RUNNING AN EMPIRE, BUILDING A NATION:

KOREAN BUREAUCRATS AND THE MANCHUKUO LEGACY, 1931–1961

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In memory of my grandparents,
Lyle E. and Ellen B. Siverson,
and Donald Eugene and Mary Adams Reiner,
who first introduced me to Asian history and fostered a life-long love of learning.

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ABSTRACT

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KOREAN BUREAUCRATS AND THE MANCHUKUO LEGACY, 1931–1961

Rolf I. Siverson

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Between 1931 and 1945 more than 10,000 Koreans served as bureaucrats in Manchukuo–Japan's imperial client state in northeast China. This dissertation investigates their experience and its impact on state-building in postcolonial South Korea through the 1950s. Within the Japanese imperial system, the Manchukuo bureaucracy was a unique institution, characterized by hyper-militarism, technocratic rationalism, and a belief in the state's paramount role in socio-economic development. Manchukuo's Korean bureaucrats internalized and applied these principles, which they brought back to liberated South Korea after 1945. However, financial constraints, American influence, and a lack of political power limited their ability to apply the Manchukuo model directly. In response, they reinterpreted and adapted the model to these conditions in creative and conflicting ways. Based on Japanese, Korean, and American government documents, as well as media publications and memoirs, this study takes a historical and individualized approach to state building. It demonstrates that Manchukuo's legacy in South Korea was multivalent, both related to and distinctive from the developmental nationalism of the 1960s military regime.

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Introduction

I. Overview

Kim Kyumin's (1918–2008) employment history reads like that of many bureaucrats in South Korea's first two decades of independent statehood.[1] Like most officials of his generation, Kim was born under Japanese colonial rule and therefore began his career in service of the empire. On graduating from the Law Department at Nihon University in Tokyo, he entered public service as a regional government official. After the collapse of the Japanese empire, Kim continued to work in government posts, first as an accountant for the U.S. military occupation and then as an official in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in the South Korean Government. Through most of the 1950s, Kim served as Managing Director on the board of Korea's public coal corporation, but his star really began to rise after the South Korean military seized control of the government in 1961. In the 1960s, he served as head of the South Korean Chamber of Commerce (Taehan sanggong hoeŭiso), Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry (Sanggongbu), and Vice President of the state-financed Inchŏn Heavy Industrial Corporation (Inchŏn chunggongŏp hoesa).

Going back to the start of his career, however, reveals a distinguishing feature. Kim's first experience as a Japanese imperial bureaucrat was not in colonial Korea, where most Korean officials at the time began, but in Manchukuo–the Japanese client state carved out of northeast China in 1931. While still in university, Kim took and

[1] The following summary of Kim's background is compiled from Ch'ongmuch'ŏ ŭijŏngguk ŭisakwa, "T'ae Han sŏkt'an kongsa isa chungim choch'i e kwan han kŏn," *Kungmuhoe ŭi sangjŏng ankŏn ch'ŏl*, 1955, Kukka kirokwŏn (KNA), Ref. BA0084200, 642–644; and Han Ch'angwan, *Mulga chŏnjaeng: kŏn'guk 20 nyŏn ŭl changsik han inmul tŭl* (Seoul: Chŏnggyŏngbo tosa, 1965), 71–72.

passed the Manchukuo civil service examination and after graduating traveled to the continent. He spent a year in a specially designed government training program and apprenticeship that existed nowhere else in the Japanese empire. Afterward, he spent the first three years of his public career working as an accountant and economic official at the forefront of Japan's wartime empire.

Between 1931 and 1945, over 10,000 Korean men served as civil officials in Manchukuo, where they directly participated in Japan's imperial project. Like Kim, many went on to have long careers as government officials and public intellectuals in South Korea after Japan's empire collapsed in 1945. During the first decades of Korean independence, they were deeply engaged in projects aimed at restructuring state and social institutions. This raises the fundamental question that drives this dissertation, how are these two projects–Japanese empire building in Manchukuo and state-building in postcolonial South Korea–connected? Put more succinctly, what is Manchukuo's legacy on the South Korean state?

This dissertation seeks to answer this question through a detailed investigation of Manchukuo's Korean bureaucrats, their careers, and the evolution of their state-building strategies. It begins by analyzing their experiences between 1931 and 1945 in the unique system of imperial rule that was the Manchukuo bureaucracy. It then follows them back to the geographic and temporal divide of imperial collapse tracing their involvement in various state-building projects through the first sixteen years of South Korean statehood.

Korean bureaucrats in Manchukuo offer a particularly useful lens for interrogating the complexity of Japanese imperialism and its effects on state-building in South Korea. Manchukuo has long been an important focal point for scholarship on East Asian state-

building in the latter half of the twentieth century, particularly in South Korea.[2] Some have gone so far as to argue that Manchukuo's unique blend of authoritarian nationalism and state-led economic developmentalism was the basis for South Koreas developmental modernity under the military regime of the 1960s and 70s.[3] The direct mechanism for this continuity, however, remains an open question. In their own memoirs, former Manchukuo bureaucrats in South Korea state that the experience was foundational to their approach to state-building in Korea.[4] And many, like Kim Kyumin, were key figures in economic development programs in the 1960s. Does this make them the "missing link" in a chain of continuity between Manchukuo and South Korea's developmental state? This dissertation casts doubt on such assumptions.

In tracing their state-building strategies across the postcolonial divide, it demonstrates that Manchukuo cannot simply be reduced to the birthplace of authoritarian nationalism and state-led economic developmentalism postcolonial South Korea. On an individual and collective level Manchukuo's meaning was not hegemonic. Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy adapted and transformed that experience throughout their long careers through a conditional process of decolonization. This dissertation, therefore, contributes to a critical reevaluation of Manchukuo's legacy on state-building South Korea and East Asia more broadly that accounts for both continuity and change. It

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[2] See the following section for an extended discussion of Manchukuo's place in the historiography of postcolonial/post-imperial state development in South Korean and East Asia.
[3] Han Sŏkchŏng, *Manju modŏn: 60 nyŏndae Han'guk kaebal ch'eje ŭi kiwŏn* (Seoul: Munhak kwa chisŏngsa, 2016).
[4] For examples, see: Ko Chaep'il, *Hanam hoegorok*, vol. 1 (Seoul: P'arandŭl, 2003) 15; Han Chunggŏn, "Daidō gakuin jidai no tsuioku to konnichi," in *Amageru beki*, ed. Daidō gakuin dai jū hachi kisei (Tokyo: Daidō gakuin dai jū hachi kisei kinen kaishi henshū iinkai, 1981), 248; and Yun Pupyŏng "Waga jinsei to Daidōgakuin," in *Yūjō no kakyō: kaigai dōsō no kiroku*, ed. Daidō gakuin dōsōkai (Tokyo: Daidō gakuin dōsōkai, 1986), 27

emphasizes the contingent, fluid, and entangled nature of postcolonial state-development. It further demonstrates how individual case studies can deepen our understanding of the interplay between continuity and change at the institutional level.

II. Historiography

Manchukuo's connection to scholarly literature on the relationship between economic development and the state first emerged in the early 1960s. Spearheaded by social scientists and economic historians, these studies explored Japan's experiments with state structure and economic institutions in Manchukuo as a unique test case in rapid industrial development.[5] Analyzing Japan's system of investment, economic planning and control, and linking them to "unprecedented" economic growth in continental Asia, on the one hand contributed to a broader political effort to rehabilitate Japan's image in the Cold War security alliance system. But it also reflected a growing scholarly interest in Japan's potential contribution to modernization theory and American economic policy in the developing world.[6]

A subsequent generation of scholars would argue that Manchukuo's lessons for development had in fact been learned and applied successfully, as Japan emerged as a global economic power. In his highly influential analysis of Japan's post war Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Chalmers Johnson theorized a particular type of late-

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[5] For examples, see: Ramon Myers, "The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria, 1932 to 1945" (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1959); Ann Rasmussen Kinney, *Japanese investment in Manchurian Manufacturing and Mining, Transportation and Communications, 1931–1945* (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, 1973); Alexander Eckstein, et. al., "The Economic Development of Manchuria: The Rise of a Frontier Economy," *Journal of Economic History* 34, no. 1 (March 1974): 239–264; and Nakagane Tetsuji, "Manchukuo and Economic Development," in *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, ed. Peter Duus, et. al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 133–157.
[6] Myers, "The Japanese Economic Development of Manchuria, 1932 to 1945," 10, 270.

developing state structure that emerged in the twentieth century standing between free market capitalism and communism. So-called "developmental states" respected private property and free enterprise on the one hand while directly intervening and controlling the economy through regulation on the other.[7] As late developers, these states were plan-rational, understanding that the only path to parity with the industrialized world was through coordinated planning and execution of industrial policy.[8] As a result, the economic bureaucracy–that is the agency in control of industrial policy–dominated the political landscape.[9]

While originally theorized on the particular case of Japan, scholars began to reevaluate state-economic relations in other late-developing states within Johnson's "developmental state" framework. This was particularly the case for South Korea and Taiwan where the connections to Johnson's Japanese case study were clearest–both had a history of Japanese colonization and went through periods of rapid economic growth in the late twentieth century. These studies made certain modifications to Johnson's theory. Scholars of South Korea, for example emphasized the role of technology transfer or the "learning mode of industrialization," and state-controlled finance in late developing states.[10] Others took a more comparative approach in order to challenge neoclassical economic development models with a universalized model based on Johnson's concept.[11]

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[7] Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The growth of Industrial Policy: 1925–1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 17.
[8] Ibid., 19–20.
[9] Ibid., 25–26.
[10] On technology transfer, see Alice H. Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). On state finance, see Jung-en Woo, *Race to the Swift: State Finance in Korean Industrialization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
[11] For examples, see: Ha-Joon Chang, *The Political Economy of Industrial Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Juhana Vartiainen, "The Economic of Successful State Intervention in Industrial

However a common feature among these studies was the importance of strong state bureaucracies in coordinating and executing industrial policy.

The "developmental state" model, however, has drawn significant criticism within social science circles. For one, it assumes a monolithic state that fails to account for both internal conflicts between bureaucrats and politicians, as well as external conflict with business, labor, and civil society that are readily apparent in the historical record.[12] Others have contended that the role of the bureaucracy in East Asian economic development is overblown, instead pointing to the influence of democratic principles, market forces, and the international political economy on economic expansion in the postwar period.[13] Johnson, himself, subsequently discussed his apprehension about presenting his analysis of Japanese development as a generalizable model, instead insisting that his main objective was to tease out the individual and institutional continuities between the wartime and postwar Japanese state.[14]

Transformation," in *The Develpmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 200–234; and Atul Kohli, *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

[12] Chung-in Moon and Rashemi Prasad, "Beyond the Developmental State: Networks, Politics, and Institutions," *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration* 7, no. 4 (Oct. 1994): 360–386; Stephan Haggard, "Institutions and Growth in East Asia," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 38, no. 4 (Dec. 2004): 53–81; Richard Boyd and Tak-Wing Ngo, "Emancipating the Political Economy of Asia from the Growth Paradigm," in *Asian States: Beyond the Developmental Perspective*, ed. Richard Boyd and Tak-Wing Ngo (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1–18.

[13] T. J. Pempel, for example, argues for a model based on a developmental "regime" rather than "state" that takes into account both domestic and international political economic factors. T. J. Pempel, "The Developmental Regime in a Changing World Economy," in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cummings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 137–181. Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer, in contrast, refute the developmental state concept entirely, arguing that Japanese expansion occurred in spite, not because of state intervention. Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer, *The Fable of the Keiretsu: Urban Legends of the Japanese Economy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). Also see, J. Mark Ramseyer, *Odd Markets in Japanese History: Law and Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[14] Chalmers Johnson, "The Developmental State: An Odyssey of a Concept," in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 39–43.

Indeed, Johnson argued that Japan's developmental state and the economic bureaucrats who created it emerged from a historically contingent process in which Manchukuo played an important role. In tracing the careers of Japan's postwar economic bureaucrats back into the wartime era, he noted that most had served in as economic leaders in Manchukuo. In their own words, Manchukuo was a "great proving ground"[15] where they "imbibed the ideas of industrial guidance."[16] Partnering with the Japanese military, these bureaucrats experimented with new types of economic planning, mobilization, and state-business relationships that Johnson argues shaped their approach to economic development in wartime and postwar Japan.[17]

Johnson's analysis of Manchukuo and its direct connection to the developmental state concept was not particularly detailed, but subsequent studies elaborated further. Building on Johnson and earlier economic histories, more historically based analyses identified Manchukuo's central planning institutions as the precursors to Japan's wartime and postwar industrial policy mechanisms.[18] Other studies focused primarily on the human methods for transmission. Researching the same high-level elites that were instrumental in shaping political and economic policy in both Manchukuo and postwar Japan, such as Manchukuo cabinet minister and post-war Japanese Prime Minister Kishi

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[15] Shiina Etsusaburō, qtd in Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, 125.
[16] Kishi Nobusuke, qtd in Ibid., 132
[17] This argument has not been without controversy. Yoshiro Miwa contends that the economic bureaucrats in Manchukuo had far less control over policy implementation than Johnson and others (including the bureaucrats themselves) suggest. Yoshiro Miwa, *Japan's Economic Planning and Mobilization in Wartime, 1930s–1940s: The Competence of the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 309–312. He further argues that state-led economic planning in Manchukuo was an abject failure. By the end of the war the economic bureaucrats understood this to be the primary lesson and therefore abandoned strict state-control policies in the postwar era. Ibid., 303–305. Miwa's evidence on the failure of economic planning in Manchukuo is compelling, but his analysis of the individuals involved, their motivations lack the depth of other historical studies discussed below.
[18] Hironori Sada, *The Evolution of the Japanese Developmental State: Institutions Locked in by Ideas* (London: Routledge, 2013).

Nobusuke (1896–1987). These studies also identified practical and discursive continuities liking the two state-building projects.[19] They further argued that Manchukuo functioned as a proving ground for Japanese fascism and authoritarian state structures that not only defined the wartime empire but also the postwar state and its economic rise.[20]

Scholars of postcolonial state-building in Korea have also sought to foreground the linkages between Manchukuo and authoritarian economic developmentalism in 1960s South Korea. Some, like Johnson, have noted key continuities between Manchukuo and South Korean industrial policy under President Park Chung Hee (Pak Chŏnghŭi, 1917–1979).[21] Others have gone further, arguing that a range of social and political ideas and

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[19] Janice Mimura and Aaron S. Moore are two prominent examples. Mimura focuses on how Kishi and other central bureaucrats developed and executed plan-rational bureaucratic interventionism in Manchukuo. Janis Mimura, *Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). Moore explores the ideology and practices of Japanese government scientists and engineers in Manchukuo as the origins of Japan's state-centric technological modernism. Aaron S. Moore, *Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan's Wartime Era, 1931–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

[20] This emphasis on fascism was in some sense a return to early postwar Marxist analysis focused primarily on Japanese military expansionism and the emergence of modern imperialism. For examples, see: Inoue Kiyoshi, *Nihon teikoku shugi no keisei* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1968); E. H. Norman, *Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writing of E. H. Norman* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975); Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics*, expanded edition, trans. Ivan Morris (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). However, these Marxist scholars' interest in Manchukuo was primarily limited to the initial Japanese invasion, which most saw as the end point for a decades long process of Japanese expansion in the continent. Maruyama Masao, for example, described Manchukuo as "the boundary line for Japan's entry into the fascist era," but offered little detail on the precise operation of the "puppet state." Ibid., 27.

[21] Kim Ungki, "Ilbon ŭi "Manju hyŏng" palchŏn model i Pak Chŏnghŭi chŏngbu sanŏphwa e mich'in yŏnghyang" (PhD Diss., Han'gukhak chungang yŏn'guwŏn, 2006). Not all scholars agree on Manchukuo as the origin for these continuities. Early discussion on the "developmental state" among scholars of South Korea identified Japanese colonial policies on the Korean peninsula and in the empire more broadly as the historical origins of the 1960s state. Woo, *Race to the Swift*; Atul Kohli, "Where do High-Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea's 'Developmental State,' in *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999) 93–136; Bruce Cumings, "Webs with No Spiders, Spiders with No Webs: The Genealogy of the Developmental State," in ibid, 61–92. Eckert was one of the first to begin to tie in Manchukuo, looking specifically at how wartime economic integration between the two colonies contributed to Korea's capitalist development. Carter J. Eckert, "Total War, Industrialization, and Social Change in Late Colonial Korea," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945*, ed. Peter Duus, et al. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 3–39.

practices that defined South Korean developmentalism originated in Manchukuo.[22] More historical approaches have focused on President Park as the key source for continuity with Manchukuo. Over the past two decades, many of his biographers have argued that Park's experience as cadet and officer in the Japanese-run Manchukuo military was foundational to his motivation and approach to state-building as president.[23] In some ways, Park offers an even better case study in continuity than leaders in post-war Japan because of the fusion of militarization and economic developmentalism that characterized both Manchukuo and the Park Regimes.[24]

Some historians, however, have argued that tracing the origins of postwar economic growth in East Asia back to the wartime Japanese empire and Manchukuo is itself teleological. In tracing historical continuity backwards from the 1960s, such studies have overlooked significant institutional transformations that occurred after 1945, particularly under increasing American influence.[25] Land reform, for example, had a profound socio-economic impact on postcolonial in Japan as well as Korea.[26] Research on the South Korean Economic Planning Board, moreover, has demonstrated that despite some discursive connections with the colonial past, American and European economic

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[22] Han, *Manju modŏn*.
[23] For example, see: Chong-sik Lee, *Park Chung Hee: From Poverty to Power* (Palos Verdes, CA: KHU Press, 2012); Carter J. Eckert, *Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism 1866–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). Not all of Park's biographers agree on this point. Chŏn Inkwŏn, for example, argues that Park's upbringing and schooling were foundational to his personal psychology in ways that dictated his later political career. Chŏn Inkwŏn, "Pak Chŏnghŭi ŭi chŏngch'i sasang kwa haengdong e kwanhan chŏn'gichŏk yŏn'gu," (PhD diss., Sŏul Taehakkyo, 2001).
[24] Eckert, *Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea*.
[25] Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans and the Making of a Democracy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).
[26] Wonik Kim, "Rethinking Colonialism and the Origins of the Developmental State in East Asia," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 39, no. 3 (Aug. 2009): 382–399; Jong-Sung You, "Demystifying the Park Chung-Hee Myth: Land Reform in the Evolution of Korea's Developmental State," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 47, no. 4 (Aug. 2017): 535–556.

theories were a major source of inspiration for postwar Korean policymakers and economists.[27] Moreover, American foreign aid policy remained a significant constraining factor in the South Korean state's ability to formulate an independent economic policy well into the 1960s.[28]

With the exception of Johnson, studies focusing on postwar political leaders as the link between Manchukuo and the Cold War developmental states tend to present continuity as a framing device rather than a specific category of analysis. Indeed, most recent studies detailing Kishi, Park, and other Manchukuo officials' experiences with wartime Japanese imperialism end in 1945, before leaping forward in time to their postwar economic ascendency.[29] Consequentially, the argument for continuity does not always hold up to historical scrutiny. One recent study interrogating the postwar career of Manchukuo Military officer and Kishi disciple Shiina Etsusaburō (1898–1979), for example, convincingly demonstrates how the postwar process of deimperialization and decolonization engendered transformations even at the individual level.[30]

In highlighting the experience of Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy, this study finds some agreement with developmental state literature on the nature of imperial

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[27] Pak T'aegyun, *Wŏnhyŏng kwa pyŏnyong: Han'guk kyŏngje kaebal kyehoek ŭi kiwŏn* (Seoul: Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'anbu, 2007).
[28] Ibid.
[29] There are a variety of compelling reasons for the lack of transwar studies of state-building and state-builders in East Asia. For one, disciplinary specialization and the publishing market tends to favor a temporal divide between pre and post-war analysis. In the case of Park specifically, the general lack of source material is also a major issue. While historians have been able to determine much about his early life from his environment and people who knew him, the period between 1953 and 1959 remains a virtual black box. Nonetheless, this period leading up to his involvement in the military coup is a vital one that any argument for continuity cannot easily overlook.
[30] Kanda Yutaka, "The Transformation of a Manchukuo Imperial Bureaucrat to Postwar Supporter of the Yoshida Doctrine: The Case of Shiina Etsusaburō," in *The Dismantling of Japan's Empire in East Asia: Deimperialization, Postwar Legitimation, and Imperial Afterlife*, ed. Barak Kushner and Sherzod Muminov (London: Routledge, 2017), 182–198.

bureaucratic institutions in Manchukuo. Manchukuo bureaucrats were recruited and trained to conceived of the state total, organic, and moral body capable of sustaining development and security in the face of an imminent, existential threat. Their role was as "managers" and "spiritual guides" organizing and mobilizing the population for wartime through professional expertise, as well as a dedication to spiritual development and blood sacrifice. While these ideas permeated Japan's wartime empire, they converged in the Manchukuo bureaucracy with unmatched uniformity and intensity. As with the Manchukuo military, moreover, Koreans in the bureaucracy generally embraced and internalized these ideas with just as much, if not more enthusiasm than their Japanese colleagues.

At the same time, it approaches the postcolonial legacy of this experience more critically. The path from Manchukuo to the developmental state of the 1960s was neither singular nor direct. Many Koreans returning from Manchukuo thought their experience should apply directly to independent Korean state-building, but they found themselves severely disadvantaged in the postwar political environment. They confronted many of the same institutional barriers that had originally driven them to Manchukuo, plus new barriers created by division and occupation. Early efforts to reform government and society along Manchukuo lines repeatedly failed, challenging key lessons of the Manchukuo experience.

Faced with political marginalization, they attempted to reconcile their training in technocratic efficiency with postcolonial demands for liberal democracy, seeking to radically reform the state from within and without. Their strategies were novel, if often contradictory. While some aimed to create a leading class of professional civil servants,

others attempted to expand the national economy through grass-roots cooperative agriculture, or relied on military mobilization to rapidly expand the coal industry and achieve energy independence. In the process, they perpetually encountered limitations dictated by domestic political conditions and increasing American influence. This forced former Manchukuo bureaucrats to grapple with and reconfigured their colonial experience in different ways.

This process, however, was not exclusively divergent. Despite their varied responses, former Manchukuo bureaucrats continued to perceive the nation to be in a perpetual crisis that could only be resolved through state action. Most remained skeptical, if not steadfast opponents, of free market capitalism. And even those promoting more democratically oriented policies still demonstrated a preference for state regulation and guidance over popular engagement and grass-roots organization. This led many to openly support the 1961 military coup and the subsequent Park regime.

III. Methodology and Sources

This dissertation also seeks to reconsider broader questions of state-building by emphasizing the careers of specific individuals. Scholars have long sought to theorize the expanding role of the state in modern society from the perspective of institutions. From prisons and armies to finance ministries and construction firms, scholars have argued that increasing state centralization and expanding state control over territory and population

define the modern nation-state.[31] This compelling framework has been particularly influential on how scholars of twentieth century East Asia approach state development.[32]

While these studies have rightly pointed to the crucial role of institutions–especially bureaucracies–in defining the dynamics of state building, an institutional focus leaves a number of unanswered questions. How are institutions, and institutional ideas transmitted and transformed across time and geography? What specific factors cause institutions to change over time? What are the origins of institutional culture and how do its constituents understand their work? The answers to such questions require an analytical focus on the individuals within these institutions. Individuals drove institutional ideology and practice through their ideas, goals, and activities.

This dissertation, therefore, seeks to disaggregate institutional forms in order to probe deeper into the origins and specific characteristics of state power in Manchukuo and postcolonial South Korea. In this respect it draws inspiration methodologically from the biographical turn in cultural history.[33] In addition to drawing attention to early and premodern cultural and epistemological contexts, the new biography offers a compelling framework for disentangling the modern state by drawing our attention to the marginal and exceptional. While former Manchukuo bureaucrats were educated elites with important government titles, their ideas and influence on the state building projects in both Manchukuo and South Korea were far from mainstream. Foregrounding these

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[31] For examples, see: James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); and Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995)
[32] See discussion the previous section.
[33] For examples, see: Natalie Zemon Davis, *Women on the Margins: Three Seventeenth-Century Lives* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Three Ways to be Alien: Travails and Encounters in the Early Modern World* (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press, 2011); and Jonathan D. Spence, *The Question of Hu* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988).

marginal voices and contextualizing them within their unique experiences in Manchukuo, therefore, enables deeper engagement with the complexities and contingencies of state-building and decolonization.

While drawing inspiration from biography, this dissertation does not ignore the state as institution and rather seeks a balanced framing of the state-building process at both the institutional and individual level. Zooming in on individual Manchukuo bureaucrats enables me to observe the ways in which their ideas and actions cut channels through the complex political environment. Zooming back out, then reveals the ways in which these channels converge into and across stronger institutional flows as well as branch off into stagnant political backwaters.

To this end, it leverages a wide array of documentary source material. It analyzes the contemporary and memorial writings of Manchukuo bureaucrats alongside official government documents from Manchukuo, the U.S. Army Military Government in South Korea, and the South and Korean government, as well as newspapers, journals, and commercial books. Reading sources in this way allows my project to examine how political ideas were transmitted and transformed across time and geography through processes of learning and adaptation that were not necessarily uniform or intentional.

Teasing out the experience of Manchukuo's Korean bureaucrats presents logistical challenges for historical research. As a marginal group, Koreans rarely appear in official documents in Manchukuo. Complicating matters further is that after around 1941, the increasing ideological unity between Japan and Korea meant that even in Manchukuo Koreans began using Japanese names and some official government statistics began redefining Korean individuals as ethnically Japanese. Capturing their experience,

therefore, has required a certain degree of lateral reading into the more common published records on Japanese bureaucrats.

In addition, the Korean War as well as substandard archival practices during the 1950s have created a significant source gap in South Korean government records. This is especially the case for understanding the day-to-day operations and internal debates at government institutions. Following in the path of other studies of the period, this dissertation overcomes this gap, in part, through mass media publications, particularly newspapers and professional journals where former Manchukuo bureaucrats occasionally published. As with Manchukuo, this dissertation also finds compelling evidence by reading laterally in American archival sources. Former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the South Korean government interacted regularly with their counterparts in the American Occupation and later the American aid program where their voices were captured in correspondence and meeting notes. On their own, these sources offer a compelling glimpse of the inner workings of South Korean government administration, albeit interpreted through American perspectives. More importantly, triangulating between former Manchukuo bureaucrats' discussions with Americans to Korean government records and their public writings in Korean offers deeper insight into their personal beliefs and motives.

Memoirs are also a valuable source of information, but one that presents analytical challenges. The stigma of Japanese collaboration has long been a reason for silencing colonial memory in Korea. The post-democratization movement to identify collaborators, including Manchukuo bureaucrats, has made these men guarded if not defensive with their reflections on the past. And while there is only a small body of

publicly available literature about their experience, this tends to be highly inflected with the discourse of contemporary nationalism. In contrast, former Manchukuo bureaucrats have been far more prolific in discussing their post-colonial life. But this too requires careful contextualization. Written during and after the nation's emergence as a world industrial power, these memoirs tend to present their lives and careers within–and contributing to–the broader narrative of national development.

This study also utilizes a hitherto untapped archive of the Japan-based alumni association for Manchukuo bureaucrats, *Daidōgakuin Dōsōkai*. These public and private documents contain the memories and stories of many Korean bureaucrats as well as their Japanese colleagues. Analyzing these sources, however, also requires careful attention to the politics of memory. Written in Japanese language and in dialogue with a largely fixed and familiar audience, these sources tend downplay the negative aspects of Japanese colonial project in Manchukuo.

This dissertation, therefore, seeks to strike a balance between recapturing otherwise hidden historical experiences through these individual voices, while acknowledging the social and political complexities of memory production. Although this study regularly utilizes memoirs and memorial writing, it does not do so exclusively. Instead, evidence from memoirs is regularly confirmed or compared with contemporary historical records. It also pays careful attention to the context in which such sources were written. Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and American sources are read against each other in order to cut across the national, international, and interpersonal contexts in which these men were writing.

IV. Organization

This dissertation consists of two parts. The first, analyzes the formation of Koreans as Manchukuo bureaucrats. At the institutional level, it traces the development of the Manchukuo bureaucracy as a distinctive system in the Japanese empire shaped by global administrative trends and local conditions. On the individual level, it examines how Koreans interacted with that system and how it shaped their understanding of the state and their identity as government officials.

Chapter 1 begins by establishing that Koreans were a numerically significant cohort in the Manchukuo bureaucracy. While not as large as in colonial Korea, the number of Koreans bureaucrats in Manchukuo exceeded 10,000 by the 1940s and their representation in the bureaucracy was proportional to the overall size of the Korean population in Manchuria. They also possessed a number of common characteristics, such as high levels of education, ambition, and physical discipline. This raises the two questions that guide this chapter, why and how did they join the Manchukuo bureaucracy? The answers lie at the intersection of two interrelated processes, personal motivation and institutional recruitment. Based on contemporary writings, news reports, and memoirs, this chapter demonstrates that elite Koreans decided to become Manchukuo bureaucrats based on a variety of factors. These included practical issues, such as lack of full or meaningful employment, as well ideological interest in Manchukuo's promise of racial harmony and ethnic inclusion. But the process was not just self-selecting. Japanese-run institutions, including the Manchukuo government and imperial universities used formal and in-formal recruitment processes to assemble the state's bureaucracy based on their own criteria. Analysis of government recruitment procedures and documents

demonstrates a strong preference for highly disciplined, politically ambiguous subjects ready and willing to participate in the empire's mobilization program.

For Koreans, joining the Manchukuo bureaucracy was only the beginning of a transformational process. Chapter 2 focuses on Manchukuo's distinctive bureaucratic culture and how Koreans experience it. Focusing first on the state's bureaucratic training program, it shows how these practices emerged from the competing and converging interests of Manchukuo's ruling factions to mold recruits into professional administrators, developmental ideologues, and partisan soldiers. Recruits were educated to become a new kind of bureaucrat, compelled by a moral imperative for development, authorized by their elite knowledge, and dedicated to following the military into blood sacrifice for the state. This uniform and rigorous training process united Korean bureaucrats through shared education and experience. It also informed their activities in the field. Seeing themselves as the qualified and rightful leaders of Koreans in Manchukuo, they enacted programs to radically reorganize the physical, social, and economic life of Korean communities in order to accomplish the state's goals for internal security and economic development. While framed as a paternalist drive for the sake of their countrymen, the programs were nonetheless deeply embedded within Japan's imperial mobilization system and ultimately failed to bring the kind of social mobility Korean bureaucrats envisioned. Faced with failure, however, they continually relied on the unwavering spiritual discipline of their training.

Part two analyzes the impact and evolution of the Manchukuo experience on former bureaucrats' state-building philosophies and activities after their return to Korea. While the experience in Manchukuo was unique in its uniformity and intensity, it's

legacy in South Korea was far from singular. Returning to their liberated homeland, former Manchukuo bureaucrats continued to approach state-building as a process of centralization and mobilized development. At the same time, they grappled with and reconfigured this colonial foundation based on the conditions, influences, and limitations they encountered. The case studies in this section, therefore, tease out their details of their ideas and practices and identify multiple contingent pathways through the 1950s.

Chapter 3 follows Koreans from their return to Korea in 1945 through the Korean War (1950–1953). In liberated South Korea, former Manchukuo bureaucrats were outsiders, but this status brought one major advantage. Lack of information, along with the political division of the country allowed most to fly under the radar during the various attempts at postcolonial justice. However, being outsiders also contributed to their marginalization within the new governing institutions. Their unique education, skills, and experiences were less important than personal connections and political allegiances in the fraught environment of post-colonial Korea. Nonetheless, former Manchukuo bureaucrats did play an important role in several early state-building projects, including policing, government organization, and socio-economic development programs. However, their lack of political authority meant that nearly all of these projects had failed by the start of the Korean War. This spurred on search for diverse solutions that carried through the end of the decade.

The final two chapters follow former Manchukuo bureaucrats' continuing reform efforts in South Korea from the end of the Korean War (1953) until the 1961 military coup d'état in two separate spheres: state administration, and socio-economic development. First, chapter 4 focuses on their involvement in civil service reform. After

the Korean War, political patronage and corruption continued to be endemic features of the South Korean civil service system. However, former Manchukuo bureaucrats were openly critical of this system and led campaigns to rationalize and professionalize the bureaucracy. The main actors were a small group of former Manchukuo bureaucrats who led the state's central personnel agencies throughout the decade. Lacking in authority and political support, they nonetheless found creative ways to work within the system and partnered with allies in the American aid program, gradually pushing the state towards a professional, merit-based bureaucracy. Although rarely articulated, Manchukuo was a significant inspiration for their agenda. At the same time, they grappled internally with how to reconcile their preference a strong centralized state with American-inspired democratic principles–an ambiguity that was ironically echoed by some of their American allies.

Chapter 5 analyzes former Manchukuo bureaucrats socio-economic reform programs in the 1950s. It first explores their involvement in the debates over management of national industries, focusing specifically on the Taehan Coal Corporation (Taehan sŏktan kongsa). During a decade in which politicians, economics, and business interests were pressuring the government to privatize underperforming national mines, former Manchukuo bureaucrats remained steadfast in their belief that the state was the only institution capable of expanding production and establishing energy self-sufficiency. Utilizing labor strikes as a pretext, former Manchukuo officials united to mobilize military labor and resources, rationalize production, and institute a centralized energy production plan with remarkable similarities to Manchukuo. Ironically, the success of the plan accelerated calls for privatization that ultimately resulted in a significant shift

towards autonomous management and that ended former Manchukuo bureaucrats' authority.

The chapter then shifts to socio-economic development programs in the agricultural sphere, returning to the debates over agricultural cooperatives begun in chapter 3. At the end of the Korean War, former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Nongimbu) continued to be skeptical of capitalist development and what they perceived as its negative impact on bedrock of the national economy, agricultural production. They therefore continued to promote agricultural cooperatives as a necessary step towards expanding farm production and achieving national economic self-sufficiency. Political leadership, however, perpetually undermined their efforts, instead focusing on rural political organization and funneling foreign aid revenues to the industrial economy. While cooperatives legislation did ultimately pass, it was largely accomplished through American pressure and with half-hearted support from the South Korean State.

At the same time, former Manchukuo bureaucrats' ideas about rural reform were evolving. The chapter concludes with an analysis of one individual's partnership with American aid workers on the community development program in the late 1950s. Merging Manchukuo's authoritarian economic mobilization with emerging American economic theory on third-world development, they attempted to create a centralized disciplinary structure to transform village life. On the one hand, the program aimed to train rural villagers to be autonomous and democratic. On the other, it functioned to maximize agricultural productivity and funnel surplus labor into industrial development.

And while the project was ultimately cut short by the 1961 coup, it nonetheless demonstrates how far former Manchukuo bureaucrats had come by the end of the 1950s.

Finally, the epilogue looks past the coup to consider the fate of former Manchukuo bureaucrats under the military regime of the 1960s. Former Manchukuo bureaucrats had a common background in Manchukuo's authoritarian system and shared vocabulary in state-centered development that quickly provided them with a newfound voice in state-building discourse. Looking at their ongoing projects for civil-service reform and socio-economic development, however, former Manchukuo bureaucrats continued to face significant barriers when it came to implementing their plans. But rather than fading into irrelevancy, Manchukuo began to take on new meaning in the international arena. The emergence of transnational alumni networks in this period created new opportunities for political and economic collaboration, as well as deeper personal reflection and renewal of Manchukuo's bureaucratic identity.

Chapter 1: They Chose Manchukuo

–How and Why Koreans Entered the Manchukuo Bureaucracy–

In early 1933, Kim T'aeho (1908-?), a second-year Korean student in the law department at Keijō Imperial University saw an advertisement posted on the campus bulletin board. It read: "Now recruiting students for the second class of Manchukuo's Great Unity Academy…The purpose of this institutions is to train bureaucrats to further the process of nation-building in accordance with the spirit of the kingly way (*ōdō*)…We are seeking 200 men (including Koreans and Taiwanese)."[1] Having been born and raised in the northern border region, Kim knew much about the conditions in Manchuria and the recent Japanese invasion, and the prospect of working there intrigued him. Like many of his law school classmates, Kim had begun to prepare for the Japanese Higher Civil Service Examination on the path towards a career in as a bureaucrat in the colonial government. He had even given up his passion, soccer, in order to study. Kim still yearned, however, for action and adventure, and the advertisement on the board offered a compelling compromise. "Rather than be confined as a bureaucrat on the narrow Korean peninsula," he thought "wouldn't it be better to fly free in the emerging state of Manchukuo and find a purpose in life. So, I applied."[2]

Kim was one of the first among many Koreans who made the decision to join in Japan's continental expansion and serve as a bureaucrat in the Manchukuo government.

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[1] Gaimushō, "Daidōgakuin gakusei boshū ni kan suru ken" December 10, 1932 JACAR Ref. B05016162500.

[2] Kim T'aeho began going by the name Kim T'aeuk sometime after 1945. It is unclear what prompted the name change, but some scholars have mistakenly identified these names as belonging to separate individuals. For the sake of consistency, I use only the name T'aeho. Kim T'aeuk, "Kaisōroku," *Tairiku Kaisō*, ed.Manshūkoku Daidōgakuin dai niki sei tairiku kaisōroku henjun iinkai (Tokyo: Manshūkoku Daidōgakuin dai niki sei tairiku kaisōroku henjun iinkai, 1977), 235.

In terms of sheer numbers, this chapter will first establish that Koreans represented a significant force within the Manchukuo bureaucracy. Between 1931 and 1945, thousands of men joined the Manchukuo civil service. While their numbers were small compared to the Government General of Korea, they nonetheless constituted a sizeable contingent, particularly on a regional level, in a territory where ethnic Koreans represented only a small minority of the overall population.

Behind the numbers, however, this chapter will focus on the more significant question of why so many Korean men, like Kim, chose to work alongside Japan's colonial expansion on the continent. While the economic troubles of the 1930s and the opening up of lands in Manchukuo to agricultural settlement precipitated a broader migration of millions of Koreans across the northern border, by all accounts the young men joining the bureaucracy were members of the educated upper elite of colonial society. Their education and status should have afforded them a wider array of options than the average Korean. Manchuria, moreover, had long been a well-known base of operations for anti-Japanese resistance forces and a place of escape from Japanese colonial oppression–seemingly the anthesis of the colonial expansion these young men were choosing to perpetuate.

This chapter begins to answer this question through a broad investigation of individual Korean motivations. Previous studies analyzing the memoirs of Korean bureaucrats in Manchukuo have focused on two primary push and pull factors: the practical conditions of the contemporary job market, and the appeal of Japanese imperial

propaganda.[3] However, these studies have largely overlooked how practical necessity and imperial ideology coexisted and interacted. Juxtaposing individual memoirs with contemporary media publications and advertisements, this chapter approaches these two factors as co-constitutive. It argues that Koreans who became Manchukuo bureaucrats not only made a rational decision to do so based on the economic and social pressures of the society in which they lived but also adapted the discourse of Japanese imperialism to justify their choice to themselves and their compatriots.

More significantly, this chapter explores a third factor that previous studies have entirely overlooked, the role of government recruitment institutions in the selection process. As Kim's story reminds us, his decision to join the Manchukuo bureaucracy began with an official government advertisement. This was merely the first encounter with a larger process of recruitment, screening, and selection that was designed to find a specific type of person willing and able to carry out the Japanese agenda in Manchukuo. Moreover, close reading of the official government record reveals how this process was infused with its own ideological and practical motivations and limitations. This process is, therefore, crucial to understanding the defining characteristics of the Koreans who joined the Manchukuo bureaucracy.

Formed at the nexus of these personal and institutional conditions, this chapter will demonstrate how the recruitment process accounted for many of the common characteristics that were unique to Korean bureaucrats in Manchukuo. In particular, it

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[3] For the former, see Panminjok Munje Yŏn'guso, *Ch'inilp'a 99-in: punyabyŏl chuyo inmul ŭi ch'inil iryŏksŏ*. Vol. 2. Ch'op'an. (Seoul: Tolbegae, 1993), 51. For the latter, see: Ch'oe Ch'unghŭi, "Manjuguk tedonghagwŏn Chosŏnin haksaeng tŭl e kwanhan yŏn'gu," (MA Thesis, Seoul City University, 2009); and Pak Sŏngchin, "Manjuguk Chosŏnin kodŭng kwallyo ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa chŏngch'esŏng," *Tongyang chongch'i sasangsa* 8, no.1 (Jan. 2009): 213-240.

both attracted and selected for highly disciplined, politically ambiguous elites oriented towards and willing to participate in state intervention on a massive scale. These characteristics lay the groundwork for a longer process of identity formation that would play a central role in their individual careers and, eventually, their state-building activities in Korea after 1945.

I. The Numbers Problem

Determining the precise number of Koreans who joined the Manchukuo bureaucracy presents a significant challenge to researchers. Since existent statistical data is limited, few scholars have even attempted to analyze size and ethnic makeup of the Manchukuo bureaucracy.[4] Nonetheless, the data suggest Korean participation in terms relative growth and regional concentration was greater than in other Japanese colonial territories. Moreover, while Japanese appear to have continued to dominate positions of power, the system increasingly created openings for Koreans to higher service.

While there are virtually no government statistics on the overall size of the Manchukuo bureaucracy prior to 1936, information on Koreans is, in fact, more readily available. The large population of Koreans in Manchuria had long been a concern for Japan's imperial officialdom, particularly the Government General of Korea. As a result, both the Japanese and nascent Manchukuo governments subjected Koreans to greater

[4] Pak Sŏngchin is the significant exception. Pak's analysis, however, relies primarily on Manchukuo government sources only for the year 1936. As I discuss below, this data is contradictory and highly unreliable. Pak ultimately concludes that an estimate of 3000 Korean officials that appeared in a 1939 Korean magazine article is roughly correct. The article, however, cites no original sources. Pak's analysis, moreover, offers little insight into changes over time, or how Koreans compared with other ethnicities in the Manchukuo bureaucracy. Pak, "Manjuguk Chosŏnin kodŭng kwallyo," 218.

surveillance and scrutiny. Barely a year after the Kwantung Army's invasion, the Manchukuo Ministry of Civil Affairs (Minseibu) published a report on the "Conditions of Koreans in Machuria" (*Zai Man Chōsenjin jijō*). Citing a December 1932 survey compiled by the Mukden Coordinating Committee of Manchuria Korean People's Associations (Hōten Manshū Chōsen Jinminkai Sōgōkai), it reported 387 Koreans employed as officials (*kankōri*), teachers (*kyōin*), and religious ministers (*bokushi*).[5] Though we cannot be certain as to the exact breakdown of these three categories, it is safe to assume that the latter two constituted a majority of the total. In addition, the majority of these public persons were concentrated a handful of urban centers and railroad towns across Manchuria where the Korean People's Associations were most active: Mukden (Fengtian), Fushun, Harbin, and Heliong (Meihekuo).[6]

The Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo also kept regular statistics on the Korean population that provide more reliable insight into the growing number of Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy. According to the embassy's survey, there were 2,485 Koreans employed as "officials" (*kankōri*) in late 1933 (Table 1.1).

[Table 1.1] Koreans Employed as Officials (*kankōri*)

	1933	1934	1935	1936
Individuals	2,485	1,638	3,158	4,088
Percent Change	N/A	-34%	93%	29%

Source: *Zai Man Chōsenjin gaikyō*; *Manshū rōdō jijō sōran*

[5] Minseibu sōmushi chōsakwa, *Zaiman Chōsenjin jijō* (Shinkyō: Minseibu sōmushi chōsaka, 1933), 52–54.
[6] Ibid.

By 1936 the number had nearly doubled to 4,088.[7] Considering the total Korean population only grew by twenty-three percent in the same period, Korean participation in the bureaucracy more than outpaced normal demographic change. Bureaucrats, of course, only represented a miniscule portion of the overall population of Koreans in Manchukuo (less than 0.4%). Regional distribution in this period, however, demonstrates that Korean officials were mostly concentrated in the border region and major urban centers where there were large Korean populations.

After 1936, the Japanese embassy stopped reporting on Korean conditions and so we must rely on Manchukuo government data. These sources, however, are generally imprecise, and contradictory.[8] In 1940, however, the central government conducted a national census which provides us with the most accurate picture of the ethnic makeup of the Manchukuo bureaucracy. According to the census, 14,261 Koreans were employed as bureaucrats (*kanri*) and public officials (*kōri*) in 1940–a 249% increase from 1936.[9] On the one hand, increased Korean migration to Manchukuo offers one possible explanation

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[7] The decline in 1934 is a suspicious anomaly. This particular data point comes from a 1936 Southern Manchuria Railway labor report which cites the 1934 Embassy survey as its source. I have not, however, been able to find the original report to verify its accuracy. Mantetsu keizai chōsakai, *Manshū rōdō jijō sōran* (Dairen: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, 1936), 308.

[8] In 1936, for example, the Ministry of Civil Administration (Minseibu) reported 11,833 Koreans serving as bureaucrats (*kanri*), public officials (*kōri*), and legal workers (*hōmu*). Manshū Teikoku Minseibu Sōmushi Bunshōka, *Manshū Teikoku Minseibu dai-ni ji tōkei nenpō* (Hōten: Minseibu, 1936), 47–47. While for the same year, a 1938 General Affairs Agency (Sōmuchō) report recorded only 5,251 Koreans in a category that included public officials (*kankōri*) and free laborers (*jiyūgyō*). Kokumuin Sōmuchō Tōkeisho, *Manshūkoku tōkei tekiyō* (Hōten: Kokumuin Sōmuchō Tōkeisho, 1938), 22–23. A 1938 the Ministry of Defense (Jianbu), reported that at the end of the previous year 37,623 Koreans were employed as officials (*kankōri*) and free laborers (*jiyūgyō*). It is safe to assume, however, that a vast majority belonged to the latter category. Manshūkoku Jianbu Keimushi, *Manshū Teikoku genjū kokō tōkei Kōtoku yonen matsu* (Shinkyō: Manshūkoku Jianbu Keimushi, 1938), 70–71.

[9] Sōmuchō Tōkeisho and Jianbu Keimushi, *Manshū Teikoku genjū jinkō tōkei (sangyō betsu jinkō tōkei hen)* (Shinkyō: Sōmuchō Tōkeisho and Jianbu Keimushi, 1942), 8–9.

for this rapid increase in numbers.[10] On the other, the push towards a wartime state after 1937 precipitated a massive expansion of the bureaucracy generally of which Koreans were merely a small part. The Government General of Korea also saw a significant, if less extreme, increase in the number of Korean bureaucrats during the same period.[11] Regionally, however, Koreans continued to be concentrated in the border provinces. The province of Jiandao (J. Kantō, K. Kando)–directly across the border from Korea–was home to nearly fifty percent of all Korean bureaucrats. Outside of the border region, Korean bureaucrats tended to be concentrated in provinces with major urban centers, such as Mukden, Xinjing, and Harbin.

The 1940 census report also offers at least some insight into the number of Korean bureaucrats relative to other ethnicities. In the Government General of Korea, Japanese bureaucrats had always outnumbered their Korean counterparts, even during wartime mobilization.[12] The same was true in Manchukuo, where the ratio of Japanese to Korean officials was nearly five to one. Bearing in mind, however, that Koreans were only a small ethnic minority in the overall population of Manchukuo, their representation within the official positions appears to have been relatively proportional. According to the 1940 census report, Koreans comprised roughly three percent of the total population, while they represented about four percent of the bureaucracy (Table 1.2).

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[10] The total Korean population increased from 872,182 to 1,309,053 (33%) in the same time period. Ibid; Zaiman Nihon Daishikan, *Zai Man Chōsenjin gaikyō* (N.A.: Zaiman Nihon Daishikan, 1936), 6.
[11] Okamoto Makiko, *Shokuminchi kanryō no seijishi: Chōsen Taiwan sōtokufu to teikoku Nihon* (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2008), 60.
[12] Ibid.

[Table 1.2] Ethnic Composition of the Manchukuo Bureaucracy 1940

	Korean	Japanese	Manchurian*	Other
Number of Bureaucrats	14,261	65,733	238,923	1,888
Percentage of all Bureaucrats	4%	20%	74%	1%
Percentage of Total Population	3%	2%	95%	0.2%

Source: *Manshūkoku genjū jinkō tōkei–shokugyō betsu jinkō tōkei*
*The census is unclear on the exact definition of the ethnic category "Manchurians" (*Manjin*), but other sources using the term included Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, and other ethnic groups native to the Chinese northeast.

Rather, the overrepresentation of Japanese within the bureaucracy appears to have come at the expense of the vast "Manchurian" (J. *Manjin*) majority. On a regional level, the trend was similar. In both Antung (J. Antō) and Tonghua (J. Tsūka) provinces, which bordered the Korean peninsula, the number of Korean bureaucrats was roughly proportional to the size of the Korean population. In Jiandao Province, where Koreans were the majority ethnic group, they accounted for 64% of all bureaucrats, and outnumbered Japanese by nearly four to one.

This raises the important question of how these ethnic divisions mapped onto the bureaucratic hierarchy. In other Japanese colonial territories, non-Japanese bureaucrats were overwhelmingly limited to lower-level positions. In colonial Korea, for example, the number of Koreans in high-level bureaucratic positions (*sōnin* and above) remained relatively small and stable, even as wartime mobilization saw the overall size of the bureaucracy expand.[13] Rather, significant proportional gains for Koreans in the colonial

[13] According to Okamoto, even as high-ranking Koreans increased numerically, they were declining proportionally. Between 1932 and 1942 the number of Koreans ranked *sōnin* and above increased from 354 to 442 (+25%), while Japanese increased from 1,126 to 1,976 (+75%). Ibid.

bureaucracy only occurred late in the war and at the very lowest (*koin*) level in the hierarchy.[14]

Manchukuo government sources offer only aggregated numbers at the national level, with no breakdown by position or title, but other sources suggest that the dynamics in Manchukuo were similar. Japanese embassy reports, for example, indicate a steady decline in the number of Korean bureaucrats in the Manchukuo capitol of Xinjing (J. Shinkyō) through the mid 1930s, even as the overall number of Korean bureaucrats was increasing. Given the relative scarcity of Japanese labor in Manchukuo's early years, it is likely that Koreans initially filled low-level bureaucratic positions in the central government only to be replaced and redistributed to the countryside as more Japanese recruits arrived. While the number of Korean bureaucrats in the capitol had increased significantly by the 1940 census, Japanese officials outnumbered them by a significant margin. Moreover, an unofficial list of 83 Koreans holding higher civil service positions (*kōtōkan*) in 1940 indicates that, much as in colonial Korea, more than 99% of Korean bureaucrats in Manchukuo were appointed to the lower levels.[15]

There is evidence that regionally, however, Korean representation was somewhat better. A 1936 report from Jiandao Province noted that the ethnic makeup of the province's central administration was evenly divided between Japanese, Korean, and Manchurian officials. They also accounted for about 21% of higher civil service positions

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[14] The number of Koreans holding *koin* appointments actually exceeded Japanese for the first time in 1940. Ibid.

[15] Kim Il sil, "Uri sahoe ŭi chenaemak: Manjuguk e Chosŏnin ŭi kokwan paek yŏ myŏng ch'oegŭn e tto 30 myŏng ŭl sinim hada," *Samch'olli 12* no. 7 (July 1940), 9–11.

(*senninkan* and above) and 35% of lower civil service positions (*ininkan* and below).[16] By 1940, both the governor (*shōchō*) and vice-governor (*jichō*) were Koreans, bringing Korean representation to both the symbolic and policy-making pinnacle of the provincial administration.

There is also evidence to indicate that wartime mobilization did cause a numeric, if not proportional, increase in Korean representation in the higher civil service ranks. Of the 108 Koreans going through Manchukuo's central bureaucratic training institute for higher officials, the Great Unity Academy (Daidō gakuin), 84 (78%) completed the program after 1937.[17]

The statistical evidence, therefore, delineates the broad contours of a bureaucratic system that, unlike other parts of the Japanese empire, recruited colonized Koreans to a significant degree. It points, moreover, to the more complex question of why Koreans decided to join the Manchukuo bureaucracy in such numbers. In seeking to answer this question, we must delve deeper into the lived experiences of these men to parse out their personal motivations, and ideological justifications for choosing Manchukuo.

II. Motivation: Recruitment as Self-Selection

Though certainly better off than rural farmers, the 1930s was still a challenging time for young Korean men with an advanced education. The global economic downturn in 1929 meant that a much more limited number of jobs were available to college and university graduates. Young men who had gone abroad during the halcyon days of the

[16] Kokumuin sōmuchō jōhōsho, *Shōsei iran dai 6 go: Kantōshō hen* (N.A.: Kokumuin sōmuchō jōhōsho, 1936), 33–35.
[17] Ch'oe, "Manjuguk tedonghagwŏn Chosŏnin haksaeng tŭl e kwanhan yŏn'gu," 23.

1920s seeking a superior education in Europe, American, and especially Japan were now faced with the prospect of unstable employment that was insufficient to recoup the enormous costs of schooling, or worse complete joblessness.[18] For many, these concerns were compounded by family commitments. Korean university students tended to be married and some already had children while they were attending school.[19] So, for many young Korean students, the annual job-hunting season was a crucial period in their lives. As one newspaper article prefaced the start of the job-hunting season in the spring of 1933: "with the coming of March, the flower days of university and delights of youth are soon to be overcome by the developing wave of anxiety that is job-hunting hell (K. *ch'wijik chiok*)."[20]

Competition was fierce and getting a job depended on a number of factors, including one's field of study. Students graduating from the Keijō Imperial University School of Medicine in 1933 fared significantly better on the job market than their classmates in the School of Law and Humanities.[21] The expanding education system in Korea also meant that graduates of normal colleges (K. *sabŏp ch'ŏnmun hakkyo*) had a relatively easy time finding employment. For the remainder, though, it was not ultimately what you knew but who. In colonial Korea, Japanese-owned businesses preferred to recruit Japanese employees for management positions and at the few Korean-owned

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[18] Chŏng Sŏn'i, "Ilche shigi tehak chorŏpcha ŭi ch'wiŏp sanghwang kwa kŭ sŏngkyŏk yŏn'gu" *Kyoyuk sahak yŏn'gu* 12 (Aug. 2002): 167-168.
[19] This was in part due to the colonial education system, which required additional years of schooling for Koreans. As a result, they tended to be a few years older than their Japanese classmates. Ko Chaep'il mentions this as a chief concern in his memoirs. Ko Chaep'il, *Hanam hoegorok*, vol. 1 (Seoul: P'arandŭl, 2003), 54.
[20] "Chorŏpcha saeng ŭi pŏnnoe: yangch'un ŭn kŭnman…ŭmsanhan ch'wijik chanson" *Tonga ilbo,* February 13, 1933.
[21] Ibid.

companies, employment prospects were limited primarily to a system of personal and family connections. As one student remarked at the time: "The secret to getting a job is getting your resume noticed by an executive, and the best way to do that is by finding a close associate of that executive who can introduce you. Getting that introduction, not to mention introduction letter, is the only surefire way to get a good job."[22]

Lack of opportunities in the private sector drove many to pursue work for the colonial government. While civil service positions had long been the exclusive realm of Korea's landed elite, research has shown that the expansion and rationalization of government employment dating back to the 1890s opened up opportunities for a broader spectrum of Korean society.[23] These trends continued to some extent under Japanese colonization. Indeed, some Koreans saw service for the colonial government not just as a means to upward social mobility but also as a strategy for dealing with colonial life. Kim Kyumin's (1918-2008) grandmother, for example, reasoned that if a family member became a colonial official, he would be able stop the local police from constantly harassing her husband. According to Kim, his grandmother sent him to a local Confucian school (K. *sŏdang*) from age four or five and pushed him to study hard, to the point that his local nickname became "higher civil servant" (K. *kotŭngkwan*).[24]

While civil service jobs may have been available to a broader social spectrum than in previous generations, receiving an appointment as a colonized Korean presented

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[22] Qtd in Chŏng "Ilche shigi tehak chorŏpcha ŭi ch'wiŏp sanghwang," 170.
[23] For more on changes in social stratification and bureaucratic recruitment patterns at the turn of the twentieth century, see Kyung Moon Hwang, *Beyond Birth: Social Status and the Emergence of Modern Korea* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004).
[24] Han'guk chŏngsin munhwa yŏn'guwŏn hyŏndaesa yŏnguso, *Kyŏktonggi chisigin ŭi segaji sam ŭi mosŭp* (Kyŏnggi-do Sŏngnam-si: Han'guk chŏngsin munhwa yŏn'guwŏn hyŏndaesa yŏnguso, 1999), 3.

significant challenges. Few Koreans seeking employment in the Japanese bureaucracy were able to pass the highly competitive civil service examination, and there was no guarantee of an actual job for those who did.[25] The Government General of Korea rarely recruited Korean employees through the merit-based civil service examination, instead using its legal authority to appoint Koreans independently, and mostly assigned them low-level and regional administrative positions.[26] With a relatively stable and limited number of positions for Koreans, competition for Government General appointments was fierce and highly dependent on personal connections. In particular, graduates of Keijō Imperial University were able to leverage faculty and personal connections to dominate these positions as opposed to those who had studied in Japan.[27]

Those who did find employment faced additional challenges, the most contentions being racial discrimination in the Japanese-run workplace. Many young Korean employees were shocked at the acute wage disparity with their Japanese co-workers. Kim Kyumin, who became an elementary school teacher in northern Korea, recalled the indignation he felt on discovering that a female Japanese teacher at his school two ranks below him earned nearly double his monthly salary. When he confronted the school

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[25] From 1931 to 1943, the number of Koreans who passed the administrative higher civil service examination was 136 or about 10 per year. Chang Sin, "Ilche ha Chosŏnin kodŭng kwallyo ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa chŏngch'esŏng: kodŭng munkwan haengjŏngkwa hapkyŏkja rŭl chungsim ŭro," *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 63 (March, 2007): 46. Kwŏn Il claims after passing the civil service examination he was denied employment at the Ministry of Justice because someone accused him of promoting Korean independence. Kwon Il, *Hyŏnhaet'an ŭl sai e tugo: ilbonso ŭi nam kwa puk* (Seoul: Haeoe kyop'o munje yŏn'guso ch'ulp'anbu), 26.
[26] Okamoto, *Shokuminchi kanryō no seijishi*, 278-279. Prior to 1931, only three Higher Civil Service Exam certified Koreans received appointments to the Government General of Korea. From 1931 to 1943 the average number of exam-certified Korean appointments was seven per year. Ibid, 285. Yi Ch'anggŭn (1900–?), the first exam certified Korean, was initially appointed to the lowest level of assistant (*konin*) in 1925 and he did not receive a higher civil service position until 1927. It took 19 years for him to work his way up to the level of Provincial Governor. Ibid, 618–619.
[27] Chŏng, "Ilche shigi tehak chorŏpcha ŭi ch'wiŏp sanghwang," 177.

principal about the reason for this disparity, he was told that her level of pay was "suitable, because she was Japanese."[28] Future Manchukuo bureaucrats also noted the systematic wage discrimination against Koreans working in the Government General of Korea as a key reason for choosing not to peruse those positions.[29]

Discrimination extended beyond wages to issues regarding workplace duties and promotion. Sin Kisŏk (1908-1989), for example, went to work as a research assistant at Keijō Imperial University's International Law and Diplomatic History Research Institute immediately after graduation. Within the Japanese higher education system, this was generally understood as the first step towards becoming a university professor. In his four years at the research institute, however, Sin was never assigned to teach a lecture course. He noted with some frustration that despite his seniority, "all the lectures were assigned to young Japanese assistants fresh out of Tokyo Imperial University."[30]

For some, the prospect of having to do the menial tasks that Japanese relegated to their Korean coworkers was thoroughly distasteful. The university system in Japan, as elsewhere, fostered a profound sense of pride among students in their intellectual ability, along with a moral imperative to put their training to practical use. However, few Koreans saw the job opportunities available to them after graduation as fulfilling that purpose. Cho Kichun (1917-2001), a graduate of Sophia University in Economics, remarked: "for those of us in the Economics Department, you were lucky if you could get

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[28] Kim Kyumin, "Ch'arari Manjuguk kwalliga natta," *8.15 ŭi kiŏk: haebang konggan ŭi p'unggyŏng, 40-in ŭi yŏksa ch'ehŏm,* ed. Mun Chean (P'ajusi: Han'gilsa, 2005), 222-223.
[29] Ko, *Hanam hoegorok*, 54; and Kim Kyumin, "Ch'arari Manjuguk kwalliga natta," 226. For recent analysis of wage discrimination in the colonial bureaucracy and the fight over wage increases, see Okamoto, *Shokuminchi kanryō no seijishi*, chapters 5, 9–10.
[30] Sin Kisŏk, *P'alsip pyŏngsaeng – Chiyang Sin Kisŏk paksa p'alsun munjip* (Seoul: T'amgudang, 1987), 419.

a job as a clerk at a bank. But I didn't want to work for a bank. I couldn't bear the thought of sitting at the bank window all day dealing with money."[31] Students such as Cho received little encouragement from recent graduates. After only three months at the P'yŏngyang branch of Korea Savings Bank, Hwang Toyŏn (1914–1976) wrote to his classmates: "I don't know if I was lucky or unlucky to get [this job], but…I want to quit."[32] Especially for Koreans, achieving an advanced education was perceived as demonstrating not only their legitimate place within colonial society but also advancing the social perception of all Koreans within the colonial hierarchy. Conversely, some Korean students took their inability to find equal and purposeful employment after graduation as a defeat not just for themselves but for Koreans everywhere.[33]

The Manchukuo bureaucracy offered a solution to all of these issues, at least on paper. Following the Kwangtung Army invasion of the northeastern Chinese provinces in 1931, the initial military plan for occupation and eventual annexation had to be scrapped due to both external and internal pressures.[34] The creation of the nominally independent state of Manchukuo required a massive civil administration. With 600,000 square miles and thirty million people, the Japanese needed enough well-trained bureaucrats to keep the state running smoothly.

Demand for bureaucratic personnel was urgent from the start. The Kwangtung Army quickly gained control of key cities where existing Japanese settler populations and

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[31] Cho Kichun, *Na ŭi insaeng: hangmun ŭi yŏkchŏng* (Seoul: Ilsinsa, 1998), 28.
[32] Hwang Toyŏn, "Hoewŏn sosik: Hwang Toyŏn," *Kyŏngdo Cheguk Taehak Chosŏn yuhaksaeng tongch'anghoe hoebo* 3 (1938): 120.
[33] Kim Kyumin, "Ch'arari Manjuguk kwalliga natta," 226–227.
[34] Shin'ichi Yamamuro, *Manchuria under Japanese Dominion*, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 62.

institutions provided administrative support. Outside these urban centers, however, the political order had been severely disrupted with nothing to fill its place. This power vacuum led to increasing public unrest.[35] And with anti-Japanese resistance forces still operating throughout the countryside, Army officials were concerned that lack of intelligence and sufficient numbers posed a long-term threat to security and stability.[36] Personnel transfers from other parts of the Japanese empire certainly covered some of the immediate need, but long-term sustainability required a more robust system of recruitment and training. In early 1932, the State Council of Manchukuo established the Great Unity Academy (Daidō gakuin), a training institution for future bureaucrats, which immediately began to set up and advertise its recruitment process in 1933.[37]

The degree to which the Manchukuo government initially appealed to Koreans is difficult to ascertain. Early recruitment plans indicate that the Manchukuo government only intended to screen applicants from Japanese universities.[38] At the same time, the official announcement circulated to Japanese campuses in December 1932 suggested that Korean and Taiwanese applicants, presumably attending universities in Japan, would be considered and outlined specific exceptions for their lack of compulsory military training.[39] Interestingly, the Government General of Korea appears to have played a more explicit role connecting Korean students with Manchukuo recruiters. In December of

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[35] Manshū Teikoku Kyōwakai chūō honbu, *Kyōwakaishi shiryōshū dai 1 gō: Jichi shidōbu kankei* (N.A: Manshū Teikoku Kyōwakai chūō honbu 1940), 366; Fujikawa Yūji, *Jitsuroku, Manshūkoku kensanjikan: dai Ajia shugi jissen no shito* (Sakai-shi, Osaka: Ōminato shobō, 1981), 28.
[36] Manshū Teikoku Kyōwakai chūō honbu, *Kyōwakaishi shiryōshū dai 1 gō*, 366; Furumi Tadayuki. "Manshūkoku no yume wa kienai," in *Zasetsu shita risōkoku: Manshūkoku kōbō no shinsō*, Katakura Tadashi and Furumi Tadayuki (Tokyo: Gendai bukkusha 1967), 211–212.
[37] Daidōgakuin dōsōkai, *Ōnaru kana Manshū* (Tokyo: Daidōgakuin dōsōkai, 1966), 24.
[38] Gaimushō, "Daidōgakuin gakusei boshū ni kan suru ken" December 10, 1932 JACAR Ref. B05016162500.
[39] Ibid.

1932, the Government General's official newspaper *Maeil sinbo* published an opinion piece stating that the Manchukuo government should extend their recruitment to schools in Korea and "*appoint many Korean bureaucrats!*"[40] Koreans, the paper argued, deserved a place in the Manchukuo bureaucracy in the spirit of social equality and recognition of the sizeable population of Koreans living in the new state's borders.[41] In January of 1933, the Manchukuo government announced that, following negotiations with the Government General of Korea, they would screen students at Korean schools, though there was no commitment to recruit a specific number of Koreans. [42] There was some skepticism, therefore, that many Koreans would ultimately be selected, but that does not seem to have reduced Korean students' enthusiasm.[43]

The sudden appearance of massive numbers of new employment opportunities in Manchukuo was a source of excitement for young men throughout the Japanese Empire, especially Koreans. With many already abandoning the private sector for the relative stability of public employment, Manchukuo promised to bring some relief to the mounting competition for posts within the Japanese Imperial Bureaucracy. Even though government appointment required an intensive six-month training program, newspaper

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[40] Emphasis in original. "Manjuguk kwalli cheyong," *Maeil sinbo,* December 20, 1932. The Government General's motives are unclear but lobbying from the Korean community in Manchukuo may have been one factor. The Government General maintained strong local ties to Koreans in Manchuria through the Resident Korean Peoples Associations. In 1934, local Korean leaders of the association petitioned the Japanese president of their assembly to push for more Korean bureaucrats, particularly in local administration. "Chōsenjin kanri wo netsubō: Noguchi Zen Man rengō minkaichō ga undo ni noridasu," *Asahi shimbun Manshū hen*, October 17, 1934. Less than a month later *Maeil sinbo* published another opinion piece demanding greater Korean representation in the Manchukuo bureaucracy. "Manjuguk kwa Chosŏnin kwalli," *Maeil sinbo*, November 2, 1934.
[41] "Manjuguk kwalli cheyong," *Maeil sinbo,* December 20, 1932.
[42] "Tedong hakkyo haksaeng Chosŏn sŏdo chŏnhyŏng" *Tonga ilbo*, January 18, 1933.
[43] "Chorŏpcha saeng ŭi pŏnnoe: yangch'un ŭn kŭnman, ŭmsanhan ch'wijik chanson" *Tonga ilbo,* February 13, 1933

articles in early 1933 noted that students would be awarded an automatic status as junior officials with commensurate salary. Moreover, room, board, clothing, and other costs were completely covered during their training period.[44] The anticipation was so great that many seemed unconcerned by the fact that military operations against anti-Japanese resistance forces–so called "bandits" (J. *hizoku*)–were still ongoing at the end of 1932.[45]

The Great Unity Academy and the Manchukuo bureaucracy proved particularly enticing to Koreans, in part because the state's founding ideals appeared to offer space for ethnic inclusion. The principle of "ethnic harmony" (*minzoku kyōwa*) was a core element of Japanese propaganda in the foundation of Manchukuo. Partially a means of justifying the legitimacy of Manchukuo "independence" from republican China, the Japanese Kwangtung Army also considered it an essential rhetorical tool in controlling a multi-ethnic population of majority Han Chinese and sizeable Manchu, Mongol, Korean, and Russian minorities. As a result, the discourse of ethnic equality figured prominently in state literature. The Manchukuo Declaration of Independence, for example, dictated that "Chinese, Manchurian and Mongolian natives, Korean and Japanese inhabitants, and residents of other nationalities in the Manchurian State shall be accorded equal treatment."[46] While one can question whether Manchukuo's founding leaders ever considered ethnic equality much more than propaganda, these principles had a natural appeal for colonized Koreans.

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[44] Ibid.
[45] "Infure wa megumu shin sotsugyōsei no mae ni kasukana shūshoku keiki,"*Asahi shimbun*, December 22, 1932 Morning Edition.
[46] Japanese Chamber of Commerce of New York, *Manchukuo: The Founding of the New State in Manchuria* (New York, Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1933), 4.

Many Koreans were particularly attracted to what the principle of "ethnic harmony" meant for workplace discrimination. Recruitment advertisements presented the Manchukuo bureaucracy as a place where Japanese and non-Japanese bureaucrats worked together regardless of social status.[47] Ethnic discrimination in employment was also explicitly prohibited in the Civil Service Law of 1938. [48] This meant, at least in principle, that Koreans bureaucrats would receive equal treatment with their Japanese counterparts. Whether or not this was actually practiced is a matter for future discussion, but for Koreans, the idea of ethnic equality was a powerful one. For Kim Kyumin, the teacher making roughly half the salary of his Japanese subordinate, it was the determining factor for his career. "When I heard about a world without discrimination," he recalled, "I couldn't sleep. So, I took the Manchukuo higher civil service examination. I passed and so I left for Manchukuo…"[49] There also appeared to be significant opportunities for promotion. By 1940 there were at least four Koreans with senior appointments (*kanninkan*)–the highest rank for civil officials not directly appointed by the Prime Minister.[50]

Along with equal pay and the possibility of promotion, some Koreans felt that Manchukuo would provide them with more opportunities to put their education to practical use. Newspapers advertised that the Manchukuo government was looking for

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[47] From a 1936 Daidō gakuin advertisement reprinted in Anada Hideo, *Gakusei ni okuru shūshoku hikkei: Shōwa 11 nen hen* (Tokyo: Chiguro shobō, 1936), 66.
[48] As the Prime Minister expressed in his introduction to the law: "…we will conduct the personnel appointments of the empire fairly and regardless of ethnicity, class, or academic background." Qtd. in Teikoku sōgō gakuin, *Manshū teikoku bunkan kōtōkan ininkan jukenhō kaisesu* (Tokyo: Teikoku sōgō gakuin, 1941), 3.
[49] Kim Kyumin, "Ch'arari Manjuguk kwalliga natta," 223.
[50] "Uri sahoe ŭi chenaemak," *Samch'olli* 12, no. 7 (July, 1940): 9-15.

Koreans with special skills in fields such as sanitation, medicine, and finance, which appealed to Korean students.[51] Sin Kisŏk recalled that after four years in a research institute, going to Manchukuo would allow him to actually see how economic theory worked in the field.[52] Yi Minchae (1917-1991), a Korean student researcher at Hokkaido Imperial University relished the opportunity to use his expertise in low temperature biological research at the Continental Science Institute (Tairiku kagakuin)–Manchukuo's state research center–doing tests for government projects.[53] Linked to this sense of personal purpose was a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of their peers and family that they had made a place in society. Their education had not been a waste of precious resources, but rather the anticipated path toward upward social mobility or renewed social legitimacy. Indeed, it promised to serve as an affirmation of their elite status within the Korean community and the Japanese Empire.

While much of the Korean interest in the Manchukuo bureaucracy was influenced by Japanese ideological propaganda, such as "ethnic harmony," it is important to understand how Koreans interpreted these ideas and incorporated them into their career goals. It would be cynical to conclude, as some have, that these were merely "empty slogans" in service of Japanese oppression and that Koreans' faith in them was naïve.[54] Indeed, as Kim Kyumin recalled: "At the time, I don't think many of us young people felt

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[51] "Manjuguk chaejŏngbu kangsŭpsaeng mojip," *Tonga ilbo*, February 2, 1935; "Pandoin pangyŏk kwalli Manjuguk esŏ mojip," *Mail sinbo*, April 10, 1942.
[52] Sin, *P'alsip pyŏngsaeng,* 420.
[53] Yi Minchae, *Ch'ang'am munjip* vol.3 (Seoul: Ak'ademi sŏjŏk, 1990), 294.
[54] Pak Sŏngchin, "Manjuguk Chosŏnin kodŭng kwallyo ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa chŏngch'esŏng," 213.

that we were working for Japanese imperialism."[55] Rather, many Koreans fashioned the slogans and symbols of Manchukuo into a justification based on ethnic solidarity.

The relationship to the Korean community in Manchukuo figured prominently in how many Koreans discussed their decision to become bureaucrats. Koreans had been living on the territory just north of the Korean border for generations, and the twentieth century had seen several waves of migration–most notably following the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 and during the economic crises of the 1930s. Located at the juncture between Japanese occupied Korea, politically divided China and the Soviet Union, this region also played host to anti-Japanese resistance fighters with a patchwork of political and ethnic affiliations. Korean newspapers frequently commented on the plight of Korean farmers caught in the political violence of competing powers, even after the establishment of Manchukuo. For the large portion of bureaucrats born and raised in the border region, these issues were highly personal.[56] Kim Kyumin, for example, was born in Ŭiju, on the Korean side of the border, but raised in Yenan on the Chinese side, and could vividly recall the contentious politics in the region.[57] Yi Minchae spent most of his childhood in Yanbian where his father owned several businesses, including a Korean language newspaper.[58] For Kim and Yi, becoming officials in the Manchukuo

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[55] Kim Kyumin, "Ch'arari Manjuguk kwalliga natta," 227.
[56] The exact proportion of Koreans recruited from northern Korea and southern Manchuria is uncertain. Pak Sŏngchin's limited analysis of 86 ethnic Koreans in Manchukuo's higher civil service found that 43% came from the northern half of Korea (Kangwŏn-do, P'yongan-do, Hamgyŏng-do, and Hwanghae-do) as compared with a rate of only 36.7% Koreans from the north working in the Government General of Korea. Pak, "Manjuguk Chosŏnin kodŭng kwallyo," 229. However, this analysis appears to exclude those Koreans whose birthplace of record was in Manchuria. Inconsistencies in Manchukuo government reporting make it difficult to determine the exact regional breakdown, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the number of Koreans in the bureaucracy with a significant number of years living in the border regions was much higher.
[57] Kim Kyumin, "Ch'arari Manjuguk kwalliga natta," 227.
[58] Yi, *Ch'ang'am munjip* vol.3, 216.

government provided them an opportunity to aid and defend friends and family from a position of power.[59]

However, even for those with no direct connection, the chance to serve their fellow Koreans factored into how many men framed their decision to join the Manchukuo bureaucracy. Many Korean students learned about the conditions of Koreans in Manchuria from school observation trips or travelogues published by their classmates. Sin Kisŏk, for example, published a series of articles on his travels in Manchuria in 1935 recounting the struggles of Korean farmers.[60] Two years later, Sin was recruited specifically to work with Korean migrants. He recalled that "the process of working for Koreans in Manchuria would be a chance to resolve some of the major issues facing our people internationally…I resolved to go to work for the Manchukuo central government…That was the beginning of my public life."[61] Sin's sentiments echoed contemporary interviews of recently appointed Korean officials declaring their dedication to helping Korean farmers improve their living conditions.[62]

Beyond the plight of current Koreans in Manchukuo, many of these young men interpreted their desire to work there as part of a long historical legacy. Manchukuo was

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[59] Aside from ethnic or community solidarity, there was also a practical side to the decision for Koreans with regional ties. For example, Yi Minchae noted that working in Manchukuo allowed him to help out with his father's various business ventures. Ibid. Chŏng Wŏnhun also remarked that when he was offered a job at Manchukuo's central bank, it was an easy decision because it was closer to his family in Ŭiju. Chŏng Wŏnhun, *Kŏul ap e torawa: ŭnhaeng 60 nyŏn* (N.A.: Tosŏ Ch'ulp'an Kalch'ae, N.A.), 22.
[60] Shin Kisŏk, "Yu Man chapki," in Ch'oe Samnyong and Hŏ Kyŏngjin eds. *Manju kihaengmun* (Seoul: Pogosa, 2010), 400–416. Originally published in *Tonga ilbo* as nine installments from August 1-14, 1935. Pak Byŏnggyo made a similar report to the Korean student association at Kyoto Imperial University in 1936. Pak Pyŏnggyo, "Man Sŏn sich'algi," *Kyŏngdo cheguk taehak Chosŏn yuhaksaeng tongch'anghoe hoebo* 1 (1936): 15–56.
[61] Sin, *P'alsip pyŏngsaeng,* 420.
[62] For examples, see: "Chosŏn kaech'ŏkmin ŭl wi he ilch'ŭng noryŏk halli," *Mansŏn ilbo*, May 11, 1940; "Kaech'ŏkmin ch'ido e ch'oesŏn ŭl ta haryŏ handa," *Mansŏn ilbo*, May 18, 1940; "Chasin ŭi him ŭl tihaya noryŏk hagetta," *Mansŏn ilbo*, May 26, 1940; "Nongsa ch'idoja ro ilsaeng patch'igetta," *Mansŏn ilbo*, May 27, 1940.

not a foreign place, some reasoned, because "that land had once been Koguryŏ territory."[63] That is to say, the land was historically Korean.[64] The Japanese government, as part of a larger propaganda campaign to unite Koreans and Japanese for the war effort, emphasized a theory of shared origins among the nomadic societies of northeast Asia. [65]

Nonetheless, creating an awareness of Korean historical ties to Manchukuo territory played to ethic sympathies that could just as easily subvert Japanese imperial propaganda as support it.[66] The work of Ch'oe Namsŏn (1890-1957), the only Korean full professor at Manchukuo's National Foundation University (Kenkoku daigaku), is particularly illustrative of this point. In his linguistic analysis of geographic and religious concepts throughout northeast Asia, Ch'oe proposed a concept of shared origins where Japan was neither central nor exceptional. Furthermore, he argued religious practices in the Koguryŏ Kingdom directly corresponded not only to concepts relating to seasonal changes in the northern reaches of Manchuria but also to more ancient concepts from the Korean peninsula.[67] Ch'oe never directly challenged Japanese authority, but there is

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[63] Ko, *Hanam hoegorok*, 54.

[64] The Kingdom of Koguryŏ (J. Kokuri, 37 BCE–668 CE) encompassed territory on the northern Korean Peninsula as well as most of the land that made up Manchukuo. Though the kingdom's place in Korean history was a hotly debated topic among Korean and Japanese historians in the early twentieth century, by the 1930s it was commonly understood to be historically Korean. Andre Schmid, "Rediscovering Manchuria: Sin Ch'aeho and the Politics of Territorial History in Korea," *Journal of Asian* Studies 56, no. 1 (Feb. 1997): 39.

[65] Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy exclusively mention Koguryŏ when referencing historical connections. However, contemporary government propaganda also mentioned the Kingdom of Parhae. While many Koreans today consider Parhae to be part of the Korean historical narrative, its absence from the memoirs of former Manchukuo bureaucrats is interesting. One possible reason is that Manchukuo government narratives at the time described Parhae as the first Manchurian state to open diplomatic relations with Japan in a politically subordinate relationship. Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōsho, *Kenkoku jijō*, Chihō shokuin kunrensho kyōzai 1 (Shinkyō: Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōsho, N.A.), 4.

[66] Schmid, "Rediscovering Manchuria," 27.

[67] Yuka Hiruma Kishida, "Pan-Asianism in the Wartime Writings of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean intellectuals in Transnational Space at Kenkoku University," *Transnational Japan as History: Empire Migration and Social Movements*, ed. Pedro Iacobelli, et. al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 51-62.

evidence that his theories sufficiently bothered university administrators that a class he offered on Manchurian and Mongolian culture was cancelled after just one lecture.[68]

Ch'oe, himself one of the highest-ranking Korean officials in the Manchukuo government, was not the only one advertising the Korean connection to Manchuria. In 1943, a Korean language publishing house in the Manchukuo capital produced a volume commemorating the tenth anniversary of the state's founding contained several articles promoting both a contemporary and historical relationship with the peninsula. Ch'oe contributed some articles alongside other prominent Koreans in the Manchukuo government, such as then Colonization Department Councilor Sin Kisŏk, and Concordia Association Representative Yi Sŏn'gŭn (1905-1983).[69] It is difficult to say definitively whether these officials were intentionally using this line of argumentation to recruit other Koreans into the bureaucracy, but that was certainly one outcome.

Evidence suggests that some Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy did informally recruit their compatriots. During a 1936 summer trip to Manchukuo, Pak Pyŏnggyo (?–?) met with several classmates who made arrangements for him to tour the Colonization Department and attend a special discussion meeting at the Great Unity Academy. Neither institution seemed to live up to his expectations. The former he described as "full of Japanese officials," and the latter as offering "only military training."[70] Rather, it was the character of the Koreans he observed working in these institutions that impressed Pak: "I couldn't help but feel their zeal, striving for the advancement of the Korean people…they were all full of creative passion, putting their

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[68] Ibid, 62.
[69] See Mansŏn hakhaesa, *P'ando sahwawa rakdo Manju* (Shinkyō: Mansŏn hakhaesa, 1943)
[70] Pak Pyŏnggyo, "Man Sŏn sich'algi," 47–48.

full energy into achieving effective results with self-confidence."[71] Far from motivated by pure self-interest or blindly following Japanese imperialism, Pak depicted them like patriots putting "the future prosperity of their [Korean] compatriots ahead of their own lives."[72]

Pak's words of praise mirrored how many Koreans who joined the Manchukuo bureaucracy justified that decision. One student described his thought process in the following way:

> I was concerned that it would be dishonorable to work for the Japanese-run Manchukuo when there were also many [anti-Japanese] patriots and freedom fighters operating there.
>
> Still, the two million Koreans who had gone to Manchuria to escape Japanese colonial rule were helpless and living in poverty. I came to the logical justification that I was going to the land where our ancestors had once lived in order to help these people and resolved to become a bureaucrat in Manchukuo.[73]

This line of reasoning may have ignored or avoided the potential for contradiction between imperial demands and ethnic solidarity. However, it did allow Koreans to participate in the developing Japanese project in Manchukuo without considering themselves imperialists or even traitors to the anti-Japanese resistance. This type of thinking, its contradictions and consequences, would have a long-term impact on how these bureaucrats approached state management in Manchukuo and postcolonial Korea.

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[71] Ibid., 47
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ko, *Hanam hoegorok*, 54–55.

III. Recruiting and Screening for the Ideal Bureaucrat

Regardless of personal motivation, the Japanese-dominated Manchukuo government was the ultimate authority on who would become a bureaucrat. Over the course of Manchukuo's brief history, there were several different processes through which one could enter the bureaucracy.[74] However, in each case, potential appointees were screened and selected in pursuit of the best fit to a specific set of criteria. More than anything else, it is through this recruitment and screening process that we can observe the commonalities among Korean bureaucrats in Manchukuo.

Broadly speaking, recruitment processes for the Manchukuo bureaucracy can be divided into three categories: direct, screening, and open recruitment. Direct recruitment involved agents of the Manchukuo government going to specific individuals and offering them government appointments. With screening, government institutions sought recommendations from trusted individuals or institutions to create a pool from which the final appointees would be screened and selected. In open recruitment, the application process was open, at least in principle, to any interested person. Prior to 1938, Government agencies tended to use direct and screening recruitment methods. It was only with the increasing need for government officials after 1937, and complaints about the screening system that open recruitment was institutionalized in the Civil Service Law of

[74] In the case of the Higher Civil Servants (J. *kōtōkan*), for example, Pak Sŏngchin has identified five primary methods: passing the Japanese Higher Civil Service Examination (*kōtōbunkan shiken*) and then being selected to go to Manchukuo, transferring personnel between Manchukuo and other parts of the Japanese Empire, passing the Manchukuo Higher Civil Service Examination (*Manshū teikoku kōtōbunkan kōshi*), promotion from lower level positions within the Manchukuo government, and graduating from the Great Unity Academy bureaucratic training school. Pak, "Manjuguk Chosŏnin kodŭng kwallyo," 219-221.

1938. However, all three methods remained in use until government's collapse in 1945 and Koreans were recruited through each process to greater or lesser degrees.

Most Koreans who entered the bureaucracy through direct recruitment were high-level officials appointed in Manchukuo's early years. Considering immediate military demands for reliable leadership, these tended to be older more established men who were well connected to Japan's ruling elite–particularly to key members of the Kwangtung Army that were planning ruling structure of the new state.[75] Pak Sŏkyun (1898-1950) is a prime example of a direct recruit. Pak graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in the 1920s and had gone on to graduate studies at Oxford. By 1930 he had already made a name for himself as a journalist and vice president of the *Maeil sinbo*, colonial Korea's government-sponsored newspaper. In 1931, the Government General in Korea recommended Pak to help organize the aborted attempt at a Korean autonomous zone in Manchuria (the so-called Minsaengdan) and later that year was appointed to the Japanese delegation to the League of Nations in Geneva. It was during the 1932 Geneva Arms Reduction Conference that Pak developed a friendship with Colonel Ishihara Kanji (1889-1949) formerly of the Kwangtung Army and one of the chief instigators of the invasion of Manchuria. Through Ishihara, Pak received a special appointment to the Manchukuo Foreign Ministry in 1935.[76]

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[75]All of the five highest level Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy in 1940 received direct appointments. They had all been born prior to 1900. Two had advanced degrees. Three had experience working in government positions in Korea or Japan, while two had been officers in the Japanese military. "Uri sahoe ŭi chenaemak," *Samch'olli* 12, no. 7 (July, 1940): 9.

[76] Pak is also said to have used his connection to Ishihara to get his brother-in-law, the aforementioned historian Ch'oe Namsŏn, appointed as a professor at the National Foundation University. Kishida, "Pan-Asianism in the Wartime Writings of Japanese, Chinese and Korean Intellectuals," 60. However, Ch'oe's son insists that Ishihara, and by extension Pak, had no influence on the hiring decision, which was based

Pak's credentials made him an ideal choice for direct appointment to the Manchukuo bureaucracy. He was highly educated, had an advanced degree, and was multi-lingual. He was an accomplished writer capable of discussing complex geopolitical issues. Moreover, he had first-hand experience as a diplomat while working for the Japanese Mission to the League of Nations at a time when that body was hotly debating the legitimacy of Japan's invasion and Manchukuo's claim to independence from China. Though Pak's personal politics were complex, he certainly had a reputation for working with Japanese authorities. His previous positions meant that he had already been thoroughly vetted and could boast references from such distinguished leaders as Korea Governors General Saito Makoto (1858-1936) and Ugaki Kazushige (1868-1956) as well as Colonel Ishihara. Pak was also a public figure within the Korean community. His appointment leant tangible credence to the principles of ethnic harmony. Moreover, he could be expected to use his position in the community and his connections to the publishing industry to promote the state agenda to other Koreans living in Manchukuo and throughout the Japanese empire.

The same could be said of the small number of Koreans recommended or directly transferred from the Government General of Korea. In 1937, the Government General sent six experienced bureaucrats to Manchukuo in the spirit of "Korea-Manchuria Unity" (*senman ichinyo*) to take local government appointments in the majority Korean border region. Among them was Yi Pŏmik (1883-?), a translator for the Japanese Army during

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purely on Ch'oe's scholarly reputation. Hak Joo Choi, *Yuktang Ch'oe Nam-sŏn and Korean Modernity*, trans. Yer-ae K. Choi (Seoul: YBM 2012), 65.

the Russo Japanese War who later held regional and central government positions in the colonial administration for most of his career.[77]

Japanese leaders also directly recruited from among the elite Koreans already living in Manchukuo, particularly those with a Japanese education. Yi Tongsŏk (1900-?), for example, had attended Keiyo University in the early 1920s, before moving to Manchuria. By the time of the Japanese invasion, Yi had become a prominent member of the local Korean community, operating a night school for local Korean men and serving as a representative to the Conference of Manchuria Koreans (Chaeman Chosŏnin taehoe).[78]

In sum, direct recruits were men whom the Japanese could immediately rely upon to help build the state from scratch. They possessed any combination of unique qualifications, powerful connections, administrative experience, and local knowledge that Japanese officials could deploy for pacification and organization of the countryside. In this respect, they were not significantly different from Japanese officials recruited and appointed through the same system.

Screening recruitment was far more common for all bureaucrats, including Koreans, especially prior to the Civil Service Law of 1938. At its most basic, the process entailed government officials–typically from the General Affairs Bureau Office of

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[77] Yamamuro Shin'ichi "Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no kōsei to Manshūkoku: tōji yōshiki no sen'i to tōji jinzai no shūryū" *Teikoku to iu gensō: "Dai Tōa Kyōeiken" no shisō to jitsuzō*, Peter Duus, Kobayashi Hideo ed. (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1998), 193. Pak Sŏngchin has identified at least twenty-two Koreans who were transferred from positions in the Government General of Korea to Manchukuo. Pak, "Manjuguk Chosŏnin kodŭng kwallyo," 223. An additional ten had experience working for the GGK, but were not actively employed by or affiliated with the GGK at the time of their appointments in Manchukuo.
[78] "Sunhoe t'ambang sambaek i wŏlgang iyŏk ŭi kukche tosi," *Tonga ilbo*, April 30, 1927, 13; "Chaeman Chosŏnin taehoe rŭl kyech'oe," *Tonga ilbo*, October 20, 1931, 2

Personnel (Sōmuchō jinjisho)–seeking qualified candidates from universities or mass organizations like the Concordia Association through recommendations from professors or administrators. In the case of Sin Kisŏk, representatives from the Manchukuo government approached the Keijō Imperial University dean of students looking for a Korean with experience in international law. The dean recommended Sin, then a research assistant in the university's International Law and Diplomatic History Research Institute.[79]

On a more complex level, from 1933 to 1937 Manchukuo's bureaucratic training school, the Great Unity Academy, utilized a screening recruitment program designed to draw in recruits from schools across the Japanese empire. In the initial plan proposed in December 1932, the Manchukuo government would request recommendations from university and college administrators in Japan, with each school being allotted a maximum number of recommendations. This was, however, the source of some controversy. Reports indicated that the Japanese Ministry of Education was angered at being left out of a process it felt was within its jurisdiction. To make matters worse, hundreds of school administrators were outraged when the quotas revealed that only three schools (Tokyo Imperial University, Kyoto Imperial University, and Waseda University) would be allotted 30% of the total applications.[80] Over the course of December, the two governments came to an agreement on a joint screening committee made up of members

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[79] Sin, *P'alsip pyŏngsaeng,* 420.
[80] "Manshūyki wo shinganshita sotsugyōsei ren ga do mayoi" *Asahi shimbun*, January 8, 1933. For the full list of quotas see: Kantōgun "Daidōgakuin gakusei kōhosha sentei no ken" December, 1932, JACAR ref. C01002929400.

of the Manchukuo government and the Japanese Ministry of Education that decided on new quotas and made the final selections.[81]

The screening process had three phases. First, schools would screen their own students to a maximum quota and forward the applications of only the most qualified. In this respect, schools were responsible for ensuring that students met the most basic criteria. Candidates for screening were to be college or university graduates within the previous three years, including students expecting to graduate in the coming spring. Graduates could only be recommended if they already had some kind of employment. All those recommended, moreover, were to have superior grades.[82] Among Japanese applicants, the preference was for those who had completed military training (*gunjikyōren*) or would complete training by graduation.[83] However, Korean and Taiwanese were specifically exempted from this qualification, as this was not a requirement for non-Japanese students at the time. In addition to the recommendation, schools were to provide a medical report from the school doctor, and a "personal assessment" (*jimbutsu kōsa*) completed by the Japanese military officer attached to the school. At institutions with higher quotas, the lists forwarded to the selection committee often ranked the students either in order of highest to lowest or separated into first,

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[81] See: Gaimushō, "Daidōgakuin gakusei boshū ni kan suru ken" December 10, 1932 JACAR Ref. B05016162500.

[82] In the 1933 screening criteria, these were broken out between Japanese and *Manshūjin* (Lit. "Manchurians" though in practice applied mostly to ethnic Chinese). Though very similar, Manchurian applicants were only required to meet the graduation requirements "in principle." In addition, preference was given to those who had "some experience living in Manchukuo." This was likely to limit the number of ethnic Chinese applicants from other parts of the Japanese Empire. Ibid.

[83] G*unjikyōren*, was an educational program implemented in Japanese public schools from 1925 to 1945 that aimed to prepare young Japanese men for conscription. It consisted primarily of basic drill instruction, usually from retired or reserve officers in the Japanese military. The program was expanded to incorporate non-Japanese imperial subjects only late in the 1930s.

second, and no rank tiers.[84] The selection committee then evaluated the applications to complete the first-round screening.

During their evaluation, military members of the committee put significant emphasis on the personal assessment of the school's attached military officer.[85] Though the format of these assessments varied, in general they included brief information on the applicant's personality, demeanor, ideology, family background, and special abilities.[86] Since it was typical for the same officer to evaluate all the students at the school, it was not uncommon for him to provide an overall rank order as well. In some cases, the assessments at the same school were quite similar, with officers repeatedly using the same phrases to describe different students. In particularly large schools, the assessments tended to have very little detail. In such instances, the committee appears to have relied heavily on the officer's overall ranking.[87]

Students who passed the initial screening were invited to participate in person at the second- and third-phase evaluations. These phases took place at six designated screening locations–Tokyo, Kyoto, Tōhoku, Kyūshū, and Keijō Imperial Universities, and a location in the Manchukuo capital–and lasted from two days to one week, depending on the number of applicants.[88] The second phase screening consisted of a personal interview between the applicant and selection committee members. Interview topics covered a wide a range of subjects designed to assess the applicant's motivation,

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[84] Kantōgun "Daidōgakuin gakusei kōhosha sentei no ken" December, 1932, JACAR ref. C01002929400
[85] Gaimushō, "Daidōgakuin gakusei boshū ni kan suru ken" December 10, 1932 JACAR Ref. B05016162500.
[86] Kantōgun "Daidōgakuin gakusei kōhosha sentei no ken" December, 1932, JACAR ref. C01002929400
[87] Ibid
[88] Gaimushō, "Daidōgakuin gakusei boshū ni kan suru ken" December 10, 1932 JACAR Ref. B05016162500.

ideological disposition, and basic understanding of Manchukuo's foundational principles and recent history. In 1935, for example, applicants were asked among the following questions:

1. Why do you want to go to Manchuria?
2. What do you intend to accomplish in Manchuria?
3. Discuss the concepts of the "imperial way" (*kōdō*) and the "kingly way" (*ōdō*)
4. Discuss the spirit that guides the people of Manchukuo
5. Discuss the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on the people of the world
6. Discuss the spirit that guides the Patriotic Students League (*aikoku gakusei renmei*)
7. Comment on the character of the people of the world?
8. Discuss [the Great Unity Academy's] foundational spirit and [Manchukuo's] foundational spirit[89]

In general, the committee emphasized traits, such as: "principled and steadfast, lofty or high-minded ideas, strong and healthy body, [and] superior grades."[90] Language ability was another important skill that the committee considered. Though the screening did not include a formal language assessment, preference was given to those with Chinese or Korean language ability, or in the case of Chinese or Korean applicants, to fluency in Japanese.[91] Committee members favored students with experience in martial arts or competitive team sports. They also took a particular interest in applicant's personal and

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[89] Keiki Kenkyūsho, *Shūshoku sōdan* (Tokyo: Chigura shobō, 1935), 329-330.
[90] Rikugun jikan "Manshūkoku Daidōgakuin dai 1 bu dai 8 ki gakusei boshū no ken" September, 1936, JACAR ref. C01003208400.
[91] The first formal language examination occurred as part of the Manchukuo Imperial Civil Service Exam in 1938. A separate language only exam was established in 1938.

family connections to Manchukuo and if they had any experience living or visiting there.[92]

The third and final round of screening was a physical exam, which assessed both the physical and psychological fitness of the applicant. The committee considered physical strength and stamina to be a crucial element to an applicant's ability to succeed. Manchukuo's harsh winters practically required a workforce that could operate effectively in temperatures frequently dropping below -20 degrees Celsius. Japanese newspapers reported that holding the physical exams in winter, where applicant's bare bodies were exposed to the cold for hours in line, created a "Manchuria-like" experience.[93] Aside from their physical stamina, it gave examiners ample opportunity to observe an applicant's mental response to extreme cold. The exam generally followed military guidelines, looking for evidence of diseases, especially tuberculosis or venereal disease, and generating basic physical statistics such as height, weight, hearing, and vision.[94] It also assessed the applicant's speech– looking for speech impediments or communication issues–and the applicant's psychological disposition. In practice, however, failing the physical exam did not always lead to elimination. In the final list of

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[92] Gaimushō, "Daidōgakuin gakusei boshū ni kan suru ken" December 10, 1932, JACAR Ref. B05016162500.

[93] "Ryūryū taru kinkotsu Manshūkoku kanshi no tamago Daidōgakuin no taikaku kensa," *Asahi shimbun,* January 30, 1933.

[94] At the screening in Kyoto in 1934, nine of the 108 candidates failed the physical: four for vision problems, one for a heart condition, one for lung inflammation, one for a hernia, one for acute venereal disease, and one for hemorrhoids. Rikugun jikan "Manshūkoku Daidōgakuin gakusei shigansha shintai kensa ni kan suru ken" December 3, 1934, JACAR ref. C04012057400. One noted exception to military guidelines was the lack of a minimum height requirement. Rikugun jikan "Manshūkoku Daidōgakuin dai 1 bu dai 8 ki gakusei boshū no ken" September 1936, JACAR ref. C01003208400.

recruits for 1935, for example, twelve of the 111 selected had failed the physical.[95] This suggests that the selection committee was willing to relax physical standards for minor medical issues where candidates excelled in other criteria.

Regional and ethnic criteria also may have contributed to the selection process. News reports indicate that there may have been quotas allotted to each testing site, which appears to be supported by the fact the final list of selected applicants was ranked according to testing site.[96] Also, the 1933 recruitment considered setting ethnicity quotas of 60 Japanese (including Taiwanese and Koreans) to 60 Manchurians (including Han Chinese, Manchu, and Mongol).[97] However, it does not appear that the committee met these quotas for the 1933 cohort, and no references to ethnicity quotas appeared in succeeding years. Precise statistics on the total number of applicants for each year between 1933 and 1937 are not available, but internal memos indicate that the committee set quotas ranging between 450 and 550 initial applicants per year and the final cohort size ranged from 80 to 120 men.[98]

The Korean experience with the Academy's screening process is difficult to gauge, but the remaining personal assessments suggest that it was mostly similar to that of Japanese applicants. That is, one of the primary features of this type of recruitment was the emphasis on where an applicant went to school. Though the quota system

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[95] Reasons for failing included: hernia, trachoma, chronic ear infections, a finger deformity, weak bones, and a large scar on the head. Rikugun jikan "Daidōgakuin gakusei saiyō no ken," February 19, 1935, JACAR ref. C04012114700.

[96] "Manju ŭi Taedong hagwŏn Chosŏn haksaeng to mojip," *Tonga ilbo,* December 10, 1933. Also see Kantōgun, "Daidōgakuin gakusei senkō ni kan suru ken" March,1934, JACAR ref. C01002972300.

[97] Gaimushō, "Daidōgakuin gakusei boshū ni kan suru ken" December 10, 1932, JACAR Ref. B05016162500.

[98] Ibid; Kantōgun, "Daidōgakuin gakusei senkō ni kan suru ken" March,1934, JACAR ref. C01002972300; Rikugun jikan "Manshūkoku Daidōgakuin dai 1 bu dai 8 ki gakusei boshū no ken" September, 1936, JACAR ref. C01003208400.

changed in response to school administrators' complaints, the selection of applicants from imperial universities and elite private universities and colleges was still over determined. Although the committee recruited at least 26 Koreans between 1932 and 1937, the total number who applied is unclear, but most certainly greater. Of those accepted, nine were graduates of imperial universities, six from private universities in Japan, six from trade colleges (*kōtō senmon gakkō*) in Seoul, four from trade colleges outside of Seoul, and two are unknown.[99]

Existing personal assessments from the 1933 recruitment specifically reveal that the strength of one's recommendation did not outweigh the type of school one attended. The military officer who recommended To Kyŏnghwa (?–?) in 1933 wrote a detailed and glowing four-page assessment, describing To as a serious and enthusiastic student. He commented on To's well-developed physical strength, facility in spoken Japanese, and moderate politics. Most pointedly, the recommender noted To's "enthusiasm" and "complete commitment" to "helping Koreans in Manchukuo become one with the empire."[100] However, To was a student at Ueda Sanshi Senmon Gakkō, a trade college in rural Nagano Japan specializing in the silk manufacturing industry, and not well known for producing civil servants. There is no indication that To even made it past the first round of cuts. In contrast, Kim T'aeho, a student at Keijō Imperial University School of Law, was selected in 1933. Unlike To, Kim's assessment consisted of a mere three lines of text, describing him as having a "well-kept outer appearance," "cheerful and

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[99] Kim Minch'ŏl "Manjuguk ŭi kwallyo rŭl kkum kku nŭn Chosŏnin Taedong Hagwŏn ch'ulshinja tŭl," *Minjok munje yŏn'gu* 12 (Fall 1996) 41-42.
[100] Gaimushō, "Daidōgakuin gakusei boshū ni kan suru ken" December 10, 1932, JACAR Ref. B05016162500.

enterprising disposition," and "someone who will get results."[101] Though we do not know the exact reason Kim was selected over To, the relative rank of their schools is the most obvious point of contrast.

Nor does aptitude in government work appear to have been a defining criterium. According to his evaluation, Ch'oe Ch'anghong (?–?), a student at Keijō Imperial University, was intent on working in regional administration after graduation. The evaluator, moreover, noted that he had demonstrated "proficiency" in the type of work necessary for government administration.[102] Ultimately, however, recruiters selected Ch'oe's Imperial University classmate Kim instead.

Additionally, common sense would suggest that the committee selected Korean applicants with the most pro-Japanese ideology. However, personal assessments from 1933 reveal that, in practice, the most pro-Japanese candidate did not always get selected. Among the four Korean applicants (out of fifteen total) from Keijō Imperial University, Kim T'aeho–the only applicant ultimately selected–was not in the top rank. Rather, he ranked second among Koreans and sixth overall. Ch'oe Chaesŏ (?-?), who ranked first among Koreans and second overall, was not selected. Ch'oe's assessment, however, noted: "Among Korean students, he is singularly the most pro-Japanese individual," while Kim's had no comment in this regard.[103] This does not necessarily mean that Kim's pro-Japanese credentials went untested. Kim, in fact, recalled receiving some especially

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[101] Ibid. Among Kim's other potential qualifying characteristics was his athletic ability. He recalled being an avid soccer player. Kim T'aeuk, "Kaisōroku," 235. One of his Japanese classmates at Daidōgakuin also remembered him as a strong athlete skilled at soccer and baseball. Mimatsu Taisuke, "Tairiku omoide no roku," *Tairiku Kaisō*, ed. Manshūkoku Daidōgakuin dai niki sei tairiku kaisōroku henjun iinkai (Tokyo: Manshūkoku Daidōgakuin dai niki sei tairiku kaisōroku henjun iinkai, 1977), 250.
[102] Gaimushō, "Daidōgakuin gakusei boshū ni kan suru ken."
[103] Ibid.

"harsh" (J. *shinratsu*) questions from the selection committee during his interview.[104] Nonetheless, Ch'oe's failure suggests that while pro-Japanese sentiment was certainly a factor, it was only one of a number of criteria that ultimately resulted in Koreans entering the Manchukuo bureaucracy.

Though the initial lack of robust state organization in many ways necessitated a hybrid, screening system like the one used by the Great Unity Academy, complaints regarding the inherent biases of such methods, a perceived decline in the quality of recruits, and the growing need to fill positions necessitated a shift towards rationalization. Open recruitment existed in Manchukuo as early as 1933, with institutions such as the Central Bank of Manchukuo (Manshū chūōginkō) establishing hiring boards that advertised broadly and recruited applicants in Japan, and later Korea, based on competitive examinations during the spring job-hunting season.[105] However, it was not until the Civil Service Law (*bunkanrei*) of 1938 that open recruitment effectively became the primary method of hiring civil officials. The Civil Service Law made two major changes to the recruitment process: it established a civil service examination system for both higher and junior civil servants, and it prohibited the use of ethnicity, class, and academic background in government hiring or promotion.[106] The law applied even to bureaucrats already serving in government appointments by requiring them to take a special certification examination. This is not to say that Manchukuo's civil service reform

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[104] Kim T'aeuk, "Kaisōroku," 235.
[105] In 1933, Japanese applicant Takeda Hidekatsu remarked that he had interviews for the Great Unity Academy and the Central Bank of Manchukuo on the same day. Takeda Hidekatsu *Manshū dasshutsu* (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1985), 137.
[106] Teikoku sōgō gakuin, *Manshū teikoku bunkan kōtōkan inkan jukenhō kaisesu* (Tokyo: Teikoku sōgō gakuin, 1941), 4.

created a completely level playing field for Koreans. Kim Tusam, for example, claimed that his Japanese boss used the special certification exam as a tool to fire him over a personal dispute.[107] The law also created 21 exceptions, which permitted employment outside the examination system. Many of these exceptional cases, such as having experience as a bureaucrat in another country, having experience as a military official, or having specialized knowledge in economics or industry, directly benefitted Japanese recruits.[108] Nonetheless, the new system did see a rise in interest, so that in 1942, over 1000 men applied to take the first-round examination.[109]

The Manchukuo Civil Service Examination system consisted of more than nine different examinations, many with distinct fields or questions depending on the type of position one was seeking. In general, most Koreans in the bureaucracy entered as civil officials (*gyōseikan*) or legal officials (*sihōkan*).[110] Unlike in Japan, the initial examination process for civil and legal officials was the same. The process consisted of two separate tests. [111] The first was the Certificate Examination (*shikaku kōshi*), a written

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[107] Kim Tusam and Kim Yŏngtae, *Unmyŏng ŭi t'aeyang* (P'yŏngyang: Kullo tanch'e ch'ulp'ansa, 2008), 11.
[108] Teikoku sōgō gakuin, *Manshū teikoku bunkan kōtōkan inkan jukenhō kaisesu*, 22-23.
[109] Manshū shihō kyōkai, *Manshū teikoku kōshi nenkan* (Shinkyō: Manshū shihō kyōkai, 1943), 8.
[110] Compared with metropolitan Japan, a unique feature of the Manchukuo system was the addition of examinations for technicians (*gijutukan*) and teachers (*kyōikukan*). In Japan technicians were appointed through a simpler screening process and teacher certification was not regulated through the civil service law. For more see: Robert M. Spaulding Jr, *Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). Precise data on the number of Koreans taking and passing the technician and teacher exams in Manchukuo is not available. Similarities between Korean and Chinese names and unrecorded birth places make determining ethnic data from the test results incredibly challenging. I have confirmed that there were at least six Koreans who passed the technician exam and two who passed the teacher exam, but the actual numbers are most certainly higher.
[111] Between 1938 and 1940 there was technically only one examination, the Employment Examination (*saiyōkōshi*), which consisted of a first round Academic Skills Test (*gakujutsu sōshi*) and a second-round interview and physical examination. Since passing the first round was required to advance to the second, the Civil Service Committee decided in 1940 to separate the Academic Skills Test as its own separate exam, the Certificate Exam (*shikakukōshi*), and henceforth referring to only the second-round exam as the

exam designed to test applicants' academic skills. The Great Unity Academy recruitment committee had attempted to implement a written examination starting in 1935, but the Certificate Examination was far more complex and covered a much wider range of knowledge. Whereas the GUA exam required applicants to respond to one of two essay prompts with a time limit of one hour, the Certificate Examination tested applicants' knowledge in seven required fields and two elective fields over the course of three days.[112] The exam was held at twelve testing locations: three in Manchukuo, eight in Japan, and one in Korea. Required subjects included: basic law, administrative law,[113] civil law, economics, East Asian history (*tōyōshi*), language, and general knowledge. Elective subjects included philosophy, world geography, sociology, finance, economic history, diplomatic history, commercial law, criminal law, civil proceedings, criminal proceedings, public international law, and private international law.[114] Every year, the Civil Service Examination Committee (Kōtō bunkan kōshi iinkai) appointed special members–mostly professors from Japanese universities and high-ranking Manchukuo officials–to devise and evaluate the questions.[115] Question types varied by subject, but were typically essays or brief identification questions with a time limit of two hours. The exact wording of the questions changed almost every year, but underlying theme of questioning reveals a number of telling consistencies.

Employment Examination. Effectively, however, the process was identical. Teikoku sōgō gakuin, *Manshū teikoku bunkan* kōtōkan, 38.

[112] The Diadō gakuin exam also appears to have been more a written extension of the interview process than a test of basic knowledge. The 1935 prompts, for example, were: "What is the future of Japan-Manchukuo relations," and "Discuss your mission in Manchukuo." Keiki Kenkyūsho, *Shūshoku sōdan*, 329.

[113] Administrative law was an elective field on the 1938 exam but required every year thereafter.

[114] Teikoku sōgō gakuin, *Manshū teikoku bunkan kōtōkan*, 42-43.

[115] Ibid, 35-37.

Questions regarding basic and civil law reveal an underlying concern that applicants understand the legal basis for the wartime state.[116] For both categories, applicants had the option to choose between questions regarding the Manchukuo or Japanese legal systems. In either case, there was a strong interest in the role and responsibilities of the cabinet and its relationship to either the state council (in Manchukuo) or the Emperor (in Japan), as well as legal rights of possession. In particular, questions focused on issues such as emergency powers (1938, 1942), the supreme right of command versus the advisory right of the cabinet (1940, 1943), the right of pardon or amnesty (1939, 1942), and the role of civil law in property claims (1938–1942). The first two of these themes were asking applicants to outline some of the basic parameters for legal authority in the wartime Japanese Empire. Though the 1943 question was presented in the hypothetical situation of a major earthquake, the special authorities delegated to the emperor to levy taxes, conscript citizens and suspend civil rights were justified under wartime emergencies as well. In asking about the right of command versus the advisory role of the cabinet, the questions were driving at the relative importance of military command in both Japan and Manchukuo. That is, the Emperor and the Kwantung Army-dominated State Council in Manchukuo ultimately carried the authority of action particularly in wartime. The emphasis on property claims was particularly important to Manchukuo administration in the wartime economy as government and quasi-government organizations began acquiring or expropriating land for agricultural settlement, primarily by Japanese colonists. All told, these questions ensured that

[116] For all exam questions between 1938 and 1943 see: Manshū shihō kyōkai, *Saishin Manshū teikoku bunkan shaken mondai zenshū* (Shinkyō: Manshū shihō kyōkai, 1943)

Manchukuo bureaucrats had a basic understanding of the role of the state and its legal framework as the Japanese empire ramped up production and restricted personal freedoms.

The questions in the East Asian History subject suggest that it was important for prospective bureaucrats to understand the role of the state in the success of a nation, and specifically contrasted Japanese success with Chinese failure. The history exam also gave applicants the option of choosing between Japanese or Manchuria and Chinese focused questions. Questions on Japanese history varied widely in terms of time period and subject matter, but the reforms during the Meiji period were a common theme (1939–1942). These questions frequently asked applicants to discuss the necessity of Meiji reforms to the Edo period political order, in essence fishing for answers that pointed out the keys to Japanese success. In contrast, questions on Manchuria and Chinese history emphasized Chinese failure by asking applicants to discuss subjects such as the Taiping and Boxer rebellions (1938, 1940, 1943). More common, though, were questions that foregrounded a narrative of Chinese lack of control in Manchuria and the resulting global threats to stability in the region from Russia and the United States in particular (1939–1943). In the end these questions were designed not so much to test basic historical knowledge as to screen for applicants with a strong understanding of Japan's historical justifications for the expansion of the empire into the continent. Thus, it provided the

examination committee with additional insight into a candidate's political and ideological disposition.[117]

The general knowledge test was by far the most eclectic, but it ensured that applicants could demonstrate that they had studied some basic facts about Manchukuo and were aware of current events in the region and the world. The test always consisted of one essay question (sometimes chosen from two prompts) and a choice of five short identification questions from a list of ten. Essay topics focused on central concepts to the Manchukuo state and asked applicants to describe Manchukuo's national essence, the founding principles of the Concordia Association, the legal and moral obligations of the state, and the principle of ethnic harmony. Other questions prompted applicants to discuss Manchukuo's role in the developing global conflict. These essays ensured that even if applicants elected to respond to questions on Japanese law in previous sections, they were still in tune with Manchukuo propaganda. Moreover, many of the short identification topics asked applicants Manchukuo trivia such as naming all the provinces or chief products in Manchukuo, or describing key events or institutions, such as the Manchuria Construction Labor Service Brigade, the Reviving the People Imperial Edict, and the investiture of Amaterasu in the National Shrine of Manchukuo (*honkoku tentei shōsho*). Other terms were the type one would have found popping up in newspapers and magazines of the day. For example, the 1938 test asked about the Sudeten German

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[117] Japanese history became a compulsory subject on civil service examinations in metropolitan Japan only in 1940. Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945) presented the addition of the subject as a way to diversify bureaucratic appointments, then dominated by graduates from law and economic departments, but Spaulding argues convincingly that it was also part of broader changes in bureaucratic recruitment to identify candidates with political or ideological problems. Spaulding, *Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations*, 174-176.

problem and the term "totalitarianism," the 1941 test asked about Allied and German battles over the Norwegian city of Narvik, and the 1943 test asked about the term "national security state." In screening future bureaucrats, these questions sought out applicants with more than a passing interest in Manchukuo. Applicants needed to demonstrate a breadth of knowledge about local and international issues, albeit mostly to the extent that these issues reflected back on the state.

Those who passed the Certificate Examination were invited to the second recruitment phase under the Civil Service Examination system, the Employment Examination (*saiyōkōshi*). Much like in the final stages of the Great Unity Academy's recruitment process, the Employment Examination consisted of an interview and a physical exam conducted at six testing locations throughout the Japanese Empire: Xinjing, Tokyo, Kyoto, Sendai, Fukuoka, and Seoul. A guide for prospective applicants published in 1941 described the ideological investigation during the interview process as "particularly rigorous."[118] Employment guides also noted that the committee was serious about the need for "sufficiently tough bodies."[119] The physical exam was conducted by military doctors and, like the Great Unity Academy physical, largely followed military fitness regulations. However, unlike soldiers, civil recruits were not subject to rejection based on height, weight, or vision limits.[120] Still, recruitment guides noted that because of the harsh conditions and potential loss on invested time and training, a borderline pass on

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[118] Teikoku sōgō gakuin, *Manshū teikoku bunkan kōtōkan*, 65.
[119] Ibid
[120] The lack of vision requirements was a change from the Daidō gakuin exam which had set limitations of between 5 and 0.7 diopters. Rikugun jikan "Manshūkoku Daidōgakuin dai 1 bu dai 8 ki gakusei boshū no ken" September 1936, JACAR ref. C01003208400.

the physical might have been considered insufficient.[121] Those who passed the Employment exam were invited to six months training at the Great Unity Academy followed by six months practical training in the field. Though their appointments were provisional (*shihokan*)–dependent on performance during training and further examination–those who passed the Employment Exam were entitled to all the benefits of civil servants, including a salary commensurate with their position.

Those Koreans who passed the Manchukuo Civil Service Examination have given us little indication of their experience was like. To the extent that former bureaucrats discussed the exam, it was usually a matter-of-fact statement like Ko Chaep'il's: "I took and passed the Manchukuo Civil Service Examination and left for Manchukuo."[122] Some even recalled taking the exam "without any deep feelings."[123] Contemporary reports from Korean exam passers also noted that many perceived it more as a hurdle than a milestone.[124] This may simply be personal humility. However, Koreans who passed the exam continued to list the credential in their official biographies and resumes well after the empire's collapse, and as will be discussed in detail below, made some attempt to defend the validity of their exam certification in postwar South Korea (Chapter 3). It is

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[121] Teikoku sōgō gakuin, *Manshū teikoku bunkan kōtōkan*, 65. Since medical records from the physical examinations are not available, however, it is difficult to say how the selection committee used the exam results in practice. It is possible that, much like in the Daidō gakuin screening process described above, failing the physical did not mean automatic disqualification.
[122] Ko, *Hanam hoegorok*, 55.
[123] Cho, *Na ŭi insaeng: hangmun ŭi yŏkchŏng*, 29.
[124] In a series of articles on Koreans passing Manchukuo's Higher Civil Service Examination that ran in the Korean Language daily *Mansŏn ilbo* in the spring of 1940, the unnamed interviewer frequently asked how these men felt about passing the exam. Kye Kuhwan (?–?), appointed to the Kantō Province Department of Agriculture and Industry, responded: "Well, I don't really have any feelings about it at all." This was common refrain in many of the interviews. "Sŏn kye sinkotŭnggwan ŭi hwingan: nae ga mat'ŭn il e ojik chŏngjin hal ppun," *Mansŏn ilbo,* May 17, 1940, Morning edition, 2.

more likely that, given their elite education, most of these Korean men looked on the exam more as the inevitable confirmation of their innate ability.

Yet, while the civil service exam for Manchukuo was competitive, it was clear even at the time that the written exam was far less difficult than its analog in metropolitan Japan. Table 1.3 shows that between 1940 and 1942, roughly one in three applicants passed Manchukuo's combined administrative and judicial certificate examination. For the same time period, the pass rate for the separate judicial and administrative examinations in Japan never exceeded 15%.

[Table 1.3] Civil Service Examination Pass Rates (Written) in Manchukuo and Japan

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943
Manchukuo					
Certificate Examination	N/A	43%	32%	33%	N/A
Japan					
Main Higher Examination (Administrative)	9%	9%	7%	14%	15%
Main Higher Examination (Judicial)	10%	10%	11%	13%	12%

Sources: For Japan, see Spaulding, *Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations*, 265-266. Manchukuo numbers for 1940 and 1941 are based on the reports of exam passers in *Manshūkoku seifu hōkoku*. The total number of test takers in these years was unreported, but I was able to calculate an estimate from the registration numbers reported for those who passed. These estimates seem congruent with the exact numbers for 1942 as reported in Manshū shihō kyōkai, *Manshū teikoku kōshi nenkan*, 8.

The sense of inevitability expressed by Koreans was also reflected in some Japanese opinions at the time. One Japanese applicant in 1939 remarked that compared with Japan, the Manchukuo exam questions were "exceedingly easy" and could be passed with a mere six months of preparation.[125] Still, an account of the 1938 exam in Kyoto by another Japanese applicant suggests that not everyone approached it with such confidence.

[125] Qtd. in Manshū shihō kyōkai, *Manshū teikoku kōshi nenkan*, 14.

> Early in the morning at the test site there were dozens of people huddled about in groups, fully absorbed in reading their notes and texts. At 8:50 a.m. the bell rang, and we all entered the classroom. I could see the nervousness on everyone's faces as they prayed for the conviction to win. The test started at exactly at 9:00 a.m. The first question was "What is the meaning of constitution granted by the Emperor (*kinteikempō*)?" It was a fairly standard question, but as I picked up my pen, I couldn't think of what to write.[126]

Not surprisingly, that student did not pass the exam. For the unknown number of Koreans who took and failed the exam, it is safe to assume that their experience was similar.

The interview portion, however, appears to have been much more challenging, especially for Koreans. In Japan, passing the written exam almost guaranteed an applicant would receive a government appointment.[127] In Manchukuo, however, roughly half of all candidates passing the written examination failed the interview every year (Table 1.4).

[Table 1.4] Manchukuo Civil Service Examination Pass Rates (Interview)

1938	1939	1940	1941	1942
49%	52%	51%	48%	31%

Source: *Manshūkoku seifu hōkoku*; Manshū shihō kyōkai, *Manshū teikoku kōshi nenkan*, 8.

The reason for this discrepancy is most likely the different purpose oral examinations served in each system. In Japan there was little consensus among examiners on whether they should be testing an applicant's academic knowledge or their character, and in the case of the latter, on what constituted a desirable character in the first place.[128] In Manchukuo, however, the interview was principally a tool for ideological investigation,

[126] Qtd. in Ibid, 10.
[127] According to Spaulding, the average pass rate on the Japanese oral exams between 1929 and 1943 was 89% for administrative and 83% for Judicial applicants. Spaulding, *Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations*, 266.
[128] Ibid, 217.

particularly with regard to non-Japanese applicants. According to Ku Ponghoe (1920–1997), the fact that he had graduated from Posŏng College (precursor to present day Korea University) marked him as a potential anti-Japanese radical. During his interview, the three-member committee began by asking him to give a critique of the Korean Government General under Minimi Jirō's administration. After Ku carefully crafted an answer to that question, the committee pressed him for his opinion on a number of other controversial topics, such as the recently instituted name change order for Koreans (J. *sōshi kaimei*), assimilation policies, and the government-ordered shutdown of private Korean newspapers. While Ku recalled being very diplomatic with his answers, he still left the interview convinced that he had failed.[129] That he still managed to pass the exam suggests that having a politically sensitive background was not automatically disqualifying.[130] Even individuals with known ties to Marxist academics and organizations passed the interview.[131] Rather, there appears to have been a delicate balance between an applicant's ability to provide ideologically conformist answers and the selection committee's desire to overlook certain inconsistencies.

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[129] Ku Ponghoe, "Fūtō hatō," *Yūjō no kikyō: kaigai dōsō no kiroku,* ed. Daidōgakuin dōsōkai (Tokyo: Daidōgakuin dōsōkai, 1986), 67-69.

[130] Even applicants with well-known arrest records for demonstrating against the Japanese colonial government were able to pass. Chang Ikmin (1911–?), for example, was arrested and sentenced to three years hard labor in 1930 for organizing student demonstrations in Ŭiju during the 1929 Kwangju Student Independence Movement. "Ch'oeha to il nyŏn, ch'oego nŭn sam nyŏn, sipp'al myŏng e taehan kŏmsa ŭi kuhyŏng: Sin ŭiju haksaeng sakkŏn," *Tonga ilbo*, December 21, 1930.

[131] Hwang Toyŏn, for example, had studied under the well-known Marxist economist Ninagawa Torazō (1897–1981) at Kyoto Imperial University. According Utsumi Koichirō (1912–1994), another Ninagawa student who ended up in the Manchukuo bureaucracy, Hwang and the other members of their study group were under police surveillance because of their involvement in the labor movement and "people's front" ideology. Utsumi Koichirō, *Haran no Shōwa shi: kiki kaki: Utsumi Koichiro sensei* (N.A.: Shigumakai seiwa jinkai, 1991), 146.

Ultimately, the civil service exam recruited Koreans with remarkably consistent characteristics. Though there was no age limit on the Certificate Examination, the maximum age for the Employment Examination was 30, meaning the Koreans who entered the bureaucracy all did so in their twenties. They were highly educated, usually with degrees from Japanese universities or top ranked colleges in Seoul. Most had academic backgrounds in law, political science, and economics, but few had much experience in the field. Whether or not they were ardently pro-Japanese, they had sufficient understanding and facility with the propaganda of imperialism that fueled Japanese expansion in Manchukuo. Even someone like the applicant who recalled having no "deep feelings" about becoming a Manchukuo bureaucrat, must have been able to produce a convincing speech in his interview about his strong conviction to create a paradise of ethnic harmony on the content. Finally, they were all remarkably athletic. [132]

Synopsis

The story of how Koreans ended up in the Manchukuo bureaucracy, then, lies at the intersection of both personal and institutional needs and aspirations. For their part, young Korean men from elite backgrounds sought out careers that both provided financial security in unstable times, and the personal fulfillment that came from doing a job that had an impact on society. They leapt at the possibility of equal pay for equal work and the promise of recognition from not only their Korean peers but also from the Japanese. Meanwhile, government institutions in Manchukuo had an urgent need to

[132] Yi Minchae, for example, was a champion Kendo fighter who continued to train while in Manchukuo. Yi, *Ch'ang'am munjip* vol.3, 298.

recruit highly qualified individuals by whatever means possible. Standards were high, and since career opportunities for elite Koreans were far more restrictive than for Japanese, employment committees had their pick of some of the best and brightest Koreans coming out of the Japanese education system.

The recruitment process then reinforced the paternalistic elitism of Koreans in the new bureaucratic force. They were to be the representatives for and defenders of their Korean compatriots in a state that was partially, at least on paper, their own. They were assured that they had the necessary skills and innate ability to guide their fellow Koreans, if not the other members of Manchukuo's multi-ethnic population, even if this assurance came through colonial paternalism. Above all, these men saw the state as the best vehicle for their skills. This was, in effect, the starting point for a deepening identification with the state that extended well beyond the collapse of Manchukuo, and the Japanese empire.

Political ideology was important, but certainly not the single determining factor. To a certain extent the very nature of the job was self-selecting for political moderates, at least as far as one's orientation towards Japanese imperialism was concerned. However, Manchukuo's new opportunities for economic mobility and social experimentation convinced even those with both left and rightwing politics to accommodate to Japanese imperialist goals. Manchukuo's government recruiters, for their part, had access to detailed information on applicant's political activities, but were, to a certain extent, willing to overlook ideological incompatibilities. What seems to have been far more important was an applicant's disposition towards the state and its active role in economic and social management. While it would be an exaggeration to say that this resulted in an imperialist united front movement, these ideas about the state–reinforced by years of

training and experience in the field–did foster common conceptual vocabulary that would endure well beyond the poscolonial division of the Korean peninsula.

The harsh conditions in Manchukuo also dictated that bureaucrats be physically and mentally tough. Physical examinations screened out only the strongest applicants. This resulted in a group of Korean men with significant experience in physical and mental discipline that was further developed through the Great Unity Academy's harsh training regimen. In the short term, this contributed to the broader militarization of a state that was already deeply enmeshed with the Japanese Kwangtung Army. From a longer perspective, however, their experience with physical discipline and militarized bureaucracy provides a context their active participation in military regimes in South Korea.

Educated, ambitions, elitist, politically diverse, and disciplined, these were the characteristics of Koreans as they left to become Manchukuo bureaucrats. These are also the traits that would also go on to shape their careers in the decades to come.

Chapter 2: Making Manchukuo Bureaucrats
–Bureaucratic Training and the Korean Experience–

When Yi Minchae (1917–1991) passed the Manchukuo Civil Service Examination in 1943, he thought he had surmounted the greatest barrier to his career goals. Crossing through the so-called "dragon gate" of the competitive examination, he assumed, practically guaranteed the job he wanted as a scientific researcher, as well as access to the economic and social comforts of upward mobility. What Yi did not realize, however, was that the examination in Manchukuo was only the first stage in an institutional process of molding imperial subjects, into imperial agents. Before taking up their official posts, Yi and the other recruits were required to go through the official government training program at the Great Unity Academy (Daidō gakuin). "That training," Yi recalled, "was like guerilla training, which I barely survived…going through such challenges for the first time, I remember constantly thinking in moments of deep suffering 'is this really the way to train civil servants?'"[1]

Yi's shock at the intensity of Manchukuo's bureaucratic training regimen is understandable when one considers how significantly it differed from other parts of the Japanese empire. While the Meiji oligarchs had relied heavily on Prussian models when conceptualizing and organizing Japan's modern civil service, centralized training was one of the central features of that system that they never seriously adapted.[2] Outside of the

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[1] Yi Minchae, "Na ŭi kyougi," 296.
[2] Japanese leaders objected to Prussia's long (five-year), unpaid training period because they feared it would make it difficult to compete with business for qualified candidates and incentivize bribery and corruption. Though they experimented with shorter salaried training programs, by the end of the Meiji period, there was little consensus on the need for any formal training outside of the judiciary. Centralized training was first considered only in the 1940s, but never enacted. Spaulding, *Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations*, 220–232.

examination system, individual departments and colonial territories handled their personnel matters, including training new recruits, independent of any central authority. In most cases this training was ad-hoc, and new bureaucrats were simply expected to learn on-the-job. Moreover, processes and policies varied drastically, resulting in significant cultural and institutional differences between government departments. In contrast, Manchukuo's civil service, including its training policies and institutions, were highly centralized and standardized. This enabled the development of a relatively uniform bureaucratic culture unlike anywhere else in the Japanese empire.

This training process and how Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy internalized it is a crucial to understanding their state-building activities in Manchukuo and postcolonial Korea. For the Koreans who came through Manchukuo's bureaucratic institutions, this shared experience was formative. It served as the lens through which they observed and evaluated state-building throughout their careers. It also offered an ideological and experiential vocabulary that shaped their identity as a community and their relationships with other groups and ideologies they encountered.

Previous scholarship offers surprisingly little detail on bureaucratic training in Manchukuo. Institutional histories have tended to approach the subject as part of a broader project to evaluate the state's commitment to "racial harmony" and offer only limited insight into how training practices related to the empire-building project.[3] While past studies of Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy have made some attempt to

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[3] For example, see: Suzuki Kenichi, "Manshūkoku no seiritsu to Daidō gakuin," in *Manshū kyōikushi ronshū* (Tokyo: Yamazaki insatsu shuppanbu, 2000), 109–122; Miyazawa Eriko, "Daidō gakuin to Nicchū kōryū katsudō," in *Ajia ni okeru ibunka kōryū*, ed. Yoshifumi Hida, et. al (Tokyo: Meiji shōin, 2004), 184–198. Mimura likewise uses her only reference to bureaucratic training in Manchukuo to make draw attention to the issue of racial hierarchy. Mimura, *Planning for Empire*, 74.

address training, their analysis has suffered from a narrow source base.[4] In their memoirs, moreover, the bureaucrats themselves have been relatively vague when it comes to what precisely their training entailed. This chapter fill this significant gap through a detailed analysis of the origins and content of bureaucratic training in Manchukuo.

It first outlines the historically contingent development of Manchukuo's bureaucratic training institutions. These institutions evolved from the unusual conditions of imperial sovereignty in Manchukuo, as well as the converging and competing interests of the Japanese military officials, pan-Asian idealists, and revisionist bureaucrats that came to power in Manchukuo's early years. The hybrid systems they developed provided this small group of military and civil planners with an effective means of controlling and channeling young recruits' idealism into their new role as professional managers and vanguard soldiers for the state.

Consequently, bureaucratic training in Manchukuo was characterized by militarism, developmentalism, and a radical belief in the state's authority to transform society. Through instruction in Manchukuo's "bureaucratic way" (*kanridō*), government recruits learned to identify as central agents in a hierarchical, rational, developmental state authorized by a broad basis of knowledge and moral conviction. Through harsh physical discipline, they learned to identify as a partisan force for violent social change, acting as a junior partner to the military.

The Koreans who came through these institutions internalized and applied these lessons to empire-building in Manchukuo. As bureaucrats in a multi-ethnic state, one of

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[4] Ch'oe Ch'unghŭi's analysis of the Great Unity Academy's training program, for example, relies almost entirely on one annual report published in 1940 and the anecdotal recollections of some of the Korean students. Ch'oe, "Manjuguk Taedong hakwŏn Chosŏnin haksaeng tŭl e kwan han yŏn'gu," 32–43.

their main concerns was managing the Korean population. In line with their training, Korean bureaucrats embarked on ambitions plans to transform Korean farmers into loyal productive members of the empire. They worked in coordination with the army to militarize and rationalize land and people through disciplinary institutions and mass relocation. And in the face of institutional failures, they remained firmly convinced of their ability to overcome these obstacles through spiritual guidance and discipline.

I. The Emergence of Centralized Training

The Manchukuo bureaucracy had significant differences from metropolitan Japan and other parts of Japan's formal empire. In particular, Manchukuo bureaucrats went through a highly centralized and standardized training regimen that molded them into imperial agents. This system arose from a variety of historically contingent factors that were unique to Manchukuo. Over the course of Manchukuo's early development, three different interests–pan-Asian ideologues, the Kwantung Army, and reformist bureaucrats–all approached the question of bureaucratic training with their own objectives.

Pan Asian Ideologues

The distinctive features of Manchukuo's administrative structure must be understood within the political and intellectual context of the decade prior to its establishment. The global trend towards liberal internationalism that came out of the First World War catalyzed increasing discontent and radical activism among the Japanese right. Beginning in the early 1920s, young Japanese military officers and right-wing study

groups perceived that the world was entering a final stage of global conflict where only the complete mobilization of society could stave off total annihilation.[5]

For both groups, the mobilization of human and natural resources for national defense could not be achieved under the current system, which they argued had been corrupted by unfettered liberalism and capitalism that prioritized the needs of the individual over the collective. This necessitated a social transformation characterized by a return to the moral authority of traditional Asian values that would unite the people against the coming war. Throughout the mid 1920s, right-wing activists in both military and civilian circles attempted to initiate radical reforms through increasingly militant action but met with limited success. So, as a small group of Kwantung Army officers centered around Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji (1889–1949) contemplated the expansion of the Japanese frontier into Manchuria, they saw it as an opportunity not only to advance strategic interests but also to experiment with social and political reorganization free from the perceived corruption and bureaucratic intransigence of the Japanese mainland.[6]

These plans came to fruition with the Kwantung Army's invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Without full Japanese government support for their invasion and occupation, Army officers struck on an alternative arrangement that created an independent state under the protective guidance of the Japanese armed forces. The initial manifestation of this system envisioned a series of "self-governing bodies" (*jichitai*) under the direction of a

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[5] Mark R. Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975); Christopher W. A. Szpilman, "Yūzonsha's 'War Cry,' 1920," in *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volume 2, 1920–Present*, ed. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011), 52-57.
[6] Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West*, 101.

"guidance board" (*shidōbu*) with oversight and direction from the Kwantung Army.[7] Lacking the expertise or local connections needed to build a state structure from scratch, they enlisted the help of local Chinese elites and Japanese civilians, particularly employees of the Southern Manchuria Railroad (Minami Manshū tetsudō, Mantetsu), in forming an administrative system. This alliance was tenuous and indeed collapsed in the face of military authority by the summer of 1932, but from the standpoint of the bureaucracy, it served as a foundation for much of its institutional and cultural characteristics.

In this early period, the task of training civil officials fell to Kasagi Yoshiaki (1892–1955), a Mantetsu employee and government reform activist. Kasagai had met renowned Pan-Asian intellectual Ōkawa Shūmei (1886–1957) early in his career at Mantetsu and been inspired to join Ōkawa in forming the right-wing reform group Yūzonsha in 1920. Kasagi had no particular sympathy for the Kwantung Army or it's defensive goals but saw the invasion of Manchuria as an opportunity to create a new type of government administration based on his vision for an Asian-style moral order. In his organizing capacity for the Central Guidance Board, Kasagi formed the "Self-governing Guidance Training Center" (Jichi shidō kunren shō) and set about recruiting students to indoctrinate and send off to join the rural administration.

Though Kasagi held no formal position in the training center, his influence is evident in its unique structure and curriculum. Far from an educational center for government bureaucrats, Kasagi's instruction placed ideological indoctrination at a

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[7] Kasagi Yoshiaki, "Manshū kenkok ni tsuite" in *Kasagi Yoshiaki ihōroku*, ed. Kasagi Yoshiaki ihōroku shuppan iin kai (Tokyo: Kasagi Yoshiaki ihōroku kankōkai, 1960), 168-171.

higher priority than professionalization. At the center, fully 25% of class time was dedicated to learning about the "spirit of self-governing guidance" (*jichi shidō seishin*) and "self-governing guidance methodology" (*jichi shidō hōhō*).[8] According to his vision, the proper role for graduates was not as "bureaucrats" (*kanri*) but "leaders" (*shidōin*) of an "ideological movement" (*shisō undō*) characterized by a rejection of Western individualism and a return to traditional forms of self-government.[9] Their structure was to be radically decentralized, with individual leaders responsible to the people in their province or village, and not to some central authority. The only national program was to establish faith and cultivate morality among the people, which officials could achieve through understanding and embodying the principles of moral leadership.

Kasagi also stressed the need for "practical training" (*jissai kunren*) and developing an intimate connection with the countryside. Students went on frequent visits to various parts of the new country, meeting with locals and collecting information.[10] In addition to his preference for field training, these excursions enabled students to conduct vital propaganda work across the country in advance of the Lytton Commission in the spring of 1932.[11] Moreover, despite his tenuous relationship with the military, Kasagi still saw a practical need for rudimentary paramilitary training. Physical exercise, including long marches through the countryside, were a central feature of the curriculum. Students trained extensively in Japanese fencing (*kendo*) and riflery as a means of self-defense.

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[8] Manshū Teikoku Kyōwakai chūō honbu, *Kyōwakaishi shiryōshū dai 1 hō: Jichi shidōbu kankei* (N.A: Manshū Teikoku Kyōwakai chūō honbu 1940), 375.
[9] Kasagi Yoshiaki, *Manshūkoku ken ki sanjikan no eikyū shimei* (Tokyo: Dai Ajia kensetsusha, 1935), 1-24.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Fujikawa, *Jitsuroku, Manshūkoku kensanjikan*, 41.

They also practiced horseback riding in order to get around Manchuria's undeveloped infrastructure.[12]

Following the foundation of Manchukuo on March 1, 1932, Kasagi's relationship with the Kwantung Army began to sour. Within the new government structure, the Self-government Guidance Board was transformed into the National Affairs Office (Shiseikyoku), which oversaw bureaucratic recruitment and training, with Kasagi as its head. The Kwantung Army, however maintained a significant and not-so-hidden interest in controlling government personnel decisions.[13] Kasagi's supporters in the army leadership were also losing ground to advocates for a more manageable centralized administration. [14] His disregard for military authority and growing base of support in the regional government did not help. In April 1932, he traveled to Japan, without notifying the army, and joined his old mentor Ōkawa in screening a new batch of recruits. Army commanders only learned of his recruitment trip when 97 young men (including three Koreans and two Chinese) had already arrived in Mukden the following month to start training. Even more alarming to military leaders was that this influx of new recruits coincided with the May 15 assassination of Japanese Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855–1932)–a failed coup attempt in which Kasagi's mentor Ōkawa was implicated.[15]

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[12] Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Ōinaru kana Manshū*, 20.
[13] Unbeknownst to Kasagi, the Kwantung Army signed a secrete accord on March 10, 1932, with the days-old Manchukuo government giving the Army's Fourth Special Division the right to approve or dismiss any ethnic Japanese official in the Manchukuo government. Furumi Tadayuki. "Manshūkoku no yume wa kienai," in *Zasetsu shita risōkoku: Manshūkoku kōbō no shinsō*, Katakura Tadashi and Furumi Tadayuki (Tokyo: Gendai bukkusha 1967), 206-207.
[14] The debate between the centralized and decentralized government factions is summarized in Miyazawa, "Daidō gakuin to Nicchū kōryū katsudō," 185–186; and Suzuki, "Manshūkoku no seiritsu to Daidō gakuin," 113–114. More detailed accounts from some of the actors involved can be found in: Katakura Tadashi, *Kaisō no Manshūkoku* (Tokyo: Keizai ōraisha, 1978) ,177-178; Kasagi, "Manshū kenkok ni tsuite," 173; Komai Tomokazu, *Tairiku eno higan* (Tokyo: Dainippon yūbenkai kōdansha, 1952), 256-257.
[15] Kasagi, "Manshū kenkok ni tsuite," 172-173; Fujikawa, *Jitsuroku, Manshūkoku kensanjikan*, 55.

The situation escalated at the end of May. After Kasagi railed against the central government at a meeting of regional governors, one of his supporters in the capitol threatened to assassinate General Affairs Office Director Komai Tokuzō (1885–1961).[16] By mid-June, Kasagi's opponents in the both the army and the Manchukuo government had sufficient cause to not just purge him from his powerful position but completely reorganize the bureaucratic system. The National Affairs Department was eliminated with its primary functions divided among other departments under greater military control. Bureaucratic recruitment and training came under the purview of the powerful General Affairs Agency (Sōmuchō) where Kasagi's training institute was reorganized as the Great Unity Academy (Daidō gakuin).

In spite of his ouster, Kasagi and his ideas continued to have significant influence over bureaucrats in Manchukuo's early years. All of the recruits Kasagi brought over from Japan in the spring of 1932 but one were allowed to continue with their training in the reorganized academy and received appointments with the blessing of the military.[17] In January of 1933, Kasagi returned to Japan where he founded the Society for the Construction of the Great Asia (Dai Ajia kensetus kyōkai) to promote his ideas about political organization on the continent and recruit idealistic young men already indoctrinated with his philosophy to join the Manchukuo bureaucracy via the new system. He began publishing the monthly magazine *Great Asia* (*Dai Ajia*) in May of that year, from which he criticized the Manchukuo government's centralization and Japanization

[16] Katakura, *Kaisō no Manshūkoku*, 178.
[17] Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Ōinaru kana Manshū*, 22.

policies.[18] Kasagi's disciples in Manchukuo made it the unofficial journal of the bureaucracy where they continued to circulate his ideas and organize in resistance to centralization up until the major civil service reforms of 1938.[19]

The Military

Following Kasagi's removal, the Military took effective control of bureaucratic training through the Great Unity Academy (GUA). Within the structure of the Manchukuo administration the Director of the General Affairs Agency, a civil appointee, had statutory oversight, serving concurrently as the President of the GUA. However, the Kwantung Army saw to it that the school's headmaster (*gakkan*)–in charge of recruitment, staffing, curriculum, and daily operations–was always a military official. Fujii Jūrō (1883–1937), a Japanese Army captain in the first reserves and contemporary of key figures in the invasion, served as headmaster for the first class of recruits in 1932 before returning to active duty.[20] His replacement, Nakahara Hachirō (?–1948), also a reserve captain, oversaw the second through fifth classes of GUA recruits.

The Military's objectives with civil service training, particularly in Manchukuo's early years, were primarily strategic and practical. While the Kwantung Army succeeded in eliminating large-scale armed resistance relatively quickly, so-called "bandits" (*hizoku*) utilizing guerilla insurgency tactics remained embedded in the countryside. After the first class of GUA recruits was attacked by bandits twice in 1932, it became clear to

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[18] Kasagi, "Manshū kenkok ni tsuite," 175-176.
[19] For more on resistance, see Fujikawa, *Jitsuroku, Manshūkoku kensanjikan*, 89-103.
[20] Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Hekikū ryokuya sanzenri* (Tokyo: Daidōgakuin dōsōkai, 1972), 143-144.

the headmasters that the young men would need to be able to defend themselves.[21] This would also enable the overextended Kwantung Army to utilize them as a front-line force for rural pacification, intelligence, and propaganda.[22] To facilitate this, the military focused on recruiting local–primarily Chinese–elites, and training Japanese and non-Japanese officials in paramilitary techniques and discipline.

The GUA also served as an essential tool for incorporating local non-Japanese elites into the civil service, as part of a not-so-subtle divide and conquer strategy. Fujii, the first military headmaster, created a "Second Division" (*dai-ni bu*) for non-Japanese trainees. Its curriculum focused on Japanese language education and pro-Japanese propaganda that would help establish control and support for the Japanese agenda in the countryside. Non-Japanese recruits were also trained for and appointed to specific government posts based on an ethnic division of labor. While Japanese bureaucrats dominated the key central government offices, non-Japanese were mostly assigned to positions in social services, education, and rural administration.[23]

Training for Japanese and non-Japanese bureaucrats alike emphasized physical discipline and blood sacrifice in a way that did not exist elsewhere in the Japanese imperial civil service. While Kasagi had introduced rudimentary military training to the Self-government Guidance Training Center, the military greatly expanded its scope and scale in the GUA. Under Fujii and Nakahara, the GUA built on the physical requirements established in the recruitment process to turn bureaucratic recruits into a paramilitary

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[21] Fujii Jūrō, "Manshū Daidō gakuin no seiseki," *Aizukai zasshi* 41 (1932): 15; Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Ōinaru kana Manshū*, 27–28.
[22] Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Ōinaru kana Manshū*, 530.
[23] Furumi Tadayuki, *Furumi Tadayuki wasure enu Manshūkoku* (Tokyo: Keizai ōraisha, 1978), 58.

force (Chapter 1). Military training at the academy increased to 20% of all instruction time. This program will be discussed in detail in the following section, but the ultimate effect was to reinforce the association between civil service, blood sacrifice, and hypermasculinity.

While this strategy seemed to be effective in extending military surveillance and pacification into the countryside, it was not a recipe for a professional bureaucracy. The lack of proper technical training would prove particularly problematic for the increasing number of experienced bureaucrats arriving from Japan already frustrated by the administrative culture in the metropole. Nonetheless, the militarized training practices and culture continued to expand alongside successive reforms.

Revisionist Bureaucrats

The Kwantung Army's push towards centralized authority in the spring and summer of 1932 and the purge of dissenting Manchuria-based idealists, such as Kasagi, from the government coincided with the arrival and rising influence of revisionist bureaucrats from the Japanese homeland. These were young men, predominantly mid-level officials, serving in the Japanese ministries of Finance (Ōkura) and Commerce and Industry (Shōkōshō) who were critical of the reactive and regulatory state and dissatisfied with the inefficiency of politicization and inter-ministerial competition. Much like their counterparts in the military, revisionist bureaucrats saw in Manchukuo an opportunity to refashion the state as an administrative, interventionist entity capable of meeting the

large-scale technical challenges of modern society.[24] Moreover, their willingness to concede authority over security related issues to the military should have made for an ideal partnership.

From the outset, however, revisionist bureaucrats had different ideas about administrative organization that conflicted with the military leadership. When the first wave of Finance Ministry bureaucrats arrived in Manchukuo in the summer of 1932, they found a bureaucracy staffed with a mixture of Japanese colonial agents and indigenous Chinese elites with stronger ties to Kasagi or the Kwantung Army than the new central government. Revisionist bureaucrats considered most of these existing officials "lacking in the knowledge and experience for modern government administration."[25] They particularly looked down on Chinese officials, who they argued only had experience with the "half-feudal, half-colonial system" of the previous regime.[26] As the main force in carrying out administrative and social reorganization, revisionist bureaucrats felt that they would first need to rationalize and professionalize the civil service, which, they argued, necessitated recruiting more suitable candidates from among Japan's bureaucratic and

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[24] Recent scholarship has applied the term "reform bureaucrats" (*kakushin kanryō*) to this group. For example, Mimura, *Planning for Empire*, 29-40. Narrowly defined, "reform bureaucrats" were a self-identified group entering the bureaucracy in the 1920s who were highly influenced by Marxism theory and planned economies. Furukawa Takahisa, "Kakushin kanryōno shisō to kōdō," *Shigaku zasshi* 99, no. 4 (April 1990): 457–490. However, not all bureaucrats in Manchukuo easily fit into this category generationally or ideologically. For this reason, I favor Spaulding's term "revisionist bureaucrats" in order to collectively refer to a number of overlapping subgroups including but not limited to "reform bureaucrats," "new bureaucrats" (*shin kanryō*), "new-new bureaucrats (*shin-shin kanryō*). According to Spaulding revisionist bureaucrats were characterized by common "determination to change the status quo," and willingness "to act in concert across ministry boundaries, and across the line between civil and military services." Robert M. Spaulding Jr., "The Bureaucracy as a Political Force, 1920–45" in *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan*, ed. James W. Morley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 60–61.
[25] Furumi Tadayuki, *Furumi Tadayuki wasure enu Manshūkoku*, 60.
[26] Ibid., 41.

intellectual elite.[27] This became a perpetual point of conflict between military and the civilian officials in Manchukuo.

The GUA's military headmasters had made some attempts at professionalization in the Academy's curriculum and operation. They replaced many of Kasagi's ideologue lecturers with Manchukuo government department heads and prominent revisionist bureaucrats in a move to make instruction more practical. Instead, the visiting bureaucrats complained that the students were totally unfit. According to government officials, the students lacked the professional and technical skills needed for a modern administrative state and had no interest in learning them.[28] Lecturers frequently arrived to find more than half the class truant.[29] By 1934, Director of the Office of Legal Affairs Ōdachi Shigeo (1892–1955) was campaigning to shut down the GUA, calling it "nothing more than a dormitory for Manchuria *ronin*."[30] By the spring of 1934, controversy surrounding the GUA had reached the Kwantung Army General Staff, prompting them to bring in Handa Toshiharu (1892-1967) to assess the situation.

Handa's background as a member of both the military and right-wing intellectual elite made him an ideal choice to reform the GUA in a manner acceptable to both revisionist bureaucrats and the Kwantung Army. He had attended the Japanese Military Academy–graduating in 1912–where he came in contact with many of the young officers agitating for political change. After leaving active duty in 1924 at the rank of captain, he

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[27] Ibid., 60.
[28] Fujikawa, *Jitsuroku, Manshūkoku kensanjikan*, 135-136.
[29] Handa Toshiharu, "Daidō gakuin to dai yon kisei no omoide," *Daidō gakuin yon kisei kaihō* no.2 (1965): 13.
[30] Ibid.

entered the Law Department at Kyūshū Imperial University and, following his graduation in 1928, lectured in Greek language and political philosophy.[31]

Handa's studies at Kyūshū were particularly relevant to how he would approach bureaucratic organization and training in Manchukuo. As a student, Handa had worked under former Yūzonsha member Kanokogi Kazunobu (1884–1949). Though now mostly remembered for his attempt to build a National Socialist Party in wartime Japan, Kanokogi was a pioneer of radical right-wing philosophy in Japan who developed a distinctive "proto-fascist system of thought" parallel to the political developments emerging in inter-war Europe.[32] Like many of his contemporaries on the Japanese right, Kanokogi condemned the destructive forces liberalism, individualism, and capitalism, instead promoting an organic theory of state capable of achieving autarky and total mobilization. Like many in the military, he saw war as a revitalizing force for national development.[33] He was an advocate for centralized economic planning and rule by experts but insisted on the primacy of spirit over matter.[34] So it was with this unique vision of the state in mind that Handa approached the task of reform.[35]

When he arrived in Manchukuo as a fulltime instructor at the GUA, Handa determined that the academy was not a complete loss. While the school lacked a consistent and practical curriculum, these were problems that were easily solved with increased oversight and rational administration. What particularly impressed him,

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[31] Kantōgun. "Daidō gakuin kyōju to shite Handa Toshiharu saiyō ni kansuru ken" April 17, 1934, JACAR Ref no. C01003000200.
[32] Christopher W. A. Szpilman, "Kanokogi Kazunobu: Pioneer of Platonic Fascism and Imperial Pan-Asianism," *Monumenta Nipponica* 62, no. 2 (2013): 234.
[33] Ibid., 245.
[34] Ibid., 257.
[35] Handa, "Daidō gakuin to dai yon kisei no omoide," 11.

however, was the idealism of the predominantly young multi-ethnic student body.[36] Contrary to the prevailing opinion among revisionist bureaucrats, Handa considered the zealous spirit of the students not just beneficial but fundamental to their future roles in civil service. That spirit, however, had to be channeled through structure and discipline into service for the state.[37]

Handa proposed a number of reforms to establish administrative oversight and control over the instructional process that brought together stakeholders from both the Kwantung Army and revisionist bureaucrats. First, he argued that separating the academy from the General Affairs Agency and putting it under the direct supervision of a specially appointed president–drawn from high-ranking, active-duty military personnel–would provide more authoritative management and effective communication with military leaders. Next, Handa proposed appointing active-duty military officers and experienced bureaucrats as department heads charged with establishing discipline, order, and implementing a uniform curriculum. In addition, he argued that permanent instructors should be limited and replaced with more active-duty officials appointed as special "education officers" (*kyōkan*). Finally, Handa proposed channeling the academy's militarized culture through top-down guidance and increasing student self-regulation and self-discipline.[38]

Handa's reforms proved acceptable to both the military and revisionist bureaucrats, not only ending calls for the GUA's closure but also extending those reforms

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[36] Ibid., 12.
[37] Ibid., 12-15.
[38] Ibid., 15,17; Daidō gakuin kyōmuka chōsa ko, *Daidō gakuin kansei ichiran: ji daidō gen nen shi kōtoku hachi nen* (Shinkyō: Daidō gakuin kyōmuka chōsa ko, 1942), 2.

across the Manchukuo bureaucracy. Beginning in with the academy's fifth class in 1936, the old guard of low and mild-level bureaucrats who had mostly been culled from Mantetsu and the Bank of Chōsen were sent to the GUA for reeducation.[39] The following year the new GUA President was granted statuary authority to design and oversee training programs for both new recruits and active-duty personnel across all government departments.[40] In 1938, the ethnic separation between the first and second divisions at the GUA was eliminated, and the second division was reorganized as a training center for lower level officials.[41] Meanwhile, the former leader of the movement to shut down the academy, Ōdachi Shigeo, used his promotion to Director of the General Affairs Agency to enact thorough civil service reform that codified and expanded on Handa's proposals in the form of the Civil Service Law (*bunkanrei*) of 1938.[42]

The consequence of these reforms represented a profound innovation in bureaucratic training in the Japanese empire. By the end of the 1930s Manchukuo had developed highly centralized and hierarchical system for educating and disciplining an atomized officialdom into a uniform bureaucratic force. Metropolitan Japanese officials and legal scholars were, in fact, so admiring of these developments that they pressed for similar reforms to the wartime bureaucracy at home.[43] More significant than the structure,

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[39] Imura Tetsurō. "Iwazaki Kenji hiaringu kiroku (1): Dairen zeikan, Daidō gakuin, Manshūkoku kanzeika," *Kan nihonkai kenkyū nenpō*, no.5 (March 1998): 122.
[40] Daidō gakuin kyōmuka chōsa ko, *Daidō gakuin kansei ichiran*, 5-6. GUA oversight and curriculum were incorporated into Regional Employee Training Centers (Chihō shokuin kunrensho) established in each province after 1939. Kokumuin sōmuchō hōseisho, *Manchūkoku hōrei shūran tsuiroku* (Shinkyō: Manshū gyōsei gakkai, 1939), 20. In Kantō Province, the head of this training center was a prominent Korean formerly of the GGK, Yu Hongsun. Kim Chihyŏng and Cho Miŭn, "Yu Hongsun," *Han'guk minjok munhwa taebaekkwa sajŏn* (Han'gukhak chung'ang yŏn'guwŏn, 2017) http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Item/E0042018
[41] Daidō gakuin kyōmuka chōsa ko, *Daidō gakuin kansei ichiran*, 10.
[42] Maeno Shigeru, *Manshūkoku shihō kensetsu kaisōroku* (Osaka: Nihon kyōiku kenkyū sentā, 1985), 95.
[43] Spaulding, *Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations*, 177-178.

however, was how it was used. Through their training in these institutions, Manchukuo officials, including a sizeable number of Koreans, were indoctrinated into a bureaucratic culture that reflected the state's hybrid goals of development and militarization.

II. Public Servants or Partisans?

There can be little doubt that Manchukuo's bureaucratic training institutions established a program of professionalization. At the same time, this process was deeply influenced by an ideological conception of the state as an agent for social transformation. As a result, Manchukuo's "bureaucratic way" (*kanridō*) was a reflection of both the convergent philosophies and experiences of the various groups that constituted Manchukuo's ruling class, and global trends in state management during the early twentieth century.

Bureaucrats and the State

Interpretations of state theory varied somewhat between factions within Manchukuo's ruling establishment, but bureaucratic training materials demonstrate a common understanding of the state as an organic, total, and moral entity. The state in Manchukuo was fashioned as "living body" (*seimietai*) with individuals constituting organic "cells" interconnectedly contributing to its existence and development.[44] The state was total and all-encompassing, functioning through individual, family, and race. State philosophy rejected the "mechanistic view" of independently operating individuals

[44] Handa Toshiharu, "Daidō gakuin no shimei ni tsuite," *Dai Ajia* 3, no 5 (May 1935): 138.

and sub-cultures, arguing that the individual derives their very existence from the state.[45] The underlying force binding the state together was a fundamental "spirit" derived from Japan's developmental history, but universalized in the creation of Manchukuo as the "national foundation spirit," (*kenkoku seishin*).[46] This unifying spirit was characterized by a moral order maintained through a series of social obligations based on Confucian organizational principles and hierarchical relationships that bound individuals to family, community, and state.[47] According to GUA instructors, this moral order served as the basis for state power: "Morality is the first principle. However, power is necessary to make this a reality. Power is inherently justified in so far as it helps to realize and act in service of morality."[48] In practical terms, this meant that Manchukuo was not governed by rule of law, but rather, the law served as a vehicle for a greater morality. This "unity of law and morality" (*hōdō ichinyo*) authorized the state to subvert the law when it was deemed to be an impediment to maintaining the moral order.[49]

In this context, the role of the bureaucrat in Manchukuo deviated drastically from the Weberian ideal of the "professional, rule-bound, impersonal" public servant and instead embraced administrative activism.[50] Within the organic body of state, bureaucrats represented "cells responsible for organizing the [other] components" upon whom the

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[45] Fukutomi Ichirō, "Minzoku yūgō no michi," *Ronsō* 1 (1939): 114.
[46] Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōsho, *Manshū kenkoku no shinishiki* (Shinkyō: Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōshō, 1937), 18.
[47] Ibid., 133.
[48] Ibid., 149.
[49] Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōshō, *Kanridō*, Chihō shokuin kunrenshō kyōzai v. 3 (Shinkyō: Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōshō, n.d.) 37.
[50] Fritz Sager and Christian Rosser, "Weber, Wilson, and Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy," *Public Administration Review* 69, no 6 (Nov.-Dec. 2009): 1137.

heath, vigor, and capacity for development rested.[51] While each bureaucrat had his own individual function or specialization, they were unified within the totality of state, society, and military by a shared guiding spirit.

This organic conception of the state, while highly influenced by the conservative philosophy espoused by the members of Manchukuo's ruling establishment, was hardly unique. Training manuals specifically tied Manchukuo's bureaucratic philosophy to Nazi civil service reforms in the 1930s, but administrative theorists from G. F. Hegel to Woodrow Wilson had long rejected a mechanistic conception of state.[52] Rather than the law, it was a fundamental guiding spirit and moral foundation that formed the basis for the bureaucrat's duties, obligations, and relationships, as well as their reciprocal rights.

A bureaucrat's first duty was loyalty to the state. Since, according to Manchukuo's Organizational Law (*kumishiki hō*), the right to appoint government officials resided with the Emperor and his government, bureaucrats learned that "like the soldier, [the bureaucrat] does not derive his status from the people."[53] As such, they were directed to give their "loyalty" (*chusei*) to the state (the emperor and his government)–a principle that was legally enshrined in the first article of the Civil Service Law.[54] Moreover, loyalty was a life-long commitment, extending even beyond the term of one's appointment.[55] This emphasis on state loyalty was also reflected in global trends in administrative organization during the 1930s. Germany's 1937 Civil Service Law, for example, enjoined bureaucrats to pledge their "fidelity to the Fürer and the Reich" with

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[51] Handa, "Daidōgakuin no shimei ni tsuite," 138.
[52] Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōshō, *Kanridō*, 18; Sager and Ross, "Weber, Wilson, and Hegel."
[53] Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōshō, *Kanridō*, 15.
[54] Kokumuin sōmucho jinjisho, *Bunkanrei tsuke kankei shohōrei*, 2.
[55] Article 8 of the Civil Service Law, for example, forbidden from revealing or profiting from information learned while in the course of their duty even after they left the civil service. Ibid.

"unquestioning obedience."[56] In Manchukuo, however, bureaucratic loyalty was expressed in relation to a more ambiguous spiritual essence.[57] All Manchukuo bureaucrats took the following loyalty oath: "I pledge to dutifully respect the rules of office according to the national foundation spirit and carry out my official duty with loyalty and fidelity."[58] Training manuals, moreover, explained loyalty in broadly Confucian terms with frequent allusion to the Confucian classics and the Seventeen Article Constitution of Prince Shōtoku (*Shōtoku taishi jū nana jō kempō*). They explained that it was a part of the social foundation, extending from the individual through the family to the state. It entailed the sublimation of the self for the collective as the one true way of heaven.[59]

The state required order and, as an extension of loyalty, demanded bureaucrats maintain "discipline" (*seturitu*), "self-restraint" (*sessei*), and "obedience" (*fukushu*).[60] In practice, this meant strict observance of hierarchy and abandoning all other personal obligations. In a clear response to the perceived politicization of the bureaucracy in metropolitan Japan, Manchukuo's ruling elite created an institutional framework to promote government cohesion and prevent factionalism. From a legal standpoint, this

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[56] James K. Pollock, *The German Civil Service Act* (Chicago: The Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada, 1938), 17.
[57] According to GUA instructor Matsuura Urakasaburō, Manchukuo bureaucrat's allegiance to the Japanese emperor was only indirectly expressed. Since Manchukuo and Japan were "inseparably bound" (*fukabun kankei*) in "one heart and spirit" (*ichio ichie*) giving loyalty to the Manchukuo state extended that loyalty to the Japanese emperor by definition. For this reason, he urged Japanese bureaucrats in particular to take up a new national identity as "Manchukuo citizens" (*Manshū kokumin*) and serve the emperor by following the Manchukuo government. Matsuura Urakasaburō, "Kakushinki no kanridō," *Tōa renmei* 5, no 9 (September 1943): 3.
[58] Futakawa Yoshifumi, *Manshūkoku kaisei bunkanrei chikujō kaisetsu* (Shinkyō: Daidō insho, 1941), 50.
[59] Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōshō, *Kanridō*, 35–41.
[60] Handa, "Daidōgakuin no shimei ni tsuite," 141.

included a prohibition against joining political parties.[61] On the practical end, bureaucrats were regularly transferred between departments and geographic areas in order to promote collaboration. According to the Civil Service Law the role of the superior was as "guide" (*shidō*) and "coach" (*kantoku*) their juniors in order to "maintain discipline."[62] The subordinate, meanwhile, was to follow orders "directly and to the letter."[63] Training manuals likewise told bureaucrats to heed the advice of their superiors and avoid letting their own personal thoughts and opinions intrude on their government work.[64] Bureaucrats would have no other master than the state. Even the needs of the family were subordinate.[65]

Bureaucrats were to exit in a state of complete dependence on the state. They were forbidden from seeking employment or participating in business activities without prior permission.[66] At the same time, their relationship with the state afforded them certain rights and privileges exclusive to civil officials. First and foremost was a "right to status" (*mibunjō no ken*) which secured an individual's position within the bureaucratic

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[61] Rikugunshō, *Hōrei/dōmeikoku guntai no chūton ni tomonau gunji hōki tekiyō nado ni kansuru ken, kanki kanri fukumu kitei*. N.D. JACAR Reference no. C12120838500. This was later modified in 1938 to allow bureaucrats to join the Concordia Association. They were still, however, prohibited from participating in "anti-state" activities and organizations, such as the Communist Party. Kokumuin sōmucho jinjisho, *Bunkanrei tsuke kankei shohōrei*, 2.
[62] Ibid., 3.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōshō, *Kanridō*, 38.
[65] While out on field observation assignment for the GUA in 1944, for example, Korean student Han Chunggŏn left his post at his father's request to return home and get married without requesting permission from his superior. School officials later discovered Han's dereliction of duty and threatened him with expulsion, though he was eventually allowed to continue his training. According to Han, the reason his disobedience was forgiven was because administrators felt an ignorant Korean could not be expected to know better. Han Chunggŏn, "Daidō gakuin jidai no tsuioku to konnichi," *Amageru beki*, ed. Daidō gakuin dai jū hachi kisei (Tokyo: Daidō gakuin dai jū hachi kisei kinen kaishi henshū iinkai, 1981), 248-249.
[66] Kokumuin sōmucho jinjisho, *Bunkanrei tsuke kankei shohōrei*, 3.

hierarchy and the broader society for the duration of his appointment.[67] Additional financial and social benefits derived from one's status level. In a very practical sense, these injunctions and incentives served to prevent corruption within the government via conflicts of personal economic interest. They also bound bureaucrats to the state.

As significant beneficiaries of the social status afforded to Manchukuo bureaucrats, Korean students at the GUA acted as some of the chief defenders of the system against actions and interpretations that deviated from the founding principles. Korean students in the GUA's second graduating class, for example, lead a movement for equal pay within the Manchukuo bureaucracy. Already fed up with wage discrimination in Korea (Chapter 1), the students called for an end to the system of "special stipends" (*tokubetsu dote*) for Japanese officials. When their petition was denied, one student quit the bureaucracy immediately and returned to Korea in protest. Another quit the bureaucracy some years later. [68] Their demands, however, were eventually addressed in the civil service reforms of 1938.

With regards to the relationship between bureaucrats and the people, the parameters were even more ambiguous and contradictory. While Manchukuo law guaranteed citizens the right to petition the government and protection from corrupt officials, these rights could expressly be revoked during "war and times of crisis."[69] Moreover, as noted above, laws in general were merely a vehicle for a higher and poorly defined moral order.

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[67] Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōshō, *Kanridō*, 24.
[68] Ishgaki Teiichi, "Daidō gakuin to Furumi san," in *Kaisō Furumi Tadayuki*, ed. Furumi Tadayuki kaisōroku kankōkai (Tokyo: Furumi Tadayuki kaisōroku kankōkai, 1984), 153.
[69] Gaimushō jōhōbu, *Manshūkoku gengyō hōreishū* (N.A.: Gaimushō jōhōbu, 1932), 16-17.

For bureaucrats this meant that their relationship with the people was more paternal guide than public servant. While instructors like Handa Toshiharu claimed publicly that "just as the national will is cultivated in the people through the bureaucrat, so is the peoples' desire reflected back on the national will," bureaucrats' legal obligations were far more focused on the former role than the latter.[70] Article five of the Civil Service Law only required bureaucrats to "diligently study" (*kensan*) and "consider" (*sasshi*) the popular will when forming and executing national policy. As training manuals made clear, this consideration did not mean "pandering to the public will" but rather staying "one step ahead."[71] On the surface, this appeared to be an expression of *bokuminkan* (officials who shepherd the people), a dominant feature of Japanese administrative philosophy dating back to the Edo Period.[72] In this case, however, the justification for bureaucratic paternalism was based as much on contemporary political conditions and social conditions.

Manchukuo's governing culture cast the people as objects in need of "guidance" (*shidō*) both because of the exceptional and dire circumstances of the time and their innate, racial inability to guide themselves. Instructors described Manchukuo as existing in a perpetual state of danger that predated its inception, with the imperial ambitions of England, America, and Russia threatening on all sides. [73] This constant threat necessitated rapid development of a "national defense state," which could only be accomplished with

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[70] Handa, "Daidōgakuin no shimei ni tsuite," 140.
[71] Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōshō, *Kanridō*, 39-40.
[72] Roger H. Brown, "Shepherds of the People: Yasuoka Masahiro and the New Bureaucrats in Early Showa Japan," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 35, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 285-319.
[73] Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōsho, *Manshū kenkoku no shinishiki*, 165.

guidance and direction from a class of skilled "managers" (*keieika*).[74] Moreover, Manchukuo's multiethnic population contained "many levels of cultural advancement (*mindo*)" that were not all uniformly capable of self-defense or self-government.[75] They needed assistance to have their supposedly primitive "fishing and hunting age" culture "opened up to modern civilization."[76] The bureaucrat, they contended, was the one with the necessary "resolve, skill and capacity" to guide these people and cultivate the new nation.[77]

The content and objective of this bureaucratic guidance was, in a word, development. The Manchukuo bureaucracy played a crucial role in the formation and evolution of a type of state-driven, centrally-planned economic development model later scholars have tied to the concept of the "developmental state."[78] Yet, while we know much about the ideological framework of the developmental program, as well as its chief architects, we know relatively little about how these ideas were planted and nurtured in the mass of officials responsible for putting it into practice.

For Manchukuo bureaucrats, the developmental imperative was a central feature of the training curriculum. In their lectures to GUA trainees, military and civilian officials presented industrial development as the "material foundation," of the state.[79] While they discussed its importance to both economic prosperity and national security,

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[74] Hoshino Naoki, "Daidō gakuin nyūgakushiki shukuji," *Hoshino sōmuchoukan kōenshū (nichibun)*, ed. Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōsho (Shinkyō: Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, 1939), 8.
[75] Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōshō, *Kanridō*, 11.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Mimura, *Planning for Empire.*
[79] Hoshino Naoki, "Manshūkoku shisei no nemoto hōshin," *Hoshino sōmuchoukan kōenshū (nichibun)*, ed. Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōsho (Shinkyō: Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, 1939), 113.

GUA officials placed particular emphasis on the later as a fundamental precondition for the former.[80] In the Social Darwinist context of racial competition between the haves and have-nots, industrial capacity was the determining factor in securing victory, and access to natural resources was the key to expanding that capacity. Manchuria's own history had demonstrated that failure on these fronts would result external conquest, colonization, and antihalation.[81] What was needed, then, was a new type of state dedicated to establishing and defending autarky, which they termed the "advanced security state" (*kōdō kokubō* kokka).[82] As a land rich in mineral resources with potential for industrial growth, the physical space of Manchukuo was essential to establishing the security state. Lectures described it as a type of "insurance" (*kakuhō*) or "lifeline" (*seimeisen*) of the Asian peoples.[83] However, development in the national security state required not just access to resources but also new forms of organization to exploit them.

According to Manchukuo's leaders, the goals of security and prosperity could not be achieved by following the model of the West. GUA lectures criticized Capitalism as a philosophy of "divisive individualism and independence."[84] In this respect they were not reluctant to deploy materialist analysis, and Marxist critiques of "class contradiction" (*mujun*).[85] Capitalism was unsustainable, they argued, and holding fast to the principles of the free market would only lead to national decline and racial annihilation. Rather, a

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[80] Tamura Toshio "Kenkoku seishin kōza," *Daidōgakuin ihō* 1 (1938): 101.
[81] One lecturer even presented Japan's colonization of the Kantō Lease territory as evidence of this inevitable outcome. He did, however, argue that Japan's colonial policies had not been as bad as those of the West. Ibid., 79-80, 85-86.
[82] Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōshō, *Kanridō*, 11.
[83] Hoshino Naoki, "Manshūkoku shisei no nemoto hōshin," 112-113.
[84] Ibid., 112.
[85] Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōsho, *Manshū kenkoku no shinishiki*, 112-121; Tamura Toshio "Kenkoku seishin kōza,"45.

global revolution leading to the next stage of history was on the horizon.[86] However, GUA lectures were critical of both liberal and communist internationalism as standard bearers for the coming social revolution. They depicted the global order promoted by Woodrow Wilson in the wake of the First World War as a form of racialized nationalism at best, or a system of neo-colonialism at worst.[87] While they had more positive things to say about the Communist Revolution in principle, they derided the turn towards "communism in one country" under Stalin as an abandonment of the rest of the world to domination by white capitalists.[88]

The real revolution, they argued, would be a new "moral world" (*dōgi sekai*) based on "totalitarianism" (*zettaishugi*) and "control" (*tōseishugi*), and it would emerge in Asia. Overcoming capitalist modernity had to be done rapidly through maximizing efficiency. This could only be achieved through a complete reorganization and reorientation of society where individuals abandoned their personal self-interest and autonomy in support of the collective. In a practical sense, this meant the total mobilization of human and natural resources for the demands of the state. Mobilization, however, was meaningless without control. This meant that there needed to be a central plan and a hierarchical structure capable of putting it into effect.[89] For all their talk of novelty, these ideas bear the hallmark of corporatist developmental discourse circulating the globe in the 1930s.[90] Manchukuo officials, however, insisted that Manchukuo would

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[86] Hoshino Naoki, "Daidō gakuin nyūgakushiki shukuji," 8.
[87] Hoshino Naoki, "Manshūkoku shisei no nemoto hōshin," 112; Tamura Toshio "Kenkoku seishin kōza," 50.
[88] Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōsho, *Manshū kenkoku no shinishiki*, 120.
[89] Hoshino Naoki, "Manshūkoku shisei no nemoto hōshin," 114.
[90] Definitions of Corporatism as a developmental philosophy vary, but I here define it as an organizational system which emerged from critiques of capitalism at the turn of the twentieth century and was theorized

be the place where this social transformation would emerge. This was, they argued, thanks to Japan's ability to manage Western scientific knowledge in the service of collective values and moral authority.[91]

As the leaders of this revolution, Manchukuo bureaucrats were to emulate this blending of scientific and traditional knowledge. Hoshino Naoki–architect of the planned economy in Manchukuo–summarized the binary role to GUA students as follows: "Today, bureaucrats must not be merely technicians but managers. They must not be office workers but spiritual guides."[92] Many scholars utilizing the framework of technocracy have demonstrated how the Manchukuo state and bureaucracy embodied the first part of Hoshino's dyad.[93] Manchukuo bureaucrats needed to be "functionally polyvalent" managers capable of operating the state through a cycle of centrally organized and scientifically rational analysis, planning, and implementation.[94] In highlighting bureaucracy's spiritual role, however, Hoshino's statement points to a certain ambivalence and even antagonism towards techno-scientific rationality's impact on the moral fabric of society that had been present in the Manchukuo bureaucracy from

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and applied in multiple states in the interwar period. Common characteristics included: state-directed social organization and mobilization, centralization of authority, statism, collectivism, and conservative nationalism (frequently based on race or ethnicity). Though generally analyzed in specific national contexts, recent scholarship has begun to foreground how corporatist theories and practices circulated across the globe in the 1930s. For example, see: Kiran Klaus Patel, *The New Deal: A Global History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Melissa Teixteira, "Making a Brazilian New Deal: Oliveira Vianna and the Transnational Sources of Brazil's Corporatist Experiment," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 50, no. 3 (Aug. 2018) 613-641; Antonio Costa Pinto and Federico Finchelstein eds, *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Europe and Latin America: Crossing Borders*, Routledge Studies in Modern History 43 (New York: Routledge, 2019). Regarding public administration specifically, see Paul Petzschmann, "Nazi Germany and Public Administration 1933-42: The Most Important Laboratory for Depression America?" *Public Administration* 92, no. 2 (2014): 259-273.

[91] Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōshō, *Manshū kenkoku no shinishiki*, 61.

[92] Hoshino Naoki, "Daidō gakuin nyūgakushiki shukuji," 8.

[93] For example, see: Mimura, *Planning for Empire*; Moore, *Constructing East Asia*

[94] Magali Sarfatti Larson, "Notes on Technocracy: Some Problems of Theory, Ideology, and Power," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 17, no. 5 (1972–1973): 11.

the very beginning. The moral order of so-called "kingly rule" (*ōdō seiji*) required not just rationality but sagacity. It was only by internalizing the moral foundation of the state and subsuming the material to the spiritual that bureaucrats could effectively organize society. In this respect, the Manchukuo bureaucracy was far more Hegelian than Weberian. [95]

This binary administrative philosophy was evident in the training curriculum as well. Regardless of their individual interest, expertise, or ultimate destination within the government structure, bureaucratic trainees sat through lectures on a broad range of topics, from sociology and science to history and hygiene.[96] Science and technology lectures, moreover, emphasized managerial aspects over specific details.[97] A significant amount of time was also spent on ideological indoctrination. Compared with the 25 hours of training dedicated to developmental conditions and theory, students spent 38 hours studying Manchukuo's "foundational spirit" (*kenkoku seishin*) and "the way of the leader" (*shidōshadō*).[98] The latter, moreover, specifically cultivated respect and

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[95] Though Weber is generally considered one of the central theorists of modern bureaucracy, his ideas were significantly influenced by Hegel's lesser-known discussion of bureaucracy that appears in *Philosophy of Right*. The overlap between their theories is significant, but there are some crucial differences. Weber argued that bureaucratic action should be based on expertise: knowledge of general rules and principles that are stable, exhaustive, and can be applied to solve a problem. In contrast, Hegel argued it was based in knowledge: an understanding of the relationship between universal norms and particular events to which bureaucrats would "use their practical judgement to arrive at the best results within the framework of laws." Karl K. Y. Shaw, "Hegel's Theory of Modern Bureaucracy," *The American Political Science Review* 86, no. 2 (June 1992): 383-386.

[96] It should be noted that there were also practical reasons for this type of generalized training. Particularly in Manchukuo's early years, a general labor shortage made it necessary to train officials to fill multiple administrative roles. This was particularly true of rural government. Even in later years, bureaucrats were frequently transferred between departments making a broad knowledge of state functions and objectives extremely useful.

[97] Ishihara Jun, "Kagaku to gijutsu," *Ronsō* 3 (1940).

[98] Manshū Teikoku Daidō gakuin, *Daidō gakuin yōran* (Shinkyō: Manshū Teikoku Daidōgakuin, 1940), Insert between 44 and 45.

dedication to personal sacrifice, including death, in the line of duty that part of a broader system of militarization.

Bureaucrats and the Military

The military had long played a central role in Japanese colonial administrations, and in this respect, Manchukuo was no different. What distinguished Manchukuo from other colonial administrations, however, was the high degree of militarization among civilian officials. While strategic and personal safety concerns required a certain level of military skill for civil servants in the early years, the gradual shift towards a professional bureaucracy after 1933 coincided with *increased* militarization. Rather than compete with civil bureaucrats for authority, Japanese military officials sought to integrate them into the military's own cultural and political sphere in a way that prefaced the rise of the national security state in the broader wartime empire. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Manchukuo's government training centers, where Japanese, Chinese, and Korean recruits were molded, figuratively and literally, into a paramilitary force.

For government recruits invited to the GUA, militarization began even before their arrival in Manchukuo. Starting with the second class of recruits in 1933, new students assembled in Tokyo and participated in a series of mandatory lectures and field trips as they traveled to their destination in the Manchukuo capital. The itinerary varied significantly from year-to-year, but always included visits to the army and navy facilities in Yokosuka, meetings and lectures with Army staff, and ritual worship at the national shrine for war dead, Yasukuni Taisha. The 1937 and 1942 trips also made stops at

famous Russo-Japanese War battle sites to honor the Japanese war-dead.[99] Starting in 1942, students were required to go through two full weeks of physical endurance boot camp in the mountains near Mt. Fuji that Yi Minchae described as "guerilla training."[100] During their ocean voyage to Manchuria, students were required to memorize battle marches and the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors and were tested after docking in port.[101]

On arrival, students observed that the GUA was deeply imbedded in the physical and symbolic space of Manchukuo's military culture. The school was constructed in an area on the southern edge of the Manchukuo capitol called Nanling (J. Nanryō), a famous battle site in the 1931 Japanese invasion. Jutting up from the relatively flat plains just south of the school stood the Nanling Martyrs Monument, a three-meter stone obelisk dedicated to the thirty-eight Japanese soldiers killed in the battle. On opening day, new students participated in a worship rite for national martyrs at the monument. They also maintained the monument grounds throughout the year, cutting the grass in summer and cleaning the stones on ritual days.[102]

Daily practices at the GUA were highly regimented and, much like military training, designed to instill future bureaucrats with strict discipline. Students lived together in a dormitory with rooms broken up into squads. They woke to the sound of morning reveille at 6:00 a.m. for a quick assembly followed by a one kilometer bare-

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[99] Gaimushō, "Dai 1 bu dai 8 kisei Nihon naichi kansatsu shikō nittei," *Manshūkoku Daidōgakuin dai 8 kisei 3 gatsu,* March 16, 1937, JACAR Ref no. B05015791400; Rikugunshō, "Dai 1 bu dai 15 kisei fu Man shikō nitteihyō nit suite" *Daidōgakuin nyūgakusei rikugunshō hōmon ni kanshi irai no ken*, September 10, 1944, JACAR Ref. no. C04014955300.
[100] Yi Minchae, "Na ŭi kyougi," 296.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Iida Seio, "Daidōgakuin 9 ka getsu shunshū," *Kuon*, ed. Daidōgakuin dōsōkai (Tokyo: Daidōgakuin dōsōkai, 1991), 83.

chested run through a nearby river, even on days when temperatures reached minus thirty degrees Celsius.[103] Students also conducted daily rounds of a cold resistance training technique known as *kanpu masatu undō* where they would stand half-naked in the frigid air rubbing their bare skin with coarse towels.[104] Meals were spartan and typically consisted of a bowl of soup, a side dish, and a bowl of rice mixed with sorghum.[105]

The GUA held recruits to a strict code of conduct that dictated proper comportment and interpersonal relationships both inside and outside the school. Respect for authority was expected in all situations. On meeting with a school official, students were required to announce their squad number and duty prior to their name and, if seated, stand for teachers as they entered and exited a room.[106] Students were even to offer respect to cafeteria workers, reporting their name and squad number upon entry.[107] Off campus, students were instructed to watch their language and maintain a "strong and sturdy disposition" that engendered respect from the surrounding community.[108]

Students were also subject to a high level of surveillance over their daily lives. Squad leaders and duty officers were required to complete daily reports of their activities along with regular roll-call lists and submit them to the dean of students after breakfast every morning.[109] While out on maneuvers and field trips, all students were required to

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[103] Cho Kichun, *Na ŭi insaeng*, 29.
[104] Paek Sanggŏn, *"Yūjō fuhen*," 153; "Daidōgakuin," *Shashin shūhō* no. 31 (September 14, 1938): 6.
[105] Kaneyama Mikio, "Omoide," 90.
[106] Manshū Teikoku Daidōgakuin, *Daidō gakuin yōran*, 57-58.
[107] Ibid., 58.
[108] Manshū Teikoku Daidōgakuin, *Daidō gakuin yōran*, 65.
[109] Ibid., 59.

keep a journal that was monitored by their squad leaders and the accompanying teacher.[110]

As an educational institution, the GUA curriculum was designed not just to train future bureaucrats in the skills of managing the state but also to prepare them to be the front line of national defense in the countryside. As early as 1935, a total of 152 hours of class time was dedicated to military training. [111] Drill instruction and marching were a regular feature of daily life, and students went on frequent treks through the countryside even in harsh weather conditions to increase discipline and physical stamina. One student recalled sleeping under trucks on an overnight excursion during the summer monsoons with the maddening chirping of frogs keeping everyone awake. "We came back looking like we'd emerge from the mud," he remarked, "and even our blisters had blisters."[112] However, with much of Manchukuo's rural territory lacking in adequate infrastructure and anti-Japanese resistance forces still operating in the hinterlands, government officials also considered hands-on training in marksmanship, martial arts, and horseback riding essential skills for bureaucrats to carry out their government duties and for their daily survival.[113] As Japan's war in Asia expanded in the late 1930s, military training became far more extensive and complex. By 1938, the curriculum had expanded to include

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[110] Daidō gakuin kyōmuka chōsa ko, *Daidō gakuin kansei ichiran: ji daidō gen nen shi kōtoku hachi nen* (Shinkyō: Daidō gakuin kyōmuka chōsa ko, 1942); Han Chunggŏn, "Daidō gakuin jidai no tsuioku to konnichi," 248.
[111] Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, *Manshūkoku gensei: kōtoku 5 nen han* (Shinkyō: Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, 1938), 289.
[112] Kitazawa Haruo, "Hansei no ki," *Tairiku kaisōroku*, ed. Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai 2 kisei tairiku kaisōroku henshū iinkai (Tokyo: Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai ni kiseikai, 1977), 153.
[113]Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Ōinaru kana Manshū*, 33. The necessity of this kind of training became readily apparent to students of the first GUA class, who were called into action against Chinese resistance forces approaching the campus on at least two occasions in 1933. Ibid, 28-30. A contemporary account of the incident by the headmaster also appears in: Fujii Jūrō, "Manshū Daidōgakuin no seiseki," *Aizukai zasshi* no. 41 (1932): 15.

training in the principles of military command, anti-aircraft defense measures and tactics, and truck driving, as well as public order and propaganda techniques.[114]

Outside of formal military instruction, students were encouraged to participate in intermural sports and martial arts competitions. In 1933 members of the school's judo club competed against the Manchukuo national team in friendly competition, and squad five participated in a relay celebrating the second anniversary of the invasion of Manchuria.[115] Rugby was also incredibly popular, with students from the second and sixth classes fielding teams composed of students and alumni and led by Korean bureaucrat, Yun Myŏngsŏn.[116] In 1943, Yi Minchae, an accomplished *kendo* fencer, also coached a team of students to the All Manchukuo Kendo Tournament.[117]

While at the academy, students were indoctrinated into a culture of service and blood sacrifice to the state. Particularly in Manchukuo's early years, when armed resistance in the countryside was rampant, the number of bureaucrats killed on duty was high. At the GUA, these deaths were promoted as the ultimate expression of bureaucratic duty. In his opening day speech to the 1934 class school president, and director of the General Affairs Agency, Endō Ryūsaku (1886-1963), noted that three graduates had already been killed in the line of duty. Calling them "martyrs," he commended them for

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[114] Manshūkoku tsūshinsha, *Manshūkoku gensei: kōtoku 5 nen han*, 57.
[115] Mimatsu Taisuke, "Tairiku Omoide no ki," *Tairiku kaisōroku*, ed. Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai 2 kisei tairiku kaisōroku henshū iinkai (Tokyo: Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai ni kiseikai, 1977), 251; Mimatsu Taisuke, "Ko Yamaguchi Rokurō kun no omoide," *Tairiku kaisōroku*, ed. Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai 2 kisei tairiku kaisōroku henshū iinkai (Tokyo: Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai ni kiseikai, 1977), 279.
[116] Ikee Yoshio, "Gakuin omoide no ki," *Tairiku kaisōroku*, ed. Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai 2 kisei tairiku kaisōroku henshū iinkai (Tokyo: Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai ni kiseikai, 1977), 312; Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinka, *Hekikū ryokuya sanzenri* (Tokyo: Daidōgakuin dōsōkai, 1972), 96-97.
[117] Yi Minchae, "Na ŭi kyougi," 298.

"laying down their lives" and "exhausting their sincere devotion to their sacred duty."[118] GUA students were taught to appreciate these "blood and sweat" sacrifices and follow in the footsteps of their fallen comrades.[119]

The discourses of martyrdom were ubiquitous in the bureaucratic community. While the official magazine of the Manchukuo bureaucracy carried only brief announcements of official deaths, the pages of *The Great Asia* (*dai ajia*) carried regular accounts of bureaucratic sacrifice. These narratives detailed the heroic exploits of local officials facing off against hordes of bandits, fighting to their last breath for the sake of the empire.[120] Both the GUA and the Manchukuo government's Office of Propaganda published volumes commemorating the heroic deaths of bureaucrats.[121] Their deaths were memorialized in stone tablets in the capitol and in the countryside, which GUA students and government officials regularly visited and maintain.[122] In 1936, the national radio station even broadcast a dramatization of the death of a local bureaucrat at the hands of bandits the previous year.[123]

At the GUA, martyrdom and self-sacrifice were embedded into the culture. Students in the first class wrote a victory song that declared: "Blood, sweat, tears, life, these are no obstacle for the man pursuing sincerity…His body buried, his bones to dust,

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[118] Endō Ryusaku, *Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin no shimei koro shōwa kyu nen ni gatsu*, January 31, 1934, JACAR Ref. no. B05016165400.
[119] Ogata Eiji, "Daidō gakuin to watashi," *Kyōen*, ed. Daidō gakuin dōsōkai (Tokyo: Daidō gakuin dōsōkai, 1991), 128.
[120] For example, see "Yamamori sanjikan gai rokumei junshoku jōkyō," *Dai Ajia* 3, no. 10 (October 1935): 24-25.
[121] Kokumuin sōmuchō jōhōshō, *Junkō resshiden dai isshū* (Shinkyō: Kokumuin sōmuchō jōhōshō, 1937); Daidō gakuin, *Junkoku no hana* (Shinkyō: Daidō gakuin, 1940).
[122] Accounts of memorial services, commemorations, and grave visitations appeared regularly in *Dai Ajia*. For example, see: "Ko Fuenken sanjikan Fujiyoshi Yasuei shi no junshokuhi rakuseishiki kyokō suru," *Dai Ajia* 3, no. 12 (December 1935): 46-47; and Kasagi Yoshiaki "Matsumura Suzaki ryōkun no haka ni mairu," *Dai Ajia* 4, no.10 (October 1936): 95-97.
[123] Min Megumi, "Aru ken sanjikan no shi," *Dai Ajia* 4, no.6 (June 1936): 90.

he will blossom like a flower bearing the fruit of truth."[124] The official song of the dormitory likewise proclaimed, "in self-sacrifice, there is ultimate purity."[125] As future bureaucrats, GUA students were brought up in the "spirit of the samurai" (*shikon*) sacrificing everything for the state.[126] A popular song written by one of the school's first instructors, "Elegy for a Nameless Samurai Warrior" (*mumei no shishi wo tomurau uta*), blended this samurai mythology with Chinese heroic epics and continental imagery to create a distinctively Manchurian sacrificial ethos. The song's lyrics idealized self-sacrifice and suggested that through death, bureaucrats would join the eternal spirit of the state.[127] Students would regularly sing these songs in both organized school excursions and while out on the town.[128]

Manchukuo authorities, moreover, specifically utilized discourses of blood sacrifice to appeal to Korean bureaucrats. Hyŏn Kiyŏng (1905-1936) was the only ethnic Korean higher civil servant known to have died while on duty. While his cause of death was reported as illness, he was nonetheless honored as making the greatest sacrifice. According to the official *Records of Martyrs and Patriots*, Hyŏn's health had been "extremely damaged" from his effort and dedication to "establishing peace and public order" and "revolutionizing local administration in the countryside."[129] As a result, he was declared "martyred from over-exerting himself in his job."[130] The author of his official state obituary suggested that Hyŏn's only regret must have been that his work

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[124] Hōzōji Hisao, *Namako wa inoru: Manshūkoku ryōkōki* (Tokyo: Shinchisha, 1933), 279-280.
[125] Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Ōinaru kana Manshū*, 40.
[126] Hoshino Naoki, "Daidō gakuin nyūgakushiki shukuji," 8.
[127] Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Ōinaru kana Manshū*, 531-532.
[128] Ibid., 531.
[129] Kokumuin sōmuchō jōhōshō, *Junkō resshiden dai isshū*, 184.
[130] Ibid., 185.

was cut short half way.[131] These sentiments were echoed in a public statements by Koreans and Japanese alike.[132] In his lengthily eulogy at Hyŏn's funeral, GUA Headmaster Nakahara Hachiro framed the young Korean's blood sacrifice largely in terms of Manchukuo's state propaganda of ethnic harmony and the national foundation spirit. At the same time, Nakahara also utilized geographic imagery of the Manchukuo-Korean borderland that likely appealed specifically to the ethnic pride of Koreans: "The snow that piles up on the peaks of Mount Hakutō (K. Paektu san) over time melts and flows away. Even so, [Hyŏn's] achievements and spirit will carry on as endlessly and eternally as the flowing of the Yalu River."[133]

Korean students deeply internalized the concept of self-sacrifice for the state not just as a part of their professional duty but also as a path to subjectivity within the imperial Japanese polity. As Japan's expanding military commitments in the late 1930s created increasing demands for soldiers at the front, Manchukuo bureaucrats had ample opportunity to dedicate their commitment to blood sacrifice by joining the army. Koreans, however, were excluded from conscription until 1943, which some Korean bureaucrats-in-training saw as an injustice. During a 1938 sending-off ceremony for two recently conscripted GUA students, one Korean got up in front of the entire student body and tearfully declared his jealousy at not being able to give his life for his country.[134] For

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[131] Ibid.
[132] The official journal of the Manchukuo bureaucracy, for example published a letter from Hyŏn's wife honoring his dedicated leadership and patriotism, and claiming his dying wish was that she raise their two children for the glory of the state. Kim Oksun "Ko Gen Kiei," *Jichi kaihō* 3, no.7 (July 1936) 10. Hyŏn's Korean GUA classmate, Chin Yŏnggŭn, went even further, suggesting that death from a bandit's bullet would have at least allowed Hyŏn to rest in peace. Chin Yŏnggŭn, "Chōji," *Nanryō* no. 31 (May 1936): 14.
[133] Nakahara Hachirō, "Chōji," *Nanryō* no. 31 (May 1936): 12.
[134] Kawashima identifies this individual as Kang Shinchae (?-2000). Kawashima Kaoru, "'Depāto no shōhin' tachi: jū kisei no aru kiroku no tame," in *Tōtenkō wo tsuku*, ed. Daidō gakuin dōsōkai (Tokyo:

some Koreans, heroic death was the only sure route to full subjectivity in the Japanese empire. As one Korean legal trainee declared: "The only way for the Japanese to understand is for us to spill our blood."[135]

Finally, at the GUA, future bureaucrats were directly taught to respect the paramount authority of the military to intervene and in social, political, economic life. In his lectures to students, Handa Toshiharu told the students that the military was the only organization to bridge the divide between the "feudal military spirit" and modern science. Soldiers embodied the spirit of the nation in their effort to establish a "moral world."[136] As such, their natural role was as the "vanguard" of the people.[137] Handa argued that the Japanese army's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was a manifestation of this spirit. The military had observed both the corruption and lawlessness of the Chinese regime, and their inability to hold back the threat of invasion by Euro-American imperialists. Under these conditions, the military took the lead in establishing order, justice, and economic development under an authority confirmed through blood sacrifice.[138] In his concluding remarks, Handa commissioned the young bureaucrats to help extend the mission started

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Daidō gakuin dōsōkai, 1973), 29. Chinese student Yu Yehua recalls the same incident somewhat differently. According to Yu, his Korean classmate used the context of national sacrifice to express his desire for Korean independence. Yu recounted the speech as follows: "I feel such jealousy for you all, who have been given the opportunity to lay down your lives for your country. I think that this is one of life's greatest joys and honors. I too wish to give my life my beloved country, but...I have no country." Katō Seiji, "Shinkyō (Changchun) Daidōgakuin (ha)" accessed May 8, 2018, http://www.geocities.jp/mmkato251/daidougakuinge.html. Original appears in Yu Yehua, "Wei Man Datong xueyuan xuexi shenghuo suo ji," *Zhangchun wenshi ziliao* no. 2 (May 1983): 83-107.

[135] Fujinuma Torao, "'Sen-kei' 'Man-kei' no koto" *Nanryō bojō zokuhen*, ed. Shinkyō hōsei dōsōkai keisōkai (Tokyo: Shinkyō hōsei dōsōkai keisōkai, 1997), 8.

[136] Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōshō, *Manshū kenkoku no shinishiki*, 61.

[137] Ibid., 62.

[138] Ibid., 165.

by the military into all sectors of society and prepare for the coming conflict. Failure was not an option, for failure meant complete annihilation.[139]

Koreans who went through this boot camp-like experience universally recalled it as a primary and distinctive feature of the Manchukuo bureaucracy. Though most depicted it as a period of intense physical and mental struggle, their memories of this martial culture are not entirely negative. In retrospect, some felt that the GUA's physical training regimen was not so bad and even "forward-looking" (J. *senken*).[140] Moreover, in a refrain common to military veterans, Korean bureaucrats identified the shared experience of physical suffering as a unifying factor amongst themselves and with their Japanese and Chinese colleagues. Indeed, this group identity would prove important to Manchukuo bureaucrats long after the collapse of the state. In this respect, at the very least, the militarization of Manchukuo bureaucrats was highly effective.

III. Korean Bureaucrats in the Field

In order to understand how Koreans internalized their training, we must look to how they deployed these ideas in the field. Two of the most important tasks assigned to Korean bureaucrats were the pacification of the countryside and mobilization of Korean farmers to expand agricultural–especially rice–production for the empire. In either case, central government planning and local implementation demonstrate Korean bureaucrats' intention to radically transform the rural population into loyal and prosperous Manchukuo citizens and imperial subjects. Their efforts to achieve this through direct

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[139] Ibid., 168-169.
[140] Paek Sanggŏn, "Yūjō fuhen," 153.

state intervention and militarized discipline, however, in most cases destroyed the rural economy and increased political discontent. Yet, according to their training, Korean bureaucrats remained committed to fixing the rural economy through top-down guidance and spiritual cultivation to the very end.

Rural Pacification and Collective Villages

From the earliest days of Manchukuo's administration, Korean officials utilized their militarized training as part of the Kwantung Army's rural pacification plan. With the objective of rooting out anti-Japanese "banditry," especially from Korean nationalist and communist forces, Korean officials served as the frontline of defense in the countryside. This entailed not just acting as the Army's eyes and ears but organizing and leading rural communities in civil defense. Kim T'aeho and So Yongsu (?–1941), who both received initial postings to rural Korean communities after graduating from the GUA, represent noteworthy cases.

Kim and So were initially assigned to villages that were strategically important and had majority Korean populations. Kim was posted to Liuhe County, home to roughly 5,000 Korean farmers and located about 60 miles north of the Korean border on a vital road linking the city of Tonghwa to the Manchukuo capitol. So's posting was to Mishan County bordering the Soviet Maritime Province on the East and home to about 13,000 Koreans. Both areas had also seen significant "bandit" activity, particularly from Korean nationalist and communist resistance forces, that only increased after the Japanese

invasion of Manchuria in 1931.[141] According to Kim, when he arrived in 1933, the sound of gunfire and banditry reports were an almost nightly occurrence.[142]

In their analysis of the local security situation, both Kim and So separated the Korean farming population from the "bandits" to demonstrate that ideology was not the root cause. The Kwantung Army contended that rural Korean communities were acting as vital support centers for anti-Japanese forces.[143] In their analysis, however, Kim and So described Korean farmers as political moderates more focused on survival than sacrificing for a cause. While these communities had supported anti-Japanese forces in the past, the physical and economic damage inflicted by these groups had generally eroded good will.[144] In Mishan County, moreover, So noted that the large population of Koreans who had fled from "state exploitation and the cruel labor duty of the Second Five-year Plan" in the Soviet Union, were deeply opposed to Communism.[145] Both men, therefore, saw the local population as not just susceptible to government propaganda but also willing to follow government plans that promised peace and prosperity.[146]

Their first task was to extend the state's policing structure into the villages. Both Kim and So were involved in organizing self-defense associations (*jiedan*), which served

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[141] Hōten Sōryōjikan "Hōten Sōryōjikan kannai Migen ura nōjō kankei," April 12, 1935, JACAR Ref. No. B09041211300. Manchukuo officials noted Mishan in particular as a hotspot for Korean communist incursions from across the Soviet border. Koreans were, of course, not the only concern. According to claims filed with the local Japanese consulate in December 1932, one Korean village in Liuhe County was attacked by retreating Chinese forces causing 632 Yen in damage. Zai Kairyū Sōryōjibunkan "Kairyū/14 Yanagikawa ken Migen ura chihō Chōsenjin higaisha chōsasho," December 26, 1933, JACAR Ref. No. B02030239900.
[142] Kim T'aeuk, "Kaisōroku," 236.
[143] Chong-Sik Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria: The Japanese Experience, 1931–1940* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1967), 25.
[144] Kim T'aeho, *Yanagikawa ken jijō*, Manshū teikoku chihō jijō daikei no. H-25 (Shinkyō: Daidō gakuin shuppanbu, 1935), 234–235.
[145] So Yongsu, "Misan kennai Chōsen nōmin no jōtai to sono taisaku," *Nanryō* 28 (February 1936): 21
[146] Ibid., 23.

as the foundation of local security. Contrary to their name, these associations of ten to one hundred men were far from self-sufficient, receiving only minimal arms and training.[147] Nor did they typically engage in "bandit suppression" without leadership and support from police or military forces.[148] Rather, their primary role was as a source of local intelligence through "precise and expeditious" reporting to the county police captain.[149] In addition, the associations served as key disciplinary and propaganda organizations in their communities. In village administration, the association chief was subordinate only to the village headman and tasked with all matters of "security control."[150] Besides "arms training" (*busō kunren*), associations focused on "the complete cultivation of mind and body, and the spirit of courageous service."[151] Members displayed their physical strength and readiness annually through local and regional sports festivals.[152] Association members were also tasked with maintaining vigilance day and night, observing the comings and goings of all residents, and conducting nightly patrols.[153]

In addition to reorganizing village society around policing, Kim and So carried out plans in coordination with the Kwantung Army's anti-insurgency program to militarize the geography of Korean communities. Between 1934 and 1938, the Kwantung

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[147] In Mishan County, for example, there were only 569 guns and 11 horses for 877 association members. Fukuda Haruo, "Kirin shō Mitsuzan ken," *Manshūkoku chihō jijō diakei: gaisetushen* (Shinkyō: Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin, 1934), 111.
[148] Only two out of 49 bandit engagements reported between January and July 1933 in Milshan County involved Self Defense Associations on their own. Both cases, moreover, appear to have been minor skirmishes resulting in no casualties or property damage. Ibid., 117–121.
[149] Ibid. In his capacity as Vice Magistrate of Lihue County, Kim T'aeho was also responsible for organizing the police force for Lihue County's fourth district. Of the 68 members of the force in 1935, Kim reported that 60 were Koreans. Kim T'aeuk, "Kaisoroku," 236.
[150] So, "Misan kennai Chōsen nōmin no jōtai to sono taisaku," 39.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Kim T'aeuk, "Kaisoroku," 236.
[153] So, "Misan kennai Chōsen nōmin no jōtai to sono taisaku," 40.

Army and the Manchukuo Government relocated more than 5,000,000 people, predominantly Korean farmers, into "collective villages" (*shūdan buraku*).[154] Faced with a guerilla insurgency in the countryside, in 1934 the Kwantung Army embarked on an all-out "campaign to separate the bandits from the people" (*himin bundan kōsaku*).[155] By concentrating the rural population into collective villages, military and civil officials hoped to better identify enemy forces and cut them off from ideological and material support.[156] Farmers would remain in the walled confines of the village, only venturing out to work in their fields. In addition, all food and equipment remained secure inside the village. In Sanyuanpu District, Kim T'aeho oversaw the relocation of roughly 2,500 Korean farmers to three of these collective villages in 1935.[157] The following year, So Yongsu outlined a four-phase plan to relocate at least 1,077 households onto 21 collective villages across Mishan County.[158]

This large-scale reorganization of the countryside was carried out under the overwhelming power and authority of the state and military, with little regard for the farmers being uprooted. Contemporary reporting shows that the army was well aware of the chaos caused by the rapid dislocation of farmers from their homes and fields, but they considered this to be a necessary step in rooting out "bandits."[159] In his classic analysis of

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[154] Ibid., 26.
[155] Kim T'aeuk, "Kaisoroku," 236.
[156] According to Chong Sik Lee, this strategy was not new in Manchuria. Evidence suggests that Chinese farmers had constructed walled villages for defense from bandits dating back at least to the 1920s. It was likely this example that inspired the Government General of Korea to fund the construction of three collective villages in the Jiandao region to defend Korean farmers in 1933. The Kwantung Army, in turn, considered the Government General project so successful that they adapted and expanded it. Chong-Sik Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 25–26.
[157] Kim T'aeho, *Yanagikawa ken jijō*, 230, 271–274.
[158] So, "Misan kennai Chōsen nōmin no jōtai to sono taisaku," 44.
[159] Qtd. in Chong-Sik Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 129–129.

the Kwantung Army's anti-insurgency campaign, Chong Sik Lee has speculated that "had the Japanese troops been dealing with their own people, they would not have done so thorough and merciless a job as they did in Manchuria."[160] However, even the Korean officials tasked with maintaining and enforcing the program appeared to consider their comrades' suffering a necessary sacrifice. As Kim T'aeho recalled: "While the construction [of the collective villages] created many victims, we were able to rapidly establish public order."[161] While such sentiments–expressed to his GUA classmates–are indicative of the militarized training Kim and his fellow bureaucrats received, Korean officials' enthusiasm for the collective village program must also be analyzed within the developmental framework of empire-building that was also fundamental to the Manchukuo bureaucracy.

In addition to its strategic value, the Manchukuo Government and Korean officials considered the collective village program an opportunity to rationalize the rural economy. Manchukuo officials had long been concerned with the high rates of tenancy among Korean farmers. This was largely the result of policies enacted under the Chinese regime that barred Koreans from owning land, forcing the growing number of Korean migrants into exploitative tenant contracts with Chinese landowners. According to Korean officials, such as Kim and So, this relationship and the poverty it created was as much a threat to stability as banditry.[162] Collective villages, however, promised to relieve these pressures by turning tenants into owner-cultivators through a kind of land reform.

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[160] Ibid., 27.
[161] Kim T'aeuk, "Kaisōroku," 236.
[162] Kim T'aeho, *Yanagikawa ken jijō*, 178; So, "Misan kennai Chōsen nōmin no jōtai to sono taisaku," 35–36.

According to their plans, the government would provide land which Korean farmers could purchase with a five-year fixed loan–in Kim's plan financed by a corporate intermediary. At the end of the loan, farmers would be able to "utilize the land completely…and corporate ownership dissolved."[163] The transformation of the countryside, however, did not end with land.

For Koreans officials, centralizing daily life in the villages also facilitated interactions between farmers and state institutions aimed at reshaping their lives. In his plan for Mishan County, So argued that the collective villages would mold Koreans into "modern people" and bring the "blessings of civilization in industry, education, and sanitation."[164] According to their plans, Kim and So intended for the collective villages to work in tandem with expanded access to financial credit. This would enable Korean farmers to invest in new equipment, increase efficiency, and boost production of white rice for the imperial economy.[165] Collective villages would also serve as centers of practical education. So's plan called for the creation of vocational schools designed to create a leading class of productive farmers and technicians.[166] Finally, the collective villages would foster healthy living not just through better access to government health services but also instruction in proper sanitation techniques and enforcement of government standards.[167]

In sum, Korean officials' active involvement in the collective village program was an ideal manifestation of their hybrid training. Wielding the unmatched power of the state,

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[163] So, "Misan kennai Chōsen nōmin no jōtai to sono taisaku," 42.
[164] Ibid., 43.
[165] Ibid., 31; Kim T'aeho, *Yanagikawa ken jijō*, 278.
[166] So, "Misan kennai Chōsen nōmin no jōtai to sono taisaku," 42.
[167] Ibid.

they intended to transform the land and the people on it into loyal and productive service for the empire. Their plans, moreover, reflected an idealism that was as rooted in their training as it was divorced from reality.

We have little indication of the long-term impact of Kim and So's collective village projects on their respective communities. However, a 1937 Kwantung Army study of one collective village in Jiandao Province concluded that it had failed on several key points. Though the collective farms did manage to decrease tenancy fees, the haphazard and under-funded dislocation of farmers from their land actually forced more of them into tenancy and decreased overall agricultural productivity. This only created further distain for the Manchukuo government's authority and incentivized farmers to support Communist "bandits."[168] That being said, army officials still concluded that the collective villages were largely effective in isolating farmers from "bandits," and combined with adequate military deployment appeared to be successful in reducing enemy activity. As a result, instead of abandoning the collective village program, they Kwantung Army and the Manchukuo Government extended the program to a wider system of settler migration, also largely managed by Korean bureaucrats.

Organizing Mass Migration

Agricultural production held a central place in the Manchukuo Government's economic development plans. Aside from the abundance of crucial mineral resources, the land itself was envisioned as a fertile, untapped source for rice production to feed industrial expansion and the redistribution of labor across the Japanese empire. For this

[168] Qtd in Chong-Sik Lee, *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria*, 129.

reason, Kwantung Army officers began implementing policies to increase land utilization specifically for wet-rice agriculture, and Korean farmers quickly became central players in the program.

Manchukuo's agricultural development policy perpetuated a racialized division of labor in which Koreans played a supporting role. While government officials envisioned a vast and fallow plains ready for cultivation, the majority of the land was actually owned by Chinese farmers engaged in dry-field agriculture that Japanese simply considered less important. The Japanese solution to this contradiction was the systematic displacement of Chinese farmers from their land. The benefits of such a program, from the Japanese perspective, were two-fold. On the one hand, it made the displaced Chinese population available for mining and industrial labor. On the other, it made land available for redistribution to agricultural immigrants from elsewhere in the empire. Japanese settlers were considered the most ideal, but from early on proved to be difficult to recruit. Koreans, however, were convenient alternatives because they were both experienced in wet-rice agriculture, and already suffering from increasing displacement in Korea due to the collapse in local rice markets. As a result, the Manchukuo Government and the Government General of Korea developed a series of policies to organize large-scale migration of Korean farmers to Manchukuo.[169]

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[169] According to Hyun Ok Park, Korean migration was principally managed by the Government General of Korea for the entirety of Manchukuo's existence, with the Manchukuo Government and Kwantung Army managing Chinese and Japanese agricultural settlement respectively. Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham NC.: Duke University Press, 2005) 160. While such a schema is useful for delineating the broad contours of colonial policy, in practice the division of authority was far more ambiguous. Reports from the Government General Consulate in Jiandao, for example, demonstrate that in 1934 the Manchukuo government was organizing hundreds of migrant villages that, though in principle did not segregate Chinese and Korean farmers, had populations made almost entirely of Koreans. Zai Hōten Soryōjikan, "Migen ura nōjō ni

On the Manchukuo Government side, ethnic Korean officials were directly involved in the design, promotion, and implementation of these policies in both central and regional government. Koreans held mid-ranking positions in the Agricultural Division of the Office of Agriculture and Mining as early as 1933.[170] Then in 1935 the Office of Colonization Policy was established with separate divisions responsible for managing Japanese and Korean settlement respectively. Yun Sangp'il (1887–?), formerly of the Kwantung Army, was appointed the inaugural chief of the Second (Korean) Division. Other top administrators included some of the earliest Korean GUA graduates, such as Chin Yanggŭn (1906–1996) and Kim T'aeho, fresh from organizing collective villages in the countryside.[171] The following year saw the creation of the Manchuria-Korea Colonization Corporation (J. Mansen takushoku kabushiki kaisha), a government-run company tasked with coordinating Korean settlement with the Government General of Korea. The company not only employed several Koreans in high level positions but also had high-level ethnic Korean Manchukuo bureaucrats on its executive board.[172] While these organizations were responsible for policy creation, Koreans in local

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kansuru ken," July 31, 1935 in *Kungoe hangil undong charyo: Ilbon oemusŏng kirok*, Han'guksa teit'ŏ peisŭ, http://db.history.go.kr/id/haf_104_0750.

[170] As a Junior Official Second Class, Choe Ch'anghyŏn (1895–?) was the highest-ranking non-Japanese in the office. Manshūkoku kokumuin sōmuchō, *Manshūkoku kanriroku: Daidō 2 nen 6 gatsu 30 nichi genzai* (Shinkyō: Manshūkoku kokumuin sōmuchō, 1933), 112.

[171] Manshūkoku kokumuin sōmuchō jinjisho, *Manshūkoku kanriroku: Kōtoku 2 nen 12 gatsu 1 nichi genzai* (Shinkyō: Manshūkoku kokumuin sōmuchō jinjisho 1935), 31. Chin was a member of the first GUA class in 1932 initially posted sent to Yitong County to deal with the Korean tenancy issue. Kim was transferred to the Office of Colonization Policy immediately after implementing the collective village program in Liuhe County. For an additional description of the Second Division, see Pak Pyŏnggyo, "Man Sŏn sich'algi," 47.

[172] Takami Akira ed. *SenMan takushoku kabushiki kaisha・ManSen takushoku kabushiki kaisha go nen shi* (Shinkyō: ManSen takushoku kabushiki kaisha, 1941), 21-23.

government offices were largely responsible for their implementation.[173] These policies also reflected the administrative and developmental principles emphasized in Manchukuo's bureaucratic training program.

In approaching migration policy, Korean officials believed it was their task to create an ideal system. In its existing "naturalized" (*shizenka*) state, they argued that Korean migration was economically and politically unstable and threatened both the government and the Koreans themselves.[174] For years, Korean farmers had been flocking to Manchuria in search of economic stability. However, economic conditions for most of these migrants had only gotten worse, and fraught political and economic relations with Chinese had the potential to spill over into violence. The role of government intervention, they reasoned, was to "rationalize" (*gōrika*) migration, converting a natural process into a regulated and controlled system.[175] This system, moreover, would eliminate racial competition, ensure the economic livelihood of Koreans, and subsequently increase the prosperity of the nation.[176]

In the broadest sense, government rationalization meant establishing total control over the rate and location of migrant settlement. Officials in the Colonization Policy Office established annual migration caps, initially set at 50,000 people. The purpose of these caps, they explained, was to prevent the over expansion of the Korean population

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[173] Typically, GUA graduates received their first posting to a local government office either in a majority Korean region or near a recent Korean settlement. For example, Kim Kyumin and Ku Ponghoe were both sent to manage Korean agricultural settlements in northern Manchukuo after graduating from the 13th GUA class. Ku Ponghoe, "Fūtō hatō," 73; Kim Kyumin, "Haebang chŏnhu kowi kongjikja ŭi sam," 26.
[174] Ch'oe Yunju, "Manshūkoku imin nit suite hitogotosu," *Zai Man Chōsen jinminkai rengōkai kaihō* 22 (December 1934): 10.
[175] Ibid.
[176] Yun Sangp'il, "Manjuguk ŭi Chosŏnin imin t'ongje naeyong?" *Chae Man Chŏnsonin t'ongsin* (May 1937): 3.

and ensure stable and efficient support for those already in the country.[177] Officials also argued that regulating where Koreans could settle was key to expanding economic production and establishing "ethnic harmony."[178] Restricting Korean settlement to "designated assembly areas," (K. *chijŏng chipgyŏl chiyŏk*), would ensure that abandoned or underutilized land was opened up for cultivation. This would leave the overpopulated villages in the border region, designated "special assistance areas" (K. *chido wŏnjo chiyŏk*), for efficient restructuring under the collective village program.[179]

From an institutional standpoint, the system was designed to eliminate migrant agency and centralize nearly all decision-making power in the hands of the state. Local officials with land for cultivation would work with local credit associations to determine its value and the number of families it could support and file a report with central government authorities. The central government would incorporate this into its annual colonization plan, purchase the land, and coordinate with the Government General of Korea to recruit settlers. Settlers would purchase the land from the government–or intermediary financial institutions–and local credit institution would finance land preparation and home construction.[180]

Much like the collective villages before them, these settlements were intended to "develop the Korean people," through the transformative "collective power" of centralization and state discipline.[181] Settlements would provide access to education through elementary and trade schools aimed at improving productivity and quality of

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[177] Yun Sangp'il, "Sunrihwa han Chosŏn imin ipsiksŏk," *Chae Man Chosŏnin t'ongsin* (Dec. 1938):12.
[178] Yun Sangp'il, "Manjuguk ŭi Chosŏnin imin t'ongje naeyong?" 3.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Yun Sangp'il, "Sunrihwa han Chosŏn imin ipsiksŏk," 38.
[181] Yun Sangp'il, "Manjuguk ŭi Chosŏnin imin t'ongje naeyong?" 4.

life.[182] They would also enable access to government-financed credit, eliminating the economic contradictions of tenancy and free competition and turning the population into productive members of the empire.[183]

Considering the economic failures of the collective village program on which it was based, the failures of the migration system are unsurprising. Korean officials tasked with managing these communities noted that the farmers lacked resources necessary for basic survival, let alone increased production.[184] It was not uncommon for settlers to abandon their fields and run off in search of work elsewhere.[185] According to more recent scholarly analysis, these problems were inherent to the system. The credit lending system in particular, envisioned as a pathway to landownership and increased rice production, merely shifted debt bondage from landlords to banks and further subjected farmers to the fluctuations in global capital markets. In addition, disparities between lending rates based on race exacerbated preexisting tension between Chinese and Korean farmers and increased the potential for violence.[186]

For Korean officials, the problem lay in part with the government, not for introducing an inherently destructive system but for failing to properly support it. On the one hand, they argued, policies were failing because centralization was incomplete. While the central government set migration policies, regional governments lacked consistent and coordinated policies for how to deal with these farmers after they

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[182] Ibid.
[183] Ibid.
[184] Ku Ponghoe, "Fūtō hatō," 74.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed*, 132–133.

arrived.[187] In addition, the Government General of Korea, which also exerted a significant amount of authority over Koreans in Manchukuo, had its own policies that frequently came in conflict with the Manchukuo Government.[188] On the other hand, they contended, the Manchukuo Government was not taking the particular challenges of Korean settlement seriously, either because of lack of interest or understanding. Particularly after the outbreak of war China in 1937, Korean officials felt that the government was no longer concerned with sustaining Korean settlements.[189] Those in the field felt like they had to force the central political and financial structures to operate as intended.[190] In their eyes, Manchukuo needed "leaders that understood" Koreans, which of course meant increasing the number of ethnic Korean bureaucrats.[191]

Yet for all their criticism of the government, Korean bureaucrats placed the majority of the blame on the Korean migrants coming across the border. For the officials in the Office of Colonization Policy, creating an ideal society required Korean farmers who not only possessed the requisite technical skills but also the correct ideological motivation. This meant having sufficient knowledge about Manchukuo's developmental ideology and a dedication to service and sacrifice for the sake of the empire.[192] Instead, officials observed that Koreans were coming to Manchuria out of economic

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[187] Yi Yongt'aek, "Chido pangch'im ŭi t'ong'il," *Chae Man Chosŏnin t'ongsin* (January 1939): 45.
[188] Ibid.
[189] Cho Wŏnhwan, "Chasuk chagye ro sinyong hoebok," *Chae Man Chosŏnin t'ongsin* (October 1938): 3.
[190] Kim Kyumin, for example, complained that he had to personally travel from his district in northern Manchukuo to the capital in order to force the government to distribute loans to the Korean farmers in his community. Kim Kyumin, "Haebang chŏnhu kowi kongjikja ŭi sam," 35–36.
[191] Kim Ch'agbyŏn, "Ihae innŭn chidoja ga p'ilyo," *Chae Man Chosŏnin t'ongsin* (November 1938): 5; Cho Wŏnhwan, "Chasuk chagye ro sinyong hoebok," 3.
[192] For example, see: Sin Kisŏk, "Chosŏnin kaech'ŏkmin ŭi chŏndo," *Chogwang* 7, no. 6 (June 1941): 312; Yun Sangp'il, "Sunrihwa han Chosŏn imin ipsiksŏk," 12; T'ae Hakmun, "Chosŏn minjung ŭi haeoe p'alchŏnsŏk," *Samch'olli* 13, no. 3 (March 1941): 54.

desperation.[193] Worse still, some complained, opportunists were crossing the border intent on "getting rich quick."[194] These destitute farmers, according to one local bureaucrat, were so ill prepared for what they faced in Manchukuo that government investment in financial and institutional support alone would not be enough to strengthen village economies.[195] Instead they emphasized the need to transform farmers' minds, bodies, and behaviors. As one Korean official argued: "It is only after grappling with the self and environment that we [Koreans] can hope to developmentally advance."[196]

As a result, Korean bureaucrats used their government positions to increase spiritual guidance through propaganda campaigns and training programs designed to instill patriotism and self-discipline even before migrants left Korea. In order to recruit the right kind of migrants, some argued, the Manchukuo government needed to counter negative press with stories of "the actual conditions on the ground" as well establish dedicated propaganda teams traveling across the Korean peninsula with "colonization films."[197] In 1937 they also established a migrant youth training center (*imin ch'ŏngnyŏn hullyŏnso*), in order to recruit a generation of young leaders who would "set their own interests aside…in order to create history and establish a new culture."[198] The training therefore emphasized "spiritual" (*chŏngsin*) over "academic" (*hakkwa*) education.[199]

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[193] Sin Kisŏk, "Chosŏnin kaech'ŏkmin ŭi chŏndo," 312.
[194] T'ae Hakmun, "Chosŏn minjung ŭi haeoe p'alchŏnsŏk," 54.
[195] Yun Pupyŏng, "Chosŏn nongch'on wisaeng munje," *Nong'ŏp Chosŏn* 3 (March 1938) 76.
[196] P'yo Munhwa, "Ilbon minjok palchŏn ŭi naejaejŏk wŏnin," *Chae Man Chosŏnin t'ongsin* (January 1937): 46.
[197] Sin Kisŏk, "Chosŏnin kaech'ŏkmin ŭi chŏndo," 312.
[198] Ibid., 317.
[199] Im Hanryong, "Nongch'on ch'ŏngnyŏn hullyŏn kwa imin purak sisŏl munje," *Chae Man Chosŏnin t'ongsin* (October 1938): 16; Sin Kisŏk, "Chosŏnin kaech'ŏkmin ŭi chŏndo," 316.

Korean bureaucrats also conducted similar programs for the Koreans already in Manchukuo. Local officials recalled that one of their main tasks was to stem the tide of migrants fleeing in the night. They did so through propaganda campaigns heavily promoting a narrative that Koreans were historically and spiritually tied to the land.[200] The Concordia Association mass party also established youth and child training centers (K. *ch'ŏngsonyŏn hullyŏnso*) across the country, reaching more than 100,000 young Korean men by 1943.[201] Like their counterparts in Korea, these training centers spent minimal time on academics and emphasized the principles of the state's "national foundation spirit" (J. *kenkoku seishin*): sublimation of the self to the nation, ideological conformity, respect for authority, collative action, and ethnic harmony.[202]

There is little evidence to suggest that these tactics were particularly effective at boosting agricultural production either, but Manchukuo officials remained steadfast to their training until the empire's collapse in 1945. Throughout the 1940s, the labor shortage in metropolitan Japan consistently attracted more migrants from Korea with promises of higher wages and a better quality of life.[203] These dynamics were similar in Manchukuo proper. According to one Japanese official in charge of a Youth Training Center, fewer than half of his graduates were returning to their villages. Of the 106 of his students who left their villages, moreover, only fourteen did so to pursue farming elsewhere. The remainder had moved into industrial, commercial, or administrative

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[200] Ku Ponghoe, "Fūtō hatō," 75.
[201] Manshū teikoku kyōwakai chūō honbu seishonennbu, *Zen Man kyōwa seishonen danzei tōkeihyo* (N.A.: Manshū teikoku kyōwakai chūō honbu seishonennbu, 1943), 5.
[202] Manshū teikoku kyōwakai, *Kyōwa tokuhon* (Shinkyō: Manshū teikoku kyōwakai, 1937), 85–86.
[203] Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed*, 145.

sectors.[204] Still, these negative outcomes only appeared to lead to calls for more state centralization and greater emphasis on ideological indoctrination to root out "old social customs."[205]

Synopsis

When Yi Minchae looked back on his time at the GUA, he found many aspects objectionable, but ultimately concluded that it "was a valuable experience" because of the comradery and shared identity it engendered.[206] Other Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy similarly found meaning in identity, as well as their professionalized training in modern state administration.[207] Such sentiments highlight some of crucial ways in which the Manchukuo experience was foundational to Korean bureaucrats. Without interrogating details of their training, however, their search for meaning fails to fully grasp the imperializing nature of the Manchukuo bureaucracy and their own place in it.

In Manchukuo, the bureaucracy was a distinctive institution that evolved from a confluence of local actors attempting to address ideological, strategic, and economic concerns with regional and global implications. Through a centralized training processes, designed to establish and rationalize control over national administration, officials–regardless of ethnicity or prior experience–were molded into a new type of bureaucratic force. On the one hand, they were tasked with transforming an atomized, multi-ethnic

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[204] Fukuda Sei, "Sei-shonen undo hatten no tame ni (ka)," *Kyōwa undō* (October 1940): 43-45.
[205] Ibid., 47.
[206] Yi Minchae, "Na ŭi kyougi," 298.
[207] For examples, see: Yun Pupyŏng "Waga jinsei to Daidōgakuin," *Yūjō no kakyō: kaigai dōsō no kiroku*, ed. Daidō gakuin dōsōkai (Tokyo: Daidō gakuin dōsōkai, 1986), 27; Ko Chaep'il, *Hanam hoegorok*, 55; Paek Sanggŏn, "Yūjō fuhen," *Yūjō no kakyō: kaigai dōsō no kiroku*, ed. Daidō gakuin dōsōkai (Tokyo: Daidō gakuin dōsōkai, 1986), 150; Han Chunggŏn, "Daidō gakuin jidai no tsuioku to konnichi," 247.

society into an organic, total, and moral state. This would be accomplished, they were told, through unwavering loyalty to state, spiritual cultivation, and a broad basis of knowledge. On the other hand, they were to serve as a paramilitary force for national defense. To this end they were given both practical and ideological training, which prepared them to follow the behind the military and lay down their lives for the survival of the state.

Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy took these organizing principles and their role in the empire seriously. Institutions like the GUA channeled and reinforced qualities selected for in training into a bureaucratic identity as the standard-bearer of modern administration and vanguard force for social change. To be certain, as an ethnic minority amply familiar with the trappings of Japanese colonization, they were readily aware of the gaps between ideology and practice in their own treatment.[208] Yet, more often than not, their reaction was to embrace that ideology as their path to agency within the system.

They approached their role in the field similarly. They worked hand-in-hand with the Japanese military to transform the Manchukuo's Korean population because they believed that this was the path to security, prosperity, and full subjectivity in an ideal moral community. When their attempts to achieve these goals through the disciplinary power of the state failed, they argued that it was the people who had failed, not the system. And the solution was always to increase size and power of the bureaucracy. While they may, with the collapse of Manchukuo and the Japanese empire in 1945, ultimately have rejected that empire-building project and their role in it, the imperializing

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[208] For example, see: Ku Ponghoe, "Fūtō hatō," 75; Kwon Il, *Hyŏnhaet'an ŭl sai e tugo*, 30; Cho Kichun, *Na ŭi insaeng*, 29.

aspects of their experience cannot be overlooked. As their world transformed dramatically from colonial to post-colonial, and race-war to Cold War, this unique experience served as a shared starting point. It not only colored their understanding of the state and its role in society but also informed their relationships with old and new interest groups in their homeland.

Chapter 3: Finding a Place in the New Order

–Former Manchukuo Bureaucrats after Liberation–

In Manchukuo's final days, as the Soviet Army was advancing rapidly on the capital of Xinjing, Economy Ministry employee Nishio Toshio (?–?) ran into his GUA classmate Son Chonghyŏn (?–1998). Son reported that some of the other ethnic Korean officials had been meeting and they had decided to return home in anticipation of national liberation.

> Now that we have independence, we will need to establish industries in order to become a modern nation, but this will be hard to do quickly on our own. Japan has lost the war, so your industries will be restricted…Circumstances may bring you to Korea to help us with this task. In that case, we would be very appreciative.[1]

Nishio perceived a level of condescension in this invitation that he did not expect from his friend and classmate.[2] Son's comments, however, were indicative of the hopefulness with which many Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy greeted the collapse of the Japanese empire. For them, Manchukuo may have ended, but the state-building project had not. Manchukuo had given them skills and experience in state management–distinct from other parts of the Japanese colonial empire–that they could now apply to making their homeland a powerful and prosperous nation.

Such optimism, however, failed to anticipate the significant challenges former Manchukuo bureaucrats faced in liberated Korea. Although their training and experience had contributed to a strong mutual identity and shared vision for state administration, the chaos of imperial collapse and repatriation disrupted the bureaucratic networks that held them together. Occupation and division between U.S. and Soviet spheres in Korea

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[1] Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Hekikū ryokuya sanzenri*, 811.
[2] Ibid.

created additional geographic barriers to their consolidation as united political force. Starting their careers in the highly centralized and standardized bureaucratic system in Manchukuo, moreover, was poor preparation for the political dynamics of the post-colonial age. In Manchukuo, Koreans had been the "vanguard" of the state, but back in Korea they were outsiders whose careers and accomplishments were virtually unknown.

This chapter explores how this outsider status contributed to their survival, while also marginalizing and atomizing their influence in the first five years of postcolonial state-building in South Korea.[3] It first focuses on how former Manchukuo bureaucrats navigated two institutional barriers to government service: the identification and punishment of former Japanese "collaborators," and government recruitment practices based on systems of political patronage.

Collaboration and patronage hold an important place in historical analysis of state-building in postcolonial Korea. According to the standard narrative, the U.S. Military Government in the South propped up the colonial elite in order to maintain stability and promote an anti-communist political agenda.[4] With American support, former colonial officials, landlords, capitalists, and anti-Communist conservatives dominated the political landscape. They then filled the rolls of the occupation and independent South Korean governments with officials who were politically or personally

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[3] Several former Manchukuo bureaucrats are known to have returned to North Korea, many with long careers in education and government. Space and source restrictions limit my ability to present a substantive analysis of their experience in this dissertation. Nonetheless, their involvement in North Korean state-building is an interesting and unexplored subject that awaits further investigation.

[4] For examples, see: Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947* (Seoul: Yuksapipyungsa, 2002), 154; Pak T'aegyun, "Han'guk kŭn hyŏndaesa esŏ ŭi cheguk chuŭi wa chisikin 8.15 chikhu Migunjŏng ŭi kwalli ch'ungwŏn kwa ch'inilp'a," *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 10 (December 1993): 43–64; An Chin, "Migunjŏng haengjŏng kwallyoje ŭi t'ŭkching e kwanhan il yŏn'gu," *Han'guk kŏbŏnŏsŭ hakhoebo* 12, no. 2 (December 2005): 135–157.

loyal to their interests. As a result, both American and Korean administrations perpetually undermined popular Korean attempts to identify and punish "national traitors" and "pro-Japanese collaborators."[5] Former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the South certainly benefited from these political dynamics, but their experience was more complex than this narrative suggests.

From early on the U.S. occupation and the South Korean government struggled to develop a consensus on the definition of "collaboration" and its punishment. Former Manchukuo bureaucrats figured directly and indirectly into the debates and practices state authorities devised to resolve the issue. However, this chapter demonstrates that they largely escaped scrutiny thanks to the lack of available information on the one hand, and the need to balance concerns for postcolonial justice with the need to retain experienced officials on the other. Consequently, the few who were identified and punished tended to be high-ranking officials and police officers from the border region whose collaborative acts were easily proven.

At the same time, former Manchukuo bureaucrats struggled to gain access to administrative power in postcolonial Korea. They may have believed that they had skills and experience to build an independent nation in Korea. Without their own basis for authority, however, their careers depended almost entirely on more politically powerful groups with different priorities, and few found much initial success. Those who did find

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[5] Hŏ Chong, "1947 Nam Chosŏn Kwado Ippŏp Ŭiwŏn ŭi ch'inilp'a ch'ŏbŏlpŏp chejŏng kwa kŭ sŏngkyŏk," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndaesa yŏn'gu* 12 (March 2000): 174–178; Mark E. Caprio, "Colonial-Era Korean Collabortion over Two Occupations: Delayed Closure," in Christine de Matos and Mark E. Caprio eds. *Japan as the Occupier and the Occupied* (Basingstoke: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2015), 118.

their way into government jobs discovered that their tenure and relative power within the state were limited or easily eroded.

These barriers did not necessarily stop former Manchukuo bureaucrats from attempting to shape state institutions according to their training and experience. This chapter concludes with an exploration of some of these state-building projects. Specifically, former Manchukuo bureaucrats focused on the expansion and rationalization of state power, and the developmental transformation of the social economy. The hybrid nature of Manchukuo's militarization and professionalization proved particularly useful for those who found work in the South Korean police force. While the American officials and South Korean politicians valued them for their experience with anti-communist insurgency, they brought with them a broader mission to expand the state's extralegal authority for social intervention. However, similarly motivated attempts to create an administrative technocracy did not fare so well, particularly when they challenged the authority of the ruling elites. The same was true for those attempting to use the power of the state to transform socio-economic relations. Officials in the South Korean Planning Office and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry worked together on policies, such as land reform, cooperative agriculture, and centralized economic planning that were highly influenced by their time in Manchukuo. However, these programs were perpetually undermined by a political establishment that increasingly associated them with the radical left.

I. The Politics of Purges: Collaboration

While Koreans returning from Manchukuo may have expected to contribute their skills to rebuilding their homeland, it was far from certain that their countrymen would accepted with open arms. Thirty years of colonial rule and the harsh conditions in the wartime empire had created considerable resentment towards Koreans who had worked alongside the Japanese and promoted the imperial agenda. Koreans working as bureaucrats in Manchukuo had been agents, albeit geographically distant ones, for Japan's imperial expansion and many had actively and publicly supported the war effort. Their actions, moreover, had directly–and often negatively–impacted Koreans outside of the peninsula proper. As such, they might easily have found themselves in the crosshairs of those seeking postcolonial justice. In the early days after Japan's surrender, influential political leaders were calling for pro-Japanese collaborators to be arrested, tried for their crimes, and their property confiscated.[6] Even with the arrival of American occupation forces it was unclear precisely how they would treat colonial elites, including former Manchukuo bureaucrats.

While there is no doubt that the U.S. Military Government coalesced around former colonial elites relatively quickly, the complexity of their position on the issue of collaboration is generally under appreciated. The U.S. military's policies and efforts to purge so-called "pro-Japanese" and "collaborators" in Korea evolved haphazardly over the first few months of occupation, but the issue was apparent to occupation officials

[6] Deokhyo Choi, "Defining Colonial 'War Crimes': Korean Debates on Collaboration, War Reparations and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East," in Kerstin von Lingen ed., *Debating Collaboration and Complicity in War Crimes Trials in Asia, 1945–1956* (Cham, Switzerland: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2017), 44–45.

almost immediately. Within days of their arrival, Military officials were warning that Korean translators procured through the Japanese liaison officer for the Government General, were "likely collaborationists" who "should be watched."[7] American support for retaining former colonial bureaucrats, both Japanese and Korea, had also proved extremely unpopular both domestically and in Washington.[8] By early October, the Military Government had issued a press release stating that "pro-Japanese officials" were in the process of being replaced with "good Koreans in all levels of government."[9] The Americans were, however, ill equipped for this task.

This was evident from the start, when investigations were left to tactical troops used to the clear-cut lines of war. The Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) was initially in charge of investigating government employees. These investigations were, according to an American official, "hurried and very incomplete."[10] The fact that Army's existing intelligence had little information on potential collaborators was one complicating factor.[11] During the war, the military had primarily collected intelligence on Koreans

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[7] "Notes on MG staff Meeting, 12 Sept, 1300," *Historical Journal, 11 Aug - 10 Oct 1945*, Kungnip chungang tosŏkwan haeoe Han'guk kwanryŏn kirokmul (NLKFADC), Image 41. Reproduced from original in National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Original Call no. 290/51/19-23/3-5/E.1256 (A1)/Box27.

[8] Between September 10 and 14, the State War Navy Coordinating Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted a letter advising the immediate removal of the Governor General and expedited purge of "collaborationist Korean officials." "SWNCC 176/4," *SWNCC*, Kuksa p'yonch'an wiwŏnhoe Han'guksa teit'ŏbeisŭ (KHDB), http://db.history.go.kr/id/swncc_008_0070. The letter was not transmitted until September 23. "Historical file---Provincial Administration," *Removal of Pro-Japanese*, NLKFADC, Image 1. Reproduced from NARA, Original Call No. 290/51/19-23/3-5/E.1256 (A1)/Box34.

[9] "Press Releases, 16 October 1945," *Historical Journal, 11 Oct - 10 Nov 1945*, NLKFADC, Image 35. Reproduced from NARA, Original Call No. 290/51/19-23/3-5/E.1256 (A1)/Box27.

[10] "Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Joint Korean-American Conference," *Minutes of the Joint Korean-US Conference, 1946-1947*, NLKFADC, Image 150. Reproduced from NARA, Original Call No. 290/51/22-23/7-5/E.1256 (A1)/Box84.

[11] "Notes on MG staff Meeting, 12 Sept, 1300," NLKFADC, Image 41

opposed to Japan that might be useful as spies or for a future invasion.[12] Army information requests to the State Department and FBI, therefore, came back with "no significant" or "conflicting evidence" of "collaborationist sympathies and activities."[13] Investigators therefore relied primarily on Japanese records and the word of prominent Koreans, neither of which they considered particularly reliable.[14] Faced with an ever-increasing caseload, CIC complained that it could not keep up and suggested turning over some investigative functions to "civil and military police and other agencies," despite a clear conflict of interest.[15]

Besides logistics, there was also the problem of interpretation. What precisely constituted "collaboration?" Troops arrived with fields orders to purge "flagrant exponents of militant Japanese nationalism and aggression," and "influential" members of "ultra-nationalistic, terroristic, and secret societies."[16] It was unclear, however if these criteria applied only to Japanese or Koreans as well.

Further guidance from Washington was also untimely and contradictory. The State War Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) had drafted more detailed instructions for the occupation of Korea as early as September 1, but one of the issues holding up the process was how to deal with collaborators. Early drafts of the "Basic

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[12] A sample of these records can be found in *5990 - Korea, Who's who,* NLKFADC. Reproduced from NARA, Original Call No. 390/32/33/4/E.77/Box2262.
[13] "Joint Chiefs of Staff Intelligence Committee to Commander in Chief Armed Forces, Pacific Advanced, 23 October 1945," *CCS 000.5 (Collaborationists (10-19-45): Identification of Pro-Japanese Korean Collaborationists*, NLKFADC, Image 6. Reproduced from NARA, Original Call No. 190/1/1/1/E.UD-1/Box1.
[14] "Interview with Lt. Commander Williams, Special Advisor to General Arnold," *Historical Journal, 11 Oct - 10 Nov 1945*, NLKFADC, Image 23. Reproduced from NARA, Original Call No. 290/51/19-23/3-5/E.1256 (A1)/Box27.
[15] "Corps Staff Conference, 15 September," *Historical Journal, 11 Aug - 10 Oct 1945*, NLKFADC, Image 54. Reproduced from NARA, Original Call No. 290/51/19-23/3-5/E.1256 (A1)/Box27.
[16] "Annex 7 to FO 55," Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe chŏnja charyokwan (AKH), Ref. No. 0112258A_92523, Image 2-3.

Initial Directive for the Administration of Civil Affairs in Korea" (SWNCC 176) were explicit that Korean collaborators were also subject to public purge. The orders for "civil administration" also expanded the definition of collaboration to include not just "flagrant" exponents, but all supporters of Japanese militarism, as well as "influential members" of militant organizations, and anyone "who manifests hostility to the objectives of the military occupation."[17] At the same time, the directive did permit Korean collaborators to work temporarily for the government under "exceptional circumstances" based on the need for their "technical qualifications."[18] A revised draft on financial reorganization penned by the Treasury Department, however, defined collaboration as any Korean who had supported "pan-Japanism or Japanese imperialism." It further specified that holding a "key position" in a militant organization automatically qualified one as "pro-Japanese" unless they could prove otherwise and called for such individuals to be purged from public and private financial services *without exception*.[19] The State and War Departments overruled this position and extended temporary exemptions to the finance section as well, but only after several weeks of debate.[20] Nonetheless, competing administrative and financial definitions of collaboration remained in the final document that arrived in Korea in mid-October.[21]

In the meantime, occupation forces developed their own criteria. Included with their October 16 weekly summary, the G-2 Intelligence Division published a piece titled

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[17] "SWNCC 176/3" *SWNCC,* KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/id/swncc_008_0060.
[18] Ibid.
[19] "SWNCC 176/6," *SWNCC,* KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/id/swncc_008_0090.
[20] According to a SWNCC memo, the Treasury Department's opinion was "no banker was of sufficient importance to make an exception." However, the War Department felt that there were not enough qualified personnel to run the banks on their own, at least in the short term, and the State Department agreed. "SWNCC 176/7," *SWNCC*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/id/swncc_008_0100.
[21] "SWNCC 176/8," *SWNCC*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/id/swncc_008_0110.

"Who Are the Collaborators," which defined collaboration as an individual act based on internal motives. First, the piece argued that holding a position in the colonial government was insufficient. Just as there were those who had "willingly" supported Japanese imperialism, there were others who did so for survival.[22] It also rejected the idea that all high-ranking officials were collaborators and not just men of "ambition and ability forg[ing] ahead."[23] Nor did it find evidence of outward support for Japanese imperialism sufficient to determine collaboration, since some Koreans publicly supported Japan while opposing it in private. According to this logic, then, the only valid criteria for determining who was a "real" collaborator was evidence of a pro-Japanese "consciousness."[24] How one determined such a consciousness was beyond the scope of the piece, but it made clear that since the Koreans had been so adept at masking their true intentions, neither Japanese nor other Koreans could be counted on to provide reliable evidence. G-2 therefore concluded that "in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is believed that the loyalty of Koreans formerly employed by the [Japanese] government…is reasonably assured."[25]

For former Manchukuo bureaucrats, the Military Government's position on collaborators was beneficial for several practical reasons. By relying on individual Koreans to report suspected collaborators, for example, the system was inherently biased towards the South. As has already been established, most Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy were from the northern provinces. And with the country divided along the

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[22] "Who are the Collaborators," AKH, Ref. no. AUS179_01_06C0002_035, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000712034
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.

thirty-eighth parallel and no communication with the Soviet occupation in the North, is unlikely that many knowledgeable local informants would have been able to contact American forces. Moreover, few Koreans in Manchukuo who might accuse former bureaucrats of collaboration repatriated to the South in the first-year occupation.[26]

The Americans' insistence that collaboration be established through evidence, particularly documentation, was also advantageous. While they may have been of only limited value to identifying collaborators, American forces had access to Government General records that could at least verify basic information, such as employment history. For Manchukuo, however, there was essentially no documentation. American officials therefore relied on former Manchukuo bureaucrats to self-report their backgrounds. Nonetheless, there is little evidence to suggest that former Manchukuo bureaucrats withheld this history from the Americans.[27] This is likely because the military government's policy of defining collaboration based on personal motives made doing so unnecessary.

In terms of motivation, Manchukuo bureaucrats had additional means of defense not available to officials in the Government General. As discussed at length above, Koreans expressed several practical reasons for joining the Manchukuo bureaucracy that fit the American criteria for unwilling collaboration. Moreover, former Manchukuo bureaucrats could, and did, argue that they were motivated to help their fellow Koreans in

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[26] The occupation did not begin to develop a policy on repatriating Koreans in Manchukuo until late 1946, largely considering it a Russian problem. For details policy development see documents in *Repatriation from Manchuria*, NLKFADC. Reproduced from NARA, Original Call No. 290/51/19-23/3-5/E.1256 (A1)/Box35.

[27] Biographical data surveys compiled by the Army's Political Advisory Group (PAG) primarily from self-reported surveys, for example, identifies several Korean officials with work histories in Manchukuo. "Who's Who in South Korea Interim Government," *9 Who's Who - Korea, 1948*, NLKFADC. Reproduced from NARA, original call no. 270/70/10/3-6/E.(NM3) 368B/Box2100.

a foreign land. Some even claimed to be secretly working as patriots against the Japanese. Without contradictory evidence, American policy suggested that they would take such reasons at face value. So, as former Manchukuo bureaucrats arrived in the occupied South, their connection to Japanese imperialism posed little problem.

While the American occupation forces made every effort to avoid taking a position on the issue of pro-Japanese collaborators, political leaders in the South made their own attempts to tackle the problem through legal means. The Special Law on Traitors, Collaborators, War Criminals, and Profiteers, passed by the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (Nam Chosŏn kwado ippŏp ŭiwŏn, SKILA) in 1947, and the Law on the Punishment of Traitorous Acts, passed by the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea in 1948, have been the subject of significant scholarly analysis. Both laws approached the subject of collaboration categorically and holistically in an attempt to resolve ongoing social tensions over the continuing power of the former colonial elite.[28] Ultimately, both internal and external forces undermined these laws, ensuring that few individuals were actually punished.[29] Less understood, however, is the degree to which former Manchukuo officials figured into this narrative.

In many ways, the time was ripe for former Manchukuo bureaucrats to find their way into the "collaboration" debate when the SKILA took up the collaborator issue in the spring of 1947. By this point, more Korean refugees and anti-Japanese resistance fighters

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[28] For detailed analyses of the SKILA law, see Hŏ Chong, "1947 Nam Chosŏn Kwado Ippŏp Ŭiwŏn ŭi ch'inilp'a ch'ŏbŏlpŏp chejŏng kwa kŭ sŏngkyŏk," 150–179. For the National Assembly law, see Hŏ Chong, *Panmin t'ŭkwi ŭi chojik kwa hwaldong: ch'inilp'a ch'ŏngsan kŭ chwajŏl ŭi yŏksa* (Seoul: Tosŏ ch'ulp'an sŏnin, 2003).
[29] Hŏ Chong, *Panmin t'ŭkwi ŭi chojik kwa hwaldong*

had returned to Seoul, and several had found their way onto the SKILA.[30] Sin Suk (1885–1967), appointed to fill a vacancy in the Assembly in April 1947, had recently repatriated from Mukden in order to lobby the Americans to provide aid and help bring back more Koreans from Manchuria.[31] In an interview with U.S. officials, however, Sin made his views on Korean bureaucrats in Manchukuo clear: "Those Koreans who lived in the cities and served as 'running dogs of the Japanese' fled immediately after the Japanese surrendered and have tried to hide themselves in various places, especially South Korea."[32]

Not surprisingly, early drafts of the SKILA Collaborator Law contained the most specific references to Manchukuo. The draft identified three groups of Manchukuo officials as "pro-Japanese collaborators" (*puil hyŏmnyŏkja*): central officials in pro-Japanese organizations (such as the Korean Resident Associations and the Concordia Association), members of the security forces in the migrant farm villages, and managers at Japanese-owned industrial farms. It also classified Manchukuo police officers as "national traitors" (*minjok panyŏkcha*) punishable with up to lifetime imprisonment or death.[33] The inclusion of these groups is unsurprising considering they were the authority

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[30] Chŏng Ihyŏng (1897-1956) and Hŏ Kŏnyong (?–?), who had both been active in anti-Japanese political organizations in Manchuria in the 1920s, were appointed to the drafting committee for the Collaborator Law. "KILA Standing Committees Elected 10 January 1947," *South Korean Interim Government Legislative Assembly 1947, Folder 1 of 8*, NLKFADC, Image 36. Reproduced from NARA, original call no. 290/51/30/2-3/E.1403/Box310.

[31] "Kim Kyusik to Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown, 20 March 1947," *South Korean Interim Government Legislative Assembly 1947, Folder 8 of 8*, NLKFADC, Image 41. Reproduced from NARA, original call no. 290/51/30/2-3/E.1403/Box310.

[32] "Interview with Mr. Shin Shook," *South Korean Interim Government Legislative Assembly 1947, Folder 6 of 8*, NLKFADC, Image 14. Reproduced from NARA, original call no. 290/51/30/2-3/E.1403/Box310.

[33] Nam Chosŏn Kwado Ippop Ŭiwon sokirok che 36 ho, 14–15. Reprinted in *Nam Chosŏn Kwado Ippop Ŭiwon sokirok*, vol. 2 (Seoul: Sŏnin Munhwasa, 1999), 350–351.

figures that Koreans in Manchukuo encountered in their daily lives. They were also officials that had battled with anti-Japanese resistance forces in Manchuria.

At the same time, it was far from clear to what degree the definition applied to Koreans in other types of official government positions. On the one hand, the proposal classified "all public officials (*kwan kong ri*) in the administrative sector" as "pro-Japanese collaborators."[34] However, the terminology it used to define officials reflected the administrative structures only in colonial Korea.[35] Interpreted literally, it therefore excluded all members of the Manchukuo civil service besides police officers and those who had transferred from positions in Japan or Korea.[36]

Manchukuo was far from a central issue in the debates over the first draft, but other problems forced the proposal back to committee. The second draft, released the following month, also had implications for Manchukuo bureaucrats. While Manchukuo police officers were still explicitly identified as "national traitors," nearly all other references to Manchukuo had been eliminated. However, the new proposal did begin to address the ambiguity over Manchukuo officials more generally. In addition to named bureaucratic ranks, the draft also included a catch all provision for all public officials in

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[34] Ibid.

[35] For one, the SKILA law specifically used the term "Government General" (K. *ch'ongdokbu*) for central government officials, which had no equivalent in Manchukuo. Ibid. The law also used terms for local administrative units such as *do*, *ri*, *ŭp*, and *myŏn*, that did not map so easily onto the system in Manchukuo. Ibid. An illustrative example of this is the Manchukuo administrative unit for Prefecture (J. *ken*). In the Japanese metropole, the term defined the largest unit of regional government, equivalent to Korean provincial governments (K. *do*). In Manchukuo, however, prefectures were a subdivision of larger provinces (J. *shō*), and therefore more akin to Korean county governments (K. *kun*). In actual practice, Manchukuo prefectures were somewhere in between, with officials holding more administrative autonomy over policing and personnel than Korean or Japanese counties, but still subordinated to provincial governors on issues such as fiscal policy. Satō Shirō ed., *Manshūkoku kansei binran* (Dairen: Manshū shoin, 1932), 62–64.

[36] This ambiguity was not lost on some SKILA members. In the first debate of the draft, one assemblyman asked if the law's definitions applied to Koreans only in Korea. Committee Chair Chŏng Ihyŏng replied that he "thought" it would apply anywhere Koreans committed collaborative acts. Ibid, 27.

government institutions and external organizations supporting "Japanese imperial rule" (*Ilche t'ongch'i*).[37] Ostensibly, this covered Koreans throughout the empire regardless of regionally specific terminology. Crucially, however, the proposal made this designation conditional on "evidence of [their] malicious acts."[38] In doing so, it introduced the same problem that had plagued American efforts at dealing with collaboration. Namely, the fact that most information on Koreans in Manchukuo was inaccessible.

Successive revisions only created greater need for evidence. The final version that passed the assembly on July 2 contained no explicit references to Manchukuo. Manchukuo police officers were now relegated to a catch-all categories for individuals who had "supported the Japanese against the independence movement," or had "killed or wounded members of the Korean resistance or their families."[39] Public officials not explicitly listed by rank in the Japanese civil service and members of popular organizations were included in the broadest category of "other collaborators committing malicious acts."[40]

The exact reason for weakening the Collaborator Law's stance on former Manchukuo officials is unclear, but it was probably unintentional. U.S. intelligence interpreted the debates as primarily dividing along partisan political lines, with members on the left favoring a harsher law and those on the right opposing it entirely.[41] Revisions to the bill more broadly demonstrate that while the right was unable to kill the law entirely, they did succeed in reducing the number of categories and references to specific

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[37] "Pan yŏkja, ch'inilp'a, chŏnbŏm, kansang tŭng," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* April 24, 1947.
[38] Ibid.
[39] "Ipŭi, minjok pŏnyŏkja tŭng e taehan t'ŭkpyŏl chore t'onggwa," *Sŏul sinmun,* July 2, 1947.
[40] Ibid.
[41] "The Pro-Japanese Issue," *Political: Interim Legislative*, NLKFADC, Image 4-5. Reproduced from NARA, original call no. 290/51/22-23/7-5/E.1256 (A1)/Box84.

organizations.[42] Gradually shifting the definition of collaboration towards the American precedent of individual acts based on evidentiary proof was likely a further indication of these efforts.

The SKILA Collaborator Law was ultimately vetoed by the U.S. occupation, but it formed the basis for a second attempt at dealing with the collaborator issue the following year. Within days of the founding of the independent Republic of Korea in the South, the National Assembly introduced the Law on the Punishment of Traitorous Acts (*panminjok haengwi ch'ŏbalpŏp*) on August 17, 1948. The National Assembly's definition of collaboration started where the SKILA's left off. It did not explicitly identify former Manchukuo officials by rank or office. However, they could be designated collaborators based on proof of acts of violence (including material support) against the Korean resistance, people, or nation.[43] And while it was rarely mentioned in the debate, assembly members indicated that the law explicitly applied to acts committed in Manchukuo or Japan.[44]

Unlike its predecessor, the Traitor Law passed relatively easily through the assembly and proceeded to the enforcement stage. However, South Korean President Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman) opposed the law and did his best to limit its enforcement. In addition, many of the judges and investigators tasked with carrying out the law were themselves members of the former colonial legal establishment who had a vested interest

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[42] Hŏ, "1947 Nam Chosŏn Kwado Ippŏp Ŭiwŏn," 166–172.
[43] "Pan minjok haengwi ch'ŏbŏlpŏp ch'oan," *Tonga ilbo,* August 18, 1948.
[44] The clearest articulation on this position was in the discussion over provisions concerning Korean owners and managers of wartime industries. "Che 1 hoe Kukhoe sokkirok," no. 43, August 18, 1948, Image 4, NADL, Ref. no. PROC2014000043. Assemblyman Kim Ungchin (?–?) also mentioned the need to punish Koreans "in Manchuria who attached themselves to the Japanese and murdered [other] Koreans." "Che 1 hoe Kukhoe sokkirok," no. 42, August 17, 1948, Image 10, NADL, Ref. no. PROC2014000042.

in limiting the number of arrests and prosecutions.[45] Nonetheless, a small number of trials did occur in the first few months, including ten former Manchukuo officials.[46] These cases demonstrate that practical limitations were as much a problem to enforcement as the politics.

While few investigative records remain, evidence suggests that prosecutors had difficulty finding evidence to identify and convict alleged collaborators in Manchukuo. High-ranking officials whose names had appeared in contemporary newspapers were relatively easy to identify and their policies well known. Evidence of individual harm or malice that would justify harsh punishment, however, was harder to come by. Nearly all of the ten alleged collaborators appear to have been identified by individuals already under investigation for collaboration.[47] While it is possible that this strategy might have

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[45] For more, see: Hŏ, *Panmin t'ŭkwi ŭi chojik kwa hwaldong*; Yi Kangsu, "Pan Minjok Haengwi Tŭkpyŏl Chosa Wiwŏnhoe ŭi chojik kwa kisŏng," *Kuksakwan nonch'ong* 84 (1999): 179–235.

[46] Hŏ Chong's research suggests that thirteen former Manchukuo officials were questioned, arrested, prosecuted, or convicted according to the law. Hŏ, *Panmin t'ŭkwi ŭi chojik kwa hwaldong*, 380–431. However, three of these are likely listed in error.

Kwŏn Sŏyun (?–?) was arrested on an unrelated case fraud on February 2, 1949. A February 4, 1949 article announcing his arrest in *Tonga ilbo* appears next to a different article on the arrest of several suspected collaborators. The Kuksa p'yonch'an wiwŏnhoe database lists these two articles in the same entry giving the impression that they are related. "No Tŏksul ŭl ŭnnik han Tonghwa paekhwajŏm Yi Tuch'ŏl ch'ep'o//Kwŏn Sŏyun ch'ep'o//Panmin p'iŭija ŭi tangdam t'ŭkwi chosakwan," KHDB, "http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=npda_1949_02_04_x0002_0250.

Hŏ also attributes elements of former Manchukuo bureaucrat P'yo Munhwa's career to P'yo Munt'ae, arrested under the Traitor Law in 1949. However, there is no evidence linking the two. Hŏ, *Panmin t'ŭkwi ŭi chojik kwa hwaldong*, 427.

Finally, Hŏ links Kim T'aeho to an individual arrested under the Traitor Law despite the names being written with different characters. "Soje rŭl morŭ nŭn panmin hyŏngŭija chasu anŭmyŏn kiil chinado ch'ep'o," *Tonga ilbo,* August 20, 1949.

[47] "P'iŭija sinmun chosa (che 4 hoe)," *Kim Ch'angyŏng Pan Minjok Haengwi T'ŭkpyŏl Chosa Wiwŏnhoe charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=an_009_0130; "Chŭngin sinmun chosa," *Pak Hongsik Pan Minjok Haengwi T'ŭkpyŏl Chosa Wiwŏnhoe charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=an_017_0240; "Kongp'an chosa," *Cho Pyŏngsang Hongsik Pan Minjok Haengwi T'ŭkpyŏl Chosa Wiwŏnhoe charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=an_052_0280.

resulted in more arrests had investigations continued, in practice, only a relatively narrow range of actions resulted in any kind of punishment.

The former Manchukuo officials arrested under the Traitor Law came exclusively from three, often overlapping, categories: police officers, higher officials, and members of the Concordia Association. In nearly all cases, moreover, the charges were for activities in Manchukuo pertaining to the arrest or murder of Korean independence fighters and not merely their status as government officials.[48] Most of these cases resulted in suspension of civil liberties for less than five years. Only the former Manchukuo Police officer Kim Yŏngch'ang (?–?) was given a prison sentence of one year that was subsequently reduced to three years suspended civil rights.[49] For those who had worked in both the Government General and Manchukuo, the former was considered the greater crime. Yu Hongsun (1889-1950), for example was labeled a collaborator based on his time as Governor of Kangwŏn Province from 1943 to 1945 and not his previous position as Vice-governor of Jiandao Province in Manchukuo.[50] In addition, investigators had evidence that Yu had been directly involved in organizing against Korean resistance fighters in Jiandao in 1940, but never perused an indictment on related charges.[51]

The failure to prosecute former Manchukuo bureaucrats under the Traitor Law did not go unnoticed. At least one self-described "patriot" was frustrated that former Manchukuo officials were not being punished for "lording over" (*haengse*) regular

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[48] "Ŭigyŏnsŏ," *Kim Ch'angyŏng Pan Minjok Haengwi T'ŭkpyŏl Chosa Wiwŏnhoe charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=an_009_0040.
[49] "Kŏmsa ŭi kuhyŏng poda chaep'an changŏn kwajung," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, July 31, 1949.
[50] "Yu Hongsun e 5 nyŏn ŏje panmin kongp'an kuhyŏng," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, July 7, 1949. Yu's prison sentence was reduced to three years suspended civil rights. "Yu Hongsun kongmin chŏngji, Yi Yŏngbe mujoe ŏndo," *Chayu sinmun,* July 13, 1949.
[51] "P'iŭija sinmun chosa (che 3 hoe)," *Kim Ch'angyŏng Pan Minjok Haengwi T'ŭkpyŏl Chosa Wiwŏnhoe charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=an_009_0110.

Korean villagers.[52] "At the slightest provocation," the anonymous individual wrote, "[Manchukuo officials] would turn into wailing, grudge-bearing demons (*sinŭm wŏn'gwi*), accusing [fellow Koreans] of 'suspicious ideas' (J. *shisō ga warui*) that get them imprisoned."[53] These men, the writer argued, deserved punishment just as much as those supporting the Japanese in Korea. Instead, they were able to "maintain their government posts like nothing has changed, strutting around as if they were real patriots."[54] Such pleas were hardly in the majority, however. And with the outbreak of the Korean War one year later, the collaboration issue was no longer a priority.

II. The Politics of Patronage: Employment

If being outsiders helped many former Manchukuo bureaucrats avoid scrutiny for their history as "collaborators," it also contributed to their marginalization in the state-building process. Going to Manchukuo had provided them with first-hand experience which they felt made them uniquely qualified to help shape their homeland. Back in Korea, however, they were only one of many groups with similar conviction vying for power and influence.

Going to Manchukuo had been poor preparation for these conditions. In the years before liberation, Koreans had joined the Manchukuo bureaucracy in part to escape the racialized and class-based discrimination of the colonial appointment system in Korea. Their training was intentionally designed to combat the perceived politicization and bureaucratic infighting characteristic in the rest of the empire, including colonial Korea.

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[52] "Manju esŏ haengse han panminja ch'ŏdan hara," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* June 26, 1949.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.

It emphasized political unity, conformity, and obedience to authority above all else. Returning after liberation, however, they discover that the conditions in Korea were not significantly different from when they had left. The individuals, institutions, and criteria for inclusion may have changed, but patronage still dominated the political landscape. Numerically small and lacking a natural constituency, access to and influence in government was limited and, in some cases, systematically restricted.

In principle, the conditions were ideally suited for former Manchukuo bureaucrats to work for the U.S. Military Government. After removing Japanese officials, occupation forces were desperate for Koreans with qualities that former Manchukuo bureaucrats possessed. They were generally well educated and had training and experience in a broad range of administrative fields. Their military training also made them likely candidates for the police force.

However, the number of former Manchukuo bureaucrats working in the Military Government between September 1945 and August 1948 was remarkably small. Out of the 148 former Manchukuo bureaucrats confirmed to have settled in the South, only 38 (27%) held positions in the Military government.[55] That represented only 4% of all Military Government officials who had previous experience in the Japanese imperial

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[55] Sources: Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Hekikū ryokuya sanzenri*, 883; *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?itemId=im; *Directing Personnel of Central Organs*, NLKFADC; *9 Who's Who - Korea, 1948*, NLKFADC; Taedong hakwŏn Han'guk tongch'anghoe, *Howewŏn myŏngbu* (N.A.: Taedong hakwŏn Han'guk tongch'anghoe, 1985). Since available sources generally only identify former Manchukuo bureaucrats who had prominent public careers, the total number who settled in the south is likely significantly higher.

bureaucracy as a whole.[56] Ironically, then, their proportional representation in the new regime was not significantly different from the one they had just left.

To a certain extent, timing may have played a role. Koreans returning from Manchukuo after liberation took a variety of often difficult paths back to their homeland. Many initially returned to their hometowns–predominantly in the North–only to migrate to Seoul later. As a result, former Manchukuo bureaucrats trickled into the U.S. occupied zone over the course of the first two years. It is plausible that, particularly for later arrivals, positions that may have been available to them at an earlier stage had already been filled. When former Manchukuo Customs Officer Ŏm Sŭnghwan (1912–?) arrived in Seoul in March of 1946, for example, the director of the Central Customs Office told him bluntly, "we don't need any more people."[57] On the other hand, Hong Sunpong (1898–?) arrived in Seoul from the North more than a year after liberation and found a job with the National Police almost immediately.[58]

What appear to have been far more consequential to former Manchukuo bureaucrats' prospects for returning to government service were the peculiarities of the Military Government's recruitment system. On paper, the Military Government was dedicated to reforming Korea's civil service institutions according to American standards of rationalization. This included provisions for merit-based recruitment and examinations.[59] The Office of Korean Civil Service (OKCS) was restructured in the

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[56] Wŏn Kuhwan, "Migunjŏng ki Han'guk kwallyoje ŭi sogŭkjŏk taep'yosŏng," *Haengjŏng nonch'ong* 41, no. 4 (December 2003): 67.
[57] Ŏm Sŭnghwan, "Che 46 hwa segwan yasa (14)," *Chungang ilbo,* June 19, 1975.
[58] Yang Pongch'ŏl, "Hong Sunbong kwa Cheju 4.3," *4.3 yŏksa yŏn'gu* 17 (December 2017): 42.
[59] "Che 69 ho insa haengjŏngchŏ ŭi chingnŭng kyujŏng e kwanhan kŏn," *Migunjŏng kwanbo,* April 20, 1946; "Insa haengjŏng kyujŏng che 1 ho: chingnŭng pundam kyujŏng," *Migunjŏng kwanbo,* June 13, 1946.

image of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, with civilian advisors from the U.S.[60] In practice, however, the Military Government was slow to put any of these policies into action.[61] As with the collaborator issue, investigation into individual qualifications were hampered by a lack of adequate time or information.[62] Instead, government appointments were portioned out according to a system of qualifications and personal connections, which benefited only a small portion of Manchukuo bureaucrats.

Experience certainly counted for something. Much like their colleagues in the Korean Government General, more than half of the former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the Military government continued to work in related fields. Government General employees, however, had the added advantage of already working in the institutions that the Americans inherited. A survey of 140 Korean officials, for example, indicated the Americans retained or promoted 42% from their original positions in the Government General.[63] There was also a disparity in the types of experience that led to former Manchukuo bureaucrats getting jobs. The majority were posts that required specialized technical knowledge, such as animal hygiene, geological surveying, public health,

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[60] "History of Examinations, Korea," AKH, ref. no. AUS179_01_05C0103_016, Image 2, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000090093; "Korean Civil Service Section," *Migunjŏng ki charyo chuhan migunsa*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/id/husa_003_0020_0120; Statistical Research Division of the Office of Administration, *History of the United States Army Military Government in Korea, Part II* (Seoul: Headquarters of the United States Army Military Government in Korea, 1947) 46; Henry L. Buckardt, "Civil Service Comes to Korea Again," *Personnel Administration* (January 1947): 12–14.

[61] The first examinations were only held in early 1947, and even then, only for relatively low-level clerical and technical positions suitable for high-school graduates. Ibid. Ŏm Sŭnghwan was the only former Manchukuo bureaucrat who appears to have benefited from this. After being turned away in early 1946, Ŏm passed a recruitment exam for customs officers in January 1947 and received an appointment to regional customs office in Kunsan. Ŏm Sŭnghwan, "Che 46 hwa segwan yasa (14)," *Chungang ilbo,* June 19, 1975.

[62] "Korean Civil Service Section," *Migunjŏng ki charyo chuhan migunsa*, KHDB.

[63] *9 Who's Who - Korea, 1948*, NLKFADC.

transportation, communications infrastructure, and resource management.[64] Considering occupation forces' desperate need for qualified Korean technicians, this is unsurprising. However, these posts did not come with commensurate power or influence in Military Government. With the centralized imperial system of the Japanese Government General largely intact, technicians remained a sub-class within the bureaucratic hierarchy that had little input on policymaking.

When it came to more powerful government posts, the Military Government simply replaced the old system of colonial patronage with a new one. Contemporary observers described the Army's early recruitment system as a "translators' government."[65] Since knowledge or experience in Korea was extremely limited in the military, American officers depended on Christian missionaries and other Americans who had lived in Korea prior to the war.[66] These men, in turn, recruited or vouched for Koreans who could speak English and serve as translators, advisors, and government officials. These two groups exercised a significant amount of influence on early top-level appointments in the Military Government that disproportionately benefited certain groups. Foremost among them, were those who had studied at American universities and could

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[64] See sources in note 55.

[65] The Military Government protested this characterization in press release on October 24, 1945. After asserting that English ability was not a prerequisite for employment with the Military Government, it quoted an unnamed American official's insistence that "this is not a government of interpreters and translators." "Press Release," *Historical Journal, 11 Oct – 10 Nov 1945*, NLKFADC, image 91-92.

[66] This group included former missionaries Horace H. Underwood (1890–1951), Franklin E. C. Williams (?–?), and Williams' son George Zur Williams (1907–1994). Arthur B. Emmons (1910–1962) had been a diplomat in colonial Korea. Melvin R. Arick (?–?) had operated a gold mine in Korea during the 1920s. Son Chŏngmok, "Migunjŏng ki chungang chŏngbu ka hyŏngsŏng toe nŭn kwajŏng: haengjŏngbu rŭl chungsim ŭro," *Hyangt'o Sŏul* 63 (November 2003): 278.

speak English.[67] In this respect, former Manchukuo bureaucrats were at a distinct disadvantage.[68]

As we have already seen, the Manchukuo bureaucracy recruited heavily from Japanese universities, and therefore only a very small number of former Manchukuo bureaucrats had studied in America or Europe. U.S. educated elites, however, appeared to use this to their advantage in the early days of the occupation. Yi Tongche (1902–?), who received a master's in political science from Columbia University, was appointed to take over as Director of the Korea Commodities Corporation.[69] Kim Up'yŏng (1898–1967), who also had a master's from Columbia and a bachelor's from Ohio State University in economic, was appointed to the Economic Advisory Board.[70] Finally, Han Wŏnsin (?–?), a graduate of the University of Nebraska, was appointed as a Division Chief in the Office of Foreign Affairs.[71]

Political allegiance also had a significant impact on who received powerful posts. Formed by conservative anti-communist Koreans, colonial capitalists, and political elites, the Korean Democratic Party (Han'guk minjudang; KDP) quickly attached itself to the

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[67] According to Kim Sucha's analysis, 65% of Korean Military Government Directors and 63% of Vice-directors had studied graduated from U.S. universities. Kim Sucha, "Migunjŏng ki (1945-1948) t'ongch'i kigu wa kwallyo ch'aeyong chŏngch'aek," (MA Thesis, Ihwa yŏja taehakkyo taehakwŏn, 1993), 53.
[68] This is not to say that study in the United States was a prerequisite for English ability. Most Koreans with a post-secondary education in the Japanese empire had been required to learn at least some English. Under the right circumstances even a limited working knowledge of English was enough to get one a job. Kim Kyumin happened to show up at the Office of Regional Affairs during an audit by an Army accountant and was roped into translating because no one in the office could speak any English. Despite having failed the English portion of the Japanese Civil Service Preparatory Examination (K. yebi kosa), Kim claims to have done a good enough job that the American offered him a job on the spot. Kim Kyumin, "Haebang chŏnhu kowi kongjikja ŭi sam," 57.
[69] This was one of the earliest officially recorded Military Government appointments for a Korean. "Immyŏng saryŏng che 7 ho," *Migunjŏng kwanbo,* October 4, 1945.
[70] "Kim Up'yŏng," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_101_30943.
[71] *Directing Personnel of Central Organs*, NLKFADC, image 13.

Military Government as a means to protecting their class interests.[72] During the occupation, nearly all the Korean Department Directors and Assistant Directors were KDP members.[73] In the key areas of police, prosecution, and judiciary, moreover the party's dominance extended down to the level of Section and Bureau Chiefs.[74] The Military Government would vehemently deny that the KDP membership was a principle criteria for government appointment, but years later, OKCS Director Chŏng Ilhyŏng publicly admitted that this was the standard practice under his leadership.[75] Manchukuo bureaucrats' political affiliations after liberation are difficult to determine, however available evidence suggests they did not coalesce around the KDP. In the first years of liberation, former Manchukuo bureaucrats participated in political parties and associations across a broad spectrum including the left.[76]

Regional ties also had a strong impact on Military Government appointments. A plurality of Koreans in top-level government positions were born in South P'yŏngan or South Ch'ungch'ŏn Provinces.[77] The most likely reason for the overall success of job aspirants from these areas is that they were also the home provinces of some of the

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[72] An Chin, "Migunjŏng haengjŏng kwallyje ŭi t'ŭkching e kwanhan il yŏn'gu," 139–140.
[73] Kim Sucha, "Migunjŏng ki (1945-1948) t'ongch'i kigu wa kwallyo ch'aeyong chŏngch'aek," 54.
[74] An Chin, "Migunjŏng haengjŏng kwallyje ŭi t'ŭkching e kwanhan il yŏn'gu," 148–149.
[75] "Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Joint Korean-American Conference," *Minutes of the Joint Korean-US Conference, 1946-1947*, NLKFADC, Image 151; *Kukhoe imsihoe sokkirok* 23, no. 12 (January 26, 1957): 8–9.
[76] To Sangrok, for example, was a founding member of the Democratic National Front (Minju juŭi minjok chŏnsŏn). "Minju juŭi minjok chŏnsŏn kyŏlsŏng chunbi wiwŏn 24 myŏng sŏnch'ul," *Chungang ilbo,* February 1, 1946.
[77] Kim Sucha, "Migunjŏng ki (1945-1948) t'ongch'i kigu wa kwallyo ch'aeyong chŏngch'aek," 51. According to Wŏn Kuhwan's research, these provinces were not in the majority but still overrepresented among the middle and lower ranks of the South Korean bureaucracy. Wŏn Kuhwan, "Migunjŏng ki Han'guk kwallyoje ŭi sogŭkjŏk taep'yosŏng," 58.

Military Government's most influential advisors.[78] Translator and special advisor to General Hodge, Yi Myomuk (1902–1957), and Director of the OKCS, Chŏng Ilhyŏng were both from South P'yŏngan Province. Commander George Zur Williams (?–?), assistant to General Hodge and child of American missionaries to Korea, had grown up in South Ch'ungch'ŏn Province, as had National Police Director Cho Pyŏngok (1894–1960).

This too only benefited a relatively small number of former Manchukuo bureaucrats. Few Koreans from Ch'ungch'ŏn Province held positions in the Manchukuo prior to liberation, and only four individuals are known to have repatriated to the South. [79] Nonetheless, Pak T'aek (?–?), the only one to work for the Military Government, was appointed to the high-level post of Deputy Director of the Department of Labor.[80] And while roughly 40% of the former Manchukuo bureaucrats repatriating to the South were originally from the northern provinces, only eight were from South P'yŏngan Province.[81] Notably, two received high-level appointments in the Police Bureau, and two were section chiefs in the Office of the Civil Administrator and the Food Distribution Corporation respectively.

Ultimately, then former Manchukuo bureaucrats returning to the American-occupied South faced many of the same employment issues that had motivated them to leave colonial Korea in previous years. Despite their enthusiasm and experience, as one individual put it: "our organization (J. *kiban*) was weak and we had no economic power…as repatriates, we were outsiders who's lack of regional, blood, or school ties left

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[78] Ibid.; Son Chŏngmok, "Migunjŏng ki chungang chŏngbu ka hyŏngsŏng toe nŭn kwajŏng" 282-283; Kim Sucha, "Migunjŏng ki (1945-1948) t'ongch'i kigu wa kwallyo ch'aeyong chŏngch'aek," 51.
[79] See sources in note 50.
[80] *Directing Personnel of Central Organs*, NLKFADC, image 6.
[81] See sources in note 50.

practically powerless."[82] The most highly educated found some success in education. Others left for the North. But, as the same individual noted, many hoped that conditions would improve after Koreans had control over their own government.[83]

For those with experience in Manchukuo, however, the transition to an independent South Korean government brought uneven benefits. Despite nominal structural changes, the independent South Korean government formed on August 15, 1948 was not substantially different from the Japanese colonial regime, particularly when it came to filling government posts. Despite claiming to promote a merit-based appointment, the public perception was that politicians continued to protect the status of old elites, including former Government General officials.[84] These officials then monopolized administrative appointments with personal connections and political patronage constituting the primary means of employment. These structural features contributed to former Manchukuo bureaucrats' marginalization in several crucial ways.

While former Manchukuo bureaucrats may have benefited from the political protection afforded to former colonial elites on the "collaborator" issue, the same could not be said for their official status. In fact, colonial status hierarchies reemerged in the debates over the South Korean Government's recognition of Japanese civil service certification. The National Civil Service Law, passed in August 1949, permitted civil service appointments based on competitive examination (*kosi*) or screening (*chŏnhyŏng*),

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[82] Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Hekikū ryokuya sanzenri*, 884.
[83] Ibid., 883.
[84] "Inje tŭngyong e ch'ijung hara," *Tonga ilbo,* October 15, 1948; "Kongjŏng han insa haengjŏng ŭl wi hayŏ," *Tonga ilbo*, July 20, 1949.

but the specific qualifications were left up to the executive.[85] The Civil Service Examination Ordinance, passed the same month, was a firm indication that President Rhee's government would support former Government General Officials. Appendix five stated that the government would recognize passage of the "Japanese Higher Civil Service Examination" (*Ilbon kotŭng pon kosi*) as equivalent in South Korea.[86] In practical terms, this meant that colonial civil servants under the Japanese would be able to keep their appointment grades, ranks, and salary schedule.

As with the collaborator issue, the specific terminology here was crucial. As a nominally independent state, Manchukuo operated its own civil service examination separate from the rest of the Japanese empire. Strictly interpreted, the Manchukuo Civil Service Examination was not included. This meant that former Manchukuo bureaucrats seeking jobs with the government only had two options: taking the competitive South Korean Civil Service Examination or trying for a screening appointment–which were highly dependent on personal connections. Moreover, those already holding government appointments in 1949 would have to take the examination in order to keep their jobs, voiding their seniority and pensions in the process.

Excluding Manchukuo bureaucrats was not a technical oversight but intentional decision on the part of the South Korean cabinet. Earlier drafts of the ordinance had explicitly extended the same privileges to individuals who had passed the Manchukuo

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[85] See article 9 of "Kukka kongmuwŏn pŏp," Enacted August 12, 1948, Kukka pŏmnyang chŏngbo sent'ŏ (NLIS), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/국가공무원법/(00044,19490812).
[86] See appendix 5 of "Kodŭng kosiryŏng," Enacted August 23, 1949, NLIS, www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=9454#0000. Exact statistics for the number of Japanese exam passers in or applying to the South Korean civil service at the time is unknown, but the fact that the government felt the need to include a specific provision suggests that their number and/or relative rank were significant.

Civil Service Examination.[87] However, these were ultimately removed from the final draft when several unnamed cabinet ministers argued that Manchukuo officials were disqualified on two grounds. First, the Manchukuo government was a "puppet" (*koere*) of Japan, not a real state.[88] As such, its certification was as illegitimate as its authority. Second, Manchukuo was a "stronghold of international imperialism" with a "vile and miserable colonial history."[89] Any Korean passing the exam, they argued, must have been corrupted by this system.

At least one anonymous individual, likely a former Manchukuo bureaucrat, sought to publicly refute these claims and lobby for the recognition of Manchukuo Exam passers. On the first point, he argued that there were no substantial differences between the two exam systems.[90] The Manchukuo exam was based on its Japanese counterpart, contained nearly identical subjects, and was written and administered by many of the same Japanese scholars and officials. He claimed, moreover, that many Japanese had praised the Manchukuo exam for solving the fundamental problems with the system in Japan. For the author, passing either exam was an equal accomplishment for Koreans because it meant overcoming not just merit-based competition but also the racial discrimination of the Japanese system. On the second point, the author noted the hypocrisy in claiming that Manchukuo officials had somehow been tainted by the ethos of Japanese imperialism when it was also being promoted across the entire empire. It followed that if Manchukuo officials should be excluded for going along with the

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[87] "Kosije ŭi chaeko," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* September 29, 1949.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.

colonial propaganda, then so should officials in Korea or Japan. In their collective defense, he added that hardly anybody in Korea would qualify for employment under such criteria. With almost not political support in the government or legislature, however, such arguments had no positive effect and may have attracted the unwanted attention.

Less than six months later, National Assembly members opposed to *all* former colonial officials revived the debate. Representative Yi Sangdon (1912–1997) of the Democratic Nationalist Party (Minju kungmindang) argued before the assembly that neither Japanese nor Manchukuo Civil Service exam passers deserved outright recognition of their credentials. While acknowledging their intellectual skills and dedication to succeeding in a discriminatory system, Yi contended that not everything they learned was applicable to the new state. In particular, the exams had been in Japanese language and not tested their knowledge of Korean language or history.[91] His proposed amendment to the National Civil Service Law, therefore, stated that applicants with foreign civil service examinations should have to pass the history and language portions of the exam. The law went through rapid-fire debate and passed on the same day with a clear majority.[92]

The cabinet, however, again demonstrated its intention to protect the interest of former Japanese exam passers over those from Manchukuo. In May 1950, they revised the Civil Service Examination Ordinance according to the new law, but while the law clearly stated that individuals passing *any* foreign civil service exam would be exempt

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[91] *Kukhoe chŏnggi hoeŭi sokkirok* 6, no. 27, February 10, 1950, Image 2, Kukhoe chŏnja tosŏgwan [NADL], Ref. no. PROC2014000353.
[92] Ibid.

from the technical subjects, the ordnance only extended this privilege to those passing the Japanese exam.[93]

Former Manchukuo bureaucrats' participation in the early South Korean government, therefore, was not substantially different from under the American occupation. Those with unique technical skills were generally able to find jobs through the more flexible screening system. As with the Japanese colonial system however, these positions came with little influence over policymaking. Those who did find their way into more powerful institutions, on the other hand, discovered that their employment was more dependent on their political usefulness than their ideas, skills, or experiences.

III. Fits and Starts: Case Studies

Despite the challenges, former Manchukuo bureaucrats individually and collectively tried to implement policies based on their experience in Manchukuo. Those who managed to gain support attempted to inject the Manchukuo ethos of centralized state power, technocratic management, and socio-economic planning into South Korea's governing institutions. However, they soon discovered that their authority was conditional. Without their own organizational base, their plans relied on support from outside political groups on both the left and the right with similar objectives. As a result, the success or failure of their initiatives was determined more by the underlying political dynamics than by the policies themselves.

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[93] See appendix 5 of "Kodŭng kosiryŏng," Enacted May 20, 1949, NLIS, http://www.law.go.kr/법령/고등고시령/(00356,19500520).

The State

Scholarship on early state-building in South Korea has rightly focused on the development and impact of the police force under the U.S. occupation.[94] Like other institutions in its zone, U.S. occupation forces generally retained the former system and many of its personnel for practical and political reasons. On the one hand, they were sufficiently trained and organized to maintain peace and stability under U.S. supervision. On the other, they were a convenient tool for monitoring and suppressing anti-American (particularly leftist) sentiment. And following the creation of an independent state in the South in 1948, these traits proved to be just as valuable to the new regime.

Former Manchukuo bureaucrats did not join the South Korean police in significant numbers, but those who did quickly found success. Hong Sunpong (1898–?) and Chŏn Samcho (1914–?), in particular, came to have a profound influence over police education under both the American occupation and the early South Korean state. Both had been police officers in Manchukuo's border regions and Hong had served as an instructor at the Manchukuo Police Academy. The Americans recognized these talents and installed both in the new National Police Academy in Seoul.[95] They continued to hold positions in police education through the establishment of the South Korean government.[96]

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[94] For example, see: Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate regimes, 1935–1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); Jinwung Kim, "Participating in Nation-Building: The role of the 'Military Government Police' in South Korean Politics, 1946–1948," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 17, no.2 (2010): 174–194; Yu Ŭnhye, "Haebanghu Namhan ŭi konggong yŏngyŏk ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa mollak," *Inmun sahoe 21* 10, no. 1 (February 2019): 433–447.
[95] "Chŏn Samcho," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_109_00423.
[96] *9 Who's Who - Korea, 1948*, NLKFADC, image 109–110, 199–200.

In practical terms, the Manchukuo experience proved highly adaptable to the militarized policing developing in South Korea before the Korean War. Like other Manchukuo bureaucrats, those in the police force were uniquely experienced in rural anti-insurgency tactics that included fortified police garrisons, physically separating the enemy from the local population, developing intelligence networks, and propaganda. Those working in the Manchukuo-Korean border region in particular, had direct experience fighting against some of the same Korean communists that the U.S. and South Korean regimes considered a political threat. As civil unrest increased in the late 1940s, these experiences became even more valuable.[97] In October 1948, Hong Sunpong was appointed police commissioner (*ch'ŏngjang*) of Cheju Island and tasked with quelling the alleged Communist uprising there.[98] In Cheju, his is tactics mirrored those he learned in Manchukuo with similarly violent and destructive consequences for the civilian population.[99] These militarized practices, moreover, were reinforced during the Korean War and had a long-term impact on how the South Korean police dealt with civil unrest in the postwar period.[100] However, former Manchukuo police officers engagement with the state-building process was more than just the violent suppression of dissent.

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[97] In at least one case, these skills saved a former official's career. Ko Pyŏngtŏk (1907–?) had served in the military police (J. Kempeitai) in Manchukou, and then the South Korean police, before being forced to resign in January 1948 when his past career was revealed. Six months later, however, Ko was reinstated by the Americans and sent on a month-long trip to Cheju Island to investigate the growing civil unrest and alleged communist insurgency. "Ko Pyŏngŏk Ch'onggyŏng pokchik," *Namsan sinmun*, June 23, 1948. Shortly thereafter, Ko published a detailed anti-insurgency plan for the island that bore a striking resemblance to Manchukup's rural "pacification" program. Ko Pyŏngŏk, "Chejudo sat'ae susŭp e kwanhan sagyŏn," *Minju kyŏngch'al* 2, no 5 (1948): 48–53.
[98] "Cheju Ch'ŏngjang Hong Sunpong ssi," *Chayu sinmun,* October 10, 1948.
[99] Yang Pongch'ŏl, "Hong Sunbong kwa Cheju 4.3".
[100] Ibid.

In their capacity as educators, both Hong and Chŏn maintained a reformist agenda that was highly influenced by their experience with the Manchukuo state. One of their primary concerns was to develop professionalism and efficiency. In early 1948, Hong wrote an article criticizing what he saw as the generally poor quality of police officers. To a certain extent, he reasoned, this was the result of poor wages that made it difficult to recruit and retain "men of ability," but it was also being driven by insufficient training.[101] This was one of the main reasons he had overseen major revisions to the police education system in 1947.

Hong's training philosophy mirrored two key elements from the programs undertaken at Manchukuo's GUA. The first was an emphasis on practical methods. While not discounting the necessity of classroom and "book learning" for grasping the "academic" or "ideal" elements of knowledge, Hong argued that it was also important that police officers have first-hand experience observing and applying that knowledge to real-life situations.[102] In addition, he stressed that formal training programs were only the beginning. For Hong, practical training was meant to instill a life-long discipline for professional improvement.[103] A second parallel to Manchukuo was Hong's focus on spiritual development. The purpose of training, he contended, was to not just acquire "knowledge" and "skills" but also mold officers into national patriots.[104] To this end, he

[101] Hong Sunpong, "Ilsang kyoyang ŭi mokp'yo," *Minju kyŏngch'al* 2, no. 1 (1948): 88.
[102] Ibid., 89.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.

felt that training should be designed to inculcate the values of "leadership," "duty," "loyalty," "sacrifice," and "perseverance."[105]

While the actual content of police instruction is unclear, Hong and Chŏn's writings on the subject of policing indicate a break with the past and the growing influence of American ideas and practices. This was particularly evident in how they described role of the police, and the state more generally, in society. To a certain extent, both embraced a discourse of democracy which fashioned the police as "public servants," and "protectors of the society."[106] They were not the "tools" of political parties or a ruling class, but rather beholden to the popular will as neutral enforcers of the law.[107] Moreover, they embraced a more democratic vision of personnel administration that recruited broadly from among talented individuals regardless of social status.[108]

However, these more democratic ideas about policing coexisted with authoritarian ideas inherited from Manchukuo. Both felt that even though the police were created of the people, and for the people, they were a still distinct social institution. Much like in Manchukuo, Hong described the police as "leaders" (*chidoja* or *yŏngdoja*) and "guides" (*annaeja*), who through their knowledge and skills could bring "guidance" (*yŏngdo*) and "enlightenment" (*kyemong*) to the people.[109] Elsewhere, he suggested the people were like children whom the police cared for with "a doting mother's love" (*chamo chiae*).[110] As an institution linking society and government in this way, the police were not only

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[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid; Chŏn Samcho, "Ku-Mi chŏguk ŭi kyŏngch'al chedo pip'an," *Minju Kyŏngch'al* 2, no. 4 (1948): 23.
[107] Ibid., 20.
[108] Ibid., 23.
[109] Hong, "Ilsang kyoyang ŭi mokp'yo," 89.
[110] Hong Sunpong, "Haengjŏng chiphaengnyŏng p'yeji wa kyŏngch'al ŭi sillyŏk paldong ŭl non ham," *Minju kyŏngch'al* 2, no.4 (1948): 81.

suited to assess the security situation, but also the "level of social advancement and will" (*mindo wa minsim*) in order to maintain peace and advance national prosperity.[111] In applying the law to these ends, therefore, they were authorized to take actions that might restrict individual freedoms for the sake of national security and social progress.[112]

Their views on the extension of state power further reflected this perspective. Chŏn, for example, was highly critical of America's decentralized policing structure, which established clear boundaries between national and local authorities. While acknowledging that such a structure served as an effective check against national dictatorship, he nonetheless felt that it created troubling inefficiencies in communication and enforcement that criminals could exploit.[113] For Chŏn, "unity" (*t'ongil*) was more important than autonomy, particularly given the internal and external threats of international Communism.[114] Therefore, he argued against any limitation on the state's authority to coordinate and direct police actions throughout the country.[115]

Hong took this a step further, arguing that state authority superseded the law itself. Hong was highly critical of the Interim Legislative Assembly's 1948 revision to the criminal law that nullified the state's authority to issue executive orders. In his opinion, the legislators had made their decisions based on political concerns, and not present conditions. Not only did national division present an ongoing security threat but also Hong felt that the people were still not prepared for this kind of full self-government.[116] Regardless of the Assembly's decision, however, Hong argued that the revisions and the

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[111] Ibid., 80.
[112] Chŏn Samcho, "Ŏllon chayu e taehan sogo," *Minju kyŏngch'al* 3, no. 1 (1949): 80-81.
[113] Chŏn, "Ku-Mi chŏguk ŭi kyŏngch'al chedo pip'an," 118.
[114] Ibid., 119.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Hong, "Haengjŏng chiphaengnyŏng p'yeji wa kyŏngch'al ŭi sillyŏk paldong ŭl non ham," 80.

law more generally would not restrain police power because, as had been the case in Manchukuo, police authority was tied to a higher universal morality. The police, he argued, had a "sacred duty" (*sinsŏnghan kwaŏp*) to maintain a peaceful society and defend the people's happiness that no law could restrain.[117] Echoing the language of Manchukuo's "kingly way," Hong called on officers to follow this "divine instruction" (*ch'ŏnsim myŏngji*) over the orders from "misguided" legislators who would soon see the error of their ways.[118]

Despite bordering on insurrection, Hong's argument elicited no known response from lawmakers. In 1948 the Interim Legislature was still a weak institution and, like the police, under the authority of the U.S. occupation. Hong's perspective on the police and state authority in Korea, moreover, aligned with U.S. military objectives. But police educators like Hong and Chŏn were not the only former Manchukuo bureaucrats interested in rationalizing government and expanding state power. Following the decision to establish an independent republic in the South, Han Ungkil (?–1975), a graduate of the GUA's sixth class, attempted to inscribe these concepts into the constitution.

Like most of his fellow former Manchukuo bureaucrats, Han had trouble finding work in the South immediately after liberation. It was likely thanks to his law degree from Kyoto Imperial University that he was able to make a living lecturing on constitutional law at universities around Seoul. He subsequently, found some success in the center-right United Youth Corps (Taedong ch'ŏngnyŏndan), serving as one of the

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[117] Ibid., 81.
[118] Ibid., 82.

corps' representatives for North Hamgyŏng Province.[119] Following the 1948 Constitutional Assembly election, the Corps' twelve seats represented a small but significant block in the largely non-partisan body. So, as the Assembly began the task of writing a constitution for an independent government in the South, Han was given the task of writing the Corps' proposal.[120]

Though Han contended that his proposal was completed through comparative analysis of the American, post-war Japanese, and Weimar constitutions, it was also highly influenced by two key aspects from Manchukuo. Namely, it expressed a fundamental distrust of politicians and capitalists, which required institutional checks on their power. It also emphasized the development of an independent national economy through government regulation.

Han was not opposed to democracy in principle. Unlike other proposals at the time, Han's constitution called for the government to be organized around a cabinet responsibility system headed by the prime minister.[121] The office of the president would have weak executive authority, instead acting as a balance between the government and the legislature. As such, Han intended the Presidency to be a uniquely democratic

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[119] Han Ungkil, "Chehŏn pihwa," in Han Ungkil, *Han'guk hŏnpŏp ŭi modu munje* (Seoul: Kosi hakhoe, 1961) 19. Originally published in *Chayu ch'unch'u*, December 1956. The United Youth Corps was a coalition of rightwing youth groups in the South formed, in part, by the U.S. occupation forces desire to consolidate the political power of the right and serve as a balance between the competing Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku factions. The corps' leader was the famous general of the anti-Japanese resistance in China and Manchuria, Chi Ch'ŏngch'ŏn (1888–1957). For more on the organization and its politics, see Kim Sucha, "Taedong ch'ŏngnyŏndan ŭi chojik kwa hwaldong (1947~1948)," *Yŏksa wa hyŏnsil* 31 (March 1999): 156–190.
[120] Han Ungkil "Chehŏn pihwa," 19–20.
[121] Ibid., 24.

institution, being directly elected, and representing the popular will of the national as a whole. [122]

Han's plan for the legislature, however, reflected a deeper concern for rational technocracy that bridged the legislative and executive branches. Han's constitution proposed a bicameral legislature, and like other proposals at the time, the lower house was to be elected according to a regional representation system. However, he was critical of other proposals, which called for an upper house also elected or appointed by region.[123] For Han regional representation was a valuable part of a democratic system, but it was imperfect. In particular, he argued that it reinforced local, rather than national interests, and risked exploitation under the "corrupting influence" of party politics. In contrast Han's upper house used a "vocational representation system" (*chingnŭng taep'yojae*), which was comprised of "experienced professionals" and "representatives from all social realms (education, culture, religion, labor, youth, women, etc)."[124] As an exclusively professional body, these men and women would reflect the "popular will from a different angle" by representing the social and economic interests of the nation as a whole.

Han's idea for vocational representation had multiple influences. In citing past experiments with the system, he highlighted the Economic Council in Weimar Germany, syndicalism in Fascist Italy and the Soviet Union, and the Irish Upper House.[125] And

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[122] Ibid., 22.
[123] Ibid., 23. Han was particularly critical of Assemblyman and member of the Constitutional Drafting Committee Yu Chin'o's proposal. For the full text of Yun's proposal, presented to the assembly on June 5, 1948, see "Hŏnpŏp kich'o wiwŏnhoe hŏnpop ch'oan t'oŭi," *Sŏul sinmun,* June 6, 1948.
[124] Ibid., 23.
[125] Han Ungkil, "Chingnŭng taep'yoje rŭl non ham," in Han Ungkil, *Han'guk hŏnpŏp ŭi modu munje* (Seoul: Kosi hakhoe, 1961), 237–241. Originally published in *Kosigye,* November 1957.

while vocational representation had never been necessary in Manchukuo, where the legislature was mostly ceremonial, it had been a major topic of conversation among the state's intellectual elite interested in political reform back in Japan.[126] But Han also distinguished his proposal from these examples, which he argued had either had too narrow a mandate, too little authority, or no autonomy from political parties.[127]

Nonetheless, the common thread among all these systems, including Han's, was a driving concern for state centralization around the goal of rapid national development. The upper house would, he argued, eliminate the need for an independent economic council that others had proposed. These legislators would function as a brain trust for the state devising economic policy and coordinating and evaluating their implementation through a parliamentary cabinet system.[128] And with representatives coming from social as well as professional organizations, their mandate extended towards broader social development as well. [129]

This tied in with the second principle, which was the elimination of free market capitalism through a constitutionally guaranteed, "equal opportunity economic system."[130] For Han, the key to increasing national production was first the protection of workers' rights to unionize, demonstrate, and strike; incentivizing labor participation in decision-making; and promoting fair distribution of profits.[131] The proposal also called for nationalizing not just key industries but also natural resources, including forestry and

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[126] For example, see "Ikkoku ittō wo mezasu: daisenkyō kusei nidaihyōsei mo kami?" *Manshū nichinichi shimbun,* May 16, 1938.
[127] Han, "Chingnŭng taep'yoje rŭl non ham," 241–244.
[128] Han "Chehŏn pihwa," 23-24.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Ibid., 24.

fishing, for future development. Finally, it maintained and rationalized the rationing system for key commodities to in order to control prices and establish economic self-sufficiency. This, he argued was the only way hold back the oppressive force of global capital and achieve an independent economy.[132]

Han's proposal–and the United Youth Corps backing it–existed in peculiar middle space in the spring and summer constitutional debates that, due to the political boycott from the left, were almost entirely contained within the right. While the KDP dominated the drafting committee, Han's proposal offered a potential compromise between the various political factions on controversial issues. On the one hand, Han's insistence on both a cabinet responsibility system and direct presidential elections offered a balanced governing system between the KDP and Syngman Rhee, who were both looking to set up future pathways to power.[133] On the other hand, proposals such as vocational representation, corporatist economic policies, and protections for labor seemed to appeal to more populist elements on the right, led by Kim Ku, that were critical of capitalists and former colonial elites in the KDP. After presenting his proposal to a coalition of Youth Corps and non-partisan assembly men, Han was optimistic that his plans for the legislature and economy would make their way into the final draft.[134]

Instead, each of his proposals was defeated in the legislative process, not based on their merits, but out of political convenience. The first thing to go was cabinet

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[132] Ibid., 25.
[133] Kim Suyong, "Haebang hu hŏnbŏp chejŏng e kwanhan yŏn'gu," (PhD diss., Seoul National University, 2007), 181–185; Hakjoon Kim, "The Influence of the American Constitution on South Korean Constitutional Development," *Asian Perspectives* 16, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 1992): 28–29.
[134] Han, "Chehŏn pihwa," 27. "3.1 kurakbu musosok kurakbu yang kurakbu kandamhoe kaech'oe," *Chosŏn ilbo,* June 23, 1948.

responsibility, when the KDP gave into Rhee's demands for a presidential system.[135] The United Youth Corps' political alignment with Rhee also forced them to give up other proposals. During the constitution's second debate period, the Corps introduced amendments guaranteeing labor protections and creating a bicameral legislature. But after heated debates, Rhee–in his role as assembly speaker–interjected that both were minor issues that could be dealt with in subsequent legislation or constitutional amendments and should not hold up the pressing need to establish a national government.[136] Both amendments failed overwhelmingly.

Rhee's rising political power concerned Han. In principle, he felt that other issues could be resolved through the legislative process, but he later argued it would take a partial revolution to reform a strong presidential system in Korea.[137] After the constitution passed, he split with the United Youth Corps and took his ideas about the state to a new political patron, this time more to the left. In December 1948, he joined Cho Soang's (1887–1958) Socialist Party (Sahoedang) as Director of the Survey Office and later served head of the party's Policy Council.[138] Cho's party platform was a much better fit for Han on the economic side, emphasizing an "equal society…realized through a planned economy, reasonable distribution of wealth and the assurance of proper welfare

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[135] The drafting committee's proposal at the end of debate still had a cabinet responsibility system. However, in the days between the end of debate and the bill's introduction to the full assembly, Rhee refused to send the draft unless there was a presidential system. At this point Han's compromise might have made some sense, allowing for greater power sharing between the cabinet and president. Instead, the KDP proposed creating a presidential cabinet system, but the compromise would be that the president was elected by the assembly and limited to a 4-year term. In the long term, this proved to be far more advantageous to Rhee than the KDP.
[136] Kim Suyong, "Haebang hu hŏnbŏp chejŏng e kwanhan yŏn'gu," 224–229.
[137] Han "Chehŏn pihwa," 26.
[138] "Sahoedang chojik pusŏ rŭl kyŏlchŏng," *Tongnip sinmun,* December 18, 1948; "Sahoedang pusŏ kaep'yŏn," *Tonga ilbo,* July 6, 1949.

for workers," and "based on the nationalization of land and large-sized factories."[139] The outbreak of the Korean War and subsequent crackdown on center-left opposition, however, proved disastrous for the party and for Han. In the summer of 1952, he was arrested and convicted as leader of a pro-North, Communist organization along with several other opposition politicians and sentenced to three year in prison.[140] His sentence was commuted sometime shortly thereafter, but with his political activities under scrutiny, he turned his attention to agricultural reform and the agricultural cooperative movement instead.[141]

The Social Economy

By the time Han began working on agricultural reform in 1952, other former Manchukuo bureaucrats had already spent several years struggling to make headway. Like Han, other Koreans had returned from Manchukuo with a profound skepticism of free market capitalism and what they saw as its stifling impact on national development. This perspective had, in large part, informed their varied attempts to transform and mobilize ethnic Korean villages in the Manchukuo border lands. These same concerns and experiences influenced their approach to socio-economic policy in South Korea after liberation, starting with land reform.

While land reform was an important element of state development in both North and South Korea, the role of former Manchukuo bureaucrats in planning South Korea's

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[139] Kyung-chae Roh, "Historical Characteristics of Korea's Social Democracy," *International Journal of Korean History* 3 (December 2002): 298.
[140] "Kukka poanpŏp wiban sakŏn p'igo e yujoe ŏndo," *Tonga ilbo,* August 1, 1952.
[141] "Nongimbu, nongminhoe wa nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap sŏllip ŭl wihae che-sam ch'a nongim wiwŏnhoe kaech'oe," *Sŏul sinmun,* November 19, 1952.

program has been under appreciated. When the left-leaning economist and SKILA Member Yi Sunt'ak (1897–?) first began working with the U.S. occupation government on a land reform law in 1947, it was his legislative assistant Chŏng Hyŏnchun (1912–1976) who did much of the legwork.[142] Chŏng, a graduate of Xinjing University of Law and Politics, had spent several years as a low-level Manchukuo official engaged in land legislation and surveying before returning to Korea after 1945.[143] Scholarship on early land reform proposals have focused primarily on American officials New Deal-inspired aim to create "yeoman farmers" through a Homestead Act-like land redistribution, while also cultivating democracy and countering Communism's political influence in the countryside. [144] But while Chŏng and other Koreans in the South working on the land reform issue received direct influence and support from the American occupation,[145] his perspective was somewhat different.

For Chŏng, the objective of land reform was not simply to create a more equitable and democratic system of land tenure. Rather, he saw it as "fundamental reform" (*kibonchŏk kaehyŏk*) for a broader program to achieve national prosperity outside of a capitalist framework.[146] As an agriculturally based economy, he argued, national

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[142] Kim Sŏngho, "Nongji kaehyŏkpŏp chejŏng," in Han'guk nongch'on kyŏngje yŏn'guwŏn ed. *Nongjŏng pan segi chŭngŏn: Han'guk nongjŏng 50 nyŏn sa* (Seoul: Nongimbu, 1999), 4.
[143] Pak Sŏngchin, "Kyŏngje ch'ammo ponbu ŭi sikminjijŏk yusan kwa che 1 konghwaguk kihoekch'ŏ ŭi t'ansaeng," *Tongil yŏn'gu* 35, no. 2 (2016) 50.
[144] George M. McCune, *Korea Today* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), 129; Inhan Kim, "Land Reform in South Korea under the U.S. Military Occupation, 1945–1948," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 101. American forces had planned to begin the land reform process as early as February1946, announcing the sale of Japanese property to Korean farmers. The plan was cancelled in April, however, due to internal conflicts over whether or not to extend sale and redistribution to Korean-owned property as well. Inhan Kim attributes this reversal to the developing coalition between the U.S. and conservative Korean elites as well as a preference for maintaining the status quo to meet Communist pressure. Ibid., 113–114
[145] Ibid., 121.
[146] Chŏng Hyŏnchun, "Nongga kyŏngje ŭi yuksŏng," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* August 15, 1948.

prosperity relied on increased land productivity that could only be achieved by eliminating tenancy and developing a new generation of small-owner cultivators.[147] However, his vision was not of American style "yeoman farmers." Instead, Chŏng positioned land reform part of a larger "integrated plan" (*chonghap kyehoek*) for economic rationalization that would transform and mobilize farmers and farm villages for national production.[148] This included the creation of additional laws and institutions, such as an agricultural bank and agricultural cooperatives.[149] This perspective worked its way into the draft bill that was eventually submitted to the assembly in December 1947. In making small owner cultivators the basis of an independent agricultural economy, the bill outlined a long-term objective to "improve the daily lives of farmers, develop farm village culture, and expand agricultural production."[150]

The bill failed to gain support in the Assembly in 1947 due to an alignment of conservative voices inside and outside the SKILA. While not outright rejecting land reform, conservative politicians argued over the level of compensation, the immediate need for land reform, and the possibility for unforeseen negative consequences on the national economy.[151] After lengthy, heated debate, land reform was put off until after a permanent government was formed. Anticipating conservative delay tactics, the Americans announced the sale and redistribution of Japanese properties under their control just prior to forming South Korea's constitutional assembly. And while limited in

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[147] Ibid.
[148] Ibid.
[149] Ibid.
[150] "Kihoekchŏgin t'oji kaehyŏk pŏpan," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, October 28, 1947.
[151] Inhan Kim, "Land Reform in South Korea under the U.S. Military Occupation, 1945–1948," 121–122.

scope, this nonetheless kept up pressure on the new National Assembly to take up land reform in 1948.[152]

Again, Chŏng was an important figure in the new government's planning efforts. Following the establishment of Republic of Korea in June 1948, Yi Sunt'ak was appointed Director of the new government's Planning Office (Kihoekch'ŏ), and he brought in Chŏng as his chief secretary (*pisŏsilchang*).[153] Here he was in familiar company, as one of six former Manchukuo bureaucrats and two individuals with business experience in Manchukuo holding high-level appointments.[154] The Planning Office was not directly in charge of carrying out the 1948 Constitution's mandate to institute land reform.[155] But as the coordinating agency for the government's overall economic policy agenda, it worked with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Nongimbu, MAF) to develop the government's legislative proposal.

This turned out to be a useful partnership, thanks in large part to the presence of likeminded former Manchukuo officials in the MAF as well. Yi Kihong (1908–1987), who was a Section Chief in the Village Guidance Bureau (Nongson chidoguk), was a Manchukuo Civil Service Exam passer who had served in posts in the central government, and as Deputy Chief of the Industry Section in Antung Province. After liberation he had briefly worked in the Military Government's Education Ministry before being transferred

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[152] Ibid., 126.
[153] Pak, "Kyŏngje ch'ammo ponbu," 50.
[154] These included: Deputy Director Kim Hun (1901–?, Manchukuo grain processing corp.), Price Planning Bureau Chief Hwan Chongryul (1909–1972, GUA 5th class), General Affairs Section Chief Yi Yunmo (1918–1983, GUA 18th class), Survey Section Chief Kil Iksŏn (1908–?, Manchukuo Education Ministry), Economic Planning Officers Kim Myŏngwan (1909–1977, GUA 2nd class) and Yi Hŭichun (1896–?,Manchukuo industry), Specialist Han Chunggŏn (1919–?, GUA 18th class). Ibid., 51.
[155] See article 86 in "Taehan Min'guk hŏnbŏp," Enacted July 17, 1948, NLIS, http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=53081#0000.

to the Agricultural Improvement Institute (Nongsa kaeryŏngwŏn).[156] Ch'a Kyunhŭi (1922–2018), a Sub-section Chief in the Agricultural Economy Section (Nongŏp kyŏngjekwa), had graduated from Tokyo Agricultural University before taking a position the semi-governmental Manchuria Colonization Corporation. Ch'a was late returning to Korea, but he quickly found work as a specialist alongside Yi in the Agricultural Improvement Institute in the summer of 1948.[157]

When it came to the details of the government's land reform proposal, the two departments were not completely on the same page. While the MAF proposal designated all property owned by absentee landlords in excess of 2 *ch'ungbo* (about 5 acres) for government purchase and redistribution, the Planning office increased this to 3 *ch'ungbo*.[158] Also, the MAF proposed a government purchase price of 150% of the annual yield to be paid out over ten years after a three-year grace period, and a resale price of 120% of the annual yield paid back over six years. In contrast the Planning office amended this a uniform purchase and resale price of 200% paid out over ten years.[159] However, the former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the MAF did not take this as evidence of a more conservative, pro-landlord stance within the Planning Office.[160] Rather, the Planning Office appeared to be concerned that the government would be unable to

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[156] "Yi Kihong," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_108_02356.
[157] According to his resume, Ch'a worked as the principal of a Korean middle school in Teiling city, just north of Mukden (present day Shenyang), from September 1947 to May 1948. "Personal History," *Community Development Conference May 26-29, 1958*, AKH, ref. AUS014_79_00C0080, images 84–85, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000661793. It is likely that Ch'a's decision to return to Seoul was driven by the Chinese Communist's 1948 military campaign to isolate and defeat the Nationalist forces remaining in Manchuria's urban centers.
[158] Yi Kihong, "Nongji kaehyŏk simalgi," *Sindonga* (August 1965): 301–302.
[159] Ibid., 302.
[160] Yi, "Nongji kaehyŏk simalgi," 302.

finance the difference between the purchase price and the resale price, especially in the context of their broader program for economic development.[161]

As far as the general objectives were concerned, however, former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the MAF expressed similar views to their colleagues in the Planning Office. They were critical of the capitalist mode of land management, which they saw as promoting absentee landlordism and petty agriculture over coordinated economic expansion.[162] They therefore considered land reform as an essential step in securing the agricultural economy and expanding production.[163] And like Chŏng Hyŏnchun, they conceived of land reform as part of a larger project for social transformation: injecting village life with "new vitality," molding "passive" peasants into "constructive" agriculturalists, "restoring and maintaining peace and stability," and "encouraging the growth of a democratic society and overall national economic development."[164]

As with the SKILA law, Conservative opposition to land reform remained strong resulting in significant changes to the legislation. Originally, the draft law had included a provision limiting individual property rights on redistributed land, including the resale, bestowal, title transfer, or posting land as collateral, and granted the state authority to oversee future transactions. But after complaints from conservative pundits and politicians over state interference in private property, the government removed these

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[161] Ibid.; Yong-Ha Shin, "Land Reform in Korea, 1950," *Bulletin of the Population and Development Studies Center* 5 (September 1976): 19.
[162] Yi, "Nongji kaehyŏk simalgi," 300.
[163] Ibid., 298.
[164] Kyun Hi Tchah [Ch'a Kyunhŭi], "Korean Land Reform and Its Effects on National Life," presented at *Agrarian Reform, Institutional Innovation, and Rural Development: Major Issues in Perspective*, University of Wisconsin at Madison (1977): 16-17.

provisions from the bill.[165] In the National Assembly, landed interests in the KDP lacked sufficient strength to completely styme the legislation as they had in 1947. However, they were able to consolidate sufficient support from conservative and anti-communist independents to increase land resale prices to 150% of the annual yield be paid over five years. The logic behind this compromise was that higher prices would facilitate landlords' transition into industrial capital.[166] Officials in the MAF were frustrated, however, because this essentially maintained preexisting tenancy rates of 30% and disincentivized expanded productivity.[167] Still, the first article did maintain language that framed land reform within former Manchukuo bureaucrats' larger socio-economic agenda and the bill eventually passed with overwhelming support.[168] In contrast, their attempts to use land reform as a launch pad for additional programs were less successful.

For the former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the MAF, land reform was practically meaningless on its own. Rather than increasing production, ministry officials noted that farm families remained in a precarious economic situation, and that land reform had actually increased the number of farmers engaged in petty agriculture.[169] While land reform had freed tenants to become independent property owners, it also exposed them to the free market without sufficient organizational support. For this reason, Ministry

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[165] Kim Seong Bo, "South Korea's Land Reform and Democracy," *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 26, no. 1 (June 2013) 54.
[166] Ibid., 57.
[167] Yi, "Nongji kaehyŏk simalgi," 303.
[168] Article 1 stated: "In accordance with the constitutional mandate for fair distribution of farmland to farmers, this law is intended to improve the livelihood of farmers and contribute to the balance and development of the national economy through the promotion of an independent and productive agricultural economy." "Nongji kaehyŏkbŏp," Enacted March 20, 1950, NLIS, www.law.go.kr/법령/농지개혁법/(00108,19500310).
[169] Nongimbu, "Nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap ŭi p'ilyosŏng," in Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe ed., *Han'guk kyŏngje chŏngch'aek charyo 1: 1948.8~1949.12*, Sillok Taehan Min'guksa charyojip v.1 (Kwach'ŏn-si: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, 2009), 388. Originally published in *Kongboch'ŏ chubo 15* (July 13, 1949). Also see Yi, "Nongji kaehyŏk simalgi," 303.

officials had always intended to follow up with an agricultural cooperatives law to facilitate the development and diffusion of advanced farming tools and techniques, fair access to credit, and collective sales that would allow individual farmers to compete in the capitalist marketplace.[170]

Cooperative agriculture was not a new phenomenon in Korea, but the former Manchukuo bureaucrats framed their law as a radical departure from the past. Historically cooperative institutions had been implemented at both the village and nationally under the Japanese and even before. Ministry officials, however, argued that these institutions served the capitalist interests of their Japanese or Korean employees or the colonial state, rather than the Korean farmers who made the bulk of their membership.[171] New cooperatives under the proposed law, they countered, would be organized for the benefit of local communities.[172] They would be democratic and contribute to village independence and autonomy.[173] In addition, they would facilitate the technical and cultural advancement of farm communities leading to mutual prosperity.[174] Collectively, this would create a virtuous cycle leading to the economic expansion of the nation as a whole.[175]

However, the discourse of village autonomy, mutual aid, and self-discipline for the sake of national production was hardly new to former Manchukuo bureaucrats. While intimately tied to Japan's imperial expansion and internal security concerns, the

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[170] Nongimbu, "Nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap ŭi p'ilyosŏng," 387.
[171] Nongimbu, "Nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap ŭi p'ilyosŏng," 389-390; Ch'a Kyunhŭi, *Han'guk nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap undong ŭi cŏnmang* (N.A.: N.A., 1951), 2; Yi Kihong, "Nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap ŭi chojik kŭp kinŭng," *Sijŏng wŏlbo 6* (October 1949): 142.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Ibid., 138.
[174] Yi, "Nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap ŭi chojik kŭp kinŭng," 140.
[175] Ibid., 138; Nongimbu, "Nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap ŭi p'ilyosŏng," 387.

collective village movement and the Korean agricultural migration programs in the 1930s and 40s were rarely, if ever, framed in such terms. Instead, as we've seen, Korean officials in charge of these programs often understood and advertised them as ethno-nationalist projects for socio-economic advancement and an equitable solution to the exploitation of colonial capital on the Korean peninsula (Chapter 2). As in Manchukuo, MAF officials argued that in their current state, villages were incapable of spontaneous self-development and self-discipline without the organizational and financial support of the government to get the movement started.[176] Moreover, in justifying the cooperative law, former Manchukuo officials suggested it also had national security implications. Ch'a Kyuhŭi, for example, argued the government's failure to reform the economic system was one of the main reasons that Communist ideology continued to be popular. Only by completing "the economic liberation of the farmers," he contended, could they finally stop Communism's harmful social influence.[177]

While officials in the MAF were working on the Agricultural Cooperative Bill, Chŏng Hyŏnchun and the Planning Office were pursuing a national planned economy. Like his colleagues in the MAF, Chŏng "flatly dismissed" the free market, instead arguing that the principle objective of nation-building was the "establishment of an equal society for the masses" (*manmin p'yŏngdŭng sahoe*).[178] His primary interest was increasing production, stating that "an economy without production is like a reflection without a body."[179] Such ends were best achieved, he contended, through the creation of

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[176] Ch'a, *Han'guk nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap undong ŭi cŏnmang*, 23-24.
[177] Ch'a, *Han'guk nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap undong ŭi cŏnmang*, 15-16.
[178] Chŏng Hyŏnchun, "Kukka kyŏngje kyehoek kigu kwan'gyŏn," *Sijŏng wŏlbo* 1 (January 1949): 121.
[179] Ibid., 122.

precise plans for economic reconstruction and centralized institutions to devise, implement and evaluate them.

Chŏng's intention was for the Planning Office serve in just such a role. The structure of the office itself was largely modeled on Manchukuo's Economic Planning Bureau (J. Kikakukyoku), which had been the central institution behind the state's Five-year Industrial Development Plan. Similar to that institution, Chŏng intended for the South Korean Planning Office to take charge of a number of policies relating to industrial development, labor relations, trade, science and technology, finance, and reparations from Japan.[180] The former Manchukuo bureaucrats already filling the office's ranks would serve as a brain trust for economic development, coordinating policies with various departments. And the centerpieces of this plan would be a multi-year economic growth plan that the Planning Office would be tasked with overseeing.[181]

Chŏng was doubles aware of the precariousness of these plans from both a popular and political standpoint. He dedicated a large portion of a 1949 article to countering the negative associations between his planned economy and the controlled economy under Japan or the economic plans proposed in the Communist North the year before. Instead, he sought to normalize the concept. At its heart, he explained, planned economies were the natural intersection between politics and economics; a set of neutral scientific tools available for nations to utilize. They were not, he reasoned, inherently "dictatorial," "violent," or incompatible with democracy, because countries across the world had utilized these institutions for economic revitalization without resorting to such

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[180] Ibid., 123.
[181] Ibid.

political tactics.[182] This included National Recovery Act in the United States, a translation of which he appended to the article.[183]

The initiatives for agricultural cooperatives and a planned economy briefly came together in early 1949. The MAF submitted their original proposal to the cabinet in November 1948 along with the land reform proposal and both were sent along to the Planning Office for review. In February of 1949, the cooperatives proposal came before to the newly formed Economic Council (Kyŏngje wiwŏnhoe), an advisory body consisting of representatives from seven ministries, as well as six civilian representatives from banking, industry, and academia, and headed by the Planning Office Director.[184] Having already heard a Planning Office proposal for a mining cooperative law the previous week, the council decided to scrap both proposals and come up with a general cooperative law that covered agriculture, mining, industry, and commerce collectively.[185] MAF officials protested that such a move ignored the "particularities" of agriculture requiring special attention in the cooperative law.[186] However, the revised General Cooperatives Bill that the Council submitted to the National Assembly in April used the agricultural cooperatives as an organizational model for other economic sectors, ultimately retaining three out of six chapters from the original MAF proposal.[187]

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[182] Ibid., 121-122.
[183] Ibid., 124-127.
[184] "Kyŏngje wiwŏnhoe, che-1 hoe hoeŭi ŭi kaech'oe," in Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe ed., *Han'guk kyŏngje chŏngch'aek charyo 1: 1948.8~1949.12*, Sillok Taehan Min'guksa charyojip v.1 (Kwach'ŏn-si: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, 2009), 144. Originally Published in *Chosŏn ilbo,* February 4, 1949.
[185] Ch'a, *Han'guk nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap undong ŭi cŏnmang*, 26.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Ibid., 26-27; "Kihoekch'ŏ chungang kyŏngje wiwŏnhoe, Nongimbu ŭi nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap an ŭl p'yegi hago sanbyŏl chohap an chaksŏng ŭl kyŏlchŏng," in Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe ed., *Han'guk kyŏngje chŏngch'aek charyo 1: 1948.8~1949.12*, Sillok Taehan Min'guksa charyojip v.1 (Kwach'ŏn-si: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, 2009), 214–215. Originally published in *Tonggwang sinmun,* March 24, 1949.

If the MAF and Planning Office were vocal advocates for social-democratic policies in the early republic, they were hardly dominant even within the government. In order to create a balanced cabinet, Rhee had appointed members of the conservative camp to the Ministries of Finance and Commerce and Industry.[188] These men, largely came from business and financial interests during the colonial period. [189] Their view of the economic development was fundamentally different from a state-guided approach, emphasizing growth through external capital (foreign aid) rather than primary industry production (agriculture).[190] This resulted in overt opposition to most of the plans from the MAF and Planning Office. Arguing against the cooperatives law, for example, Minister of Finance Kim Toyŏn (1894–1967) stated that old colonial institutions like the Federation of Financial Associations (Kŭmyong chohap hyŏphoe, FFA) and the Farmers' Associations (Nongmin hoe) were sufficient, and cooperatives unnecessary.[191] Nonetheless, their alliance with conservatives in the National Assembly proved insufficient to overcome centrist and progressive factions in the legislature.

By the end of 1949, however, the tide was turning against socio-economic reformers. In June of 1949, police arrested much of the center left leadership in the National Assembly accusing them of being secret members of the Communist Party. [192] Practically overnight, the so-called "proxy incident" (*p'ŭrakch'i sakkŏn*) eliminated nearly all support for agricultural reform and a planned economy in the legislature.

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[188] Chŏng Chin'a, "Che-1 konghwaguk ch'ogi (1948–1950) ŭi kyŏngje chŏngch'aek yŏn'gu," *Han'guksa yŏn'gu*, no. 106 (September 1999): 244–245
[189] Ibid., 243–244. Park T'aegyun, *Wŏnhyŏng kwa pyŏnyong*, 68.
[190] Ibid., 269.
[191] "Yanggok munje e chilŭi ŭngdap," *Chosŏn ilbo,* February 19, 1949.
[192] Among those arrested was Pak Yunwŏn (1908–1994), who had been an agriculturalist in Manchukuo. "Pak Yunwŏn," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_106_00720

Around the same time, Rhee abandoned his balanced approach and began siding with officials in the Finance and Commerce Ministries. Rhee had long expressed a preference for free market economic policy and was deeply concerned with the political impact of rising inflation, so the changing political tides offered a convenient opportunity to change direction. [193] In December 1949, he publicly declared that his government would "abolish the controlled economy" and instead establish "a free economy based on the principles of supply and demand."[194] American support for progressive reforms was also waning. With the Communist victory in China and the unresolved political division on the Korean Peninsula, American policymakers placed even more emphasis on maintaining social and economic stability in the South. Earlier support for New Deal style reforms and economic equality as a path to democracy were abandoned in favor of supporting conservative anti-communist politicians and reining in inflation.[195]

As a result, the Cooperatives Bill foundered in the National Assembly. Similar to the Land Reform Law, the Assembly's Industry and Commerce Committee debated writing its own Agricultural Cooperative Bill in early 1949 but tabled the issue until the Government released its own proposal.[196] After receiving the Government's bill in April, however, the committee refused to even bring it up for debate, ultimately killing the bill when the legislative session expired the following spring.[197] After the election and start of the new legislative session, the bill was again sidelined, this time by the outbreak of the

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[193] For more on Yi's position see Pak Sŏngchin, "Kyŏngje ch'ammo ponbu ŭi sikminjijŏk yusan," 54–55.
[194] "Chayu kyŏngje rŭl chuch'ang," *Chosŏn ilbo,* December 24, 1949.
[195] Chŏng Chin'a, "Che-1 konghwaguk ch'ogi (1948–1950) ŭi kyŏngje chŏngch'aek yŏn'gu," 259–263.
[196] "Kihoekch'ŏ chungang kyŏngje wiwŏnhoe, Nongimbu ŭi nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap an ŭl p'yegi hago sanbyŏl chohap an chaksŏng ŭl kyŏlchŏng," in in Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe ed., *Han'guk kyŏngje chŏngch'aek charyo 1: 1948.8~1949.12*, Sillok Taehan Min'guksa charyojip v.1 (Kwach'ŏn-si: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, 2009), 214–215. Originally published in *Tonggwang sinmun,* March 24, 1949.
[197] Ch'a, *Han'guk nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap undong ŭi cŏnmang*, 27.

Korean War. The precise reason for the Assembly's reluctance to consider the Cooperatives Bill is unclear, but for the former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the MAF, it was yet more evidence of the assembly's classist character. As Ch'a reasoned in 1951, weather they were motivated by fear, ignorance, or a conservative desire to maintain the status quo, the Industry and Commerce Committee had acted in a manner that protected capitalist interests just as they had with land reform.[198]

At the same time the Planning Office was rapidly losing its authority over economic policy. In the summer of 1949 Yi Sunt'ak resigned as Director, followed shortly thereafter by Chŏng Hyŏnchun. Chŏng briefly found a leadership role in an irrigation coop, but this did not last past the Korean War. And while he continued to argue for economic planning, he never served in government for the remainder of the Rhee regime. Yi Sunt'ak's replacement at the Planning office, Kim Hun (1901–?), also had experience in Manchukuo's industrial sector, but political forces were uniting against the office.[199] In March of 1950, the President ordered a reorganization of the office which reduced the size and scope of the Materials Mobilization and Price Planning Bureaus, and left the Economic Planning Bureau with only one of its original five sections.[200] By the start of the Korean War, the Manchukuo clique in the office had been broken up and moved around to other departments.

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[198] Ibid.
[199] "Kim Hun," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_101_21945.
[200] "Kihoekch'ŏ chikje," Enacted April 1, 1950, NLIS, http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=16118#0000. Rhee had earlier expressed support for an amendment to the Government Organization Law eliminating the office entirely in order to "get rid of unnecessary institutions" and "unessential bureaucrats." "Chayu kyŏngje rŭl chuch'ang," *Chosŏn ilbo,* December 24, 1949.

The political turn against socio-economic planning posed an even greater threat to some individuals. In the spring of 1950, Yi Kihong at the MAF and Kil Iksŏn, who had been recently transferred out of the Planning Office, were rounded up as part of an investigation into alleged South Korean Workers' Party members.[201] It is unclear, however, if the investigation got very far before the outbreak of the Korean War and its impact on the two men was mixed. On the one hand, Kil disappeared from the historical record after 1950 and evidence suggests he may have gone North–voluntarily or involuntarily–along with other South Korean leftists during the War.[202] On the other hand, the allegations appeared to have little impact on Yi's career, at least in the short-term. Yi continued to work at the MAF throughout the 1950s and he remained a champion for the cooperative movement (Chapter 5). His career trajectory, however, peaked around the time of the investigation. After more than a decade of service, he never rose above the rank of section chief, suggesting that there may have been more subtle long-term consequences to the allegations.

Synopsis

Until August 1945, Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy represented a distinctive interest group. Shared characteristics, training, and experience, engendered unity behind the state's power and authority to foster development and security. As

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[201] "Hyŏpdong susa kyŏlgwa palp'yo, minganin 47 myŏng songchŏng," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* March 23, 1950.

[202] According to his friend and colleague from Manchukuo, Kang Sinch'ae (?–2000, GUA 10th class), Kil was still in Seoul during the North Korean occupation in the summer of 1950. Kang recalled that during the occupation Kil had met with another GUA graduate, Kim Tusam, who was a high-ranking North Korean political officer. Kil's whereabouts after the war are unknown. Kang Sinch'ae, "Chōsen dōran no hazama de," in Daidō gakuin dōsōkai ed., *Kuon* (Tokyo: Daidō gakuin dōsōkai, 1991), 78.

bureaucrats they were trained to wield this power in order to radically transform society into an ideal state. As Koreans, they were convinced of their unique capability and duty to organize their countrymen. These ideas and ambitions did not disappear as precipitously as the empire they had supported. In the complex political dynamics of post-colonial Korea, however, ideas and ambition were not necessarily the primary criteria for success. In a more practical sense, then, the Manchukuo experience, proved to be a mixed blessing back in liberated Korea.

On the one hand, supporting Japanese imperialism outside of the Korean peninsula offered some protection from political actors seeking postcolonial justice. In principle, the fact that many had actively participated in violent and coercive programs against their fellow Koreans in Manchuria should have made them targets. They were aided, however, by two interrelated conditions: the lack of available information on their activities, and the fact that many possessed desirable technical skills. This resulted in negative outcomes for only a relatively narrow range of individuals.

On the other hand, these same conditions were a significant barrier to power in the emerging post-colonial states. Politics and geography combined to atomize former Manchukuo bureaucrats. In postcolonial Korea, old and new forms of political patronage continued hold more sway over government influence than skills or ideas. As political outsiders, Manchukuo officials lacked a pre-existing basis of support and instead offered their skills to more powerful groups. As these groups vied for power, however, Manchukuo bureaucrats found their collective interests at the wayside.

This had a significant impact on their state building activities. Former Manchukuo bureaucrats joined forces with a variety of political actors in order to continue the work

of development. Their training in a national defense state on the frontlines of empire, where even civil officials were expected to lay down their lives for the state, proved highly adaptable to both U.S. occupation forces, and conservative South Korean politicians interested in putting down popular dissent and the perceived threat of Communism. More broadly, former Manchukuo bureaucrats' objective to expand state power was also acceptable, so long as it fit within an anti-Communist framework. In contrast, policies and institutions premised on a critique of global capitalism and designed to create a powerful and prosperous nation through technocratic expertise and rational planning proved less relevant to many in the early postcolonial leadership. While the political fluidity of the early liberation period was sufficient for such plans to arise, the solidification of the ideological divide in the leadup to the Korean War was detrimental to both their policies and careers.

By the time of the Korean War, then, the once-united cohort of Manchukuo bureaucrats was scattered geographically, politically, and institutionally. The chaos and bloodshed of the war years only heightened their atomization, with unknown numbers killed or missing. After the war, however, those who survived would carry on with the state-building project, albeit in diverse ways. Individually they evolved as supporters, reformers, and critics of the political establishment. In the process, the application and meaning of the Manchukuo experience also transformed.

Chapter 4: Reforming the State

–Former Manchukuo Bureaucrats and the Civil Service–

When Kim Yŏngchun (1916–1995) was appointed to the Personnel Appeals Hearing Board (Insa soch'ŏng simsa wiwŏnhoe) in 1963, he was required to make the following statement: "I hereby acknowledge my responsibility to act democratically and efficiently, as a servant of the people, and solemnly swear to carry out my assigned duties faithfully according to the laws and regulations."[1] Added to the National Civil Service Law only months before and required of all civil servants, this oath of office represented the foundation of the administrative justice that Kim and his fellow board members were tasked with overseeing. For Kim, however, it had far deeper meaning. In 1956, he had argued for the necessity of just such an oath for all newly appointed officials. This was only one of many civil service reforms that Kim had proposed under the banner of "democracy" and "efficiency" during the height of his civil service career in the 1950s.

Scholars have long attributed the establishment of a rational Weberian style bureaucracy to the May 1961 military coup d'état and the presidency of Park Chung Hee. According to this narrative, under Park's leadership, the existing arbitrary and corrupt civil service was rationalized, and new institutions were created to forge a bureaucratic system based on merit, order, and efficiency.[2] More recent studies have argued

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[1] See article 55 of "Kukka kongmuwŏn pŏp," Enacted June 1, 1963, NLIS, http://www.law.go.kr/법령/국가공무원법/(01325,19630417).

[2] For example, see: Byung-Kook Kim, "Bringing and Managing Socioeconomic Change: The State in Korea and Mexico" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1987); Pak Yŏnho, "Urinara kongmuwŏn kyoyuk hullyŏn ŭi yŏksajŏk chŏn'gae kwajŏng e kwanhan punsŏkjŏk koch'al: Kungnip kongmuwŏn hullyŏnwŏn (5.16 hyŏngmyŏng hu Chungang kongmuŏn kyoyukwŏn ŭro kaech'ing) ŭi yŏkhal ŭl chungsim ŭro," *Haengjŏng munjae yŏn'gu 1*, no. 1 (1993): 9–40; Stephan Haggard, "Institutions and Growth in East Asia," *Studies in Comparative International Development 38* (2004): 53–81; Hyung-A Kim, *Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004). While arguing that the

convincingly that many of the cultural and institutional features of the 1960's bureaucracy were already developing in the 1950s, albeit slowly or poorly implemented.[3] As with the Park-centric argument, however, much of the analytical work on 1950s bureaucratic reform remains focused on the highest level of government administration, namely the President and the Cabinet ministers.[4] Yet, these were far from the only change agents involved.

This chapter approaches bureaucratic reform in South Korea from the perspective of former Manchukuo bureaucrats, such as Kim Yŏngchun. After the Korean War, Kim was part of a small cohort of former Manchukuo officials who held key positions in the government's civil service management institutions. As career bureaucrats, their authority was highly limited. However, they did not, as some have argued, simply follow along with the nation's political leaders.[5] Rather, this chapter demonstrates that they repeatedly pursued creative strategies and partnerships to leverage support for incremental reforms inspired, in part, by their time in Manchukuo. At the same time, it argues that their objective was not necessarily a revival of Manchukuo's authoritarian state structures.

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bureaucracy was still corrupt under Park, Kang argues that it was nonetheless more meritocratic than the previous Chang and Rhee regimes. David Kang, *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[3] For example, see Sooyoung Park, "The Emergence of the Merit-Based Bureaucracy and the Formation of the Developmental State: The Case of South Korea in Historical Perspective," (PhD diss., University of Manchester, 2013).

[4] A noted exception is Jong-Sung You, who argues that land reform in the 1950s provided the necessary social and educational foundations for meritocratic bureaucracy irrespective of direct government policy. Jong-Sung You, "Demystifying the Park Chung-Hee Myth: Land Reform in the Evolution of Korea's Developmental State," *Journal of Contemporary Asia 47*, no. 4 (2017): 535–556.

[5] Sooyoung Park, "The Emergence of the Merit-Based Bureaucracy and the Formation of the Developmental State," 203–204.

It begins by tracing their activities through two periods. From 1953 to 1957, former Manchukuo bureaucrats inside the South Korean government faced significant financial and political hurdles. Both the political leadership and the American aid community were more with concerned stabilizing the nation's finances than structural reform. Moreover, President Syngman Rhee's politically motivated reorganization of the government in 1955 further weakened their already limited policymaking authority. Nonetheless, former Manchukuo bureaucrats worked within these political and financial constraints to "clean up" the government, while further developing plans for comprehensive reform.

While the Rhee regime was characterized by frequent personnel changes, in 1957 several of the reformers were promoted to higher levels of influence. At the same time, the American aid community was developing a growing interest in civil service reform. From 1957 to early 1960, these two groups collaborated to overhaul the nation's civil service training program hoping that this would lead towards a broader based reform program.

This chapter next takes a wider look at the community of former Manchukuo bureaucrats outside of the South Korean government who increasingly criticized the civil service system in the late 1950s. Considering their experience, former Manchukuo bureaucrat's concern with the state of the bureaucracy in South Korea is not surprising. For many, the decision to enter the Manchukuo bureaucracy was based on their inability to access jobs in the colonial government in Korea through the racialized, patronage-based system that limited opportunities for those without proper connections. In Manchukuo, however, they found a system that idealized equity, merit, and rationalism

and eschewed the influence of capitalism and partisan politics in government. As a colonial state, Manchukuo may have operated in ways that often undermined these principles, but from their perspective, so did the post-liberation South Korean state. Despite nominal restructuring after liberation aimed at creating a democratic and efficient civil service, they argued that little had changed in practice from colonial times.

Their solutions to this problem often took inspiration from Manchukuo, but this did not necessarily lead in a uniform direction. This was especially the case on issues such as regional autonomy and a civil service commission, which resulted in competing proposals. To a certain extent this conflict was driven by the hybrid character of Manchukuo itself, which allowed for multiple interpretations. However, it was also a product of a developing Cold War tension between democracy and efficiency that shaped how both they and their American counterparts understood the fundamental role of bureaucracy in society.

Finally, this chapter explores the role of former Manchukuo bureaucrats in bureaucratic reform after the collapse of the Rhee regime in the spring of 1960 and the establishment of the Second Republic. In the midst political purges, some former Manchukuo bureaucrats maintained their positions and sought to leverage renewed public interest, political will, and American support for a program of comprehensive civil service reform. Contentious politics and weak authority, however, led to delays at a time when many felt decisive action was needed. As a result, little substantive progress was made before the military overthrew the civilian government in May 1961 and took control of the state and the reform movement.

I. Trying for a Fresh Start, 1953–1957

Despite widespread destruction, the end of the Korean War in 1953 proved to be an opportunity for some former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the South Korean government. In the fall of 1953, Chi Ch'iyŏng (1914–2006), a graduate of the GUA's eleventh class was appointed Director of the Personnel Bureau (Insaguk) within the Office of General Affairs (Ch'ongmuch'ŏ) of the South Korean government. This was a logical step up for Chi, who had already served in multiple Section Chief appointments within the office, before being transferred to the Foreign Aid Bureau in the summer of 1953. In addition, he had participated in a six-month observation tour of personnel management systems in the United States and Canada in 1952 as part of a United Nations Technical Assistance Administration program.[6] Around the same time, Kim Yŏngchun, a graduate of Xinjing University of Law and Government (J. Sinkyō hōsei daigaku) and Manchukuo Civil Service Examination passer, also received an appointment to the Personnel Office as Chief of the Planning Section (Kihoekkwa chang).[7] Under Chi and Kim's direction, the Personnel Office took steps towards reestablishing and even strengthening the civil service system in several key areas, but their programs faced significant logistical and political hurdles.

One of the most immediate concerns was stabilizing bureaucratic wages. During wartime, rampant economic inflation had hit government workers particularly hard. Preoccupied with the progress of the war, the Rhee administration began administering a

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[6] "Chi Ch'iyŏng," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_109_20828.
[7] "Kim Yŏngchun," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_101_21264.

system of Special Wartime Allowances to provide some economic relief for civil servants and their families. Inflation, however, continued to be a problem. By the end of 1953, the growing gap between government wages and the cost of living was making it difficult to recruit and retain civil servants, and many considered insufficient wages to be a leading cause of official corruption.[8] With the transition to peacetime, the Office of General Affairs put forward a proposal that would have resulted in an across-the-board monthly salary increase of 5,000 hwan at time when the average government salary was only 900 hwan per month.[9] According to the Bureau's annual report, however, the proposal failed to gain budgetary approval. Instead, in April 1954, the government reauthorized the Special Wartime Allowance for another year and increased the daily grain ration by 20%.[10]

Another major concern for the Office was bureaucratic training. The National Officials Training Institute (Kukka kongmuwŏn hullyŏnwŏn; henceforth NOTI) had been established in 1949 as a central institution for training new government recruits, mostly in the lower grades, but had only conducted two three-month training programs in general administration before the war.[11] Thereafter, most of these programs were discontinued,

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[8] "Ponggŭm insang ŭn yanggok ŭro kongmuwŏn saenghwal pojang e Yi Taet'ongnyŏng tamhwa," *Tonga ilbo,* September 9, 1953.
[9] "Tansang tanha," *Tonga ilbo,* March 24, 1954; Office of Public Information, *Reports of the Cabinet Ministries of the Republic of Korea for 1954*, Korean Report Vol. 3 (Washington D.C.: Washington Bureau of the Korean Pacific Press, 1955), 1-2.
[10] Ibid.
[11] "Highlight-Feature Report—March, 1958 TC-Public Administration Division," *RG 469, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations(1953-61), Office of Far Eastern Operations, Entry 422, Korea Subject Files, 1953-59, Box 129, Administration-Public Admin. 1958*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_35_00C0422, Image 198-199, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000054722.
Little is known about the NOTI in its first few months of operation, but there is a possible Manchukuo connection here as well. According to two brief resumes from the early 1950s, P'yo Munhwa was appointed the Dean (*kamdok*) of the institute, most likely prior to the outbreak of the Korean war. "P'yo Munhwa," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB,

with training occurring on-the-job. After 1953, however, the Office of General Affairs and the Personnel Bureau began to take back some central control. In the fall of 1953, the NOTI was reestablished in a temporary facility in Seoul and began programs for both new and existing civil servants.[12]

The scope and content of these training programs, however, was extremely limited, particularly when compared with the highly developed program in Manchukuo. Between 1953 and 1955, the institute held two six-month training courses for newly recruited tax officials totaling 142 individuals.[13] Also, in the spring of 1954, the institute conducted three two-week in-service training programs for 178 officials from multiple departments.[14] The emphasis in these programs was also on training low-level financial officials, with most taking courses in accounting and tax administration, as well as basic English.[15]

While South Korea's post-war finances placed severe restrains on the office's programs, policymakers and their American advisors also showed little interest in tackling bureaucratic reform. In 1953, the Combined Economic Board (CEB), made up of officials from the South Korean and American governments, was focused on stabilizing state finances and therefore particularly averse to programs like government salary

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http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_113_20007. Nonetheless, his tenure was likely extremely short and had little impact on the development of the institution in the post-war.

[12] "Highlight-Feature Report—March, 1958 TC-Public Administration Division," AKH, Ref. AUS014_35_00C0422, Image 199; Office of Public Information, *Reports of the Cabinet Ministries of the Republic of Korea for 1954*, 2.

[13] "Highlight-Feature Report—March, 1958 TC-Public Administration Division," 199

[14] Ibid.

[15] Office of Public Information, *Reports of the Cabinet Ministries of the Republic of Korea for 1954*, 2.

increases that might actually worsen inflation.[16] American aid officials were not opposed to bureaucratic reform, at least in principle, but there were some differences within the various offices on timing. Officials in the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA)–newly formed to coordinate aid programs for U.S. allies around the world–were deeply concerned by the South Korean government's "crying need for administrative improvement, not least in personnel administration."[17] Throughout the summer and fall of 1953, FOA's Washington office pushed for a large-scale public administration program to "rehabilitate the civil service system."[18] However, the American officials on the CEB were less enthusiastic about implementing such a program, and not just for financial reasons. United Nations Command Economic Coordinator C. Tyler Wood (1900–1983) argued that the "climate" in the Korean Government was not right for a "whole-hearted" reform program. Judging individual ministers and high-level administrators in the government to be unreceptive to such programs, Wood felt that the FOA's plans were "very premature."[19] Rather, he outlined a more gradual, decentralized

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[16] "Kingmuwŏn pup'ae kwansŭp ilso saenghwal pojang wihae insang ponggŭp ryanggok kŭbyŏ," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* September 9, 1953.

[17] MacDonald Salter, "Public Administration in Korea," *RG 469, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations(1953-61), Office of Far Eastern Operations, Entry 422, Korea Subject Files, 1953-59, Box 1, (Korea-Administration) Staffing; Public Administrative; Rhee Visit; UNCRK*, AKH, Image 132, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000054378

[18] FOA/Washington, "Public Administration Program," in ibid, Image 274–278.
Such a proposal was not without precedent. Officials at the Economic Coordination Administration (ECA), which had administered U.S. aid programs in South Korea between 1949 and 1951, drafted a similar "Administrative Improvement" plan in the spring of 1950, but it was abandoned during the war. Donald Stone, "Program for Administrative Improvement of the Korean Government," *RG 469, Office of the Assistant Administrator for Program (1948-52), Korea Program Division (Division of Korea Program) 1948-51, Entry 80, Subject Files, 1948-51, Box 58, [Letter from Acting Prime Minister to Mr. Chun Kyoo Hong, Director, Office of Administration]*, AKH, Image 2-6, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000055126. FOA officials appear to have been aware of this plan and used it as a basis for their own recommendations. Macdonald Salter, "Public Administration Program, Korea," *Public Administration*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0125, Image 31 http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000261917.

[19] CINREP Seoul, "Public Administration in Korea," in ibid, Image 38.

plan to place technical advisors with at least some competency in government administration across all South Korean ministries and to encourage the Koreans to approach reform on their own initiative.[20] According to Wood, after "a year or two" of this foundational work, a more comprehensive plan might be practical.[21]

The CEB and FOA were at odds on the issue until the end of 1953, but as the central coordinating body among the various aid groups in Korea, the CEB had the last word. In early 1954, however, Wood seemed receptive to a more limited FOA plan to recruit Korean officials for short-term study trips to the U.S. focused on public administration.[22] In this regard, at least, there was some successful coordination between the FOA and the South Korean Personnel Bureau. With assistance from Director Chi, himself a graduate of a similar program, 63 Korean officials were selected for technical training in the U.S. in 1954. [23] However, only nineteen ultimately departed–fourteen on short-term programs and five on long-term study trips.[24] While the full reasoning for the program's limitation is unclear, resistance from President Rhee was likely a factor. According to FOA documents, Rhee was upset that students on previous training missions had later quit or transferred to posts irrelevant to their training, and some had even refused to return to Korea. As a result, Rhee insisted to the Americans that they

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[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] MacDonald Salter, "Letter to C. Tyler Wood, February 23, 1954,". *RG 469, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations(1953-61), Office of Far Eastern Operations, Entry 422, Korea Subject Files, 1953-59, Box 1, (Korea-Administration) Staffing; Public Administrative; Rhee Visit; UNCRK*, AKH, image 138, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000054378; G. W. Lawson Jr., "Letter to MacDonald Salter, March 25, 1954," in ibid., image 137.
[23] Office of Public Information, *Reports of the Cabinet Ministries of the Republic of Korea for 1954*, 2
[24] Ibid.

confine themselves to bringing technical advisors to conduct training in Korea rather than sending Koreans abroad.[25]

Rhee's political agenda would prove problematic for bureaucratic reformers in other ways. In the fall of 1954, Rhee's Liberal Party submitted and passed a controversial constitutional amendment that significantly strengthened the power of the president and eliminated the term limits preventing Rhee from running for reelection in 1956.[26] A less appreciated outcome of the constitutional amendment was the organizational chaos caused by eliminating the Office of Prime Minister, especially regarding personnel management. Under existing laws, the Prime Minster oversaw personnel issues not only as head of the Office of General Affairs but also as President of the Civil Service Examination Committee, and the Civil Service Special Disciplinary Committee. Until these laws were amended to accord with the new constitutional structure, therefore, virtually all of South Korea's civil service institutions were without leadership. This issue was not unanticipated, and shortly after the amendment's passage, the Liberal Party introduced a bill to revise the Government Organization Law (*chŏngbo chojikpŏp*).

Leading the Liberal Party's push for government reorganization was another former Manchukuo bureaucrat, Yi Ch'unghwan (1917-2005).[27] When introducing the bill

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[25] Foreign Operations Administration Office of Regional Director for the Far East, "Korea Fiscal Year 1955 Program Submission to the Bureau of the Budget," *Korea Fiscal Year 1955 Program Submission*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_57_00C0009_004, Image 27, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000181772.

[26] For a concise summary of the amendment's main points and the controversy over its passage, see *Report of the United Nations Commission for the Rehabilitation of Korea*, General Assembly Official Records: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/2947) (New York: United Nations, 1955), 12-13.

[27] Yi graduated from the GUA's thirteenth class in 1941. In the first five years after liberation, he worked as a teacher. He was elected to the South Korean National Assembly in 1950 as an independent, but after joining Rhee's Liberal Party in 1954 he became Chairman of the National Assembly's powerful Budget Committee. "Yi Ch'unghwan," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_108_22096.

in the Assembly, Yi characterized the overall objective of proposed revisions as "simplification," "democratization," and the "promotion of government efficiency."[28] To this end the bill consolidated all civil service functions, including recruitment, certification, training, compensation, and punishment into a new Office of General Affairs (Kungmuwŏn samuguk, henceforth OGA).[29] It also placed the power of appointment below the level of Vice Minister exclusively in the hands of the president and the cabinet.[30]

On paper this new organizational structure was remarkably similar the civil service structure in Manchukuo, although it is unclear if it was a direct inspiration. By centralizing personnel management into a single office housed within the executive branch, the government would gain more control over the bureaucracy without interference from the legislature. Moreover, Yi claimed that such measures would lead to a more qualified, efficient, and professional civil service.[31] In Manchukuo, however, those leading the charge for a centralized bureaucratic structure had benefited from a high level of coordination and cooperation among ministries at the policy-making level, particularly in the military. This was not the case within the Liberal Party government and, as will be discussed shortly, practical application of the government reorganization program actually hindered bureaucratic centralization in several ways.

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[28] "Che 19 hoe Kukhoe imsi hoeŭi sokkirok," no. 116, January 10, 1955, Image 14, NADL, Ref. no. PROC2014001133.
[29] The name of this office is sometimes translated as Cabinet Secretariat. While I find this to be a more accurate translation, I use Office of General Affairs or OGA because it is the English name used most frequently by the South Korean Government and other international agencies in Korea.
[30] Ibid, 8-9.
[31] Ibid, 14.

Debate over the bill proved to be highly contentions. There was broad consensus within the assembly that the existing civil service structure had been a failure, but opposition politicians were concerned that centralizing the bureaucracy might also lead to Liberal Party dominance over the state.[32] Some Liberal Party members even objected to the reduction of legislative oversight.[33] Two multi-party groups of legislators, therefore, introduced competing amendments that would have created an independent Civil Service Commission. Neither amendment offered much detail, but their arguments suggested that similar institutions in the United States or Japan might serve as useful models.[34] Opposition politician Chŏng Ilhyŏng, who had been Director of the OKCS during the U.S. occupation, for example argued for a return to the kind of institutions the Americans had established in 1946.[35] The irony of this argument was not lost on Yi Ch'unghwan who pointed out that the civil service under the Americans had been just as politicized and corrupt.[36] In this respect, Yi argued, operation was just as important as structure. In his own assessment, an independent civil service commission like that in Japan would, in practice, create more inefficiencies and should therefore be rejected.[37] Rather, Yi positioned the original proposal as a means of strengthening the existing institutions with greater authority. The bill passed on party lines in January 1955.

Yi Ch'unghwan's comments on the distinction between structure and operation proved to be equally ironic. In practice, consolidating personnel functions into the hands

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[32] "Che 19 hoe Kukhoe imsi hoeŭi sokkirok," no. 119 (January 13, 1955) Image 22, NADL, Ref. no. PROC2014001135.
[33] *Report of the United Nations Commission for the Rehabilitation of Korea*, 12.
[34] "Che 19 hoe Kukhoe imsi hoeŭi sokkirok," no. 126 (January 21, 1955) Images 23–25, NADL, Ref. no. PROC2014001142.
[35] Ibid., 23.
[36] Ibid., 25.
[37] Ibid., 25-26.

of the newly formed OGA significantly reduced their authority. Despite an expanded mandate and jurisdiction over the entire government bureaucracy, the leadership structure of the OGA was far too weak to carry out the task. The former Office of Personnel and Civil Service Examination Commission were reduced to section level units with little authority of their own. The Director of the OGA was also a career bureaucrat with no policymaking power. Instead, the office was placed in the portfolio of the Chief Cabinet minister–usually the Minister of Foreign Affairs–who, in addition to having little background in civil service policy, was in charge of one of the same ministries that the OGA was tasked with regulating. In practice, personnel appointments and dismissals continued to be handled within the individual ministries while the OGA's main responsibility was processing the paperwork.

At the same time, former Manchukuo bureaucrats represented a significant portion of new OGA's mid-level leadership. Sin Tuyŏng (1918–1990) and Kim Tŏkpo (1917–1989) had both been officials in Manchukuo's public land development corporations in the 1940s, followed by a variety of administrative posts in the South Korean government, before coming to OGA as section chiefs in 1955.[38] Kim Sangch'ŏl (1916–?), who started out as a paid advisor to the OGA and then took a permanent position in 1956, had previously spent three years in the Manchukuo General Affairs Office, including six months in the Personnel Department.[39] But it was Kim Yŏngchun,

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[38] Ch'ongmuch'ŏ insaguk insakwa, "Kungmuwŏn samuguk 2 kŭp 3 kŭp kongamuwŏn immyŏng" *Immyŏng kwangye chŏl (Kungmuwŏn samuguk)*, 1955, Kukka kirokwŏn (KNA), Ref. BA0086331, 1–9; "Sin Tuyŏng," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_107_20431; Kim Tŏkpo," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_101_20711.

[39] In another example of former Manchukuo bureaucrats supporting each other, Kim Chunhwan (GUA 14th class) served as a character witness for Kim Sangch'ŏl's employment evaluation. Ch'ongmuch'ŏ insaguk

who carried over as Chief of the Personnel Section, who took the most active role in pushing for civil service reform at the OGA.

Kim identified three fundamental and interrelated issues with the civil service. The first was that bureaucrats lacked a secure standard of living. According to Kim, this had been the root cause of most of the problems within the bureaucracy since the nation's founding, particularly government corruption. However, in Kim's opinion neither the government's budget authorities nor the public had seriously taken up the matter.[40] The second was the low level of bureaucratic efficiency. For Kim this was also largely a consequence of the lack of financial stability, since bureaucrats were more focused on personal survival than their official duties.[41] But he also noted several structural causes. The Special Disciplinary Board, for example, had effectively ceased functioning after constitutional revision eliminated the Prime Minister.[42] In addition, government officials were under no obligation to make appointments from the list of Civil Service Examination passers, and therefore recruited almost exclusively through a less stringent screening system.[43] This related to the third issue for Kim, the lack of proper training. With most bureaucrats either lacking government experience or having come up through the old Government General, Kim argued that both pre- and in-service training were urgently required to turn the still colonialized bureaucracy into an efficient, and

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insakwa, "Samugwan (Kungmuwŏn samuguk) immyŏng ŭi kŏn," *Immyŏng kwangye chŏl (Kungmuwŏn samuguk)*, 1956, KNA, Ref. BA0086924, 162–176.
[40] Kim Yŏngchun, "Uri nara insa chedo kaesŏl (4)," *Kosi wa chŏnhyŏng 4*, no. 5 (July 1956): 68.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Kim Yŏngchun, "Uri nara insa chedo kaesŏl (5)," *Kosi wa chŏnhyŏng 4*, no. 6 (August 1956): 71.
[43] Kim Yŏngchun, "Uri nara insa chedo kaesŏl (3)," *Kosi wa chŏnhyŏng 4*, no. 4 (June 1956): 22.

democratic civil service.[44] For Kim, these issues all required a systemic reorganization of the state's personnel management around a powerful centralized institution.[45]

Kim's proposal for such an institution remained vague on the details, likely for political reasons, but his analysis of Japan's postwar civil service system offers some clues. Opposition politicians had first proposed adopting Japan's post-war National Personnel Agency (K. Insawŏn, J. Jinjiin) as a model for civil service reform during the government reorganization debates in 1954, predominantly out of a desire to check Liberal Party control over the bureaucracy. Kim likewise praised the Japanese agency's independent and depoliticized structure, but he argued that the system had far more to offer in terms of "advancing bureaucratic efficiency" and "basic scientific management."[46]

The commission, for example, played a crucial role in securing fair compensation for government officials. This was because, according to Kim, the committee based its recommendations on "scientific research and surveys" and the principle of balancing between the needs of bureaucrats and the taxpayers they served.[47] Kim even produced a chart showing that the commission had recommended pay rises annually from 1948 through 1956, and nearly every recommendation received diet approval–with some modifications–within three months.[48] For someone like Kim, who had weathered multi-year political battles in both the Cabinet and National Assembly for regular salary increases, this was clearly more efficient.

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[44] Kim Yŏngchun, "Uri nara insa chedo kaesŏl (4)," 68.
[45] Kim Yŏngchun, "Uri nara insa chedo kaesŏl (1)," *Kosi wa chŏnhyŏng 4*, no. 2 (March 1956): 21.
[46] Kim Yŏngchun, "Ilbon ŭi insa chedo," *Kosigye 2*, no 9 (November 1957):169.
[47] Ibid., 171
[48] Ibid.

Kim also praised the Japanese for establishing a merit-based system. The near exclusive use of competitive examinations for appointments, and increasingly for promotions, was certainly one feature that drew Kim's attention. However, Japan also offered a more holistic set of tools for creating a more skilled bureaucracy. Policies such as a six-month probationary period for new appointments and regular performance reviews allowed administrators weed out unqualified individuals. Moreover, Kim contended that these programs alone had largely eliminated official corruption without the need for disciplinary boards.[49] These were also part of a more positive set of institutions designed to study and promote greater bureaucratic efficiency throughout the government, including university education, in-service training, and a National Public Administration Association.[50]

Considering the failure of the Civil Service Commission amendments 1955, this kind of systemic change was unlikely, but Kim was not deterred from pursuing more creative solutions. Starting in 1955 there was a significant shift in the kind of training programs taking place at the NOTI. Short-term classes for tax officials and accountants were replaced with those focusing on training officials in general services and personnel administration.[51] Beginning in 1956, the Institute began general in-service training programs for low-ranking officials (grades 4 and 5) across all ministries.[52] The Personnel Section also implemented an "administrative probationer" program that had some structural similarities to the civil service system in Manchukuo. In order to encourage

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[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid., 173.
[51] "Highlight-Feature Report—March, 1958 TC-Public Administration Division," AKH, Image 200.
[52] Ibid.

ministries to make appointments from the civil service exam list, the Personnel Section invited exam passers to a three-month pre-service training program at the NOTI, followed by a one-year practical training at an assigned ministry.[53] The hope was that at the end of their probation, the ministries would decide to bring them on with a full appointment. However, ministry officials were under no obligation to do so and evidence suggest that few were retained.[54] Like other attempts at reform, the probationer program also suffered from a lack of financial support. Probationers were only paid a fraction of the regular government salary–already a meager sum–and with few probationers transitioning into regular employment, the program began to lose popularity.[55]

Kim also attempted to find more creative solutions to reform the bureaucracy from the inside. In the fall of 1956, he spearheaded an OGA proposal to "clean-up" (*chŏngni*) the civil service through mass layoffs. Periodic reductions in the government rolls had occurred since the outbreak of the Korean War for financial reasons. Consequently, the OGA's proposal to lay off more than 11,000 regular (*ilban*) and 15,000 temporary (*imsi*) public workers by the end of 1956, was presented as a financial win-win for the budget as well as the bureaucracy. The layoffs would allow for the first significant wage increase since the war and simplify personnel expenses. This included the elimination of the Special Wartime Stipends and a 500% increase in average monthly

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[53] Korean Research and Information Office, *Reports from the Cabinet Ministries of the Republic of Korea for 1957*, Korean Report vol. 5 (Washington D.C.: Korean Research and Information Office, 1957), 235.
[54] Song Haekyŏng, "Kungmu hoeŭirok ŭl t'onghae salp'yŏ pon che 1 konghwaguk hugi ŭi kukka kwalli wa kongmuwŏn insa chŏngch'aek," *Han'guk insa haengjŏng hakhoebo 9*, no. 1 (2010): 123-124.
[55] In 1957 the Office of Personnel recruited 405 candidates and selected 120 for the program. Korean Research and Information Office, *Reports from the Cabinet Ministries of the Republic of Korea for 1957*, 235. The following year there were 325 applicants, with only 30 selected for the program. Korean Research and Information Office, *Reports from the Cabinet Ministries of the Republic of Korea for 1958*, Korea Report vol. 6 (Washington D.C.: Korean Research and Information Office, 1958), 222.

salary for all workers.[56] It also established an institutional framework for civil service retirement support, although not to the level of a full pension system.[57] But for reformers such as Kim Yŏngchun, this was more than simply a financial program.

If Kim's Personnel Section could not directly control the ministries' hiring practices, the layoffs could at least be an opportunity to pressure them to increase efficiency by eliminating the corrupt and incompetent. This was apparent from the criteria the proposal used to identify workers for termination. One of the main groups singled out were individuals likely appointed through personal favors or corruption, such as those previously subject to disciplinary action, those who had never passed the screening process, and those on perpetual leave or so-called "on-call" (*taegi*) officials who, according to Kim, "don't actually do any work."[58] The guidelines also included officials over the age of 55, which would eliminate most of the remaining holdovers from the Government General. Finally, those with "substandard work performance," were targeted for layoffs.[59] The guidelines also made several explicit exemptions based on merit and efficiency. Older officials, for example, were exempt if they possessed "irreplaceable and special skills."[60] It also protected civil service examination passers, graduates and currents students at the NOTI, and current and former members of foreign observation and study missions.

The actual impact of the layoffs is difficult to assess. A total of 11,482 regular civil service jobs were eliminated by the end of 1956, but it is likely that regional

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[56] Kim Yŏngchun, "Kongmuwŏn chŏngnian ŭi chŏnmo," *Kosigye 1*, no. 3 (November 1956): 155.
[57] Ibid., 152, 154.
[58] Ibid., 151.
[59] The guidelines were notably silent, however, on how work performance should be evaluated. Presumably, this was left to each ministry's personnel office to determine.
[60] Ibid.

officials were far more effected than those in the central government.[61] Moreover, officials in the OGA Personnel Section had little control over how individual ministries implemented their guidelines. Consequentially, the program likely did little to advance Kim's desire to "clean-up" the bureaucracy. Still, it was not a complete failure. The overall reduction in personnel costs did lead to the promised salary increase that he had been pushing for since 1953.[62] Moreover, bureaucrats like Kim continued to press for more substantial reforms after 1957, this time with added support from American officials.

II. The "Quarterbacks," 1957–April 1960

While U.S. aid workers had been unsuccessful in developing a large-scale public administration program in 1954, things began to change shortly thereafter. In November of 1955 C. Tyler Wood reversed his position and created a dedicated Public Administration Division (PAD) within the office of the Economic Coordinator, in part to consolidate the police, tax administration, supply, and statistical programs into a single office.[63] However the renewed interest in public administration also came from increasing frustration with the South Korean government's "lack of coordination."[64] The Korean civil service, according to one American, was hampered by lack of adequate

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[61] Specific numbers are not available, but the Ministry of Home Affairs, which oversaw regional administration at the time, accounted for more than 75% of all reductions. Korean Research and Information Office, *Reports from the Cabinet Ministries of the Republic of Korea for 1957*, 234.
[62] Korean Research and Information Office, *Reports from the Cabinet Ministries of the Republic of Korea for 1957*, 234.
[63] CINCREP Seoul, "Reply to Letters Dated 9/11/56 and 9/21/56," *Public Administration*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0360, Image 33-34, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000954470.
[64] Frederick C. Spreyer, "Comments on Public Administration as Requested in FOATO A-469," *Public Administration*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0125, Image 16.

training and experience, the "semi-dictatorial" political power of Syngman Rhee, and inadequate pay.[65] American officials were beginning to consider these issues as threatening to the effectiveness of the overall aid mission.

Despite a lack of expertise and financial support, the PAD made some important first steps towards a reform program in the summer of 1956. In late July, the PAD led a group of Korean officials on a week-long observation mission to the Institute of Public Administration in the Philippines hoping that this would build support for a similar project in Korea.[66] The trip succeeded in impressing the Koreans, and following their return, the PAD helped organize a meeting government officials and academics where the group presented their findings. While government representatives came from several departments, the largest contingent came from Kim Yŏngchun's Personnel Section.[67] The PAD's efforts led to two major accomplishments that bureaucratic reformers like Kim had been pressing for in the fall of 1956. The first was the formation of the Korean Association for Public Administration (Han'guk haengjong hakhoe), which was to serve as joint effort by government and academia to advance the scientific study of government management.[68] The second was an expansion of the technical assistance contract with the

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[65] Ibid.
[66] Victor L. Glines, "Report of the Survey Trip to Institute of Public Administration, Manila, Philippine Islands; from July 27 to August 3, inclusive," *Public Administration*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0360, Image 4-5.
[67] It is possible that Kim was in attendance. Of the five representatives of the Personnel Section listed on the PAD's roster, one is named "Kim Yong Hoon." I have been unable to find any evidence of an individual with this name in South Korean Government, although records for this period are incomplete. However, since "J" and "H" are adjacent on a typewriter, there is a high probability this is a typographical error for "Kim Yong Joon," a typical transliteration of Kim Yongchun. "Roster of ROK and Foreign Officials Attending Meeting Held at National Officials Training Institute on 23 August 1956," *Public Administration*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0360, image 14.
[68] CINCREP Seoul, "Korean Association for Public Administration," ibid., image 16.

University of Minnesota to improve the NOTI's in-service training program and develop a Graduate School of Public Administration at Seoul National University.[69]

The following year saw significant personnel changes in both the OGA and the PAD that would bring reform-minded former Manchukuo bureaucrats and American advisors into a closer working relationship. In June 1957, Sin Tuyŏng was promoted to Director of the OGA and Kim Yŏngchun was promoted to Deputy Director.[70] Around the same time Marvin Smith (?-?) arrived to take over as Director of the PAD. Unlike previous leadership in the PAD, Smith had extensive experience in public administration, particularly personnel management. Prior to his arrival in Korea, Smith had worked as a contract technician on the U.S. public administration program in the Philippines where his focus was on rationalizing the classification and pay scale system.[71] Smith's arrival was followed by Dr. Erwin R. Draheim (1908–1994) the first technical advisor from the University of Minnesota contract. Draheim had worked in the U.S. Department of Agriculture Office of Personnel where he developed the department's in-service training program. His job in Korea was do the same for the entire civil service.

Draheim's responsibilities put him in daily contact with the OGA, and he quickly developed a close working relationship with the reform-minded former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the office. Draheim's initial impression of the office was that for that

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[69] E. R. Draheim, *Improving Management through Effective In-Service Training* (Seoul: National Officials Training Institute, 1959), 2–3.
[70] Ch'ongmuchŏ insaguk insakwa, "Kungmuwŏn samugukjang immyŏng ŭi kŏn," *Immyŏng kwangyech'ŏl*, 1957, KNA, Ref. BA0086958, 16–17.
[71] Earlier in his career, Smith served in the personnel divisions in the State of California, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Department of Agriculture. Marvin M. Smith, "Term-End Report, Marvin M. Smith, Chief of Public Administration Division," *RG 469, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations(1953-61), Office of Far Eastern Operations, Entry 422, Korea Subject Files, 1953-59, Box 129, Public Administration, 1959*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_35_00C0423, image 22, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000054723.

nation's central civil service management institution, it was severely understaffed and overworked.[72] He nonetheless found the leadership to be enthusiastic and supportive of his plans. This was driven in large part by a shared belief in the need for practical, rather than purely academic training.[73] On a more personal level, Sin and Draheim bonded over their shared background in rural agricultural development.[74]

Since taking over the leadership of the OGA, Sin and Kim had generally focused their energies on expanding existing programs. At the time of his promotion to Deputy Director, Kim had just completed a major project to create a handbook for personnel administrators.[75] Then in the fall of 1957, Sin and Kim ran two short-term training programs for 83 central and regional government officials engaged in personnel administration, in an attempt to create a uniform system of procedures and standards.[76] They also continued to attempt bottom up reform through pre-service training and the administrative probationer system, but were unsuccessful in convincing ministries to

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[72] Not long after his arrival, for example, Draheim reported that Sin Tuyŏng had "collapsed in his office from overwork." E. R. Draheim, "Letter to Tracy F. Tyler, March 18, 1958," *1957–1958 Dr. E. R. Draheim*, Lloyd Milton Short Papers, Box 14, Folder 25, Image 97, University of Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll523:864.

[73] E. R Draheim, "Letter to George A. Warp, September 4, 1959," *1959–1961 Dr. E. R. Draheim*, Lloyd Milton Short Papers, Box 14, Folder 24, Image 20, University of Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll523:5092.

[74] E. R Draheim, "Letter to George A. Warp, June 8, 1959,"*1958–1959 Dr. E. R. Draheim*, Lloyd Milton Short Papers, Box 14, Folder 23, Image 77, University of Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll523:2840.
Draheim's academic background was in agricultural education, and he had nearly a decade of experience teaching at vocational high schools and colleges before arriving at the USDA. E. R. Draheim, "Biographical Sketch," *Dr. Draheim, 1957–1958*, 1957–1958, Box 16, Folder 13, Image 247, University of Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll515:12744. Sin was a graduate of Suwon Agricultural College prior going to Manchukuo and lectured at agricultural schools in Manchukuo and South Korea after liberation. "Sin Tuyŏng," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_107_20431.

[75] Kim Yŏngchun, *Insa kwangye pŏmnyŏng mit yegyujip* (Seoul: Chusik hoesa samhyŏp munhwasa, 1957)

[76] "Highlight-Feature Report—March, 1958 TC-Public Administration Division," AKH, Ref. AUS014_35_00C0422, Image 207.

support the program.[77] The greater part of 1958, however, was dedicated to another protracted budget battle over wage increases. The cabinet ultimately agreed to a 100% across-the-board pay raise coinciding with another round of layoffs. As in 1956, the vast majority of 9,500 who lost their jobs were in regional government.[78]

American aid officials proved to be valuable allies in advancing these policies. Smith and the PAD succeeded in putting external pressure on the cabinet to increase government wages in order to "maintain efficient operations."[79] Draheim, meanwhile, helped restructure the pre-service training program. He also secured funding to renovate the aging NOTI facilities and expand the institute's outdated library with the latest in printed and visual training material.[80]

Smith and Draheim, however, had their own ideas about how to achieve long-term reform that differed from the Koreans. The existing approach at the OGA was to transform the bureaucracy from the bottom-up by retraining low-level officials, developing young recruits, and eliminating older, inefficient workers. While not discounting the importance of such methods, the Americans also recognized the utility of a top-down approach targeting the high-level officials responsible for hiring decisions and setting the culture in their individual ministries. Winning them over would also create momentum for a more comprehensive in-service training program. Early on, the two men agreed to pursue training courses for Directors and Bureau Chiefs (civil service grades 1

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[77] Song, "Kungmu hoeŭirok ŭl t'onghae salp'yŏ pon che 1 konghwaguk," 124.
[78] Korean Research and Information Office, *Reports from the Cabinet Ministries of the Republic of Korea for 1958*, 222.
[79] CINCREP Seoul, "Public Administration Development in 1956," AKH, Ref. AUS014_35_00C0422, Image 40.
[80] Draheim, *Improving Management through Effective In-Service Training*, 12–18.

and 2).[81] According to Draheim, when he proposed this to officials at the OGA, they "thought it was a good idea."[82]

For former Manchukuo bureaucrats, the necessity and benefits of management training were already well established before the American's suggested it. While the details of the program Draheim was proposing were quite different, the idea of management training tapped into a deeper way of looking at the bureaucracy that had changed little since Manchukuo. Much like the founders of the Manchukuo civil service complaining about Japan, former Manchukuo bureaucrats in South Korea blamed the government's problems, in part, on poor leadership. Those in upper echelon of the career civil service, they argued, were inexperienced and obstinately clung to old ways of thinking.[83] At the same time, reformers in both Manchukuo and South Korea understood that cultivating new leadership from below would take time that they could not afford.[84] The result in Manchukuo was continuous expansion of centralized training for not only new but existing managers in all government-controlled sectors.[85] More than a decade later, Kim Yŏngchun and other former Manchukuo bureaucrats had argued that a similar

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[81] E. R. Draheim, "Letter to George A. Warp, January 8, 1958," *1957–1959, Dr. E. R. Draheim*, Lloyd Milton Short Papers, Box 14, Folder 22, Image 51, University of Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll523:4495. Draheim claims in this letter to have had Cabinet approval for this program, but this was most certainly an erroneous assumption. The cabinet did not approve the plan until October 1958.

[82] E. R. Draheim, "Monthly Summary Report, February 19, 1959," *1958–1959 Dr. E. R Draheim, National Officials Training Institute Reports*, Lloyd Milton Short Papers, Box 14, Folder 26, Image 72, University of Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll523:5706

[83] Pak Am, "Kongmuwŏn ron," *Chibang haengjŏng* 7 no.1 (January 1958): 63; Kim Yŏngchun, "Uri nara insa chedo kaesŏl (4)," 68.

[84] Sin Tuyŏng, "Need for Training in the Civil Service System in Korea," *1958–1959 Dr. E. R Draheim, National Officials Training Institute Reports*, Image 29.

[85] In-service training in Manchukuo began as early as 1934 but was relatively sporadic at first. It became more systematized in 1940, when Great Unity Academy established a special six-month training course for officials with three-years of experience as higher officials in the Government and Concordia Association, as well as managers in state industries. Daidō gakuin kyōmuka chōsa ko, *Daidō gakuin kansei ichiran* 18

approach was necessary in South Korea.[86] Nonetheless, OGA officials, including Kim, told Draheim that they "did not consider it possible to accomplish [such a program] in Korea."[87]

After years attempting their own reform programs, they clearly understood the limitations of their authority within the existing political structures. In the past, getting cabinet approval had required near constant negotiations on political and budgetary issues. Progress was also persistently setback by President Rhee's unchecked power to reshuffle the cabinet at will. Even if they did get cabinet approval, OGA leaders were skeptical that they would be able to convince managers to participate.[88]

Within a few months of his arrival, Draheim had encountered these roadblocks on his own. One of Draheims' early proposals was to create a "government wide training committee" at the cabinet level to help develop a comprehensive general training program and build awareness around the value of such a program.[89] Draheim reported making some "initial steps" in April 1958, and was still working on the project in May, but by June he had given up due to lack of interest from ministry officials.[90] Draheim also worked with the OGA to draft a presidential decree calling for the establishment of a

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[86] Pak Am, "Kongmuwŏn ron," 63; Kim Yŏngchun, "Uri nara insa chedo kaesŏl (4)," 68; Chŏng Hyŏnchun, "Kongmuwŏn ch'ŏu kaesŏn ŭl kidae handa: ch'ŏu kaesŏn ŭi munjejŏm kwa haegyŏlch'aek," *Chaejŏng* (June 1958) 28.
[87] Draheim, "Monthly Summary Report, February 19, 1959," Image 72.
[88] Ibid., Image 73.
[89] E. R. Draheim, "Record of Agreed Upon Recommendations for Improving NOTI," *1957–1959 Dr. E. R. Draheim*, Lloyd Milton Short Papers, Box 14, Folder 22, Image, 122, University of Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll523:4495.
[90] E. R. Draheim, "Monthly Summary Report, April 19, 1958," *1958–1959 Dr. E. R Draheim, National Officials Training Institute Reports*, Lloyd Milton Short Papers, Box 14, Folder 26, Image 3, University of Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll523:5706.

"government wide In-service Training Policy," but it was stuck in "discussion" for months.[91]

Still, Draheim was undeterred. By June 1958, he had convinced Sin to focus their efforts on an executive training program.[92] Together with the Dean of the NOTI, the three men engaged in a relentless lobbying campaign for the next four months.[93] The three "quarterbacks," as Draheim called them, scheduled meetings with Ministers and Vice Ministers throughout the summer to convince them to back the plan. Unlike previous reform efforts, though, they also worked with American aid officials and Korean academic organizations, such as the Association for Public Administration, that might be able to put pressure from the outside.[94] Their efforts proved to be successful. Along with the layoffs and pay raise announced in October 1958, the cabinet stated its intention to "raise the integrity of its employees."[95] While not the direct statement on in-service training policy Draheim had been pushing, it was certainly an opening. Shortly thereafter, Draheim and the OGA began serious discussions with the cabinet on a pilot program. The curriculum and instructors were set by the end of October, the proposal was approved in November, and the program was set to start at the beginning of 1959.[96]

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[91] E. R. Draheim, "Monthly Summary Report, June 19, 1958," in ibid., Image 8.
[92] Initially Draheim reported this program would be for Directors and Vice-ministers (civil service rank 1) but was later downgraded to Directors and Bureau Chiefs (rank 2). Ibid.
[93] E. R. Draheim, *Improving Management through Effective In-Service Training*, 12.
[94] Draheim and Sin, for example collaborated on a joint lecture to American aid workers as part of the "Technical Lecture" series. Sin introduced the structural problems with the South Korean bureaucracy, and Draheim followed up with a discussion of how in-service training would help. E. R. Draheim and Shin Too Young, "Technical Lecture No. 11," *1958–1959 Dr. E. R Draheim, National Officials Training Institute Reports*, Lloyd Milton Short Papers, Box 14, Folder 26, Images 24–38, University of Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll523:5706.
[95]CINCREP Seoul, "Public Administration Development in 1956," AKH, Ref. AUS014_35_00C0422, Image 40.
[96] E. R Draheim, "Monthly Summary Report, October 20, 1958" *1958–1959 Dr. E. R Draheim, National Officials Training Institute Reports*, Lloyd Milton Short Papers, Box 14, Folder 26, Image 40, University of

Their lobbying efforts only intensified with the start of the pilot program. In addition to the 24 Directors and Bureau Chiefs[97] selected for the program, Draheim and Sin invited more than 70 "special honored guests" to observe and participate in the classes daily. These included high-ranking officials, university presidents, American military and aid officials, and industrial managers.[98] Draheim had also worked with the University of Minnesota to equip the NOTI with the latest in audio-visual learning technology, that impressed both the student and observers. Sin and Draheim aimed for even wider publicity to the public at large. In January, just as the pilot program was kicking off, Sin appeared on national radio to discuss the "positive steps that will be taken in 1959 to improve management in the ROK Government at all levels."[99] In the broadcast, he not only introduced the pilot program for Directors and Bureau Chiefs but also mid-level management training for section chiefs, and revamped programs for lower level bureaucrats, despite the fact that none of those programs yet had cabinet approval.[100] The pilot program also received positive assessment from the South Korean press.[101] At the end of the program, the students completed anonymous evaluations that were overwhelmingly positive. Students particularly responded to the practical nature of the pedagogy that emphasized active discussion, case studies, and inductive reasoning

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Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll523:5706; Drameim, *Improving Management Through Effective In-service Training*, 12.

[97] Notably, one of the first officials to go through the training was OGA Deputy Director Kim Yŏngchun. "Directors and Bureau Chiefs of the ROK Government Attending the Executive Development Training Seminar Conducted at NOTI from 1/28/59 through 3/16/59" in ibid., Image 76.

[98] "Special Honor Guests Who Attended the Executive Development Training Seminar," in ibid., Images 79–84.

[99] E. R. Draheim, "Monthly Summary Report, January 19, 1959," in ibid., Image 48.

[100] Ibid.

[101] "Picture and Report of Executive Development Seminar under way at the National Officials training Institute, Seoul, Korea," in ibid. Images 94-96; "Picture and News Story Covering the Closing Ceremony of the First ROK Government Executive Development Seminar at the National Officials Training Institute, Seoul, Korea," in ibid., Images 97–98.

over straight lecture.[102] One anonymous student went so far as to echo the OGA's agenda directly:

> It is to be regretted that this kind of training could not have taken place much earlier in our government which…is now struggling for betterment of administration…The importance of this training together with a training policy should have been determined a long time ago as an essential national fundamental policy for public officials.[103]

All of this positive publicity provided Draheim and the OGA with momentum to expand the program further. By the end of 1959, 141 Directors and Bureau Chiefs had completed the Executive Development Seminar, and 97 Section Chiefs had participated in a newly developed Middle Management Training Seminar.[104] Draheim's proposal to make the NOTI a nexus for training programs in specific ministries also began bearing fruit, thanks in part to another individual with Manchukuo experience. Shortly after his arrival in Seoul, Draheim had crossed paths with Kim Ilhwan, a former military officer in Manchukuo and at the time Minister of Commerce and Industry. [105] Kim came out of their meeting with a favorable impression and wrote that Draheim "should have come to Korea earlier."[106] Following the success of the pilot program, Kim, now Minister of Transportation, met with Sin and Draheim about establishing dedicated training officers in each ministry, starting with his own.[107] Kim was also instrumental in forming a special

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[102] "Results of Evaluation," in ibid., Images 137-139.
[103] Ibid., Image 138. Though I cannot say for certain, it is possible that this statement was written by Kim Yŏngchun, who participated in the pilot program as a student.
[104] Draheim, *Improving Management Through Effective In-service Training*, 21.
[105] For a more detailed discussion Kim Ilhwan's background and post Korean War activities, see Chapter 5
[106] Kim Il Hwan, "Letter to Erwin R. Draheim, January 31, 1958," *1957–1959 Dr. E. R. Draheim*, Lloyd Milton Short Papers, Box 14, Folder 22, Image 69, University of Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll523:4495.
[107] E. R. Draheim, "Monthly Summary Report, May 19, 1959," *1958–1959 Dr. E. R Draheim, National Officials Training Institute Reports*, Lloyd Milton Short Papers, Box 14, Folder 26, Image 142, University of Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll523:5706; E. R. Draheim, "Monthly Summary Report, June 19, 1959," in ibid., Image 163.

cabinet sub-committee to research in-service training policy.[108] The sub-committee's efforts ultimately led to language included in the Government's 1960 budget proposal calling for in-service training at all levels of government "in order to secure rapid development and improvement of administrative efficiency."[109] Based on these accomplishments, Draheim made an overwhelmingly positive assessment of his progress at the end of his contract in December 1959.[110]

In the broader context of bureaucratic reform, however, the success of the management training program was quite limited. Draheim himself admitted that training alone could not resolve the problems in the South Korean civil service. In order to see long-term benefits from training, he argued, things like improved job standards, classifications, and pay scales, as well as new systems for performance evaluation, promotion, and retirement were also necessary.[111] The former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the OGA leadership, who had been advocating for more systemic reforms since the end of the Korean War were certainly already aware of this. Even before the new in-service program started, they had held several conferences with Draheim on broader issues of civil service reform and set up an internal working group to research future policies.[112]

One of their primary areas of focus continued to be personnel management. In his meetings with Americans, Sin argued that the existing system was incomplete and

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[108] "Kongmuwŏn chehullyŏn nonŭi Kungmhoeŭi sŏ sowi kusŏng," *Tonga ilbo*, February 8, 1958.
[109] "1960 ROK Government National Budget Policy," *1959 Dr. E. R. Draheim National Officials Training Institute Reports*, Lloyd Milton Short Papers, Box 14, Folder 27, Image 38, University of Minnesota Libraries, University Archives, https://umedia.lib.umn.edu/item/p16022coll523:277; "Sinnyŏndo yesan p'yŏnsŏng pangch'im ŭl palp'yo," *Tonga ilbo,* August 6, 1959.
[110] Draheim, *Improving Management Through Effective In-service Training*, 1–2.
[111] Ibid., 38.
[112] Draheim, "Monthly Summary Report, September 19, 1958," Image 22.

perpetuated bureaucratic incompetence, political patronage, and corruption.[113] Individual ministries had few limitations on appointments, promotions, and transfers. And, according to Sin, in most cases these decisions were left to up to the "patriotism and moral conscience" of individuals who were, themselves, poorly prepared for the job.[114] Once appointed, moreover, it was incredibly difficult to remove an individual for incompetence.[115] Parallel to in-service training, therefore, Sin argued for major revisions to the Civil Service Examination System and the National Civil Service Law to create a more rigid system of rules and accountability.[116]

These kinds of reform, however, required major legislative action at a time when partisan conflict was high. The OGA's major financial accomplishment for 1959 was the passage of the Civil Service Pension Act, but this this long-desired reform program had come at a significant political price. Members of the opposition argued with Sin that the program was simply a ploy by Rhee and the Liberal Party to buyoff civil service votes in the lead up to the 1960 presidential election. [117] This was not an unreasonable accusation considering the cabinet's increasingly overt political actions.[118] The law passed on party lines on New Year's Eve, but in a private briefing with officials at the U.S. embassy, Sin said he was skeptical that the assembly, cabinet, or president would move on the more

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[113] William G. Jones, "The Views of Director Sin Tu-young of the Office of General Affairs, on the Korean Civil Service," *Public Administration FY 1959*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_76_00C0159, Image 54, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000631209.
[114] Shin, "Need for Training in the Civil Service System of Korea," Image 26.
[115] Jones, "The Views of Director Sin Tu-young," Image 54; Shin, "Need for Training in the Civil Service System of Korea," Image 28.
[116] Jones, "The Views of Director Sin Tu-young," Image 54; Shin, "Need for Training in the Civil Service System of Korea," Images 26-28.
[117] "24 il ponhoeŭi sangjŏng," *Tonga ilbo,* December 19, 1959.
[118] In February 1960, for example, newspapers reported that some cabinet members began openly using civil servants to drum up support for the Liberal Party's Vice-Presidential Candidate. "Kongmuwŏn sŏn'gŏ undong ant'orok," *Tonga ilbo*, February 14, 1960.

complicated matter of reforming the Civil Service Law. The country's politicians, he claimed, either misunderstood the true nature of the problem, or directly benefited from the status quo.[119]

Shin's remark was an uncharacteristically direct condemnation of South Korea's political leadership from an acting high-level bureaucrat. This was doubtless a reflection of the private nature and the foreign audience. In their public writings and speeches, OGA leaders like Sin and Kim were loath to jeopardize their careers or reform plans through more overt criticism. This was not the case for former Manchukuo bureaucrats outside the government.

III. Efficiency, Democracy, and the Nature of Reform

In the late 1950s, several former Manchukuo bureaucrats reemerged as advocates for sweeping bureaucratic reform. While most had been silent on the state of the South Korean bureaucracy, two groups in particular maintained a certain level of professional and personal interest in the institution. The first were those who had transitioned into academic careers after liberation, particularly in law and political science.[120] The second were individuals who had served in the government prior to the Korean War before changing careers for political or

[119] Jones, "The Views of Director Sin Tu-young," Image 54.
[120] Paek Sanggŏn (1918–?), for example, had developed a career as a political science professor after liberation, primarily focused on legislative organization and party politics. However, by the late 1950s, his research and teaching turned to the emerging field of public administration. In 1959, he was elected as Vice-president for Research in the Korean Association for Public Administration.

personal reasons.[121] In either case, it was the proposed salary and pension reforms in 1958 and 1959 that appears to have prompted most to speak up.

Former Manchukuo bureaucrats overwhelmingly supported these programs. Much like their colleagues in the OGA and American aid workers, they argued that low government wages were a leading cause of official corruption.[122] According to a survey by one former Manchukuo bureaucrat most criminal cases involving government officials in the first half of 1957 were related to embezzlement, and they accounted for roughly 50% of all criminal fines.[123] Providing civil servants with sufficient wages to cover the ever increasing cost of living and programs to provide financial security to workers and their families after injury, death, or retirement would, they argued, go a long way to alleviating this problem.

However, they were also skeptical of the government's plans. From a technical standpoint, the proposed salary increases were still insufficient to support the daily needs of a family of five living in Seoul.[124] Moreover, by funding raises and retirement through layoffs instead of finding new ways to raise revenue meant that inflation would quickly erode these financial gains.[125] On a more fundamental level, former Manchukuo bureaucrats were concerned that the government's approach to bureaucratic reform focused too narrowly on monetary

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[121] Former Planning Bureau Chief Chŏng Hyŏnchun and former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Am (?-?) are two prominent examples.
[122] Chŏng Hyŏnchun, "Kongmuwŏn ch'ŏu kaesŏn ŭl kidae handa," 25-26; Han Ungkil "Hyŏnhaeng kukka kongmuŏnpŏp ŭl kŏmt'o," *Pŏpchŏng 14*, no 1/2 (January 1959): 8; Pak Am, "Kongmuwŏn ron," 61
[123] Chŏng, "Kongmuwŏn ch'ŏu kaesŏn ŭl kidae handa," 25.
[124] Ibid., 22.
[125] Ibid.

issues. The problem, they argued, was not merely that officials were corrupt. Rather corruption was a symptom of a system that was unscientific, undemocratic, and unfair.[126] The government had seemed to acknowledge as much by stating that the ultimate objective of salary increases and the retirement system was not only to eliminate corruption but also establish a more efficient, professional, and democratic civil service.[127] Former Manchukuo bureaucrats, however, argued that establishing financial security was only one of many necessary preconditions for a rational civil service. In pressing for more comprehensive reform agenda, moreover, they drew in part on their experience in Manchukuo.

This was particularly prominent in their proposals for reforming the appointment system. Much like their colleagues in the OGA, former Manchukuo bureaucrats outside the government were critical of arbitrary decision-making by untrained personnel officers who ignored the merit-based examination system. However, closing the loopholes that devalued the examination was only a first step towards rationalizing appointments. In its present form, they argued, the examination itself was far from ideal. To them it was only a "certificate examination" (*chagyŏk kosi*), a vestige of the old Japanese imperial system of academic elitism which evaluated candidates on basic knowledge rather than actual suitability for a job.[128] A truly rational and meritocratic system, they countered, would also select officials based on such characteristics as personality,

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[126] Han "Hyŏnhaeng kukka kongmuŏnpŏp ŭl kŏmt'o," 4.
[127] Chŏng, "Kongmuwŏn ch'ŏu kaesŏn ŭl kidae handa," 21–22.
[128] Han, "Hyŏnhaeng kukka kongmuŏnpŏp ŭl kŏmt'o," 6-7; Paek Sangkŏn, "Uri nara kosi chedo e taehan kwan'gyŏng," *Kosigye 3*, no. 10 (October 1958): 155-156.

physical and emotional fitness, and capacity to perform the duties required of the position.[129] One practical proposal for achieving this was to establish a separate "appointment examination" (*chaeyong kosi*) that, much like the similarly named examination in Manchukuo, would involve a detailed personal interview and physical examination.[130] However, they went even further, arguing that the examination should only serve as a preliminary evaluation, followed by an extended period of training. This included six months to one year of general training, similar to Manchukuo's Great Unity Academy, as well as practical training as "interns" or "probationers" in specific ministries, and additional skills and performance evaluations.[131] Moreover, these metrics needed to be applied not just to initial appointments but a broader disciplinary program that eliminated incompetence and corruption, and promoted superior performance throughout an individual's career.[132]

However, former Manchukuo bureaucrats were far from united, particularly on broader structural reforms. While they tended to agree, for example, that greater regional autonomy was necessary to stamp out corruption and improve bureaucratic efficiency, they differed on what that autonomy should look like. Chŏng Hyŏnchun argued that the trend towards centralization should be rejected, and greater authority delegated to regional governments, particularly

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[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid., 155.
[131] Han, "Hyŏnhaeng kukka kongmuŏnpŏp ŭl kŏmt'o," 7; Paek "Uri nara kosi chedo e taehan kwan'gyŏng," 157; Paek Sangkŏn, "Haengjŏng ŭi kwahakhwa: hujinchŏgin kwŏllyŏk chibae chakyong esŏ minjujŏk kwalli chakyong ero ŭi haengjŏng ŭi kil," *Sin t'aeyang 8*, no. 6 (June 1959): 41.
[132] Han "Hyŏnhaeng kukka kongmuŏnpŏp ŭl kŏmt'o," 7–8.

with regard to budgetary matters.[133] He went even further in calling for a more expansive decentralization of power through the popular election of provincial governors and the mayors of Seoul and Pusan.[134] Han Ungkil, also criticized the trend towards centralization and the subordination of regional bureaucrats to the government in Seoul. Unlike Chŏng, however, he proposed a of division of labor between central and regional government. According to Han, the central government's role was to engage in high level planning, while the regional government was the "front line of administration" responsible for the practical implementation of those plans.[135] In this schema the latter was not subordinate to the former, but part of an integrated whole. Planning informed implementation, which in turn informed planning. In practical policy terms, Han drew explicitly on Manchukuo as a model, proposing the equalization of bureaucratic ranks between regional and central government, and regularly transferring officials between the two.[136]

Another point of difference emerged from proposals for a central personnel authority. There was broad consensus among former Manchukuo bureaucrats that a strong and independent personnel management institution was an essential component for establishing and maintaining a professional and efficient civil service.[137] Like Kim Yŏngchun in the OGA, most former Manchukuo bureaucrats outside the government looked to the U.S. Civil Service

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[133] Chŏng, "Kongmuwŏn ch'ŏu kaesŏn ŭl kidae handa," 27.
[134] Ibid 27-28.
[135] Han "Hyŏnhaeng kukka kongmuŏnpŏp ŭl kŏmt'o," 6.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid., 4; Chŏng "Kongmuwŏn ch'ŏu kaesŏn ŭl kidae handa," 28; Paek Sangkŏn, "Yŏnbang kukka insa haengjŏng chedo sŏsŏl: Mi, So pyŏn," *Nommunjip (Chungang taehakkyo) 2*, no. 1 (1957): 160.

Commission and the Japan's post-war National Personnel Authority for inspiration.[138] Both institutions were based on a similar structure consisting of a three member bi-partisan committee that had broad rule-making and disciplinary authority over the civil service. Some were attracted to the committee structure in large part because it would help alleviate the issue of political patronage.[139]

While not denying that this was an important feature, Paek Sangkŏn argued that there were also distinctive disadvantages to such a system. The committee, he contended, required consensus building, which slowed down decision making.[140] And since they were held to fixed-term appointments, he felt that commissioners lacked the knowledge and responsibility of career civil servants.[141] For Paek, these problems were much more easily addressed by strengthening existing personnel management functions in the OGA.[142] Nonetheless, Paek did not abandon the commission concept entirely. Rather, he proposed a hybrid model, where a commission and government bureau worked in tandem. Commissioners would be responsible for making broad decisions on rules and discipline, while the Personnel Bureau Chief would contribute to technical development and implementation and provide continuity between the regularly changing commissions.[143]

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[138] Han "Hyŏnhaeng kukka kongmuŏnpŏp ŭl kŏmt'o," 4; Chŏng "Kongmuwŏn ch'ŏu kaesŏn ŭl kidae handa," 28.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Paek, "Yŏnbang kukka insa haengjŏng chedo sŏsŏl," 160. Yi Ch'unghwan had lodged similar complaints against establishing an independent civil service commission during the government reorganization of 1955. "Che 19 hoe Kukhoe imsi hoeŭi sokkirok," no. 126 (January 21, 1955): 25.
[141] Paek, "Yŏnbang kukka insa haengjŏng chedo sŏsŏl," 160.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Ibid., 161.

To a certain extent these points of divergence were part of a preexisting internal debate. The Manchukuo bureaucracy had arisen from an uneasy alliance between forces for centralization and decentralization. While the course of the war increasingly tipped the scales towards top-down authoritarianism, opposing views–particularly in the countryside, where Korean officials were more common–persisted. And the abrupt dissolution of the state in 1945 had left these basic philosophical questions unresolved. However, the debate in South Korea was not entirely the same.

Their lack of unity on these issues reveals a deeper internal tension on the nature of bureaucratic reform that had evolved significantly since liberation. At the most basic level, reformers argued that the South Korean bureaucracy was a corrupt and backward institution. Nearly all of them agreed, moreover, that the solution was to make it more democratic and more efficient. In practical terms, there certainly was some overlap between the two positions. Reforming the appointment system, for example, advanced both democratization and rational efficiency. However, the two positions could also lead in opposite directions. On the one hand regional autonomy might make bureaucrats more accountable and responsive to their local communities. On the other, the hallmark of a modern nation was the state's ability to carry out coordinated central planning that could only be accomplished through centralization. A bi-partisan civil service commission might facilitate political neutrality, but a more hierarchical structure would allow for speed and decisiveness.

This tension between democracy and efficiency was apparent even in how they discussed the social role of bureaucracy. During their time in the Manchukuo, Koreans had been trained to see themselves as a "vanguard" (J. *senkusha*) for the creation of a new moral order and "leaders" (J. *shidōsha*) of a supposedly "backward" population incapable of advancing on its own. Liberation had brought a rhetorical shift towards a more democratic role. National officials were no longer "bureaucrats" (K. *kwalli*) but "civil servants" (K. *kongmuwŏn*); no longer "leaders" (K. *chidoja*) but "servants" (K. *pongsaja*) of the people.[144] And by the late 1950s, it was clear that some former Manchukuo bureaucrats had embraced these rhetorical changes.[145] Han Ungkil even criticized contemporary bureaucrats for holding onto the feudalistic attitude that they should lead the people from above.[146] However, the more authoritarian understanding of bureaucracy continued to remain salient, particularly in the context of national division. To some, the Korean War and its devastating aftermath demanded the kind of leadership that could only come from an advanced and dedicated corps of national patriots.[147] Six years after the armistice, some were arguing that reforms were

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[144] This rhetorical shift can be found in the first article of the original 1949 National Officials Law (Kukka kongmuwŏnpŏp). "Kukka kongmuwŏn pŏp," Enacted August 12, 1949, NLIS, http://www.law.go.kr/법령/국가공무원법/(00044,19490812).

[145] In his introduction to the basic philosophy of public administration, for example, Kim Yŏngchun wrote succinctly: "We must be the nation's civil servants (*kongbok*)! We must be the servants (*pongsaja*) of the whole population!" Kim Yŏngchun, "Uri nara insa chedo kaesŏl (1)," 20.

[146] Han "Hyŏnhaeng kukka kongmuŏnpŏp ŭl kŏmt'o," 8.

[147] A prominent example of this perspective can be found in the work of, Paek Namhun (1906–?). Not to be confused with the contemporary KDP politician of the same name, Paek was an academic and served as president of the Civil Service Examination Association (Kosi hakhoe) in the early 1950s. See especially: Paek Namhun, "Chŏnjaeng kongmuwŏn ron," *Pŏpchŏng 8*, no. 7/8 (July 1953): 20–24; and Paek Namhun, *Chŏnjaeng kwa insaeng* (N.A.: Samhak munhwasa, 1955).

necessary to make the civil service into "the vanguard of the people (K. *kungmin ŭi sŏn'guja*)" leading them towards the fulfilment of national reunification.[148]

At the same time, the dividing line between these positions was far from clear even on an individual level. Han Ungkil, for example argued that bureaucrats were subservient to the people and needed to be regulated through a bi-partisan commission.[149] However, in the very same article, he pressed for greater integration between regional and central governments in order to advance his vision of modern state planning.[150]

This tension between democracy and efficiency was not only characteristic of former Manchukuo bureaucrats. From the early days of the U.S. occupation, there had been a considerable gap between American rhetoric and practice. American officials considered the existing Korean bureaucracy to be inexperienced, and incompetent. Consequentially, public pronouncements in support of democratization were tempered by an underlying pressure to organize a functioning modern government.[151]

After the Korean War, the American agenda had changed very little. This was driven in part by the strategic objective to protect the country from future invasion. However, it was also clear that they continued to believe, as they had during the occupation, that the Korean people were not ready for democracy. For all their criticisms of Rhee as his government as dictatorial and corrupt, American

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[148] Kwon Nyŏngku, "Kongmuwŏndo hwangnip ŭl wihan cheŏn," *Chibang haengjŏng 8*, no. 72 (1959): 16.
[149] Han "Hyŏnhaeng kukka kongmuŏnpŏp ŭl kŏmt'o," 5, 8.
[150]Ibid., 6.
[151] This was hardly unique to Korea. American involvement in Japan's postwar bureaucratic restructuring was characterized by a similar dynamic. B. C. Koh, *Japan's Administrative Elite* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 38–39.

aid workers generally focused their energies on establishing basic state functions, rather than complete civil service reform. And there were definite limits to how far some were willing go in the name of efficiency.

As the civil service reform movement was gaining momentum in the spring of 1958, a report on the subject from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul caused a stir in the American aid community. Penned by Donald S. MacDonald (1919–1993), the Embassy First Secretary, the paper's analysis was largely in line with American perceptions of Korean society and government since liberation. The Korean Republic had failed, he argued, because Koreans were stuck in "traditional" ways of thinking and lacked the "motivation, organization, and discipline" to advance beyond them.[152] This was reflected in the state of the South Korean civil service, which he criticized as corrupt, disorganized, unmotivated, irresponsive to the public, and overly focused on "status without accomplishment."[153] His civil service reform program also largely conformed to the American objective of rationalization, calling for comprehensive training, merit-based appointment and promotions, political neutrality, and improved financial support.[154]

MacDonald's paper, however, took rationalization a step further. The Korean civil service, he argued, was "the only agency which can be utilized as a

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[152] Donald S. MacDonald, "On the Improvement of the Korean Civil Services," AKH, Ref. AUS014_76_00C0159, Image 9.
[153] Ibid., Image 12.
[154] Ibid., Image 16.

basis for social action aimed at economic and social improvement."[155] Despite its flaws, for MacDonald, the bureaucracy was at least a functioning institution, and still maintained some of its historical prestige and authority. The ultimate objective of civil service reform, therefore, was not simply to make it more efficient but to turn it into "an effective instrument of national development."[156] To this end MacDonald proposed reorganizing the bureaucracy according to a powerful centralized hierarchy. This included strengthening the power and independence of the OGA Director, who would also serve as head of a bi-partisan civil service commission. These institutions would then be used to create an "elite corps" of government bureaucrats, "formed through common experiences, such as examination, [and] basic training…and a body of accepted beliefs and ideals…beyond their own self-interest."[157] This corps would serve as a directing institution for broader transformation in the civil service and society at large.

The response to MacDonald's proposal within the aid community was overwhelmingly negative, particularly with regard to the idea of an "elite corps." While American aid workers generally agreed that strengthening the independence and authority of the civil service were necessary long-term goals, they argued against doing so rapidly and without parallel considerations for other sectors of society.[158] PAD Director Marvin Smith was skeptical that establishing an "elite corps" would work in the long run, arguing that he could think of no

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[155] Ibid., Image 11.
[156] Ibid., Image 12.
[157] Ibid., Image 20.
[158] William E. Warne, "Letter to Ambassador Walter C. Dowling, April 17, 1959," in Ibid., Image 4.

other country where the civil service had "been found suitable as a chosen instrument for advancing the social progress of an entire nation."[159] Other aid workers went even further, suggesting that it ran counter to democracy and created the conditions for "Fascist-type seizures of power.[160] But for MacDonald, these were necessary risks.

MacDonald argued that while these programs were extreme, they were urgently necessary. In his assessment, the conditions in Korea were dire, and the Korean people, unsatisfied with the status quo, desired change.[161] While he acknowledged that an "elite corps" might produce dictatorship or a fascist state, the alternatives were worse. On the one hand, a "Korean Mussolini" might emerge with his own "corps" and carry out radical reform programs "in a manner we [Americans] may not relish."[162] On the other, the Koreans might turn to Communism, which he suggested was at least more organized and disciplined than the South Korean government of the time.[163] Either way, decisive American policy coordination was necessary to maintain control.

MacDonald's proposal, however, did not result in any substantial changes to U.S. policy on South Korean civil service reform. A June 1958 cable from Washington

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[159] M. Smith, "Recommendation on the Improvement of the Korean Civil Service," *Public Administration FY 1958*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_76_00C0089, Image 71, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000608818.
[160] Clarence Hendershoot, "Comments on Paper by Mr. Macdonald on the Improvement of the Korean Civil Service," in ibid., Image 67; Lucy W. Adams, "Improvement of the Korean Civil Services," in ibid., Image 69.
[161] MacDonald, "On the Improvement of the Korean Civil Services," Image 18.
[162] Donald S. Macdonald, "OEC Comments on Proposals for Improvement of the Korean Civil Service," *361.4, Civil Service - ROK, 1958*, AKH, Ref. AUS003_01_00C0218, Image 15, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000014658.
[163] MacDonald, "On the Improvement of the Korean Civil Services," Image 18.

suggested American aid officials might also use this impending budget talks on civil service salaries to push a bi-partisan civil service commission and a civil service pension program. [164] However, there is no indication that these proposals made their way to the South Korean cabinet, and the PAD continued to focus on the more limited in-service training project. Indeed, even with the success of the training program and increasing requests for support from Korean reformers–including former Manchukuo bureaucrats in and out of government– American officials were reluctant to put direct pressure on South Korean leaders to increase the pace of reform. In early 1960, PAD officials argued that it was up to the Koreans themselves to fix government corruption and inefficiency:

> In a democracy, such an attack [on corruption and inefficiency] is made through election campaigns, exercises of the ballot, influence of pressure groups of organized citizens, [and] the outcry of the national press. These are available for the use of Koreans in Korea, but may not be used by Americans in Korea.[165]

Such a grass roots movement was soon to emerge, albeit in a form that neither American aid workers nor former Manchukuo bureaucrats anticipated.

IV. Giant Plans and Baby Steps, April 1960–May 1961

The popular uprisings in the spring of 1960 and the ultimate collapse of the Rhee regime proved to be an unexpected opportunity for bureaucratic reformers. While accusations of political manipulation and corruption during the presidential election had been the inciting incident, demonstrators expressed anger

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[164] "Joint State-ICA Message," *Internal Political and National Defense Affairs: Civil Service, Salaries, Retirement*, Haewoe sojae Han'guk kwallyŏn charyŏ, Kukhoe chŏnja tosŏgwan, Image 10.
[165] Carroll K. Shaw, "Proposals for Public Administration Program of USOM/K," *Public Administration (Jan. – Jun. 1960)*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C1129, Image 140, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000967437.

and frustration over a much broader range of entrenched issues, including accusations of rampant politicization and impropriety throughout the bureaucracy. This called for more than just a change in leadership. As one former Manchukuo bureaucrat complained, the past twelve years had seen over 100 different ministers all pledging to tackle corruption, but none of them had kept their word.[166] Restoring public trust in government would require decisive action and systemic change.

The structural reforms that took place in the early summer of 1960 laid the foundation by further centralizing and strengthening the existing civil service institutions. Under the revised constitution's cabinet system, the Executive Office of the State Council (Kungmuwŏn samuch'ŏ; EOSC) was formed to consolidate the administrative functions of the former OGA and the legislative functions of the Office of Legislation.[167] The change in name came with significantly greater policy making power and regulatory authority. Though classified as an office, its Executive Director had cabinet minister status, and its two Deputy Directors for Administration and Legislation had vice minister status. The former OGA's civil service functions, including the Personnel Section, Examination Section, and Pension Section, were further consolidated into the Personnel Affairs Bureau (Insaguk). As a reflection of the new Bureau's policy advisory role, a Planning

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[166] Yi Minchae, "Ibŏn e salge toel kka," *Ch'angam munjip*, vol. 1, (Seoul: T'amgudang, 1977), 53. Originally published in *Min'guk sinbo,* August 28, 1960.

[167] From early 1961, the EOSC changed its English name to the Ministry of State Council Administration. The Executive and Deputy Directors also began using the English titles Minister and Vice-minister, respectively. This linguistic change was not reflected in Korean, however, and the Office remained legally and organizationally distinct from other cabinet ministries in several ways. For the sake of clarity and consistency, this section uses the terms EOSC, and Executive and Deputy Director throughout.

Section (Kihoekkwa) was added and tasked with "surveying, researching, and planning" all matters related to civil service management.[168]

For the former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the OGA, the political and structural changes were more advantageous to some than others. Sin Tuyŏng fared well at first, transitioning from his role as Director of the OGA to Deputy Director for Administration in the EOSC. However, his connection to the ancien régime proved to be a political liability. As the secretary for the Rhee cabinet, Sin was deeply implicated in the alleged election meddling from the previous spring.[169] He resigned in September 1960 and was effectively purged from government service. Meanwhile, Kim Yŏngchun's influence in government increased. He was appointed the first director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau under the caretaker government of Hŏ Chŏng (1896–1988) in early July and retained his post after the formation of the Chang Myŏn government in August. In September he was appointed to a Special Cabinet Sub-committee on Personnel Reform.[170] Then, in November he was appointed Chairman of another sub-committee for Government Organizational Reform.[171]

Kim's primary agenda was to revise the laws and regulations that formed the framework of the civil service system. Despite the successes of reforms like

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[168] "Kungmuwŏn samuch'ŏ chikche," Enacted July 1, 1960, NLIS, www.law.go.kr/법령/국무원사무처직제/(00013,19500701).
[169] "Modŭn ch'aegim Ch'oe Inkyu e chŏn'ga," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, September 29, 1960; "3.15 tangsi ch'agwan kŭp tŭng susa," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, February 8, 1961.
[170] "Sowiwŭnhoe rŭl kusŏng," *Tonga ilbo*, September 14, 1960.
[171] USOM/Seoul "Memorandum of Meeting with Deputy Director Chang (Executive Office of the State Council)," *Public Administration (Jul. – Dec. 1960)*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C1128, Image 71, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000967436; "Yukkae sowi rŭl kusŏng," *Tonga ilbo*, November 5, 1960.

the training program and the pension system, Kim argued that the only way to create and sustain change was a thorough reevaluation of the legal structures. The old system needed to be purged of its "backward," "unscientific," "contradictory," and "undemocratic" elements and replaced with a system of laws that was "specific" and "forceful."[172] His first target were the regulations surrounding the appointment system, which he called "completely irrational from beginning to end."[173] By December Kim's team had drafted major rewrites of the existing regulations to consolidate the EOSC's authority over personnel management and established clear merit-based guidelines for appointments.

The draft orders contained several revisions that Kim and his former Manchukuo bureaucrat colleagues had been pressing for years. The first was a significant strengthening of the civil service examination system. Under the revised orders, examination would be the preferred method for filling all non-technical appointments below the second grade.[174] Individual ministries would no longer be able to recruit applicants directly. Rather all vacancies would be communicated to the EOSC, which would then provide the ministries with a list of three qualified candidates chosen from the list of civil service examination passers.[175] The much-maligned screening system would remain the preferred method for appointing technicians, but it's use for both technical and

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[172] Kim Yŏngchun, "Hyŏnhaeng insa chedo ŭi swaeshin pangan," *Nonsŏl*, Pŏpchech'ŏ chisik ch'anko, https://www.moleg.go.kr/mpbleg/mpblegInfo.mo?mid=a10402020000&mpb_leg_pst_seq=124356. Transcribed from original in *Pŏpche wŏlbo 3*, no. 9 (September 1960): n.p.
[173] Ibid.
[174] Kungmuwŏn samuch'ŏ, "Kongmuwŏn imyongnyŏng (an)," *Kungmuwŏn hoeŭirok 1960*, KNA, Ref. BA0085199, 848.
[175] Ibid., 852.

administrative jobs would be severely restricted.[176] In either case, the screening process was amended to be far more exam-like. What had previously been largely an administrative process, now involved anywhere from one to three essay examinations (depending on the grade of the position) and an interview.[177]

The proposed structure and content of the civil service examination would also have changed significantly. It added a new Grade Five Examination (*o-kŭp kongmuwŏn kosi*) to the existing Regular and Higher Examinations for grades four and three respectively.[178] This meant that all civil servants below the rank of section chief would be exam certified. In addition, the Grade Five Examination was posited as a move towards democracy because it was open to all applicants, regardless of academic background.[179] All the examinations were reformatted and made up of two separate written tests.[180] The first consisted of objective questions on three mandatory subjects. Only those who passed were allowed to move on to a second round consisting of subjective questions on six mandatory subjects and one elective.[181] Though not explicitly stated, proposed examination subject charts indicate that the Higher Examination for Administration as well as the Regular

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[176] Kim's own preference was to completely do away with screening for administrative appointments. Kim Yŏngchun, "Hyŏnhaeng insa chedo ŭi swaeshin pangan," n.p. The proposal, nonetheless, gave the EOSC significantly greater authority to reject screening applicants. Those who were rejected were forbidden from applying for screening for a period of at least six months, and those found to have received a screening appointment through fraud were subject to immediate decertification and dismissal. Kungmuwŏn samuch'ŏ, "Kongmuwŏn imyong chŏnhyŏngnyŏng (an)," *Kungmuwŏn hoeŭirok 1960*, KNA, Ref. BA0085199, 870-873.
[177] Ibid., 869–870.
[178] Kungmuwŏn samuch'ŏ, "Kongmuwŏn kosiryŏng (an)," *Kungmuwŏn hoeŭirok 1960*, KNA, Ref. BA0085199, 831–832.
[179] Ibid., 833.
[180] Kim's original intention was for a three-stage examination–two written stages and one oral–similar to that proposed by his colleague Paek Sangkŏn some years earlier. Kim Yŏngchun, "Hyŏnhaeng insa chedo ŭi swaeshin pangan," n.p.
[181] Kungmuwŏn samuch'ŏ, "Kongmuwŏn kosiryŏng (an)," 834.

Examination, and the new Grade Five Examination would incorporate separate specialized tracks for general administration, finance, and foreign service.[182]

Passing the exam, moreover, was only the first stage. All exam passers below grade two were required to go through a period of classroom and on-the-job training. Their appointments would be provisional for the duration of this program, and they would only be entitled to full civil service privileges on completion.[183] The proposal did not go into specifics on the content of this training, suggesting it would be expanded on in a separate order. What is clear, however, is that those in higher levels would be required to undergo longer periods of training.[184]

Kim's proposed changes to the appointment system were generally accepted as necessary steps to increase bureaucratic efficiency and restore faith in government. However, much like under the previous regime, politics was an impediment to rapid change. The cabinet agreed to proposals in principle on December 26, 1960 but sent them to the vice ministers' council for further assessment of their practical application.[185] The final language of the orders was approved two weeks later, and the original typed cabinet minutes stated that they would be issued on March 1. However, this date was crossed out and replaced

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[182] Ibid., 842-845.
[183] Kungmuwŏn samuch'ŏ, "Kongmuwŏn imyongnyŏng (an)," 854.
[184] The training periods for grades five, four and three, were three months, six months, and one year respectively. Ibid.
[185] Kungmuwŏn samuch'ŏ, "Kungmu hoeŭirok songpo ŭi kŏn (che 83 hoe)," *Kungmuwŏn hoeŭirok 1960*, KNA, Ref. BA0085199, 812.

with the words "after further study."[186] According to news reports, the orders met with significant opposition within the ruling Democratic Party, though the precise reason is unclear.[187] And when the orders were finally published in April 1961, their effective date was delayed until August 1.[188] Cabinet delays were a problem for other areas of Kim's reform program as well.

The centerpiece of Kim's vision for bureaucratic reform was the creation of an independent, politically neutral civil service commission. As we have already seen, Kim had written extensively on Japan's National Personnel Authority as a potential model for Korea in 1957. By 1960, however, his thinking had changed in favor of the hybrid model similar to that of his colleague from Manchukuo, Paek Sangkŏn. Rather than a bi-partisan three-person committee, Kim's plan was to do away with politicians entirely and place the commission in the hands of bureaucratic professionals. The Executive Director of the EOSC would be an automatic member and chairman. The other two members would be "non-partisan" (*p'ichŏngdang*) individuals selected by the Prime Minister and confirmed by the President on the basis of their academic and practical experience in public administration.[189] In addition, the two appointed members would serve for five-year terms, ensuring continuity in the event cabinet reshuffles or changes in government.[190] Like Paek, Kim proposed that the commission's primary responsibilities should be policymaking and disciplinary judgment. The EOSC

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[186] Kungmuwŏn samuch'ŏ, "Kungmu hoeŭirok songpo ŭi kŏn (che 6 hoe)," *Kungmuwŏn hoeŭirok 1961*, KNA, Ref. BA0085201, 363.
[187] "Onŭl kongp'o yejŏng kongmuwŏn kosiryŏng tŭng," *Tonga ilbo*, March 21, 1961.
[188] "Kongmuwŏn kosiryŏng tŭng ŭi kongp'o rŭl pogo," *Tonga ilbo*, April 16, 1961.
[189] Kim Yŏngchun, "Hyŏnhaeng insa chedo ŭi swaeshin pangan," n.p.
[190] Ibid.

and the Personnel Administration Bureau, meanwhile, would be responsible for the day-to-day operations of the civil service, replacing the old "passive" system with "proactive work management."[191]

Establishing a central civil service commission of this type was a challenging task requiring political support for legislation that Kim likely understood as a long-term objective. However, he found allies among the American aid workers in the PAD. Kim first started working with officials in the PAD during the drafting of the revised appointment orders. At Kim's request, the Americans had provided the Bureau with recent government publications from Japan on personnel matters, including sample questions from recent civil service examinations.[192] He also solicited PAD feedback on the proposed orders.

The Americans responded positively to Kim's reform efforts. Since the fall of the Rhee regime, PAD officials had been urging the new government to take a decisive and proactive approach to civil service reform.[193] In November 1960, they drafted an aid program proposal for "improvement of personnel administration," with the ultimate goals of developing legislation for improved compensation, merit-based appointment and promotion, and establishing a "central personnel agency."[194] To this end, the PAD would hire an additional two

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[191] Ibid.
[192] Wayne C. Olson, "Memorandum of Meeting, December 6, 1960," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C1128, Image 30.
[193] Carroll K. Shaw, "Urgent Need for Administrative Reform in the ROKG," AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C1129, Image 41–42.
[194] "Country Economic Program: Improvement of Personnel Administration," *RG 469, Office of the Far Eastern Operations, Korea Division, Entry # 478, Box No. 22, FY 1962 Country Program Book thru FY 62 Deob-Reob. (2 of 3)*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_60_00C0097_091, Image 2, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000756861.

technical advisors with specific competencies in personnel administration.[195] The plan, however, was devised unilaterally without request from the Koreans themselves. Following their first meeting, the PAD director wrote to Kim in late December that their present staffing, while able to offer general advice, lacked specialized knowledge in personnel administration. If the Bureau's intention was to pursue more comprehensive reforms, he suggested that they begin discussions on expanding the current aid program to meet these needs.[196] Kim's reaction is unknown, but during the first three months of 1961, the EOSC began internal discussions on taking advantage of American technical aid.[197]

The American's offer of technical support, however, face significant opposition on the Korean side, mostly on political grounds. PAD officials met with Kim's boss, Deputy Director for Administration Chang Tŏkyong (1916-1992), in early March of 1961 to discuss the program directly. Chang stated that he had brought up the proposal with the Executive Director on multiple occasions, but that he was concerned bringing American advisors into the EOSC on a permanent basis might be viewed as an "invasion of sovereignty." According to Chang the Office was under such close scrutiny from the press and National Assembly, that the Executive Director's main priority was to avoid opportunities for public criticism.[198] Chang, however, proposed that it might be acceptable for

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[195] Ibid.
[196] Carroll K. Shaw, "Letter to Kim Young Joon, December 21, 1960," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C1128, Image 8.
[197] Thomas L. Eliot, "Memorandum of Conversation, March 7, 1961," *Public Administration, Jan.-1961 (3of3)*, AKH, Ref. AUS056_08_00C0223, Image 38, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000001040271.
[198] Ibid.

advisors to work with the EOSC externally on a temporary basis, which the Americans accepted for the time being.[199] The Americans also agreed to a kind of pilot program, where the PAD would invite a personnel advisor from another country program for a short visit to Korea.[200] Charles W. Terry (?–?), the personnel advisor for Indonesia, arrived in Seoul in early April and worked closely with Kim Yŏngchun to evaluate the Bureau's needs and develop a plan to best utilize American technical aid.[201]

Even with the EOSC leadership onboard, however, the peculiarities of the foreign aid system in Korea meant that all program requests had to go through the Ministry of Reconstruction. The EOSC's request for two American personnel advisors was sent on March 29.[202] The Ministry of Reconstruction demurred, stating that "further study has to be made before any decision."[203] When pressed by the PAD for a more detailed explanation for the delay in early May, one Ministry of Reconstruction official stated that there were still those in government who would oppose any reforms that might disrupt the system of personal and political patronage. He further suggested that political support for the proposed

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[199] Ibid.
[200] Carroll K. Shaw, "Letter to Chang Duk Yong, March 30, 1961," in ibid, Image 2
[201] Charles W. Terry, "Letter to Kim Yung Joon, April 28, 1961," *Public Administration, Jan.-1961 (1of3)*, AKH, Ref. AUS056_08_00C0221, Images 115-120, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000001040269.
[202] The request was actually submitted indirectly by the PAD. The EOSC had sent their request directly to the PAD on March 15. It is unclear if this was simply due to an unfamiliarity with the aid system, but according to the Americans they had done this with previous requests as well. It is possible that this was an intentional political strategy on the part of EOSC leadership to avoid taking full responsibility for the proposal. Carroll K. Shaw, "Advisory Assistance in Personnel Administration," in ibid, Image 102.
[203] Daniel Kie Hong Lee, "Letter to Mr. Shaw, April 7, 1961," *Public Administration, Jan.-1961 (1of3)*, AKH, Ref. AUS056_08_00C0222, Image 48, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000001040270.

program would likely only be achieved through increased economic aid.[204] While the PAD hoped to press the matter further, the Deputy Director of the aid program ordered them to drop the matter and leave the lobbying efforts to the EOSC.[205]

The only collaboration between Kim and the PAD that made any headway in the spring of 1961 was a plan to send Kim and several colleagues to study personnel management institutions in Japan and the Philippines. EOSC Deputy Director Chang first proposed the trip in late January, arguing that it was an "urgent necessity" to observe personnel administration practices in neighboring countries, rather than just the United States.[206] The proposal was approved in April, thanks in large part to unused program funds from the 1961 aid budget and the trip was planned for the latter half of May.[207] However, this and all other projects were quickly put on hold, at least temporarily, when the military abruptly overthrew the civilian government on May 16.

Synopsis

In 1967, the United States Operations Mission, the successor organization to the U.S. aid program in South Korea, published an evaluation of the public administration program from its inception in 1955. The report argued that during the late 1950s, government reform programs were "largely American in

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[204] Carroll K. Shaw, "Memorandum of Conversation, May 3, 1961," in AKH, Ref. AUS056_08_00C0221, Image 101.
[205] John Heilman, "Advisory Assistance in Personnel Administration," in ibid, Image 83-84.
[206] Dukyong Chang, "Letter to Carroll K. Shaw, January 24, 1961," in AKH, Ref. AUS056_08_00C0223, Image 93.
[207] Carroll K. Shaw, "Request for Approval of Third-Country Observation Travel – Wayne C. Olson, Public Administration Advisor (O&M)," in AKH, Ref. AUS056_08_00C0221, Image 124.

conception and initiation" and that Korean government officials had to be repeatedly cajoled and pressured into identifying structural problems and looking for solutions.[208] In contrast, the South Korean military's establishment of a stable–if forceful–political climate had finally resulted in the Korean's taking the initiative to reform on their own.[209] By its own admission, the report arrived at this assessment with "little documentary evidence" and based primarily on American impressions of the policy-making elite.[210] This flawed perspective, which has been repeated by later scholars, fails to account for the significant contributions of career civil servants to reforming the system from the inside.

This was particularly true of the small group of former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the Office of General Affairs, and its successor institutions. By the end of the Korean war, these men had already diagnosed the South Korean bureaucracy as functionally deficient and understood the need for substantial changes to make it a more efficient and democratic institution. Not content with mere critique, they spent the remainder of the decade discussing, lobbying, and implementing various strategies for civil service reform. To be certain, these efforts were often met with indifference or opposition from Korean and American leadership, but former Manchukuo bureaucrats proved capable of advancing their reform agenda incrementally through strategically targeting areas where their interests aligned.

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[208] Frank M. Landers, *Technical Assistance in Public Administration: USOM/Korea – 1955–1967* (Seoul: USOM/Korea, 1967), 5-6.
[209] Ibid., 6-7.
[210] Ibid., 6.

In this regard, the Manchukuo experience offered a useful set of practical tools. For these bureaucratic reformers, Manchukuo served as an example that despite its imperial context, nonetheless, aspired to rational efficiency in a way that was never attempted elsewhere in the Japanese empire, especially it's Korean colony. Moreover, it offered some level of balance between the old colonial systems and those introduced, if not fully implemented, by the Americans after liberation. This was particularly true in areas such as recruitment and training, where, by the end of the decade, former Manchukuo bureaucrats were beginning to make significant gains thanks to American support.

Still, Manchukuo's impact on South Korean civil service reform in the 1950s was neither linear nor uncontested even among the former Manchukuo bureaucrats themselves. While they agreed that South Korean bureaucrats needed to be transformed into democratic, efficient civil servants, they were far from united when these two objectives came into conflict. Should regional administration be autonomous, or tied to the central government in order to advance national development? Should politicians have power to regulate and discipline the civil service, or should rules and judgment be rendered by administrative professionals and the bureaucrats themselves? Was the ultimate goal to create a "vanguard" force for social development, or to serve as a rearguard in service and support to the popular will? The founders of Manchukuo's bureaucracy had also grappled with such questions to a greater or lesser extent in the early years, but by the 1940s, answer was overwhelmingly in favor of hyper-rational efficiency. For former Manchukuo bureaucrats in South

Korea, however, the answers to these questions were as unclear in 1953 as they were in 1961. The Americans, for their part, were just as unsettled on which way to resolve these competing objectives. By the 1960s, however, there was a consensus among bureaucratic reformers in both groups that decisive change was necessary sooner rather than later.

Ultimately, the South Korean military would be the ones to answer these questions. Former Manchukuo bureaucrat's continued voice in these decisions will be explored in greater detail in the epilogue. However, it is worth noting that despite certain ideological affinities regarding bureaucratic reform, the transition was far from seamless. Within a month of the coup, the military junta ordered the immediate implementation of the Kim Yŏngchun's revised appointment orders. But when Kim brought a draft law to the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction in November 1961 establishing a civil service oath of office remarkably similar to the one adopted in 1963, the military generals on the council resoundingly rejected it as "unnecessary."[211] Before addressing this longer legacy, however, there are other areas where former Manchukuo bureaucrats were active in the 1950s that require attention.

[211] "Kukka Chaegŏn kotŭng hoeŭi sangim wiwŏnhoe hoeŭirok," no. 64, November 1, 1961, Image 1, NADL, Ref. no PROC2014C21101.

Chapter 5: Reforming the Social Economy

–Coal, Cooperatives, and Community Development–

In the fall of 1962, Economic Planning Board Deputy Chairman Ch'a Kyunhŭi announced the Five-year Economic Plan (*o-gae nyŏn kyŏngje kyehoek*). Aimed at creating a "self-sustaining economy through industrialization," he outlined an "ambitious" program for state-directed development aimed at achieving an average annual growth rate of 7.1% over the next five years.[1] According to him, the plan was "the most important single achievement of the Military Government," which had seized power the previous year, and marked a revolutionary break from the past.[2]

> Korea for the first time in history has declared socio-economic development to be the main objective of national policy. For the first time, the government has been able to identify itself with the heartfelt aspirations of the people, namely to advance forward with the dignity and hope that all human beings rightly deserve…For the first time the government and people have come to appreciate the importance that ultimately we must help ourselves.[3]

But for Ch'a, the plan represented more than simply a change in national policy or social perspective. On a personal level, it was the culmination of over a decade in government service dedicated to socio-economic reform; a decade of collaboration and conflict over state-directed programs for economic growth; a decade in which his own views on economic development adapted to new influences. In the context of his career, therefore, Ch'a's list of "firsts" is not so much a beginning as an inflection point in an evolutionary process that had started long before.

Park Chung Hee remains a dominant figure in historical analysis of South Korea's economic development. Scholars have long considered the 1961 coup d'état as a key turning point, with Park's regime quickly adopting a slate of new economic policies centered around

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[1] Tchah Kyun Hŭi, "Prospect of the Econonimic Plan," *Koreana Quarterly* 1, no.4 (Fall 1962): 94–96.
[2] Ibid., 94.
[3] Ibid., 96.

state-led economic growth.[4] Relatively recent studies go so far as to argue that this developmental system was a product of Park's personal leadership, not "an institutional artifact developed autonomously, incrementally, and technocratically from within the state bureaucracy."[5] Such conclusions, however, are not easily born out when viewed through the lens of the 1950s.

Economic policy in 1950s South Korea, while different from the succeeding decades, nonetheless followed a developmental formula. Despite rampant corruption, Rhee and his regime were far from irrational actors. Scholars have convincingly demonstrated how Rhee's political ambitions and desire to avoid economic reintegration with Japan drove him to pursue an import substitution industrialization program.[6] Leveraging his control over state finance, Rhee redistributed U.S. foreign aid dollars to urban capitalists in order to buy political allegiance and pioneer new industries.[7] At the same time, the state-controlled banking sector manipulated currency and pricing rates in order to balance the state's financial deficit.[8] This effectively enabled the relatively rapid expansion of South Korean light industrial capacity by the end of the decade.

Scholars of the 1950s have also argued the decade was a foundational "embryonic stage" (*t'aedong ki*) in Korea's economic development on an institutional and discursive level.[9] Rhee's import substitution policy cultivated a new generation of industrial capitalist families and set a

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[4] For example, see: David Hunter Satterwhite, "The Politics of Economic Development: Coup, State, and the Republic of Korea's First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962–1966)" (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1994); Atul Kohli, *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), chapter 3; Hyung-a Kim, *Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961–79* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004).
[5] Byung-Kook Kim, "The Leviathan: Economic Bureaucracy under Park," in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Trasformation of South Korea*, eds. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezrak F. Vogel (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), 201.
[6] Jung-en Woo, *Race to the Swift: State Finance in Korean Industrialization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 45–60; Stephan Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 54–55.
[7] Woo, *Race to the Swift*, 65–66; Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery*, 55–57
[8] Woo, *Race to the Swift*, 61–65.
[9] Pak Sŏngchin, "1950 nyŏndae Han'guk palchŏn kukka ŭi t'aedong," (PhD diss., Kŏn'guk University, 2010), xi.

precedent for the integration between state and industrial capital the 1960s.[10] His government also cultivated future economic bureaucrats, with many of the key officials in the early 1960s economic bureaucracy getting their start in the 1950s civil service.[11] Analysis of economic development discourses during the decade also reveals broad consensus among government officials and intellectuals around the need for economic development.[12] As a result, developmental principles had worked their way into South Korean economic institutions, to greater or lesser degrees, by the end of the 1950s.

These studies attribute the lack of a comprehensive, centralized economic development plan in the 1950s to a combination of external and internal limitations. After the Korean War, American foreign aid policy focused more on Korea's economic stability than development.[13] Nominally democratic institutions, such as the National Assembly and national press, also provided a voice for opposition that constrained state action.[14] And even as the American position began to change later in the decade, there remained significant differences among Korean officials over the degree of state involvement in economic development.[15] The dominant trend favored a private-driven economy with the state "assisting" private industry through subsidies, such as foreign aid allocation and divestment of public property.[16] Those favoring a state-driven approach, in contrast wanted the state to take a more direct role in developing and managing major industries, funded through domestic capital.[17] It was this second group that some scholars

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[10] Woo, *Race to the Swift*, 65–69. Amsden is less sanguine on Rhee's developmental program in the 1950s, but she also sees this period as "embryonic" in that it the influx of U.S. aid cultivated a new generation of capitalist entrepreneurs. Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant*, 38–40.
[11] Ibid., 425–427.
[12] See especially Chapter 1 in Pak T'aegyun, *Wŏnhyŏng kwa pyŏnyong: Han'guk kyŏngje kaebal kyehoek ŭi kiwŏn* (Seoul: Sŏul Taehakkyo ch'ulpan munhwawŏn, 2007).
[13] Pak Sŏngchin, "1950 nyŏndae Han'guk palchŏn kukka ŭi t'aedong," 81–90; Pak T'aegyun, *Wŏnhyŏng kwa pyŏnyong*, 110–121.
[14] Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery*, 54–55.
[15] Ibid.; Pak Sŏngchin, "1950 nyŏndae Han'guk palchŏn kukka ŭi t'aedong," 111–115.
[16] Pak T'aegyun, *Wŏnhyŏng kwa pyŏnyong*, 50–55.
[17] Ibid., 55–61.

have looked to seeking out "'islands of technocratic rationality" and an emerging force in economic policy in the 1960s.[18]

This chapter builds on these arguments by exploring the debate over the state's role in socio-economic development during the 1950s from the perspective of former Manchukuo bureaucrats. As we saw in Chapter 3, former Manchukuo bureaucrats generally took a state-centric approach to economic policy after liberation, but by 1950, the political leadership–largely made up of urban capitalists–had rejected such ideas in favor of a private capital. These dynamics continued after the Korean War. Former Manchukuo bureaucrats continued to hold isolated official positions within the South Korean government with a level of longevity that was unusual for the period. The urgent need for economic recovery and broad consensus around the need for economic development created opportunities for them to revive programs and arguments based in part on their experience in Manchukuo. The structural limitations of the political system, however, resulted in only incremental change. Their involvement in programs to develop the coal industry and agricultural production–both of which tied into their broader agenda for state-led economic growth–are important examples.

Throughout the 1950s, South Korea's national coal corporation was a focal point in the ongoing political debate over private-led and state-led economic development. Former Manchukuo bureaucrat, Kim Kyumin, came to power at South Korea's national coal corporation at a time when it's financial and operational failures resulted in growing pressure for privatization. Kim, however, argued that increasing state investment in the corporation to increase production and develop the national market were a necessary precondition for privatization. He formed a coalition with other Manchukuo alumni in government and the military to formulate and execute a comprehensive plan to expand production and achieve energy self-sufficiency under the state's economic guidance. Despite succeeding on their own terms, Kim and his colleagues were forced

[18] Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery*, 61; Pak T'aegyun, *Wŏnhyŏng kwa pyŏnyong*, 55.

to compromise with economic liberals demanding structural reforms to reduce the state's financial burden.

Much like the coal industry, the post-Korean War debate over agricultural production pitted free-market liberals against advocates for state-led development. Just as before the war, former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry focused on agricultural cooperatives as a follow up to land reform. They argued that legal, financial, and organizational power of the state were necessary to establish a national cooperative movement capable of competing with commercial capital and contributing to economic growth. Their ideas failed to sway policymakers who downplayed the importance of the agricultural sector for growth and favored a hands-off approach. While cooperatives legislation did eventually pass late in the decade, it was largely a reflection of American pressure and interests.

Not all former Manchukuo bureaucrats responded to these constraints dogmatically and instead incorporated new ideas and programs into their broader vision for state-led economic growth. This chapter concludes with the example of Ch'a Kyunŭi and his collaboration with American aid workers to start a community development program. In the latter half of the 1950s, the Americans implemented a new type of program based on the theory that democratic values and self-help philosophy would lead to political and economic stabilization in the countryside. As a comprehensive solution to rural society, community development was premised on centralized government planning and coordinated responses to village needs. Newly appointed to the Combined Economic Board, Ch'a played a leading role in the program's design and implementation. His interest in the program, however, represented an amalgamation of new and old influences. Inspired by both his background in Manchukuo and later graduate education in the United States, he was determined to use the program to extract surplus labor from the agricultural sector in order to grow the industrial economy. As in other cases, Ch'a's ability to follow through on these plans was limited. However, his facility with western socio-economic theory and

relationships American aid workers allowed him a higher degree of latitude and support than his colleagues in other fields.

I. Coal

South Korea's nationalized coal industry had a complicated birth. When U.S. occupation forces arrived in 1945, they inherited Japan's highly centralized state mining operations established as part of the imperial wartime mobilization system. American officials quickly took direct control of the system because without access to energy sources in the north, coal was vital for maintaining economic and social stability, and they felt Koreans were incapable of running it on their own.[19] Their long-term goal, however, was to break up the colonial monopoly and encourage private mining, even going so far as to overrule the Interim Legislative Assembly's attempts to permanently nationalize the coal industry. The failure of reunification talks and increasing labor action at South Korean coal mines, however, forced the Americans to abandon privatization and administer coal mines directly.[20]

These conditions were also a problem for the South Korean government after 1948. As we saw in Chapter 3, South Korean politicians were split on the state's role in economic development. But the fact that coal production had recovered significantly under U.S. direct management and the urgent need for stable energy supplies resulted in consensus around nationalization, even as many center-left officials were being pushed out of government. In May 1950, the South Korean government merged its mines and the public distribution corporation into the Taehan Coal Corporation (Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa, THCC). Political consensus, however, was weak and throughout the decade, the THCC was a focal point for renewed debates and competing policy programs leading towards free market capitalism or state-led economic development.

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[19] Im Ch'aesŏng, "Haebang hu sŏkt'an sanŏp ŭi chaep'yŏn kwa kwisok t'angwang ŭi unyong (1945–1950)," *Asea yŏn'gu* 41, no. 4 (2008): 235.
[20] Ibid.

One former Manchukuo bureaucrat, Kim Kyumin,[21] played a prominent role in these debates. Kim had a unique level of influence over the THCC during the 1950s. As in other government agencies, the corporation's leadership changed regularly during the Rhee administration.[22] Kim was appointed to the board of directors in the summer of 1952 for a single three year-term but bucked the trend of frequent removals and transfers. He was the only board member in the decade to serve three consecutive terms.[23] Kim also served as the board's managing director (*ch'ongmu isa*) for most of his eight years in office, making him a key player in overall company strategy and day-to-day operations.

Kim's arrival at the THCC coincided with a period of increasing pressure to privatize national industries. In September 1952, President Rhee announced in a cabinet meeting that the nation's industries were draining the state's finances because of their poor management. The best way to solve these problems, he argued, was to convert national corporations into private enterprises where the free market would force them to adopt rational management and increase operational efficiency.[24] Rhee also likely had political motives, as he used his authority to divest government property at discounted rates to private capitalist in order to build support behind the liberal party.[25] The proposal met with some enthusiasm particularly among economic liberals who had been critical of state industries since their inclusion in the 1948 constitution and continued to

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[21] Kim had experience in economic administration under both the Japanese in Manchukuo, the U.S. Military, and the South Korean government. After graduating from Manchukuo's GUA, he had briefly served in rural administration before being transferred to the Central Tax Office, and later the General Affairs section of the Economy Minister's Secretariate. After 1945, he worked as accountant and auditor in the Economic Department of the U.S. occupation government. This led to positions in the South Korean Board of Audit (Simgyewŏn) and Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) all at the bureau chief (*kukchang*) level. Ch'ongmuch'ŏ ŭijŏngguk ŭisakwa, "T'ae Han sŏkt'an kongsa isa chungim choch'I e kwan han kŏn," *Kungmuhoe ŭi sangjŏng ankŏn ch'ŏl*, 1955, KNA, Ref. BA0084200, 642–644.
[22] Between 1950 and 1960 the THCC had seven presidents. Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa, *Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa 50 nyŏnsa: 1950–2000* (Seoul: Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa, 2001), 612.
[23] To this day, Kim is the only director in the corporation's history to serve more than two terms. Ibid., 618–621.
[24] "Kukyŏng hoesa ŭi minyŏnghwa koryŏ," *Chosŏn ilbo*, September 13, 1952.
[25] Haggard, *Pathways from the Periphery*, 57–58.

pressure the government to pursue a private-directed economic development.[26] Public perception towards the corporations had also never been especially positive since many people associated them with the Japanese mobilization system. Frequent public scandals during and after the war did further damage.[27]

Nonetheless, constitutional revision proved to be a challenging task. Discussions died down in 1953 only to revive again in early 1954. In addition to eliminating presidential term limits allowing Rhee to run for a third term, the Liberal Party's constitutional amendment bill eliminated provisions for national industries.[28] In April the cabinet approved a law restricting national industries' access to government credit and preferential treatment until they were "completely divested."[29] Rhee and the Liberal Party framed these policies as a move towards establishing "liberal democracy" and the "free economy" as the nation's political and economic "line" (*nosŏn*).[30] The principal argument coming from Rhee and liberal economists was that rapid growth would come through market forces and with the war over and land reform completed the time was ripe for the state to start incentivizing private capital investment in industrialization.[31]

Kim Kyumin was one of several national industry officials who publicly opposed privatization, at least in the near-term. While he agreed in principle, Kim criticized the plan to immediately divest national industries and expose them to the free market as "dangerous."[32] These were "vital industries," he argued, and it was in the public interest to ensure that they had a "solid foundation." He conceded that national industries were unprofitable but rejected privatization as a viable solution. Private capital, he contended, would be impossible to secure

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[26] For example, see "Kukyŏng ŭi minyŏnghwa an," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* September 18, 1952.
[27] Kim was himself arrested and charged with dereliction of duty in relation to a THCC rationing scandal in 1953. A judge found him not guilty in 1954 and continued to serve in his post. "Sŏkkong Kim Kyumin ssi mujoe," *Chosŏn ilbo,* January 25, 1954.
[28] "Kaehŏn an kŭmmyŏng konggo," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* January 24, 1954.
[29] "Yi taet'ongnyŏng chaega kukyŏng kiŏp minyŏnghwa an," *Chosŏn ilbo,* May 7, 1954.
[30]"Ch'anbu kukyŏng kiŏpch'e minyŏnghwa e ŭi sibi," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* May 16, 1954.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.

until these industries could produce return on investment. Until that time, government investment and management were "inevitable."[33] He therefore, suggested that state economic policy should focus on "cultivating" industries and getting them to a sustainable level of independent profitability before considering divestment.[34]

The constitutional amendment passed in a controversial assembly decision in November 1954, but this did not lead to the immediate dissolution of the THCC. In the intervening months, THCC coal miners had organized a labor union to protest poor wages and living conditions. In October they demanded immediate payment of back wages and a 100% pay increase.[35] Then in December, workers at four THCC mines staged a two-day work stoppage. Later that month, the National Assembly passed bill promising back wages and a 54% pay raise, but Rhee refused to sign it. Instead, he decided to call in the military to break the strike and establish control over the THCC. He further justified military intervention in the peace-time economy on the basis that Americans had taken similar actions against railroad strikers.[36]

An unintended consequence of Rhee's move against organized labor was that it brought together former Manchukuo bureaucrats in military, government, and at the THCC. On the military side, Rhee appointed Kim Ilhwan to lead the so-called Army Dispatch Team (Kun P'akyŏndan, ADT). Kim's background was unique among former Manchukuo officials. While he had been an officer in the Manchukuo military, his training and experience were more similar to those of civilian officials. Kim was a graduate of the fifth class at Manchukuo's Central Army Training Center (J. Chūō rikugun kunrensho) in Mukden.[37] Unlike most of his Korean colleagues

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[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] For more on the THCC labor action, see Im Ch'aesŏng, "Kun p'akyŏndan ŭi Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa chiwŏn kwa sŏkt'an sanŏp ŭi puhŭng (1954.12–57.8) *Tongbang hakji*, no. 139 (2007): 249–250.
[36] "Kaebal, susong, noim tŭng," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, December 29, 1954.
[37] Founded in 1932, the Central Army Training Center was the first military training institution in Manchukuo. In addition to training officer candidates, it offered several specialized technical programs, including accounting, communications, and military policing. Unlike the Manchukuo Military Academy (J.

in infantry, Kim was sent to the accounting program and, after completing the course, assigned to a management and accounting division in the regional headquarters near the Soviet border.[38] One of Kim's primary duties during the assignment was securing and rationing coal supplies for military and military family consumption. According to Kim, he devised a "coal development plan," that would have made military coal supplies self-sustaining, but the Japanese surrendered before it went into action.[39] After liberation he continued his military career in mostly administrative positions at South Korean Army General Headquarters and at the Ministry of Defense.[40]

Pae Ŭngto (?-?), the Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry was a key player on the government side. Like Kim Kyumin, Pae was a graduate from the thirteenth class at the GUA and had served as a judge in Manchukuo. After liberation, he worked extensively with public industries. Under the Americans, he had worked in the Food Distribution Corporation, and after the creation of the South Korean Government, he was a member of the board of directors at the publicly operated Samch'ŏk Cement Corporation. During the Korean War, he served as Director of the Electricity Bureau before his promotion to Vice Minister in 1954.[41]

Kim Kyumin and Pae had similar complaints about the state's handling of the situation at the THCC. According to Kim, government officials regularly criticized the corporation for poor management and inefficient operations. "[They] formed survey commissions and discussed plans

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Manshū rikugun gunkan gakkō), established in 1939, the Training Center course was only two years and resulted in a commission as second lieutenant. For more, see Manshū kokugun kankō iinkai, *Manshū kokugun* (Tokyo: Ranseikai, 1970).

[38] According to his memoirs, Kim went into the accounting program because he already had prior experience. After the Kwantung Army invaded Manchuria in 1932, Kim claims that the Japanese requisitioned him and several other students in Harbin to serve as military translators. Kim served in an accounting unit, where his education and aptitude for numbers resulted in additional clerical assignments. Kim Ilhwan, *Kim Ilhwan hoegorok: Taehan min'guk kukka kŏnsŏlgi ŭi yŏkhal ŭl chungsim ŭro* (Seoul: Hongsŏngsa, 2015) 52-53.

[39] Ibid., 61.

[40] "Kim Ilhwan," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_101_21483.

[41] "Pae Ŭngto," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_106_30353.

for rationalization," he complained, but never ultimately addressed the underlying economic and structural issues plaguing the corporation.[42] Pae, moreover, criticized state financial agencies for reactive investment in coal production during the winter months with no consideration to the industry's long-term stability.[43] Both agreed that if the nation were serious about rapidly developing domestic coal production, then the government needed to invest more resources.[44]

When the three parties met in January, therefore, the conversation went well beyond the immediate labor problem. Instead, they resolved to "mobilize the military's powerful organizational strength and resources" towards solving "the various bottlenecks" at the THCC.[45] Rhee seemed to be persuaded that the military could help increase coal production and end Korea's reliance on imports from Japan and Taiwan.[46]

This proved to be a controversial move among both civilian and military officials. Politicians in the National Assembly argued that the president had no legal basis for deploying the military and that strict operational limitations were necessary to ensure civilian control.[47] The Army Chief of Staff, moreover, told a member of the U.S. Embassy staff that "he had argued for one month with President Rhee to persuade him not to give the Army [the] assignment."[48] Nonetheless, both civil and military officials concede that the military was uniquely positioned to solve some of the THCC's production problems and begrudgingly agreed to back the plan with some limitations.[49]

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[42] "Sŏkt'an munje t'agaech'aek ŭn ponsa chuch'oe chwadamhoe (3)," *Tonga ilbo,* January 22, 1955.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] "Samja yŏnsŏk hoeŭi Sŏkkong unyŏng aero t'agae," *Tonga ilbo,* January 9, 1955.
[46] Coal production was a major part of Rhee's annual new year's address in 1955, a copy of which can be found in Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa, *Kun pakyŏndan 2 nyŏnji* (Seoul: Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa, 1957), 204–206.
[47] "Sŏkt'an munje t'agaech'aek ŭn ponsa chuch'oe chwadamhoe (wan)," *Tonga ilbo,* January 25, 1955.
[48] Roy T. Haverkamp, "Memorandum of Conversation," *Plans for ROK Army Withdrawal from UNC; Implementation of New Table of Organization and Equipment under Agreed Minute; and ROKA Supervision Taehan Coal Corporation*, AKH, Ref. AUS003_06_01C0020_002, Image 1, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000159328.
[49] Ibid.

Kim Kyumin and Pae Ŭngdo, however, embraced the military as a partner in industrial development. From their perspective, this move was hardly unprecedented. In Manchukuo's hybrid governing structure, the organizational and cultural boundaries between military and civil administration had always been far lower. And in the field, the military had often taken the lead in the name of national security. The same had been true, to a certain extent, under the U.S. military government. Kim further pointed out that the THCC was already accepting technical and financial assistance from the United Nations and the United States, so why not the military too?[50] And since the THCC bore ultimate responsibility, he felt there should be no limit to the extent of the military's assistance.[51] For Pae, military assistance was fully warranted because civilians–both government officials and the population at large–were unable to mobilized sufficient resources on their own. He speculated that even if the resources were there, Koreans would simply refuse to voluntarily come to the corporation's aid. "[People] will ignore a man in a suit," he lamented, "but they listen when he straps on a gun."[52]

The military deployment had an immediate effect on THCC operations, particularly in regard to transportation. One of the major challenges that Kim Kyumin had identified was that the existing Japanese-built transportation networks connected mines with the east coast–convenient for transport to Japan, but not to the major markets and urban centers on the western peninsula.[53] This meant that mining supplies and coal had to be transported mostly by ship, which significantly increased production costs. To alleviate this problem, the Army deployed two transportation squadrons of nearly 100 large trucks that made over 10,000 supply runs over the next two years.[54] As a long-term solution, two engineering companies began construction on rail

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[50] "Sŏkt'an munje t'agaech'aek ŭn ponsa chuch'oe chwadamhoe (wan)," *Tonga ilbo,* January 25, 1955.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] "Sŏkt'an munje t'agaech'aek ŭn ponsa chuch'oe chwadamhoe (2)," *Tonga ilbo,* January 21, 1955.
[54] The Army also improved living conditions at the mines and the surrounding areas. In addition to company supplies, military trucks provided miners with over 18,000 uniforms and 15,000 pairs of

lines linking the major mining regions with the overland freight lines to the west. Construction on one line was completed by the end of 1955, with a second completed the following year.[55]

The former Manchukuo bureaucrats collaborating on the military deployment, however, aimed for more than immediate aid. In February, Kim Ilhwan organized the Joint Korean-American THCC Operations Committee (Han-Mi haptong Sŏkkong taech'aek wiwŏnhoe), comprised of representatives from the THCC, Korean government ministries and banks, and U.S. military and aid organizations.[56] The committee met regularly over the next six months, but quickly settled on expanding production through a five-year plan.[57] Based on estimated increases in overall demand through 1960, they set annual targets aimed at increasing production roughly 30% per year, bringing total output from 1.6 million to 4.3 million tons.[58]

With such ambition's targets in mind, the committee's scope began to expand. Starting in the spring, they broke up into three subcommittees dedicated to the main bottlenecks in the production process: transportation, operations, and finance.[59] They determined that solving these problems required comprehensive planning and an integrated approach that went well beyond the THCC. In September 1955, the committee was formally reorganized as the Joint Korean-

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underwear and hats. They constructed five new radio communication centers. And, with American support, they built twelve schools and two auditoriums. Beginning in December 1955, the Army also took control of and expanded mine medical facilities and personnel, enabling them to offer surgery and inpatient services for the first time. Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa, *Kun pakyŏndan 2 nyŏnji*, 30–32; Im "Kun p'akyŏndan ŭi Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa chiwŏn," 264.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Specifically, these included on the Korean side: the ministries of Commerce and Industry, Reconstruction, Finance, Transportation, Agriculture and Forestry, the Bank of Korea, the Industrial Bank. On the American side, were the FOA, UNKRA, KCAC, and Korea Command. Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa, *Kun pakyŏndan 2 nyŏnji*, 28.

[57] The precise impetus for this is unclear, but there was precedent on both the Korean and American sides. The U.S. was a strong proponent of the five-year plan. American aid officials had first approached the Korean government with a five-year coal production plan in 1950 and the CEB had conduced similar research during and after the Korean War. Im, "Haebang hu sŏkt'an sanŏp ŭi chaep'yŏn," 227–234; Im, "Kun p'akyŏndan ŭi Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa chiwŏn," 255–256. But the concept of five-year production plans was far from a new concept to former Manchukuo bureaucrats in key positions on the committee. In this regard, it is unsurprising that consensus around development planning happened so quickly.

[58] Im, "Kun p'akyŏndan ŭi Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa chiwŏn," 257.

[59] Ibid., 252.

American Workgroup for Accelerating Coal Development (Han-Mi haptong sŏkt'an kaebal ch'okchin hyŏpŭihoe).[60] Rhee tasked Kim Ilhwan with leading the workgroup and shortly thereafter appointed him Minister of Commerce and Industry.[61]

Despite his nominal support privatization and a "free economy," Rhee had several reasons to support expanding state control over the coal industry. As South Korea's only domestically produced energy source, coal was vital not just for the economy but for national security as well. Indeed, this had been one of his main justifications for sending in the military the previous year.[62] Since the Korean War, however, the American aid program had focused on supplying coal from Japan and Taiwan–part of a larger move towards reintegrating Korea with the Japanese imperial economy. Rhee's nationalist perspective on development, however, sought to prevent reintegration and turn Korea into another Japan.[63] Combined, these concerns likely made him more open to former Manchukuo bureaucrats' calls for immediately expanding domestic production and establishing energy independence.

Under Kim Ilhwan's leadership, the workgroup completed the Comprehensive Five-year Fuel Plan (*yŏllyo chonghap o-gye nyŏn kyehoek*, CFFP). The CFFP integrated the targets set in the Five-year Coal Production plan with three other interlocking plans.[64] The first was the "supply and demand plan" (*sugŭp kyehoek*), which sought to control the growing demand for coal and allow for production to catch up. To this end, it planned for significant reductions in supply to government-controlled sectors, such as military and electricity generation, to allow for growth in

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[60] The membership remained identical. Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa, *Kun pakyŏndan 2 nyŏnji*, 65.
[61] Ibid., 28. Kim Ilhwan's appointment as Minister of Commerce and Industry, however, appears to have come at Pae Ŭngdo's expense. When Rhee fired Pae's boss in October 1956 to make way for Kim, Pae was also replaced. "Sŏngkong ch'agwan kyŏngchil," *Chosŏn ilbo,* September 21, 1955.
[62] Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa, *Kun pakyŏndan 2 nyŏnji*, 204–206.
[63] Woo, *Race to the Swift*, 56–57.
[64] Kim Kyumin, "O-kae nyŏn yŏllyo chonghap kyehoek kaekwan: kŭ palchŏn kwajŏngchŏk yakkan ŭi munjaechŏm ŭl chungsim ŭro," *Puhŭng wŏlbo* 2 (July 1956): 39–45.

industrial and private demand.[65] The second piece was a the "transportation plan" (*susong kyehoek*), which increased the relative share of coal shipped overland, mostly by rail. This cheaper option would reduce costs, allow for timely delivery, and make domestic coal more competitive with imports.[66] Finally, the "fuel transition plan" (*yŏllyo chŏnhwan kyehoek*) worked to stop "uncontrolled," "inefficient, and anti-national fuel consumption habits."[67] The main way the plan accomplished this was by transitioning the railroad industry from imported bituminous coal to complete reliance on domestically produced briquettes by the end of five years. It also proposed increased utilization of Korean anthracite coal in industry and private households, which at the time mostly relied on firewood.[68]

For Kim Kyumin, achieving such a comprehensive plan required total integration and mobilization of national resources. The whole country, he argued, needed to get behind this "revolutionary, integrated" policy program.[69] Echoing the discourse of Manchukuo's wartime mobilization, Kim called for "complete unification of the military, government, and civilians" behind the plan as a national movement for self-reliance.[70] This meant both "powerful government measures and powerful popular response."[71] Institutionally, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry would be the main coordinating body, with the THCC, private coal producers, the Ministry of Transportation, regional governors, and technicians and researchers providing organizational and technical support. But, according to Kim, the program would

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[65] It also accounted for increased demand in railroad transportation for the coal itself. Kim Kyumin, "O-kae nyŏn yŏllyo chonghap kyehoek kaekwan," 40.
[66] Ibid., 41.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid., 42-43.
[69] Ibid., 38.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid., 44.

require coordination with every government department and all foreign aid agencies to mobilize society behind the plan.[72]

By the end of 1956, there was evidence that the plan was working thanks in large part to military mobilization. At the mines, military advisors created Operational Improvement Measures Committees (*kadong hyangsang taech'aek wiwŏnhoe*), made up of labor, management, and mine town residents.[73] These committees were responsible for micro-level planning: conducting surveys, educating miners about their role in the program, and auditing outputs.[74] The military's construction of rail freight lines also led to a significant reduction in transportation costs.[75] These increases in operational and transportation efficiency led to a direct increases in production at THCC mines. From 1954, THCC mines increased output by roughly 300,000 tons annually and domestic production exceeded imports for the first time in 1956.[76]

At the same time, private coal mines also experienced a dramatic increase in productivity. The CFFP had anticipated an increase in private coal production, but private mines exceeded their 1956 target by more than 100% despite only a small increase in the overall number of mines in operation.[77] While this sudden expansion in private coal had multiple causes, the CFFP was responsible in two major ways. First, private mines also benefited from the military's rail line extension projects to nearby THCC facilities, reducing transportation costs and opening access to profitable urban markets to the west.[78] Second, government restrictions on firewood consumption–part of the CFFP's fuel transition program–had an appreciable effect on demand for anthracite coal. Between 1954 and 1956, domestic coal consumption roughly doubled from

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[72] Ibid.
[73] Chaisung Lim, "The Emergence of Private Coal Mines and the DHCC's Management Stabilization in the 1950s," *Review of Korean Studies* 10, no. 4 (December 2007): 155; Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa, *Kun pakyŏndan 2 nyŏnji*, 53.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Lim, "The Emergence of Private Coal Mines," 155.
[76] Ibid., 153.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid., 159-160.

900,000 to 1.8 million tons.[79] With the THCC focused on the larger public coal market, this left the growing private market to private coal producers.[80]

Despite the overall success of the CFFP's first year, the explosive growth of private coal created problems for the THCC. While infrastructure and organizational improvements had allowed the corporation to rapidly increase output and exceeded its annual target, it continued to operate at a substantial loss.[81] In this condition, it was clear that additional production increases were going to require even greater investment from the national budget. Private mines, by comparison, were extremely profitable and with their production exceeding private sector demand, they began to expand into public sector sales as early as 1957.[82] These developments were bad for the THCC both optically and financially.

Government officials revived discussions on selling off the THCC and fully privatizing the coal industry in the spring of 1957. The National Assembly responded to the THCC's request for a price increase with their own set of demands. Assembly members argued that private mines had demonstrated that free enterprise and management rationalization could lead to economic development without high levels of government investment.[83] The THCC, in contrast was both inefficient and an unnecessary drain on public finances. They ordered a full review of the corporation's operations with an eye towards complete divestment by the end of the year. In the meantime, they required the THCC to implementation of an independent accounting system on advice from the assembly itself.[84]

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[79] Ibid., 154.
[80] Ibid., 161; Kim Kyumin, "Sŏkt'an sanŏp ŭi hamnichŏk pangan: t'anga insang kwa Sŏkt'an kongsa unyŏng ŭi kil (1)," *Chosŏn ilbo,* April 16, 1957.
[81] Lim, "The Emergence of Private Coal Mines," 162–163.
[82] Ibid., 156.
[83] Kim Kyumin, "Sŏkt'an sanŏp ŭi hamnichŏk pangan: t'anga insang kwa Sŏkt'an kongsa unyŏng ŭi kil (2)," *Chosŏn ilbo,* April 17, 1957.
[84] Ibid.

For Kim Kyumin, the National Assembly was entirely missing the point when it came to "rationalization." He conceded that the THCC was less efficient and poorly managed when compared to private mines but countered that this was not the main reason for the corporation's financial troubles. The real "irrationality," he argued, was in the pricing system. Unlike private mines, which sold their products at market rates based on supply and demand, the THCC was limited to a fixed price determined by the National Assembly itself. So, as demand increased–thanks in large part to the CFFP–private mines were able to reap significant profits by selling their products at market prices determined by the laws of supply and demand, while the THCC was forced to sell at below production costs.[85] If the assembly were serious about "rationalization," Kim argued, they should first relinquish their own control over the market.[86]

Pricing reforms aside, Kim was adamant that the politicians and officials calling for privatization were too focused on the THCC's bottom line. Unlike those in favor of privatization, Kim's take away from the CFFP's first year was that increased production directly correlated with increased government investment in both the public *and* private sectors.[87] Private capital, while growing, was still insufficient to sustain the speed of development needed to accomplish the five-year plan. The state was the only institution capable of making such long-term investments.[88] The THCC's responsibility, therefore, was not to create a profit, or necessarily break even. Rather, it was meant to serve as an engine for development and expanding coal production as a public good.[89] Kim was skeptical that private mines could perform this function

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[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid. Neither Rhee nor the assembly had much reason to relinquish control over prices. As later scholarship has demonstrated, manipulating exchange rates and consumer prices was the government's primary mechanism for financing industrial development under Rhee's import substitution industrialization program. Woo, *Race to the Swift*, 63–65. "Getting the prices wrong" was therefore an objective, not a flaw. Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant*, 139.
[87] Kim Kyumin, "Sŏkt'an sanŏp ŭi hamnichŏk pangan: t'anga insang kwa Sŏkt'an kongsa unyŏng ŭi kil (3)," *Chosŏn ilbo,* April 18, 1957.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.

on their own. "Even if we disband the THCC," he argued, "[market conditions] will still demand a national institution that can guide production development and direct national investment and accounting."[90]

Kim Ilhwan, meanwhile, attempted to find some ground for compromise. Like his colleague at the THCC, Kim saw privatization as a gradual process after the state had developed and stabilized the market.[91] By 1957, however, he felt that economic conditions had changed enough to warrant some modifications in the THCC's role. Owing to its successful first year, the CFFP underwent a review and in April 1957, the MCI submitted a revised plan. Unlike its predecessor, the "Ten-year Plan to Increase Coal Production" explicitly called for adjustments in the THCC's operations and management. The plan agreed with the assembly's opinion that the corporation's constant deficits were a significant problem and that there was an urgent need for management "rationalization," but it stopped short of calling for complete privatization. Instead, the plan proposed leaving the THCC's three profitable mines untouched and divesting only the unprofitable ones that would most benefit from private management.[92] It also recognized Kim Kyumin's position that the corporation's main role should be in development. To this end, the report proposed revising the corporations charter to separate and transfer its sales operations to the MCI, which would then contract them out to the private sector.[93]

In a direct response to the National Assembly's wishes, Kim Ilhwan also hired a new THCC president with experience in private mining. Chŏng Inuk (1912–1999) had spent the first part of his career as a bureaucrat working for state mining agencies under the Japanese, Americans, and eventually the THCC. In 1952, he entered the private sector, founding a mining

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[90] Ibid.
[91] According to his memoirs, Kim met with Syngman Rhee in 1954 and recommended that the government consider eventually privatizing several gunpowder plants, albeit with continued government investment and oversight. Kim Ilhwan, *Kim Ilhwan Hoegorok*, 218.
[92] Ch'ongmuch'ŏ ŭijŏngguk ŭisakwa, "Sŏkt'an chŭngsan 10-kae nyŏn kyehoek surip e kwan han kŏn (che 37 hoe)," *Kungmuhoe ŭi sangjŏng ankŏn ch'ŏl*, 1957, NAK, Ref. BA0084209, 375.
[93] Ibid., 378–379.

corporation in Kangwŏn Province that by 1957 had over 500 employees with double the labor productivity of the THCC.[94] Chŏng returned to the corporation with plans for major internal reforms. After his appointment in September 1957, he announced his intention to eliminate "myopic methods," "modernize" operations, and "rationalize" management.[95] In agreeing to take the job, moreover, Chŏng secured assurances that the government would not interfere.[96]

Chŏng started with major structural reforms that quickly caused conflict between him and Kim Kyumin. Chŏng proposed revisions to the corporation's charter that increased the power of operations and management over production and facilities.[97] The new structure also significantly reduced Kim's personal power as Managing Director by transferring his authority over personnel to a separate division.[98] This opened up an additional position on the board for one of Chŏng's allies and further centralized his control over the corporation's workforce. When it appeared as if the rest of the board would go along with the plan, Kim Kyumin threatened to resign and stormed out of the boardroom.[99] Kim returned with the board's support, but Chŏng submitted his own letter of resignation shortly thereafter.[100] Kim Ilhwan sided with Chŏng, refusing to accept his resignation, and Rhee approved the new structure on October 18.[101] Kim Kyumin ultimately remained on the board but with significantly less influence.[102]

Kim's opinion on the direction for the THCC had changed dramatically by the end of 1957. While still not in favor of privatization, he came out in favor of many of Chŏng's reform

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[94] Lim, "The Emergence of Private Coal Mines," 167-168.
[95] "Kŭndaehwa rŭl chihyang Chŏng Sŏkkong ch'ongjae ŏmmyŏng," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun* (September 7, 1957).
[96] Lim, "The Emergence of Private Coal Mines," 168.
[97] "Ŏngk'yŏjin samgak ŭi kaltŭng: Chŏng Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa ch'ongchae sap'yo sodong ŭi imyŏn," *Tonga ilbo,* December 9, 1957.
[98] "Insa p'adong kwa allyŏk ŭl nojang," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* September 14, 1957.
[99] Ibid.
[100] "Ŏngk'yŏjin samgak ŭi kaltŭng: Chŏng Taehan sŏkt'an kongsa ch'ongchae sap'yo sodong ŭi imyŏn," *Tonga ilbo,* December 9, 1957.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Kim's byline in an article published in December 1957 identified him as "Director" rather than "Managing Director." Kim Kyumin, "Sŏkt'an sanŏp ŭi tangmyŏn kwaje (3)," *Chosŏn ilbo,* December 10, 1957.

proposals. If the THCC was going to survive in a market where it competed with private mines, he reasoned, then it needed to be freed from tight government regulation.[103] Rather than selling off the corporation, as the Assembly had proposed at the beginning of the year, he urged them to revise the laws and allow the THCC greater autonomy to operate as a semi-private company. This meant granting the corporation independent operations, allowing private investment, and ending restrictions on developing new markets domestically and internationally.[104]

This strategy appears to have worked. Despite a slight decline in 1958, THCC mines increased production by over 1 million tons over the next two years.[105] Meanwhile, private mine production continued to expand exponentially and exceeded THCC output in 1960. As later scholars have convincingly argued, by focusing on management rationalization and increasing efficiency, the THCC managed to eliminate its deficits while still hitting the production plan's targets.[106] At an international meeting on public enterprises in 1959, Kim Kyumin acknowledged the success of privatization and "autonomous self-supporting management" in Korea's public sector.[107] Nonetheless, his speech hinted at a lingering dissatisfaction with the government's position on public industries like the THCC:

> State-operated enterprises are often criticized for a lack of efficiency, although it is difficult to define the true meaning of that word. Furthermore, the government has emphasized a policy of lower prices…It is hard to find criteria of effective management under an official price system…These pressures are gradually causing a shift towards a free enterprise system, and the industrial facilities under government operation are being sold to private ownership…At this stage, cooperation and adjustment between public and private enterprise is the most important problem in management of Korean industrial enterprise.[108]

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[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Lim, "The Emergence of Private Coal Mines," 153.
[106] Ibid., 180.
[107] Kim Kyumin, "Public Industrial Enterprise in the Republic of Korea," in *Public Industrial Management in Asia and the Far East: A Selection from the Material Prepared for a United Nations Seminar Held in New Delhi in December 1959*, ed. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (New York: United Nations, 1960), 108.
[108] Ibid., 108-109.

Around the same time, Chŏng was ousted, reportedly by National Assembly members under pressure from mining interests and smugglers.[109] But there was little opportunity for Kim to adjust to changing leadership. Six months later, the Rhee government had fallen, and Kim resigned along with the rest of the THCC board of directors.[110]

II. Cooperatives

While Kim Kyumin was attempting to use the national coal industry to push the nation towards state-led economic development, other former Manchukuo bureaucrats were doing likewise in the agricultural sector. In the early days of the Republic, former Manchukuo bureaucrats had advocated for agricultural cooperatives as a follow up to land reform (Chapter 3). Lack of political support for further socio-economic development policies in the countryside, however, had relegated the program to legislative limbo. The Korean War caused further logistical delays, but former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the MAF returned to the subject even before the armistice in 1953. Like Kim Kyumin, their ideas about state-guided socio-economic developmental clashed with political leaders' private-guided approach. In the case of agriculture, however, the debate centered around the concept of self-help.

By late 1952, former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry were beginning to build momentum within the government to revive the cooperative movement. This was driven in large part by the entry of new leadership. In September 1952, Sin Chungmok (1902–1982) was appointed as MAF Minister, bringing some much-needed stability and renewed interest in cooperatives. Since the outbreak of the war, the ministry suffered from a lack of leadership thanks to a stream of cabinet reshuffles. When he was appointed, Sin became the fifth head of the ministry in just two years. The previous months had also been fraught with political

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[109] "Twikkolmok," *Tonga ilbo,* December 19, 1959.
[110] "Sŏkkong isa chŏnwŏn saim," *Tonga ilbo,* June 16, 1960.

uncertainty due to the unfolding power struggle between Syngman Rhee and the opposition in the National Assembly. Sin, however, arrived as part of a compromise coalition behind the President's constitutional revision. And he intended to use his position to increase the South's flagging wartime agricultural production. Sin believed that the production problem was due to farmer's inability to stand on their own two feet.[111] This was not, he argued, their own fault but rather due to the perpetuation of exploitative systems from the colonial period and a lack of support and security from the government. Sin, therefore, proposed that the government needed to take the lead in organizing independent agricultural cooperatives in order to improve the spiritual and material conditions in the villages and turn them into happy and productive units. In this respect, his agenda fit in well with the former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the Ministry's middle ranks, such as Ch'a Kyunhŭi and Yi Kihong, who had been working on developing the cooperative movement since before the War.

For Ch'a and Yi, the war did little to change their underlying assumptions about the nature of economic development in Korea and only added to their sense of urgency. In spite of the violent crackdowns against alleged communist or socialist sympathizers during the war's chaotic first year, they remained deeply critical of free market capitalism and the government's policies to protect it.[112] Agriculture, they argued, was the bedrock of the national economy, but remained under developed after decades of oppression by colonial capital.[113] They felt that government policies had not only failed to address these issues but also perpetuated a system of economic stagnation–as evidenced by declining productivity–by favoring the interests of

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[111] Kim Minsŏk, "1950 nyŏndae nongŏp hyŏptong chohap chŏngch'aek tamnon," *Han'guk minjok undongsa yŏn'gu*, no. 78 (2014): 147–148.
[112] Ch'a Kyunhŭi, *Nongŏp hyŏptong chohap ŭi kyŏngyang,* Nongch'on kŏnsŏl tokpon 3 (Seoul: Nongimbu, 1953), 19.
[113] Ibid., 14–15; Yi Kihong, *Nongŏp kyŏngje kaeron*, Nongimbu nongŏp kyodowŏn yangsŏng kyoje 3 (Seoul: Nongimbu, 1954), 4.

commercial and industrial capitalists.[114] The war had only compounded the issue. Echoing the discourse of the wartime Japanese empire, they saw the rapid division of the world between American and Soviet camps as a call to national mobilization. Agricultural production took on new urgency as national survival and the fate of the "free world" rested on it. Free market economics, they argued, had to be set aside as even countries like the United States were placing limitations on private capital in order to mobilize for the Cold War confrontation.[115]

For Yi and Ch'a, cooperatives were a crucial part of the solution to these problems. Establishing collective systems for farmers to transport and sell their products, as well purchase supplies would cut out the middleman, allowing them to compete on the capitalist market.[116] No longer in competition with each other, the cooperatives would liberate farmers to develop new technologies and techniques and serve as a conduit for the dissemination of this knowledge.[117] Petty farmers would be converted into rational agricultural managers, developing their crops according to scientific planning in a way that mirrored former Manchukuo bureaucrat's designs for the national economy as a whole.[118] The result they envisioned, however, was not just an increase in agricultural production but also a complete transformation of the social economy from the ground up.

If cooperatives were based on the principles of self-help, former Manchukuo bureaucrats tied this to the collective in a way that mirrored Manchukuo's imperial morality. For them, self-cultivation did not end with the individual. Instead, it served as a "foundation" for "the pacification and stabilization of the national essence (*kungmin chŏngsin*)."[119] In this respect, cooperatives were vital not simply for bringing farmers out of poverty but also for achieving the

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[114] Yi Kihong, *Han'guk ŭi nongji kaehyŏk* (Seoul: Nongimbu nongji kwalliguk, 1954), 65.
[115] Yi Kihong, *Nongŏp kyŏngje kaeron*, 1.
[116] Ibid., 7.
[117] Yi Kihong, *Han'guk ŭi nongji kaehyŏk*, 59.
[118] Ch'a, *Nongŏp hyŏptong chohap ŭi kyŏngyang*, 9; Yi Kihong, *Nongŏp kyŏngje kaeron*, 1.
[119] Yi Kihong, "Haengun ŭi kŏch'ŏ," *Kyŏnghyan sinmun,* May 31, 1955.

common prosperity, stability, and cultural advancement of the local and national community. Some went even further, suggesting that through this national program for self-cultivation, the Korean nation would draw the course of history away from America and the West as a harbinger of a "new Asian future."[120]

To this end, former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the MAF saw the state, and their ministry specifically, playing a leading role developing the cooperative movement. Ch'a argued that since the people had only limited opportunities to develop managerial experience under Japanese colonization, it was the state's responsibility to ensure that cooperatives were organized and managed properly and efficiently. The state's relationship to cooperatives, therefore, was threefold. First, the state was the "director" (*kamdok*). This meant the state should have the authority to audit cooperative finances and activities, as well as issue sanctions for illegal actions.[121] Second, the state offered "guidance" (*chido*). According to Ch'a, the state would be responsible for training cooperative employees, giving them the tools for rational planning, statistical analysis, and managerial efficiency that would eventually allow them to be self-sustaining.[122] Finally, the state was directly responsible for "cultivating" (*yuksŏng*) the cooperative movement. Unlike other states where agricultural cooperative movements had developed naturally from below, Ch'a argued that in Korea, only the state had the necessary competencies to shepherd the farming population into the modern age.[123] If self-help was the ultimate goal of cooperatives, then it was the responsibility of the state to help farmers help themselves.

In addition to Ministry officials, Sin Chungmok brought in outside advisors that also included former Manchukuo bureaucrats. Less than a month after his appointment, Sin announced

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[120] Ibid.
[121] Ch'a, *Nongŏp hyŏptong chohap ŭi kyŏngyang*, 23.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Ibid., 24.

the formation the Agriculture and Forestry Committee (Nongim wiwŏnhoe), an unofficial advisory group tasked with helping draft a new Cooperatives Law.[124] Among the 46 members on the Committee was Han Ungkil.[125]

Han's views differed somewhat from his MAF colleagues, particularly regarding the government's role in the cooperative movement. Arguing against what he called "government organized" (*kwanch'e*) or "government controlled" (*kwanji*) cooperatives, Han felt that it was vital that the farmers organize themselves.[126] He felt that a strong government role risked ceding control to politicians and capitalists who might exploit the cooperative movement for their own personal gain. In his analysis, this was precisely what had happened with the wartime production cooperatives setup by the Japanese and the colonial credit institutions that continued to dominate postcolonial agriculture.[127] The only way to guard against this, he contended, was through local autonomy. This is not to say that Han saw no role for government in the cooperative movement. He acknowledged that it was necessary for the government protect and guarantee the rights of cooperatives through legislation and judicial enforcement. He also expected the government to put up capital for farm credit. But the connections between the government and individual cooperatives was far less Ch'a had proposed.

Both approaches, however, were a significant departure from the growing political dominance of financial capitalists and economic liberals. As we saw previously, this group believed in a private-guided economic development program that emphasized industrial growth through foreign capital (Chapter 3). But this did not mean they were uninterested in agricultural

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[124] "Nongimbu changgwan, hyŏptong chohap chojik ŭl wihayŏ nongim wiwŏnhoe sŏlch'i hal kŏsim ŭro ŏmmyŏng," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* September 20, 1952.
[125] The circumstances behind Han's participation are unclear. According to his 1952 bio, Han had served as a higher official in Manchukuo's Office of Agricultural Promotion (J. Kōnōbu). Han Ungkil, *Nongŏp hyŏptong chohap chojik ron*, Nongch'on kŏnsŏl tokpon 2 (Seoul: Nongimbu, 1952), unpaginated back matter.
[126] Ibid., 20.
[127] Ibid.

production. Rather, their emphasis was on expanding agricultural through market rather than state discipline.[128] They were not, therefore, opposed to the agricultural cooperative movement in principle but argued that it should develop "naturally" through private commercial credit and financing rather than through long or short-term government investment.[129]

President Rhee's interest in the cooperative movement, meanwhile, had more to do with politics than economic development. Following the 1952 elections, Rhee and his political allies were looking to expand Liberal Party influence in the countryside and one tool at their disposal was the Farmers Association (Nongminhoe). Originally a Japanese colonial institution, the Farmers Association had strong connections to the wartime mobilization system. Rhee disbanded the organization in 1949 but bringing it back three years later made political sense organizationally and financially. Not only did many associations continued to operate informally, often with the same local leadership, but also the organizations financial holdings of roughly 10 billion hwan were sitting in a government account. Reviving the Farmers Association would provide a convenient justification for absorbing these existing organizations and funds into the Liberal Party.

Some MAF officials, particularly Sin Chungmok, saw Rhee's announcement of the new National Farmers' Association (Taehan nongminhoe) as an opportunity for the cooperative movement. With the Ministry's cooperatives bill again stuck in legislative limbo, Sin was eager to push ahead with organizing village cooperatives anyway. Despite its political purpose, the Farmers Association's organizational and financial resources could also be directed towards

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[128] Park T'aegyun, *Wŏnhyŏng kwa pyŏnyong*, 68; Kim Minsŏk, "1950 nyŏndae nongŏp hyŏptong chohap chŏngch'aek tamnon," 156.
[129] Ibid., 156–157.

setting up cooperatives.[130] Moreover, Rhee had suggested that this might be possible, but the farmers would have to take the initiative themselves.[131]

Not everyone was convinced by Rhee's sudden interest in cooperatives. Han Ungkil and several other members of the Agriculture and Forestry Committee protested that the MAF had no business getting involved with the Farmers Association.[132] Han was critical of Rhee for obfuscating the boundary between the Farmers Association and cooperatives, which he felt served two completely different functions. The Farmers Association, he argued, was a "social organization" (*sahoe tanche*), which was intended to "promote the political, economic, and social position" of farmers.[133] Membership in the association was open to any individual or political organization interested in promoting farmers' rights and its primary activities were advocacy, political organizing, and cultural activities. In contrast, cooperatives were "economic organizations" (*kyŏngje tanche*), intended to rationalize production and provide "practical and concrete" benefits directly to farming communities.[134] As such, they were politically neutral, and membership was exclusively for those engaging in agricultural production.[135] He therefore urged Sin to "proceed as planned with promoting the cooperatives and leave the Farmers Association to the politicians."[136]

Han and other advisor's recommendations did not dissuade Sin from focusing on the Associations. The MAF began organizing local association chapters as agricultural cooperatives

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[130] "Nongimbu, nongŏp hyŏptong chohap chojik chinhaeng," *Minju sinbo,* November 4, 1952.
[131] While he publicly stated that the association was not intended to be a cooperative organization per se, Rhee hinted in his announcement of the Farmers Association's revival that it might later institute a "cooperative system" (*hypdŏng chohap chedo*). Yi Sŭngman, "Chayudang kusŏng kwa nongminhoe chojik e taehayŏ," in *Taet'ongnyŏng Yi Sŭngman paksa tamhwajip*, ed. Kongboch'ŏ (Seoul: Kongboch'ŏ, 1953), 109.
[132] "Nongimbu, Nongminhoe wa nongŏnp hyŏptong chohap sŏllip ŭl wihe che 3 ch'a Nongim wiwŏnhoe kaech'oe," *Sŏul sinmun,* November 19, 1952.
[133] Han Ungkil, "Nongminhoe wa nongŏp hyŏptong chohap," *Pŏpchŏng* 8, no. 5/6 (June 1953): 10.
[134] Ibid., 10-11.
[135] Ibid., 11-12.
[136] "Nongimbu, Nongminhoe wa nongŏnp hyŏptong chohap sŏllip ŭl wihe che 3 ch'a Nongim wiwŏnhoe kaech'oe"

in early 1953. However, this quickly began to anger Rhee's allies who felt this was undermining their political and financial interests.[137] In February Rhee chastised Sin for intervening in the association's "natural" and "autonomous" organization and causing unnecessary delays with his insistence on instituting a cooperative system.[138] He subsequentially transferred project oversight to the Ministry of Interior.[139] When the association held its opening meeting the following month, Rhee's speech made no reference to cooperatives, instead explicitly declaring the organization "a vital part within the Liberal Party" and it's mission for national unification.[140]

Support for state-supported cooperatives evaporated in the upper echelons of the South Korean government after the end of the Korean War. Rhee fired Sin in September 1953 setting off another period of unstable leadership in the MAF.[141] With land reform largely completed by 1954, Rhee's post-war political fortunes and economic recovery plans were increasingly tied to urban industrialization.[142] So despite broad concerns about the state of agricultural production, economic and political policy tacitly embraced the status quo. Former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the MAF nonetheless remained dedicated to developing their own vision of cooperative

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[137] Sin's activities particularly bothered Ch'ae Kyuhang (?–?), President of the Liberal Party-aligned League of Korean Farmers (Taehan nongmin ch'ongyŏnmaeng). At the time the league was engaged in organizing its own cooperatives, and Ch'ae had argued against MAF involvement. "Nongimbu nongim wiwŏnhoe, nongmin hyŏptong chohap sŏllip ŭl noko kyŏngnyŏlhan nonchaeng chŏngae," *Sŏul sinmun* (October 21, 1952). After Sin began directing the new Farmers Association to create cooperatives, Ch'ae and the League broke off and started a separate Farmers Association, claiming political legitimacy. Rhee threw his support behind Ch'ae and pressured Sin and the MAF to back off. For more on the dispute, see Pang Kichung, "1953–55 nyŏn Kŭmyong chohap yŏnhaphoe ŭi siksan kye puhŭng saŏp yŏn'gu: Yi Sŭngman chŏngkwŏn ŭi hyŏptong chohap chŏngch'aek kwa kwallyŏn hayŏ," *Tongbang hakji* 105 (1999): 213–220.
[138] Taet'ongnyŏng pisŏsil, "Nongminhoe chojik chugwan e kwanhan kŏn," *Taet'ongnyŏng kirongmul*, 1953, KNA, Ref. AA0000500, 1114–1115.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Yi Sŭngman, "Chŏnguk nongmin taehoe e," in *Taet'ongnyŏng Yi Sŭngman paksa tamhwajip*, ed. Kongboch'ŏ (Seoul: Kongboch'ŏ, 1953), 116.
[141] In the following five years, there were six ministers and one acting minister. Sin's thirteen-month tenure as minister was the longest on record until 1957.
[142] Woo, *Race to the Swift*, 65.

agriculture.[143] Unable to gain support with domestic political leaders, however, they began looking to the Americans for help.

After the Korean War, American aid workers began show an interest in developing agricultural cooperatives as part of Korean's national rehabilitation plan. Studies conducted after the war determined that the lack of low interest farm credit was major impediment to increasing agricultural production and stabilizing the food supply. The report proposed establishing an institution modeled after the American Farm Credit Administration to provide low interest loans to "locally organized" credit institutions.[144] These institutions would "encourage" farm villages to form cooperatives through small loans to finance shared burdens such as rice milling, fertilizer purchase, and irrigation.[145] Korea, the report argued, was a good candidate for such a program because the Japanese had established "farm organizations…along cooperative lines."[146] And while these institutions had been abandoned, it concluded that "Korean farmers have the capacity and considerable experience in managing their own affairs if given assistance and guidance."[147]

Nonetheless, the American perspective on cooperatives was not an easy match for the former Manchukuo bureaucrats in the MAF. In particular, the Americans argued against any direct government involvement in organizing cooperatives. Farmers needed to take the initiative themselves. In a perspective typical of the aid program more generally, the Americans argued that "an effective farmers' cooperative is not likely to arise in an area where assistance [has] arrived before the local people have organized themselves to use it and have not made substantial contributions of time and work in the planning and preparation for it."[148] Korean government officials and American technicians should therefore advise but not direct the process, and

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[143] Yi Kihong, *Han'guk ŭi nongji kaehyŏk*, 61.
[144] "A proposal for Korean Rehabilitation," *Farm Credit and Cooperatives - 2 of 2*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_87_00C0048, Image 29, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000978191.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Ibid., Image 30.
[148] Ibid., Image 31.

withhold direct assistance until the farmers had demonstrated they were "prepared to receive it."[149] In this respect, the American perspective on self-help and autonomy was not all that different from Rhee and the Liberal Party, albeit for reasons that were more financial than political.

The cooperatives movement made little subsequent progress. After 1953, the former Manchukuo bureaucrats at the MAF lost a significant amount of influence over the project. In 1953, Ch'a departed for the United States for a one-year master's program in Agricultural Economics at the University of Wisconsin, but he ended up extending his stay for an additional two years to complete a Ph.D.[150] Yi Kihong replaced Ch'a as Agricultural Economy Section Chief and in 1954, he was in charge of drafting a new Agricultural Cooperatives Bill. The Agriculture and Forestry Committee of the National Assembly, however, elected to draft their own bill which was substantially different from Yi's. The details of these differences will be discussed in greater detail below, but the bill's life was remarkably short lived. It died in committee just twenty-one days after its introduction when the assembly session ended.[151] Following the spring elections, the new Liberal Party majority turned its attention to constitutional revision and did not return to the cooperatives issue until the fall of 1955. By that time, new MAF leadership had transferred Yi to the Agricultural Experiment Station where he no longer had any direct input on the cooperative movement.[152]

Around the same time, the America's position was beginning to change due to concerns over persistent instability in the agricultural economy. By the end of 1954, American aid workers were growing extremely concerned that the Korean Government's inability to resolve the farm

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[149] Ibid.
[150] "List of Personnel Selected for Training Abroad," *Extension Service – 1 of 3*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_87_00C0044, Image 34, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000978187.
[151] Taehan min'guk kukhoe, "[020436] Nongŏp hyŏptong chohap pŏpan (Nongim wiwŏnjang)," *Ŭian chŏngbo sisŭt'em* (BIS), http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=001206.
[152] "Yi Kihong," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_108_02356.

credit crisis and wean the national economy off American monetary aid.[153] By their calculations, injecting 4 billion hwan for direct loans to farmers would help to stabilize the financial situation in the countryside. However, they had little faith that the existing institutions–the South Korean government and the Federation of Financial Associations–were capable of effectively and fairly administering such a large-scale credit program.[154] The consensus was to approve these funds on the condition that South Korean government take serious strides towards establishing a "grass-roots" and "democratic" cooperative organization.[155]

In an apparent contradiction to their "self-help" philosophy, the Americans began to bring in technical experts who took a far more active role in determining what kind of cooperative organization Koreans needed. In August 1955, Edwin C. Johnson (?–?) of the Farm Credit Administration's Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation and two other American experts arrived to conduct a thorough study of the farm credit situation in Korea. The Johnson Report concluded that the farmers needed to directly control the cooperatives through democratic organization and management for the system to be financially stable and improve village life. It also proposed that the most efficient way to organizing cooperatives was to "utilize the best feature[s] of existing institutions.[156]

With this in mind, the report's primary recommendation was to reorganize the Federation of Financial Associations (Kŭmyong chohap hyŏphoe, FFA). At the central level, the Government would transform the FFA into the "Agricultural Bank." Since the Korean government would provide the initial capital (along with American aid), the report recommended

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[153] C. Tyler Wood, "Financial Reforms for the Korean Farmers," AKH, Ref. AUS014_87_00C0048, Image 51
[154] CINCREP Seoul, "Agricultural Credit," AKH, Ref. AUS014_87_00C0048, Image 88.
[155] Office of Food and Agriculture, "Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives," AKH, Ref. AUS014_87_00C0048, Image 118.
[156] Edwin C. Johnson, C. Maurice Wieting, and George B. Blair, "A Proposal for Improving Agricultural Credit in Korea," *Farm Credit and Cooperatives – 1 of 2*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_87_00C0047, Image 111, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000978190.

that the government should select the bank's first interim board and have veto power over subsequent elected members. However, the ultimate objective was for the bank to become self-sustaining and self-governing. The government would also separate the FFA's 414 branch offices and convert them into "independent associations." Their primary function would continue to be financial, approving and overseeing direct loans to farmers. But the report recommended that they should also become "multiple purpose associations," or cooperatives, carrying out such activities as purchase and distribution of farm supplies, sales and marketing, transportation and storage, and education.[157] Local associations would adhere to cooperative principles of "democratic control," "one man one vote," "operation for the benefit of members," and "limited return on capital."[158]

Of course, the main hurdle was that such reforms required legislation. Johnson's advice was to set up a working group of Korean officials–guided by American technicians–to draft and press for legislation as quickly as possible.[159] After Rhee offered a general "interest" in the Johnson report and an "apparent approval" of the plan to organize local cooperatives, the Americans proceeded to form a committee to draft legislation.[160] The committee was mostly American and headed by John Cooper (?–?), a credit specialist temporarily brought in from the aid program in the Philippines.[161] The committee drafted three separate but interdependent bills creating an agricultural bank, reorganizing FFA branches as local credit associations, and establishing a national agricultural cooperative organization.[162] The CEB submitted these drafts to

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[157] Ibid., Image 107.
[158] Ibid. Image 108.
[159] Edwin C. Johnson, et. al. to C. Tyler Wood, September 9, 1955, in AKH, Ref. AUS014_87_00C0047, Image 91
[160] Edwin C. Johnson to C. Tyler Wood, September 12, 1955, in ibid., Image 48.
[161] James A. Carey to Kim Young Chan, October 13, 1955, in ibid., Image 41. Notably, nearly all the Koreans on the committee represented the financial side of the government: the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Korea, and the FFA. The only representative from the MAF was Yi Chongmyŏng (?–?), who had replaced Yi Kihong as Agriculture Economy Section in 1955. "Members of Full Time Work Group from ROK Side," in ibid., Image 42.
[162] CINCREP Seoul, "Proposed Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Legislation," *1956 Agriculture – Credit*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0192, Images 30–31, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000954302.

Rhee and the cabinet for consideration in February of 1956. At this point, however, the so-called "Cooper Bills" (*K'up'a an*) entered an already crowded field. In addition to the 1954 MAF proposal, the Assembly Agriculture and Forestry Committee reintroduced the proposal from the previous session in October 1955, and the Assembly Finance and Economy Committee introduced its own draft legislation in December.

The main differences between the four proposals were structural. The Cooper and Finance Committee bills both treated the cooperative organization and the Agricultural Bank as separate but interrelated institutions. The Ministry of Finance had exclusive authority to regulate and direct banking activities at the central and provincial levels. The Cooper Bills added an additional layer of bureaucratic complexity by reorganizing the FFA branched offices as credit associations that were financially affiliated with, but administratively independent from, both the Agricultural Bank and the cooperatives.[163] In contrast, the MAF and Agriculture Committee proposals placed both cooperative and credit functions under a single administrative structure. The MAF was the principle regulatory agency, but shared authority with Ministry of Finance on banking and credit issues.[164]

Meanwhile the MAF and Cooper Bills were more similar when it came to the structure of the cooperatives. Both envisioned that the basic cooperative unit would start at the village level, with common credit and marketing systems located at the city (*si*) or county (*kun*) level. These city/county cooperatives would feed into a national association, which managed (MAF) or

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[163] "Korean Agricultural Cooperative System," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_87_00C0047, Image 32. This was a significant deviation from the Johnson Report which called for the FFA Branches to be reorganized as multipurpose cooperatives. The Cooper committee's reasoning was that since the Financial Associations were had a capitalization of roughly 4 billion hwan from both farmers *and* private investors, it made little sense to liquidate such a significant source of potential credit. By allowing for continued private investment, however, the Credit Associations in the Cooper Bills undermined one of the fundamental principles of agricultural credit. This fact was not lost on some Korean critics, as will be discussed in detail below. CINCREP Seoul, "Proposed Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Legislation," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0192, Images 30–31.

[164] For the MAF bill, see Yi Kihong, *Nongŏp kyŏngje kaeron*, 31–32. For the Agriculture Committee bill, see Taehan min'guk kukhoe, "[020436] Nongŏp hyŏptong chohap pŏpan (Nongim wiwŏnjang)," BIS, Pages 3–4 in original document scan.

coordinated (Cooper) banking and credit functions at the national level. The National Association also operated provincial level branches that were responsible solely for marketing and distribution activities.[165] The Assembly bills, however, envisioned larger cooperatives starting at the city/county level with provincial and national confederations coordinating marketing and financial activities at higher levels.[166] The MAF and the Agriculture Committee proposals also differed slightly in the size and makeup of the leadership structure at the national level. In the Agriculture Committee's version, the president of each provincial cooperative was an automatic member of the national board of directors. In addition, the provincial boards elected two representatives from their respective city/county cooperatives and one representative from their livestock and stoneware cooperatives.[167] The MAF proposal, on the other hand, proposed that a general assembly of all cooperative members should elect up to 30 candidates "who have knowledge in agriculture or economics."[168] The federation president–also an elected position–would then select ten of these candidates for positions on the board, with the approval of the MAF.[169]

Though no longer directly involved in the process, former Manchukuo bureaucrats were vocal participants in the public debate. Yi Kihong and Han Ungkil were particularly critical of the Cooper Bills and both Assembly proposals. The Americans, Yi argued, had made a significant error in thinking they could simply repurpose the FFA. For Yi, the FFA represented the ongoing domination of commercial capital and large industries that had undermined farmers and agricultural development since colonial times.[170] Moreover, the Cooper Bills failed to fully cut

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[165] "Korean Agricultural Cooperative System," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_87_00C0047, Image 32; Yi Kihong, *Nongŏp kyŏngje kaeron*, fold-out insert after 56.
[166] Taehan min'guk kukhoe, "[020436] Nongŏp hyŏptong chohap pŏpan (Nongim wiwŏnjang)," BIS, Pages 1–2 in original document scan.
[167] Ibid., Page 39 in original document.
[168] Yi Kihong, *Nongŏp kyŏngje kaeron*, 49.
[169] Ibid., 49–50.
[170] Yi Kihong, "'Nongjo' wa 'nongŭn' ŭi kal kil," *Chosŏn ilbo,* November 9, 1955.

ties with capitalist interests by leaving the FFA's basic organizational structures intact and continuing to permit profit-seeking, non-agricultural investors. Rather than building on that foundation, he pressed for a "new start" (*sin ch'ulbal*), with cooperatives specifically designed for the operation and benefit of farmers, and dedicated to rationalization, increased production, and national economic expansion.[171]

Han was critical of the Cooper and Finance Committee proposals because of the institutional and administrative separation between credit and other cooperative functions. Like Yi, he was concerned that an independent agricultural bank would not act in farmers' interest and risked further binding them to merchant and industrial capital. Administratively, he argued that the MAF was the bank's logical regulatory body because farm credit was directly tied to agricultural policy. The Ministry of Finance, moreover, already had a higher level of control, since financial policy dictated agricultural policy.[172] Han also criticized the Assembly proposals for placing too much power at the city/county and provincial levels. For him, this kind of structure maintained the socioeconomic geography of capitalist power, with urban landlords controlling access to credit and markets. Instead, Han preferred the MAF model which focused on organizing at the village level, where farmers living and working in community could reap the most benefit from shared resources.[173]

As for democratic cooperative principles, Han's perspective most closely matched the Cooper Bills. Like the Americans, Han believed that the Korean cooperative system should adhere to the fundamental principles set out at the International Cooperative Congress in 1930. These included provisions for free and open membership, democratic management, limited

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[171] Ibid. Not surprisingly, these objectives were explicitly stated in the MAF proposal, which Yi had helped draft. Yi Kihong, *Nongŏp kyŏngje kaeron*, 32.
[172] Han Ungkil, "'Hyŏpcho' pŏpan ŭi nonjaengchŏm (6)," *Tonga ilbo,* November 22, 1955.
[173] Han Ungkil, "'Hyŏpcho' pŏpan ŭi nonjaengchŏm (1)," *Tonga ilbo,* November 17, 1955; Han Ungkil, "'Hyŏpcho' pŏpan ŭi nonjaengchŏm (3)," *Tonga ilbo,* November 19, 1955.

interest on capital investment, and political and religious neutrality.[174] Of the three Korean proposals, the MAF's came the closest to these principles, particularly on the issue of neutrality. Likely based on the controversy surrounding the Farmers Associations, the MAF proposal forbid cooperative leaders from financially supporting or engaging in politics and activities for their own personal benefit. Instead, it required them to give farmers the maximum amount of assistance, "without prejudice."[175]

With multiple competing interpretations, none of the proposals made any progress. Both assembly bills expired in committee at the end of the session in February 1956. The Cooper Bills meanwhile were stuck in the cabinet where the MAF and Ministry of Finance failed to agree on which ministry should have regulatory oversight.[176] The Americans, meanwhile, protested that the Ministry of Finance had changed the Cooper Bills so "radically" as to "nullify" the core democratic principles of the Johnson Report.[177] They further suggested that they would not release the promised financial aid until legislation incorporating these principles passed the assembly.[178]

Syngman Rhee, who was in the midst of a reelection campaign, decided to take unilateral action that appeared to break the deadlock but in practice maintained the status quo. In March, the cabinet agreed to spinoff the FFA's agricultural credit service and reorganize it as the Agricultural Bank Incorporated (Chusik hoesa nongŏp ŭnhaeng). Since the new institution was essentially a commercial bank, it was reorganized under existing banking law and did not require special legislation.[179] There was little functional difference between the FFA and the Agricultural

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[174] Han Ungkil, "Hyŏptong chohap ŭi chido wŏnch'ik," *Pŏpchŏng* 12, no. 2 (February 1957): 21-23.
[175] Yi Kihong, *Nongŏp kyŏngje kaeron*, 32.
[176] [176] CINCREP Seoul, "Proposed Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Legislation," AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0192, Image 31.
[177] C. Tyler Wood to Kim Hyun Chul, February 29, 1956, in AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0192, Image 28
[178] Ibid., Images 28–29.
[179] Chin Hongpok, "Chonghap nonghyŏp ŭi sŏllip," in *Nongjŏng pansegi chŭngŏn: Han'guk nongjŏng 50 nyŏnsa pyŏlch'aek*, ed. Han'guk nongch'on kyŏngje yŏn'guwŏn (Seoul: Nongimbu, 1999), 153.

Bank Inc, which opened on May 1. According to American aid workers, the bank was "unable to cope with the peculiar needs of farm credit" and "not…wholly effective in assisting farmers."[180] They attributed this in large part to the fact that the government had failed to enact legislation for a cooperative system to facilitate loans to individual farmers.[181]

Yi Kihong largely agreed with the American position and over the summer of 1956 embarked on a personal campaign for legislative action.[182] Countering a popular argument among free market intellectuals and politicians that the laws were unnecessary, Yi argued that "cooperatives without legal protections are like an infant without its mother's milk."[183] While acknowledging that other nations, such as Denmark, had succeeded in growing cooperatives without legal protections, the Korean case was different.[184] Korean farm communities still suffering from colonialism and war, lacked the knowledge and resources develop these structures on their own.[185] And in an age where economic development was necessary for national survival, Yi argued that Korea could not afford to wait decades for cooperatives to emerge naturally.[186] He also challenged the idea that government regulation meant politicization. For Yi, the opposite was true. Since political and religious neutrality was a unique and fundamental feature of the cooperative movement, codifying these principles in law would protect farmers from harmful outside influence.[187]

American financial pressure, however, was more effective at catalyzing legislative reform. Dissatisfied with Rhee's ineffective commercial bank, the Americans continued to withhold the

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[180] CINCREP Seoul, "Conference on November 26 with President Rhee," *Meetings – EO*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0290, Image 6, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000954400.
[181] Ibid.
[182] It is unclear if Yi was still working in the MAF, but during this period all of Yi's publications listed his profession as "lecturer" (*kangsa*) at various universities in Seoul. Yi Kihong, "Hyŏpjopŏp muyongnon ŭl pakham," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* June 22, 1956.
[183] Ibid.
[184] Yi Kihong, "Ippŏp issŏya hal hyŏptong chohap (sang)," *Chosŏn ilbo,* July 19, 1956.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Yi Kihong "Ippŏp issŏya hal hyŏptong chohap (ha)," *Chosŏn ilbo,* July 20, 1956.
[187] Ibid.

promised 4 billion hwan in aid until the Koreans enacted legislation to their liking.[188] As a result, the Cooper Bills and the Johnson Report shaped the National Assembly's renewed legislative proposal. In particular it divided financial and social/economic administration between the two institutions and granting the Finance and Agriculture Ministries their own respective spheres of influence.[189] As with the Cooper bills, however, the power of the purse gave the Agricultural Bank significant leverage over the cooperatives.

The Cooperatives Bill also bore a strong resemblance to Cooper's. Structurally, it created a grassroots system based on village-level cooperatives organized around financial, sales, and marketing structures at the city/county and national levels.[190] While not necessarily as strong as the Americans had initially proposed, the bill also established a greater level of democratic control than previous assembly versions, particularly at the national level.[191] The bill also contained a political neutrality clause and further banned government officials, including elected officials, from holding positions in the cooperative organization above the local level.[192]

The compromise appeared to work. The members of the Assembly committees developed a general consensus with their respective government ministries on the drafts. Just prior to their official introduction on the assembly floor, Cooper returned to Korea and declared that he was "in broad agreement" with the "basic elements" of the proposed legislation.[193] Both bills moved

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[188] CINCREP Seoul, "News Report, Far East Asia Agricultural Credit Workshop," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0192, Image 10.
[189] Taehan min'guk kukhoe, "[030228] Nongŏp hyŏptong chohap pŏpan (Nongim wiwŏnjang), *BIS*, http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=001965; Taehan min'guk kukhoe, "[030229] Nongŏp ŭnhaeng pŏpan (chaejŏng kyŏngje wiwŏnjang)," *BIS*, http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=001966.
[190] "Nongŏp hyŏptong chohap pŏp," Enacted March 1, 1957, NLIS, http://www.law.go.kr/법령/농업협동조합법/(00436,19570214).
[191] In addition to electing local leadership, cooperative members had the right to elect the chairman and vice-chairman of the National Federation (with the consent of the Minister of Agriculture), as well as local representatives at the city/county level to serve on the Central Committee. Ibid.
[192] Ibid.
[193] Korean Affairs Institute, "Spotlight on ROK Banking (Part 1)," *The Voice of Korea* 14, no. 231 (August 30, 1957): 887.

through the assembly where they were met with considerable debate and several proposed amendments, but neither changed substantially before passing on February 1, 1957.

At this point, however, Syngman Rhee broke what had been a relatively extended period of silence on the issue to announce that he had significant reservations about both laws. While declining to outright veto the legislation, he followed his established pattern of undermining the cooperative movement in the name of democracy and self-help.[194] Rhee's first objection was to the government's financial obligation. The Agricultural Bank Law set a minimum operating capitalization of 30 billion hwan. As outlined in Johnson Report, the law envisioned that the cooperatives would eventually be the bank's principal investors but required the government to provide the unmet capital until the organization had enough cooperative investors to be self-sustaining.[195] Rhee argued, however, that this obligation violated the spirit of democracy, autonomy, and self-help that was at the center of the cooperative movement. It not only deprived the farmers of full ownership but also made them financially "dependent" (*ŭijon*) on the government. Instead, Rhee proposed that the farmers should finance the bank themselves.[196] Rhee's second objection was that the Agricultural Bank was forbidden from making direct loans to farmers, instead relying on the cooperatives' loan boards to make individual determinations.[197] For Rhee, the loan boards represented an inefficient middleman standing between farmers and

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[194] Rhee's antagonism for the movement was less subtle in private. According to the Americans Rhee distrusted the even the word "cooperative" because of its "sinister [communist] connotations" and nearly vetoed the cooperatives bill simply because of the name. Korean Affairs Institute, "Spotlight on ROK Banking (Part III)," *The Voice of Korea* 15, No. 233 (November 27, 1957): 893. But by the late 1950s, his reasons for undermining the cooperatives and maintaining the status quo were as much financial as political. True cooperative credit threatened the commercial finance and loan system that was continuing to prop up his political career as well as drive his import substitution industrialization program. This gave him every incentive to maintain the status quo. Repeatedly emphasizing self-help and farmers' personal responsibility, meanwhile, offered convenient political cover for the lack of growth in the agricultural sector.
[195] "Nongŏp ŭnhaeng pŏp," Enacted February 14, 1957, NILS, https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/lsEfInfoP.do?lsiSeq=2030#.
[196] "Nonghyŏp ŭi yŏsin ŏmmu sakche p'iryo chŏngch'i kansŏp ŏptorok," *Chosŏn ilbo,* February 16, 1957.
[197] "Nongŏp ŭnhaeng pŏp," Enacted February 14, 1957, NILS.

their investment in the Agricultural Bank. He therefore demanded their elimination, allowing farmers to deal directly with the bank.[198]

Former Manchukuo bureaucrats agreed with Rhee's argument in principle but not in substance. Ch'a Kyunhŭi, newly returned from his studies in the U.S., published a veiled critique of the President's arguments the following month. In it, Ch'a concurred that the laws contained flaws that limited the development of a democratic, autonomous, self-sustaining cooperative system for farmers. These were not, however, the flaws that Rhee had identified. Regarding the Agricultural Bank's capitalization, Ch'a argued that the problem was not the government's obligation for temporary financing but that the operating capital requirements were too high.[199] Since the farmers could not meet these requirement on their own, and it was unclear if the government could afford it even with American aid, it seemed unlikely that the bank would ever be able to get off the ground.[200] So rather than cut off government financing entirely, he suggested a more sensible move would be to lower the capital requirements closer to the level of commercial banking law. This would allow the banking operations to proceed and shorten the overall time until government investment was unnecessary.[201] As for the loan boards, Ch'a agreed that they stood between the bank and the farmers, but this was not inherently bad. In fact, he considered this one of the more "progressive" and democratic aspects of the laws because farmers had the authority and responsibility over the Agricultural Banks' investments.[202] His problem was that the connections between the board and the bank were too weak and unbalanced, which he feared might lead to an antagonistic relationship.[203] The solution was not separation, as Rhee

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[198]"Nonghyŏp ŭi yŏsin ŏmmu sakche p'iryo chŏngch'i kansŏp ŏptorok," *Chosŏn ilbo,* February 16, 1957.
[199] Ch'a Kyunhŭi, "Nongŏp ŭnhaneg pŏp pip'an," *Chejŏng* (March 1957): 44.
[200] Ibid.
[201] Ibid.
[202] Ibid., 47.
[203] Ibid. According to the law, the bank was allowed only one seat on the seven-member board. The other members were a representative from city/county government, the president of the city/county cooperative

proposed, but deeper integration that made the loan boards a true intermediary between bank and cooperative interests.[204]

Ch'a went further in pointing out additional areas where the law violated the spirit of autonomy and democracy, which Rhee did not address. In particular, he criticized the Agricultural Bank's leadership structure as being "completely under [government] control."[205] Ch'a, like the Johnson Report, expected that a high level of government direction during the initial years when the bank relied on state capital, but he was concerned that the law made government control permanent.[206]

Still, Ch'a did not go so far as to directly question the President's motives or accuse him of hypocrisy. Instead, he argued that it was important not to focus on perfecting the laws. Good execution, he reasoned, could overcome their flaws.[207] The immediate task, therefore, was for government and farmers to work together to develop and operate these institutions based on the cooperative principles outlined in the laws.

While the two laws did go into force on March 1, Rhee's opposition increased tensions between the MAF and Finance Ministry. The MAF argued that if the farmers were going to be responsible for self-funding, then the ministry required additional funds in order to help educate and organize them quickly. The Finance Ministry countered that this went against the President's

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and four individuals elected by the cooperative members. "Nongŏp ŭnhaeng pŏp," Enacted February 14, 1957, NILS.

[204] The Americans for their part strongly opposed to the Agricultural Bank loaning directly to farmers and informed the MAF that this undermined the basic principles of cooperative credit. However, this did not appear to prevent them from releasing aid after the reorganization of the bank in 1958. William E. Warne to Chung Jai Sul, December 12, 1957, in *Agriculture - Credit (Loans to Farmers)*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0424, Image 26, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000959400.

[205] While the cooperatives had a voice in the bank's general assembly, the powerful Operating Committee (Unyong wiwŏnhoe) was mostly made up of government or semi-government officials appointed by the president. In addition, the committee's budgeting and finance plans required Finance Ministry approval. Ch'a, "Nongŏp ŭnhaneg pŏp pip'an,"45.

[206] Ibid.

[207] Ibid., 48.

budget policy and only allocated about 4 billion hwan to the program in 1957.[208] The Finance Ministry also delayed reorganizing the existing Agricultural Bank, which in turn held up the transfer of FFA assets and American aid.[209] Limited central government funding put the onus on ill equipped local governments to organize and register cooperatives. Within the first five months, they had registered only 634 of an expected 25,000 village level cooperatives.[210] And while the MAF put out guidelines instructing them to strictly adhere to the principles of political and religious neutrality, Americans reported that there were instances of "undue influence" by members of the Liberal Party.[211]

The National Assembly amended both laws in early 1958 according to Rhee's demands, but additional political delays remained. In May, the cooperatives held their first national general assembly to elect leaders for National Federation of Cooperative Associations (NFCA). The representatives selected Kong Chinhang (?-?)–MAF minister in 1950 president of an agricultural development corporation in Manchukuo before 1945–over one of Rhee's oldest and closest allies.[212] While he did not outright veto the election, Rhee delayed certification for nearly six months. Shortly after receiving cabinet approval, Kong dedicated the national cooperative organization to Rhee's political agenda for financial autonomy and radical self-discipline, arguing

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[208] Korean Affairs Institute, "Spotlight on ROK Banking (Part III)," 894.
[209] Ibid.
[210] There were an additional 1,934 applications in process. Ibid., 893.
[211] Ibid., 894.
[212] Kong's Manchukuo experience was significantly different from former bureaucrats. While he did accept some Manchukuo government funds, Kong's corporation primarily relied on private investment. Kong was deeply influenced by Danish cooperative principles learned through his studies in continental Europe and his Chŏndogyo faith. After liberation, he remained largely opposed to government intervention in the cooperative system on both economic and religions grounds. Yang Chŏngp'il, "1930 nyŏndae chungban Kaesŏng chabonga ŭi Manju chinch'ul kwa nongŏp t'uja: Kong Chinhang ŭi sarye rŭl chungsim ŭro," *Yŏksa munje yŏn'gu* 17, no. 1 (2013): 183–216.

Han Ungkil was also elected as an outside advisor to the NFCA's Central Committee, although it is unclear how much influence he had in this position. "Komun tŭng ŭl sŏnch'ul," *Tonga ilbo*, May 14, 1958.

that the previous attempts at cooperatives had been dominated "by bureaucratic elements," and suffered "from too much dependence on governmental subsidies."[213]

The cooperative organization grew relatively quickly in its first three years. Between 1958 and 1960 the number of village cooperatives increased from 8,000 to over 18,000.[214] But despite numeric expansion, few cooperatives operated effectively. According to American analysis, village and city level cooperatives were hampered by a lack of training and experience. More importantly, the administrative separation and political competition between the Agricultural Bank and the cooperatives limited the cooperatives access the credit necessary to finance operations, purchase fertilizer and other production goods, or to loan out to their members.[215] By 1960, however, the Americans considered inefficient legal and administrative structures and a lack of interest or understanding from high level government officials a near insurmountable barrier to the cooperative project as a whole.[216]

III. Community Development

At the same time as the Agricultural Bank and cooperatives' troubled official launch, the U.S. aid program was also transitioning. With South Korea experiencing a modest level of economic recovery–at least sufficient to curb inflation–and waning American support for monetary aid, American officials in Korea began emphasizing programs to make Koreans and the

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[213] Qtd. in Korean Affairs Institute, "ROK Banking Surveyed (Part II)," *The Voice of Korea* 16, no. 251 (September 1959): 969.
[214] Kim Yongt'ek, "Haebang hu Han'guk nonghyŏp ŭi kijŏm e kwanhan sogo," *Hyŏptong chohap kyŏngyŏng yŏn'gu* 28 (2003): 101.
[215] One American estimate stated that in its first year the Agricultural Bank only loaned out 6% of it's 3.45 billion hwan fund for the cooperative sector. The cooperative sector, moreover, paled in comparison to the bank's other loan programs, which totaled 82.5 billion hwan in 1958. John P. McCauley, "Term End Report: July 1, 1959," *RG 469, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations(1953-61), Office of Far Eastern Operations, Entry 422, Korea Subject Files, 1953-59, 1958-59, Construction-Economic Conditions 1958, Box 103, Contract-Personnel; Contract-Reports; Cooperatives; Crimes; Culture*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_35_00C0360, Image 77.
[216] Korean Affairs Institute, "ROK Banking Surveyed (Part II)," 969–970.

Korean economy more democratic and self-reliant.[217] The cooperatives were certainly one element of this, but there was also a growing interest in a new program, community development,[218] that connected these values beyond agricultural production.

To a certain extent community development was a repackaging of the local self-help philosophy already entrenched in the U.S. aid community. Community development's fundamental premise was that aid programs were often in effective because they were initiated from the top down rather than the bottom up. Government assistance was meaningless and often counterproductive without villagers taking the initiative with their own human and material resources.[219] The proper role of government, therefore, was to "help people find methods to organize self-help programs and to teach techniques for planning and cooperative action allowing local people to improve their own communities."[220]

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[217] Trammel M. Ice, "End of Tour Report," *RG 469, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations (1953-61), Office of Far Eastern Operations, Entry 422, Korea Subject Files, 1950-61, 1960-61, Cooperatives-Economic Development, Box 146, Economic Development; Cooperatives*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_35_00C0469, Images 99–100, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000054769.

[218] The concept of "community development" first originated in education policy in British colonial Africa during the 1920s. It was based on "the idea of a total integrated approach to development and the community, the idea of helping people to manage their own affairs, the idea of service, the co-ordination of all efforts in a given area to aid everyone…to have a decent life…, and the feeling of humanism and the need to put people first in the developmental process." Jim Lotz, "Community Development: A World View," *Canadian Journal of Public Health* 62, no. 4 (July/August 1971): 314–315. In 1955, the United Nations adapted the concept as a general framework for economic and social aid already operating in the developing world. They defined it as "a process designed to create conditions of economic and social progress for the whole community with ats active participation and the fullest reliance upon the community's initiative." Qtd. in ibid., 315. The American perspective was slightly different, emphasizing "the democratic process," and individual self-actualization. International Cooperation Administration, *Community Development: Report by ICA Consultants Based on Observations of Programs in the Philippines, Pakistan, India, Iran, Egypt, the Gold Coast, Peru, Bolivia, Puerto Rico and Jamaica – October 5, 1955* (Washington, D.C.: ICA, 1955), 2–6.

[219] "Need for Community Development in Korea: June 21, 1956," *300 Community Development in Korea 1956-1959*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_79_00C0021, Image 123, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000661734.

[220] Kyun Hi Tchah, "Rural Problems of Korea," in *Report of the Philippines-Korean Community Development Conference, Manila-Seoul, May 18–29, 1958*, ed. United Nations Command, Office of the Economic Coordinator for Korea (San Francisco: United Nations Command, Office of the Economic Coordinator for Korea, 1958), 27.

As we have seen, the concept of "helping people help themselves," was an integral part of American aid discussions on cooperative credit. It was also deeply ingrained in other programs such as health and hygiene, housing, and education.[221] Where community development went further was in calling for an integrated approach to total social and economic transformation of rural villages. On the one hand, this meant training villagers to identify problems and mobilize for solutions on such broad issues as poverty, unemployment, and quality of life. On the other hand, the government needed to be able to offer technical support services once these problems and solutions had been identified. Both tasks required planning and coordination across government agencies in order to anticipate and build up necessary competencies, and then provide villagers with integrated services.[222] Community development activists, therefore, recommended organizing programs around a high-level, inter-ministerial coordinating and policy-making body comprised of "political and administrative leadership," and technical experts.[223] In other words, the vehicle for grass-roots democracy was greater government centralization.

After the CEB first proposed a program in 1956, community development began on the American side with the arrival of Lucy W. Adams (1898–1996) in early 1957. Adams, a product of New Deal education, was an experienced hand in community development, having previous started a program in Iran.[224] As she began to organize the new Community Development Division (CDD) and coordinate with other aid groups behind a comprehensive community development program, one of Adams' chief Korean allies was Ch'a Kyunhŭi.

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[221] Ernest E. Neal, "The Problems of Community Development in the Philippines," *Community Development*, AKH Ref. AUS014_79_00C0044, Image 7, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000661757.
[222] "Chapter II: Organization for Community Development," in ibid., Image 2.
[223] Ibid., Image 4.
[224] For more on Adams' background, see Han Pongsŏk, "Hyŏndae 'Indojŭi' wŏnjo ŭi kiwŏn: 1950 nyŏndae chu-Han chiyŏk sahoe kaebal kukchang Rusi Adamsŭ (Lucy W. Adams) wa 'Kŭndong chaedan' ŭi sare rŭl chungsim ŭro," *Tongbang hakji* 187 (June 2019): 343–374.

Shortly after returning from his studies in the U.S. the Korean government nominated Ch'a to serve as Secretary General on the Korean side of the CEB. Then in July of 1957, he was given a concurrent appointment as economic planning officer (*kyŏngje kyehoekkwan*) in the Ministry of Reconstruction. It is unclear when the two first met, but when the CEB established a special Community Development Committee in November of 1957, Ch'a was named acting chairman on the Korean side.[225]

Ch'a saw community development as a logical extension of his and other former Manchukuo bureaucrats' efforts earlier in the decade. Their main objective with the cooperatives was to transform rural villages into prosperous and self-sustaining communities. They had also emphasized government's vital disciplinary role in this transformational process in their plans for MAF programs since the beginning of the republic and even earlier. In introducing the community development concept to Koreans, Ch'a argued that the government's primary responsibility was "cultivating leaders" (*chidoja rŭl yuksang*).[226] The government accomplished this by identifying "key individuals" (*chungsim immul*) in village communities and enhancing the "breadth" and "depth" of their "leadership ability" through government sponsored lectures and practical training.[227] Community development training, moreover, was comprehensive in nature, designed not just to develop technical skills but change minds, attitudes, and ways of thinking.[228]

Ch'a's perspective, however, differed from the Americans on the relationship between community development and the production process. Community development set broad-based

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[225] The committee was made up of fourteen members (seven American and seven Korean) among the various departments in the CEB. Technically chairmanship was divided between the Minister of Reconstruction on the Korean side and the Deputy Director for Technical Assistance on the American side. In practice, however, Ch'a and Adams were in charge of committee planning and day-to-day operations. Combined Economic Board, "Community Development Committee Charter," *Community Development Committee Charter*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_60_00C0100_019, Image 1, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000756916.
[226] Ch'a Kyunhŭi, "Han'guk ŭi chiyŏk sahoe kaebal undong," *Chejŏng* (December 1958): 60.
[227] Ibid.
[228] Ibid.

goals that included increasing agricultural and craft industry production as well as improvements health, education, housing, and recreation.[229] But the balance between these goals was uneven. In Korea, Americans aid workers only focused on increasing production for the sake economic stabilization.[230] For Ch'a, however, community development could go beyond simply raising the quality of life to mobilize and maximize villages' productive capacity for national economic development. [231] To this end, community development could plant the seeds for micro-level socio-economic planning. The basic idea behind community development's emphasis on self-help was to train communities to identify both their problems and local resources (material, labor, knowledge) that they could mobilize to solve them.[232] These techniques mirrored a broader approach to maximizing efficiency that characterized his approach to the economy as a whole.

In his opinion, one of the main problems limiting economic growth was inefficiency in the agricultural sector. On the one hand agricultural productivity was low due to lack of available credit and technological improvements. On the other hand, agricultural labor productivity was low because it was both labor intensive and seasonally effected, resulting in high rates of unemployment and under employment.[233] The key to economic growth, he argued, was to divert unused labor into productive non-agricultural industries. This meant both expanding industrial job opportunities for the unemployed and promoting "supplementary enterprises" and "cottage industries" for farmers in the off season.[234] By Ch'a's own admission, most of the projects he had worked on, including the cooperative movement, had been oriented towards these efforts but had

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[229] E. C. Bryant, "Community Development as a Stimulus for Rural Improvement and Self-Help Activities in Korea," in *Report of the Philippines-Korean Community Development Conference, Manila-Seoul, May 18–29, 1958*, ed. United Nations Command, Office of the Economic Coordinator for Korea (San Francisco: United Nations Command, Office of the Economic Coordinator for Korea, 1958), 25.
[230] Hŏ Ŭn, "1950 nyŏndae huban chiyŏk sahoe kaebal saŏp kwa Miguk ŭi Han'guk nongch'on sahoe kaepyŏn kusŏng," *Han'guksa hakpo* 17 (July 2004): 307–308.
[231] Ch'a, "Han'guk ŭi chiyŏk sahoe kaebal undong," 56.
[232] Ibid., 61–62.
[233] Tchah, "Rural Problems of Korea," 27.
[234] Ibid., 28.

met with limited success.[235] In this respect, he saw community development as "an excellent device" to convince farm villages to participate in the broader economic development agenda and "mobilize idle resources which people possess towards increased production."[236] And in his capacity as the nation's chief economic planner, he worked towards integrating the community development program into the government's ongoing effort to establish an industrial development plan.[237]

Ch'a's plan to transition agricultural labor into industrial production was a blending of old and new ideas. As we have seen, Manchukuo's military and state planners worked to restructure the agricultural economy along similar lines, albeit within a racialized framework. As an employee for the state-run Manchukuo Colonization Coropration, Ch'a contributed to a system that brought in Korean agricultural migrants, who the Japanese considered capable of higher levels of production, thereby displacing and driving Chinese agricultural labor into the state's growing industrial sector (Chapter 2). Later, during his studies in the U.S., Ch'a discovered the work of economist William Arthur Lewis (1915–1991), an early pioneer in developmental economic theory. Ch'a was particularly drawn to Lewis' concept of the "dual economy" which theorized a division between a "subsistence" or "traditional" agricultural sector and a "capitalist" manufacturing sector. Lewis argued that the agriculture economy was inherently not profit oriented, and in poor countries it was both under productive and over supplied with labor. The key to growth, therefore, was to transition agricultural labor in to the more productive, profit oriented manufacturing sector.[238]

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[235] Ibid.
[236] Ibid.
[237] Combined Economic Board, "CEBCOM Minutes: December 15, 1958," *CEBCOM - Minutes - (1958) 1-11*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_78_00C0008, Image 5, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000631363.
[238] W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," *The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies* 22, no. 2 (May 1954): 139–191.

Lewis also offered a theoretical justification for top-down state guidance similar to the type Ch'a experienced in Manchukuo. Lewis' theory posited that greater and faster levels of economic development were possible in poor countries when governments intervened. This was because, he argued, the rate of social and economic changed "depend[ed] on the willingness of the many to accept the leadership of the enterprising few."[239] In explaining community development, Ch'a directly cited Lewis ideas to argue that development must start with a "small group of farsighted leaders" (*sosu ŭi sŏn'gakchŏk chidoja*) capable of unifying and directing social efforts around common goal.[240] In training community development workers, therefore, the government was not spreading democratic values but creating a vanguard force for the state's developmental project.

Despite their different perspectives, Ch'a and Adams had early success getting the community development project off the ground. In January 1958, the cabinet approved a general plan to establish a Community Development Committee and embark on a five-year pilot program starting on Cheju Island, and three other counties.[241] In May, Ch'a and Adams organized a joint community development conference with the Philippines Government in order to gain insight on their experience and build domestic support for the pilot program.[242] In August, the two partners organized a national community development workshop for central and regional government

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[239] Lewis went so far as to suggest that "authoritarian" organizations were "probably better" at achieving developmental goals because they are able to plan, measure, and mobilize around a specific objective. W. Arthur Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth* (Homewood, IL.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955) 79-81
[240] Ch'a, "Han'guk ŭi chiyŏk sahoe kaebal undong," 59.
[241] "Korean Government Adopts Plans for Community Development Pilot Operation," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_79_00C0021, Image 104.
[242] The conference began with a Korean delegation visit to the Philippines, followed by a reciprocal program in Korea. United Nations Command, Office of the Economic Coordinator for Korea, *Report of the Philippines-Korean Community Development Conference, Manila-Seoul, May 18–29, 1958* (San Francisco: United Nations Command, Office of the Economic Coordinator for Korea, 1958). The original conference plan also included a third country program in Thailand, but the Thai delegation withdrew from the conference at the last minute due to "unforeseen circumstances." William E. Warne to Chung Whan Cho, May 5, 1958, *Community Development Conference May 26-29, 1958*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_79_00C0080, Image 149, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000661793.

officials to explain community development principles, objectives, and methods.[243] Finally, in September President Rhee signed an executive order establishing the National Council of Community Development and lower level committees, officially launching the pilot program.[244]

While Ch'a and the Ministry of Reconstruction were the main administrative leaders on the Korean side, American values and objectives dominated the pilot program. According to the original plan, American aid covered all costs in the initial five-year program. This included both administrative expenses for the National Council and grant-in-kind allocations for individual community projects.[245] As a result, the CEB had a significant amount of authority over how these aid dollars were spent. In addition, American aid workers were entirely responsible for training community development workers and supervising projects during the pilot program. While the original plan had called for short and long-term training programs to cultivate local leadership, American trainers tended to take a more limited approach, providing only basic education and guidance.[246] The specific types of community-driven projects also reflected American policy to prioritize village stabilization over economic expansion. Nearly 60% of the projects completed in the first two years were for public works.[247] Only 55 projects involved agricultural improvements, mostly for purchasing livestock, and 19 projects involved village industries.[248]

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[243] Combined Economic Board, "CEBCOM Minutes: August 25, 1958," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_78_00C0008, Image 46.
[244] Lucy W. Adams, "A Ten Year Plan for Community Development in Korea," *A Ten Year Plan for Community Development in Korea*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_79_00C0006, Image 15, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000661719.
[245] Combined Economic Board, "Community Development Pilot Program Operating Procedures," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_79_00C0021, Image 104.
[246] Han Pongsŏk, "Hyŏndae 'Indojŭi' wŏnjo ŭi kiwŏn," 367.
[247] The majority of these were health and sanitation infrastructure, such as wells, latrines, and water reservoirs. They also included construction of village centers, roads and bridges, and a small power plant. Linwood L. Hodgdon, *Community Development in Korea: An Evaluation Survey of the NACOM Grant-in-Aid Program* (San Francisco: Community Development Division, United States Operations Mission to Korea, 1961), 77.
[248] Ibid.

By 1960, the pilot program was showing some measure of success, at least by American standards. According to Adams, changes in village organization and infrastructure were having reciprocal effects on attitudes and behaviors.

> There are manifestations of pride–beyond self and family–in the community, its appearance, its industry. Children appear a little cleaner, perhaps a little happier. Young people feel they have achieved greater status. The participation of women is encouraged…There is greater willingness to cooperate and undertake new things.[249]

More recent historical analysis bear's out this characterization revealing how the program did have an appreciable cultural impact on village youth by introducing them to new technologies and ideas, particularly democratic organizational principles.[250] But these benefits were still extremely narrow, and the CEB was putting increasing pressure on the Koreans to take financial and administrative control.[251] Adams, however, was unsure whether progress would be sustainable under Korean administration.

Despite persistent lobbying, there was very little interest at the highest levels of Korean government to take over and expand the program. The CEB arranged for a legal consultant to come to Korean in December 1958 to help draft legislation formally incorporating the ad-hoc community development organization into the national government structure.[252] The National Council, made no progress on advancing a bill. Adams expressed frustration that at the coordinating body's lack of initiative, which by 1960 she described as "generally inactive and rarely called into session."[253] The main impetus on the Korean side came from Ch'a and the

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[249] Adams, "A Ten Year Plan for Community Development in Korea," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_79_00C0006, Image 16.
[250] The same analysis, however, concludes that the economic impact was far less significant. Han Pongsŏk, "1950 nyŏndae mal nongch'on chido ŭi han sare: chiyŏk sahoe kaebal saŏp hyŏnji chidowŏn ŭi hwaltong ŭl chungsim ŭro," *Yŏksa munje yŏn'gu* 19 (2008): 131–134.
[251] Combined Economic Board, "CEBCOM Minutes: April 27, 1959," *Box 2, CEBCOM Minutes 59-1-5, to, CEBCOM Minutes 60-1*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_11_00C0001, Image 16, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000011496.
[252] Ibid.
[253] Adams, "A Ten Year Plan for Community Development in Korea," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_79_00C0006, Image 19.

Ministry of Reconstruction.[254] After returning from a community development conference in Sri Lanka in the spring of 1959, Ch'a concluded that if Korea's program were to achieve the successes of other regional states, it needed to be incorporated into the government.[255] By the end of the year, however, neither the cabinet nor the National Assembly had taken up the matter.[256] In February 1960, the Ministry of Reconstruction reported to the Americans that they would introduce legislation in the next assembly session after the upcoming presidential elections, but the initiative fell to the wayside during the post-election political turmoil and the Rhee government's collapse.[257]

The political reforms in the summer of 1960 presented new opportunities for Ch'a and the community development project. Despite having played a role in pressuring community development workers to support Rhee and the Liberal Party in the election,[258] Ch'a was promoted to Vice Minister of Reconstruction in the new government, where he began to push for an expanded community development program.[259] In October, he worked with Lucy Adams to arrange a for fifteen members of the National Assembly to tour some of the pilot villages in order

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[254] Combined Economic Board, "CEBCOM Minutes: April 27, 1959," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_11_00C0001, Image 16.
[255] Combined Economic Board, "CEBCOM Minutes: June 5, 1959," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_11_00C0001, Image 5
[256] USOM/Korea, "Information Regarding Host Country Community Development," *RG 469, Office of the Deputy Director for Operations(1953-1961), Office of Far Eastern Operations, Entry 422, Korea Subject Files, 1953-59, 1958-59, Communications-Community Development, 1959, Box 102, Korea-Community Development 1959, etc.(1 of 2)*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_35_00C0357, Image 209, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000054657.
[257] USOM Seoul, "Community Development Round-up," *303 Community Development Division 1960*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_79_00C0019, Image 163, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000661732
[258] According to the Lucy Adams, community development field workers were "called into Seoul and given strong injections of Liberal party discipline and propaganda with the frank statement that their future is dependent on the outcome [of the election]." Ibid., Image 164. Adams did not specify Ch'a's involvement, but May 1960, the Seoul District Prosecutor's Office investigated him for election interference and organizing a "meeting to pressure civil servants." "Ch'a Kyunhŭi ssi sohwan," *Chosŏn ilbo,* May 25, 1960.
[259] "Samu ch'agwan pallyŏng," *Chosŏn ilbo,* August 29, 1960.

to convince them to approve general budget funds to support the program domestically.[260] The lobbying paid off and the National Assembly included general budget funds to cover salaries and administrative expenses for community development in the 1961 budget law.[261] At the start of January, Ch'a reported to Community Development Committee staff that the new government had fully embraced the community development approach, and the Ministry of Reconstruction was working on incorporating it into its government reorganization plans.[262]

The details of the Ministry's plans, however, signaled a significant change that not only recognized community development's place in the government but also integrated it into the state's economic development program. According to the Americans, Ministry of Reconstruction officials intended to consolidate all rural development programs (community development, cottage industry promotion, agricultural extension, and agricultural credit) into a single Rural Development Authority (RDA). Though nominally a part of the MAF, the new agency would be a "highly centralized," "autonomous agency with independent control over its employees and finances."[263] It would also have direct control over field operations in rural areas, circumventing the authority of provincial governments. The RDA would maintain direct connections to relevant ministries and the Agricultural Bank through an advisory council, but this was controlled by the RDA president and limited to advice on the agency's operations. Instead, the main guiding body for the RDA would be a newly established Central Planning Office under directly authority of the

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[260] Lucy W. Adams, "Transporation for National Assembly Members to Visit Community Development Villages," *Community Development (Aug. - Dec. 1960)*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0995, Image 127, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000967303.
[261] Hodgdon, *Community Development in Korea*, 29.
[262] Melvin E. Frarey, "Informational Material," *314.1 Community Development Contract - NEF 1961 thru*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_79_00C0020, Image 290, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000661733
[263] Seoul, "Adjustments in Rural Development Operations," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_44_00C0995, Image 89.

Prime Minister, which would coordinate RDA programs and finances as part of long range national economic development program.[264]

The proposal sparked a considerable amount of controversy among cabinet ministers and American aid workers. Officials in the Agriculture, Reconstruction, and Health and Social Affairs ministries all wanted great authority over community development.[265] While not objecting to the reorganization in principle, the Americans were concerned that the process was advancing too quickly and risked derailing the progress already made in the pilot project. They were also "deeply disturbed" that even with the reorganization, Korea's economic planners were too focused on the industrial sector.[266] Instead, they recommended creating an inter-ministerial commission under the Prime Minister to research rural development "in the broadest sense" and "formulate an overall plan."[267] To that end, they also suggested Korea host an international community development in 1961 "in order for ranking [government] officials to seek advice in closed sessions from community development leaders from countries with established programs."[268]

Despite pressure from the Americans, the commission never materialized, but the international conference did move forward. This was a far more extensive and visible affair that the conference three years prior. Ch'a and Adams were instrumental in bringing together representatives from fifteen countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[269] The cabinet declared the week of the conference "Community Development Week," and the Prime Minister gave the

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[264] Ibid., Images 89-90.
[265] Adams, "A Ten Year Plan for Community Development in Korea," Image 18.
[266] Seoul, "Mr. Louis Miniclier's Remarks to NACOM," *Community Development, Jan. 1961*, AKH, Ref. AUS056_08_00C0042, Image 371, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000001025107
[267] Ibid., Image 372.
[268] Louis Miniclier, "Suggestions Regarding Community Development and Related Activities," in ibid., Image 349.
[269] "Ku-gae kuk Han'guk morŭgo," *Chosŏn ilbo,* May 7, 1961.

keynote address on "The Place of Community Development in Korea."[270] The theme of the conference, "Community Development and its Role in Nation Building," focused precisely on the function of rural development in broader national economic development planning.[271] According to Adams, the conference was a technical and political win for the community development program.[272] The timing of the conference, however, was less fortunate. The week-long conference concluded on May 12, 1961, just four days before the military coup overthrew the government.

Synopsis

At the end of the Korean War, South Korea was in a dire economic situation. In the most literal sense, the war had destroyed material and human resources and disrupted labor resulting in a significant economic decline. The failure to unite the peninsula territorially or ideologically, moreover, shrouded post-war recovery efforts within the ongoing existential crisis of division.

For former Manchukuo bureaucrats, this sense of crisis was nothing new. Their training in Japan's wartime empire was premised on the idea of an omnipresent external enemy threatening the sovereignty and social fabric of the state. The dominant total war philosophy equated military strength with economic power, necessitating the maximization of all the states resources for national defense. Give the similarities with the situation in post-war Korea, it is unsurprising that they reverted to discourse and ideas that harkened back to their time in Manchukuo.

Throughout the decade, they pursued strategies that leveraged the power of the state towards socio-economic development. They saw increased production as the key element in

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[270] Unknown to Louis Miniclier, April 25, 1961, in AKH, Ref. AUS056_08_00C0042, Image 5. Ch'a presided over closing remarks held in the "historic and colorful elegance of the Audience Hall of the Chang Duck (sic) Palace." Seoul, "CD Conference Report," *489-81-469 ('61) Community Development Conference*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_79_00C0139, Images 3-4, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000000661852.
[271] Ibid., Image 3.
[272] Ibid.

rapidly boosting the national economy for the sake of national security and domestic prosperity. While Cold War discourses prevented them from outright rejecting capitalism, they argued that the free market was inappropriate for Korea's present conditions. Instead, they considered the state the only institution with the leadership and resources capable of enacting long-term social and economic changes. In the coal industry, for example, civil officials joined with colleagues in the military to centralize and mobilize government recourses behind expanding production. In agriculture, some sought to utilize the disciplinary and organizational power of the state to transform villages into collective, self-sustaining production units.

This is not to suggest that former they were completely united. As we saw with bureaucratic reform (Chapter 4), the group was often divided, especially when it came to the details. At the THCC, Kim Ilhwan was far more sympathetic to free market economics than Kim Kyumin, especially when it came to the issue of privatization. And Han Ungkil was far more skeptical of long-term state intervention in the cooperative movement than his colleagues at the MAF. Still, these differences were largely a matter of degree and did not prevent them from collaborating towards the broader goal of state-led economic development.

At the same time, former Manchukuo bureaucrats were not always completely at odds with the dominant political forces. In both the coal development plan and the cooperatives, areas of convergence created opportunities to advance their agenda in part, if not in whole. This was particularly true with the American aid community late in the decade when modest economic recovery opened up new possibilities for a development program. Individual responses were perhaps more mixed. Some, like Kim Kyumin, adapted to the market-oriented policies begrudgingly, and primarily out of a desire to prevent the complete disillusion of the THCC. Others, like Ch'a Kyunhŭi, willingly incorporate theories, discourses, and programs into their pre-existing developmental framework. In either case, however, they managed to preserve or advance some of the structural elements of state-led development within the dominant system.

Consequentially, Manchukuo's legacy on the 1950s economy was also mixed. While certain elements remained relevant, practical and ideological limitations required a significant amount of accommodation and adaptation. In this regard, state-led economic development, both in theory and practice, was as much a product of the contemporary moment as the recent past.

Epilogue

On May 16, 1961, a group of South Korean military officers executed a coup d'etat, toppling the democratically elected government in the name of "revolution." Less than a month later, former Manchukuo bureaucrat and Seoul National University professor Yi Minchae praised the military for their decisive action and urged his countrymen to embrace the coup as an act of national salvation:

> It has only been ten odd days since the May 16th Revolution, but already the military government has announced and executed many bold new policies…They have promised to immediately sweep out corruption and maleficence in politics, economics, society, and the academy and usher in a fresh new political age…The revolution has burst open the door creating an opportunity for national development that must not be wasted. This is our last hope for national reconstruction. What are we waiting for?[1]

Yi was hardly alone. While there is no evidence to suggest that they were involved in the coup itself, former Manchukuo bureaucrats were some of the military's earliest partners in the months and years that followed.

Given their background, former Manchukuo bureaucrats' attraction to the coup is not particularly surprising. The sympathies between these two groups were in part a product of a shared connection to Manchukuo's authoritarian state culture. Several of the coup's leaders, including Major General Park Chung Hee, were graduates of the Manchukuo Military Academy and had served as officers in the Manchukuo Army during World War Two. Like former Manchukuo bureaucrats, they were indoctrinated into the "national foundation spirit," which

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[1] Yi Minchae, "Saegaejŏk wigi wa 5.16 yhŏngmyŏng," in *Ch'angam munjip*, vol. 1 (Seoul: T'amgudang, 1977), 49.

posited a centralized, top-down system of state-led social and economic change.[2] In the highly militarized state, moreover, the Army's role as the preeminent leader was a common feature of both military and civilian official training.[3] This shared experience engendered a common language about administrative management that emphasized rational organization, patriotism, and physical and moral discipline.

Like the former Manchukuo military officers leading the coup, many former bureaucrats also maintained social ties throughout the 1950s. The precise date is unclear, but sometime after the Korean War, GUA graduates began organizing alumni gatherings.[4] By 1960 they were meeting formally twice a year and publishing a membership list of at least 50 individuals.[5] The organization provided a system of mutual support, though this never translated into greater political influence. On occasion individuals in certain ministries worked together or published on topics of shared intertest. But these networks and meetings were also a forum where the Manchukuo experience was collectively remembered and "reborn."[6] Even amidst their institutional atomization, Manchukuo remained a salient part of their individual and collective identity. So, by 1961, experience in

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[2] For more on the ideology of training program in the Manchukuo military and its relationship to social and economic transformation, see Carter J. Eckert, *Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism, 1866–1945* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2017), especially chapter's six and eight.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Hekikū ryokuya sanzenri*, 885.
[5] Ibid 874; "Zai Daikan minkoku Daidō gakuin dōsōkai meibo," *Daidō gakuin dōsō kaihō*, no. 35 (July 1968): 18.
[6] Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Hekikū ryokuya sanzenri*, 885.

Manchukuo's militarized, total state structure was still a relevant and shared point of commonality for former bureaucrats and military officers alike.

Former Manchukuo bureaucrats did not simply fall in with the coup out of lingering loyalty to military authority, however. The military's perspective on South Korean state-building was also largely in line with former Manchukuo bureaucrats' experience over the previous fifteen years. For over a decade, bureaucratic reformers in and out of government had argued that the nation was in a state of political and socio-economic crisis.[7] And they felt that it was the state's responsibility to mobilize all resources to establish Korea as a secure and prosperous nation.

They were also increasingly critical of political leaders who they felt acted too slowly or intentionally undermined reform efforts for their own personal gain. Their own lack of authority severely limited their ability to make substantive changes, but they were far from alone. Syngman Rhee's decision to deploy the military to the coal fields in 1954 had been a rare opportunity for the two groups to collaborate to this end but faced sustained opposition from politicians and public opinion. It nonetheless set a precedent.

On the day of the coup, the Military Revolutionary Committee issued a six-point platform dedicated to rooting out government corruption, promoting systematic structural and social change based on "new ideas," and developing a prosperous and independent national economy.[8] And by overthrowing the

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[7] Ibid.
[8] Pŏpchechŏ, *Hyŏngmyŏng pŏmnyŏngjip*, vol. 4 (N.A.: Pŏpchechŏ, 1961), 2.

government, they had proven their determination to disrupt the status quo. The army's early actions on several of the former Manchukuo bureaucrats' pet projects also suggested that they had the organizational capacity and authority to actually follow through. In the first few months, they ordered immediate implementation of Kim Yongchun's three proposals for reforming the appointment system with only minor revisions.[9] By September, they had even made major changes to the National Civil Service Law, including a permanent legal structure for a disciplinary commission.[10] This was something that, despite repeated complaints from bureaucratic reformers, neither of the previous civilian regimes had managed to accomplish since the commission was first proposed in 1949. Over the summer of 1961, the newly formed Korean Central Intelligence Agency (Chungang chŏngbobu, KCIA) also forced over 40,000 bureaucrats–mostly senior officials–into "retirement." And echoing Kim's plan from years earlier, they justified the purge in the name of financial rationalization.[11] The military government also embraced the agricultural cooperative movement and fixed many of the legal and financial problems that had plagued it since the late 1950s. Within months of the coup, the military had approved substantial legal

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[9] "Kongmuwŏn imyongnyŏng," Enacted July 22, 1961, NLIS, https://www.law.go.kr/법령/공무원임용령/(00062,19610722); "Kongmuwŏn kosiryŏng," Enacted June 13, 1916, NLIS, https://www.law.go.kr/법령/공무원고시령/(00012,19610613); "Kongmuwŏn imyong chŏnhyŏngnyŏng," Enacted June 13, 1961, NLIS, https://www.law.go.kr/법령/공무원임용전형령/(00013,19610613). The only major revisions were updating the names of government organizations that had been changed since the coup.

[10] "Kukka kongmuwŏn pŏp," Enacted September 18, 1961, NLIS, https://www.law.go.kr/법령/국가공무원법/(00721,19610918).

[11] Hyung-a Kim, "State Building: The Military Junta's Path to Modernity through Administrative Reforms," in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 92–93.

revisions that gave cooperatives full authority over credit and financial services to their members.[12] And on August 15, the anniversary of Korea's liberation, they dismantled the Agricultural Bank and transferred its funds directly to the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives.[13]

On the surface, evidence suggests that the military was also interested in working with former Manchukuo bureaucrats. After establishing the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, the coup leaders recruited a slew of academics, intellectuals, and officials to serve on various advisory councils. Among these were at least nine former Manchukuo bureaucrats, including vocal advocates for political and economic reforms such as Han Ungkil.[14] In the short-term, Kim Yŏngchun, Yi Kihong, Ch'a Kyunhŭi and other pro-reform officials already serving in the government kept their positions or received promotions.[15] Some, like Kim Kyumin and Sin Tuyŏng, who were purged after the Rhee regime's collapse, found their way back in government positions. Others, like Yi Minchae, who publicly supported the military government were rewarded with their first government appointments since liberation.[16]

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[12] "Nongŏp hyŏptong chohap pŏp," Enacted July 29, 1961, NLIS, https://www.law.go.kr/법령/농업협동조합법/(00670,19610729).
[13] "Nongŏp ŭnhaeng pŏp," Enacted August 15, 1961, NLIS, https://www.law.go.kr/법령/농업은행법/(00670,19610729).
[14] Others included Paek Sanggŏn, Sin Kisŏk, Cho Kichun, P'yo Munhwa, Kim Yŏngchun, Kim Tŭkhwang, Kim Yŏngchun, Kim Kyumin, and Ch'oe Kyuha.
[15] Kim was initially retained as Personnel Bureau Chief, but the Supreme Council fired and replaced him with a military officer in 1962. Under Park's presidency, however, he returned to government as a member of the Personnel Appeals Hearing Board along with his former boss Sin Tuyŏng. "Wiwŏnjang tŭng pallyŏng insa soch'ŏng simwi," *Tonga ilbo,* June 19, 1963. Yi Kihong received a promotion at the MAF to Grain Administration Bureau Chief, his first vertical promotion since 1955. "Chŏngbu insa," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* July 19, 1961.
[16] Yi was appointed Vice Minister of Education a little over one month after his public declaration supporting the military in June 1961. "Mun'gyobu Ch'agwan e Yi Minchae ssi," *Chosŏn ilbo,* July 13,

In the long-term, moreover, a greater number achieved higher positions within the government hierarchy than during the 1950s. During Park Chung Hee's presidency (1963–1979), former Manchukuo bureaucrats served as Ministers and Vice Ministers of Commerce and Industry, Agriculture and Forestry, Foreign Affairs, Communications, Health and Welfare, General Affairs, and Education. Perhaps the most successful of all, at least in terms of career track was Ch'oe Kyuha, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and a key advisor on diplomatic relations during both the military government and the Park regime in the 1960s. In the 1970s, Park made Ch'oe Prime Minister, and after Park's assassination in 1979, Ch'oe became acting president until another military coup removed him from office in 1980.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that former Manchukuo bureaucrats were able to suddenly restructure society according to a Manchukuo model. For one, career advancement did not necessarily come with greater personal authority. From the beginning, Park exercised a high degree of personal leadership over national policy and more so as his presidency wore on.[17] Especially in the first two years after the coup, when the country was under direct military leadership, many former Manchukuo bureaucrats found themselves in positions that while highly visible, had only weak connections to policy makers on the Supreme Council. Kim Kyumin, for example, was appointed General Secretary of the Korean Chamber of Commerce mainly to drum up support for

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1961. Ch'a initially stayed on as Vice Minister of Reconstruction and in 1962 was named Deputy Director of the Economic Planning Board. "Kyŏngje kihoekwŏn Puwŏnjang e Ch'a Kyunhŭi ssi," *Chosŏn ilbo,* June 29, 1962.

[17] Byung-Kook Kim, "The Labyrinth of Solitude: Park and the Exercise of Presidential Power," in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F Vogel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 140–167.

the military and the Five-Year Economic Plan among domestic and foreign business leaders.[18] He had little input, however, on the plan itself. Park also carried on Rhee's tradition of frequent cabinet reshuffles, so that few former Manchukuo bureaucrats held policy-making positions for more than two years at a time. And even while in office, their plans for state reform depended on military and public support.

The public campaign to revise the constitution in 1962 is illustrative example of this. In the summer of 1962, Kim Kyumin represented the business community in a public hearing on the constitutional revisions. While Kim and the fourteen other representatives agreed on a number of points, he stood out as the only advocate for a bicameral legislature. Kim was skeptical about a return to democratic government and felt that the matter needed to be "treated cautiously."[19] He therefore proposed that the democratically elected lower house be paired with an upper house dedicated to carrying out the military's revolutionary promise. Half of the upper house's 50 members would be selected according to a "vocational representative system," and the other half would be selected from among the revolutionary leaders.[20] In Kim's scheme, therefore, the military would continue to exercise a considerable amount of legislative power.

Kim was not the only former Manchukuo bureaucrat publicly promoting such reforms. Han Ungkil had been advocating for a vocational representation system in since 1948, but the idea received little attention during the 1950s. With the military coup, however, Han revived his call to check the power of political parties and capitalist

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[18] "Kim Kyumin ssi imyong," *Tonga ilbo,* Februray 7, 1962.
[19] "Yŏnsa tŭl ŭi palŏn yoji sae hŏmpŏp kongch'ŏnghoe," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* August 23, 1962.
[20] Ibid.

interests that had he felt were dominating the national legislature.[21] In a subtle deviation from 1948, however, Han explicitly highlighted the military's role in such a structure. "Since the military will also have representatives [in the upper house]," he wrote, "this will ensure that the Supreme Council can comfortably participate in legislative government."[22] While perhaps more subtle in in tone, Han was essentially echoing Kim Kyumin in calling for the institutionalization of military authority within the civilian government.

The plan was generally unpopular, however. Han was an outlier among academics and legal professionals, most of whom were critical of bicameral system established during the Second Republic.[23] Others, while agreeing with the vocational representation in principle, felt that it was too "idealistic" and impractical given the current state of the country.[24] During the public hearings there was near unanimous agreement on a unicameral legislature based on regional representation.[25]

The military's preference on the matter is unclear, but the Supreme Council ultimately sided with the majority. According to Council Member Yi Sŏkche, the military decided to take a hands-off approach, allowing the specialists to hammer out the details.[26] This was, he argued, an intentional strategy for consensus building both among experts and the general public that was key to building legitimacy for the new regime.[27] It is also

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[21] Han Ungkil, "Chingnŭng taep'yo ŭi ch'amhoek i p'illyo," *Chosŏn ilbo,* May 21, 1962.
[22] "Kukhoe ŭiwŏn ŭi chaesan tŭngnokje tugo kyŏngch'al kyoyuk chungniphwa," *Chosŏn ilbo*, August 25, 1962.
[23] "Sae hŏmpŏp chisang kongchŏnghoe che-5 hoe: yangwŏnje wa tanwŏnje," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* August 21, 1962.
[24] Ibid.; "Chehŏn ŭihoe ŭi kusŏng ŭl cheŭi handa," *Chosŏn ilbo,* May 18, 1962.
[25] "Yŏnsa tŭl ŭi palŏn yoji sae hŏmpŏp kongch'ŏnghoe," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* August 23, 1962.
[26] Yi Sŏkche, "Che-68 hwa Kaehŏn pisk: che-3 konghwaguk kaehŏn (1)" *Chung'ang ilbo,* June 5, 1980.
[27] Yi Sŏkche, "Che-68 hwa Kaehŏn pisk: che-3 konghwaguk kaehŏn (7)," *Chung'ang ilbo,* June 12, 1980.

worth noting that Park and his allies were already established other mechanisms for maintain control after the return to civilian government.[28] Nonetheless, the strategy of open debate succeeded in getting a broad swath of experts onboard, including critics like Han. After releasing the constitutional draft, Han tempered criticism of structural issues with praise for constitution's economic provisions, which he felt went a long way towards resolving the capitalist excesses and laisse faire policies of the 1950s.[29] Ultimately, he concluded that it was up to the people to determine if and when further revisions were needed.[30]

The military coup also did little to diminish American influence on South Korean affairs, particularly when it came to economic policy and former Manchukuo bureaucrats continued to grapple with American policy limitations. Ch'a Kyunhŭi's continued involvement in community development is a useful example. As we have seen, Ch'a interest in community development was deeply connected to his belief in balanced growth and autonomous development. And Ch'a was likely behind the effort to transfer the existing community development organization into the Economic Planning Board during the summer of 1961.[31] Ultimately, the Supreme Council decided to create a

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[28] The KCIA was a primary example. The agency saw its role in domestic intelligence and political manipulation increase after the return to civilian rule as it became one of Park's primary instruments for maintaining personal rule. Hyung-A Kim, "State Building: The Military Junta's Path to Modernity through Administrative Reforms," 108–109.
[29] "Kaehŏnan ŭl pip'an handa," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* November 13–16, 1962.
[30] "Kaehŏnan ŭl pip'an handa (wan)," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* November 16, 1962.
[31] "TOICA 164, July 31, 8 PM," in *Korea 1961.7 (2 of 2)*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_117_00C0022, Image 85, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000001011263.

Community Development Bureau within the MAF, where after the reversion to civilian rule and Park's election as president in 1963, Ch'a became minister.[32]

By that point, American interest in community development programing had declined significantly. The transition to the newly established U.S. Agency for International Development brought several structural and ideological changes to the U.S. aid community in Korea. The Community Development Division was reduced to a section and combined with the Agricultural Division, both of which had a long history of internal political conflict, to form the Rural Development Division.[33] Internal audits during the transition also indicate that new leadership in Washington felt that rural development programs produced little value for the overall aid strategy.[34] The existing program, they argued, focused too heavily on agriculture and craft industries, which had little export value.[35] American strategic concerns about poverty and communist radicalization, however, kept the program alive.

At the MAF, Ch'a continued to work with Rural Development Division to fund small and medium-scale infrastructure and pilot village projects. But during the mid 1960s, there was even less interest in supporting projects that required high levels of technical expertise or capital expenditure.[36] The result was a dramatic transition towards

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[32] Ch'a did not become minister until May of 1964. He was briefly preceded by former EPB Director Wŏn Yongsŏk (?–?). "Chŏng Ilkwŏn naegak palchok," *Kyŏnghyang sinmun,* May 11, 1964.
[33] John E. Mills, "Office Memorandum," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_117_00C0022, Image 8
[34] The Inspector General and Comptroller, Mutual Security, Department of State, "Evaluation Report of the Mutual Security Program for Republic of Korea, January 1961," in *Korea-Evaluation*, AKH, Ref. AUS014_117_00C0037, Images 70–72, http://archive.history.go.kr/image/viewer.do?system_id=000001018699.
[35] American Embassy Seoul, "Meeting New International Development Objectives," in AKH, Ref. AUS014_117_00C0022, Images 19–28.
[36] Dajeong Chung, "From Dependency to Self-Sufficiency: American Relief Food in the Korean Peripheries in the 1960s," in *Korea and the World: New Frontiers in Korean Studies*, ed. Gregg A. Brazinsky (Lexington: Lexington Books, 2019), 45–46.

low skill labor intensive projects funded by the Food for Peace Program. Based on the principals of self-discipline and self-help from earlier community development programs, the Food for Peace Program sought to reduce poverty and unemployment and stabilize the rural economy by supporting locally initiated infrastructure projects. Instead of financial support, however, local laborers were paid in direct food aid.[37] The program was particularly vital to Ch'a's interest in developing South Korea's fishing industry. In 1965, Food for Peace grain payments accounted for more than 80% of total expenditures on oyster and agar-agar field development, with the central and provincial governments contributing only about 10% each.[38] As in the 1950s, however, this high level of dependence on foreign aid meant that only projects that met American standards and priorities got off the ground. It was only towards the end of the decade, as the Americans began to scale back all community development projects, that Koreans were able to exercise more control.

Rural development was major component of Park's 1967 reelection campaign and the Second Five-Year Plan. Under the banner of "dual emphasis on agriculture and industry" (*nong kong pyŏngjin*) the state enacted policies designed to increase production in agriculture and other primary sector goods and boost consumption and quality of life in rural areas as well as urban centers.[39] To this end, Park tapped Ch'a to lead the president's new pet project, the Agro-fishing Village Development Corporation (Nongŏch'on kaebal kongsa). This was a public investment corporation tasked with

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[37] For more on this program, see ibid.
[38] Ibid., 53.
[39] Ch'a Kyunhŭi, "Nonggong pyŏngjin chŏngch'aek kwa chibang tosi: Nongŏch'on kaebal kongsa ŭi saŏp kyehoek ŭl chungsim ŭro," *Tosi munje* 3, no. 8 (1968): 25.

setting up agriculture and fisheries businesses in rural communities across the country.[40] In the first three years Ch'a led the corporation set up over twenty model businesses, mostly related to agriculture and seafood processing, preservation, and marketing.[41] But despite Park's personal support and a relative high level of autonomy, Ch'a had little input in the direction of overall economic planning which had changed significantly over the course of the decade, in large part due to the U.S.

American foreign policy under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations represented a dramatic shift away from the 1950s. Inspired by Rostow's theory of economic development, and the move towards economic reintegration as a check against Communism, the Americans began to pressure the Korean government into abandoning import substitution for export-oriented industrialization.[42] This was a problem for Korean economists, like Ch'a, who continued to believe in balanced growth theory and placed agricultural production at the bedrock of economic growth.

Early in the decade, Ch'a and others attempted to strike a balance between their existing theories and American pressures. By the late 1960s, however, a new generation of American-trained economists and their theories dominated all levels of economic planning. From his position at the Agro-fishing Village Development Corporation, Ch'a was highly critical of these developments. In 1969 he called out provincial and local planning commissions in particular for ignoring the particular needs in their own communities and adopting the central government's national plan as a standardized

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[40] For more on the genesis of this project, see Wŏn Hŭiyŏn, "Konggiŏp hyŏngsŏng kwa pyŏndong e kwan han yŏn'gu: Han'guk nongsusan sikp'um yut'ong kongsa sarye rŭl chungsim ŭro" (MPA Thesis, Sŏul Taehakkyo Haengjŏng taehagwŏn, 2012), 28–43.
[41] Ibid., 34.
[42] Pak T'aegyun, *Wŏnhyŏng kwa pyŏnyong*, 255–273.

model.[43] This was a profound indication of how much the tables had turned since the previous decade. Reviving the concept of "community development," which had long since gone out of style in Korean and American development circles, Ch'a called on economic planners to take a more democratic approach that ensured the "direct participation and understanding of village people."[44] This meant "cultivating leaders" and emphasizing the values of collaboration and self-help.[45]

Community development would undergo a significant revival, at least rhetoricaly, in the 1970s as part of Park Chung Hee's New Village Movement (*saemaŭl undong*).[46] But while his collaboration with the Americans in the 1950s and 60s would serve as an inspiration for this movement, Ch'a's direct influence was minimal. Ch'a was arrested for bribery during an audit of public corporations in 1971, and he spent the better part of the decade fighting the case and subsequent appeals in court.[47]

If some limitations from the 1950s persisted after the coup, it opened new areas where former Manchukuo bureaucrats were able to exert greater influence. This was particularly true in relations with Japan, where the so-called "Manchukuo network" (*Manju inmaek*) played a central role in interstate diplomacy in the 1960s.[48] While most scholars have focused on Park and his relationship to then former Japanese Prime Minister and architect of Manchukuo's five-year plan, Kishi Nobusuke, several former

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[43] Ch'a Kyunhŭi, "Chiyŏk kaebal e issŏ paramchikhan chŏngchaek sudan," *Chibang haengjŏn* 18, no. 186 (1969): 38-39.
[44] Ibid., 38.
[45] Ibid., 39–40.
[46] Dajeong Chung, "From Dependency to Self-Sufficiency," 58.
[47] "Ch'a Kyunhŭi chŏn Nonggaegong ch'ongchae kusok," *Chosŏn ilbo,* December 11, 1971; Ch'a Kyunhŭi p'igo mujoe rŭl hwakchŏng," *Chosŏn ilbo,* March 24, 1976.
[48] Kim Ungki, "Ilbon ŭi tae Han 'pesang pijŭnisŭ' rŭl tullŏ ssan Han-Il 'Manju inmek' ŭi kyŏlhap kwa yŏkhal," *Chŏngsin munhwa yŏn'gu* 31, no 3 (2008): 133–135.

Manchukuo bureaucrats were key figures in the actual negotiating process from the very beginning.

The most well-known of this group were Ch'oe Kyuha and An Kwangho.[49] Both Ch'oe and An were GUA graduates and unsurprising allies for the coup leaders. An had been one of a the few former bureaucrats to join the South Korean military before the Korean war. Ch'oe, meanwhile, had become a career diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he was involved in earlier negotiations with the Japanese during the Rhee's presidency. The Supreme Council tapped Ch'oe as a foreign affairs advisor and a lead negotiator in the lead up to the normalization treaty with Japan in 1965. An served as ambassador to Japan in 1965, where he was responsible for overseeing the treaty's implementation.

However, former Manchukuo bureaucrats also led negotiations on a number of subsidiary issues, particularly related to trade. One outcome of Park Chung Hee's trip to Japan in November 1961 was renewed Korean interest in grain exports to Japan. Starting in March 1962, then Grain Administration Bureau Chief Yi Kihong made several extended trips to Tokyo to negotiate an export agreement with the Japanese government.[50] By the end of April, Yi's team had secured a contract to sell 22,000 tons of white rice and 18,000 tons of brown rice over the next six months.[51]

In some specific instances Manchukuo connections proved to be a useful resource during negotiations. During his time as MAF Minister, Ch'a Kyunhŭi was involved in

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[49] Kim Ungki highlights their contributions specifically in ibid., 135.
[50] "Yi Ryangjŏng kukjang kwiguk ssal tae Il such'ul kyosŏp," *Tonga ilbo,* April 14, 1962.
[51] "Ssal 4 man t'on tae Il such'ul hwakchŏng," *Tonga ilbo,* May 1, 1962.

diplomatic negotiations with Japan over agricultural trade and fishing rights.[52] According to Cha's deputy, when the meetings began in April 1965, Japanese Minister of Agriculture Akagi Munenobu (?–?) refused to listen to Ch'a and treated him as an inferior.[53] Ch'a's team called off negotiation and relayed their complaints to Hunada Naka (?–?) and Yatsugi Kazuo (?–?), both members of Kishi Nobusuke's political faction. Yatsugi proceeded to scold the Japanese Minister for his undiplomatic behavior in front of the Koreans, and demand that he treat Ch'a as an equal.[54]

Former Manchukuo bureaucrats in Korea also began to reconnect with their Japanese colleagues in less formal settings. In 1960, GUA graduate Kwŏn Il, who had been working as a lawyer and prominent figure in Japan's resident Korean community since 1945, traveled to Seoul to help lobby the new government to revive diplomatic talks.[55] On his return, Kwŏn reported to Japan's Great Unity Academy Alumni Association (J. Daidō gakuin dōsōkai) that he had made contact with alumni in Korea.[56] By 1966 nine Korean GUA graduates had traveled to Japan for government missions, business trips, or international symposia.[57] In each case, the alumni network helped organize reunions between the Korean visitors and their former colleagues in Japan.[58] In 1968, the alumni association published the names and contact information for 55 of their

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[52] This included controversial discussions over maritime economic and political boundaries.
[53] Kim Tongcho, "P'ilhwa nae ga kyŏkkŭn Han'guk oegyo (28)," *Munhwa ilbo,* October 23, 1999.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Kwon had been involved in helping to coordinate interstate dialogue since at least 1957 and continued to serve as an informal representative during the normalization treaty process in the 1960s. He returned to Korea in the late 60s and was elected to the National Assembly in 1971. "Kwŏn Il," *Han'guk kŭn hyŏndae inmul charyo*, KHDB, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?levelId=im_101_30299; Kwon Il, *Hyŏnhaet'an ŭl sai e tugo: ilbonso ŭi nam kwa puk* (Seoul: Haeoe kyop'o munje yŏn'guso ch'ulp'anbu).
[56] Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Hekikū ryokuya sanzenri*, 874.
[57] These were Kim T'aeho, Chin Yŏnggŭn, P'yo Munhwa, Hwang Chongryul, Ch'oe Kyuha, Yi Minchae, Song Hyochŏng, and Yun Pupyŏng. Ibid.
[58] Ibid.

Korean colleagues in its quarterly bulletin.[59] Then in 1970, two Korean representatives attended the annual GUA alumni gathering in Kyoto and helped coordinate a reciprocal event–officially organized as an "industrial observation mission"–for two Japanese alumni in Seoul the following year.[60] Korean and Japanese GUA graduates continued to correspond and meet regularly until the early 2000s.

These exchanges were more than an opportunity for former Manchukuo bureaucrats to reminisce about their youth. In their writings Korean alumni revived and reconfigured Manchukuo's discourse of racial harmony and pan-Asian cooperation as a necessary measure for the Cold War. After a trip to Tokyo in 1968, Kim T'aeho wrote that he was deeply disturbed by the anti-government student protests at Tokyo University, which he likened to China's Cultural Revolution.[61] He felt that the Japanese youth were susceptible to radical leftwing propaganda in part because they had not experienced the direct threat of Communism, as Koreans had. At the same time, he argued that Japanese had lost their sense moral authority in the postwar world. In the process of national recovery, he felt they had sacrificed their traditional collective values and their "national spirit" had been replaced by individualism and materialism.[62] That same year, P'yo Munhwa similarly mused: "are Japan and Korea…rising through the ranks of capitalist-materialist civilization or falling to the bottom of spiritual civilization?"[63] For them, the confluence of social, economic, political problems was not ultimately all that different from what they faced during their time Manchukuo. And both Kim and P'yo suggested

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[59] "Zai Daikan minkoku Daidō gakuin dōsōkai meibo," *Daidō gakuin dōsō kaihō*, no. 35 (July 1968): 18
[60] Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai, *Hekikū ryokuya sanzenri*, 875.
[61] Kim T'aeho, "Tōkyō de mita Nihon no kunō," *Daidō gakuin dōsō kaihō*, no. 38 (April 1969): 2–3
[62] Ibid., 3.
[63] P'yo Munhwa, "Uruhasiki haru dake naha no hi no moto ni," *Daidō gakuin dōsō kaihō*, no. 39 (July 1969): 3.

that as GUA graduates, they should again work together to bridge the gap between spiritual and material advancement.[64]

It is unclear, however, if such sentiments had a measurable impact on national policy back in Korea, or interstate diplomacy more generally. Neither Kim nor P'yo played much of a role in the Park government. Nor did they appear to directly promote these ideas in Korean language, or outside of the relatively obscure confines of the Japanese alumni bulletin. A more detailed analysis of Korean writing in GUA alumni publications is beyond the scope of this study. But it may be more appropriate to view these as part of a broader genera of postcolonial nostalgia writing that former Manchukuo bureaucrats produced for their own consumption.

Manchukuo's legacy on Korea, therefore, was far from simple. While some have argued that the essence of Manchukuo's industrial modernity spread through society,[65] the case of former Manchukuo bureaucrats reminds us that this process was conditional and highly selective. Even in positions of relative power and authority, former Manchukuo bureaucrats still operated within internal and external constraints that dictated what and how they might apply their past experiences to the present moment. This was as true during Park Chung Hee's regime as it had been before.

This is not to diminish enduring influence of the unique institution that was the Manchukuo bureaucracy. It is noteworthy that on an individual level, many Koreans continued to rely on and find meaning in their experience in Manchukuo's governing institutions. That meaning was, of course, far from uniform and changed throughout their

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[64] Ibid; Kim T'aeho, "Tōkyō de mita Nihon no kunō," 3.
[65] Han Sŏkchŏng, *Manju modŏn.*

lives. But in this regard, they were little different from their colleagues in other parts of Japan's former empire trying to navigate a present that was at once familiar yet remarkably different.

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