization* as an emergent real abstraction and *racism* as the outcome of a particular ideological interpellation, a specific subjectification though racialization—to endeavor "to think the conditions of possibility of an impossible task, to think the unthinkable."[161]

One such figure of thought is offered by Michael Taussig in his meditations on the "culture of terror, space of death."[162] Here, in the "epistemic murk" of the colonial encounter, the signifier becomes unmoored, floating in the dissolution of determinate ideological formations that are suddenly and vertiginously inadequate to a New World in which "reality is up for grabs." Here too is the dissolution of the subject, a dissolution that is the condition on the birth, through genocidal violence, of a new subject, alongside the colonial Other. We must be careful here, however, not to pose the "space of death" as *total* temporal rupture, as this would dis/place the colonial encounter either *outside* of history (as, for example, in the figure of trauma) or at the *end* of history (as in the figure of messianic time). For, as Taussig reminds us, "this space of death is preeminently a space

of *transformation*: through the experience of coming close to death there well may be a more vivid sense of life; through fear there can come not only a growth in self-consciousness, but also fragmentation, then loss of self conforming to authority, or…through evil, good."[163] We should note the inherent ambiguity of this double potential of creative destruction, but here I want to focus on the terms *transformation* and *experience*, for both signal the seeming paradox of a continuity that subtends radical discontinuity. It is this paradox that organizes Althusser's impossibility of thinking within the conjuncture; that is, at the level of ideological formation, or thought itself, it seems that one cannot get *there* from *here*—an impasse. This also reintroduces the problematic of historicity, as outlined above by Trouillot, as the need "to relate place to time, or address a unique temporality, that is, the position of the subject in that place."

First, the term transformation implies both a process of change and an underlying substrate that undergoes, or suffers, that same process of change. Here we might think of the Aristotelean concept of a *privation* (*sterēsis*), recovered by Heidegger and Agamben, as the necessary condition on movement, and thus the fundamental principle of potentiality/power.[164] We could say that it is because the space of the subject stands empty (a *privation* in relation to the subject to come) that it potentiates a *movement*, or interpellation. I will return to the notions of privation and potentiality shortly, but first we must address the claim that the "space of death" constitutes an *experience*. To begin, we might consider the *movement* in the preceding formulation as the *content* of that experience, and then ask *what* exactly is being moved, or moving, or experiencing this movement. Of course, the very question of *experience* is untenable in this context if we reduce experience to the image of a consciousness comprised of explicit, well-formed

conceptual categories organized into higher-order cognitive schemata, i.e. language, discourse, ideology. For as we have seen, it is precisely the loss of symbolic integrity that *defines* the "space of death." This is why, Taussig tells us, the problem of thinking in, and writing from, the "space of death" is not a matter of producing an accurate representation—an appropriation by knowledge/reason—but rather of producing a *feeling*—an experience that is registered on a different level of consciousness than that of ideology or discourse. And with that, we enter onto the terrain of affect.

Of course, as we have already seen, several tendencies within the recent "affective turn" (e.g. the mythicization of pure immanence-virtuality-becoming that sustains a "fantasy of immediation"; a problematic relation to the natural sciences that relies on a one-sided materialism and reintroduces a crypto-mind/body dualism; a positioning of affect as ontologically prior to and autonomous of signification/socialization/ideology and therefore transcendent to history, e.g. racialization), are ultimately incompatible with an historical materialist account. Departing in these respects from the Deleuzean tack, I return to Raymond Williams' seminal "structures of feeling" as a starting point. By structures of feeling, Williams designates those "affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought; practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity."[165] Williams identifies this "practical consciousness" with the specific temporality of the lived *present*, as a *structure* that is always *in process*, as opposed to the past which is always already completed or a future that can be projected. "For structures of feeling," he writes, "can be defined as social experiences *in solution*, as distinct from other social semantic formations which have been *precipitated* and are more evidently and more immediately available."[166]

Crucially, while the structure of feeling as solution pertains to emergent structures, "this solution is never mere flux." Instead, Williams writes, "It is a structured formation that, because it is at the very edge of semantic availability, has many of the characteristics of a pre-formation, until specific articulations—new semantic figures—are discovered in material practice."[167]

Lauren Berlant[168] has taken up Williams' concern with the "present as a process of emergence" in order to produce what she describes as "a materialist context for affect theory" centered on the problematic of the "historical sensorium." Elaborating Williams, she asserts that "the present is perceived, first, affectively: the present is what makes itself present to us before it becomes anything else, such as an orchestrated collective event or an epoch on which we can look back."[169] Berlant develops a heuristic of "temporal genres" that can provide us with several alternative figures of affective experience in dis/solution which compliment Taussig's "space of death." For example, her *impasse* is "a stretch of time in which one moves around with a sense that the world is at once intensely present and enigmatic,"[170] while the *situation* is experienced as "an animated suspension" characterized by "a historical sense of the present affectively as immanence, emanation, atmosphere, or emergence," through which "a relation of persons and worlds is sensed to be changing but the rules for habitation and the genres of storytelling about it are unstable, in chaos."[171] If situations always "threatens utter, abject unraveling," for the most part they do not coalesce into "world-shifting events," but rather abide in the unsettling abeyance of the *crisis ordinary*. Crisis ordinary provides a figure of "the ordinary as a zone of convergence of many histories," in which "catastrophic forces take shape…and become events within history as lived."[172] Against the image of trauma as cataclysmic rupture,

crisis ordinary suggests that "the extraordinary always turns out to be an amplification of something in the works, a labile boundary at best, not a slammed-door departure. In the impasse induced by crisis, being treads water; mainly, it does not drown. Even those whom you would think of as defeated are living beings figuring out how to stay attached to life from within it."[173]

Like Williams, Berlant is working in the cultural studies tradition and so builds her conceptual repertoire primarily from analyses of texts, media and other artifacts of cultural production. In recent years, despite what Rutherford[174] describes as the inherent difficulties of capturing affect through traditional ethnographic methods, anthropologists have increasingly taken up these same problematics in an effort to interrogate both the historical emergence and transformative potentials of what Deborah Thomas describes as the "production, reception, and circulation of…affective fields."[175] Essential for the present argument, Thomas characterizes the latter as the "embodied atmospherics" comprising "the *nonideological dimensions of hailing* and the aspects of relation that arrive without always explicitly calling attention to themselves" but which are always "grounded in particular historical materialities; they are generated through particular technologies; and they produce temporally specific expressions, with different effects in different periods."[176] With this formulation we return to our question concerning the problem of continuity in discontinuity and the *what* of the experiential grounds of the vertiginous *movement* of subjectification. For as Thomas argues, ethnographic attunement to affective fields affords "the emergence of the body on the stage of critical thinking, not just as raw material of management, but also as a way of knowing, both publicly and intimately."[177] This allows us to think of the body, or embodied consciousness, as the existential-experiential plane or

substrate that subtends ideological dissolution and radical transformation. Crucially, Thomas does not posit the body as either a transhistorical signifier or biological substance that is somehow before ideology, arguing that it is always "social, relational, and historical, and its unconscious is therefore also fully historically and culturally situated."[178]

Thomas's call for an "archive of affect" signals a way forward, through the Althusserian impasse, by way of a "reordering" of such "ontological taken-for-granteds [as] time and space, politics and justice, and the very terrain of humanism itself."[179] In doing so, she charts a conception of subject formation that remains thoroughly *historical* while radically disrupting the hegemony of History. I will return to questions of temporality shortly, but first I should note that Thomas' analysis of historical embodiment in the context of "what it means to be human *in the wake of the plantation*" exposes a problematic one-sidedness to my line of argumentation thus far. Namely, by endeavoring to show how racialization outstrips racism, I have been framing the question of modern subject formation solely in terms of the European colonizer. While I have intended the shorthand "*the* modern subject" to historicize and provincialize the possessive individualism of the bourgeois European genre of the human, this same convention risks reproducing the erasure of experiences, subjectivities and alter-praxes of the human that have proliferated outside the bounds of Man while being no less constitutive of Modernity. This must be addressed. To do so I turn to Hortense Spillers' seminal distinction between the body and the flesh, which restages questions of continuity/discontinuity, historical embodiment, and experiences of rupture in that preeminent space of modernization, the Middle Passage.[180]

Spillers draws the distinction between body and flesh to mark Modernity's organizing distinction "between captive and liberated subject-positions." "In that sense,"

she writes, "before the 'body' there is the 'flesh,' that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography."[181] The flesh, then, while not a *body*—the constituted and constitutive property of the self-possessed individual—is never an ahistorical, biological substance. Rather, it marks both an historical material *relation* and a term in what Spillers calls "an American Grammar," a symbolic order that "begins at the 'beginning,' which is really a rupture and a radically different kind of cultural continuation."[182] For Spillers, the originary scene of this paradoxical continuity/discontinuity—"the altered human factor"—is the slave ship. While the galley of the slave ship, a quintessentially modern "geography of management," does produce a place, it is not the place of the liberal individual—*body*. Rather, it is the place of *flesh*, a place of social death where Blackness is produced for "accumulation and fungibility."[183]

Against Taussig's "space of death" or Berlant's "impasse," here we find Glissant's *abyss*. "What is terrifying" Glissant tells us, "partakes of the abyss, three times linked to the unknown."[184] First the belly of the ship, second the violet depths of the ocean, and third, "the most petrifying face of the abyss," the unknown that lies ahead.

> Experience of the abyss lies inside and outside the abyss. The torment of those who never escaped it: straight from the belly of the slave ship into the violet belly of the ocean depths they went. But the ordeal did not die; it quickened into this continuous/discontinuous thing: the panic of the new land, the haunting of the former land, and finally the alliance with the imposed land, suffered and redeemed.[185]

The slave ship provides a limit case of the experience of radical rupture. Here, the Door of No Return would seem to stand as direct rebuttal to Berlant's assertion that the "the extraordinary always turns out to be…a labile boundary at best, not a slammed-door departure." Similarly, Glissant's image of the "underwater signpost [in] these lowest depths, these deeps, with their punctuation of scarcely corroded balls and chains"[186] startles the assurance that "in the impasse induced by crisis, being treads water; mainly, it does not drown."[187] With the figure of the slave as social death, we have the very image of total privation. But this privation would seem to be of a fundamentally different nature than that signaled above, for rather than the movement-potentiating void of the empty place of a new subject, we have the fulfillment, or rather enfleshment, of the utter impossibility of subjectivity itself. Privation without movement, impotentiality without potentiality, the absolute absence of power inscribed in law and etched in flesh. As Spillers argues, "If the slave is perceived as the essence of stillness…or of an undynamic human state, fixed in time and space, then the law articulates this impossibility as its inherent feature."[188]

However, and this is crucial, the operative word in Spillers' account is *perceived.* For as Glissant reminds us, from the utter terror of the abyss there *is* movement—"the ordeal did not die; it quickened into this continuous/discontinuous thing: the panic of the new land, the haunting of the former land, and finally the alliance with the imposed land, suffered and redeemed." To deny this movement by casting the slave as complete and total abjection/objectification, then, would be to reiterate and reaffirm the impossibility articulated by the law, and thus to erase the radical potentialities of the flesh itself. "In the absence of kin, family, gender, belonging, language, personhood, property, and official

records, among many other factors, what remains is the flesh, the living, speaking, thinking, feeling, and imagining flesh: the ether that holds together the world of Man while at the same time forming the condition of possibility of this world's demise."[189] All the same, it would be worse than imprudent to suggest that the two senses of privation that I have sketched here, and the movements that they potentiate, are somehow equivalent, a point to which I will return below when discussing *racism*. But before moving to our next term, I want to offer a final word on the historical determination of racialization, which will also provide for a summary of some of the main points presented so far.

As argued throughout, globality is the historical material condition on racialization. Here, globality designates the emergence and uneven development of the first planetary social formations comprised of heterogeneous sociopolitical relations—colonial mercantilism and later global capitalism—and with them the real abstraction of the relational totality of the human as differentiated and hierarchized into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans. As Weheliye argues, "there exists no portion of the modern human that is not subject to racialization."[190] This is not an incidental relation but is rather definitional of both modernity and of the human as an actually existing relational totality. Similarly, ontological globality is the historical material condition on epistemological universality and is thus the condition on the self-description of Man (the western liberal bourgeois ethnoclass) as the universal, unmarked, full human. This means that Man as episteme—and the 'West' as Modernity's geography of imagination—lags behind the emergence of globality as historical material formation—a novel geography of management. Even so, from within the boundaries of Man, it is Man who has always

already occupied the place of the full human, the pinnacle of the hierarchically articulated relational totality of humanity.

What this means for a historical determination is that racialization as defined here cannot antedate the 'discovery' of the New World, taken as the advent of globality. This also means that the concept of racialization entails a theorization of the *totality* of the human, though not as a closed or transhistorical totality. None of this is to propose an exact moment, in the sense of an absolute time and place, when racialization begins (i.e. a *genesis* in the [teleo]logical sense). From the start, racialization-modernization is already out of joint, spatio-temporally heterogeneous. Rather, the point is to establish historical material parameters on our projection of racialization into the past based on an analysis of the relational totality in the contemporary. This critical determination does not "follow from" the history (as genesis), but rather the historical determination follows from the critical determination. At the same time, this does not mean that we cannot meaningfully speak of 'antecedent' ideological formations and social elements that were taken up into and thereby transformed by the emergence of the real abstraction of racialization (or racializing assemblages). As Lisa Lowe writes, "The operations that pronounce colonial divisions of humanity—settler seizure and native removal, slavery and racial dispossession, and racialized expropriations of many kinds—are imbricated processes, not sequential events; they are ongoing and continuous in our contemporary moment, not temporally distinct nor as yet concluded."[191] To describe the sort of non-linear temporal imbrications she has in mind, Lowe draws on Williams' elaboration of dominant, emergent and residual forms, providing a conceptual repertoire for understanding how residual ideological formations as

well as circulating affective fields can be reconfigured and rearticulated into emergent social formations.

Importantly, residual forms are not the "survivals" of late nineteenth century unilineal evolutionary thinking but are rather submerged elements within a historical repertoire whose transformative potential lies precisely in the power to disrupt the dominant and/or be taken up into the emergent. For example, we might think here of the various "racialisms" of Medieval Europe as traced by Cedric Robinson.[192] Rather than suggesting that racialization had already been consolidated in premodern or even ancient times, or that modern racialization was fully determined by, as a linear outgrowth of, these forms, we can instead think of them as being relational elements that were taken up into and thereby transformed by the emergence of racializing assemblages. This is perfectly compatible with Weheliye's deployment of assemblage thinking, as the relational elements of any assemblage are characterized by "different speeds" and can be taken up in lines of flight only to be reterritorialized and thereby transformed in novel assemblages. This sort of thinking allows us to think of history not as a linear succession (either liberal telos of progress or determined dialectical unfolding), but rather as a "palimpsest" of entangled temporalities.[193]

Because of this tendency for novel relational elements to emerge and be articulated within racializing assemblages, Weheliye does not ascribe them a fixed content (religious, biological, cultural, etc.) or form of expression, though he does maintain the tendency (not necessity) of racializing assemblages to inscribe and implement difference through what he calls "human physiology," thereby privileging visuality as a mode of registering racial difference. This provides for a much more expansive conceptualization of racialization as

compared to those approaches which posit a unique set of differentiating criteria (e.g. ancestry, geography, genetics, phenotype), even as the historical criterion provides a limit. Following from this, Weheliye defines Blackness not as a *race* or *racial identity*, but rather as "a changing system of unequal power structures that apportion and delimit which humans can lay claim to full human status and which humans cannot."[194] We can think of this as something of the negative complement of the above suggestion that Man is the hierarchizing diagram embedding racialization. This means that, whiteness—if understood here to be coextensive with Man—is similarly not reducible to an empirical *race*, i.e. the population of white people, but is rather a relational principle of the moving axis of verticality within "a changing system of unequal power structures that apportion and delimit which humans can lay claim to full human status."

Importantly, the constellation of actual entitlements, prerogatives and privileges that accompany apportionment into "full human status" are variable across time and space. The critical point is that the *realization* of those distinctions—"the category of the human as it is performed in the modern west"—has always been predicated on the barring of the majority of the planetary population from this status; that is, their reproduction and degradation as not-quite-humans and nonhumans. In this rendering, whiteness and Blackness are not discrete, empirical racial formations or historically determinate racialized populations, or even two fixed coordinates or poles between which extends the domain of denumerable *races*. Instead, we can imagine them as the positive and negative asymptotes defining a shifting vertical axis along which a ceaseless movement of deterritorialization-reterritorialization seems to move ever toward, but never achieve, both

the final perfection of Man—the truly self-determined, self-possessed, and transparent Subject—and the total objectification/abjection of slave—the completion of "social death."

As we have seen, if racialization outstrips both race (racialized groups/identifications) and racism (ideology), then it cannot be *comprised* of them. Now I want to argue that the more fundamental reason that racialization cannot be exhausted by these terms is that racialization not only exceeds but is *productive* of *race* and *racism*, and therefore must be different in nature from them. While I have argued that we might think of racialization as the abstract machine or diagram of the relational totality of the human as articulated and embedded by Man, it is important to stress that we should not take this to mean that this diagram somehow "looks like a man." That is, racialization is not itself the Subject of Modernity. Rather, the relational totality of the human as articulated by racialization must be *asubjective*, even as it cannot be a simple *object* either, inasmuch as it draws and embeds the plane within which processes of subjectification/objectification take place and are overtaken.

Moving now to a discussion of the term *race*, I begin by mentioning that Weheliye does not provide an explicit definition of either *race* or *racism*. In fact, he at times seems to equivocate between race, racism and racialization, while at others he suggests that what is commonly taken as *race* is actually *racialization*. He does, however, provide one very suggestive formulation of the relation between racialization and race that I will pursue here. He writes, "We can say, then, by way of Karl Marx: race is a mysterious thing in that the social character of racializing assemblages appears as an objective character stamped upon humans, which is presented not in the form of sociopolitical relations between humans, but as hierarchically structured races."[195] Here again we arrive back at the language of

appearance, which suggests some relation to *essence*, and which in turn reintroduces the question of the relation between subject and object. While Weheliye does not pursue the language of appearance/essence or its relation to questions of subjectification/objectification, it is here that I want to situate the terms *race* and *racism* in relation to *racialization*.

I will begin with the following provisional determination: *Race* designates the *objective appearance* of racialization. The key notion here is "the objectivity of appearance," which was first developed by Hegel in his critique of Kant's phenomenology. There, he faults Kant for having made the relation between phenomenon and noumenon *arbitrary*, thereby reinstating the skepticism he had sought to overcome by maintaining that the objective reality of the thing-in-itself must remain forever inscrutable. Against this, Hegel asserts that the "Essence must appear." The basic notion, as Jameson explains, is that "appearance is not subjective or arbitrary, not to be replaced by some underlying essence, or at the very least the essence must be sought in the appearance itself."[196] When Hegel declares that, "The truth of appearance is Essential Relation," he is rejecting both naïve empiricism and skeptical rationalism, presenting a novel epistemological position that Marx will later take up and transform. The objectivity of appearance will figure centrally in Marx's categorial critique of bourgeois society, which famously unfolds from a dialectical critique of the commodity form. The commodity, we learn, is the concrete appearance of the value form. But the commodity is not an arbitrary or illusory façade, but rather, an *objective* appearance, and so must have an *essential* relation to the value form. So, while in the first instance the commodity form *conceals* the essence of capital (the famous formulation of social relations between things and objective relations between

people), it is only by way of a proper analysis of the commodity form itself that the essence of the value form, and thus capital itself, stands revealed—the truth of the appearance.

For the formulation of the dialectic of objective appearance that I want to pursue here, we turn to Jameson's reading of an essay published by Adorno near the end of his life, entitled "Sociology and Psychology." In that essay, Adorno puts his negative dialectics to work on the ambition for a holistic social science, *a la* Parsonian structural functionalism. Of the fragmentation produced by the disciplinization of bourgeois human sciences, he writes, "The separation of society and psyche is false consciousness; it perpetuates conceptually the split between the living subject and the objectivity that governs the subjects and yet derives from them." Hence, the aspiration to holism. But against holism, he writes, "But the basis of this false consciousness cannot be removed by a mere methodological dictum. People are incapable of recognizing themselves in society and society in themselves because they are alienated from each other and the totality…False consciousness is also true: inner and outer life are torn apart." [197] Here we arrive at "the truth of the appearance" which is "the essential relation." Jameson, adopting language from Žižek, describes the movement of this dialectic of objective appearance as follows: "stupid first impression as the appearance; ingenious correction in the name of some underlying reality or 'essence'; but finally, after all return to the reality of the appearance, it was the appearance that was 'true' after all." For clarity of illustration, I want to schematize the movement of Adorno's critique, which will aid in demonstrating how this same dialectic elucidates the question of *race* in relation to racialization.

1. Each discipline builds knowledge of a unique domain of reality; disciplinary boundaries reflect the real world (stupid first impression; "thesis");
2. Disciplinization perpetuates the mystifying fragmentation of what is actually a *unity* ("antithesis);
3. A holistic human science is required to attain an understanding of this unity (ingenious correction; "synthesis")
4. Social fragmentation and real contradiction are the essence of bourgeois society, of which disciplinary fragmentation is the objective appearance (return to the truth of appearance.)

This is the dialectic of the "objectivity of appearance"—the *concealment* of the essence by *appearance* in the end reveals something essential about that essence, even if it is only that the essence cannot be properly revealed in its totality because it is inherently contradictory. Now, let's consider a similar schematization pertaining to *race*.

1. Humans are naturally divided into discrete biological/geographic/ancestral categories, designated by races, that are distinguished by shared physical traits, behavioral characteristics, and social proclivities, which map onto and explain difference in social standing (stupid first impression; racist thesis)
2. Science has proven that racial categorization arbitrarily divides humans into groupings that have no basis in nature; race is a _____ [social construction, ideological projection, deliberate strategy of domination, pseudo-scientific misconception] ("antithesis")

3. All humans are created equal and all lives are of equal worth; there is only one race, and all lives matter (ingenious correction; antiracialism as "synthesis")
4. The relational totality of the human is differentiated and hierarchized into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans; both state-sponsored and extra-legal racializing violence are pervasive, normative and foundational; disposable life proliferates along borders and in frontiers, in black sites and in zones of abandonment; life that does not make value for racial capitalism is of no value at all; (return to the truth of appearance)

The startling denouement is that the initial racist position (stupid first impression), even in its patent falsity, is closer to the truth than the (disingenuous? aspirational?) assertion of universal humanity ("All lives matter"). Following Adorno, we might say that the first position is characterized by "false consciousness, but the basis of this false consciousness cannot be removed by a mere methodological dictum." This is because race is not an *illusion*, but is rather the *objective* appearance of racialization, and thereby has an essential, rather than *arbitrary*, relation to actual social formations articulated by racializing assemblages. Of course, this does not mean that we have undertaken the analysis only to settle on the first position. Rather, by way of a dialectical critique of the one-sidedness of the initial appearance of race, we have learned something about the essence of the relational totality of the human as articulated by racialization. So, while the objective appearance of race, as first apprehended in the natural attitude of racism, produces a concealment, it also holds the potential to reveal something of the truth of racialization as its essential relation. As Adorno would have it, "The truth of the whole sides with one-sidedness."

The distinctive advantage of conceptualizing race as the objective appearance of racialization is that it allows for the objective reality of race (i.e. existence criterion) while also maintaining that race is neither self-grounding nor self-evident (i.e. contingency criterion). As we have seen, the primary aim of most social constructionist approaches has been the achievement of just such an account of objectivity with contingency. However, these approaches have encountered difficulties when trying to specify the ground of race, tending finally toward: 1. subjectivist accounts that ultimately ground race in culture/language/perception (e.g. racism); 2. epiphenomenal accounts that ground race and racism in some other ontological category (typically 'class,' sometimes 'nation'), or 3. accounts of ontological multiplicity that ultimately reject any common ground at all, reducing the category of race to an illusory analytical imposition. The problem with each of these approaches is that, in the final analysis, they tend to pose race as ultimately *arbitrary*, and that which is arbitrary cannot, strictly speaking, be the object of knowledge proper. So, in the end, the contingency of race tends to foreclose the objectivity of race. It should also be noted that this foreclosure of the possibility of objective knowledge has obvious bearing on questions of political struggle. So we see that from these perspectives there follow seemingly incommensurable but ultimately convergent approaches to the politics of race: from an antiracialism focused entirely on undoing the *representational* infrastructures of racial classification; to status quo color-blindness and the vacuous celebration of diversity; to the promotion of class struggle over mere 'identity politics;' to the assertion that "race should not be eliminated, but *proliferated*, its many energies directed at multiplying racial differences so as to render them joyfully cacophonic"—what the author describes as "a thousand tiny races."[198] In the place of this impasse of the

arbitrary, the "objectivity of appearance" posits an *essential relation* between race, as objective appearance, and racialization as essence. We will need to further specify the notion of *essence* deployed here, but first a final example of the sort of confusion that is produced by the introduction of arbitrariness into the account of race as both objective and contingent.

Trica Keaton begins her entry for "Race" in *Keywords for African American Studies*: "What is race? Over time and space, many people have asked that very question. However, there is no universal definition or universally agreed-on response to this query, largely because the concept of race, born out of Europe and disseminated across the globe, is a human invention."[199] She commences, then, with the somewhat paradoxical assertion that *because* race is a human invention (i.e. a social convention or set of conventions), there can be no "agreed-on response" (i.e. objectivity) regarding what race actually is. She then proceeds through a presentation of Fields and Fields' concept of *racecraft* (already discussed above) and Mills' 'racial contract' before stating that, "Race and racism are not mere social constructs but political, lived, and at times deadly experiences that play a fundamental and intersectional role in the everyday because they are deeply ingrained in our social institutions, ranging from family to education to economics to law."[200] Apparently, this is intended to signal a rejection of a purely subjectivist/mentalist account of race (i.e. "*mere* social construction") by arguing that race becomes "ingrained" in institutions, which in turn have an objective reality (and so, one must ask, are not *mere* social constructions?). This position, for the most part, aligns with the analytic-constructionist account with which we began this chapter. From here, Keaton moves to an attempt to specify the actual content of race ("what race means, of what it is constructed"),

claiming that "From a sociohistorical perspective, race can be regarded as a social category that descends from nineteenth-century scientific racism, or race as biology, and its claims of biological determinism." However, she notes, the endeavor to fix any content is immediately frustrated by the fact that "human beings have arbitrarily selected which traits carry social significance when fashioning categories that define a specific group." Here she cites the example of Blumenbach to demonstrate "the pure randomness of race-making."

After rehearsing the contemporary scientific refutation of the biological reality of race, Keaton turns to Cedric Robinson and critical medievalist Geraldine Heng to adduce evidence of "racial thinking, racial law, racial formation, and racialized behaviors and phenomena in medieval Europe before the emergence of a recognizable vocabulary of race," formations that were eventually taken up in order to justify racial slavery. "Framed this way," Keaton argues, "it is insufficient to say that race is socially constructed or to advocate, as do color/raceblind adherents, the purging or effacement of the idea with the expectation and/or hope that doing so will mitigate or nullify the effects of the concept's protracted and destructive career in the world. Race has a material life whose definition has never been fixed, precisely because it is a product of human perception that dominant groups have wielded to preserve their position of dominance."[201] Here we have a reiteration of the rebuttal of mere social construction (subjectivism refuted) via the assertion of the "material life" of race (objectivity asserted), which is immediately followed by the claim that this material life is a "product of human perception" (subjectivism affirmed), and furthermore that it can have no "fixed definition," suggesting again the arbitrariness of racial ascription. And so, Keaton ends right where she started, "What, then, is race?

Paradoxically, race is everything and nothing at the same time but ultimately whatever a society has made it to mean."[202]

What are we to make of this? "This" meaning an entry in a *Keywords* volume that ultimately posits indefinability as the very definition of the term that it set out to define. One might catch a whiff of something like a Derridean deconstruction here, but clearly that is not what Keaton is after, as she is asserting this indefinability as a unique property of race, not an entailment of the impossibility of semantic determination in principle. So then, should we say that Keaton has simply failed at her task? Or perhaps that she has provided erroneous readings of the extensive literature she uses to ground her argument? I think not, which is precisely why I have chosen this example.

On analysis, we can see that the conundrum stems from a tension between Keaton's commitment to an explicitly antiracist politics—which requires that race not be explained away (no *mere* social construction)—and the strategy by which she pursues this commitment—by demonstrating that race has no basis in nature (it is socially constructed). To wit, she is committed to the simultaneous objectivity and contingency of race. The problem, however, is that *objectivity* in her account refers too *narrowly* to the empirical domain of discrete, concrete institutions and the individuals of which they are comprised, while *contingency* overshoots the mark by positing sheer *arbitrariness* (i.e. "the pure randomness of race-making"). The upshot is that race is said to be grounded in (arbitrary) perceptions that are then materialized in (objective) institutions. So, we arrive again at the alternatives of ideological projection and discursive construction, and the various problems, already discussed, that arise.

I want to argue that this impasse results from the tacit assumption that the delineation between the objective and subjective is ontologically *prior* to racialization. This assumption leads to the problem being framed in terms of where to locate the origin of race, either on the side of the subject or on the side of the object. In order to avoid naturalization, race is said to originate on the subject side (i.e. racism), and then some variant on the gloss 'racialization' (race-making, racecraft, racial formation) is deployed to explain how it moves from the side of the subject (contingency) to the side of the object (objectivity). But as we have seen, a closed ontology of racialization results when we reduce the process of racialization to the relay between the position of racism (subject) and the position of race (object). To avoid what I have called the impasse of the arbitrary that results, we have to locate racialization *prior* to both race and racism. But more than this, we must also assert that racialization is *productive* of *race* and *racism*, and therefore must embed the very dialectical processes of subjectification/objectification themselves.

Returning to an idiom called upon earlier in our discussion of real abstractions, we might be tempted to say that racialization happens "behind the backs" of both the subject *and* the object, rather than *in between* (i.e. in front of, and therefore *after*) them. The problem with this otherwise felicitous metaphor is that it risks presenting the relation of objective appearance (race) to essence (racialization) as one of either transitive or expressive causality. Both of these modes of causality give the image of racialization as lying somewhere behind, underneath, beyond or otherwise external to race, rather than immanent to it. Against these models, we must instead understand the relation between race (appearance) and racialization (essence) in terms of a *structural causality*, as elaborated by Althusser. Key to Althusser's theorization of structural causality is Marx's

distinction between the two senses of *representation* as denoted by the German words *Vorstellung* and *Darstellung*. In a useful discussion of Althusser's development of the concept, Vittorio Morfino explains the distinction as follows: "In *Vorstellung*, there is a position, but it is one that presents itself before, which presupposes, therefore, something that remains *behind* this pre-position [*pré-position*], something that is *represented* by that which was in front, by its emissary: the *Vorstellung*. *In* Darstellung, *on the contrary, there is nothing behind*: the same thing is here, '*there*', offered in the position of presence." *Darstellung*, as described by Marx is the "theatre with no author," and so "[W]e can say that '*Darstellung*' is the concept of the presence of the structure in its effects, of the modification of the effects through the *efficacy of an absence*."[203]

It is immediately clear how such a notion of causality differs from the mechanistic model of linear causation which maintains the strict externality of cause and effect, as when one body acts upon another, thereby causing a change (effect) in the state of the latter. What is less clear is how structural causality differs from expressive causality. We can understand this distinction in terms of its relation to an underlying thesis described by Morfino as "the constitutiveness of relations," the basic idea of which I have already introduced in several places throughout this discussion: namely, the constitutiveness of relations states that entities or "elements" do not enter unchanged into relations, thereby forming complex structures, but are rather determined by the relations of the complex structures or relational totalities of which they are elements. With this, we can understand the difference between expressive causality and structural causality in terms of their respective models of constitutive relationality. Of relational totalities characterized by structural causality, Morfino writes, "This is not an expressive relationality, in which each

relation expresses all of the others in a homogenous space, but a structural relationality that defines a complex, deep, and stratified social space."[204] What defines structural causality then is this simultaneity of absence –"the efficacy of an absent cause" (i.e. the relational totality determines each element but is not *expressed* in any element and so is 'absent')—on the one hand, and *presence*—"the immanence of the cause in its effects, in other words *the existence of the structure in its effects*"—on the other. Morfino, citing Althusser, explains that:

> For this reason '*the absence of the cause [...] of the structure on its effects is not the result of the exteriority of the structure with respect to economic phenomena; on the contrary, it is the form of the interiority of the structure, as a structure, in its effects*'. This implies that the effects are not an object, an element, or a space 'on which the structure arrives to *imprint its mark* [*sa marque*]'. … The existence of the structure consists in its effects, that is, the structure is 'in short only a specific combination of its own elements': it is nothing 'outside of its effects'.[205]

When Althusser speaks of 'effects' as 'economic phenomena,' he of course has in mind such elements as "accumulated money-capital, 'free' labor-power, [and] technological inventions," while 'structure' refers to the totality of bourgeois society that determines these elements. But let us take 'effects' to instead refer to *races* and 'structure' to refer to the relational totality of the human as articulated by *racialization*. When I say that *race* is the objective appearance of racialization, or that race is the form of content and expression *produced* by racializing assemblages, I have in mind those more or less concrete, empirical phenomena or 'elements' that are usually gathered under the term "race" in the critical literature. A second determination of *race*, then, would be, *the*

population-based, probabilistic distributions of differential exposures to illness, death, poverty, hunger, toxicity, dispossession, incarceration, expropriation, torture, terror, alienation, and abandonment, which are implemented through heterogeneous but articulated technical and institutional apparatus that elaborate hierarchical systems of human classification (typically employing visual or 'phenotypic' criteria, though not necessarily) in combination with justificatory/explanatory discourses positing the innate inferiority (biological, cultural, moral, etc.) of those who, as members of populations, deviate from the normative model of the productive, self-possessed and self-determined individual Subject of Right and Reason, and who thereby forfeit claims to the prerogatives and protections constituting full human status as within and across a diverse array of technical and institutional domains.

It is important to distinguish this determination of race from that of *racialization*. What is operative here is the specification of actual, empirical *distributions* (count noun, as opposed to an abstract principle). Similarly, "population-based" here refers to the actual, denumerable populations that are defined by and constituted as these distributions of differential exposures, and which are susceptible to knowledge practices and institutional operations of classification, measurement, and intervention in ways that cannot be described as purely arbitrary (i.e. random). At the same time, to stipulate that these are actual, empirical distributions is *not* to suggest that race *represents* racialization in the mode of a *material instantiation* of an *immaterial essence* that is external to and fully autonomous of this instantiation. It is in order to avoid such a dualist reading that I have found the concept of structural causality so useful. There are several implications for our understanding of race as the objective appearance of racialization.

Returning to the above-quoted passage, consider Morfino's assertion that "the effects are not an object, an element, or a space 'on which the structure arrives to *imprint its mark* [*sa marque*].'" Here we have a clear formulation of the 'constitutiveness of relations' thesis. The implication for our understanding of race is pivotal: namely, we cannot take the historically variable empirical criteria or 'content' of racial classification (e.g. phenotypic traits, including skin pigmentation most prominently, but also cranial, facial and skeletal morphology, hair and skin texture, body odor, and others; socio-cultural modes including religious systems, social institutions and political organizations; geographic distribution and putative ancestry) as *static elements* onto which racial meanings come to be arbitrarily projected or inscribed from without. That is, skin color, as determined within the relational totality of the human as articulated by racialization, is not ontologically prior to its determination as a relational element—likewise for cultural practices, geographic distributions and ancestry. Of course, such a claim frustrates the natural attitude: Certainly, human populations were distinguished by differences in skin pigmentation long before the colonial encounter. We have scientific proof that such differences resulted from divergent evolutionary trajectories dating back thousands and thousands of years! And as for socio-cultural formations, wasn't the discipline of anthropology born of the very necessity of understanding the sheer diversity of cultures that were *encountered* in the earliest movements of European conquest? And if they were *encountered*, then don't we have to say that they were already there? And as for geographic and ancestral distributions, if human populations weren't distributed across the globe according to geography and ancestry before the advent of the world-system, then *where* were they and *whence* did they come?

But such protestations require for their coherence the ideological back projection of "human populations" *as* populations of the relational *totality* of the human prior to the advent of globality, which as we have seen is the ontological condition on the very epistemological universality enunciated in phrases such as "human populations" and "evolutionary trajectories". The same applies to the notions of cultural diversity and geography; that is, the very idea of "cultural diversity" requires the *universal* category of Culture, just as "geographical distribution" requires a global space for defining those distributions, and so both require the real abstraction of planetary social formations as their material condition. To reiterate, this is not to pose the matter in terms of interpretation, conceptualization or the ascription of meaning to what was already there. Nor is to deny outright the validity of the scientific evidence just adduced (i.e. it is not completely "arbitrary" or "random"). But the validity of such evidence *is* historically determined, inasmuch as it is conditioned by the emergence of actual planetary socio-historical, material formations that ontologically *determine* the objective elements of scientific discourses. This is to say in the strongest sense that the relational elements designated by phenotype, ancestry, geography, etc. do exist, but that they do not exist independently of their ontological determinations within the relational totality of the human as articulated by racialization.

At the same time, we cannot say that racialization has an autonomous existence that transcends its relational elements (i.e. it does not "arrive to imprint its mark" upon them). Following from this, the second claim of the above-quoted passage: "The existence of the structure consists in its effects, that is, the structure is 'in short only a specific combination of its own elements': it is nothing 'outside of its effects'." But this would seem to directly

contradict the central claim that I have maintained throughout that racialization *exceeds* race and racism, and so cannot be *reduced*. The concept of structural causality as stated here would appear to suggest just the opposite, that racialization, as the 'structure,' is precisely the *sum* of race as its 'effects.' To understand why such reductionism is not the only alternative to dualism—or, how the relational totality can be both immanent yet nonreducible, material yet nonempirical—we can revisit the distinction made above between expressive and structural causality.

As we have seen, the mode of constitutive relationality defining structural causality is not an expressive relationality, "in which each relation expresses all of the others in a homogenous space, but a structural relationality that defines a complex, deep, and stratified social space."[206] What is crucial for present purposes is how this distinction between homogeneity and heterogeneity stages the duality (not dual*ism*) of the "absent cause" that is also the "immanent cause." Throughout this chapter it has been argued that the relational totality of the human as articulated by racialization comprises an open totality of "difference in complex unity," "full of contradictions, unevenness and tendencies" and embedding "heterogeneous machinic assemblages."[207] This means that the "whole" of racialization can never be fully *present* in one of its "parts," i.e. "a race." *Pace* the universalist claims of Liberal Humanism (e.g. "There is only *one* race, the human race") *a* race does not represent a full complement of the human totality, even as it is ontologically determined as a relational element within that totality and therefore cannot be determined independently of it. "One race" is always mystification.

At the same time, neither do *all* the races *add up* to the totality of the human. This is because the reversible operation of summation requires the very spatio-temporal

homogeneity (i.e. the synchronic, tabular space-time of comparativity) that is incompatible with the heterogenous space-time of structural causality. And as was argued in the second section of this appendix, such a notion presupposes a concrete subject who is *outside* of the totality and therefore able "to take it all in" at once. This rejection of a homogenous space-time within which the reversible operation of summation (and therefore reduction) can be performed reminds us again why we cannot *reduce* the human totality to its constituent, empirical *relata* (individual races), as these are spatio-temporally (i.e. ontologically) determined by their articulation into the relational totality (as we saw above in our discussion of Mitchell). This why we must insist that the relational totality is both historically and materially determinate (i.e. real), but non-empirical. As real abstraction, the relational totality is always *absent* (it is nowhere to be found *in* here) but also *immanent* (it cannot be abstracted from its effects and placed *out there*).

The foregoing discussion underlines why the distinction of "differential and plenary time"—which Morfino names the thesis of temporal plurality—is so crucial to Althusser's concept of structural causation. Here, differential time refers to the "coexistence without contemporaneity" of the various elements articulated into the relational totality, while "plenary time" is understood as the "historical time" of the relational totality: "the specific form of existence of the social totality under consideration, an existence in which the different structural levels of temporality interfere, because the relations of the correspondence, non-correspondence, articulation, dislocation, and torsion which obtain [*entrtiennent*], between the different 'levels' of the whole in accordance with its general structure."[208] This account has clear resonance with the earlier discussion of "residual, emergent and dominant forms" comprising a "palimpsest" of "temporal entanglements"

that are not defined by linear succession. There, I argued that "residual forms," "relational elements" and "affective fields" could be taken up into and thereby transformed by emergent formations. Here I want to clarify how this assertion fits with the one put forward a few moments ago to the effect that the elements of race—skin color, ancestry, geography and so on—do not exist independently of their respective determinations as relational elements within the totality of the human. Because I have also argued that racialization is "only a specific combination of its own elements," the question arises as to what I earlier described as the problem of the *genesis* of racialization. That is, it would seem that racialization either came first and then determined its elements (and so is exterior to them), or the already constituted elements joined to form (i.e. cause) racialization (and so exist independently). Another option would be that the elements and the structure emerged "at the same time," but this reintroduces the problem of a "container" of absolute, homogenous spacetime in which simultaneity can be defined, and in doing so simply displaces by one remove the necessity of an external cause or linear telos.

Against these alternatives, Althusser posits the "encounter," or "the conjuncture." It is here that I want to situate what I earlier introduced as the *contingency criterion* for an ontology of racialization. The conjuncture defines a process of bringing-into-relation, of which the new structure itself is the *effect*. The elements which "conjoin" by "'taking hold' in the new structure" have been determined by relatively independent social formations prior to the encounter (although the tense here gets tricky), and have undergone a transformation by becoming newly determined by the relational totality that the conjuncture produces: "each of the elements that come to be combined in the conjunction of the new structure…is itself, as such, a product, an effect."[209] At the same time, even as

they are relationally determined by the totality, each element or "articulation" maintains an index of relative autonomy, as each has a specific temporality produced through an autonomous history/genealogy. The elements of the structure are therefore *non-contemporaneous* even as they *co-exist* within the totality. This means that the totality cannot be thought of as a *linear* outgrowth of these prior elements, nor as the expression of a telos that transcends them: "'only *apres coup*' can they be identified as elements" of a new structure.[210] This breaks with determination as both linear mechanism or immanent *telos*. At the same time, the processes of bringing-into-relation that mark the conjuncture are not initiated or driven from without history—they are immanent to and constitutive of history. This breaks with radical temporal rupture. And here we find the thesis of the *necessity of contingency* that temporal plurality introduces: "In the absence of a plurality of different rhythms, the encounter falls into the category of genesis: the necessity of contingency is not the breach of an empty and homogenous timeline, but rather the necessity of an encounter, an encounter which assumes more times, more rhythms. For this reason Althusser rejects both the continuous and discontinuous conceptions of historical time. Both options are a simplification of the complex temporality of the social whole."[211]

I have belabored this point because it allows us to clarify what it means to say that *races* are produced by racialization (or racializing assemblages), as effects or objective appearance, while also maintaining that races are not homogenous or fungible—a crucial distinction and limitation of the analogy with commodities implied above. That is, we must think coexistence without contemporaneity. Here *co-existence* means that to think about race (i.e. any one *race*, and therefore any *one* terrain of racial struggle) is to think about the relational totality of the human as articulated by racialization—the absent cause immanent

in all of its elements—and therefore *every* race and every terrain of racial struggle, even as there is no position from which one can actually think this totality "all at once". *Co-existence protects against the denial of relations*. *Non-contemporaneity*, on the other hand, means that we can except neither the homogenous space-time required for the "grammar of comparativity" nor the linear telos of a universalist liberal humanism that merely, following Thomas, "(re)produces the undifferentiated juridical and economic subjects it presupposes without fundamentally transforming the material, social or symbolic circumstances through which they emerged."[212] *Non-contemporaneity* protects against the erasure of history, the denial of necessary contingency and the hegemony of destiny.

In fact, I will argue that it is the negation of "coexistence without contemporaneity" that provides us with a minimal determination of the subject position defined as *racism*. But before moving to an elaboration of that argument, I want to say a few words concerning the implications for the empirical social sciences of the two definitions of race put forth here. This is important, as the discussion thus far has perhaps implied an unfavorable assessment of the potentials for empirical modes of knowledge production in relation to racialization. On the contrary, the "theoretical" meditations pursued here were spurred by the generative perplexities of ethnographic engagement, and so are not at all the outgrowth of a distanciated ideological critique, much less so a philosophical reflection performed in the space of pure contemplation (i.e. nowhere). At the same time, I do maintain that the rejection of *empiricism* is necessary to an adequate theorization of *race*, and therefore *racialization*. This is why, I suggest, it is essential to think *together* both of the definitions of *race* that I have presented here, i.e. "objective appearance" and "population-distributions." One can help guard against the vagaries of subjectivism (i.e. race as

arbitrary), while the other defends against both positivist affirmation (race as self-grounding) and obscurantist disavowal (race as ungrounded, i.e. pure multiplicity). This will also allow me to make good, if only very briefly, on claims made in the first section of this appendix concerning the indispensable contributions of those approaches that were earlier subject to critique.

Let's begin with a slightly truncated restatement of the second determination of *race* in order to highlight its key moments: *the population-based, probabilistic distributions of differential exposures…implemented through heterogeneous but articulated technical and institutional apparatus which elaborate hierarchical systems of human classification…in combination with justificatory and explanatory discourses positing innate inferiority…as members of populations…who deviate from the normative model of the human…and thereby forfeit claims to the prerogatives and protections constituting full human status.* Starting in the middle of this definition, we find the core concern with classification, institutionalization and discursive performativity with which we identified the analytic-constructionist approach at the very beginning of this chapter. Including this moment in our definition of *race* underscores the key theoretical and methodological insights provided by this philosophical tradition, as well as longstanding social scientific engagements with the social construction and enactment of human categories, including race.

We could say that the importance of classification follows from the fact that the actual populations determined by racialization *as races* have *names*, and so are partially performed through discursive and symbolic practices. They are also, as already argued, available to techniques of measurement and intervention that are nonarbitrary. But here we

must immediately provide several qualifications. As was already addressed, we need to eschew any tendency to treat classificatory systems as relatively stable and exhaustive, and the populations they categorize as the outcomes *completed* processes. At the same time, and relatedly, an emphasis on categorization risks reflecting in the analysis the homogenous, tabular space-time of classification itself, thereby tempting comparativity. It is therefore crucial to make several additional stipulations regarding the nature of populations. First, populations are always comprised of ongoing, iterative processes of bringing-into-relation; the names of populations do not designate static entities, but these processes. This means that the empirical extensions of population members are not static (i.e. populations are probabilistically determined distributions), nor does a relation of biunivocality obtain between populations and members (e.g. populations are spatiotemporally noncontiguous and overlapping). Second, the relationally determined material elements of populations (including racialized bodies-in-relation) are not abstractable from the spatio-temporal terrains through and within which they emerge, and in turn partially constitute. That is, populations are inextricably imbricated in ongoing processes of temporalization and spatialization within unfolding socio-material formations and therefore maintain their own specific histories/temporalities and indexes of relative autonomy and effectivity.

These specifications of processual formation, relational determination, and spatiotemporal heterogeneity might at first seem incompatible with empirical approaches. However, while admittedly antithetical to certain tenets of *empiricism*, it is precisely within certain branches of the *empirical* social sciences that we find their most robust and sophisticated formulations. I have already discussed recent anthropological elaborations

and ethnographic deployments of affect theory, so here I will focus on several distinct but adjacent developments. First, critical geographers have long provided crucial conceptual and methodological interventions for empirically investigating the manifold and contradictory processes of the social production of space, elaborating such thematics as uneven development, space-time compression and spatio-temporal heterogeneity.[213] Critical geographers working at the intersections of Black studies, Black feminist and Marxist feminist critique, and critical race theory have provided crucial analytics for interrogating the complex, dialectical interactions driving the racialization of space and the spatialization of race, underscoring the need to understand how ongoing population differentiations are produced within, through and as spatial practices—ghetto, suburb, favela, gated community, prison, project, plantation, single-family detached, structural readjustment, military mobilization, police operation, development, disinvestment, revitalization, uneven development, capital flight and state abandonment—and thus are themselves always constitutive of spatiotemporal terrains.[214]

Even more recently, anthropologists have generated a bourgeoning literature on the materialities of governance spurred by a flurry of renewed and refashioned ethnographic approaches to bureaucracies, infrastructures, and expert systems.[215] This work has taken up and elaborated many of the above thematics to produce novel theorizations of the material, intimate and affective social terrains that these socio-material apparatus both engender and partially conceal, terrains which in turn constantly exceed and thereby threaten to destabilize those same apparatus. Even more so than critical geography, it is fieldwork-based STS scholarship that has provided many of the methodological and conceptual tools taken up by anthropologists working in these areas. In particular, ANT-

inspired approaches to tracing material-semiotic networks while attending to the "enactment" of ontological multiplicity have been deployed with much enthusiasm (and with much success, I would add). Similarly, many have engaged with new materialist and post-humanist scholarship. And it is here, I argue, that we must insist on the first determination of *race* presented above; namely, *the objective appearance of racialization*, which we can now also state (because equivalent) as, *races* are *the relationally determined elements-effects of the relational totality of the human as articulated by racialization/racializing assemblages*.

I will not rehearse my criticisms of the proscription on thinking with totalities, and therefore structures of domination, in much recent STS, new materialist, and post-human scholarship. I will only point out that by defining race as objective *appearance*, we signal the absent cause of the relational totality, theorization of which, as I have already argued, is necessary both epistemologically (as per historical materialist criteria) and politically (because it satisfies coexistence without contemporaneity). This allows for an empirical approach that rejects the restrictive tenets of a narrow empiricism. Races are neither illusory nor self-grounding; the absent cause of structural causality signals a depth ontology that is also immanent. This also means that we can recognize the indisputable insights provided by, for example, ontological anthropology and ANT-inspired approaches. This only requires that we replace "radical ontological multiplicity" (ultimately a denial of relation disguised as its multiplication) with the notion of spatio-temporal heterogeneity within an open relational totality that is structured in domination. Finally, the above stipulation of the *necessity of contingency* allows for the theorization of indeterminacy

within historical conjunctures. This provides for the rejection of any determinism, transitive/mechanical or expressive/teleological, without mystifying durable historical structures of domination through appeals to an 'immediated' plane of virtuality, the asocial becoming of pure immanence, or the productivity of a transhistorical *matter per se*. Finally, this also means that we can recognize that no subject occupies a position of complete knowledge, and therefore total control, of the totality while at the same time rejecting the dubious suggestion that this means there is no sense in talking about differential responsibility for the reproduction of differentially invested and steeply uneven power relations. Even as racialization *exceeds* both determinate ideological formations and population-distributions, it also requires that these mutually imbricated terrains be ceaselessly invested with desires, affective attachments and ideological interests, which in turn drive further iterative, if always indeterminate, movements of racialization. With this, I turn to our final term.

As already intimated, I define *racism* as a particular subject position. Specifically, *racism names any subject position that is constituted through the unfolding sociopolitical relations of racializing assemblages (i.e. all modern subject positions) and that is simultaneously structured by the negation of coexistence-without-contemporaneity*. The negation of coexistence-without-contemporaneity, I have argued, amounts to both the denial—conscious or unconscious—of *relation* (coexistence) and the erasure of history, that is, *contingency* (non-contemporaneity). I should stress that when I specify *racism* as a subject *position*, I mean to indicate that it is not a *property* (attitude, belief, habit, etc.) that is quantifiable over some extension of racist people, but a position that people variously occupy as subjects. Relatedly, while we cannot think *racism* without thinking ideology,

racism does not comprise a fixed ideological *content*, but is rather defined as specific relation and the particular *movement* of interpellation that it traces. In fact, while our initial determination designates a *position*, it is actually this specific *movement*, and the particular mode of *privation* that potentiates it, that is primary, and with which I begin.

I introduced the heuristic of *privation* and *movement* earlier when discussing the problem of continuity in discontinuity, the experience of ideological dissolution, and the grounds of embodied historical consciousness. To recapitulate the basic argument presented there, I suggested that we can think of the productive movement of racialization as always exceeding constituted subject positions (i.e. determinate ideological formations) and therefore as always carving places for *new* subjects along an open horizon. I characterized *interpellation* as the *movement* that is potentiated by the *privation* of a subject position that stands *empty*. I juxtaposed this movement-potentiating mode of privation with the seemingly antithetical figure of the slave as a privation in which the impossibility of movement is actualized, and therefore the possibility of the subject foreclosed. I argued that, while the imposition of immobility in this reading of the slave (and Blackness as an ontological category) reproduces the violence inscribed by the Law, we must all the same maintain that these two modes of privation do in fact potentiate radically different movements, i.e. modes of subjectification. Now I want to return to this argument, focusing first on the notion of the fulfillment by interpellation of the subject position that stands empty. I argue that this particular mode of privation-movement defines the subject position designated by *racism*. To do so, I bring Agamben's reading of the Aristotelean concept of privation (*sterēsis*) into conversation with Althusser's notion of ideological interpellation.

In his reading of *privation* as the "actuality of the potentiality to not-be," Agamben tells us that, "What is truly potential is thus what has exhausted all its impotentiality in bringing it wholly into the act as such."[216] What is proper to privation, as the relation of contrariety between impotentiality and potentiality, he argues, is that it defines a movement of actualization in which potentiality "*gives itself to itself*."[217] Two points are crucial for present purposes. First, the phrase "gives itself to itself" suggests a movement that is self-determined, self-grounding and self-actualizing, and therefore requiring of no relations outside of itself. The relation of contrariety between impotentiality and potentiality that defines privation is ultimately a relation of unity. Second, the claim that this movement traces an actualization which has "exhausted all of its impotentiality in bringing it wholly into the act as such" signals an actualization with no remainder, and so which contains no contingency, and therefore marks the completion of a movement that potentiates no further movement. This is the expressive movement of a telos already contained in the privation itself.

Keeping these two points in mind, I want to return to Althusser's theorization of the conjuncture and the empty space for the future subject that it makes. While Althusser does not use the concept of privation, I argue that it offers a useful analytic for understanding an implacable ambiguity that runs through his account. As we have already seen, the *necessity of contingency* means that the conjuncture is not determined by either the mechanical or expressive mode of causality. That is, the place of the future subject is neither a linear outgrowth contained within present historical conditions, nor is it the realization of a telos that both transcends and determines present conditions. The *encounter* is truly undetermined, entirely unprecedented. At the same time, it is not *outside* of history

as such, but is immanent to the unfolding heterogeneous relations of history itself. It is in principle impossible to predict who will fill the space of the future subject, and yet, Althusser argues, that fulfillment is the sole imperative of politics. Thus the "endeavor to think the conditions of possibility of an impossible task, to think the unthinkable."

Here the problem of discontinuity/continuity introduced by the necessity of contingency is recast as the paradoxical contingency of necessity. As Matheron explains, "the conjuncture is purely empty, the subject who must fill this void is wholly absent. Between the two, any transition is thus, at least for now, strictly impossible. However, called for by the conjuncture, the transition is at the same time strictly necessary."[218] On the one hand, we have an image of utter contingency that would seem entirely incompatible with a privation through which potentiality "gives itself to itself." And yet, on the other we have a "transition" that, once "called for by the conjuncture…is strictly necessary." That is, the *empty* place is "*destined* to be filled by a subject," and the fulfillment of this destiny leaves no remainder. Matheron observes that the ambivalence this produces runs through Althusser's entire oeuvre, and he offers an incisive diagnosis of its origin:

> …it is precisely here that things become complicated. For if everything, in a sense, prompts Althusser to think that the conjuncture is empty, and that the place of political subjects is unoccupied, a different tendency draws him in completely the opposite direction: the place of the subjects is always already occupied by a completely hypostatized working class embodied by the Communist Party. This leads him to an extremely significant formula: if the space of a conjunctural analysis

only makes sense if it arranges a place that is empty for the future, Althusser hastens to add: 'I say empty, though it is always occupied.'[219]

Matheron reads "always occupied" as an entailment of the Marxist definition of history as class struggle, which Althusser endorses, and which would necessitate that the proletariat is always already the future subject. But we should also note that Althusser's paradoxical insistence on the empty place of the subject always already being occupied follows necessarily from his definition of the subject itself. It is this definition of the subject, and the theory of ideology that it entails, that I will pursue here as the model for the privation-interpellation of the subject position designated by *racism*. This discussion will also provide occasion to consider the traditional Marxist contention that the future subject can only be emancipated Labor, which precludes even for Althusser a full appreciation of the radical contingency produced by the historical conjuncture, that is, the encounter.

Althusser presents his most (in)famous treatment of the problem of ideology and the subject in his "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Towards an Investigation)."[220] Thankfully, for our purposes it won't be necessary to rehearse the several lines of argumentation that he opens there. Instead, I will focus only on a few definitive statements put forth in the essay's penultimate section entitled, "Ideology Interpellates Individuals as Subjects." Let's begin with the upshot and then work backwards to pull out the most pertinent moments.

Thus ideology hails or interpellates individuals as subjects. As ideology is eternal, I must now suppress the temporal form in which I have presented the functioning

> of ideology, and say: ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last proposition: *individuals are always-already subjects.* Hence individuals are 'abstract' with respect to the subjects which they always already are. This proposition might seem paradoxical.
>
> That an individual is always-already a subject, even before he is born, is nevertheless the plain reality, accessible to everyone and not a paradox at all.[221]

To make sense of Althusser's claim that "ideology is eternal" and has therefore "always-already interpellated individuals as subjects," we must understand two prior claims. The first is Althusser's insistence on an immanent materialist definition of ideology. Rather than being comprised of "ideas," he argues, ideology can only be said to exist in concrete material apparatuses of practice, which are in turn comprised of the concrete subjects of those practices, who thus must themselves constitute ideology. He writes, "the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but at the same time and immediately I add that *the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function* (*which defines it*) *of* '*constituting' concrete individuals as subjects.*"[222] Here we find an example of Althusser's thinking with structural causality, what he describes in this case as a "double constitution." What this means is that *ideology* cannot be said to exist *prior* to or over and against the concrete subjects that it interpellates and that in turn constitute it, but neither can the subject exist prior to ideological interpellation: "in reality these things happen without any succession. The existence of

ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing."[223]

This brings us to the second ancillary claim; namely, "ideology *has no outside* (for itself)."[224] Here we again encounter the task of "thinking the unthinkable." Althusser formulates the problem thus: "Now it is this knowledge that we have to reach, if you will, while speaking in ideology, and from within ideology we have to outline a discourse which tries to break with ideology, in order to dare to be the beginning of a scientific (i.e. subjectless) discourse on ideology."[225] Because ideology has no outside for the subjects it interpellates, to think the limits of ideology is an impossibility for the subject. And while Althusser maintains an ambiguous distinction between individual and subject that might open onto a way of knowing outside of ideology, that potential is immediately foreclosed by the assertion that "individuals are always-already subjects."[226] With this we can see why, for Althusser, the empty place of the subject marked by the conjuncture must always-already be occupied. Not only does ideology have no outside, Althusser tells us, it also has no history. And so the interpellation of the subject does not occur as by succession, but was rather always already completed. From inside ideology—"after" interpellation—there is no remainder, no contingency. But there is also never a "before" interpellation. The individual is always already interpellated. This is why I am arguing that the empty place of the new subject parallels the privation described by Agamben. In both cases, potentiality, once actualized, is revealed to have always already been fully present in its own absence, or impotentiality, such that the movement of actualization itself vanishes and leaves no history, no trace of contingency, "giving itself to itself."

To begin to understand what this means for a definition of the subject position designated by *racism*, I want to draw attention to how Althusser initiates his description of the "elementary ideological effect" of *obviousness*. Here we note a shift in Althusser's mode of address, from that of a third person formal expository prose to the second person, referring to himself and the reader as 'you and I.' He begins by noting that both he and his reader are subjects: "and therefore ideological subjects (a tautological proposition), i.e. that the author and the reader of these lines both live 'spontaneously' or 'naturally' in ideology in the sense in which I have said that 'man is an ideological animal by nature.'" Here I quote the core passage at length in order to present the reader with the rhetorical effect that is created.

> As St Paul admirably put it, it is in the 'Logos', meaning in ideology, that we 'live, move and have our being'. It follows that, for you and for me, the category of the subject is a primary 'obviousness' (obviousnesses are always primary): it is clear that you and I are subjects (free, ethical, etc....). Like all obviousnesses, including those that make a word 'name a thing' or 'have a meaning' (therefore including the obviousness of the 'transparency' of language), the 'obviousness' that you and I are subjects – and that that does not cause any problems – is an ideological effect, the elementary ideological effect. It is indeed a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes (without appearing to do so, since these are 'obviousnesses') obviousnesses as obviousnesses, which we cannot *fail to recognize* and before which we have the inevitable and natural reaction of crying out (aloud or in the 'still, small voice of conscience'): 'That's obvious! That's right! That's true!'[227]

Earlier in this discussion, I implied that *racism* entails a 'natural attitude' toward the objective appearance of *race*. I did not mean by this solely, or even primarily, 'the *belief* that races are natural groupings,' as in an explicit formulation involving ideas about biological inheritance, ancestry, etc. What I intended by natural attitude is a more fundamental obviation of the need for such an explicit formulation in the first place because the question does not arise. That is, from the subject position of racism, *that* race is, is its own explanation. What is even more essential to add to this is that this same relation obtains to the self as subject. *That* the self is a subject is obvious, and *that* that does not cause a problem marks the ideological interpellation of the subject-position of *racism* within a field of subjectification constituted through racialization. We can think back to the earlier discussion of Ferreira da Silva's exegesis of the modern, liberal subject of Western Metaphysics whose subjectivity is defined as a self-determination and who experiences self as self-possession and self-transparency.[228] As we have already seen, however, the epistemological conceit of the self-determination of universal Reason is predicated on a disavowal of the ongoing racializing violence and degradation that is both its material condition of possibility and that also provides its content through the production of a constitutive Other. However, even before there is occasion for the conscious disavowal of relation and of history, there is also the *obviousness* that no such disavowal is required. Racialization, through racializing assemblages, produces empty places, in real material social formations, for new subjects whose interpellation—"giving itself to itself"—produces the negation of the constitutive relations which potentiate this movement and the erasure of the historical traces it leaves. No history, no contingency, no remainder, no trace, no relations—a perfect unity. As the fulfillment of destiny, a *telos*, this interpellation can

also be seen as the experience of the self as the End of movement, and so of History, thereby the fixed point (civilization) toward which others must move.

But it would seem that such a definition of *racism* would require that *every* subject position be designated by *racism*, at least given the historically determinate existence of racializing assemblages. That is, if, following Althusser, every individual is always already interpellated as a subject, and so always already exists in ideology, and if further, to exist in ideology is to exist 'naturally' and 'spontaneously' in the *obviousness* of ideology, and finally, if to experience the obviousness of ideology is to occupy the subject position of *racism*, then every subject position is the position of *racism* ("a tautological proposition," Althusser might say). So then, have we arrived at the unhappy conclusion that *racism* is both everything and nothing at the same time? And if not, then how could one possibly provide a determination of a subject position that is *not* the position of *racism*? To suggest an answer, let's return once more to Althusser's own interpellation of "you and I" which rhetorically structures his characterization of the primary function of ideology as the imposition of "the obviousness of obviousnesses."

Inasmuch as anyone who is reading this passage must necessarily be a subject, and therefore must, for Althusser, live 'spontaneously' or 'naturally' in ideology, we can take it that for him the deictic 'you' addresses any and every subject. That is, his audience is universal, if only because comprised of any and all particular subjects (subjects "in general"). And inasmuch as he and his audience are, in this regard, one and the same ("that you and I are subjects—and that that does not cause any problems"), he too is universal, in this particularity. At the same time, as the theory of ideology he seeks is "a theory of ideology *in general*," it must attain to Science, a "subject-less discourse." Here, the

affirmation of a universal condition of subjectivity (i.e. existence in ideology) paradoxically provides for a performative disavowal of subjectivity, which as we have seen always reinstates a Universal Subject. But to grasp what this means for a determination of the subject position designated by racism we must ask what happens if we consider those subjects for whom "the obviousness" of being a subject is not at all obvious but is in fact always a *problem*.[229] And we must ask why Althusser, in addressing any and every subject, has failed to address them, and how this in turn leads him to the myopic identification of the future subject with Labor's fulfillment.

To begin, I return to Sylvia Wynter's elaboration of the *sociogenic principle*, focusing here on her critique of the "self-evidence of consciousness."[230] Her exposition of the latter, we will see, provides both a parallel analysis and a crucial corrective to Althusser's notion of the primary "obviousness of obviousnesses" which, for him, defines the function of ideology, and thus interpellation, "in general." Through a provincialization of Althusser's "general theory" of the subject, Wynter offers an opening for the principle of differentiation which we require for a determination of the subject position of *racism*.

Wynter's conceptualization of the *sociogenic principle* in many respects corresponds perfectly to Althusser's formulation of ideology. Both are primarily concerned with elucidating the ideological/sociogenic conditions on the reproduction of social formations/modes of being human structured in domination, and with specifying the role of interpellation/sociogenesis in mediating between the real relations of the social formation and the individual subject's relation to those relations; i.e. the constitution of consciousness. Consider, for instance, the following passage from Wynter:

> If, therefore, we postulate by analogy, that the "socialized" normal subject of each order must, like the organism, also know and classify the world in terms that are of adaptive advantage to its "artificial" or culturally constructed "sense of self," rather than in terms of the veridical truth of what that world empirically *is* outside its own viewpoint, the same corollary follows. This is that while its mode of viewpoint-knowing is adaptively advantageous, in the long term, to the stable reproduction of the sociogenic principle instituting of its culture-specific mode of being human, it can continue to be so *only* through the mediation of what the individual human subject *feels* to be to its own adaptive advantage (i.e. to be "good" and bad for itself), as it interacts with both its physical and its sociohuman environments or "worlds." This is to say, the individual must filter the external through the mediation of what he/she is socialized to experience with reference to his/her culture-specific identity as "good" or "bad."[231]

The final sentence in this passage offers yet another parallelism between Althusser and Wynter's respective problematics. Namely, it stages Wynter's own formulation of the "impossible task" of thinking outside of ideology/sociogeny in order to realize the political imperative of making a space for the new political subject/new praxes of the human. Wynter formulates this conundrum in terms of the "self-evidence of consciousness," writing: "the self-evident consciousness can clearly convey what it is like to be conscious only in the terms of its own consciousness as the culture-specific 'normal subject' *for* and to whom such a specific, and necessarily adaptive, order of consciousness can be experienced as self-evident."[232] As we have just seen, the impossibility of thinking outside of ideology—"ideology has no outside (for itself)"—prompts Althusser to recommend

Science as a subject-less (i.e. non-ideological) discourse of Knowledge. Wynter similarly meets the challenge of the "self-evidence of consciousness" with the prescription of a "new science,"

> one in which the "study of words"…will link the study of the sociogenic principle, as a transculturally applicable constant able to serve as the "common reality" of our varied cultural modes of being/experiencing ourselves as human, to that of the biochemical/neurophysiological correlates that its positive/negative meanings activates…[233]

I will bracket Wynter's own proclivities for transhistorical "theorizing in general" based on a mixture of Durkheimian and Marxian philosophical anthropologies and her provocative forays into neurobiology and ethology (i.e. sociogeny as the "transcultural constant" defining the "species-specific" mode of implementing human being). Instead I want to focus on the ways in which her very formulation of the problem radically disrupts Althusser's postulation of the universal experience of ideology, and therefore of subjectivity, as an "obviousness" that "does not cause any problems." For where Althusser posits only individuals who are always already subjects and subjects who are always already 'naturally' and 'spontaneously' in ideology, Wynter introduces a disruptive difference by way of a simple qualifier, 'normal.' That is, the self-evidence of consciousness, which for our purposes is equivalent to Althusser's "obviousness of obviousnesses," is not definitive of *all* subject positions, but rather the narrowly delimited subset of subject positions that are valorized as *normal* within a given mode of being human; in this case, the historically determinate ethno-class genre of Man. And so, whereas Althusser must look for a subjectless discourse, Wynter turns to discourses on the

subject produced within the "liminally deviant category" of the dominant order. She looks to Du Bois, Césaire, and above all, Fanon.

> Fanon's exploration of the ground of the lived experience of the black can therefore be recognized here as one carried out from the liminal perspective of what it is like to be both *Man* (as an educated middle class and westernized subject) and its Nigger Other; to be both the embodiment of the western bourgeois criterion of what it is to be a good man and woman of its kind (and, as such the positively inscribed bearer of its self-evident normative consciousness), and its anti-criterion, and as such the negatively marked symbolic death of its "bad" genetic-instinctual self.[234]

For Fanon, Wynter notes, the "obviousness" of being a subject, the "self-evidence of consciousness," is nowhere to be found. Rather than the spontaneous and stultifying unity of subjectivity from which "there is no outside," Fanon is seized by the inescapable vertigo of finding himself a "triple person," "given not one but two, three places."[235] Never fully present nor fully transcendent to any one of the places "given to him," and so never "giving himself to himself," he experiences a dizzying movement that is neither inside nor outside, only displacement. In drawing upon Fanon, and the larger tradition of Black existentialism, Wynter alerts us to a blind spot in Althusser's analysis that is no doubt produced by his own interpellation as a white, western, bourgeois male academic; that is, the *norm* of *Man*. And by doing so, she also reveals the principle that distinguishes the subject position of racism; namely, the negation of relation as the experience of unity ("there is no outside") and the negation of non-contemporaneity as the experience of necessity ("there is no history").

What the Black existentialist tradition reveals is the impossibility of the experience of subjectivity as the spontaneous negation of coexistence-without-contemporaneity for those individuals who are interpellated into subject positions that are outside the boundaries of Man, but that at the same time define its content. So, Du Bois can write of "a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity."[236] And Ellison can write of his "invisibility" that it is "not exactly a matter of a bio-chemical accident to my epidermis," but rather "occurs because of a peculiar disposition of the eyes of those with whom I come in contact."[237] And Wright can diagnose the problem of the color line thus, "There is no Negro problem in the United States, there is only a white problem." And Césaire can point out that "the colonizer, who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing the other man as *an animal*, accustoms himself to treating him like an animal, and tends objectively to transform *himself* into an animal."[238] The interpellation of the individual into the subject position of not-quite-human or, indeed, nonhuman— what Césaire calls *thingification*—is experienced as a privation that does not "give itself to itself," but is rather always *being* given by the other, and therefore *absented* from itself by and for the other; that is *not*-being. The impotentiality of the privation is never exhausted in the ceaseless movement.

The subject of a privation-interpellation that traces an inexhaustible displacement is "gifted" with what Du Bois termed "second sight."[239] And this gift is not a matter of mere *perspective* but is rather produced by an ontological condition registered as the vertigo-inducing, embodied experience of coexistence-without-contemporaneity-with-the-self. As Fanon tells us, "The black man has no ontological resistance against the eyes of

the white man. Overnight the Negro has been given two frames of reference within which he has had to place himself."[240] Against the "obviousness of obviousnesses," Fanon presents us with the impossibility of being "naturally, spontaneously" *in* ideology (he must place himself within two frames of reference) that is also the impossibility of *transcending* his displacement-interpellation as a less-than-human subject (there is no ontological resistance). This provides us with a criterion for distinguishing the subject position of *racism* while at the same time opening up the possibility of a knowledge of that subject position that does not require a subjectless discourse (Science), but is instead grounded in a particular experience of subjectivity—a knowledge produced in what Wynter calls Man's "liminally deviant category," a category that is not addressed in the appeal to the subject in general, Althusser's "you and I."

I will have more to say about *racism* below, but having presented this minimal determination I now move to conclude this appendix.

Conclusion

I want to begin the end of this discussion by addressing several moments of confusion that I suspect I have encouraged in the preceding discussion of *racism*. First, it might seem that we have gone from the position that "every subject position is racist" to "all *white* subjects, and *only* white subjects are racist." Second, and relatedly, the account of interpellation presented here may give the impression that interpellation is a singular event that inaugurates a subject; one subject per individual, as it were. Third, this would make it seem that it is impossible for any subject who has been interpellated as white/racist to ever be anything other than a racist. And finally, the definition of racism provided here

seems somewhat innocent, inasmuch as it is structurally determined and never explicitly available to the racist subject ("there is no outside of ideology").

I will begin with the second point. Interpellation does not correspond to the "birth" of *a* subject in the sense of a one-time event or genesis. Interpellation is the movement by which an individual comes to occupy a subject position. And we can say that the individual that is interpellated is always already a subject, but only by keeping in mind that Althusser's account of subjectivity is a *special case* of ideological interpellation. To adopt Spillers' idiom, the individual may be *flesh* rather than *body*. The flesh will *not* have the Father's name, as it were, and so, while not *pre*-social, *pre*-discursive, or *pre*-ideological, the subject of/as flesh is always and only complexly (i.e. problematically) and not 'spontaneously' so. The same goes for the notion of "occupying" a subject position. To occupy the place of racism is to experience subjectivity as a unity (non-movement) produced by the negation of coexistence-without-contemporaneity, while to occupy a subject position that is not designated by racism is to experience coexistence-without-contemporaneity, and therefore (the potential for) movement.

To address the first point in full would require a long digression into more definitions, and as I have already gone on too long, I will try to avoid this. Instead I will only say that if "whiteness" is defined—as is often the case, for example, in the Whiteness studies literature—as the unmarked racial *category*, then it can be said to largely coincide with the category of universal Man, and so the full human. And because it is only the subject position corresponding to full human status that can be experienced as an "obviousness of obviousnesses" within a social field constituted through racialization, and given the historically determinate structures of global white supremacism, we can easily

understand why the subject position of racism largely maps onto whiteness, as defined here. However, I have throughout this discussion tried to avoid confusion by following Weheliye in not conflating Blackness and whiteness/white supremacism with categories demarcating *races*, that is, probabilistically defined populations-distributions-exposures of "black people," "white people," "Asian people," "Latinx people," "Native American people," etc. This is because there is no perfectly biunivocal determination between subjectification into the subject positions of full human, not-quite-human and nonhuman and the assembly into population-distributions, although there are obviously strong "preferred articulations." For instance, we can say that Fanon's body was taken up into the racializing assemblage of colonialism, and thereby incorporated into the population-distribution of "black people" *before* he was interpellated into the subject-position of the Negro upon his arrival to the metropole. Furthermore, the 'same' bodies are multiply assembled (Deleuze's dividuals) into different populations within different assemblages at different scales and within heterogenous spatio-temporal terrains, just as the same individuals are multiply and iteratively interpellated into different subject positions across space and time. All of this is to say that we should avoid the confusion that results from identifying abstract organizing principles of hierarchization and differentiation (i.e. Blackness/white supremacy) with probabilistically defined populations-terrains of bodies-in-relations (e.g. black people/white people) because they do not *necessarily* coincide ontologically. The upshot is that we don't have to posit a *logical* relation that will invariably be contradicted by an abundance of readily available empirical examples.

I have already suggested an answer to the third point, regarding whether a person interpellated as "white" can become anything other than racist. Following from what was

just argued, we will rephrase the question in its proper form: Can an in/dividual who has been interpellated into the subject position corresponding to full human status as defined by Man, and who therefore experiences subjectivity as the negation of coexistence-without-contemporaneity, ever come to occupy a subject position that is not designated by racism? First, we have already seen that interpellation is ongoing, iterative and multiple across time and space. Furthermore, the totality of the human as articulated by racialization is characterized by multiple contradictions, unevenness and tendencies. The subject positions produced through racializing assemblages are relationally determined elements within this totality (i.e. structural causality). But we have also seen that those relations are always undergoing further processes of bringing-into-relation (deterritorialization-reterritorialization). Therefore, the ground on which the subject of "self-evident consciousness" stands is ever shifting, the "obviousness of the obviousnesses" always under threat. In fact, the subject can experience this threat as a vertiginous, decentering displacement opened up by the sudden appearance of the constitutive relationality and irreducible contingency of coexistence-without-contemporaneity. But this provides for a transition to the fourth and final point regarding whether the definition of racism that I have put forward here is not too overly structuralist, and therefore deterministic, and whether this forecloses questions of responsibility, ethics, and politics.

It is true that I have said little about the sorts of things most commonly associated with the term *racism*: for example, firmly held beliefs concerning the (biological, psychological, cultural, etc.) superiority/inferiority of different human populations; open expressions of animus and violence; covert but systematic discriminatory treatment; direct exploitation. I have avoided these more commonsense understandings of racism so as not

to divert from the less intuitive determination pursued here. I also wanted to show how these familiar definitions of *racism* might be too narrow. At the same time, it would be gratuitous to suggest the these more commonly recognized expressions of racism are *exceptional* or entirely *marginal*. They have long been and remain pervasive and are themselves fundamental rather than accidental to the ongoing productive deterritorializations-reterritorializations of racialization. What I want to consider now is how these more familiar expressions of racism might be understood to relate to the determination of racism as the negation of coexistence-without-contemporaneity. I argue—in an admittedly most provisional manner—that we might think productively of these expressions of racism as deriving in large part from the decentering displacement that is spurred by the appearance/experience of coexistence-without-contemporaneity, which thereby threatens the spontaneous self-evidence of consciousness as predicated on the negation of relation and contingency. Here I am thinking primarily with Gordon's theorization of racism as "bad faith,"[241] while also drawing on Glissant's meditations on the poetics and politics of Relation,[242] and Weheliye's reading of the flesh as the *ether* "that holds together the world of Man while at the same time forming the condition of possibility of this world's demise."[243]

We begin by noting that all subject positions are differentially constituted by and invested with desires, affects and interests. Following Wynter, we can argue that for the "normal subject," here identified with the subject position of racism, these investments are fundamentally organized for the reproduction of the dominant sociogenic principle (and its concomitant historically determinant mode of being, here the ethno-class of Man) through which the subject's experience of the "self-evidence of consciousness" is continuously and

iteratively re/constituted through interpellation. That is, "the obviousness that [the subject is a] subject—and that that does not cause any problem," is ideologically and affectively invested such that any perturbation of this experience of self-evidence is experienced as a violence to the subject. We have already considered several figures for thinking this experience of a threatening dislocation in the above discussion of affect and embodied consciousness, so I will not repeat them here.

Next, we note that all subject positions are *relationally* determined, and are therefore *contingent* (i.e. not self-grounding), but that what defines the interpellation of *racism* is precisely the *negation* of relation ("gives itself to itself") and contingency ("exhausts its impotentiality"). Here, Althusser's definition of ideology as the representation of the imaginary relation of the subject to the real relations of the social formation is apropos. What is definitive of *racist* ideology is that the subject's imaginary relation to the real relations is negation, and furthermore that the representation of this relation obtains a *unitary* frame of reference, as opposed to the "double frame of reference" signaled by Fanon, Du Bois, Ellison and other Black existentialist thinkers. And it is precisely this "second sight" that reveals the "imaginary" (i.e. false consciousness) nature of this representation, for this second sight is ontologically structured by a knowledge of coexistence-without-contemporaneity, what Glissant calls the knowledge of Relation within the Whole.

> Thus, the absolute unknown, projected by the abyss and bearing into eternity the womb abyss and the infinite abyss, in the end became knowledge. Not a specific knowledge, appetite, suffering, and delight of one particular people, not only that,

but the knowledge of the Whole, greater from having been at the abyss and freeing knowledge of Relation within the Whole.[244]

It is this knowledge of Relation that threatens a negation of the negation of relation structuring the subject position *racism*, and so which must be denied in order to reproduce the self-evidence of consciousness. But herein lies what Gordon calls the "performative contradiction" of racism; namely, in *recognizing* the existential threat produced by the knowledge of Relation, the racist subject must also recognize the subject of that knowledge and the relation itself.[245] The negation of relation is itself a relation that also requires the recognition of Relation, and so is always a "bad faith" *denegation*. For as we have seen, it is the exclusion from full human status of those subjects interpellated into the positions of not-quite-human and nonhuman that is the ontological condition (i.e. determining relation) on the subject position designated by *racism* and which defines its content *in toto.*

Returning now to questions of explicit beliefs, overt violence, discrimination and exploitation, we can see how these are structured by the same contradictory mode of denegation elucidated by Gordon, following Fanon, as well as by more recent theorists (Hartman, Chen, Johnson among others) of the contradictory movement of misrecognition/objectification that always requires (a disavowed) recognition/subjectification.[246] From the perspective of the racist subject, and to adopt a somewhat clinical idiom, we can see certain familiar expressions of racist animus as so many psychic and affective compensatory mechanisms that seek to re/establish the equilibrium of subjective unity (i.e. the self-evidence of consciousness) through the explicit negation of relation. At one extreme we have genocidal fantasies of annihilating the constitutive racial other as the impossible desire for a final negation of relation. At the

other, we have "colorblindness" as the negation of relation through the denial of any difference in the first place. There is also the intellectualist negation of relation through the elaboration of classificatory typologies based on innate difference. Such thinking also allows that not all instances of so-called "racially motivated violence" derive from the same mode of subjectification, and therefore are not strictly grounded in *racism* even as they are produced by subjectification through racialization. That is, if racial animus derives from the desire to *maintain* or *restore* the experience of equilibrium through the negation of relation on the part of the racist subject (full human), then it can also derive from the desire to *attain* a unitary subjective field by negating through violence the fragmenting displacement induced, for example, by Fanon's "eyes of the white man," on the part of the fragmented subject. This understanding also leaves open analyses of the political manipulation of the investment of desire and affective attachments to subject positions, and how these are iteratively taken up in the reproduction of durable "preferred articulations" while also potentiating lines of flight and reterritorialization in novel assemblages.

The advantage of pursuing such questions in terms of "bad faith," as Gordon does, is that it clearly stages questions of commitment, responsibility and ethics. But at the same time, we also risk reproducing a rather subjectivist-psychologistic, and therefore reductionist, image of racialization that replaces the questions of historically determinate social formations with the "primal phantasms" of a "libidinal economy."[247] I have throughout this discussion argued against such readings by insisting that the constitutive material relations (real abstractions) of the relational totality of the human as articulated by racializing assemblages must necessarily exceed and outstrip determinate ideological formations and the subjects they interpellate (along with the desires they invest and

embodied affects they engender). At the same time, I have argued that the ongoing processes of bringing-into-relation that comprise the human totality necessarily proliferate, through movements of deterritorialization-reterritorialization, new "places" for "new" subjects—some of which are "always already occupied" by a privation that "gives itself to itself," and others which are only ever occupied in the mode of a ceaseless displacement, a privation that is never exhausted.

The problem that I will restate here without attempting a solution is the problem of the possibility of an abolitionary politics that wouldn't require a political subject that could somehow "get ahead of" racialization (an impossibility it would seem) in order to stop it. Relatedly, what would it mean to think the possibility of abolitionary politics without a guarantee, without a determinate "place" to go? It is my hope that the foregoing discussion has signaled openings for imagining such a politics from *within* rather than from without the heterogeneous and contradictory material articulations of racializing assemblages, though I won't attempt to specify those openings in the manner of political prescriptions here.

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