

COMBATting SKEPTICISM AGAINST RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM (WITH A SPECIAL
FOCUS ON PAKISTAN)

By

Sardar Asfandyar Cheema

An Undergraduate Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

JOSEPH WHARTON SCHOLARS

Faculty Advisor:

Amy J. Sepinwall

Associate Professor, Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics

THE WHARTON SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

MAY 2021

Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank Dr. Amy J. Sepinwall for her extensive guidance and encouragement on conducting this research. Without her dedication and keen interest, this research would not have come to fruition. The author also expresses his sincere gratitude to family and friends, especially Saima Zia and Zahra Elhanbaly, for their support in the completion of this thesis.

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis was to take an in-depth look at the arguments made by scholars against religious nationalism. These scholars believe that the added influence of religion in nationalism makes it take a turn for the worse. To determine whether this is truly the case, a set of the main arguments put forth by these scholars was discussed and critiqued. The goal was to understand whether the negative consequences of religious nationalism existing in the public sphere are a product of religion or if they can be traced back to nationalism itself. The thesis discovers that the main arguments being looked at bring up issues one can link to nationalism regardless of the form it takes (religious, secular, ethnic etc.). To support the analysis, case studies from different parts of the world were used as empirical evidence. These case studies range from the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide to the assassinations of prominent Egyptian and Indian politicians at the hands of nationalist groups. The general analysis is followed by a deeper look into the evolution of nationalism within Pakistan to understand how nationalism within the same region and society can have both positive and negative effects. The analysis indicates that those who find religious nationalism to be less ideal than secular nationalism fail to see that the vices within religious nationalism are a direct result of nationalism itself, not religion.

Keywords: nationalism, religious nationalism, religion, state, nation, secular, ethnic, religion

Disciplines: Political Science, Legal Studies

Table of Contents

<i>I. INTRODUCTION</i>	3
<i>II. DEFINING KEY TERMS</i>	6
A. Nation and State	7
B. Nationalism	10
C. Religious Nationalism	12
<i>III. CRITIQUING ARGUMENTS AGAINST RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM</i>	18
A. Argument 1	20
Critique on Argument 1	23
B. Argument 2	29
Critique on argument 2.....	31
C. Argument 3	35
Critique on Argument 3	36
D. Argument 4	38
Critique on Argument 4.....	41
E. Summary	45
<i>IX. CASE STUDY: BRITISH INDIA AND PAKISTAN</i>	47
A. British India until 1947	48
B. Pakistan post-1947	52
C. Lessons to learn from the Pakistani case	57
<i>References</i>	60

I. INTRODUCTION

Religious nationalism, especially in today's day and age, is generally considered detrimental for society. It has been deemed a perverted form of secular nationalism in most mainstream literary works by scholars who study political science and theory with the general belief being that the added influence of religion in nationalism makes it take a turn for the worse. In this thesis, I will look at the role played by religious nationalism in different societies, the main arguments and critiques against religious nationalism and a specific case study, pre-1947 British India and post-1947 Pakistan, to take a deeper look at how religious nationalism can have positive and negative effects in the same region and society.

Religious nationalism is on the rise around the globe. In some cases, its rise is very explicit—for example, in India's case with the Hindutva movement (Malji 2020). In other cases, the involvement of religious nationalist elements may not be as explicit. A prominent example of this is the involvement of Christian nationalism in the recent anti-immigration wave in the United States (Al-Kire et al. 2021).

While the ways that religious nationalism influences a country or society may differ, there have been quite a few prominent cases where religious nationalism has given rise to (or led to an increase in) communal violence. A recent example of this is the case of radical Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar that has resulted in the deaths of thousands of Rohingya Muslims, with many of them fleeing to neighboring Bangladesh to avoid being persecuted (International Crisis Group 2017). As nations and states around the world are growing increasingly polarized, these waves of religious nationalism do not appear to be subsiding anytime soon. In a world where the

largest democracy, India (UNDEF 2021), and the country with the strongest economy, the United States, are experiencing an uptick in religious nationalism, it is imperative to better understand religious nationalism and whether or not it is truly detrimental to society.

To that end, I shall argue that, although on the surface level it appears that the ‘religious’ element of religious nationalism leads to conflict, violence and societal collapse, religion is not the sole, or perhaps even the primary, factor that leads to these outcomes. The problems that arise in societies where elements of religious nationalism are present come about as a byproduct of nationalism itself, not religious nationalism specifically. Nationalism, whether religious or secular, is a source of inherent instability and is bound to lead to complications of one kind or another if left unchecked.

To build on this line of argument, I will look at the main points put forth by scholars who believe that religion, specifically, is responsible for the vices brought about as a result of religious nationalism. I will tackle these points from a theoretical perspective and then through the use of real-world examples where it is evident that it was the internal logic of nationalism itself that led to the societal collapse, violence, and conflict that can be seen in the examples. The examples will span cases of both secular nationalism and religious nationalism, so I have sufficient evidence to make my argument.

I begin in Section 2 by defining the key terms that will be used in this thesis. Doing so will ensure that there is a general, base level understanding of the meanings of complex terms such as nationalism, nation, and state. It is important to do so as these terms have been used in different

contexts throughout history and, depending on the context, they can have different meanings—I want to make sure that the meaning I wish to convey and the way in which I view these terms is explicit. Following this, Section 3 will look at the arguments made against religious nationalism by scholars who have studied the phenomenon. Here, after presenting the main arguments put forth by said scholars, I will offer counter arguments to assess the validity of these claims. In essence, Section 3 will deal with understanding whether the religious element of religious nationalism is truly to be blamed for the negative effects religious nationalism has had on society.

Following this, in Section 4, I will look at the role played by religious nationalism in British India and post-1947 Pakistan. Looking at this in-depth case study will allow us to better understand how religious nationalism can evolve in a region over time and how it can have both positive and negative consequences.

II. DEFINING KEY TERMS

In this section, I am going to look at the meaning of nationalism itself and assess how it has been viewed and described over time. The end result will be a working definition for the term ‘nationalism,’ and, in the process, I will look at the definition for the term ‘nation’. I will shed some light on why I decided to use one specific definition, as opposed to something else, and why it fits well with the overall argument I am trying to make. An important point to keep in mind in the process is that nationalism is, at its very core, a word. This statement sounds simplistic on its own, but it is important to recognize this fact, as nationalism is not a phenomenon that can be defined through empirical means. Nationalism is not something that can be observed in the natural world, thus making our task a definitional one, not an empirical one.

As a result of it being a definitional task, it is natural to see the word being defined in myriad ways with most, if not all, of the definitions varying based on the context in which they are used (Motyl 1992, 308). Giovanni Sartori, a renowned political scientist, recommends that the best approach one can take is to look at these different definitions and to isolate the core, fundamental concepts underlying each one of them (Motyl 1992, 307). By following this approach, I can tease out the base definition of the concept itself and to ignore the context-dependent variations that have been introduced along the way. Then, I can determine what definition works best in the context of this thesis.

A. Nation and State

The concept of nationalism cannot exist without the idea of a nation so let us focus on nations first¹. The idea of a nation as it is loosely understood today is very recent. Nations are considered to be groups of people that share the same heritage, culture, myths, language and in some cases, religion. This list is by no means exhaustive, but the general belief is that the word ‘nation’ refers to a group of people that is united by some common factor and the desire to control a territory that is thought of as the group's national homeland (Barrington 1997, 712-713). This common factor (or these common factors) can vary from one nation to another depending on what beliefs and traits they value more than others.

A state, on the other hand, refers to the political and territorial structures that house a population. This includes having a sovereign government to govern the populace within specific borders that are, at least in modern times, internationally recognized (PSU Geography of International Affairs 2021). Combining these two ideas gives rise to the idea of a ‘nation-state’, a sovereign state that is governed for the sake of a single, homogenous nation.

¹ The chicken and egg paradox of what came first also exists in this domain as there seems to be some degree of conflict amongst political scientists when it comes to determining whether nationalism stems from nations or whether nationalism gives rise to the idea of nations. Gellner argues for the latter where he states that nationalism engenders nations (Gellner 55). He recognizes that nationalism relies on pre-existing notions of cultural wealth, amongst other things, but he argues that these ideas alone do not have the ability to give rise to a nation. Nationalism weaponizes and radicalizes these ideas of cultural wealth and other phenomena that connect people, especially through shared heritage. It has the ability to revive dead languages, invent traditions and create ‘pristine purities’ (Gellner 56)—it gives rise to nations. Others argue for the former, that nations have to exist for nationalism to flourish. One individual in this group, Mellor, states that nationalism is simply a political expression of a nation’s aspirations (Mellor 1989). He believes that nations predate nationalism and that “every nation has its nationalism” and not the other way around (Mellor 1989, 6).

Keeping these definitions in mind, the ancient empires and kingdoms of Egypt, China, Persia, and Rome, amongst many others, do not meet today's definition of what is considered a nation or a nation-state. Some of these were simply "flocks led by a Son of the Sun or a Sun of Heaven" (Renan 1996) who cannot be considered citizens of a state nor did they lay claim to any territories as their historical homelands. The examples that do not fall into these cases share similarities with others: clans and collections of clans with no central, sovereign institutions and no historical, shared territory that they controlled or wished to control. Others constituted societies with feudal structures or empires that spanned such a large area that it would be impossible to consider them as singular nations or nation-states. At one point in time, Alexander the Great's empire covered swathes of land from Western Europe all the way to Central Asia, yet there are no nations today that derive their sense of national identity from his empire (Renan 1996).

For this thesis, however, looking at the modern-day ideas of nations should suffice. The timeline being studied does not stretch too far into the past, so the origins of nations is not a concern.. Some of the main attributes of modern day nationhood as described by Rasmussen (2001) are: (1) a common postulated relationship which can either be a blood relationship or, and this is the case more commonly, a relationship derived through a shared myth², (2) a shared cultural heritage, (3) linguistic coherence which can include one distinct language or multiple interlinked

² Here, the word myth does not refer to a story known to be false. Instead, it refers to a story or set of stories that the members of a nation believe to be a part of their origin, of their collective identity

languages where distinctness (when compared to other languages) is considered to have a great impact on the strength of national identity, (4) a sense of identification by the members of the nation to the nation they belong to. This list, as highlighted by Rasmussen as well, is not an exhaustive list, and a single nation is not expected to reflect all of these simultaneously to be considered a nation (Rasmussen 2001).

In conjunction with what has been discussed so far, Smith's definition of a nation can be used as the working definition for this thesis because it essentially conveys Rasmussen's main points in a more concise manner³. Smith defines a nation as "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith 1991, 14). While it can be argued that some of these points, such as the presence of common myths, come about as a result of a nation existing in the first place, the definition works well for this thesis.

³ Rasmussen does not add territory to this list as he believes that a group of people can be considered a nation without having its own distinct territory. His discussion on states and the combined idea of a nation-state includes territory as a focal component as that is when it becomes essential to do so. While Rasmussen's definition is more detailed, Smith's idea of a nation includes territorial claims as well. Therefore, I believe it is important to refer to both when thinking about what the word 'nation' means.

B. Nationalism

Now that we have a working definition for a 'nation', I can move on to defining nationalism.

There are two common approaches to defining nationalism. The first approach considers nationalism to be an idea or a belief while the second one considers nationalism to be a process.

Of the most prominent scholars in the first category, Ernst Haas, an expert on international relations theory, has perhaps the most basic and straightforward way of defining nationalism. He calls it "a belief held by a group of people that they ought to constitute a nation, or that they already are one" (Barrington 1997, 713). This way of thinking about nationalism is very common amongst people who have worked on the subject and the definitions put forth by Gellner, Motyl and Haas are considered standard ways of defining nationalism⁴.

The second category of people are those who define nationalism as a process rather than an idea. The scholars in this category look at features that define a nation, and they consider nationalism as the process through which these features are united to ultimately form a nation. Roy Mellor, who considers nationalism to be "the political expression of the nation's aspirations" (Mellor 1989, 5), is a prominent voice in this second category. The one aspect of nationalism most of these political scientists and theorists believe to be essential is that there is some claim to territory that is involved in their understanding of nationalism. Those in the first category believe

⁴ Another widely accepted definition is that one proposed by Rejai and Enloe who define nationalism as "an awareness of membership in a nation (potential or actual), together with a desire to achieve, maintain, and perpetuate the identity, integrity, and prosperity of that nation" (Rejai). This definition puts Rejai and Enloe in the group of people that consider nationalism to be an idea or a belief.

that nationalism as an idea is tied to common territorial descent to some degree or that it can be linked to a group of people that share common territory while those in the second category consider nationalism to be a process whereby a group of people can lay claim to a territory as theirs.

Synthesizing the definitions of nationalism put forth by different scholars, across both categories, and focusing solely on the fundamental, underlying arguments, there are two key features of nationalism that appear especially prominent (Barrington 1997). The first one is that almost all nationalisms define a set of territorial boundaries (which do not have to be very precise) that a nation should have the right to control. The second one focuses on the boundaries for the nation itself i.e., the criteria that an individual needs to fulfil to be considered a member of the nation. The second feature is where Smith and Rasmussen's definitions of a nation, which was examined earlier in this section, come into play. These two features are both important when looking at modern day nationalisms such as Indian nationalism, ethnic nationalism in Rwanda and religious nationalism in Israel, amongst others. All involve (to some degree) a claim to territory. Moreover, those within said territory should conform to the image of a person who belongs to that nation. This will be discussed in detail in the next section when the examples will be explored in detail.

I believe that Jonathan Hearn, a sociologist, has defined nationalism in a way that applies perfectly as a working definition in the context of this thesis. In his book, *Rethinking Nationalism*, Hearn writes that nationalism is “the making of combined claims, on behalf of a

population, to identity, to jurisdiction and to territory” (Hearn 2006, 11). This definition succinctly combines both the key features I have highlighted earlier while not including any context dependent stipulations that do not apply in modern day nationalisms.

C. Religious Nationalism

With this understanding of the meaning of the words ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’, I can move on to defining the phrase ‘religious nationalism’. Before arriving at a general understanding of what religious nationalism is, it is important to understand what it is not. The general assumption in today’s day and age is that nationalism is a secular phenomenon, that it relates to and interacts with nations in a purely secular, nonreligious way. The reason why this is so has to do with our understanding of nations and nationalism. Looking back to the operational definitions of both of these, it is clear that there is no explicit mention of religion apart from one case: where common religion can contribute to a group of people considering themselves a nation. Even in this case, however, other factors such as shared heritage, culture, language etc. need to come into play to strengthen that feeling of nationhood. Perhaps the only modern-day exceptions to this statement are the states of Pakistan and Israel, both of which are considered ‘ideological states’ (Devji 2013, 4) formed on the basis of religion itself.

Nationalism in the case of every other state, as a result, is considered to be nonreligious by default. Therefore, when religion is mixed with nationalism to give rise to religious nationalism, the end result is considered a perversion of nationalism. This idea of religion perverting nationalism stems from the belief that religion is something that is personal and should remain

out of the public sphere. Following the shift toward the separation of church and state in the second half of the second millennium, spearheaded by Enlightenment thinkers and constitutionalized by the United States (Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life 2007), this belief has simply grown stronger. So, when religion, something which should be kept private, starts playing an active role in nationalism, which exists in the public sphere, it leads people to draw the conclusion that the end results will not be good for society. They believe that religious nationalism can lead to dangerous outcomes as a result of the infusion of ‘otherworldly’ significance and beliefs that cannot be explained or supported through factual debates (Omer and Springs 2013, 1). One implicit assumption that lies within this line of reasoning is that nationalism is a modern and progressive concept while religion is something of the past, relying on beliefs that are ignorant of the progress humanity has made in the past few centuries. This leads to the conclusion that any degree of religion in nationalism will simply alter the latter for the worse.

I do not agree with this line of reasoning as it is overly simplistic. Boiling down two complex institutions like religion and nationalism into such simple categories leads to an incorrect view of religious nationalism as a combined institution. However, this argument is one that is supported by quite a few political scientists and theorists, so I would be doing an injustice to that school of thought if I chose to completely ignore their arguments. At the forefront of this modernist view of religious nationalism is Mark Juergensmeyer. Juergensmeyer (1994) , like many others, believes that religious nationalism and secular nationalism are entirely different; that they are polar opposites of one another. He states that these institutions encompass “competing ideologies” (Juergensmeyer 1994, 26-44) with secular nationalism being the preferred option

over religious nationalism in every case. The latter, he believes, leads to divisions within society. I will look at Juergensmeyer's comments and arguments in detail in the next section where they will become more relevant.

Based on what I have described so far, it is evident that there is no single way to define religious nationalism and that like nationalism, this definition is rooted in context. For the purpose of this thesis, I am more interested in defining religious nationalism in comparison with secular nationalism as British India saw a rise in secular nationalist sentiments first, which were then infused with religious divisions to give rise to religious nationalist movements. Brubaker, in an extensive study on the matter, concludes that there are essentially four ways to look at the relationship between religious nationalism and secular nationalism (Brubaker 2011, 2-12). These are:

1. Religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena
2. Religion as a cause or explanation of nationalism
3. Religion as intertwined with nationalism
4. Religious nationalism as a distinctive kind of nationalism

I have already looked at case (4) by elaborating on the research carried out by Juergensmeyer and (3) by discussing the existence of a symbiotic relationship between religious and secular nationalism as described by Hibbard. One of the main arguments put forth in support of case (2) is that religion can serve as one of the unifying factors for bringing a nation together and ultimately giving rise to nationalism. In this case, nationalism is still considered secular, and

religion is one of the components needed to form a nation, nothing more. I will briefly discuss the last case to ensure a holistic understanding of the subject before moving on.

Nationalisms that define themselves as being secular or explicitly nonreligious, Max Weber argues, still have some elements of religion present within them. Weber states that secular nationalism still uses cultural, religious, and ethnic resources to help build the sense of being a part of a nation and to cement a group identity (Omer and Springs 2013, 44). In *Essays on Nationalism*, Hayes makes the argument that secular nationalism can be thought of as a religion in and of itself. He explores the determination that a group of people might have and the source of strength that motivates them to “subordinate all other human loyalties to national loyalty” (Hayes 1933, 94).

What gives rise to a group of individuals’ tendency to come together on the basis of something they collectively believe in has been a topic of discussion for generations. Humans, since the dawn of time, have been distinguished from other life forms as they have the ability to have a “religious sense” (Hayes 1933, 95) that transcends the physical world. This argument is very similar to the concepts of ‘profane self vs sacred self’ put forth by Emile Durkheim, a sociologist whose work has influenced most, if not all, authors I have brought up so far. “A man cannot enter into intimate relations with sacred things until he has rid himself of all that is profane” (Giddens and Durkheim 1972, 233). There are parallels between this and Hayes’ argument, with the sacred entity being national loyalty and the profane entity being other loyalties that one has. This is very similar to how most mainstream religions function where one is expected to put

religion and, in the case of monotheistic faiths, a supreme deity, above all else. Anthony Smith, Brubaker suggests, holds the same belief; for Smith, nationalism is “a religion both in a substantive sense, in so far as it entails a quest for a kind of this-worldly collective ‘salvation’, and in a functional sense, in so far as it involves a ‘system of beliefs and practices that distinguishes the sacred from the profane and unites its adherents in a single moral community of the faithful’” (Brubaker 2011, 3).

At a very basic level, as can be deciphered from Smith’s discussion of the subject, there are two main points put forth by those who believe that nationalism can be considered a form of religion: (1) both demand utmost loyalty towards one entity and (2) both have a system of beliefs and symbols that connect and bring their followers together. Therefore, it is important to understand that nationalism itself, in most cases, has quasi-religious qualities which is why the argument that religious nationalism is a perverted form of secular nationalism does not make logical sense. Moreover, the negative aspects commonly attributed to religious nationalism can also be connected to the quasi-religious qualities of nationalism itself—an arena I will explore further in the next section.

Out of the four highlighted cases above, it is now important to decide which case makes the most sense for the purpose of this thesis. I have already alluded to this earlier but case 3 (Religion as intertwined with nationalism), is perhaps the one case that is most prominent in the context of post-independence Pakistan while case 4 (Religious nationalism as a distinctive kind of nationalism) will help explain some of the earlier developments of Islamic nationalism towards

the start of the 20th century. Prior to the split that occurred along religious lines after the formation of the All-India Muslim League in 1906, Indian nationalism was one collective institution. The Indian people's national and religious interests were being jointly represented. In this context, the form of nationalism that was prevalent would fall under the umbrella of case 1 (Religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena). Therefore, even within the example of Indian nationalism extending from British India to modern day Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, the nationalisms involved are multi-faceted. In conclusion, there is a high degree of nuance involved in analyzing religious nationalism, so simply labeling it as a perverted or distorted form of secular nationalism would be unjust.

III. CRITIQUING ARGUMENTS AGAINST RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

After looking at the definitions for some key terms that I will be using in this thesis, the next step is to shift the focus towards religious nationalism and how it has been viewed over time by different scholars and researchers. To better understand the rift between secular and religious nationalism, I will expand on the arguments put forth by scholars on the subject of religious nationalism and why they think it is a perversion of secular nationalism or otherwise undesirable.

Religion, in this school of thought, is considered a thing of the past; an institution that has no place in modern times. Most writers on the subject, such as Rupert Emerson, are of the view that secular nationalism should replace the hold that religion has had on societies around the world (Juergensmeyer 1994; Emerson 1960, 158; Acquaviva 1979, 83). When writing his book, *From Empire to Nation*, Emerson (1960) held that secular nationalism would leave its Western confines and take over the whole world. He acknowledged that the wave of secular nationalism in the West happened in conjunction with a downfall of religion.

This rise in secular nationalism and a subsequent decline in the hold of religious institutions was, and still is, considered the West's gift to the rest of the world as it was seen as a shift away from the arcane ways of religion and towards modernity (Juergensmeyer 1994, 14). In framing it as such, and keeping in mind that this point of view is one that is a very popular one, it is evident how religion has been demonized and reduced to simply being an institution of that past that enlightened humans do not, and should not, believe in.

Karl Marx famously said that “religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people” (Marx 1844). He believed that it offered people a way to come to terms with their daily oppression. Freud compared religion to a “childhood neurosis” (Freud 1927). Acceptance of secularization became so widespread that “the consensus was such that not only did the theory [remain] uncontested but apparently it was not even necessary to test it, since everybody took it for granted” (Casanova 1994, 17).

The opposition to religious nationalism, it appears, is not solely directed towards nationalism that draws its sense of nationhood from religious roots. In fact, the opposition starts from religion itself. Most scholars who write about religious nationalism, especially those who consider it to be evil or detrimental to society, believe that religion itself is an institution that is old and arcane—an institution that should not exist in the modern world. Their reasoning is generally motivated by the post Enlightenment way of viewing religion.

Similarly, Freud believed that there were similarities between believing in religion and having childhood neurosis (Barker 2014, 3), and many other Enlightenment thinkers would agree with Marx and Freud. This same belief is already held very strongly in scholarly circles in the West, as a result of the Enlightenment, that paved the way for the separation of the church and state (Friedland 2001, 126). When it comes to the study of religious nationalism, most literature seems to amplify this belief. More recently, this view has seeped through to the East, especially in states that gained independence in the 20th century. An example of such influence is that of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, who famously said “there is no going back”

(Juergensmeyer 1994, 12) to segregating and differentiating based on religious beliefs; he stated that modernity and secularism were the only ways for India to move forward.

In this section, I will look at some of the main lines of argument put forth by those who believe that religious nationalism does not lead to any positive outcomes for society or that it leads to episodes of violence in more extreme cases. In each of the following subsections, I will first discuss the four main themes that appear in writings by critics of religious nationalism, and then I will provide counter arguments against them.

A. Argument 1

Religious nationalists, particularly those in the East, have not ‘modernized’ enough to understand that a rational compact between people can be enough to unify them around a shared sense of identity

Perhaps the most salient point of argument that is made against religious nationalism, and nation-states around the globe which are influenced by religion, is this idea that religion’s active presence in the public sphere is a relic of the past. From the early 1600s onwards, societies in Europe started experiencing a shift in how they governed themselves. The church started losing power, and a secular, national culture started becoming the underlying, unifying factor that brought together a nation (Rieffer 2003, 231-232). This process of separation of church and state did not happen overnight; it happened gradually over the course of a few centuries. It is heralded

as a great step towards modernization, especially by Enlightenment thinkers who believed the separation to be an “essential condition for freedom” (Friedland 2001, 126).

Religion was blamed for giving the state a certain degree of absolutism in its rule which then led to acts of violence. Once relegated to the private sphere, it appears that they believed religion would not have the same degree of control over the people and, as a result, there would be less acts of violence. This process of Enlightenment, of the shift from nations being defined on the basis of religion to something more secular, did not carry over to the East, however.

The presence of religion in the public sphere is one of the main reasons why the adoption of secular nationalism has not been as successful in the East. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a Palestinian leader, asserts that politics should not exist independently of religion and any argument otherwise i.e. that religion should not influence politics, is a Western concept that does not apply to nation states in the East (Juergensmeyer 1994, 6). Proponents of religious nationalism, Juergensmeyer (1994) notes, believe that the foundation of a nation cannot be formed only on the basis of politics and secular culture; this void needs to be filled simultaneously with a political and religious approach, with the latter informing the former. Religious nationalists reject the idea that a nation’s political order can be based on a rational compact that aims to bring people who live in close geographical proximity together through a set of laws and secular politics.

Scholars who criticize religious nationalism, when making the case against the presence of religion as a unifying force for a nation, relegate religious nationalism to a perverted form of secular nationalism. They believe that religious nationalism leads to “disruption of order and loss

of life... and, at times, even massacres associated with religious persecution” (Armstrong 1997, 598). These massacres include, but are not limited to, Western Europe labeling Eastern Christians as heretics and killing them, the massacre of the Jews, and the conflicts between Christians and Muslims that have lasted centuries (Armstrong 1997, 599).

Enlightenment thinkers, in line with modern day scholars who oppose religious nationalism, believed that a secular worldview along with understanding the world through rational explanations (Rieffer 2003, 232), instead of relying on religious superstition, would allow humanity to progress past these evils of religion. While religious nationalisms do bring people together, they “violate civil society’s codes” (Friedland 2001, 149); by contrast, these scholars believe that having a rational compact that unites people would allow a nation to surpass these negatives. In short, religious nationalism is based on a set of pre-modern beliefs that humanity should shed in its current post-enlightenment phase.

These same scholars highlight that many cases of religious nationalism and violence induced by religious nationalists involve some degree of retaliation against the West. This may include, at a very basic level, disliking Western teachings and ideals, and in more extreme cases, hatred directed towards Western states that had colonized the religious nationalists’ countries at some point in time. The main factors that contribute to this animosity include the fact that Western nations actively advocate that religion should exist only in the private sphere and that these nations were once colonizers of most Eastern states.

This leads scholars to argue that religious nationalists actively choose to either continue or revert to letting religion influence political and social structures simply because they want to retaliate against the West. The underlying assumption here is that if these religious nationalists were truly rational beings and weighed the pros and cons of secularization, instead of simply retaliating against it, they would opt to relegate religion to the private sphere.

Critique on Argument 1

The core argument here uses the Enlightenment as a foundation. Scholars mention it directly or indirectly to support their argument that nations where religion is still present in the public sphere are inherently backward given their lack of understanding that a rational compact between people can be enough to unify them around a shared sense of identity. This claim stems from the belief that religion in the public sphere brings superstition, old beliefs that do not rely on rationality, and intolerance with it, all of which are detrimental to society.

However, some of these scholars seem to believe that religion as an institution should cease to exist while prominent Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire, Kant and Hume did not categorically state that all religion was evil and should be completely removed from all facets of life (Byrne and Houlden 2014). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts Enlightenment religion in four categories: “deism, religion of the heart, fideism and atheism” (Bristow 2017). Deism is believed to be the form of religion that is most closely associated with the Enlightenment. In deism, the general belief is that the universe was created by a supreme

intelligence. This being, however, does not interfere with our daily lives, and we are to rely on our own reasoning as humans to shape and guide our lives rather than relying on miracles or special revelations in the form of religious scriptures and the like (Bristow 2017).

Therefore, the notion that the Enlightenment called for the shedding of religion in general is one that is not supported by the thinkers that gave rise to the movement itself. Even more importantly, the hallmark of the Enlightenment was a commitment to rationality, and secular nationalism does not appear to be any more rational than religious nationalism. Therefore, even though the Enlightenment thinkers called for religion to be relegated to the private sphere, scholars using this fact to argue that religious nationalism is not as desirable as secular nationalism need to be cognizant of the fact that these same Enlightenment thinkers would not support secular nationalism either.

It is even more important to understand the geographic origins of the Enlightenment and how religion functioned in the regions that went through this transformative phase compared to the regions that did not give rise to a similar breed of thinkers. Within Christianity itself, the split between Western Catholics and Eastern Orthodox Christians gave rise to two very different versions of the church-state relationship. The latter demanded “submission to earthly rulers” (Veith 2019) thereby calling for a closer relationship between the church and state while the former has often defined itself by defying the state (Tooley 2019).

As a result, even though the church was involved in politics in both regions to a great degree, separating church and state in the West was not as monumental a task as doing so in the East.

Moreover, by the time of the Enlightenment, a lot of the Eastern regions that were previously under the influence of Christianity now had a different dominant religion—Islam. Islam’s view on the church-state relationship is no secret; Muslims believe in the authority of Sharia law as the supreme law of the land. The presence of codified principles and laws that come together to form the basis of Sharia law leads to an even stronger intertwining of church and state, making the two inseparable. Therefore, the separation of church and state was a lot easier to accomplish in the West when compared to the East, and even then it is evident, through the current renewed religious fervor and religious nationalism in the West (Barker 2014, 12), that they failed to achieve true secularization as well.

Religion is still very much present in the public sphere in regions that gave birth to the Enlightenment. Wuthnow (1992, 4) argues that it is always around us; we are not as good at seeing it as we might think. However, for argument's sake, it can be assumed that Western Europe, the birthplace of the Enlightenment, was truly able to achieve secularization. In this scenario, there is no involvement from religious entities in politics and religion is an entirely private matter for all individuals. If this were the case, arguments put forth by scholars against the East, as discussed above, would have a lot more credibility. In this case, however, I see an even more problematic line of argument. The Enlightenment galvanized the gradual separation of church and state in a society where doing so was easy, given the relatively weaker nature of that relationship.

Using this model of separation and stating that it be enforced in the East i.e. the East should remove religion from the public sphere and rely on a rational compact as a unifying factor,

without considering the fact that the nature of the church-state relationship in the East is very different, simply propagates, to a certain degree, the same kind of thinking that led to the colonization of regions such as Africa at the hands of the Europeans. This idea that the progress and advancements made by Western European civilizations made them superior to more ‘backward’ societies is what led to the civilizing missions in Africa (Conklin 1997). Now it is obvious that this notion of superiority was based on nothing but scientific racism—racism that ran rampant not just in Western Europe but in the world’s first explicitly secular nation, the United States, as well. The argument that secular Western nation-states and political structures are more sound and better off than the religion-influenced nations in the East is not too different from Nott (1851, 3) stating that the “White” race is intellectually superior to the “Red and Black” races.

Moreover, even the West, despite having a considerable head start in the secularization process, occasionally struggles with keeping religion in the private sphere (Barker 2014, 6-8).

Considering that the East did not go through the same process of Enlightenment and secularization, establishing a secular nationalist identity instead of one that relies on religious foundations is significantly harder.

The second part of the argument being looked at is concerned with the idea that religious nationalists refuse to believe in secular models simply to retaliate against the West and its teachings. This argument appears to be a bit simplistic in nature as it ignores the fact that most countries in the East boast a collectivist culture that revolves around large family units and being interdependent in society (Cohen, Wu and Miller 2016). This culture of collectivism is supported

by religious teachings across a variety of faiths, and it stands in stark contrast to the individualistic culture that is very common in most Western states. This individualism exists, in part, as a result of religion not playing as public a role in the West as it does in the East.

As a result, religious nationalists argue that Western secular teachings calling for a departure from religion can result in a more individualistic society which can prove detrimental for the country. They are not simply retaliating against the West; they are trying to preserve their way of life.

Moreover, this dislike of Western teachings does not stem solely from a religious perspective. The collectivist culture in the East is not simply a direct result of religious influence (Cohen, Wu and Miller 2016). Religion and culture, when both exist in the public sphere, have a much more complex relationship than simply affecting each other. Therefore, the argument that the secular teachings and forms of governance promoted by the West can lead to more individualization and inevitably lead to the breakdown of society are backed by both, religion and culture.

The last point, i.e. religious nationalists dislike Western nations and ideals because they were colonized by Western countries at some point in time, is very straightforward and does not merit a long discussion. Since religious institutions, as stated earlier, were able to operate independently to some degree under colonization, they did not assimilate or integrate themselves into the colonial state as much as other institutions. Their hatred, therefore, is more pronounced since they were never really a part of the colonial administration and in most cases, actively struggled or fought against them. One might argue that the religious nationalists' rejection of

Western teachings is more so an act of retaliation then, rather than them truly trying to understand what the other side is proposing and making a fair and just decision.

However, there are instances where the people actively wanted to go back to the way of life they were used to when they were not being colonized by another nation, such as the case of Azerbaijan (which will be expanded upon in Argument 4). The retaliation, therefore, is understandable, and the need to want to live a life in the way they were used to, before having to live under the oppression of a foreign colonial power, is justified. To view it simply as them hating Western teachings and principles is an oversimplification and an injustice to them.

In conclusion, the idea that nations in the East, where religion is still influential in the public sphere, should make an active effort to secularize themselves as was done in Western Europe through the Enlightenment tends towards absolutism. One can make arguments in favor of measures that would limit this religious influence, and the benefits that come with doing so, but the way that current pro-secularization arguments are presented do not take into account the societal, cultural, and historical differences between the West and the East. Theoretically, secularization might lead to better outcomes for most nations but given the nature of the church-state relationship in the East, especially in majority Muslim states, it might not be possible to do so at this point in time.

B. Argument 2

Religion gives those in power the authority to declare when violence is moral and justified and when it is not

Religion, especially in the case of the Abrahamic religions of Islam and Christianity, has frequently resorted to violence to expand its following and to solidify its stronghold amongst the people already under its influence (Kung 2005). Drawing on the definition of religion from the second section, it can be understood that the follower of a religion is required to completely submit to an entity and cause that transcends humanity and the physical world in general. As Emile Durkheim would phrase it, belief and submission in religion fulfil one's need for the 'sacred' (Durkheim and Thompson 2004, 86). Therefore, any acts carried out by a follower of a certain religion to bring more followers into the fold can be considered a part of one's faith. In this scenario, there is no cause greater than that of spreading the knowledge and message of the supreme entity (or entities) of religion. This line of reasoning can be applied to both peaceful acts and acts of violence as both are being committed for the greater good.

Sabrina Ramet (2005), in her analysis of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, notes that the Serbian Orthodox church actively discouraged using dialogue and peaceful measures to diffuse the situation. Instead of resolving the conflict in a peaceful manner, the church instilled within its followers the belief that engaging in violent conflict against Muslims was a religious duty (Ramet 2005), with the implicit assumption that not doing so would make one less religious. Despite there being an alternate way, the church chose violence. In one of its pronouncements, it stated "Once again, the Serbian nation is on the cross... to the malicious and aggressive

Muslims: ‘Forgive us for killing you, but we cannot forgive you if you force us to kill you’” (Ramet 2005, 270-271). This use of religious imagery by the church, “the Serbian nation is on *the cross*” (Ramet 2005, 270-271), along with telling its followers that killing Muslims was a sacred duty, is believed to be a common aspect of religious nationalism, according to its opponents.

Similarly, Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, leader of Tanzim al-Jihad and a radical Islamist and theorist who played a role in the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, described Islam to be a religion of warfare (Juergensmeyer 1994, 60). He argued that Muslims around the world have to commit to *jihad*, which, according to him, meant actual violent conflict and nothing else. He, along with his followers, denied that the world had any allegorical meanings and called for Muslims to take up arms to fulfil their rightful duty. In his case, the rightful duty was removing Anwar Sadat, who had tried to take a more neutral approach in striking a balance between the pro-religious political group on the one hand and the pro-secular political group on the other. Despite Sadat’s best effort to appease the Muslim nationalists while also trying not to turn Egypt into a completely Islamic state, he was assassinated by Faraj’s group (Juergensmeyer 1994, 37).

Juergensmeyer, in his analysis of the Sikh opposition to the Indian government, highlights similar characteristics to the Serbian and Egyptian examples. In his conversations with a group of Sikh fighters, who believe that the Sikhs should have their own nation, he noticed that they were attached to their cause both politically and religiously. The group in question discussed that Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a militant Sikh who was ‘martyred’ by the Indian government in

1984, was their “symbol for radical opposition to the Indian government” (Juergensmeyer 1994, 91). Bhindranwale gave up his life for a cause he believed in, a cause motivated by his religious beliefs, and his sacrifice glorified the idea of violent opposition for the sake of religious freedom. Juergensmeyer goes on to look at other examples from South and Southeast Asian countries, the Middle East, and Africa, to highlight similar circumstances that exist across different religions and nations. Similarly, Armstrong (1997, 597) makes the same argument that religious leaders glorify violence, and in doing so, they push their followers to commit violent acts with the belief that they are doing so for a sacred cause.

Critique on argument 2

The arguments made against religious nationalism and the periods of violence to which it has led to are based on sound, factual evidence. Religious nationalism in regions such as the Middle East, India and Bosnia-Herzegovina has indeed led to violent episodes and, in some cases, the persecution of religious minorities. These acts of violence are visibly carried out along religious lines with believers of one faith attacking those of another or, as is the case with the Sikh example, one religious group engaging in violence for self-determination and/or religious freedom.

However, even though it is nearly impossible to make a strong case that these events were not motivated by religious nationalism, it is important to understand whether these acts of violence were a result of religion or nationalism. More specifically, it is necessary to decipher whether it is the religious element within religious nationalism that motivated these events or whether it is

the nature of nationalism itself that gives rise to violence. I argue that it is the latter. I do not mean that all nationalism leads to violence, however, the inherent ‘othering’ that comes about as a direct result of nationalism, regardless of whether it happens across religious, cultural or ethnic lines (amongst others), is what leads to such episodes of violence.

More specifically, through the use of historical examples, I aim to show in what follows that secular nationalism can give rise to episodes of violence at least as severe as those found in polities under the sway of religious nationalism. The cause of violence, I will contend, is not then religion but instead the inherent ‘othering’ that comes about as a direct result of nationalism, regardless of whether it happens across religious, cultural, or ethnic lines (amongst others). Take, for example, the Rwandan genocide, which occurred at the tail end of the 20th Century. Rwanda has historically had three prominent ethnic groups. In order of size, they are the Hutus, the Tutsis and the Twa. In 1932, 85% of the population were identified as Hutu, 14% as Tutsi and 1% as Twa (United Nations 2021).

The Tutsis had historically been in positions of power and were better off than the Hutu, the latter being the subjugated class (Human Rights Watch 1999). This was a result of the Tutsi minority belonging to the royal class, a status quo that existed for centuries. Under the Belgian colonization of Rwanda from 1916 to 1962, however, this disparity was given a new racial angle. The Tutsis and Hutus were divided across rigid ethnic lines through the issuance of identification cards that identified them as such based on physical characteristics and genealogy (Human Rights Watch 1999). The Belgians, during their rule, further reinforced the notion that the Tutsi

were superior to the Hutus by disproportionately awarding them positions of power within official circles.

Naturally, this led to a deep-seated resentment towards the Tutsis by the Hutus (Ahluwalia 1997, 501-502). This resentment saw violent releases at various points around the 1961 elections, which were marked by the departure of the Belgians and in sporadic intervals up until the 1994 genocide. Following independence, the Hutus were in control of the government, and a rebellion by Tutsis in 1963 resulted in the death of 20,000 Rwandan Tutsis—a pattern that continued until a bloodless military coup in 1973 (United Nations 2021). Many efforts were made to resolve the ethnic divisions that had been laid down by the Belgians. By this point, however, half the Rwandan Tutsi population was living in exile, and they were motivated by strong nationalist sentiments to take back what they believed to be their rightful position as the superior ethnicity in Rwanda.

A series of violent episodes spanning three decades culminated in what is now known as the Rwandan genocide which led to the massacre of about 1,000,000 people including Tutsis and moderate Hutus (who did not wish to partake in the massacre against the Tutsis) and the rape of an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 women, all over the course of a hundred days (United Nations 2021). The Rwandan genocide is one of the most violent events in recent human history and it was evidently motivated by ethnic nationalism. The Tutsis were led to believe they were the superior ethnicity which resulted in the oppression of the Hutus—the same idea of “us vs. them” that is present in almost every nationalist movement.

Another similar example is that of the Holocaust. The Holocaust is perhaps the first example that many think of when presented with the word genocide, given the sheer intensity of the massacre that unfolded under Nazi Germany. While the genocide was carried out against a group of people identified by their faith, a pattern of oppression that scholars blame religious nationalism for instigating as well, the Holocaust was not perpetrated by individuals motivated by religion. There is some debate as to what the main factors were that led Hitler to hate the Jews enough to kill them, but none of them devote too much energy towards their faith, specifically. At the forefront, it is believed that he had a deep-seated hatred for the Jewish population, not just in Germany, but across the world. He blamed them for “all failings” (Holocaust Matters 2021). In the German case, he blamed the Jews for Germany’s loss in the First World War, their influence in banking and finance and their “role” in causing the Great Depression in 1929 (Holocaust Matters 2021), amongst other reasons.

The argument that the Holocaust was motivated by religion would be baseless considering the fact that Hitler did not think highly of religion in general and was critical of other religions as well, especially Christianity which he considered “a religion fit only for the slaves” (Bullock 1962, 389). Therefore, it is evident that even one of the most notable genocides in recent human history was fueled by the sense of superiority that nationalism can instill within a group of people. Even though a large proportion of the group of people being targeted belonged to a specific faith, religion had little to do with it.

Nor are the examples of Rwanda or the Holocaust unique. Think too of the Cambodian genocide, the Armenian genocide, and the genocide in Bangladesh in 1971. All of these suggest that

religion should not be blamed for the violence that erupts through religious nationalism—it is the nature of nationalism that motivates people to engage in such acts. In all these cases, those who were carrying out or supporting the massacres were led to believe that it was their moral duty to do so and that it was completely justified.

C. Argument 3

Religious nationalism promotes one religion above all else and the followers of this religion are deemed superior to those who do not follow it (Grim and Finke 2011).

This line of argument makes intuitive sense as it is evident through our discussion thus far that religious nationalism is based on the belief that a certain religion is the true religion, and it should guide the public and private lives of the nation's members. The general consensus amongst scholars is if a religious nationalist movement achieves its goals and is able to establish its faith as the prime religion for all those who live within the geographical confines of the nation at hand, other religions will be considered secondary or inferior. In some cases, there is also a shift from being the oppressed religious group toward being the oppressor, as was the case with Shia Muslims in Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein (Grim and Finke 2011, xii). This holds true even for religions that theoretically preach equality as is the case with Sinhalese Buddhism and its followers' determination to establish superiority over the minority religious groups in Sri Lanka (DeVotta 2007, 2).

Religious nationalism is unlikely to exist without establishing one religion as the true religion and, by extension, every other religion as inferior and false. This can be seen through the examples of the Hindutva in India (Malji 2020), which has led to countless acts of violence against the minority Muslims in India (Bajoria 2020), the Islamization of Zia's Pakistan that singled out minority religious groups (Hassan 1985, 264), the atrocities committed against the Rohingya Muslims in Burma by the majority Buddhists (Zaman 2020, 27), and many others. Although many of the religious scriptures and teachings for each of these religions preach nonviolence and harmony, it appears that these teachings do not matter as much when religion is infused with nationalism. Establishing religious superiority, most commonly through violent means, becomes the priority.

Critique on Argument 3

Of the four lines of argument in this section, this is perhaps the easiest to counter. What all these authors find detestable about religious nationalism is the foundation of nationalism itself. Nationalism, as per our working definition, is the making of combined claims, on behalf of a population, to identity, to jurisdiction, and to territory. To make these combined claims, the population relies on something that brings it together. This *something*, in the case of religious nationalism, is religion. Naturally, when this *something* brings a group of people together, others will be excluded. Similar patterns of 'othering' exist in nearly every form of nationalism, so nationalism itself is to blame for this, not religion.

Forgoing the terms ‘imagined communities’ and ‘worldviews’ used by authors from whom he draws some degree of inspiration (‘imagined communities’ by Anderson and ‘worldviews’ by Smart), Juergensmeyer instead refers to religious and secular nationalisms as “ideologies of order” (Juergensmeyer 1994, 31) with the explicit intention of using a phrase that has political connotations. In his comparison, he draws on works by Gellner and Weber to make the claim that a core feature of secular nationalism is the act of submitting to an “ordering agent” (Juergensmeyer 1994, 32). This is not too different from religious nationalism where the ordering agent, instead of simply being the state, is a divine or sacred entity. In both religious and secular nationalism, one is expected to submit to the ordering agent and not doing so results in the individual being alienated or ‘othered’.

The Rwandan example shows how a group of people belonging to one ethnicity deemed themselves superior to the other ethnicities, much akin to how a group of people might consider themselves to be religiously superior to followers of other faiths. Another example is that of Pakistan and what Pandey and Samad (2007) term the “Punjabistan of Pakistan”. The Punjab province of Pakistan is home to almost half of the population and generally has a disproportionately higher representation in politics. Furthermore, the province is also home to the Pakistan Army which has ruled the nation with an iron fist ever since its inception, either through direct military rule or indirectly from behind the scenes (Ranjan 2012, 105). Even under civilian leadership, a hostile Punjab has enough strength and control to topple a national administration—a harsh realization that the Sindhi Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had during her short tenure from 1988-1990.

This pattern of provincial superiority, coupled with the fact that Punjabi is more widely spoken than Urdu, the national language, makes it evident that there exists a form of provincial nationalism within Pakistan where the populous Punjab undermines those who do not come from Punjab. This provincial superiority plays out in myriad ways, especially in terms of development and water distribution, with Punjab getting a disproportionate share of both. This ‘othering’ of non-Punjabis proved to be a pivotal factor in the separation, and subsequent independence, of East Pakistan in 1971 and it continues to be one of the main factors fueling the insurgency in Balochistan today (International Crisis Group 2007). Therefore, to argue that religious nationalism has a concerning pattern of relegating those with religious beliefs different than those in power to an inferior position is a critique of nationalism, not religion. This same phenomenon can be seen across other forms of nationalism such as secular or ethnic nationalism.

D. Argument 4

Religious nationalists have a certain degree of power in the East that they do not wish to lose—this prevents those nations from adopting a model of secular nationalism.

There is one theme that appears across multiple scholarly works when looking at religious nationalist leaders in the East, and it is the influence they have in their respective nations. These leaders do not wish to lose the influence that they have in their respective societies. This leads critics to believe that Eastern nations would adopt a secular model if these religious leaders did not have this power and influence over them. As a result, religious nationalist movements in these regions are not simply movements calling for religious order and supremacy; they are also

reactionary and revolutionary in nature (Fox 2004). The religious leaders feel threatened by the ideas of secularization that are promoted by the West and actively retaliate against them.

Most of the states that fall in this category were colonized by a Western European country at some point. While colonial states were in charge of most public institutions in their colonies, religious institutions continued to operate independently. Following the departure of these colonial states, these religious institutions had some of the nation's "most effective systems of communication" (Juergensmeyer 1995, 384) and religious leaders were often "more devoted, efficient, and intelligent than government officials" (Juergensmeyer 1995, 384). As a result, intervention by religious leaders was not particularly difficult and religion could not be sidelined or pushed into the private sphere as it had been in the West. The reins of government, the belief that they are carrying out a sacred duty, and the basic human desire of wanting to have power in authority makes religious nationalists reluctant to give up power. Since scenarios like this are commonplace in the East, an overall shift towards secular nationalism and politics was, and remains, virtually impossible.

There have been cases where leaders have pushed for religion to exit the public sphere and for the nation-state to adopt a truly secular model of government. Juergensmeyer (1994) looks at the example of India which was formed as a secular state in 1947. Three generations of Prime Ministers, Jawaharlal Nehru, his daughter Indira Gandhi, and his grandson Rajiv Gandhi, all tried to develop secular Indian nationalism that would bring the nation together irrespective of religion or ethnicity. In doing so, however, they did have to make concessions to religious groups at times. Despite this, the religious nationalists were too strong, and accepting all their demands

would effectively reduce India to a religious nationalist state in all but name—something that one can argue has already happened in modern-day India.

In return for not bending over backwards to meet the demands of religious nationalist groups or for taking bold stances against them, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by Sikh nationalists (Juergensmeyer 1994, 37). Rajiv Gandhi was greatly disliked for the same reason and suffered a similar fate, albeit at the hands of Tamil nationalists for India's role in the Sri Lankan conflict against the Tamils—yet another movement involving elements of religious nationalism (Mitra 1991). On the other hand, there are examples of rulers using a nation's religious beliefs to their benefit.

As Hibbard describes it, “mainstream political elites... helped to normalize illiberal [exclusivist] religious ideologies and brought these ideas into the political mainstream” (Hibbard 2012, 5). This description of the relationship between those in power (politically) and how they used religion to their benefit is one that fits almost perfectly in certain situations when looking at the timeline of religious nationalism-inspired events that occurred in British India and post-independence Pakistan. One prominent example is that of Zia-ul-Haq. The military dictator came into power on the back of a wave of nationalist sentiment that the serving Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was unable to properly lead the country (Mohammadi 2017, 1). After deposing Bhutto, he imposed martial law in the country and stayed in power for a decade till 1988. During this time, Zia started his process of *Islamization* and would frequently use religion as a political card to prove his government's legitimacy when things started going awry (Mohammadi 2017, 2).

In general, religious activists want nearly complete control, and efforts to strike a balance by secular governments are not reciprocated in kind. They are well aware, in most cases, of the power and influence they hold, and they choose to use it to their benefit. In cases like that of Pakistan, yet another post-colonial state, these religious nationalists have very large and strong followings making them effectively invincible. If the government chooses to enact true secular democracy, it is at risk of losing everything to religious fanatics. If the government instead chooses to keep these religious nationalists at bay through undemocratic means, it does not bode well for their reputation at the global level and even amongst liberal and secular circles within the country itself. Therefore, while it is imperative to strike a balance between the demands of the religious nationalists while also not letting the country descend into chaos, it is becoming increasingly harder to do so in today's polarized world.

Critique on Argument 4

This line of argument has a lot in common with a point made earlier—that people living in the East have not modernized enough to understand that a rational compact between a group of people can constitute a nation. However, the difference here is that scholars specifically point out that religious leaders fulfill their desire to be in power by halting attempts towards secularization. As a result, these states are unable to free themselves from the hold of religion and cannot progress towards 'modernization'. The underlying assumption here, similar to what was discussed earlier, is that this Eurocentric view of modernization, built on the foundation of the Enlightenment, is the ideal scenario to which a state should aspire. I will not spend time discussing this as the arguments will be similar to what I have stated earlier. In short, simply

supplanting existing political and social structures in the East with those from the West, without taking into account the process these Western states went through to get there and the differences between them and the Eastern states in question, is a flawed strategy.

It is imperative to understand that most mainstream religions that have mass followings today originated either from Asia or Africa—the same regions being criticized by scholars for not adopting secular models of governance. By virtue of being the birthplace of these religions, it is a great undertaking for nation states in these regions to try to remove religion from the public sphere as religious practices, symbols and heritages are deeply ingrained and intertwined in society at every level (Agbiji and Swart 2015; Yang 2018). In the case of nations that gained independence from colonialism, there was a great demand, a need even, to revert to their own way of life—that is, to reject the Western, colonial influence. This element of anti-Westernism is apparent in almost all the cases of religious nationalism in Asia and Africa in recent years—it is not unique just to religious leaders but can be seen within the common populace as well.

Religious nationalist movements here consider secular nationalism to be a Western notion and view it the same way they view everything else European: Western, neocolonial, and against their values and traditions.

The second string within this argument is that the religious leaders in countries like India, Pakistan, and Iran that want to be in power are in the wrong; they should let secular governments take the helm. In response, it is worth noting that these religious leaders' desire for power is a feature that is hardly unique to religious nationalism. Their reasons for wanting to be in power rely on the belief that their religion is the true faith and that they should lead others under the

umbrella of this faith. As is evident, these reasons are unique to religious nationalism. However, the general belief that some element of a group's identity is superior when compared to others is a feature, a cornerstone even, of nationalism. Similar patterns exist with leaders of secular nationalist movements.

This is especially true in the case of Azerbaijan where despite the population being overwhelmingly Muslim (97%), it was a group of secular nationalist elite that first gave rise to the Azerbaijani identity and took control of the nation-state. There, in 1918, the Azerbaijani nationalist elite, led by M.A. Rasulzada, revolted against the Russians and declared independence. In doing so, they established a unique Azerbaijani identity to differentiate themselves from the general "Caucasian Muslims" group (Ahmadoghlu 2020). The nation-state of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR), established by Rasulzada's group in 1918 ended two years later when the Soviets took control again. However, almost eight decades later, when Azerbaijan gained independence from the Soviet Union, the country chose to follow the example of the ADR and remain secular rather than turning into a Muslim state. The Azerbaijanis wanted to go back to the identity they believed in, the first instance of them identifying as a unique nation (Ahmadoghlu 2020), and not be lumped together with other Caucasian Muslims or 'Tatars' regardless of the fact that most people from the time of the ADR were not alive anymore, and those who were, were probably too young to remember anything.

In similar fashion, countries in the Middle East and South Asia, where the people strongly identified with their religion and religion was closely tied to political and social structures, chose to revert back to the ways of their people before the West colonized them. They derived their

sense of identity from their religious beliefs, and this idea has seeped through and grown stronger over the years.

Simply stating that religious leaders in these regions want to be in power and impede the process of secularization ignores the fact that these leaders are only able to do so because of the support they receive from the masses. If this was not the case and a majority of the population disagreed with them, they would not have been able to take control so easily. Therefore, by looking at both examples where religious leaders are able to take control post colonization and where a nation chooses to remain secular despite an overwhelming majority of the population belonging to one religion, it becomes clear that labelling religious leaders' desire to be in power is a surface level argument. Rather, it is the support they receive from their followers that allows them to rise and remain in power.

Let's assume, for arguments' sake, that these religious leaders do not have popular support and are able to come into power regardless. In this case, critiquing their intentions would be justified. Once again, I will argue that it is easy to find similar examples in any nationalist movements or groups in general. The Rwandan example showed us a similar pattern with leaders from one ethnic group trying to assert dominance over the other and efforts for coexistence did not succeed at all. Leaders on either side wanted power for themselves. In the case of Nazi Germany, the Nazis were convinced that they were superior to everyone else and wanted complete authority. Solely blaming religious nationalism here does not make sense. The desire to be in power and complete control is one that is commonplace within nationalist movements in general,

irrespective of whether a certain group being in power is good or bad for the nation-state in the short or long term.

E. Summary

In conclusion, there are four essential arguments that critics of religious nationalism propose when making their case: First, religious nationalism is a less ideal, perverted form of secular nationalism. Here, scholars argue that nations in the East have not modernized enough to understand that a rational compact between people, rather than religion, is enough to unify them around a shared sense of identity. The flaw in this argument is the assumption that secularization is synonymous with modernization and that the same model of secularization adopted in the West, especially in Europe, can simply be transported to the East without the latter going through the same processes that gave rise to this secular model of politics in the first place.

Second, these scholars state that religion gives those in power the authority to declare when violence is moral and justified and when it is not. This argument does not make much sense since these very same critics do not highlight the same issue originating in nations with secular nationalism. This idea of violence, of ‘othering’ a group of people based on certain defining characteristics, is not unique to religious nationalism. It is, however, a defining characteristic of nationalism itself whether it is secular, religious, or ethnic nationalism.

Along the same vein, the third main argument in critique of religious nationalism is that religious nationalism promotes one religion above all else, and the followers of this religion are deemed

superior to those who do not follow it. This, yet again, is a characteristic of nationalism itself. Nationalism is built on a foundation of 'othering' and in the case of religious nationalism, the basis of this othering is religion. Lastly, there is the argument that religious nationalist leaders in the East have a certain degree of power that they would lose if their respective countries adopted a secular model of politics. Therefore, they do not allow it to happen. It is important to understand here that these leaders have overwhelming support from the people as these people, or nations, derive their sense of identity from their religious beliefs. Therefore, even if the argument that a handful of religious nationalists do not want their nations to become more secular is true, the argument that they are single handedly hampering their nations' progress towards secularization is simply not true.

IX. CASE STUDY: BRITISH INDIA AND PAKISTAN

In this section, I will look at the evolution of religious nationalism in the Indian subcontinent⁵ from its early origins in the 19th Century leading up to its independence from the British Raj in 1947. I will then focus on Pakistan and how religious nationalism has evolved there from 1947 onwards. Section 4 will essentially allow for a deeper look into the role religious nationalism has played over time, with a very specific case study, and how it can have both positive and negative consequences depending on the context. My focus will specifically be on the negative effects that scholars have argued come about as a result of religious nationalism, as seen in Section 3.

As I trace the events motivated by religious nationalism and how the phenomenon itself gained a stronghold in the region, I will frequently draw on our insights from the previous section to assess whether at any given point in time Indian religious nationalism has shown patterns that scholars such as Juergensmeyer would find concerning. In cases where violent acts are committed in the name of religion, where critics of religious nationalism could use as evidence of religious nationalism's inferiority to secular nationalism, I will assess whether the issue lies within the religious element of religious nationalism or whether it is a product of nationalism itself.

This section is divided into three parts. The first part will focus on tracing events surrounding the origins of religious nationalism, and how it split from the general Indian nationalism that served as its foundation. Here, I will take a closer look at how religious nationalism influenced the

⁵ The Indian subcontinent, in this thesis, is limited to the territories occupied by modern day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh

movement for Pakistan as a separate nation for Indian Muslims following the departure of the British and whether, in the process, there were any major negative consequences originating as a result of the presence of religious nationalism in the public sphere. In the second part, I will carry out a similar analysis on Pakistani religious nationalism post-1947, how it has evolved over time, and whether it has had any negative consequences for Pakistan both domestically, and internationally. In the last part, I will take a brief look at the lessons Pakistan should aim to learn from the first two parts and how it should try to navigate the popular religious sentiment and fervor in an increasingly complex and volatile political situation.

A. British India until 1947

To understand the concept of nationalism in the Indian context, there must first be a framework. When referring to 'Indian nationalism', I am looking at the modern Indian subcontinent, post 17th Century. During this timeframe, the subcontinent was still divided into numerous smaller states and they were either already colonized or were in the process of being colonized by the British (Welch 2011). So, the initial scene here is one of a very fragmented India with one major factor bringing them together (in terms of governance): colonization. During the British Raj, there were around 565 'princely states' which were ruled by a local ruler who had complete autonomy in all departments except defense, foreign affairs, and communication. These three, along with inter-state relations, were looked after by the government of India led by a Viceroy appointed by the British government (Khanam 2016). The Viceroys were all of British descent leading up until the last one, Lord Mountbatten. Towards the end of this timeframe, I will highlight how Indian nationalism proved to be a pivotal element in mitigating the uproar that

started when these states were forced to give up their lands and sovereignty. At this point, in 1947, they only had two choices: become a part of either India or Pakistan.

Indian colonization has been covered extensively by countless scholars in different contexts, with nationalism being one of the major factors studied. While these scholars are not always in full agreement with one another, one area where there's some consensus concerns the origins of this nationalism. Madhusoodanan, in their work which analyzes multiple credible sources, argues that every major nationalist uprising in British India was a direct result of oppressive policy changes by the British government. The Indian populace, especially the educated middle class, considered it unjust that decisions that significantly affected Indians were being made without any say from the Indians themselves (Madhusoodanan 2009). The lack of representation led to an 'us' versus 'them' situation, providing grounds for the Indians to unite and leading to the evocation of nationalistic sentiments.

The introduction of Western education in the Indian middle class was one of the main factors leading to a rise of nationalism in the region (McLane 1978). However, it was the creation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 that brought Indian nationalism into the political arena; whereas the belief amongst mainstream Muslim politicians that the Congress valued Hindu interests more than Muslim interests introduced religious divide into the mix. McLane observed this divide and highlighted that Indian nationalism, especially in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, was fragmented across religious lines—the main division being the Hindu-Muslim divide (McLane 1978). To put it in simplistic terms, the Indians wanted independence from the

British and somewhere along the way, the Muslims decided that not only did they want independence from the British, they also did not want to live jointly with the Hindus afterwards.

Looking at important nationalist movements in the Indian subcontinent in the early 20th century makes it evident that the ‘divide and rule’ policies implemented by the British early on during their rule started backfiring towards the end, giving rise to nationalist sentiments amongst the people (Sarkar 1989, 20). At the start, it was easy for the British colonizers to exploit the lack of a single unified ‘nation’ and divide the people based on religious and/or ethnic divisions. A prime example of this is how they divided the Indian army to ensure security for the British soldiers, who were far fewer in number. The strategy’s main goal is perfectly summed up in this quote by Lord Ellenborough: “The fewer elements of combination there are in the native army the better, and therefore the more nationalities and castes and religions, the more secure we shall be” (Stewart 1951, 53).

However, over time, it was these same policies combined with certain other factors that gave rise to Indian nationalism. Although the division of British India into presidencies and provinces was met with little resistance in the early days of British rule, when Lord Curzon decided to partition Bengal into two in 1905, the British were met with fierce resistance from the Bengalis. Sarkar attributes this to the “atmosphere of strong regional unity and growing self-confidence”, a strong nationalist sentiment that had developed over time during the British rule (Sarkar 1989, 109). As seen throughout this thesis, multiple similar nationalist movements showed this strong sense of unity.

As the timeline moves closer to 1947, divisions arise in scholarly works over the reasons behind Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the All-India Muslim League, shifting from staunchly advocating for Hindu-Muslim unity until the 1920s to believing that partition was the only answer. As is evident, a strong sense of nationalism—the Indians’ resolve that they needed independence as a nation—was the major motivation for the demand for an independent India, whereas the divide that led to the partition was along religious lines. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India post-1947 called this religious nationalism inevitable (Bose 1998). However, while traditional scholars base the partition entirely on religion, the revisionists question to what extent it was solely religion.

Some in the revisionist pool argue that Jinnah never wanted Pakistan to be a religious or theocratic state and a leading voice in this regard is Khairi who calls Jinnah a “nationalist of the highest order” (Khairi 1995, 250). Wolpert from UCLA, in his review of Khairi’s texts, argues that there is no proof of Jinnah wanting a purely secular state (Wolpert 1995, 1607). Khairi relies on his access to countless letters written by Jinnah, amongst other primary sources, but reading his work makes it evident that he was unable to truly separate his journalistic tendencies and analyze the sources in an unbiased manner (Wolpert 1995, 1608).

For the purposes of this analysis, it is important to understand that while there is disagreement as to *how* important a role religion played in the partition, it played an important role, nonetheless. The divide and rule policies implemented by the British along with controversial acts such as the partition of Bengal in 1905 were aimed at stripping the Indians of any sense of collective identity but these arbitrary divisions were not able to combat the Indians’ strong feelings and sense of

identity associated with their religious beliefs. Leading up to 1947, even though religious nationalism was on the rise, there are no major examples of violence erupting on the basis of religion. The Hindus and Muslims had a cordial relationship, even though the latter wanted a separate state. None of the arguments that critics of religious nationalism have put forth apply here. The Indians were coexisting despite the differences in their faiths as they believed that both their national identity (being Indian) and their religious beliefs were equally important. Moreover, the two men at the forefront of the movement for Indian independence, Gandhi and Jinnah, believed in the importance of secular politics despite having strong religious beliefs (Pande 2010). Thus, religious nationalism proved to be very beneficial for the Indians in gaining independence from the British Raj and it allowed them to free themselves from the oppression they had faced for centuries.

B. Pakistan post-1947

The literature on nationalism and religion in post-independence Pakistan⁶, on the other hand, is not as abundant as the literature on religious nationalism in British India that I have analyzed so far. This lack of literature can partly be attributed to the stifling of dissent and narratives that threaten the integrity of the state—as is evident from multiple studies and reports including those produced by the Human Rights Watch (HRW 2019). Khan explores how fragmented the populace is in today's Pakistan and how these divisions were exacerbated over time. While the division amongst nationalists came in the form of religion in British India, these divisions appeared along ethnic lines in Pakistan. From the initial five ethnic groups in Pakistan (West and

⁶ In this section, references to Pakistan pre-1971 do not include East Pakistan (modern day Bangladesh) unless otherwise specified.

East) (i.e. Balochis, Sindhis, Punjabis, Bengalis and Pukhtuns), four actively advocated against the administrative structure of the state i.e. the way that the country was run through a central government which had a great deal of control over each of the provinces.

The Pakhtuns and Balochis were opposed to being a part of Pakistan right from the start and wanted their own independent states, while the Sindhis supported the creation of Pakistan under the assumption that it would be a decentralized confederation of Muslim majority states. This assumption proved to be false leading the Sindhis to oppose the administrative structure of the newly created state (Khan 2005). Of the four groups, the Bengalis managed to separate themselves and create their own state, Bangladesh, in 1971. Madan makes it a point to mention that although Islam served as a strong bond, it was not strong enough to overcome these ethnic divisions (Madan 2009, 24-27).

After the creation of Pakistan, a new ethnic group was created—the Mohajirs. This group consisted of migrants who had moved from India to Pakistan during the partition. They were staunch supporters of the state which was to be expected considering they left everything behind to be a part of this new country. This group too, however, soon lost faith in the administrative structure of the state and yet another faction of ethnic nationalism was added to the mix (Khan 2005). Instead of exploring this rise of ethnic nationalism in detail, what is more relevant is the role religion played in all of this. Religion, the institution that served as a divisive force pre-1947, now served as a unifying force. These ethnic groups boasted unique cultures, traditions, languages, and history and the one factor that brought them together was a common religion.

However, the involvement of religion cannot be considered benign as religious leaders, most of whom were initially opposed to the creation of Pakistan, started calling for complete Islamization of the state (Hassan 1985). The liberal politicians of the All-India Muslim League, under the leadership of Jinnah, were against this but it is clear that their protests were unsuccessful. Farzana highlights how the true role of religion in the state has never been defined properly. Instead, the country started going down a path that saw it becoming more Islamized as time passed, both at the societal and the administrative levels. This Islamization intensified after the secession of Bangladesh in 1971 as the country turned away from South Asia and started developing deeper ties with the Muslim Middle East (Shaikh 2009). The thesis will look at this shift in detail, to trace how religion grew in prominence and to understand whether or not this had morally good or bad outcomes for the state and/or its populace.

There is a general consensus amongst scholars in this field that religion and nationalism have been present in Pakistan throughout its history, both being used repeatedly by religious, military and liberal leaders alike to legitimize their rule and increase their authority and power. More than 70 years after its inception, these institutions are stronger than ever and show no signs of fading anytime soon (Haqqani 2004; Khan 2005). The same religious nationalism that did not give rise to any incidents before 1947 that can serve as empirical evidence of the arguments critics of religious nationalism put forth is now actively leading Pakistan down a dark route.

Before 1947, religious nationalism in the case of Muslims was tied to the belief that the Muslims should have their own state where they will not be oppressed anymore and where they will be able to practice their faith with freedom. After Pakistan gained independence, however, the sense

of superiority and the element of ‘othering’ that nationalism brings with it had already seeped into society. The newly formed nation-state had an overwhelming Muslim majority but within this nation, there were sectarian and ethnic divisions. There were different sects of Islam with the Sunni Muslims being the overwhelming majority while other sects such as the Shias having a very limited number of followers in comparison.

In terms of ethnicity, the Punjabis had a much greater representation and Punjab was home to the Pakistan Army, as discussed in Section 3. Therefore, the idea of superiority that was so deeply ingrained in society by this point simply found a new home. The Sunnis started oppressing those belonging to other sects of Islam while the Punjabis gave rise to a new phenomenon of ethnic nationalism. In these cases, it can be easily seen that religious nationalism played a negative role. However, even in these cases it is nationalism and the idea of superiority it brings with it that led to this rise in religious and ethnic intolerance. These beliefs about Sunni/Punjabi superiority could have been dealt with during the early years following 1947 had there been direct political motivation and desire to do so.

It can be argued that those in power until the late 60s actively resisted and did not give into the demands of these nationalist groups but there is a clear time period where Pakistan takes a turn for the worse. This happened on the back of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s use of emotive religious phrases to gain power by appealing to the religious sentiments of the public. Once in power, his government started yielding to these nationalist groups, especially following the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, to ensure that they would be able to stay in power. This set a very dangerous precedent for years to come—that siding with radical religious nationalist groups results in a

great increase in one's support and voter base. Following Bhutto's tenure, Zia ul Haq used religion to an even greater extent to legitimize his rule through what he called the Islamization of Pakistan, which was discussed already in Section 3. From that point onwards, the country has simply spiraled down and descended into an era of widespread religious intolerance.

What makes the modern-day Pakistani case harder to deal with is the fact that these institutions of religious and ethnic nationalism do not exist without support. Much akin to the points raised in the critique of argument 4 in section 3, there is a great deal of support from the public that reinforces these ideas of superiority and emboldens those who oppress minority groups. This has hampered the nation's progress in economic and humanitarian terms and will inevitably lead to more domestic suffering and the country being completely ostracized on the global stage. A very recent example of the latter is the action taken by the European Union against Pakistan to reassess the country's special trading privileges as part of the GSP plus group in light of its controversial blasphemy laws (UNPO 2021). This came after weeks of violent protests led by extremist followers of TLP (Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan—an Islamist political party) that led to countless people being injured and the deaths of two police officers (Janjua 2021). The fact that the current government was unable to take a heavy-handed approach in stopping these violent protests goes to show how religious nationalism and fervor is taking a turn for the worse (Devdiscourse 2021). In cases like this, the underlying elements of nationalism that give rise to such groups and identities, if left unchecked for too long, can very easily lead to the downfall of the entire state.

C. Lessons to learn from the Pakistani case

The single most important takeaway from this analysis of religious nationalism's evolution in British India and, later on, post-independence Pakistan, is that nationalism can lead a nation and its people down an endless cycle of violence and othering. While it is hard to find explicit evidence of religious nationalism in British India having any of the undesirable characteristics that scholars criticize it for, the same cannot be said for Pakistan following its independence in 1947. The same group of people that rallied around the desire for religious freedom and demanded a country where they would not be oppressed, turned into the oppressors themselves. This shift happened as soon as they went from being a part of the minority i.e. Indian Muslims, to being Pakistani Muslims, an overwhelming majority. This ties back to the critique of the third argument from section 3, the fact that 'othering' is an integral part of nationalism itself.

It is important to acknowledge that the oppression was carried out on the basis of faith with Sunni Muslims being the dominant group and those belonging to other faiths, or even other sects within Islam, being oppressed and marginalized. Nevertheless, this does not mean that religion is to blame here. The minority group of Muslims that rallied for Pakistan found themselves in a position, after 1947, where their demands were accepted, and they had achieved their goals. This, however, left them in a position where the belief that they were a nation that was different from the others they shared territory with now had no foundation. Pakistan had an overwhelming Muslim majority, almost everyone residing in the state was Muslim. The religious nationalists had lost the defining characteristic that set them apart, the characteristic that they derived their sense of belonging and superiority from. They needed to find an alternative basis to justify their

strong nationalist sentiments, to pacify their need to view themselves as better than others in the newly formed state.

This need was fulfilled in two main ways: inter-religious nationalism with the Sunni Muslims at the forefront and ethnic nationalism with Punjabis at the forefront. Religion and ethnicity served as means to an end; it just so happens that religion and ethnicity offered them with distinct delineators to separate themselves from the ‘others’. The cases highlighted in section 3 follow, for the most part, a similar pattern. The same religious nationalism that championed the desire for Muslims to have their own homeland quickly degenerated into an institution that inflicted unbearable pain on religious and ethnic groups that were not Sunni Muslim or Punjabi.

Looking at the progression of religious nationalism in this case, it is clear that radicalization does not come about as a result of any specific form of nationalism—it is nationalism itself that radicalizes groups of people by instilling within them the belief that they are superior to those around them. This belief need not, and in most of the cases presented in this thesis, does not, rely on any rational foundation. Allowing for nationalisms that threaten the integrity of the state, as Pakistan has done countless times in its history, simply exacerbates the situation. The case of Rahul Gandhi from Section 3 demonstrates how trying to meet nationalist groups in the middle does not work well either—they do not negotiate.

It is important to realize that once they are given a platform and a voice, nationalist groups are very hard to contain afterward. What justifies the existence of one form of nationalism versus another is entirely context and perspective dependent. There is no clear answer to this question.

The presence of concerning patterns within nationalist groups, however, can be seen from the very early stages. If a state wishes to maintain its integrity and effectively combat these negative effects of nationalism, it is imperative to not give any concessions to groups that exhibit the negative characteristics explicated in this thesis. As far as the question of understanding what form of nationalism is justified and should be allowed to exist within a state is concerned, that is outside the scope of this thesis and would be a logical next step for anyone wishing to continue this analysis.

References

Acquaviva, S. S. *The Decline of the Sacred in Industrial Society*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.

Agbiji, Obaji M, and Ignatius Swart. "RELIGION AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN AFRICA: A CRITICAL AND APPRECIATIVE PERSPECTIVE." *Scriptura* 114 (2015): 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.7833/114-0-1115>.

Ahluwalia, Pal. "Specificities: The Rwandan Genocide: Exile and Nationalism Reconsidered." *Social Identities* 3, no. 3 (1997): 499–519. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13504639752023>.

Ahmadoghlu, Ramin. "Secular Nationalist Revolution and the Construction of the Azerbaijani Identity, Nation and State." *Nations and Nationalism* 27, no. 2 (2020): 548–65. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12682>.

Al-Kire, Rosemary L., Michael H. Pasek, Jo-Ann Tsang, Joseph Leman, and Wade C. Rowatt. "Protecting America's Borders: Christian Nationalism, Threat, and Attitudes toward Immigrants in the United States." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 2021, 136843022097829. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220978291>.

Armstrong, John A. "Religious Nationalism and Collective Violence." *Nations and Nationalism* 3 (4) (1997): 597–606.

Bajoria, Jayshree. "'Shoot the Traitors.'" Edited by Meenakshi Ganguly. "Shoot the traitors" Discrimination Against Muslims under India's New Citizenship Policy. Human Rights Watch, June 16, 2020. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/04/09/shoot-traitors/discrimination-against-muslims-under-indias-new-citizenship-policy#>.

Barker, Philip W. *Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God Be for Us*. London: Routledge, 2014.

Barrington, Lowell W. "'Nation' and 'Nationalism': The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30, no. 4 (1997): 712–16. <https://doi.org/10.2307/420397>.

Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life. "Separation of Church and State." *Boisi Center Papers on Religion in the United States* 1 (2007). https://doi.org/http://www.bc.edu/centers/boisi/publications/boisi_center_papers.html.

Bose, Sugatha. "Nation, Reason and Religion: India's Independence in International Perspective." *Economic and Political Weekly* 33 (1998): 2090–97.

Bristow, William. "Enlightenment." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, August 29, 2017. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/>.

Brubaker, Rogers. "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches*." *Nations and Nationalism* 18, no. 1 (2011): 2–20. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00486.x>.

Bullock, Alan. *Hitler: a Study in Tyranny*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1962.
"By Rejecting European Parliament Resolution, Pak Proves Its Relations with TLP Is 'Weightier' than EU: Think Tank: International." Devdiscourse. Devdiscourse, May 7, 2021. <https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/international/1564459-by-rejecting-european-parliament-resolution-pak-proves-its-relations-with-tlp-is-weightier-than-eu-think-tank>.

Byrne, Peter, and J. L. Houlden. *Companion Encyclopedia of Theology*. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

Cohen, Adam B., Michael Shengtao Wu, and Jacob Miller. "Religion and Culture: Individualism and Collectivism in the East and West." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 47, no. 9 (2016): 1236–49. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022116667895>.

Conklin, Alice L. *A Mission to Civilize: the Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.

Devji, Faisal. *Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.

DeVotta, Neil. *Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology: Implications for Politics and Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka*. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Washington, 2007.

Durkheim, Émile, and Kenneth Thompson. *Readings from Emile Durkheim*. London: Routledge, 2004.

Emerson, Rupert. *From Empire to Nation: the Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*. Boston, MA: Beacon Pr., 1960.

"European Parliament Calls for Immediate Reassessment of EU-Pakistan Trade Regime." UNPO. UNPO, April 29, 2021. <https://unpo.org/article/22141>.

Fox, Jonathan. "The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945-2001." *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 6 (2004): 715–31. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304047434>.

Friedland, Roger. "Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (August 2001): 125–52.

Giddens, Anthony, and Emile Durkheim. *Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972.

Grim, Brian J., and Roger Finke. *The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and Conflict in the 21st Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Haqqani, Husain. "The Role of Islam in Pakistan's Future." *The Washington Quarterly* 28 (2004): 85–96.

Hassan, Riaz. "Islamization: an Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan." *Middle Eastern Studies* 21, no. 3 (1985): 263–84. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263208508700629>.

Hayes, Carlton J.H. *Essays on Nationalism*. New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1933.

Hearn, Jonathan. *Rethinking Nationalism: a Critical Introduction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Hibbard, Scott W. *Religious Politics and Secular States: Egypt, India, and the United States*. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012.

Human Rights Watch. "Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda." History (HRW Report - Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, March 1999), March 1999. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-09.htm>.

International Crisis Group. "Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar," September 5, 2017.

International Crisis Group. "Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan," October 22, 2007.

Janjua, Haroon. "Pakistan Protests: Why the Islamist TLP Party Is Now a Major Political Force: DW: 15.04.2021." DW.COM, April 15, 2021. <https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-protests-why-the-islamist-tlp-party-is-now-a-major-political-force/a-57214719>.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. University of California Press, 1994.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. "The New Religious State." *Comparative Politics* 27, no. 4 (July 1995): 379–91. <https://doi.org/10.2307/422225>.

Khairi, Saad R. *Jinnah Reinterpreted: The Journey from Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood*. Oxford University Press, 1995.

Khan, Adeel. *Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005.

Khanam, Attiya. "An Historical Overview of the Accession of Princely States." *Journal of Historical Studies* II, no. I (2016): 84–103.

Kung, Hans. "Religion, Violence and 'Holy Wars.'" *International review of the Red Cross* 87, no. 858 (June 2005): 253–68.

Madan, T N. "Sense and Sensibilities on Pakistan." *Economic and Political Weekly* 44, no. 43 (October 30, 2009): 24–27.

Madhusoodanan, Sriram. "The Development of Nationalism in the Indian Case." Thesis, Grace Allen Scholars Theses, 2009.

Malji, Andrea. "The Rise of Hindu Nationalism and Its Regional and Global Ramifications." Association for Asian Studies, May 14, 2020. <https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/the-rise-of-hindu-nationalism-and-its-regional-and-global-ramifications/>.

Marx, Karl. *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*. Edited by J. O'Malley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1844.

McLane, John R. *Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton Univ.Pr, 1978.

Mellor, Roy E.H. *Nation, State and Territory: A Political Geography*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1989.

Mitra, Anirudhya. "Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: How Plot Was Hatched and Executed by LTTE." *India Today*, July 15, 1991.

Mohammadi, Dawood. "Causes of General Zia Ul Haq's Islamization Program." Thesis, South Asian University, 2017.

Motyl, Alexander T. "The Modernity of Nationalism: Nations, States and Nation-States in the Contemporary World." *Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board* 45, no. 2 (1992): 307–23.

Nott, Josiah C. *An Essay on the Natural History of Mankind: Viewed in Connection with Negro Slavery: Delivered before the Southern Rights Association, 14th December, 1850*. Mobile: Dade, Thompson, 1851.

Omer, Atalia, and Jason A. Springs. *Religious Nationalism: a Reference Handbook*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2013.

Pande, Malabika. "Gandhi's Secularism: An Inclusive Philosophy." *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress* 70 (2010): 1124–33.

Pandey, Gyanendra, and Yunas Samad. *Fault Lines of Nationhood*. New Delhi: Lotus Collection, Roli Books, 2007.

Ramet, Sabrina P. *Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005.

Ranjan, Amit. "Inter-Provincial Water Sharing Conflicts in Pakistan." *Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies* 4, no. 2 (2012): 102–22.

Rasmussen, Peter Ravn. "'Nations' or 'States' an Attempt at Definition." "Nations" or "States" an Attempt at Definition, July 20, 2001.

<https://archive.globalpolicy.org/nations/nation/2001/0720definition.htm>.

Renan, Ernest. *What Is a Nation?* Toronto: Tapir Press, 1996.

Rieffer, Barbara-Ann J. "Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship." *Ethnicities* 3, no. no. 2 (June 2003): 215–42.

<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796803003002003>.

Sarkar, Sumit. *Modern India 1885-1947*. Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 1989.

Shaikh, Farzana. *Making Sense of Pakistan*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009.

Smith, Anthony D. *National Identity*. London: Penguin Books, 1991.

“State, Nation and Nation-State: Clarifying Misused Terminology.” PSU Geography of International Affairs: State, Nation and Nation-State: Clarifying Misused Terminology. Accessed May 8, 2021. <https://www.e-education.psu.edu/geog128/node/534>.

Stewart, Neil. “Divide and Rule: British Policy in Indian History.” *Science & Society* 15 (1951): 49–57.

Tooley, Mark. “Tyranny & Russian Orthodoxy.” Providence, January 28, 2019. <https://providencemag.com/2019/01/tyranny-russian-orthodoxy/>.

United Nations. “Rwanda, Genocide, Hutu, Tutsi, Mass Execution, Ethnic Cleansing, Massacre, Human Rights, Victim Remembrance, Education, Africa.” United Nations. United Nations, 2021. <https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/historical-background.shtml>.

Veith, Gene. “Eastern vs. Western Christianity on Church & State.” Cranach. Patheos Explore the world's faith through different perspectives on religion and spirituality! Patheos has the views of the prevalent religions and spiritualities of the world., April 7, 2019. <https://www.patheos.com/blogs/geneveith/2019/04/eastern-vs-western-christianity-on-church-state/>.

Welch, James P. “The British Raj and India: British Colonial Influence: 1612-1948,” 2011.

“Why Did Hitler Not Like the Jews?” Holocaust Matters, February 10, 2021. <https://www.holocaustmatters.org/why-did-hitler-not-like-the-jews/>.

Wolpert, Stanley. “Saad R. Khairi. Jinnah Reinterpreted: The Journey from Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood.” *The American Historical Review* 101, no. 5 (1995): 1607–8.

“World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Pakistan.” Human Rights Watch, January 17, 2019. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/pakistan>.

“World's Largest Democracy Contributes to UNDEF Democracy Fund.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed April 27, 2021. <https://www.un.org/democracyfund/news/worlds-largest-democracy-contributes-undef>.

Wuthnow, Robert. *Rediscovering the Sacred: Perspectives on Religion in Contemporary Society*. Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 1992.

Yang, Fenggang. "Religion in the Global East: Challenges and Opportunities for the Social Scientific Study of Religion." *Religions* 9, no. 10 (2018): 305.

<https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9100305>.

Zaman, Anisuz S M. "The Rise of Mono-Ethnic Religious Nationalism in Myanmar and Its Impacts on the Security Situation of the South Asian Region," 2020.