

EMERGENT BUREAUCRACY IN COUNTER
BUREAUCRATISM,
FROM THE HUNDRED FLOWERS TO THE
ANTI-RIGHTIST CAMPAIGN
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Introduction

The period between 1956 and 1957 was one of the most drastically transformative in the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Following Nikita Khrushchev's report, *On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences*, and his efforts at denouncing Stalin, Mao Zedong delivered his famous speech, *On the Ten Major Relationships*, in April 1956, announcing the need to streamline the Communist Party of China (CPC) while encouraging the democratic parties to supervise it.¹ Summarizing Mao's idea, the CPC spread the principle of "let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend" nationwide. It signaled the start of the Hundred Flowers Campaign.² In September, the 8th National Congress of the Party was inaugurated, resulting in a new Party constitution. Then, the sudden outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution further stimulated the desire for democracy and freedom of speech in Chinese society. After months of apparent normality, a Rectification Movement in May 1957 abruptly stirred up waves of mass discussions and demonstrations against bureaucratism, elevating the Hundred Flowers Campaign to a new height. However, with the start of the Anti-Rightist Campaign in June, freedom of speech quickly became a thing of the past. Eventually, the authorities labeled at least 550,000 individuals as "rightists," sentencing them to punishments and social death.³ Suddenly, it seemed

all the steps previously taken toward building up a liberalized socialist republic had been in vain. This paper analyzes the causes of this reversal in course.

China's spring of academic research emerged after the country underwent reform and an economic opening in the 1980s. As the *de facto* Party Leader who created this historical transition, Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues sought to pass a definitive judgment over previous decades of the PRC. As Deng commented,

The necessity for the anti-Rightist struggle of 1957 should be reaffirmed. After the completion of the socialist transformation, there was indeed a force—a trend of thought—in the country that was bourgeois in nature and opposed to socialism. It was imperative to counter this trend. I have said on many occasions that some people really were making vicious attacks at the time, trying to negate the leadership of the Communist Party and change the socialist orientation of our country.⁴

He believed this campaign should be viewed as a turning point in Mao Zedong's correct leadership. The true mistake, if any, lay in the "magnification," or the broadening of scope, in assigning "rightist" labels. Following Deng's orthodoxy, many reformist CPC scholars, such as Wu Lengxi, composed memoirs or scholarship depicting Mao's mistakes in the magnification of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. They did not address the transition from the Rectification Movement to this later campaign, potentially suggesting that it involved a smooth collective decision-making process.⁵

Until recent years, mainstream scholars directed their criticism towards Mao Zedong's leadership. Historians, including Ye Yonglie and Yinghong Cheng, have argued the Hundred Flowers Campaign, or at least the Rectification Movement, together with the Anti-Rightist Campaign, was part of Mao's grand scheme to expose and eliminate critics.⁶ Though not all Chinese scholars subscribe to this explana-

tion, they commonly explicitly or implicitly acknowledge Mao's supreme position and his obsession with power. Yen-lin Chung's metaphor of Mao as a "wayward king" is a notable example.⁷

Critical of these simplified interpretations, Maurice Meisner, Roderick MacFarquhar, Shen Zhihua, and other scholars outside of China provided more nuanced accounts of this period. On the one hand, some of their work places emphasis on Mao's original intention behind counter-bureaucratism. On the other, in-depth analyses of the complex senior-level struggle confront the conventional view of smooth collective decision-making or Mao's rule as a dictatorship. Through their work, a critical historical actor, the bureaucracy, becomes partially visible but receives little detailed examination.

To analyze what I term the "emergent bureaucracy" that emerged through the 1957 conjuncture, I organized my paper into two parts. The first, based on a comparative analysis of Mao's speeches and critical scholarship (MacFarquhar et al.), delves deeper into Mao's role to situate this novel historical actor within a broader political context. In the second part, I conduct an original quantitative and qualitative analysis of key historical documents like "Beijing daxue youpai fenzi fandong yanlun huiji" (Collection of Rightists' Speeches at Beijing University) to deepen my investigation of the interactions between Mao, students, and Party Leaders at Beijing University during the May 19th Movement.⁸ This enables me to identify key characteristics of this emergent bureaucracy, which I define as those who benefited from their privileged official positions and Party Memberships. Far from adhering to the Maoist doctrine of the "Mass Line," they gradually formed a de facto political collective by resisting efforts against bureaucratism.⁹

I argue that 1956-57 marked the transformation of individual privileged Party Members into a de facto political

bureaucratic force formed on the principles of counteracting Mao's Hundred Flowers Movement and the Rectification Campaign. Rooted in the new social relations and structural tensions of socialist China, members of this emergent entity played two important roles in 1957. Though unwilling to contest Mao's nominal authority directly, they attempted to produce misinformation when interfacing with their superiors. Confronting the masses that were supposed to be served, they tried to suppress any act that could challenge their position. In the context of senior-level disagreement, this emergent bureaucracy contributed to the historical shift from the Rectification Movement to the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the subsequent magnification of this purge. Thus, my analysis contributes to a better understanding of Mao's responsibility and challenges the common tendency among historians to refer to socialist China as a "Maoist regime."

1. Mao Zedong's Position

When taking an initial approach to the political movements in 1956 and 57, encountering Mao's participation is inevitable. Superficially, it is tempting to focus on the changes in Mao's thoughts from 1956 to mid-1957. Over time, scholars have sharply and sensitively emphasized the differences in Mao's statements in the successive campaigns. At the start of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, he sincerely invited the democratic party members to supervise the Party.¹⁰ Then, in January 1957, he introduced a metaphor of "fragrant flowers" and "poisonous weed" to describe the appearance of society.¹¹ Eventually, in June, he issued an instruction, Organize to Counter the Furious Attacks from the Rightists, to initiate the Anti-Rightist suppression.¹² Such a selection of materials easily leads to an emphasis on Mao's central responsibility, given the prevailing preconceived notion of Mao's dictatorship. These shifts in tone were undeniably significant. Yet,

they often obscure other messages in his words.

Mao constantly discussed the issue of bureaucratism. In January 1957, when Mao spoke about the existence of rightist slogans and his metaphor of flowers and weeds, he first framed the problems within the Communist Party, denouncing those cadres who loved and only cared about competing for titles and promotion.¹³ In May and June, when his attitudes were changing, he did not forget to talk about the issue of dogmatism among many comrades.¹⁴ Further, it must be highlighted that before the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Mao even pushed for a Rectification Movement that mainly targeted bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism (widely referred to as Three Evils) among Party Members.¹⁵ By attacking the bureaucratic working style, the self-serving factionalism, and the vice of making arbitrary decisions inside the CPC, he hoped to bring the Party back to its mass supporter base. Particularly, such a movement would include examining “the status of tackling the contradictions among the people,” the conditions of practicing the Party’s policy of Hundred Flowers, the phenomenon of not uniting each ethnicity, party, mass, and intellectuals, etc.¹⁶ The participation of individuals who were not members of the CPC was welcomed; however, this participation “must [stem] from their willingness,” and these individuals were allowed to quit whenever they desired.¹⁷ Doctrines of the Mass Line and self-criticism remained the fundamental theoretical pillars regardless of other changes.

Mao’s conception of rightists was minimal, and his proposed way of tackling them was hardly brutal. From the outset, he proposed two contradictions of very different natures: the contradiction among the people and the contradiction between ourselves and enemies.¹⁸ The essential line of distinction was the definition of the people. For Mao in 1957, it was: “All the classes, strata, and social groups who supported, embraced, and participated in the course of so-

cialist construction.”¹⁹ Most of the population participating in the Hundred Flowers would have been classified as the people, for they did not want to overthrow the CPC leadership. Regarding protests and disturbances, he believed most should be attributed to the political or economic mistakes made by the Party, “nothing but subjectivism and bureaucratism.” Further, he argued that “the last factor is the counter-revolutionaries.”²⁰ As Mao envisioned in the first weeks of the Anti-Rightist Movement, the true counter-revolutionaries would only be a tiny portion of the population who belonged to the category of “anti-Communist, anti-people, and anti-socialism bourgeoisie rightists.”²¹ He believed these would only be “a few out of a hundred” and “the zealous ones might not exceed one percent.”²² Qi Benyu said, “Chairman Mao at the time said there were merely four to five thousand rightists.”²³ Yet, the ultimate rule was not the estimated percentage but sufficient evidence.²⁴ In Mao’s initial plan for the Anti-Rightist campaign, he expected a process of debates and criticism for these rightists who supposedly assumed an enemy position. It involved letting them speak up and then providing proper objections to make people understand the negative attitudes these rightists were promoting and why they were wrong, thus isolating them from the masses. The entire campaign, “if properly done, should only take around a month,” then the focus would turn back to rectification within the CPC.²⁵ Even if some rightists did not regret it, “as long as they never serve as spies, not continuing any destructive actions, the government should still provide them employment, and not expropriate their citizen rights.” This is because the result of many historical events that adopted extreme policies was not satisfactory.²⁶ Rather than suggesting a prolonged ruthless suppression that had historically resulted in punishing 550,000 or more individuals in 1957 and 58, the long-term primary target for the Chairman was still the bureaucratic elements in the CPC apparatus.

Recognizing Mao's insistence on counter-bureaucratism and his initial proposal for a limited Anti-Rightist campaign, several questions must be raised: To what extent was this devastating campaign truly a product of this "supreme" leader? Were there other parties that should also be held responsible or even more responsible for the massive purge that historians observed?

2. The Hundred Flowers Contested

To approach these questions, it is essential to first shed light on the gradual power shifts within the Communist Party. The roots of such changes, as Qi Benyu recalled, can be traced back to 1953, when Gao Gang, previously the Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, fell out of power due to his sectarianism errors after a political power struggle within the Party Central with Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. This increased the latter's authority.²⁷ Later, in September 1956, during the first meeting of the 8th National Congress of CPC in Beijing, Liu presented the political report, and Deng made a statement on modifying the Party Constitution. This seemed to be a turning point in the Party's power dynamics, as Deng's report included strengthening democratic decision-making and opposition to individual cults as guiding principles.²⁸ Partially as a response to Khrushchev's report and by emphasizing the importance of the collective will, Mao's weight had sharply declined. As Maurice Meisner noted, "'guided by the thought of Mao Zedong' was deleted in the new Party Constitution," and the post of General Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee (Central Secretariat) was established.²⁹ Deng Xiaoping was appointed to this crucial position. He and his subordinates would be responsible for drafting and ensuring the implementation of directives from the Political Bureau and reviewing and selecting documents and reports.³⁰ From

a political construction perspective, the Communist Party seemed to be on a more democratic track. However, this change was not necessarily positive regarding implementing the Hundred Flowers Campaign.

As my discussion indicates, Mao was dedicated to promoting the Hundred Flowers Campaign. It's evident from recent historiography and key primary sources that many central and local party cadres were unhappy with Mao's campaign from the outset. In 1956, Qi recalled that Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Zhen complained, "Mao's speech at the Supreme State Conference (announcing the Hundred Flowers) were made without prior discussion, whereas previously anything was discussed within the party first..."³¹ Lin Xiling, a well-known student rightist, noted, "80% of senior cadres do not agree with the Hundred Flowers; this is not groundless; Chairman Mao spoke it."³² Nevertheless, Mao Zedong was determined to push for the Hundred Flowers Campaign. After the 8th Congress, despite him still being influential and irreplaceable, more confrontations arose between him and other cadres in the Party. In March, Mao held discussions with many groups of party and non-party representatives, specifically regarding the stagnant implementation of the Hundred Flowers Campaign due to "dogmatists' stubborn resistance."³³ Generally, as Shen Zhihua's book presents, while democratic party members increasingly applauded Mao's attitudes, more and more CPC comrades were found unwilling to accept criticism from society.³⁴ In April, after an inspection tour to the south, Mao expressed his anxiety to Wu Lengxi: "The comrades in the Party are afraid of poisonous weeds, which are the 'right,' while outside of the Party, people are afraid of the dogmatism, that's to say, the 'left.'"³⁵ Determined to intervene in the conjuncture, Mao spoke (or wrote) his famous line: "If we do not rectify, the Party will be ruined."³⁶ Somehow, he managed to gain permission from most senior leaders and launched the Rectification Cam-

paign.³⁷ However, this consent seemed superficial, as about half of the Political Bureau members later demonstrated their opposition through their actions.³⁸

The myth of Mao's supreme leadership has been challenged at this stage. Mao still had irreplaceable symbolic and political importance, but within the CPC system, he was only an eminent member of the senior decision-making collective. Further, since 1956, from senior leaders to low-level functionaries, there was widespread antagonism against his Hundred Flowers principles and the subsequent Rectification Campaign. Ironically, Mao's attempt to summon his comrades to overcome the Three Evils of bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism helped foster a growing alienation from the masses.

Based on these understandings, rather than simply using the individualized term "bureaucrats" in 1956 and especially in 1957's context, it appears appropriate to introduce the designation of "bureaucracy," more precisely, an "emergent bureaucracy." A preliminary definition would be: Some who benefited from their privileged official positions and Party Memberships, far from adhering to the Maoist doctrine of the Mass Line, had gradually formed a *de facto* political collective on resisting efforts against bureaucratism. To elaborate on my points, in the following sections, I will examine how this emergent bureaucracy counteracts Mao's summon and eventually transforms the Rectification Campaign into an anti-rightist purge.

3. Strategies of Rejection and Magnification

Two clear strategies can be observed. The first, briefly presented in the previous section, occurred before the Rectification Movement, where this emergent bureaucracy reacted to the Hundred Flowers principles primarily with official loathing and rejection. However, when the Rectification Move-

ment was launched, a nominal agreement was reached in the Central Committee, and with the mass mobilization under this strong call for rectification, this strategy seemed no longer valid.

The second strategy appeared in June. Leveraging the immediate shift in focus from rectification to suppressing the so-called attacking bourgeoisie rightists, the bureaucracy amplified the purge to radically overturn the tide. From the senior level, an enormous quota of rightists was set. According to Qi, it would be 10% of each work unit.³⁹ Some other sources said that (by early July) at least initially, there was a 5 percent quota.⁴⁰ Regardless of the case, this quota number far exceeded Mao's estimation.

Despite not making statements against socialism or the Party, many individuals who actively participated in the Hundred Flowers Campaign were nonetheless victimized. One notable example was Wang Meng, a novelist labeled a rightist despite Mao's firm support and purged in 1958 for unknown reasons.⁴¹ Famous sociologist Fei Xiaotong was the other example.⁴² In his last interview, he recalled a discussion after being labeled a rightist. Sitting near a swimming pool, the Chairman comforted him, saying: "What's the matter of being a rightist? How many labels have I had? Those labels placed will eventually be removed."⁴³

The magnification of the Anti-Rightist campaign quickly reached the entire country. Many people not only suffered from the hostile policies made by the top but also from some lower-level bureaucrats. An exemplary case was the Jiabangou labor camp in Gansu province, a part of the re-education through the labor penal system created by a central order to re-educate some extreme rightists and counter-revolutionaries. Sebastian Veg's article has depicted some distinct mislabeled rightists: In Qi Shuying's case, she was persecuted for refusing her bureau chief's abnormal (sexual) demand; In Qi Yaoquan's case, previously the local Youth

League Secretary, he was labeled a rightist for irritating the County Secretary. Even some old revolutionaries, such as Li Tianqing, who fought against the Nationalists during the Civil War and the subsequent Korean War, were classified as rightists for various reasons.⁴⁴ In the name of Mao and socialism, bureaucrats tried their best to persecute anyone for disobedience. It is reasonable to believe that these magnified numbers would eventually end up in reports received by the central government, which led the leaders to make wrong forecasts, resulting in hundreds of thousands of victims. The magnification strategy was historically proven to be notorious but effective. Confirming this, Deng Xiaoping captured an essential part of the story.

4. At the Turning Point of History: Students and Emergent Bureaucracy in the May 19th Movement

The failed attempt at rejecting the Hundred Flowers principles and the success of the strategy of magnifying the anti-Rightist purge provided general insights into the emergent bureaucracy's continuous effort to counteract the Hundred Flowers Movement. However, a crucial period remains unexamined: late May and June 1957, the climax of the entire Hundred Flower—Rectification movement. This was precisely the time when senior leadership, including Mao Zedong, stepped towards initiating the Anti-Rightist Campaign.

The historiographical focus has generally been on the senior leadership struggles and social unrest that transformed Mao's attitudes.⁴⁵ Roderick MacFarquhar and Shen Zhihua have offered persuasive analyses of the former. However, when specifically discussing the student movements that started at Beijing University on May 19th and soon flourished across China's cities, most scholars have focused on senior Party officials' memoirs and internal reports. Little attention

is given to interactions between students, senior decision-makers, and members of the emergent bureaucracy. In this section, I attempt to fill this gap based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of a contemporaneous official account of “representative rightists” speeches by students at Beijing University, Beijing daxue youpai fenzi fandong yanlun huiji to achieve an in-depth understanding of the emergent bureaucracy.⁴⁶

1/Themes	Party’s Leadership	Socialism	Rectification
Support or Likely Support	35	42	48
Unclear, Cannot Infer	7	7	1
Critical or Against	7	0	0

From the outset, adhering to Mao’s conception of the “rightist” (see section 1), the extent to which these exemplary “rightists” were truly rightists must be questioned. As evidenced quantitatively, most of the 49 documented “rightist” individual students or groups hold a positive consensus on socialism and the Rectification Campaign.⁴⁷ Admittedly, though, there was more of a debate over the CPC’s leadership among the students. As more than 70% of them were content with its dominance, it is hard to say whether most fit Mao’s “rightist” designation: Party Communism was not their target; they self-identified with the people and did not question socialism at all. While many did come from previously bourgeoisie families, that alone was far from sufficient. Countless Communist revolutionaries were also born into landlord or bourgeois families.

Far from anti-socialism, most students pushed for a better-refined, idealistic version of socialism. Among their writings, the word “democracy” appeared frequently. Yet, the meaning of it was far from liberal democracy or other Western forms of social democracy. Throughout the entire

collection of speeches, elections are rarely mentioned. Even in cases where they are, most of the time, student activists merely asked for direct elections to the posts of certain junior officials or functionaries they disliked. The only individual who could be categorized as asking for an election to semi-replace the existing system of the People's Congress was Jiang Xingren from the Department of Biology, but just like all the others, he did not question the idea of socialism; instead, he believed his democratic solution would reinforce its realization.⁴⁸ The majority of student activists, in fact, focused on more concrete problems. Some, including Qian Ruping and Jiang Xingren, demanded more genuine public ownership (where workers truly control the production), while others questioned the allocation of jobs, the non-transparency of personal files, disrespect of the law or constitution, the biased teaching approach, dogmatic and mandatory political education, etc. All of these critiques were tied to denouncing the "Three Evils" of bureaucracy, sectarianism, and subjectivism in the Communist Party (which was precisely Mao's target in the Rectification Movement). Thus, it could be said that "democracy," in students' comprehension, was a largely enhanced mass supervision of politics under the Communist Party's Leadership, which would be effective in eliminating the existing Three Evils, thereby promoting the making of genuine socialism.

The fundamental similarities between the students' and Mao's views are apparent when comparing their general denunciations and commitments with a contemporaneous directive issued by the Central Committee. On May 16th, the latter informed its subordinates:

From facts that have been revealed... Party Members enjoyed privileges in terms of ranking, wage determination, promotion, treatment, etc. Party Members are ranked higher, while non-Party Members are ranked lower. Party Members are arrogant, while non-Party Members are submissive.

In schools, our Party's cadre instructors, assistant teachers, lecturers, and professors have lower qualifications and less knowledge, and rather than sincerely learning from the instructors and professors with higher qualifications and more knowledge, they assume an attitude of superiority. Though the above situation does not reflect the whole, it is pervasive.⁴⁹

In the broader picture, most of these "rightists" aligned with these views and thus confirmed Mao's agenda.

Thus, Mao was far from absent in their discussions. Of the 49 exemplary "rightist" groups and individuals, 12 mentioned him. Interestingly, besides one critical person, most viewed Mao mainly as a positive figure. Students like Qian Ruping and Wang Shuyao deliberately drew upon Mao's words and examples to persuade their audience.⁵⁰ Some, however, had bolder and sharper discussions about him. One of the student leaders, Tan Tianrong, passionately urged students to support the Rectification Movement; he stated, "Our beloved comrade Mao Zedong is in a challenging position; the students must make sure the mass movement goes in the least harmful direction."⁵¹ Another student, Zhang Jingzhong, even discussed the possibility of inviting "Chairman Mao" to the university with his friend.⁵² The above account is indeed still far from fully summarizing the complexity of students' thoughts. However, it establishes that most were not rightists and were not made "rightists" until June.

Though the students did not extend their invitation in the end, Mao kept a close eye on the movement at Beijing University. Since the start, internal news reports had been continuously updated on the changing situation in universities. Party agents copied exemplary big character posters and summarized students' claims.⁵³ Mao appears to have become extremely concerned in the last ten days of May.⁵⁴ On May 25th, Mao spoke to the delegates of the Communist Youth League:

Your meeting was very successful... The Chinese Communist Party is the leading core of all Chinese people. Without this core, the socialist cause cannot succeed. Your meeting is a solidarity meeting, which will have a big impact on all Chinese youth. I congratulate you. Comrades, stay united, and bravely strive for the great cause of socialism. Any words or actions that deviate from socialism are completely wrong.⁵⁵

A warning had been issued. As the birthplace of the student movement that had attracted Mao's attention, Beijing University's case likely had some influence on his position. The question is, why, considering students' genuine agreement with the Party's Leadership and socialism, did Mao feel there was an undesirable tendency present within the student movement?

Among the key factors that contributed to Mao's understanding, published memoirs have shown that members of the bureaucracy at Beijing University, who partially controlled information transmission, played an important role. Regardless of his direct target of accusation, Qi Benyu's complaint provides a general sketch: "While Deng Xiaoping was in charge of work, many documents, including some abnormal situations, were quickly sent to the Chairman [Mao] via internal channels. For a while, he could not figure out which were the truthful ones and which were the fake ones."⁵⁶ Mao's secretary, Chen Boda, recalled: "At the time, many big character posters appeared in Beijing University, the Xin Hua News Agency [in charge of producing internal news reports, Neibu cankao] and the Party Committee of Beijing University reported to the Central Committee, believing that the situation was difficult, and saying it had turned into the Hyde Park."⁵⁷ No records of what exactly the university's Party Committee had reported to Mao and others exist. Still, it certainly had a great stake in exaggeration and providing misinformation, considering it was the common immediate target of student activists' critiques. My following analysis

will show that they can be characterized as members of China's emergent bureaucracy.

With no signs of receiving directives from their superiors, leaders of the university's Party Committee showed a strong reluctance towards the students' participation in the Rectification Campaign. Since the start date of May 19th, while students were putting up big character posters, Deputy Secretary of the Party, Cui Xiongkun, backed by the Secretary of the Youth League Committee, Shi Yougang, immediately responded by saying: "We do not recommend this form of participation, because it is not good. Indeed, if someone does put up such a poster, we do not prohibit it."⁵⁸ His words soon produced a widespread sense of antagonism among the students. Not only accused of being irresponsible, he and, implicitly, the school's Party Committee, were charged with bureaucratism.⁵⁹ The fact that, as Deputy Secretary, Cui did not even know the number of Youth League members in the University strengthened their arguments.⁶⁰

On the night of the 21st, responding to students' criticisms, the Party Secretary, Jiang Longji, publicly apologized in a speech. He then announced the committee's support for the students. This was a successful act: passionate students had flooded the dining hall, and they all applauded in the end.⁶¹ Yet, the entire speech was merely a concession made on the leading collective's behalf, resulting from fear of escalating tensions. Fundamentally, these leaders did not agree with the students. Jiang soon used his actions to prove it. First, he used a play-dumb strategy. Though he promised to support the movement, he likely did nothing in the first few days.⁶² Then, on the 25th, when students from the Western languages department organized an accusation meeting and bitterly revealed several tragic wrongfully purged cases brought on by the Three Evils, Jiang broke his silence and admonished against such actions retaking place.⁶³ Speaking to more than a disagreement over tactics, he posed several fierce

questions to the students: Were they denouncing the Communist Party? Was the meeting aimed to resolve the contradictions within the people – that is, social tensions among them – or to amplify them? Was it aimed to strengthen the Party’s Leadership or weaken it? Did it seek to consolidate socialism or undermine it? He concluded by saying the students’ meeting was “abnormal” and “unsound.”⁶⁴ That night, a reporter interviewed Jiang about his assessment. Jiang optimistically stated: “After a week of activism [which could alternatively be translated as “riots”], the students are now mentally tired.”⁶⁵ However, precisely due to his speech, the ruptures between the school leaders and students grew significantly. Students were unafraid of his threats and denounced him and the university’s Party Committee more than ever. It is crucial to ask: what made the university’s Party Secretary Jiang pose such a threat to the students? Or, more broadly, what made the university’s Party Committee act against the student movement since its beginnings (by speaking against it and sending misinformation to the Central Committee)?

There were likely multiple concerns that converged into such decisions. Primarily, Jiang and other heads of the school arguably cared about their positions and privileges. Mao’s warning on the 25th against deviating from the Party’s Leadership line and socialism may have provided them sufficient courage to take action. However, other reasons and rationales likely contributed to their decisions. The most significant one was a possible belief that they were acting on behalf of the Party: rectification was acceptable only if it was carried out under the Party’s Leadership; in Beijing University’s case, this responsibility naturally fell on Jiang and Cui’s backs. The student movement carried a high risk of losing control, and the chaos it caused could have eventually made both the Party’s Leadership and socialism vulnerable. This resonates in Jiang’s speech about the accusation meeting on the 25th. It also points to a possible rationale for providing

exaggerated information to Mao and other leaders: misinformation was necessary for ensuring the Party's greater good. Given their dual concern over their positions and imagined Party interests, Jiang and Cui's actions were likely their best available recourse. Yet, regardless of these possible considerations, a critical point remained clear: the objective function of the bureaucracy's actions was to suppress mass participation in the Rectification Movement. It was, of course, a conservative act. It left no room for the Mass Line or truthful self-criticism. These university leaders surely deviated from their commitment to the people, the supposed priority of their public service, and the core of Maoism.

Mao did not appreciate the University's leaders' "good-hearted" mindset in providing misinformation. While he received reports from Xin Hua News Agency and Beijing University's Party Committee, he must have doubted the truthfulness of the information. This was likely why he dispatched his secretaries to investigate the university's case. Yet, this process took time. It was not until the last few days of May, after his speech on the 25th, that he got results: His secretary Chen Boda suggested the information had been exaggerated; developments at Beijing University were of minor severity and "not worth making a fuss over."⁶⁶ Now equipped with a better understanding, Mao remarked on the student movement:

Looking at the current situation, we should still encourage [the] outspoken, with the goal of rectifying the party, winning over the centrists, and isolating and dividing the rightists. However, our approach to the rightists should be gentle and subtle. Significant issues are unlikely to occur at Peking University. Among the school's professors and associate professors, 11% are right-wing, 39% are left-wing, and 50% are centrist... Among the 8000 students, only about 70 are rightists, with about 200 people supporting them.⁶⁷

It was clear that the student movements at Beijing University, after a period of confusion and concern, did not ultimately influence Mao's perception of society in his ongoing Rectification Campaign. Yet, this by no means suggests the ineffectiveness of the emergent bureaucracy's influence on turning the Rectification Movement into the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Approximately five days of confusion had already led to the production of false signals (such as Mao's warning on the 25th), which would lead to the escalation of conflicts between students and members of the bureaucracy. Besides, and importantly, the student movement spread from Beijing University to universities across the country; if a sufficient number of university leaders were inclined to join or were already part of the emergent bureaucracy, then the fact that Mao had seen through the misinformation produced by Beijing University's Party Committee would have meant little. There were places where the university's Party Committees had taken a more radically conservative position. At Tianjin Nankai University, Beijing University was already officially portrayed as a state of "anarchy" "controlled by counter-revolutionaries."⁶⁸ Considerable amounts of misinformation were spreading across the country. This created more than enough political capital for Mao's senior-level opponents to utilize and, by leveraging other anxieties and discourses, to change the course of the Rectification Campaign.⁶⁹

It did not take long for Jiang Longji and other members of the emergent bureaucracy to feel a sense of relief. On June 8th, acting on the collective leadership's behalf, Mao announced his attacks on the rightists.⁷⁰ A perfect chance to crack down on the critics emerged. Students were quickly classified as "rightists," and many had to take responsibility for their words from May. To what extent Jiang was dedicated to the anti-rightist hunt remains debatable. According to a biography that portrayed him as a respected educator, he was invited to meet with Mao Zedong (time not specified) and

obtained a rightist quota of one percent.⁷¹ Superior directives must have arrived at Beijing University, and regardless of whether Jiang was willing to escalate or not, the purge numbers eventually reached 511, out of which 421 were students, approximately 5.3% of their total number.⁷² Certainly, it was higher than the alleged 1% Mao quota or the previously mentioned 70 rightists. Jiang and his colleagues could not be excused from their vital roles in carrying out such a persecution.

One last topic merits exploration: for what exact reasons were non-rightist students made into “rightists”? Fundamentally, most of these student rightists were accused of “attacking the Party.”⁷³ According to a Beijing Daily report, various attempts to “overthrow the Party Committee of Beijing University” were direct manifestations of such a crime.⁷⁴ The university committee’s stubborn resistance in May now turned into a glorious act. They pruned students’ speeches and posters and introduced sentences that contained any element of questioning the party to reinforce students’ guilt. The true meaning of their words was never discussed. Even the entirety of the May 19th Student Movement was heavily criticized as if that was just how Mao Zedong had judged it.⁷⁵ However, other than the arbitrary and vague label of having attacked the CPC and after-the-fact explanations of class backgrounds and trivial factors such as naivete and arrogance (Tan Tianrong was famous for this, both among other students and members of the bureaucracy), many criticisms were commonly based on three meaningful differences between the student and Party narratives.

First, several students, such as Liu Qidi and Cui Depu, questioned previous purges in the PRC. Though students discussed general revolutionary purges such as the Counterrevolutionary Eradication Struggle, they often focused on mislabelled individuals rather than the question

of the righteousness of these campaigns. What they truly questioned were the cases of Hu Feng and Gao Gang-Rao Shushi, that is, specifically, the political purges.⁷⁶ These were the sensitive points upon which senior leaders had previously defined collective political correctness. Discussing the rightness or wrongness of those purged in these struggles would have required too much depth. The true tension that students' questioning invoked was the conflict between the traditional method (since the Yan'an period) of line struggle and a modern desire for jurisdiction justice, a tricky and entangled topic that the entire CPC leadership had been reluctant to make a firm choice on.⁷⁷

The invocation of "Poland and Hungary" was also a key point of controversy. While senior leadership, including Mao, had been discussing the Polish and Hungarian incidents cautiously and, in the majority of cases, slightly negatively since the end of 1956, students viewed them positively.⁷⁸ Under the same symbol of "Poland and Hungary," it turned out that significantly different conceptions of these incidents were at play. For the CPC leaders, these were examples of the eruption of social tensions within the Hungarian and Polish socialist societies. Their negative attitudes primarily resulted from a perceived threat to the Party's Leadership and socialist public ownership of the economy. Ironically, as examined above, most of those exemplary student "rightists" did not genuinely question these. In their perspective, recent international incidents were merely rallying cries for mass supervision to ward off the Three Evils. The students' peculiar understanding produced some striking correlations. For example, according to Long Yinghua: "The May 19th Movement is the new May Fourth Movement; it is a Marxist Enlightenment in the current stage. It was born under the call of the Twentieth Congress (in the Soviet Union), occurred under the sun of the Hungarian Revolution, and realized under the cannon shot of our People's Congress and the wise

Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao...”⁷⁹ It is essential, however, to grasp the fundamental problem behind students’ and officials’ differences: a deep and persistent conflict between information control and open information access. Reading international information was a privilege enjoyed by junior and senior officials (the news report, Reference News, was an internal publication until 1980). If we take a more abstract view of this tension, it becomes a tension between trust in the people and their subjectivity and the need to consolidate the people’s democratic dictatorship over counter-revolutionaries.

Finally, there was a profound divergence over the formulation of bureaucratism. Essentially, both groups’ arguments answered these two central questions: One, is bureaucratism an implicit tendency or the semblance of an already existing oppressive bureaucracy? And two, what is the root of this bureaucratism or bureaucracy? In a talk addressed to the 8th Central Committee members, Mao said: “We must be aware, not to foster the bureaucratic style of work, not to form a noble stratum deviated from the people... whoever committed bureaucratism... the people have the justification to overthrow him.”⁸⁰ Although Mao’s attitude of justified rebellion against official misdoings was already apparent, one that would come up with increasing frequency in his later years in his choice of wording, at this stage, he saw bureaucratism only as a tendency, a mistake committed by some individuals; in the worst case, it would manifest as a future stratum, but not as a class. The published version of Mao’s 1957 speech *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People* (which was heavily modified and so no longer represents his stance, but rather the collective views of the Party Leadership) presents “the contradiction between the bureaucratic style of work and the people” as “also a contradiction among the people. Generally speaking, the contradictions among the people are contradictions formed based on

the fundamental conformity of the interests of the people.”⁸¹ This was the leading collective’s definitive answer.

Regarding the roots of bureaucratism, Mao’s vision appeared less visible, but collectively, the commonly circulated idea in the Anti-Rightist Campaign is available. This was the leading collective’s definitive claim. Regarding the roots of bureaucratism, there were no records directly telling Mao’s understanding, but collectively, the commonly circulated idea in the Anti-Rightist Campaign is available. Yao Wenyan, a literary critic and in the 1960s a leading Maoist, wrote an article, “On Revisionism in Some Cultural and Creative Tendencies,” in which he argued: “Of course, we should criticize bureaucratism... But bureaucracy is not a product of the socialist system, nor does it occupy a dominant position [in it]. Therefore, we should not demonize those who have been bureaucratic, nor should we describe bureaucratism as a dominant force, as if our society is at the mercy of the bureaucracy with no room to breathe.”⁸² Thus, we could conclude that for the mainstream of the CPC (including Mao and many later Maoist radicals) in 1957, there was no such class as bureaucrats (a bureaucracy), but only a bureaucratic tendency among the people. For them, bureaucratism was not rooted in the Chinese socialist political structure but rather in the remnants of the past social formation. Finally, bureaucratism did not constitute the dominant contradiction in society; the real acute social tension was still a class struggle between capitalism and communism, between the bourgeoisie and the CPC revolutionaries.

Some student rightists took a radical and distinct position from the mainstream CPC. To them, the issue of bureaucratism was no longer a matter of false tendencies or individual vices but a much more severe problem of an oppressive class of bureaucrats emergent from the existing socialist apparatuses, which should be handled as the most pressing systematic issue. A student from the Department of

Mathematics, Qian Ruping, offered a representative analysis:

To present my main arguments from Lenin's definition of class, let's look at the reality: 1. The control over means of production was mainly in the hands of prominent military and political figures – because it was not in the hands of the people; one worker does not have the right to intervene in the production process. 2. The distribution is unfair; there are people at the top who get too much based on what they deserve from laboring... 3. (meaning not clear) ... 4. Does not trust the masses... to give an example, in terms of big character posters, why Secretary Cui's attitude is apathy...⁸³

If one compares these different formulations of bureaucracy with Mao's pronouncements in the 1960s, the convergence is apparent; this provides a theoretical angle of inquiry into the grassroots formation of Maoism's maturity. However, at the time, this difference only provided an excuse for students to be persecuted. More importantly, if we consider the potential reasons behind these different formulations, we can see the fundamental contradiction within the PRC's socialist model: a theoretical vanguard position and the importance of the Party in keeping the country socialist versus, in reality, the privileges of Party Members, the gradual deterioration of revolutionary commitments, and the making of a bureaucracy alienated from the people.

Conclusion

Based on my analysis of the Beijing University case, I would develop my definition of my concept of an “emergent bureaucracy” as follows: 1) Emergent from a deviation from the Maoist Mass Line and self-criticism, individual bureaucrats formed a bureaucracy based on a collective rejection of the Hundred Flowers principles and the Rectification Movement.⁸⁴ 2) In particular, the essential criteria of belonging to the “emergent bureaucracy” consisted of a privileged

social position as a junior or senior-level Party Member and conservative actions in the Rectification and Anti-Rightist Campaign. 3) Members of the emergent bureaucracy, while not yet ready to directly challenge Mao Zedong's position in mid-1957, dared to influence senior decision-making through misinformation or to sabotage Rectification by suppressing the mass activisms. 4) It was 'emergent' because no signs of an explicitly political organization with an articulated program existed. 5) The new form of society had new contradictions. Behind the above-specified three key differences between student rightists and the Party mainstream, we have uncovered the three hidden fundamental contradictions: *a.* traditional method of purging vs. need for a modern, transparent jurisdiction; *b.* trust in people's subjectivity vs. practical concern on reinforcing democratic dictatorship over counter-revolutionaries; *c.* theoretical importance of the Party in the making of socialism vs. actual privileged Party Members and their abuse of power. These were closely tied to the PRC's socialist model and hence became the foundations of this emergent bureaucracy. 6) Thus, despite various apparent similarities, this emergent bureaucracy and other bureaucracies that existed throughout Chinese history (such as those of the Ming or Qing Dynasties) were fundamentally different.

My analysis of the emergent bureaucracy has brought much clarity to the history of Rectification and the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Fundamentally, it explains some of the students' attacks on the Party's Leadership. Though a significant divide was present inside the Party, identifying it was not an easy task for all students. In their daily contact, quite a number of those who represented the Party (Secretary Jiang, etc.) were members of this emergent bureaucracy. Rather than being deeply uncomfortable with the CPC, these "rightists" may have failed to distinguish the Three Evils from the larger Party apparatus in which they resided. If this were

true, the number of true rightists (following Mao's definition) would be further reduced.

My research also raises the question of the appropriateness of referring to the PRC as a Maoist regime. Though it may remain a relatively adequate designation for the country before 1957, exposing the emergence of a bureaucracy in mid-1957 suggests that applying the term beyond that year without necessary caution could produce potentially misleading interpretations. Discerning the power dynamics between true Maoists and the bureaucracy would thus be necessary before making a historical judgment and labeling a later period "Maoist."

Finally, my term helps clarify Mao Zedong's responsibility in the 1957 campaigns. It does not amount to his giving his final consent for the initiation of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, nor to the mistake of not promoting information transparency. Instead, it hinges upon his failure to act against the emergent bureaucracy (rather than bureaucratism) and its structural roots in the novel socialist social structure. The Chairman might have partially recognized it. Still, he was not yet convinced and prepared to tackle it in the most thorough way: no longer as a contradiction among the people but a contradiction between "ourselves" and the enemies. Mao finally determined to combat this bureaucracy in 1965, yet the students he summoned to rebellion were no longer the ones from 1957. His counter-bureaucratism indeed ended up in trauma for student activists. Many, such as Qian Liqun and Lin Xiling, became critical to Mao after 1980.

Notes:

- 1 Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Major Relationships," in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, vol. 5 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press; Marxists Internet Archive), https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_51.htm.
- 2 Wu Lengxi, *Xinde tansuo he zhengfeng fanyou* [New discoveries and the Rectification and Anti-Rightist Campaigns] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian Chubanshe, 2016), 23.
- 3 "Fanyoupai Douzheng," *Gongchandangyuan Wang*, June 6, 2012.
- 4 Deng Xiaoping, "Remarks on Successive Drafts of the 'Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China'" (1980-1981), in *The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, vol.2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984; WordPress, 2013)
- 5 Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Hu Qiaomu, et al., *Guany jianguo yilai dang de ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi* [Resolution on certain historical issues of the Party since the founding of the People's Republic of China] (1981), The Central Government of the People's Republic of China.
- 6 Ye Yonglie, *Fanyoupai yundong shimo* [The beginning and end of the Anti-Rightist Campaign] (Xining: Qinghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1995), 178.
- 7 Yen-lin Chung, "The Witch-Hunting Vanguard: The Central Secretariat's Roles and Activities in the Anti-Rightist Campaign," *The China Quarterly* 206 (June 2011): 391.
- 8 "Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui guanyu zhengfeng yundong de zhishi [The Central Committee of Communist Party of China's directory on the Rectification Movement]," *People's Daily*, May 1, 1957, <https://cn.govopendata.com/renminribao/1957/5/1/1/#167617>.

An important line of this report goes: [Through criticism and self-criticism, to achieve new solidarity on a new basis; there should be a universal, in-depth, anti-bureaucratism, anti-sectarianism, and anti-subjectivism rectification movement in the entirety of the party, to elevate its ideological qualification of Marxism, and to improve the style of work, so as to fit the need of socialist transformation and socialist construction.] "Beijing Daxue Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui, eds., Beijing daxue youpai fenzi fandong yanlun huiji [Collection of Peking University rightists' speech] (Internal published, 1957).

9 "Mass line" is a Maoist principle, meaning to hear, to serve, to guide, and eventually, to be the people.

10 Appearance of society Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Major Relationships."

11 Mao Zedong, Zai sheng shi zizhi qu dangwei shuji huiyi hang de jianghua [Speech at the party secretary meeting of provinces, cities and autonomous regions], January, 1957. <https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-195701.htm>.

12 Mao Zedong, Zuzhi liliang fanji youpai fenzi de changkuang jingong [Organize to counter the furious attacks from the rightists], June 8th, 1957. <https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-19570608.htm>.

13 Mao, Zai sheng shi zizhi qu dangwei shuji huiyi shang de jianghua.

14 Mao Zedong, Shiqing zhengzai qi bianhua [Things are starting to change], May 15th, 1957. According to Shen Zhihua, it was only internally issued in June, not as other scholars usually believe, on May 15th. Mid-May was only the time when he started to draft this article, but this original version might have big differences from the circulated one; Shen Zhihua, Sikao yu xuanze: cong zhishifenzi huiyi dao fanyoupai yundong (1956- 1957) (1956- 1957) [Reflections

and Choices: The Consciousness of the Chinese Intellectuals and the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1956-1957)] (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008), 553.

15 “Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui guanyu zhengfeng yundong de zhishi [The Central Committee of Communist Party of China’s directory on the Rectification Movement],” *People’s Daily*, May 1, 1957, <https://cn.govopendata.com/renminribao/1957/5/1/1/#167617>.

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16 Ibid. Corresponding line: “处理人民内部矛盾问题的情况。”

17 Ibid. Corresponding lines: “必须完全出于自愿” and “允许随时自由退出。”

18 Mao Zedong 毛泽东, *Guanyu zhengque chuli renmin neibu maodun de wenti* 关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题 [On the correct handling of contradictions among the people], Feb 27th, 1957.

19 Ibid. Corresponding line: “在建设社会主义的时期，一切赞成、拥护和参加社会主义建设事业的阶级、阶层和社会集团，都属于人民的范围...”

20 Yang Shangkun 杨尚昆, *Yang Shangkun riji* 杨尚昆日记 [Diar of Yang Shangkun] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 2017), 284. The full section goes: “闹事原因，我们在政治和经济上犯错误，无非是主观主义官僚主义。不要一闹，就都说是反革命。兰州林业学校捉了几十个人，不好。有的是政策正确，是执行方法不好，太

生硬。最后一个因素才是反革命分子，或者坏分子的存在。 [(Mao said) The reasons for riots (are likely) nothing but subjectivism and bureaucratism. Do not label all dissent as counter-revolutionary. The Lanzhou Forestry School had dozens of people arrested. It is not good. Sometimes, the policies are correct but not carried out in the proper method, too brutal. The last factor is the counter-revolutionaries.]”

21 Mao Zedong 毛泽东, *Yijiuwunian xiaji de xingshi* 一九五七年夏季的形势 [The situation in summer 1957], July, 1957, <https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-195707.htm>. Corresponding line: “反共反人民反社会主义的资产阶级右派。”

22 Mao, *Zuzhi liliang fanji youpai fenzi de changkuang jingong* 组织力量反共反右派分子的情况. Corresponding line: “反动分子人数不过百分之几，最积极疯狂分子不过百分之一。”

23 Qi Benyu 戚本禹, *Qi Benyu huiyilu* 戚本禹回忆录 [Qi Benyu's memoir], chapter 7.

Corresponding line: “毛主席当时说过，全国不过4、5千个右派。”At the time, Qi was working as a secretaire in the Political Secretary Office (Zhengzhi mishushi 政治秘书室) of the Secretariat of the Central Committee; Ye Yonglie also confirmed this number of 4,000 in his book, specifically located in Mao's handwritten comment to a Central instruction issued on June 29th; Ye Yonglie, *Fanyoupai yundong shimo*, 263.

24 Mao, *Shiqing zhengzai qi bianhua*. Corresponding sentences: “所谓百分之一、百分之三、百分之五到百分之十的右派是一种估计，可能多些，可能少些。在各个单位内情况又互相区别，必须确有证据，实事求是，不可过分，过分就是错误。 [The so-called one percent, three percent, and five to ten percent of rightists are a kind of estimation, maybe more, maybe less. The situation varies between each work unit; there must be evidence, seek truth from facts, it should not be excessive, excessive is a mis-

take.]”

25 Zuzhi Liliang Fanji Youpai Fenzi De Changkuang Jingong. Corresponding line: “整个过程，做得好，有一个月左右就够了，然后转入和风细雨的党内整风。”

26 Mao, Yijiuwuqi Nian Xiaji De Xingshi. Corresponding line: “最后不能转变的那一部分资产阶级右派分子是死硬派，只要他们不当特务，不再进行破坏活动，也给他们一点事做，也不剥夺他们的公民权。这是鉴于许多历史事件采取了极端政策的后果，并不良好。”

27 Qi, Qi Benyu huiyilu, chapter 5. Liu Shaoqi, at the time the Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and the Vice-Chairman of the Central People’s Government, generally can be seen as the second in command in CPC for political affairs.

28 “Deng Xiaoping yu zhonggong bada 邓小平与中共八大 [Deng Xiaoping and the 8th Congress of CPC],” Deng Xiaoping Jinian Wang.

29 Maurice Meisner, *Mao’s China and After*, 3rd ed. (New York: The Free Press: 1999), 170.

30 Yen-lin Chung, “The Witch-Hunting Vanguard: The Central Secretariat’s Roles and Activities in the Anti-Rightist Campaign,” 392. Important Note: After the 8th Congress, the previous Secretariat of the Central Committee (Zhongyang shujichu 中央书记处) was renamed the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Zhongyang zhengzhiju changweihui 中央政治局常委会), and the new Central Secretariat had a different role, as described by Chung.

31 Qi, Qi Benyu huiyilu, chapter 7. Corresponding sentences: “据我当时在办公室听到的情况，刘少奇、邓小平和彭真他们就说，主席在最高国务会议讲话，没有经过讨论就出去了，以往什么事情都是先党内后党外，毛主席这次是先党外后党内外了...”

- 32 Ye, Fanyoupai yundong shimo, 52.
- 33 Beijing Daxue Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui, Beijing daxue youpai fenzi fandong yanlun Huiji, 240. Corresponding sentence: “我前次曾经说过80%的高级干部不同意百花齐放，这不是没有根据的，这是毛主席自己说。”
- 34 Shen Zihua, Sikao yu xuanze: cong zhishifenzi huiyi dao fanyoupai yundong, 483-490.
- 35 Wu, Xinde tansuo he Zhengfeng fanyou, 109.
- 36 Ibid, 79, 112.
- 37 Shen Zihua, Sikao yu xuanze: cong zhishifenzi huiyi dao fanyoupai yundong, 517.
- 38 Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, vol.1, Contradictions Among the People (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 248- 249.
- 39 Qi, Qi Benyu huiyilu, chapter 7.
- 40 Yinghong Cheng, “Quota, Class, and Political Violence in Mao’s China,” Journal of Chinese History (2023): 16.
- 41 Cui Jianfei 崔建飞, “Mao Zedong wutan Wang Meng zuzhibu xinlai de qingnianren 毛泽东五谈王蒙《组织部新来的青年人》 [Mao Zedong’s five talks on Wang Meng’s (novel) The New Comer of Organization Department],” The Great Wall 长城 no.2 (2006), reprinted in The History of the People’s Republic of China,
- 42 Sociology was banned as a subject of teaching in the 1950s. However, scholars still retained some freedom in their research. Many continued their work under the guise of other subjects, such as ethnology. Fei was an active supporter of the Hundred Flowers Movement, as this campaign granted him greater autonomy in conducting research and facilitating discussions. He never publicly criticized Mao or the Communist Party, and maintained some friendship with

Mao. Therefore, if Party Members in charge strictly adhered to Mao's definition, Fei would not have been a target of the Anti-Rightist Campaign.

43 "Fei Xiaotong fangtanlu 费孝通访谈录 [Interviews with Fei Xiaotong]," *Southern Weekly*, April 28, 2005, reprinted in Ai Sixiang 爱思想, accessed on October 22nd, 2023, <http://www.aisixiang.com/data/68377.html>. Corresponding lines are: "不要紧, 右派有什么关系。我自己戴多少帽子啊。" "帽子戴上去, 会飞掉的。"

44 Sebastian Veg, "Testimony, History and Ethics: From the Memory of Jiabiangou Prison Camp to a Reappraisal of the Anti-Rightist Movement in Present-Day China," *The China Quarterly* 218 (June 2014): 528- 530.

45 Can refer to Shen and MacFarquhar's publications.

46 The exact number may slightly vary due to difference in ways of interpretation, but generally, the patterns should remain unchanged.

47 This number excludes students from other universities and staff members

48 Beijing Daxue Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang Jiaoyu Weiyuanhu, *Beijing daxue youpai fenzi fandong yanlun huiji*, 118-120.

49 "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu duidai dangqian dangwai renshi piping de zhishi 中共中央关于对待当前党外人士批评的指示 [Directives of the CCPCC on how to treat criticism from personages outside the party]," (1957, May 16th), in Song Yongyi et al. eds., *Chinese Anti-Rightist Campaign Database, 1957—*, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: University Service Centre for China Studies, 2013), <http://chinamovement.net/Default.aspx>. English translation of original title adopted from the database content translation. Corresponding lines: "从揭露出来的事实看来... 党员评级、评薪、提拔

和待遇等事均有特权，党员高一等，党外低一等。党员盛气凌人，非党员做小媳妇。学校我党干部教员助教讲师教授资历低，学问少，不向资历高学问多的教员教授诚恳学习，反而向他们摆架子。以上情况，虽非全部，但甚普遍。”

50 Ibid, 28. Corresponding line: “看来我们亲爱的毛泽东同志处于十分困难的地位。”

51 Ibid, 19.

52 Beijing Daxue Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang Jiaoyu Weiyuanhu, Beijing daxue youpai fenzi fandong yanlun huiji, 6, 65.

53 Zhao Qian 赵谦 et al., “Beijing daxue xuesheng zifade tiechu shubaizhang dazibao 北京大学学生自发的贴出数百张大字报，要求学校积极开展整风 [Peking University students put up hundreds of posters spontaneous, requiring schools to actively carry out rectification],” Neibu cankao (Internal Reference), May 23rd, 1957, in Song Yongyi, Chinese Anti-Rightist Campaign Database; Big Character Posters (Dazibao 大字报): This is a method of public expression that originated from the May 19th Student Movement. Typical Dazibao would feature sharp and critical text, ideally displayed on walls that attract the most attention within the work unit. From 1957 to 2000, it was the most common form of protest.

54 Shen Zihua, Sikao yu xuanze: cong zhishifenzi huiyi dao fanyoupai yundong, 602-603.

55 Mao Zedong 毛泽东, “Zhongguo gongchandang shi quanzhongguo renmin de lingdao hexin 中国共产党是全中国人民的领导核心 [The CPC is the leading core of all Chinese people],” in Mao Zedong xuanji: Diwujian 毛泽东选集：第五卷 [The Fifth Volume of Selected Works of Mao Zedong](Shanghai: People’s Press, 1977), 430. Correspond-

ing paragraph: “你们的会议开得很好…中国共产党是全中国人民的领导核心。没有这样一个核心，社会主义事业就不能胜利。你们这个会议是一个团结的会议，对全中国青年会有很大的影响。我对你们表示祝贺。同志们，团结起来，坚决地勇敢地社会主义的伟大事业而奋斗。一切离开社会主义的言论行动是完全错误的。”

56 Qi, Qi Benyu huiyilu, chapter 7. Corresponding sentences: “邓小平主持党的工作，大量材料，包括一些不正常的情况，很快就从党内渠道报送到主席这里来了。主席一时也弄不清哪些是真的，哪些是假的。”

57 Chen Xiaonong 陈晓农 eds., Chen Boda zuihou koushu huiyi 陈伯达最后口述回忆 [Chen Boda's last verbal memoir] (Hong Kong: Sun Global Publishing Hong Kong Limited, 2005), 148. Original lines: “当时北京大学出现了许多大字报，新华社和北京大学党委向中央反映，认为情况严重，说是北大已成了海德公园了” ; At the time, “Hyde Park” was commonly used by Party Members to describe the chaotic bourgeoisie politics.

58 Yu Dunkang 余敦康, Gei wuhan daxue Zhang Shouzheng de xin 给武汉大学张守正的信 [A Letter to Zhang Shouzheng of Wuhan University], 20 May 1957, in Song Yongyi, Chinese Anti-Rightist Campaign Database. Corresponding sentence: “我们不提倡这个形式，因为它不好，但如果有人贴大字报，我们也不禁止。”

59 Zhao Qian et al., “Beijing daxue xuesheng zifade tiechu shubaizhang dazibao.”

60 Yu Dunkang, Gei wuhan daxue Zhang Shouzheng de xin.

61 Zhao Qian et al., “Beijing daxue xuesheng zifade tiechu shubaizhang dazibao.”

62 Beijing Daxue Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang Jiaoyu Weiyuanhu, Beijing daxue youpai fenzi fandong yanlun huiji, 97.

63 Wang Guoxiang 王国乡, "Beijing daxue minzhu yundong jishi 北京大学民主运动纪事 [Chronicles of Peking University pro-democracy events]," (1957, June 3rd) in Song Yongyi, Chinese Anti-Rightist Campaign Database.

64 "Beida bufen xuesheng jianchi kongsuhui- Jiang Longji yixihua zai beida xuesheng zhong you yinqile xinde fengbo 北大部分学生坚持控诉会——江隆基一席话在北大大学生中又引起了新的风波 [Some students at Beijing University uphold the accusation meeting- Jiang Long Ji's remarks at Beijing University caused new controversy]," Neibu cankao 内部参考 (Internal Reference), May 27th, 1957, in Song Yongyi, Chinese Anti-Rightist Campaign Database.

65 Lei Peng 雷朋, "Beijing daxue biamian xingshi siqu huanhe, dan shitai zheng yunniang kuoda 北京大学表面形势似趋缓和, 但事态正酝酿扩大 [The situation at Beijing University relaxing on surface, yet the situation fermenting the expansion]," Neibu cankao 内部参考 (Internal Reference), May 27th, 1957, in Song Yongyi, Chinese Anti-Rightist Campaign Database.

66 Chen Xiaonong eds., Chen Boda zuihou koushu huiyi, 148. Corresponding line: "没什么大不了的, 不值得大惊小怪。"

67 Lin Ke 林克, Lin Ke riji 林克日记 [Lin Ke's diary] (manuscript), 42, quoted in Shen Zhihua, Sikao yu xuanze: cong zhishifenzi huiyi dao fanyoupai yundong, 608.

68 Wang, "Beijing daxue minzhu yundong jishi." Corresponding lines: "无政府状态" and "被反革命分子所控制"

69 Mac Farquhar and Shen Zhihua had made much analysis on this transition.

70 Mao, Zuzhi liliang fanji youpai fenzi de changkuang jingong.

71 Wang Ge 王戈, Wang Zuoren 王作人, Jiang Longji de zuihou shisnian 江隆基的最后十四年 [The last fourteen

years of Jiang Longji] (Beijing: Writers Publishing House, 2015), 109.

72 Ibid.

73 “Beidajizhongpipanguangchangfandongjitian北大集中批判“广场”反动集团 [Peking University focuses on criticizing the “square” reactionary clique],” Beijing Daily, July 21st, 1957, in Song Yongyi, Chinese Anti-Rightist Campaign Database. Corresponding phrase: “向党进攻.”

74 Ibid. Corresponding line: “要推翻北大党委会.”

75 Ibid.

76 “Beijing daxue xuesheng yiyou yuan yaoqiu xuexiao jiji zhengfeng biancheng dui Hu Feng wenti he Gao Rao shijian zhenxiang de bianlun北京大学学生已由原要求学校积极整风变成对胡风问题和高、饶事件真相的辩论 [The Beijing University Students turned the original request of school active rectification to debate about the truth of the problem of Hu Feng and event of Gao/Rao],” Neibu cankao 内部参考 (Internal Reference), May 24th, 1957, in Song Yongyi, Chinese Anti-Rightist Campaign Database; Hu Feng: A famous leftist literary critic in the Republican Era and Mao Era; Gao Gang: A senior CPC official, originally in charge of the North East Bureau. Rao Shushi: A senior CPC official, originally head of the Organization Department of the CPC. Gao and Rao were purged after failing a political struggle.

77 By this traditional method, I am referring to the non-transparent purging of officials after serious doctrine struggles. People in these cases were usually not charged for committing clearly defined crimes but for taking a wrong ideological and political position.

78 Mao Zedong 毛泽东, Mao Zedong zai bajie erzhongquanhui shang de zongjie fayan毛泽东在八届二中全会上的总结发言 [Mao Zedong’s summary remarks at the second Plenary Session of the Eighth Party Congress], November 5th, 1956, in Song Yongyi, Chinese Anti-Rightist

Campaign Database; Long Yinghua , Wu yijiu yundong shi xinde wusiyundong” . ” [The “May 19 Campaign” is the new May 4 Movement], May 1957, in Song Yongyi, Chinese Anti-Rightist Campaign Database.

79 Ibid. Corresponding sentence: “五·一九’运动, 是新的‘五四’运动, 是现阶段的马克思主义启蒙运动, 它是在‘二十大’号召下产生的, 它是在‘匈牙利革命’号召之下发生的, 它是在我们的‘人大’和英明的党中央和毛主席的一声炮响下发生的…”

80 Mao Zedong 毛泽东, Zai zhongguo gongchandang dibajie zhongyang weiyuanhui dierci quanti huiyi shang de jianghua 在中国共产党第八届中央委员会第二次全体会议上的讲话 [Address to the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China], November 15th, 1956, <https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-19561115.htm>. Original line: “我们一定要警惕, 不要滋长官僚主义作风, 不要形成一个脱离人民的贵族阶层。谁犯了官僚主义, 不去解决群众的问题, 骂群众, 压群众, 总是不改, 群众就有理由把他革掉”

81 Mao, Guanyu zhengque chuli renmin neibu maodun de wenti.

82 Yao Wenyuan, On Revisionism in Some Cultural and Creative Tendencies, quoted in Cai Xiang, Revolution and Its Narratives: China’s Socialist Literacy and Cultural Imaginaries, 1949-1966 (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2016), 119-120.

83 Beijing Daxue Shehui Zhuyi Sixiang Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui, Beijing daxue youpai fenzi fandong yanlun huiji, 3. Corresponding lines: “言归正传, 写下主要论点, 由列宁关于阶级定义出发, 试看现实: 1. 生产资料占有, 主要掌握在军政要人手中——因为并不掌握在群众手中, 一个工人并无权干预生产。2. 分配不合理, 高者有不合劳动应得报酬者… 3. … 4. 对人民不信任… 只要举一例, 就

大字报来说，为什么崔书记态度冷淡...”

84 Criticism and self criticism was an important part of ideal Maoist political participation.