

The Antifederalists Were (Mostly) Right:
An Analysis of Modern American Public Opinion on
the Concerns of The Antifederalists

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	3
Abstract	4
Introduction	5
The Antifederalist Papers	6
<i>Republican Form of Government Over a Large Territory</i>	8
<i>Congressional/State Issues</i>	9
<i>Growth of the Presidency</i>	14
<i>Changing the Constitution</i>	15
Modern Issues and Public Opinion	16
<i>Nationalism</i>	16
<i>Presidentialism</i>	21
<i>Congress/Government Levels</i>	25
<i>Electoral College</i>	28
Methodology	33
<i>Selected Surveys</i>	34
<i>Data Analysis</i>	34
Data and Findings	35
<i>Nationalism</i>	35
<i>Presidentialism</i>	60
<i>Government Levels</i>	71
<i>Electoral College</i>	77
Limitations	82
Conclusion	83
Works Cited	89

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the connection between Antifederalist objections to Constitutional ratification and modern-day public opinion on related topics to see the long-term validity of the Antifederalist claims. Using Pew Research Center data, this study focuses on topics of rural consciousness, nationalism, presidential identity, governmental distance from constituency, and the Electoral College as proxies through which to consider Antifederalist claims. The use of proxies is meant to allow the contextualization of Antifederalist attitudes within a context that will produce meaningful public opinion data. This paper also seeks to find explanatory variables for the trends discovered in the data. The results show that the core ideas behind Antifederalist concerns are still largely present within the American public, specifically related to nationalism, congress being too distant from the constituency, and the Constitution being too difficult to amend. The growth of presidential power making presidential identity unimportant, though, is not present and thus contradict part of Antifederalist claims. This study adds to the field of American politics by taking a novel approach in considering the long-lasting impact of Antifederalism. This group is frequently overlooked and discounted, but this study shows that, perhaps, they deserve to be given more credit for their anxieties than they often are.

Keywords: Antifederalism, Public Opinion, Rural Consciousness, Nationalism, Presidential Power, Congress, Electoral College, Political Science, Michele Margolis, Margolis, Michele

Discipline: American Politics

The Antifederalists, or those that opposed the ratification of the United States Constitution held a variety of beliefs as to why they took issue with the Constitution. At a bare minimum, some believed the document needed more thorough consideration and debate while others believed there were fundamental issues that needed to be fixed before its adoption. This can best be summarized by a quote from Patrick Henry, a famous antifederalist: “my great objection to this Government is, that it does not leave us the means of defending our rights; Or, of waging war against tyrants” (qtd. in Ketcham 203). Yet, others believed that the Constitution should be rejected entirely, and the United States should be governed under a system closer to that outlined in the Articles of Confederation (Klarman 309). Federalists posed these individuals to the public as closeted loyalists who wanted to see the United States returned to British rule or as state office holders who did not want their own power diminished (Klarman 307). However, the diversity of thought within the Antifederalist camp makes it clear that their motivations were not as simple as any of the attacks waged against them. As is obvious, the Antifederalists lost the argument and the Constitution was ratified on June 21, 1788, when New Hampshire became the 9th of the 13 states to ratify it. Rhode Island was the final of the 13 original states to ratify the Constitution on May 29, 1790, with the Bill of Rights being added in 1791.

Dissatisfaction with the government and how it was framed, though, did not end with the Antifederalists. It has continued throughout United States history, as early as the start of the Democratic-Republican Party in 1792. Interestingly though, this party, which began as a rebellion of sorts against the idea of not having strong political parties, became the dominant political faction until 1825, even leading to the downfall of the Federalists (Heidenreich 330). A more modern example is that of the Tea Party Movement that came to rise after the election of President Barack Obama in 2008 and gained prominence on Tax Day 2009 (Madestam, et al.

1633). There will never be full assent within a republican form of government. Disagreement, debate, and compromise are cornerstones of the democratic process and without them, no true democracy would exist. But the question exists if, at the core, the issues that Americans have today with the government are in line with the fears of the Antifederalists. And if so, do they follow certain demographic and partisan lines or are they dispersed throughout the voting aged population evenly?

This paper begins with an account of the central antifederalist arguments. I use these points to make connections to 21st century issues that thematically match. The following section is a literature of these modern issues that leads to the hypothesized results for each issue. Next, there is the public opinion data analysis. Polling data from Pew Research Center is the primary source of data to show that four of the five areas of interest provide support for the idea that the Antifederalist concerns have manifested in modern American Politics. Regression analysis is run to see if there are any demographic trends in the results. Finally, I conclude with the implications on modern American politics and future areas of research that should be explored.

The Antifederalist Papers

The *Antifederalist Papers* were published after the final version of the Constitution was agreed upon by the Founding Fathers but prior to its ratification. This would date them post-1787 and into the early 1790s. Unlike the Federalists who actively collaborated to publish the *Federalist Papers*, the *Antifederalist Papers* were written by a variety of anonymous men who had little, if any communication with each other. It was not an organized effort; instead, it was various authors who published in a variety of locations and formats, such as newspapers and pamphlets (Historical Society of the New York Courts). What they coalesced around was a belief

that the Federalist goals were “the lust of ambitious men” (Ketcham xxvi). The push for big government only bolstered this claim in the eyes of the Antifederalists.

As such, there is no canonical list of the papers and until the mid-1900s there was no published compilation of the papers. Below is an analysis of the papers that are generally considered to be the most important when looking at specific objections as opposed to overall philosophical ones (Ketcham xxiv). Ketcham even explains the ordering in his compilation as being meant to tell a story of the evolution of Antifederalist political thought (Ketcham xxiv). However, it is an incomplete account of the entirety of antifederalist thought at the time. This is a limitation, but with the similarities in concerns across the various groups of papers being used, it is clear that these ideas were quite prevalent. Furthermore, with being the most influential papers, there is likely to be some modern reasoning for this distinction; perhaps that the ideas are similar to modern concerns.

The Federalist papers, contrastingly, were written by a prearranged group of men, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. There was a total of 85 essays published across *The New York Journal*, *Independent Journal*, *New York Advertiser*, and *Daily Advertiser* with some cross publication depending on the paper. This was an attempt to persuade the public to accept the newly signed Constitution and to encourage the process of ratification. At this point, the Antifederalists had already begun their writing and the Federalists saw a need to defend their choices to the public (Lloyd).

The selected concerns for this research are varied, yet needs to be in order to give a well-rounded picture of Antifederalist dissent. The ability of representatives to connect with their constituency, potential issues with a democratic republican form of government, difficulty to amend the Constitution, and the inevitable growth of the presidency are the focuses of this

research. These will be translated into the modern context through an examination of, approval over different levels of government to assess the ability of Congress to connect to constituencies compared to local government and state government, nationalist ideology in multiple contexts, of the difficulty to change the Constitution by using the Electoral College as a proxy, and presidentialism and if people think the identity of the president actually has an impact.

Republican Form of Government Over a Large Territory

The next major concern is that of a republican democracy being able to effectively govern a large territory. A republican democracy is a governmental structure where the people vote for representatives who then vote on laws and other major topics. This is unlike direct democracy where every person has a vote in every decision. A republican democracy relies on the elected representatives making the best decision for their constituents. This results in a very small number of people making all crucial decisions for the entire population. It is important to frame this within the fact that the antifederalists had an issue with a republican democracy being used for only the 13 original states. Today that seems laughable, but there was no easy form of communication or travel so faith was being put in this system when there was no way for states to contact federal officials immediately.

Different antifederalists had different views on why, but one thing was very clear: “a very extensive territory cannot be governed on the principles of freedom” (qtd. in Ketcham 249). Centinel expressed that “a republican, or free government can only exist where the body of the people are virtuous, and where property is equally divided” (qtd. in Ketcham 236). This created an issue on two fronts. First, if there is a fundamental concern with corruption and personal benefit from holding seats in government, there is the implicit belief that these people will not be virtuous. Extending this to the common person who had no reason to not be self-interested,

expecting virtuosity was an unrealistic standard. Also, nobody was under the illusion that property was equally divided. Between slavery and the way land was held by select families and passed down within families, there was far from equal property division. These together mean that according to Centinel, there would need to be a massive overhaul of society more broadly before a free republican government could even be entertained as an option. Regardless of his other opinion, this would completely rule out ratifying the Constitution in good faith.

Brutus was of the belief that “One government and general legislation alone, never can extend equal benefits to all parts of the United States” (qtd. in Ketcham 275). This touches upon the issue of state governments not having enough power and the federal government not understanding the needs of all parts of the country. The needs of Rhode Island, for example, were very different than those of Virginia than those of Georgia. This can also be said for today, but it is undeniable that the regional differences that existed back then made it hard to imagine any legislation being mutually beneficial. Not only would this result in significant portions of the population always being unhappy, but it would not best serve the populations that needed it. Farmers would always see themselves as being overshadowed by the cosmopolitan elites, and vice versa.

Congressional/State Issues

One of the most central themes in *The Antifederalist Papers* has to do with concerns about Congress. These can be divided into the sub-issues of broad congressional concerns and concerns with the branches of congress. Fears about Congress as an institution centered around the amount of power that they had. There was the overwhelming fear that “the powers vested in Congress...[would] annihilate and absorb the legislative, executive, and judicial, powers of the several states” (qtd. in Ketcham 250). The Framers intentionally placed the Legislative branch

first in the Constitution, under Article I. This was due to the amount of power that was being placed in their hands, and therefore, close to the people. At this point, in history, the House of Representatives was the only directly elected part of the national government, so by giving them a share of most of the power and obligations, the people likely saw this as being more closely connected to them and their conscious choices (History of the House). Additionally, the senate was created with the express goal of state rights and minority interests (Origins and Development, U.S. Senate).

But the antifederalists saw this as being too liberal and too trusting that Congress would not abuse their power. They may be a larger group of people than any other branch, but that did not prevent them from being more focused on “private interest and ambition” than community and thus resulting in a permanent aristocracy (*Cato* qtd. in Ketcham 236, 242). This fear was reasonable and understandable given the history of despotic, tyrannical rule by the British monarchy.

Yet, being independent from the British monarchy would not stop the same aristocracy from developing in the United States. This was emphasized by asking that the people “must recollect how disproportionately the democratic and aristocratic parts of the community group were represented” (*Letters from a Federal Farmer* qtd. in Ketcham 273). It is impossible to ignore how all the Framers were landowning, elite, white men. Nobody outside of the upper echelons of society had any say in the way the government was structured, yet those men claimed to represent all people that the government deemed worthy of representation. Yet, they were aristocrats themselves and were the exact sect that they were concerned about having too much power. The antifederalists were elites too, and that cannot be ignored, but they at least recognized it and wanted the people to notice the hypocrisy. How could a democratic

government for all be designed by men who were elites and did not know the concerns of common people? The antifederalists did not claim to know the answer or offer an alternative, but they believed it was a flaw and wanted people to recognize it.

Another prominent argument was the fear of a strong federal government at the expense of state governments. Federalism, or the system under which there is a strong central government along with smaller state governments, would inevitably result in a stronger centralized government and weaker state governments. It was baked into the Constitution. The antifederalists took issue with the implied faith in federal officials and asked, “Why should the citizens not trust their state governments, to a certain degree, but have faith that the power-hungry federal officials who are out of touch with the average citizen does not need to be reined in just the same” (John DeWitt qtd. in Ketcham 332-333). People would be significantly more familiar with their state officials than federal ones. Federal officials could be seen as wanting more for their career than the people they represent. State officials have less incentive in their positions and have less opportunity to benefit themselves. The idea that people were supposed to be more suspicious of their state officials despite this, struck the antifederalists as being a sign of an issue with the government structure. This connection with state officials versus federal officials is still true today, even with improved communication and travel.

Transitioning to issues directly with the Senate and the House, the first and perhaps most important concern is that of the amount of representation in Congress. There were two central proposals for this structure before the current system of Congress came to be. First, there was the Virginia Plan that proposed a bicameral legislature, like we have today, but with both houses allocating state representation based on population. This would have favored the larger states and was seen as unacceptable to smaller states. The alternative was the New Jersey Plan which

proposed a unicameral legislature where all states, regardless of size, would have the same number of representatives. This, unsurprisingly, was seen as unacceptable to larger states. The system known as the Connecticut Plan, or the Great Compromise, was the ultimate form of congressional organization laid out in the Constitution and remains the system used today. There is a bicameral legislature which consists of proportional representation in the lower house (House of Representatives) and equal representation in the upper house (Senate).

Despite the compromise, different antifederalists took issue with the organization of Congress for various reasons. In *Cato V*, it is expressed that “it is a very important objection to this government, that the representation consists of so few; too few to resist the influence of corruption and their temptation of treachery” (qtd. in Ketcham 340). He does not go on to explain his solution to this problem, be it a larger House or more Senators for each state. Based upon his view that representation as a whole is inadequate it would not be impossible to imagine Cato wanted both houses to be expanded. He would likely see it as being best to have as many people as possible involved to thwart any possible corruption that might arise. This matches earlier concerns about dishonesty in government and the fear of officials using their positions to only benefit themselves.

Patrick Henry was instead concerned about what the structure of the House meant for small states: “the number [of representatives] might be reduced so much [by Congress], that some States should have no Representative at all” (qtd. in Ketcham 202). The Constitution leaves the process by which to expand House size and determine the number for each state open in a way that theoretically each small state under a certain size could have been given only one representative each. It would benefit large states to minimize the representation of small states and Henry feared the lack of explicit regulation preventing this from happening. This is a

fundamentally different objection than in Cato since it deals with the democratic process within itself. But it is not that different since it still deals with the issue of government officials using their positions to help themselves.

The man who wrote under the pseudonym Centinel was not happy with how either branch of Congress was to be organized. He believed that the House would be too small and incapable of dealing with local problems while escaping corruption and simultaneously thought that the Senate was unequal and contributed to a future of aristocracy (qtd in. Ketcham 241). This is a unique position as, generally, the framers and societal elites were content with the Connecticut Compromise, which established the bicameral legislature. It was not seen as a win for anybody, necessarily, but seen as an alternative to endless infighting between small and large states. Centinel found issues with both houses and did not see either as being a permanent solution to the issues that the Confederation of States was facing. However, he did not offer solutions either. This is not common throughout *The Antifederalist Papers*. Normally, there is some alternative offered or some suggestions made, but here Centinel focuses on explaining the issues as opposed to coming up with solutions.

In fact, no solutions regarding Congress are offered up. This seems to be an issue that even though the opposed what was proposed, Antifederalists did not necessarily know what the alternative would be. The structure was already set up for Congress and perhaps they did not see an easy fix that would be persuadable. It is not outside the scope of reason to think that suggesting an entirely different body than the one proposed by the Framers would not be supported. Antifederalists already risked being seen as traitors so trying to dismantle a core piece of the newly structured government would not have been advantageous.

Growth of the Presidency

Presidential power was certainly an area of concern for the antifederalists, but less fervently than other issue areas. The major issue revolved around the assumption that “the president cannot represent you because he is not of your own immediate choice” (Cato qtd. in Ketcham 337). This connects to the broad antifederalist sentiment that the government who is meant to be representative of the people should be elected directly by the people. The electoral college was not binding like it is today. So thus, electors could go against the popular vote of their state if they determined that it was “necessary”. This made it impossible for the antifederalists to even have the illusion that the president would be directly elected. Compare this to senators being chosen by the state governments. The state governments were directly elected, so it could be said that they are executing the will of the people they represent when picking senators. To modern Americans this might seem absurd, but it was a valid argument at the time. If the electoral college was structured similarly, the antifederalists might not have raised this issue.

Further, another concern about the structure of the presidency and the possibility for a massive growth of power was the “improper connection” between the Senate and the President (Cato qtd. in Ketcham 341). This fear was mostly on the basis that with the two institutions being so connected, how will there ever be true checks and balances? Could the people trust that any necessary impeachment proceeding would be held justly and correctly? Would Senate be an “impartial judicature” (Cato qtd. in Ketcham 341)? These were all issues in the minds of antifederalists when looking at the structure of the presidency. All of this would breed a system where elites were rewarded, and a new aristocracy would form within a system that was meant to be democratic and represent everybody.

Changing the Constitution

Changing the Constitution was designed to be hard. This was purposeful by the Framers in order to avoid any tyrannical leaders or members of federal government from taking advantage. But to the antifederalists, this difficulty went beyond what was needed to ensure adequate protection. To them it set unrealistic standards. John DeWitt wrote in his third paper that, “to obtain that majority of 3/4 to any one single alteration, essentially affecting this or any other state, amounts to an absolute impossibility” (qtd. in Ketcham 194). While he did not directly state this, it is likely that DeWitt predicted the need to update the Constitution over time, including in times of crisis. The original 13 states were cohesive enough to come together to draft the Constitution but there were massive differences regionally. The biggest of which being slavery. The Framers knew slavery was going to be an issue later, as can be seen in the Three-Fifths Compromise, for example, and with the simple existence of slavery. DeWitt and other antifederalists may not have been thinking about the slavery issue explicitly, but it gives an example of the way that amending the Constitution was predictable at the time of ratification. So it makes sense that seeing ¾ of states agreeing to any single change would be seen as setting up the country for failure. This links back to the idea a democratic republican form of government being potentially problematic. It would be particularly difficult to get ¾ of the country to agree on something when interests are not the same from region to region, or even state to state. Having such diversity in thought and needs contributes to the success of a country, but when there is a ¾ consent requirement to make any major change, it would be difficult to see this being a system that stands the test of time.

DeWitt reasoned that “a bare majority in these four small States may hinder the adoption of amendments; So that we may fairly unjustly conclude that one-twentieth part of the American

people, may prevent the removal of the most grievous inconveniences and oppression, by refusing to accede to amendments” (qtd. in Ketcham 205). This not only explains the logic behind his stance being that a very small minority could force the will of the whole country but reckons back to the fear of a strong centralized government, with officials not directly elected, having too much power. Fear of tyranny and the will of the minority being ignored was a consistent theme throughout the Antifederalist Papers. Both the good and the bad of the system the Framers created is the way our republican democracy gives equal power, in some situations, to all states regardless of population. In the context of constitutional change, this presents an unequal power dynamic within the states. The small states, as a result, have outsized power. While this was not necessarily perfectly foreseeable in the modern context, as it would have required the understanding of how the population would grow and be geographically distributed, there was certainly some portent of it in the population distribution of colonial America.

Modern Issues and Public Opinion

The concerns of the Antifederalists cannot be directly transposed onto the modern context of the 21st century. The political, social, and economic conditions are far too different to draw a direct comparison. There would also be an issue with finding public opinion data that would be adequate. In order to solve this issue, modern issues with the same core issue as presented by the Antifederalists will be the subject of public opinion data. This will allow the data to show whether or not the broad concern and theme is relevant instead of looking at the exact wording and context that the Antifederalists anticipated in the late 1700s.

Nationalism

Nationalism, especially in the United States, can take many forms. In this research there will be a focus on rural consciousness, or the idea that there is something unique about living in a

rural area that suburban and urban dwellers cannot understand, and exclusionary nationalism that promotes American interests and excludes anything and anybody that is not seen as American.

This will be able to give insight as to if the Antifederalists were correct that one unified democratic republic cannot effectively rule such a large geographic area and population.

Rural consciousness is a specific form of nationalism. At its core is the belief that “decision makers routinely ignore rural places and failed to give rural communities their fair share of resources” (Cramer 5). This of course would create resentment and a feeling of being valued less than other citizens. This resentment comes a perceived lack of power compared to city dwellers. And this occurs on many issues; it is not restricted to areas that would seemingly be directly impacted by being rural vs. urban (Cramer 60). It is also not just that rural residents feel as if their interests are not protected, they also do not think their concerns are being heard by those in power (Cramer 65). This adds the element of choosing not to listen, not just ignoring their needs. It is easy to see how over time and generationally this would create the feeling of being ignored and left behind that would lead to resentment.

One cannot dismiss how strongly rural citizens identity with being a rural citizen. There are of course many social group identities, but it was found by Cramer that “[people] in rural areas used identities rooted in place and class...” (Cramer 6). Class cannot be dismissed as a part of the rural identity given that rates of poverty in rural areas is higher than in urban areas, especially for racial minorities (Rural Health Information Hub). Identities related to place though are more complicated. They generally function on the core belief that rural residents are proud of where they live despite the stereotypes that city dwellers have of them (Cramer 66). And moreover, the presence of these stereotypes makes urban residents unqualified to make decisions that impact the lives of rural communities (Cramer 67). This fundamental divide between rural and urban

residents creates an idea that there are two types of Americans. Even if this is an incidental effect of rural consciousness, it is clearly an important one.

The perception of two Americas is especially prevalent when looking at how rural residents view hard work. Hard work is seen by rural residents as a necessary component of life given the economic realities they face. As well, non-hardworking people are lazy and undeserving of respect and public support (Cramer 72). This may read as harsh, but it is similar to the common adage of pulling yourself up by your bootstraps. If you are not willing to help yourself then you are not deserving of the help of others. This is a central idea to the greatness of America: anybody can make anything of themselves if they try hard enough. Rural people see this as a necessary part of life and something that urban residents do not have the same appreciation for. This contributes to a substantial divide in the thought process of who deserves what and what parts of the country are not given their fair share.

Antifederalists would think it impossible for rural communities as well as more urban communities to both be happy and well served. Their interests are far too different on many fronts. This, along with the idea that rural life creates a unique set of thought processes, illustrates the fear that a diverse country could never be effectively governed by a democratic republic. No group will get everything they need, and the compromise required will leave no group adequately assisted. This leads to the idea that due to the massive impact of rural consciousness and the overruling impact of this group identity, rural residents would align most with Antifederalist attitudes. More specifically, **H₁**: *Residents of rural communities, regardless of demographics, will view rural communities as underfunded. As well, they will see suburban and urban communities as being overfunded while those residents will see the level of aid as*

more fair. This trend will be strengthened as age increases due to the amount of time that people have dealt with the consequences of over/underfunding.

A more traditional, exclusionary form of nationalism is engrained in the American psyche without citizens even knowing it. Much of what children are taught to be nationalism is more aligned with patriotism: being proud to be an American and being lucky to live here. Nationalism though is also impressed from a young age. We are, realistically, taught a “mythical” version of the United States’ history, role in international politics, our existing societal structures, and economic system. Core to this system is the idea that questioning the past or present actions of the country means you hate America (Lieven 2). Lieven traces this back to how Americans have a “quasi-religious veneration for the Constitution and the founders” that does not allow us to reflect on the changing needs of our society and the consequences of actions taken by the founders as well as the inability to question the United States’ “sinfulness” (Lieven 2, 53).

There are generally considered to be two core elements to American nationalism: (1) The American Creed, or “the set of great democratic, legal, and individualist beliefs and principles on which the American state and constitution are founded”, and (2) the American antithesis where nationalistic pride stems from ethnoreligious roots (Lieven 6-7). The major issue is with the latter. This type of ethnoreligious motivated action is normally seen as a thing of the past, such as the Trail of Tears, Chinese exclusion, Japanese internment, etc. However, this ethnoreligious framework is central to today’s radical conservatives, such as the Christian right or the Tea Party (Lieven 8). This only leads to hatred of certain groups both within the country and outside of it. Immigrants get targeted as well as other countries are framed as inherently or impossible of working with. The United States is thus protected as being the best country in the world and the exemplar of democratic values and systems without acknowledging the internal flaws that the

United States has (Lieven 47). Not only does this create internal division between ethnoreligious groups, but it also creates division between people that believe and don't believe such rhetoric. There is no way for all groups to be happy with the same policies as their politics are so different.

This rhetoric was especially powerful during the election of 2016 when "findings revealed a fear that American global dominance was in danger" (Chokshi). 2016 is far from the first time this has been the case, and in fact led to many of the nationalistic policies discussed above. However, this time, it was combined with the "a subset of primarily younger and well-educated Americans lack[ing] any strong form of patriotic sentiment; [while] a larger class, primarily older and less well educated, embrace every form of nationalist sentiment" (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 949). Further divide was created among age and education lines and as such, people began to see other demographic groups as the not being proud to be an American. Older and lower educated Americans could see younger individuals as hating America while the young people see themselves as simply acknowledging the flaws of the United States and finding it hard to be particularly patriotic about. There also appears to be a partisan divide that implies different factors matter for each major party. Bonikowski and DiMaggio suggest that "the most ardent nationalists tend to statistically be white men with only a high school education. They also tend to be Evangelical, or highly religious, older, and strong Republicans. The young, more highly educated, and self-identified Democrats tended to be overwhelmingly less nationalistic" (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 959-961). It's clear here that this is a vast generalization, but Republicans are more nationalistic than Democrats. Even though education and age can impact the amount of nationalism, the partisan trends are present.

As such, this leads into **H₂**: *Republicans with college or advanced degrees will have about the same, or a slightly higher, view of the United States as do Republicans with a college degree or less. For Democrats, those with less education will have a more favorable view of the United States. However, for Democrats there will also be an age factor where younger Democrats aged 18-29 will have a much lower view of the United States than any other age group.* This hypothesis begins with the preliminary assumption that the parties will fundamentally be different. But within this assumption, there is still the factor that education is extremely important in both groups. As well, it would be remiss to not take into consideration the age effect for nationalism, especially within the already less nationalistic group. Antifederalists be aligned with the idea that there would be a division between different groups in terms of nationalism. Those that are best served by the actions of the democratic republic will be more nationalistic and those who feel like their interests are ignored and want change will be less proud to be American.

Presidentialism

The president was not meant to have the amount of power he has today. The founders intended for Congress to have the vast majority of the power. However, it was not too long after the ratification of the Constitution that presidential power began to grow. Andrew Jackson was the first to truly expand the presidency. It could be said that he embodied the fears of Antifederalists that the president would become an elected king. Jackson was known as “King Andrew the First” by critics, mostly due to his disregard for congress in terms of military action and the debate over the Bank of the United States (Yoo 106). He set a precedent for the executive branch being co-equal to Congress as well as the president interpreting the Constitution and not deferring to Congress or the courts to do so (Yoo 150-151).

The next major shift to presidential power came during the Civil War. Lincoln, admittedly, went beyond the constitutional bounds of presidential power in order to preserve the union. The largest of these was the way he subverted Congress and acted unilaterally when Congress was out of session. This was an issue due to it being Congress's responsibility to declare war, yet Lincoln enacted a military blockade against the South, which is generally considered an act of war (Savage 17). This did not have as long-lasting effects as Jackson's actions since it was seen as an exceptional time that could allow for exceptional actions. If the circumstances had been different, it is unimaginable that Lincoln would not have been impeached.

Theodore Roosevelt, on the other hand, did take a stance that had permanent consequences. He was the first president to outwardly declare that the president had the right to do anything that he was not explicitly forbidden from doing. This became known as the theory of inherent power (Savage 17). This would allow many later presidents to expand the powers of the presidency simply by the precedent set. Interestingly, it could be said that without this precedent, Franklin Roosevelt would not have been able to have such sweeping policies enacted for the New Deal.

Post-World War II and into the Cold War is considered to be when the modern era of the presidency began. It is often characterized by the "the 'imperial' power invested in the presidency...[as]these presidents and their men began arguing that the modern world was too dangerous and complex for president's hands to be tied" (Savage 14). There was a substantial rise in unilateral action as seen in Truman saying that the president had the "unwritten power to take the country into a major overseas war on his word alone" and Reagan asserting "it was unconstitutional for Congress to pass laws giving executive branch officials independence from presidential control" (Savage 19, 48). At the time, these were major upheavals, but today they seem as if they were features of the presidency that always existed. No matter the party of the

president, there have been times when these precedents were used to the executive branch's benefit. This is what leads to the question if who the president is really matters or if they all at the same in the long run.

Congress did not sit by and let this happen without a fight, though. Especially after Watergate, congress began passing laws that empowered public scrutiny and required information about intelligence gathering to be shared with the legislative and judicial branches (Savage 89). This represented a big move on congress's part to try to reign in presidential power. While it was not necessarily successful and was too little too late, it was something to be done to temper the presidency. And after Watergate was the perfect time to make this attempt. The public was generally suspicious of the executive branch at that point and would have been receptive to such policies. 9/11, though, also entirely reversed any willingness for the public to allow a limit on presidential power. The Bush administration seized the opportunity of the public wanting protection and "dramatically expand the zone of secrecy surrounding the executive branch" (Savage 93). This was accompanied by an increase in presidential war powers and control over parts of the bureaucracy that still exists today.

More theoretically, there is the idea that as the selection of presidents evolved, such as actively campaigning, the character of presidents and American politics in general changed (Crenson and Ginsberg 43). When looking at the 20th century, there is "the expansion of presidential war and spending powers, the increased prominence of executive orders and other presidential policy instruments, along with the introduction and expansion of regulatory review through the OMB" which led to a massive shift in political power to the presidency (Crenson and Ginsberg 26). This shift, though, did not happen through sheer will alone. Congress had to allow a gap that needed to be filled. Crenson and Ginsberg assert that once Congress was facing

increased polarization and thus was less able to unify, the executive branch was able to come in and take some of the power (Crenson and Ginsberg 31). This may make it seem as if the political system is a competition for who has what and how much power. That would not be entirely incorrect given the way in which the president and Congress are often opposed both politically and in terms of their goals. Even when one party hold both the presidency and both houses of Congress it can be difficult to get things accomplished so what may seem like incidental power can amount to a lot in the long run.

In line with the Antifederalist assumption is, thus, **H3**: *As presidential power has grown over time, the identity of the president will be seen as having less of an impact. People have likely evolved to think that the Institution of the presidency is more important than the President himself. This will be especially true for both Republicans and Democrats with less than a college degree and those who are younger.* This hypothesis is directly related to the Antifederalist sentiment and will be able to either bolster or work against the Antifederalist concerns. Fearing the rise of institutional power and having a de facto king in the presidency, the modern Antifederalists would be those that believe the indemnity of the president does not matter or matters very little. Education and age are hypothesized as being important for different reasons. Education will be impactful on the basis that those with lower education levels will not have the same level of political knowledge and do not have the background knowledge required to understand the evolution of the presidency and the intended role of the presidency. Age connects to disillusionment. Younger people that have more recently aged into the ability to be politically active have not had the time to acclimatize to the system. And unlike older Americans who have seen more presidencies in their lifetimes and have had the chance to see the impact of more presidents firsthand, younger Americans have not experienced as many circumstances

where the identity of the president matters. Instead, they will be more primed to think about the Institution and the difficulty to really change anything.

Congress/Government Levels

Modern public opinion regarding Congress can take many forms. There is a wide variety of subtopics that can be focused on. The topics that best match the Antifederalist concerns are those that concentrate on approval ratings of the entirety of Congress vs. a person's representatives/senators. These are imperfect metrics but will both contribute toward looking at the core concerns presented by Antifederalists.

Fenno's Paradox is the classical explanation for how people compare Congress to congresspeople. Key to this theory is that people "apply different standards of judgment, those that we apply to the individual being less demanding than those we apply to the institution" while simultaneously congresspeople prioritize their constituency and reelection (Fenno). This emphasis on reelection is key. This means that members tend to spend the bulk of their time on constituency relations and arguable not as much time on the legislative process as they should. But also, "they [congresspeople] re-enforce our unfavorable judgments about the institution" in order to promote themselves (Fenno). They simply would not win reelection by going against consistency views on the institution, so this results in them perpetuating the negative perception while allowing themselves to be contrasted with it.

Other scholars look more at the reasoning for why this phenomenon occurs. Parker and Davidson recognized that domestic policy, foreign policy, and the "pace of the legislative process" are key in approval ratings for Congress. These issues though, as systematically seen negatively. It seems that the most salient issues just happen to be those that create negative opinions of the institution. People lay the task of solving these national problems, and more, on

Congress and when they do not do that it reflects extremely poorly, even if it is not the fault of Congress (Parker and Davidson 54-56, 59). People are generally more willing to forgive individual members in this case than the institution. This may be because they recognize that stalemate and inactivity is not the fault of any one person, but it could also be a form of cognitive dissonance where a person does not want to admit that the person they voted for is part of the problem.

In contrast, people tend to evaluate congresspeople as individuals, not on the basis of them doing their job. Public opinion surveys will only ask people about their approval/view of their district's representative or their senators. This automatically leads people to think about the more personal connection they have to these officials than they do with the entirety of Congress. Parker and Davidson showed that "evaluations of representatives tend to be based upon constituency service provided the district and the personal attributes of incumbent" and policy is rarely used when evaluating individuals (Parker and Davidson 56). This makes sense considering the closer connection people have to their representatives and individual senators. Even if this is an illusion, it stands to reason that people would see their representatives as a member of their community and thus have more pride and protective instinct over their reputation as opposed to Congress or other representatives.

Political polarization is also a necessary component. General agreement centers around the idea that partisan conflict within Congress is detrimental to public confidence in Congress (Harbridge and Malhotra 494). Confidence in and approval of Congress are different measures, but it stands to reason that if the public has low confidence in the institution, then they would not approve of it. The only group where this may not be true is within strong partisans in the electorate. They would not want to have as much bipartisanship and would not see partisan

gridlock in such a negative light. If anything, this would incentivize congresspeople to follow the lead of strong partisans and not engage in bipartisanship (Harbridge and Malhotra 495). Living in the current age of decreasing reasons to be bipartisan, this trend is not surprising, yet sheds some light on the view of the median voter who would be more toward the center.

This literature is more subtly connected to the exact variable that will be examined. This research will focus on options of local vs. state vs. the federal government(s) and while there is a lack of literature explicitly on these areas, literature can be extrapolated to the context. If people tend to evaluate congresspeople better than Congress because of their distance from them and the consideration of personhood, it stands to reason that this might apply to different levels of government as well. People can identify more with and have more involvement with their local government than state government and state government than the federal government. The further away that government gets from an individual, like Congress vs. congresspeople, the lower and evaluation could get. This could have many motivations, but the ability to see the people in that sector of government as individuals from their community instead of just cogs in the federal machine is important.

Antifederalist literature tells us that they would envision people as preferring government closer to them as their interests would be better understood and protected. This also connects to the idea that a large republic cannot be governed the same way. **H4** asserts that *among all participants there will be increasingly favorable views for government as the sector of government becomes closer to their everyday lives i.e., local government is more favorable than state government, and state government is more favorable than the federal government. This will be particularly true for those who are younger.* This hypothesis is jointly motivated by the Antifederalist literature as well as public opinion literature that tells us that “younger people tend

to more positive about government” (Section 2: Demographics and American Values). While this means that their overall assessments of local, state, and the federal government should theoretically be higher, it could also mean that there is an expectation that they would be more positive than other age categories about the group they prefer. They also have not had the same amount of time as the other age categories to become cynical about all forms of government.

Electoral College

The Electoral College is a proxy for the difficulty to change the Constitution. Recently, it has become an increasingly salient issue in public consciousness and the news media, but this dissatisfaction with the presidential election system dates back to its conception at the Constitutional Convention. Discussion about presidential elections was put on hold until all other parts of the Constitution had been agreed upon and was described as being “rushed and sloppy” (Foley 27). This is due to the great levels of disagreement that this issue caused. Nobody wanted state delegates to walk out of the discussion entirely because of this issue. It was, and continues to be, undeniably important, but was not worth sacrificing the entire Constitution over. This resulted in a system that was composed entirely of compromise, little federal regulation in terms of electors and enforcement, and ultimately left nobody entirely happy.

The history of the Electoral College is a complex one, but uniquely, it is one of the few United States systems that has had minimal overhaul. Fundamentally, the system evolved from the belief that “people were not qualified to choose the president, because they would be ignorant of candidates or because they would be influenced by demagogic leaders or because they would usually vote for someone from their own state” and as such “a national legislature should elect the national executive” (Johnson 13, 16). This is more understandable in the 1780 context than it is today. Very few people had the extra time to dedicate to political involvement and knowledge.

Mostly elites were involved since they had servants, laborers, and slaves doing the work that often would occupy the time of the lower classes. These elites are also the type of people that would want their interests protected and would end up being electors in the Electoral College. Each state had their own system for picking electors, but it would always be well connected and wealthy elites (Foley 2). This, however, was one reason why some Antifederalists opposed the system and therefore saw the Constitution as unacceptable. Samuel Chase, for example, opposed the Constitution because “the president will not be chosen by the people immediately” (Chase qtd. in Johnson 51). He saw this as being undemocratic and essentially allowing the aristocracy to choose the president without input from the masses and essentially allow him to become a “elected king” (Johnson 54).

The evolution of the Electoral College at the Constitutional Convention can be best explained by providing a brief timeline of the debates that occurred. On June 2, James Wilson of Pennsylvania proposed that states be made into districts and the people vote within these districts to choose the electors who would then cast ballots for the presidency (Johnson 21). This is not an entirely unfamiliar idea to modern Americans although it is obviously not the winning proposal. The Convention reiterated the need for election by “national legislature” on July 26. Interestingly, they also voted for a seven-year terms with no eligibility for a reelection (Johnson 26). The largest part of negotiation occurred between August 31st and September 4th when “a committee consisting of one member from each of the attending eleven states, recommended what became... the institution we know today is the Electoral College” (Johnson 31).

Issues arose almost immediately. Double balloting, or “each elector [being] constitutionally required to vote for two candidates without distinguishing which candidate was preferred for president and which for vice president” showed the flaw in not requiring the distinguishing

between candidates (Johnson 80). It inadvertently resulted in situations, such as the election of 1824, where no candidate got the majority of the votes. The Framers also did not predict the rise of political parties. This resulted in several issues quickly arising: (1) double balloting resulted in unpredictable “electoral anomalies” such as the tie between Burr and Jefferson in 1800, (2) a president and vice president of different parties, (3) the potential for the intended vice-president to end up being president if enough minority party electors voted for him as their second choice (Johnson 88-89). Fundamentally, the Founders saw the Electoral College originally as purely a nominating body and believed it would be difficult to get a majority of elector votes (Johnson 143). However, this was untrue and as a result, it did not work as intended.

The Electoral College did not last long, though, before it was changed by the 12th Amendment. Following the win of Thomas Jefferson against Aaron Burr the 12th Amendment required that all sequent presidential elections be carried out with clear presidential and vice-presidential candidates. This means that electors would have to designate who they were voting for for each office as opposed to the Constitutional system where electors did not differentiate between their two votes. While this change was certainly motivated by “the Republicans’ desire to redesign the Electoral College to assure Jefferson’s victory in 1804” the party also “continued to believe that the very survival of the Republic was at stake” (Foley 29). Having such a major change early on in the history of the country should have signaled that there might be problems with the system later on. Any electoral system was unlikely to be perfect, but considering that this is still the method in effect over 200 years later, it is noteworthy that there has been no other major alteration.

In 1828, after the election of Andrew Jackson, plurality winner takes all election systems became the dominant method in the states. This meant that a person could win a state’s electoral

votes simply by getting a plurality of the popular vote (Foley 50). this changed made under his presidency is interesting considering he was awarded the presidency by the House of Representatives and only received a plurality of the national popular vote himself (Foley 60). The historical implications are interesting to consider. If Jackson had not been elected in this way would the system of changed? Would it have changed later? What other ways might it have evolved These questions can be asked for every election and are important to ask. Yet, this change in particular would possibly be seen by the Antifederalists as taking away what little public input already existed.

This lack of change is certainly not due to perfection. Scholars generally agree that there have been at least three times that the Electoral College has resulted in the winner of the presidency not winning the majority-of-majorities that the Founders intended. These are the elections of 1844, 1884, and 2000 (Foley 49). The 2016 election is also seen as one where the legitimacy of the Electoral College System was thrown into disarray given being another instance where the Electoral College winner won less of the popular vote (Johnson 103). These metrics are of course imperfect and there are certainly other elections that could fit into this category. That highlights the number of problematic elections as opposed to highlighting an issue with the scholarship.

More so, while the President Biden did win a majority-of-majorities in 2020, and technically the system worked as intended, “the 2020 election showed that the traditional bias of the Electoral College toward the election results in battleground states could be taken to a whole new level of political mendacity, frivolous litigation, raw political pressure, and attempted unconstitutional action” (Johnson 131). While these are not issues inherent to the Electoral

College, they are symptoms of larger issues with the current state of American Politics and the way that such an open-ended system can fall victim to political circumstances.

As such, it stands to reason that Antifederalists would take issue with the inability to change the electoral college after so many failures. While it may seem that over the course of more than two centuries there has only been a handful of questionable elections, those elections have ended up being majorly consequential. At a bare minimum the questioning of presidential legitimacy has result in partisan issues and debate and at worse the electoral outcome has had a major impact on the overall direction of the country. The Antifederalists would see this amount of power being taken away from the people and put into the hands of the elite electors. They would see the election of president as more than a game of politics that is to be played by a few, especially when the masses think they are making the choice. While this may be closer to the modern reality of the electoral college, this was certainly not the case historically.

Taking public opinion literature into account, a hypothesis becomes clear. **H₅: Support for the Electoral College is a purely partisan decision with no difference based on age, education, and sex across the parties.** This is based in the 2018 moment that these surveys were taken following the 2016 election. It has been found that “source cues, the political actors behind a policy issue, play an influential role in shaping public opinion” (Nicholson 52). As such, Democrats would be primed to think about Clinton’s loss despite winning the popular vote and Republicans would think about how the Electoral College is the reason Trump won the presidency. Further, there is the consideration that out-party cues are more impactful than in-party cues (Nicholson 64). This means that Democrats would be looking at Republican commentary and forming opinions the opposite of what they are hearing, and vice versa. This combination of factors means that partisan identity and the impact of the Electoral College on

their party would be crucial to the opinion of the Electoral College. There are Democrats and Republicans of all ages, education levels, and both sexes, but with the existing literature that looks at the roles of these factors, none is likely to play as strong a role in this situation as partisanship.

Methodology

In order to assess the prevalence of Antifederalist beliefs in modern day America, existing public opinion polling will be utilized. This data will come from iRoper, a public opinion polling database compiled by Cornell University. This allows pollsters to upload their surveys, questions, results, and raw data if they choose to include it. They have over 800,000 surveys and 23,000 data sets available for use. Prior to selecting data sets, a set of requirements was created in order to assure quality data was used for this project. First, the survey had to have raw data available. This automatically reduced the number of surveys by a substantial amount but having the raw data will allow a deeper dive into the data and allow me to run regressions using demographic data to see if there is any correlation between belief and demographics. That feeds into the second requirement, having at least a couple demographic questions available. This will vary from survey to survey but at least asking about ideology and/or political affiliation will allow some sort of connection to be made to certain demographics. The more information the better, but this is a second priority to the quality of the questions asked. Third, the surveys should be from a high quality, trustworthy source. This will not be a difficult quality to meet given the database being used, but it is a necessary set to assure quality. Finally, the questions themselves need to be adequate. They need to be worded in a non-leading way, have a variety of answer choices, and most importantly, get to the heart of exactly the topic of concern. It is also important that each survey covers multiple topics of interest. There needs to be a reasonable

number of surveys to work with, with 2 being ideal, however, it is also important to cover all topics given that different surveys focus on different content.

Selected Surveys

Two surveys are being utilized as data sources. Both are comprehensive and from Pew Research Center. This means that they cover an extensive amount of topics (not all of which are relevant to this study), have large sample sizes, and provide in depth demographic information. The first survey is called the American Trends Panel Wave 32. It was conducted between February 26, 2018 and March 11, 2018 and was a national sample with 6,251 participants. The survey was conducted online and asked a total of 97 questions in addition to demographic questions. This survey will be used for questions referencing nationalism and the rural-urban divide. The second survey is the March 2018 Political Survey conducted between March 7, 2018 and March 14, 2018. This was also a national survey, but it was over telephone. This resulted in a much smaller sample at 1,466 participants. However, there was a 4.3% and 5.6% response rate (depending on the type of phone). This is important since it shows that a larger sample size was the goal, but telephone interviews are notoriously difficult to have high response rates. There were 59 content questions in addition to demographic questions. This survey will provide data for the presidency, congress, a couple questions about nationalism, and the electoral college.

Data Analysis

All data analysis was conducted within the statistical computing programming language R. A couple clarifications are in order. First, every question of interest involved some recoding. This was done to make the data more digestible and intuitive as well as making the data easier for R to process in a seamless way. For example, all data was originally categorical and need to be made numeric. This involved recoding the lowest response to be “0” and increase in number as

the categories advanced. This allowed averages to be calculated, bar graphs to be made, and regressions to be run. Secondly, the partisanship, sex, age, and education variables were recoded to create binaries, or as close as possible in the case of age. This allowed accuracy in the regression analysis that would not have been possible if the data was left raw.

Data and Findings

Prior to conducting a deep look into the data, it is necessary to situate the time at which these surveys took place. Both were taken at the beginning of 2018. This means that it is essential to remember that it was a year into Donald Trump's presidency and the political situation in the United States was particularly fraught. Having Trump as president is a massive confounding variable and that needs to be mentioned. As will be seen, there are partisan trends with many of the survey results and it is necessary to consider the impact of the Trumpian politics. Trump was a shock to the American political system and motivated both Democrats and Republicans to hold strong in or sometimes change their opinions. He accentuated the divides between the parties and as such it is necessary examine responses under the control of party.

Nationalism

In the case of nationalism, the Y-axis scales differ between the two types of data. First, there is the data concerning federal aid. This includes whether respondents believed a certain community type received a fair share of aid, indicating rural-consciousness attitudes. This requires an extrapolation of the term. Rural residents, in this context, would see themselves as separate from suburban and urban communities. And as such, would evaluate themselves as consistently underfunded, and thus left behind. While suburban and urban residents might also share this view of rural areas, they will have different perspectives of their own communities, showing that rural residents view themselves differently than others view themselves. The scale

ranges from 0 to 2 where a 0 is less than their fair share, 1 is the correct amount of aid, and 2, where a community gets too much federal aid. The graphs display average answers.

Trends in rural consciousness attitudes are demonstrated in Figure 1.1. Red bars represent the attitudes of rural community residents, green bars represent of suburban community residents, and blue bars represent urban community residents. The average response indicates no group thinks any community is receiving too much federal aid, regardless of membership. This could indicate that people tend to lean toward the idea that the federal government does not do enough. Out of the 9 possible combination options for resident type and community type, only 4 groups see aid as being adequate as indicated by an average above 1. These groups are rural residents asked about suburban aid, rural residents asked about urban aid, urban residents asked about suburban aid, and suburban residents asked about urban aid. This shows a few crucial trends.

First, no resident said that their own community was receiving the correct amount of aid. The closest group that comes to an average of 1 is suburban residents, but they do not quite reach the threshold. This shows that there is a level of bias in these responses and people will always view their own community as underfunded regardless of what the situation might be. Second, nobody believes that rural communities are adequately funded. This stands out since (1) it is a very stark difference between assessments of suburban and urban aid, (2) both suburban and urban residents said the other group's community is very slightly overfunded yet lean toward being adequately and fairly funded, and (3) there is an ascending order in the average the farther away a person gets from living in a rural community. To focus in on the last point, rural residents think rural communities are more underfunded than suburban residents do than urban residents do. This indicates that a degree of separation from a given community's lifestyle or needs has some influence on responses. Yet, suburban and urban communities, though, are similar enough

that there is little meaningful difference between them. The main focus is the difference in rural attitudes versus the other two groups.




Figure 1.1

Typically, data of this nature must be situated in its demographic context. However, this is not the case here given the massive similarity to the data broken down by partisanship.¹ Partisanship, though is still important to consider as trends within each party are likely to be different and party can act as a control. The one central difference is that there are more categories with an average above 1. These categories are urban Republicans when asked about suburban and urban aid. Other than these groups, it is the same as with the full sample of both Democrats and Republicans. Independents and non-identifiers were surveyed as well, but they

¹ Sample Sizes:

Democrats: Rural (510), Suburban (981), Urban (596)

Republicans: Rural (778), Suburban (826), Urban (193)

were not of focus and likely would have had samples too small to draw any meaningful conclusions.

The groups also look very similar across party, but with a couple important distinctions. These differences occurred mostly within the urban respondents: (1) Urban Democrats think that rural communities get more of a fair share than urban Republicans, (2) Urban Democrats have a higher average for suburban aid than Urban Republicans, indicating that Democrats think they get slightly more than their fair share while Republicans lean more toward the perspective of the right amount of aid, and (3) there is a massive difference in urban views of urban aid across party with Democrats having an average around 0.50, indicating they do not think urban communities get enough aid, while Republicans have an average above 1, indicating they think urban communities get slightly too much aid.

This data works toward supporting H_1 that everybody will see their own community as underfunded and be less compassionate about the funding of other communities. Interestingly, though, everybody generally sees rural areas as underfunded and rural communities are more critical of suburban and urban aid levels. While it was not hypothesized that everybody would feel this way about rural areas, it aligns with the Antifederalist idea that a democratic republic in a country with such large and diverse interests would not work. Somebody would always feel ignored and left behind, and the data supports the idea that this is rural communities. Even outside of rural areas, rural areas as seen, to some extent, as left behind. This illustrates how strong this feeling is; for those outside of rural areas to see this phenomenon, it must be an extremely strong phenomenon. In this context, the phenomenon of rural consciousness is understandable. If you felt isolated, underfunded, and fundamentally misunderstood, it makes sense that the identity causing this would be the main lens through which you see the world.




Figure 1.2




Figure 1.3

Education is the first demographic factor that responses will be divided by. In this case, and for education throughout the paper, respondents with less than a college degree were coded as “0” and those with a college degree or advanced degree were coded as “1”. The following data divides the participant responses based on this coding. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 depict responses for Democrats with less than a college degree and a college degree or higher, respectively. They contain almost identical trends and values. This is, frankly, somewhat surprising as education level would be expected to have a visual difference on perceptions of federal aid. However, this does not rule out the potential for statistical significance. There are some differences and, in most categories for both education levels, people think less than the fair share of aid is being given. This is for all rural aid categories, suburban views of suburban aid for both education levels, urban views of urban aid for both education levels, and suburban views of urban aid for those with at least college degrees. This reinforces the idea that a person will almost always think that their own community is not receiving a fair share of what they are owed.




Figure 1.4




Figure 1.5

Examining Republicans by education level, there are not such extensive similarities. The rural aid and suburban aid categories all look very similar regardless of education level. The approximate averages for each community type are slightly different, as would be expected, but they are very similar, and the trend are nearly identical. What is different is the urban view of urban aid. Republicans without a college degree who are living in an urban area have an average score under one indicating that the average respondent does not think urban areas are receiving a fair share of aid. The average, though, is just below 1, so these urban Republicans with lower education levels are close to thinking the fair share threshold is being met. However, when a Republican with more than a college degree lives in an urban area, they have an average response over 1. This indicates that they think the area is, on average, receiving a fair amount of aid, but a fair number of respondents think the aid level is too high. This is interesting since it is rare for a resident to think their own community to receiving too much. Yet, if any group would say this, it makes sense that it is Republicans who tend to be more opposed to federal aid overall and would prefer lower levels of government spending (Jones). But they do think that rural communities do not receive enough aid so perhaps they would prefer reallocation of funds to cutting spending entirely. Also, a college degree could indicate a level of political

knowledge/civic literacy higher than those without a college degree that would contribute to these attitudes.




Figure 1.6




Figure 1.7

Sex is an extremely interesting variable to look at as well. Male respondents were coded as a “0” and female respondents were coded as “1” (throughout all the data). This is because it is nearly impossible to distinguish between the data for men and women (within each party) without provided context. This is much like the trend for Democrats divided by education level. Figures 1.8 and 1.9 display Democrat women and Democrat men, respectively. The graphs are nearly identical. There are slight differences, but they are shockingly similar. The two most evident differences are the urban resident views of rural and urban aid, but comparatively to other variable differences, these are minor. As well, both graphs display data that aligns with the overall graph of Democrat data in Figure 1.2, described above. This is not surprising given how the sex distinguished graphs look the same, but it leads to the preliminary conclusion, before regression analysis, that sex is likely not going to be significant for Democrats for any type of aid share.




Figure 1.8




Figure 1.9

For Republicans divided by sex, the overall trends are similar, but the values of the data points are different. Thus, the trends in each graph have different implications. Looking at Republican women, the average value for all urban aid and suburban aid categories for urban and rural communities are all approximately 1 or higher. This means every community type think urban areas receive almost exactly their fair share of aid as well as rural and urban community residents thinking suburban areas receive their fair share of aid. This aligns with the findings for Republican men in Figure 1.11. The only difference is that Republican men living in rural areas believe that suburban and urban communities get slightly more than their fair share, as indicated by averages solidly above 1. There is also a solid consensus for all Republicans, regardless of respondent sex and community type that rural aid is far below the fair share threshold.




Figure 1.10




Figure 1.11

The age variable is also divided by Democrats and Republicans. The coding for this variable was slightly more complicated with four categories: 18-29 years-old, 30-49, 50-64, and 65+, coded 0 through 3, respectively. The volume of graphs compared to the other variables, though, is due to each age category requiring its own graph. As such, Figures 1.12-1.15 are Democrats and Figures 1.16-1.19 are Republicans. Both sets of graphs are in ascending age order and are clearly marked.

Beginning with the Democrats figures 1.12-1.15 look extremely similar. Consistent is that regardless of age or community type, all averages indicate that rural areas receive less than their fair share. Suburban and urban residents, regardless of all, also think their respective communities do not receive enough aid. This is in line with Democratic trends across the other demographic variable examined. Another important trend of note is the consistent idea among rural residents in all age groups that suburban and urban communities receive slightly too much aid. This is indicated by all but 1 of these categorical averages being over a 1. This trend also applies to urban views of suburban communities and suburban views of urban communities. As such, it may be the case that when divided by age, Democratic respondents simply think rural

communities as well as their own get too little aid and the other (suburban or urban) gets too much. This may seem like a very simplistic picture, but it is indicated by the data.




Figure 1.12




Figure 1.13




Figure 1.14




Figure 1.15

Switching to Republicans, the trends are not as clear cut. There are certainly similarities among age groups, but it is not across all of them evenly. First, the trend is still present that every community type thinks that rural communities are federally underfunded. It is also consistent that rural communities think that rural areas are the most underfunded. For 18-29 and 30-49-year-olds, urban communities have the highest average score which indicates that they are closest to thinking that rural areas are highly funded. This may show that for these ages, distance from the

lifestyle you live in may play a role in the assessment of aid share. As well, rural residents in all age categories have an average score more than 1 for suburban and urban aid showing they think these areas are both slightly overfunded. In every category except 65+ the average is also higher for urban aid indicating rural residents think that urban areas are more overfunded than suburban areas.

For suburban and urban residents, the average opinion does differ for each age. Suburban residents in all age groups have an average assessment of suburban aid below 1, indicating they think their own community is underfunded. This is in line with previous data. Interestingly, young suburban residents in the 18-29 age category thinks that urban communities are overfunded but 50-64 and 65+year-olds think that urban areas are underfunded, and the 30-49 category has an average of approximately 0.97 showing that they are incredibly close to thinking the threshold for fair aid is met. This goes against previous trends of thinking communities other than your own are overfunded. Urban residents in nearly every age they think that both suburban and urban areas receive more than their fair share as indicated by an average over 1. There are two exceptions to this: urban Republicans aged 50-64-years-old assessing suburban aid and urban Republicans aged 30-49-years-old assessing urban aid. This are the two cases where the average is less than 1 showing that they do not think this community receives the correct amount, never mind too much, federal aid. No other group says that their own community is overfunded.




Figure 1.16




Figure 1.17




Figure 1.18




Figure 1.19

Regressions were conducted on the data to see if there are non-random relationships between the independent and dependent variables. It will show if the trends in the graphs are meaningful. For the ease of understanding, discussion of the regression results needs to be separated based on aid type. First, rural aid levels from the perspective of all community types and both parties.

Then the discussion will progress to suburban aid and urban aid (Figure 1.20)

The first significance test run was that of community type and if it influences views of rural aid share. Democrats and Republicans both have statistically significant relationships for suburban and urban residency when they are compared against rural residency (p-values <0.01).

This means that there is a significant difference between rural residents and others when assessing rural aid share. All of these groups have positive coefficients showing that suburban and urban residents that are Democrats and Republicans are more likely to assess rural aid share as being “fair” instead of “unfair”. Although, neither party has significance related to age and Republicans do not have significance related to education. This demonstrates that age does not impact either party’s assessment and education level does not impact Republican assessments. For Democrats both sex and education level have p-values <0.01, showing there is an important connection. This means, functionally, that having a college degree as well as sex play a non-random role in Democrat assessments of rural aid. Those with college degrees and men will have higher average responses. Republicans do have significance related to sex at a p-value of 0.011277, which is important and shows sex plays a role for Republicans, but not as strongly as for Democrats.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Rural Aid		Suburban Aid		Urban Aid	
	(Republicans)	(Democrats)	(Republicans)	(Democrats)	(Republicans)	(Democrats)
Suburban Residency	0.131*** (0.030)	0.173*** (0.039)	-0.304*** (0.036)	-0.139*** (0.041)	-0.101*** (0.039)	-0.178*** (0.043)
Urban Residency	0.204*** (0.047)	0.248*** (0.043)	-0.048 (0.057)	0.100** (0.045)	-0.340*** (0.061)	-0.355*** (0.047)
Age	-0.018 (0.015)	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.041** (0.018)	-0.052*** (0.017)	0.017 (0.019)	0.024 (0.018)
Sex	-0.072*** (0.028)	-0.202*** (0.031)	-0.007 (0.034)	0.055* (0.033)	-0.144*** (0.036)	0.005 (0.035)
Education	0.022 (0.029)	0.225*** (0.032)	-0.041 (0.035)	0.142*** (0.034)	0.219*** (0.037)	-0.074** (0.035)
Constant	0.412*** (0.056)	0.590*** (0.067)	1.176*** (0.069)	1.020*** (0.071)	1.539*** (0.073)	0.849*** (0.074)
Observations	1,757	2,038	1,751	2,040	1,755	2,041
R ²	0.024	0.067	0.048	0.032	0.044	0.033
Adjusted R ²	0.021	0.064	0.046	0.030	0.042	0.030
Residual Std. Error	0.574 (df = 1751)	0.699 (df = 2032)	0.701 (df = 1745)	0.741 (df = 2034)	0.746 (df = 1749)	0.772 (df = 2035)
F Statistic	8.611*** (df = 5; 1751)	29.039*** (df = 5; 2032)	17.728*** (df = 5; 1745)	13.497*** (df = 5; 2034)	16.270*** (df = 5; 1749)	13.768*** (df = 5; 2035)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 1.20

Progressing to views of suburban aid, there is statistical significance related to Republicans that live in suburban areas (p-value <0.01). This shows that there is a difference between rural

assessments and suburban assessments of suburban aid. The negative coefficient implies that suburban Republicans think that their community's aid level is less fair than how rural residents would assess it. In other words, rural residents are more likely to say that suburban areas get too much aid. There is no significance for urban residents. For Democrats, there is significance for both suburban (p-value <0.01) and urban residents (p-value <0.05), indicating a meaningful difference between them and rural Democrats. However, the coefficient for suburban residents is negative and the urban coefficient is positive. Practically, this means that, like suburban Republicans, rural residents are more likely than suburban residents to say that suburban aid is too high, but urban residents are more likely than rural residents to say that suburban aid is too high.

Interestingly, views of suburban aid share show statistically significant relationships to age for both Democrats and Republicans with p-values of 0.00143 and 0.0229, respectively. As well, both have negative coefficients, indicating that the younger a respondent is, the higher their evaluation is of aid share. Younger people are more likely to share aid is higher than it should be. This is unlike rural aid where age was not significant for either group. This implies that there is something different about views of rural aid and suburban aid. Perhaps this has to do with the amount of time being politically active and an evolution of one's perspective of the needs of suburban communities. Democrats, though, have a stronger significance level for education, with a p-value <0.01. This shows that having a college degree is a more important factor in evaluations of suburban aid share than age, sex, or area of residence. Republicans do not have significance related to sex or education, showing that age is the only non-random influential variable.

Finally, there is the regressions related to urban aid share. All four conditions (combinations of party ID and suburban/urban residency) are statistically significant. Suburban Republicans have a p-value <0.05 while the other three groups have p-values <0.01 . These indicate extremely strong relationships and non-random differences between rural Democrats and Republicans compared to suburban and urban Democrats and Republicans. As well, all four of these groups have negative coefficients. This shows that rural residents are more likely than any of these groups to say that urban areas receive too much aid. At a minimum, they will think that urban aid is closer to “fair” than suburban and urban residents do. However, this also means that they would be more likely to say that urban areas are overfunded.

Democrats, in fact, only have one other variable that is significant and that is education, with a p-value of 0.0365, which is quite low. This indicates that there is evidence that having a college degree is connected to having a lower average evaluation of aid share. Republicans, when evaluating urban aid share, have high levels of significance related to both sex and education. Both variables result in p-values <0.01 , showing there is extremely strong, non-random connections between each variable and the views of Republicans. The negative regression coefficient implies that men (coded as “0” vs. the “1” for women) have average higher evaluations of urban aid share and are thus more likely to think there is too much aid. The positive coefficient for education though, indicates that higher education levels are correlated with higher average evaluations of aid. This contrasts with Democrats. Unlike Democrats, there seems to be no consistency among the three types of aid share in terms of significance to certain dependent variables.

Altogether, this data shows a general support for H₁: *Residents of rural communities, regardless of demographics, will view rural communities as underfunded. As well, they will see*

suburban and urban communities as being overfunded while those residents will see the level of aid as more fair This trend will be strengthened as age increases due to the amount of time that people have dealt with the consequences of over/underfunding. Where it falls short is the concept that age plays a major role. There are situations, with suburban aid levels, where age is shown to be important. However, there is strong evidence that, with variation within aid type, party, sex, and education play a large role in the assessment of federal aid share, overall. Yet, the graphs do show that that there are differences between rural and non-rural communities with strong statistical relationships attesting to this point. This shows that there is something different about the types of people that live in these different places and is in line with what the Antifederalists would have expected. It might be that rural consciousness and the overall group identity to where one lives is an influence in how federal aid distribution is assessed. It could be another variable concerning, job type or income level, for example. While this is a route that future research could take, it does show that there is at least a difference between raw data and the data controlled for by age, sex, and education.

United States Stance in the World

The second metric by which to measure nationalism to asking how the United States compares to other countries on seven various measures: political system, science, universities, economy, health care, military, public education, and the overall standard of living. This was scored on a scale of 0 to 3 where 0 means the US is below average, 1 is average, 2 is above average, and 3 is the best in the world. The average response is displayed in the graphs on the y-axis.

Figure 2.1 shows the average across all the questions for each party. There is a stark divide between the parties. Democrats have an average of approximately 1.35 indicating that they think

the United States is generally closer to “average” than “above average” than other countries. This symbolizes relatively low nationalism. Contrastingly, Republicans have an average response of about 1.80 which puts them much closer to the “above average” category but still broadly in the “below average” group.

This difference is largely attributable to questions where there is massive disagreement between the parties (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Essentially, this was all questions except the one about universities where the party averages were basically even. In every other question though, Republicans had a higher valuation of the United States. This was especially true for health care, which Democrats consider “below average” and Republicans consider halfway between “average” and “above average”. Evaluations for the political system and economy are also massively different with Republicans and Democrats being in different categories, on average.




Figure 2.1




Figure 2.2




Figure 2.3

These differences between Republicans and Democrats results in party being hugely statistically significant at a p-value < 0.01 . This makes it clear that at a bare minimum, party identification plays a large role on evaluations of the Unites States and therefore nationalism (Figure 2.19). Given the negative coefficient, this indicates that Republicans have higher evaluations of the United States' stance in the world.

Education is crucial given the hypothesis focusing on the impact of a college education. Figure 2.4 shows that Republicans, regardless of education level, have almost equal views of the United States. Democrats with a college education or higher have a better average view of the United States. Republicans also have a much higher view than Democrats overall. Examining each of the seven questions, Democrats with college degrees or higher have better views of the United States on every metric (Figure 2.5 and 2.6). Some differences between the groups are greater than others, but there is not a single instance when those with than a college education have better views of the US stance in the world. Republicans, contrastingly, show that each group has differing views of most topics, but they average out to be about the same. For

example, college educated Republicans have higher average views of the political system, military, and public education (Figure 2.7). Yet, Republicans without a college education have better views of US universities and health care. This is in support of H₂: which anticipated party being the dominate lens that Republicans used to evaluate the United States yet goes against the prediction of Democrats with less education having more favorable views.




Figure 2.4




Figure 2.5




Figure 2.6




Figure 2.7




Figure 2.8

For sex, though, the trend is reversed. Figure 2.9 shows that while Republicans, regardless of sex, still have a higher average view of the United States' stance in the world, there is a sex difference for Republicans and not one for Democrats. Democrats had mixed results for each question. Females had noticeably higher averages for scientific achievement, economy, public education, and the US standard of living. Yet, males were considerably higher on their evaluations of universities and health care (Figures 2.10 and 2.11). Worth mentioning, though, is that both males and females had extremely low evaluation of healthcare in the United States compared to the rest of the world. Both averages were just above 0.5 indicating that they both think the United States is firmly below average. Republicans, contrastingly, had a clear trend based on sex. As seen in Figures 2.12 and 2.13, females had higher average evaluations of the United States in every category, except the economy. Some categories had bigger differences than others, such as the military where there was a larger gap between the sexes than universities.




Figure 2.9




Figure 2.10




Figure 2.11




Figure 2.12




Figure 2.13

The final demographic variable is age and is seen in Figure 2.14. Republicans, once again, have an overall average evaluation across all age categories. Republicans all have an average above or around approximately 1.65, indicating that the average Republican, in every age group, tends to think that the United States is just average yet approaching above average. This average is highest amongst the youngest age category of 18-29 with the oldest category of 65+ being a close second. Democrats, in comparison, have a very different trend. The 18-29 age group is well below an average of 1 showing that they think the United States is below average compared to other countries. All the other age groups are clustered together around approximately a 1.3 showing that they think the United States is solidly average.




Figure 2.14

Looking at Democrats for each question, it becomes clear very quickly why 18–29-year-olds have such a lower average than the other age groups. The first factor is that in every question,

there is a large difference between their average evaluation and the other age groups that tend to cluster closer together (Figures 2.15 and 2.16). In fact, it places their average in an entirely separate category most of the time. In all but one question, they assess the United States as below average. Also, the average is missing for 18–29-year-olds for the questions of economy and health care. For the question regarding the economy, this is due to more non-responses than answers to the question being provided. This meant that a reliable mean could not be calculated. However, for health care, the average response was simply zero; every 18–29-year-old asked about the United States health care system assess it as globally below average.

Similarly, looking at individual question averages for Republicans, it becomes clear why 18–29-year-olds have a higher overall assessment of the United States (Figures 2.17 and 2.18). In 4 of the 7 questions, they have a higher average than any of the other age categories, and like Democrats, tend to be more closely clustered together. For 3 of the 4 questions, they have an average response of 3 which is as high as possible and indicates that every 18–29-year-old Republican surveyed thinks the United States is the best in the world for universities, economy, and health care. They do, however, have a mean of 0 for public education, indicating every person every 18–29-year-old Republican surveyed thinks the United States public education system is below average. This along with the below average score of 1 given for standard of living explains why the overall average response for this age group is not higher than it is in Figure 2.14. It is necessary to note that this 18–29-year-old sample size, though, is far too small to draw any meaningful conclusion, yet it would be remiss not to point out this trend and explain the lack of data on the graph.




Figure 2.15




Figure 2.16




Figure 2.17




Figure 2.18

Interestingly, the regression analysis makes it clear that for Republicans there is no statistical significance for sex and education and minimal statistical significance for age, at a p-value of 0.0558 (Figure 2.19). This shows that for Republicans, their evaluation of the United States, and thus their nationalism, links back almost fully to their party identification. For Democrats, once again, age is not a statistically significant variable, but sex and education level are, both with p-values < 0.01 . These are both very low p-values, with the sex coefficient being negative and the education coefficient being positive. This means, practically, that males and more highly educated Democrats have higher evaluations of the United States compared to other countries.

This differentiates Democrats and Republicans showing that there is a more complicated connection between Democrats and their nationalistic evaluations than there is for Republicans. However, it is somewhat surprising that age is not more significant for Republicans or significant at all for Democrats. When looking at the overall average responses for each age group, this makes slightly more sense, but there are drastic differences when examining the data on a question-by-question basis.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	United States Stance in the World		
	(Partisanship Importance)	(Republicans)	(Democrats)
Party	-0.451*** (0.046)		
Age		0.112* (0.058)	0.056 (0.043)
Sex		-0.082 (0.098)	-0.226*** (0.070)
Education		0.090 (0.116)	0.484*** (0.104)
Constant	1.798*** (0.033)	1.706*** (0.213)	1.223*** (0.172)
Observations	794	196	238
R ²	0.108	0.031	0.132
Adjusted R ²	0.107	0.016	0.121
Residual Std. Error	0.648 (df = 792)	0.655 (df = 192)	0.541 (df = 234)
F Statistic	96.215*** (df = 1; 792)	2.044 (df = 3; 192)	11.858*** (df = 3; 234)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 2.19

The data above provide support for most of *Republicans with college degrees or advanced degrees will have about the same view of the United States as do Republicans with a college degree or less. For Democrats, those with less education will have a more favorable view of the United States. However, for Democrats there will also be an age factor where younger Democrats aged 18-29 will have a much lower view of the United States than any other age*

group. Education is seen as not being a significant variable for republicans, which indicates there is little difference in assessments of the United States based on education level. However, this variable is significant for Democrats as hypothesized. Where the hypothesis is disproven is the role of age for Democrats. There seems to be age differences in the survey answers, but age is not statistically significant. In fact, sex is significant which was not foreseen.

Presidentialism

There is, quite frankly, a lack of public opinion polling that addresses views on the growth of presidential power. People are not directly asked if they think the president has more power than they used to. Instead, there are questions framed around the idea of whether they think it matters who the president is. These data, while not a direct translation to the Antifederalist concern does give valid insight. If respondents do not tend to think the identity of the president matters, then they can be seen as more resigned to the fact that the president has certain powers, and anybody would use them. This is more a reflection on the institution of the presidency instead of a reflection on who the individual president is. The Antifederalists would think that the identity of the president does not matter as the Institution creates a king-like figure no matter the person. The Institution shapes the person instead of the person shaping the Institution. Findings aligning with this outlook would indicate a modern agreement with Antifederalist concerns.

There was a total of five questions asked about a range of topics: mood in the US, national security, personal life, economic health, US standing in the world. Each of these questions referenced whether the identity of the president had a big impact on that topic. Answered ranged from 0 to 2 where a 0 means that there is no difference in the identity of the president, a 1 means there is some difference and a 2 represents that there is a big difference in the identity. These averages are shown on the y-axis of the graphs.

Beginning with the strictly partisan divide, it is interesting that when averaging the answers across all the questions, the parties almost have an identical average (seen in Figure 3.1). This is not necessarily expected, but when the data are divided among questions (Figures 3.2 and 3.3) it becomes clear that opinion differs on issue and Figure 3.1 is deceiving. For example, Democrats think presidential identity is more important for the mood in the US, their personal life, and US standing in the world, but Republicans think it is important for national security and economic health. This not surprising. During the Trump presidency, as seen in the literature review, Democrats increasingly focused on social issues and Republicans focused on the economy and security. While the survey questions did not ask about Trump, everybody was primed to think about him since he was the current president and an incredibly divisive one at that. As well, all average answers across the five questions had an average over 1, indicating that everybody agreed presidential identity does make a difference. The averages over 1.5 show an especially strong feeling that on those issues, presidential identity is incredibly important.

Figure 3.4 shows the regression output for party identity related to the average view of presidential importance. As can be seen, party is not statistically significant and has an incredibly high p-value of 0.892. This shows that there is a no connection between party and view of the importance of presidential identity. This reinforces Figure 3.1 and shows that despite the differences in individual questions, the overall averages make partisanship a non-factor. Yet, given the average value for each party being a 1.5, this works to disprove H_3 that states presidential identity does not matter.




Figure 3.1




Figure 3.2




Figure 3.3

In the case of education differences, there is a clear difference between Democrats and Republicans. These can be seen in Figure 3.4, showing the overall trend of college educated Democrats and Republicans with less than a college education but thinking that presidential identity is more important than their counterparts. However, the differences between the in-party educational categories are not very large when looked on at this graph that averages the five

questions together. All groups think presidential identity makes a difference as they all have an average around approximately 1.5.




Figure 3.4

As such, it is necessary to examine the data by question for each party. First, looking at Democrats (Figures 3.5 and 3.6) as all averages are over 1.0, and some even over 1.5, presidential identity is seen as important regardless of education level. However, for 3 of the 5 questions, mood in the USA, national security, and economic health, college-educated Democrats think presidential identity is more important with those with less than a college education. For the other 2 questions, personal life and US standing in the world, the averages are almost identical, but those with less than a college education have slightly elevated average answers. For Republicans (Figures 3.7 and 3.8) these trends are entirely reversed. Like Democrats, every question indicates that the president's identity is important. However, for all questions except that of the respondent's personal life, those without a college education say the identity is much more important. The gap between educational averages is larger across the

Republican category than the Democrat category, indicating that education might be more important for Republican evaluations




Figure 3.5




Figure 3.6




Figure 3.7




Figure 3.8

Sex is the next demographic variable in question. Figure 3.9 shows that regardless of question, sex seems to have a slight impact for Democrats, with males believing presidential identity is more important than females, but it seems to have no impact for Republicans. All groups though, believe that identity is very important with female Democrats having an average just under 1.5 and the other 3 groups being at or above a 1.5. Looking at just Democrats, in

Figures 3.10 and 3.11, men have a higher reported average answer across all questions except for the one related to the mood in the US. The differences between male and female answers are noticeable too, it is not a massive difference in any average, but there certainly is a difference that has the potential to be statistically significant. Republican data, though, reinforces the idea of no gender difference existing. In the national security category and personal life category, the average answer is the same, men have a much higher answer for mood in the US, and women have higher averages for the economic health and US standing in the world (Figures 3.12 and 3.13). However, these differences balance out to create the nearly identical overall average shown in Figure 3.9.




Figure 3.9




Figure 3.10




Figure 3.11




Figure 3.12




Figure 3.13

The final demographic variable is age. Figure 3.14 shows results of the five questions averaged across age category and party. As can be seen, age is important to every category, but it is noteworthy how the 18-29-year-old category for both parties seem to be an outlier. For Democrats, 18-29-year-olds have an average response of 1 while the other 3 age categories are all centers around approximately 1.5. While there is diversity in those categories, the lowest age range stands out as having exceedingly low averages. This is also true for 18-29-year-old Republicans, but to a lesser degree. Their average response is much closer to the other categories

than it was for Democrats, but it is still noticeably lower, at approximately 1.3 instead of approximately 1.5 like the other age groups.

Further examining why the youngest respondents have such low scores, 18–29-year-old Democrats have much lower average responses than others for the questions of economic health, US standing in the world, and impact on their personal life (Figure 3.15 and 3.16). This means that they do not think the identity of the president matters in their categories as much as other age groups do. The highest average among these 3 is a 1 which represents “some impact” so they think the institution itself is more important than the individual holding the presidency. This could be reflecting the pessimism of young people that anything within politics makes a difference, and any one person can change anything.

Contrastingly, for young Republicans, their responses do not particularly stand out as low when looking at each question. They have an average response of 2 for their assessments of economic health and US standing in the world, signaling they think the president’s identity has a big impact. This is countered though by their average response of 1 for national security and their personal life. This stands out, but 50–64-year-olds have this exact same response, so it is not as overly stark as for young Democrats who consistently answered lower than others. For Republicans, age does not seem to have as clear of an impact as it does for Democrats, yet Democrats do not have a very clear connection either.




Figure 3.14




Figure 3.15




Figure 3.16




Figure 3.17




Figure 3.18

Finally, there is the regression analysis data for all three demographic variables. Figure 3.19 shows the regressions for Republicans and Democrats. As predicted, there is statistical significance when education is considered. Republicans have a p-value of 0.0225 and Democrats have a p-value of 0.00431. As well, the coefficients are of interest, being 0.20 and -0.17, respectively. This shows that the magnitude of the relationship is about the same for both parties, but the relationship between degree and non-degree holders runs in opposite direction. Republican non-degree holders and Democrats degree holders are increasingly likely to say presidential identity matters. The p-values for sex are also as expected with Republicans having a non-significant p-value of 0.3001 and Democrats having a significant p-value of 0.00336. This Democrat p-value along with the positive coefficient of 0.144 shows that Democratic women are more likely than men to think presidential identity is important. With this p-value being lower than that of education, it shows that sex has even more of an impact on importance of presidential identity. Interestingly, despite the data differences in some for the age categories, age is not statistically significant for either Republicans or Democrats, with p-values of 0.5467 and 0.78950, respectively.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	(Partisanship Importance)	(Republicans)	(Democrats)
Party	0.005 (0.035)		
Age		0.023 (0.039)	-0.008 (0.030)
Sex		0.067 (0.065)	0.144*** (0.049)
Education		-0.177** (0.077)	0.205*** (0.071)
Constant	1.505*** (0.025)	1.552*** (0.140)	1.238*** (0.118)
Observations	796	197	239
R ²	0.00002	0.036	0.066
Adjusted R ²	-0.001	0.021	0.054
Residual Std. Error	0.490 (df = 794)	0.435 (df = 193)	0.373 (df = 235)
F Statistic	0.018 (df = 1; 794)	2.434* (df = 3; 193)	5.566*** (df = 3; 235)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 3.19

H₃ (*As presidential power has grown over time, the identity of the president will be seen as having less of an. People have likely evolved to think that the Institution of the presidency is more important than the President himself. This will be especially true for both Republicans and Democrats with less than a college degree*) was entirely unsupported by the data. People across all groups saw the identity of the president to at least make somewhat of a difference. No group had an overall average answer suggesting that the identity is not important at all. While there were certain questions that may have leaned toward little difference, this is not nearly as strong a response as hypothesized. Education was statistically significant for both Democrats and Republicans, but it did not manifest as hypothesized. In fact, Republicans with less than a college degree thought the identity of the president was more important than those with a college degree; this goes entirely against the hypothesis. This results from this set of analyses do not support the Antifederalist stance. While they may be correct that presidential power has grown and the

president will become a de facto monarch, the people see the identity of the person being influential in how the presidency is run. If people aligned with Antifederalist stance and saw all presidents as being king-like in their ruling style, they would not see the identity of the president as mattering.

Governmental Levels

To best assess feelings toward Congress, it was important to compare to other types of government. There were questions regarding feelings toward the individual respondent's state government and local government as well as the federal government. All these questions were worded identically besides replacing the section of government asked about. They were also all scaled identically ranging from 0 to 3 where 0 represented a very unfavorable attitude, 1 meant mostly unfavorable, 2 meant mostly favorable, and 3 meant very favorable. The graphs below contain the data taken as the differences between local/state and state/federal. This will show the preference (or disfavor) for local over state and state over federal governments.

First, Figure 4.1 depicts a purely partisan divide. As can be seen in the graph, all values are positive, indicating that both Democrats and Republicans hold a preference for the closer section of government to them. This means local government is preferred over state government, yet state government is preferred over federal government. What stands out, though is the margin of difference between the parties. Looking at local government, Republicans have a higher value indicating a stronger local preference, than Democrats. It is not a large difference, but it is present. Looking at state government versus federal government, Democrats have a substantially larger preference for state government than republicans do. But it also stands out that both parties prefer state over federal government more than they prefer local over state government. This

could be the result of large-scale distaste for the federal government instead of strong feelings about state government.




Figure 4.1

There is limited statistical significance though, related to purely partisan differences. For the local over state condition, there is no significance related to party, with a p-value of 0.568 (Figure 4.5). Yet for state over federal, there is strong statistical significance related to party, with a p-value of 0.00038 and a positive coefficient (Figure 4.6). This positive coefficient means that Democrats have more of a preference of state government over federal government than Republicans do.

Examining preference by education and sex within each party is not as different from the strict partisan divide as one might expect. Beginning with education level, as can be seen in Figure 4.2, the trends look similar to Figure 4.1. Of note is the disposition of those with less than a college education, regardless of party, to have a weaker preference for local and state government. For Republicans this is strong when looking at the local versus state condition and for Democrats it is a very large difference when looking at the state versus federal condition.

Yet, education is not statistically significant for either party in either condition (Figures 4.5-4.6). This shows that while there is some divergence in opinion, this difference cannot be definitively linked to education level alone.

Looking at sex differentials in Figure 4.3, it looks incredibly similar to the results for education. The main differences are that Republican women have a weaker preference for local government and Republican men have a weaker preference for state government. While these two analyses cannot be directly compared, it is interesting and worth noting that the overall trend seems to be the same: there is a stronger preference in both parties for the state over federal versus local over state. Once again, though, nothing related to sex for either party or condition is statistically significant.




Figure 4.2




Figure 4.3




Figure 4.4

Age is the category that stands out, simply because of how different the graph looks. This is the only category where there are negative values graphed, as seen in Figure 4.4. These indicate that for those age/party combinations there is a preference for state government over local government and federal government over state government. As well, these preferences are stronger, in 2 out of the 3 cases, than all but 1 preference going the other way. This stands out given the nature of the data in all other demographic categories. Focusing in on Republicans 18-29 and 30-49, this is where the negative values appear. For local versus state, 18-29-year-olds produce a value of approximately -0.5 while 30-49-year-olds have an average value of approximately 1. This is massive difference between these two categories and unlike anything else shown for two age categories, in the same party, that neighbor each other.

Interestingly, for Republicans 50-64-years-old, the category next to 30-49-year-olds, the average drops drastically to under 0.25. This indicates that there is something unique about the 30-49 age category. Examining the same Republican 18-29 and 30-49 categories for state versus federal, both categories produce negative values, approximately -0.7 and -0.3, respectively. This shows that for 18-29-year-olds there is a stronger preference for federal government over state government than there was for state government over local government. Also, the preference for 30-49-year-olds flipped entirely to a noteworthy negative preference, for federal government. Yet, once again, there is no statistical significance for age in either party and either condition. This leads to a possible inference that there is simply not enough of a sample size in each category for significance to be drawn but using the same participant data for other topics did lead to significance, so these results cannot be entirely dismissed.

Ideally, there would be a control variable related to area of residence. It is impossible to ignore that this may play a role in preferences of government type, especially given the lack of

explanation from age, sex, or education. For example, rural residents might be more comfortable with their local governments as they are better understood by local governments. Linking back to rural consciousness, they might see themselves as misunderstood by state and/or federal officials. However, this data is not available in this data set and serves as a significant limitation

	Dependent variable:		
	Local vs. State Government		
	(Partisanship Importance)	(Republicans)	(Democrats)
Party	0.036 (0.062)		
Age		-0.036 (0.080)	0.065 (0.072)
sex		-0.019 (0.133)	0.104 (0.118)
Education		-0.213 (0.159)	-0.021 (0.171)
Constant	0.216*** (0.044)	0.594** (0.288)	-0.094 (0.286)
Observations	766	193	233
R ²	0.0904	0.012	0.006
Adjusted R ²	-0.001	-0.004	-0.007
Residual Std. Error	0.860 (df = 764)	0.887 (df = 189)	0.896 (df = 229)
F Statistic	0.326 (df = 1; 764)	0.757 (df = 3; 189)	0.498 (df = 3; 229)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 4.5

	Dependent variable:		
	State vs. Federal Government		
	(Partisanship Importance)	(Republicans)	(Democrats)
Party	0.274*** (0.077)		
Age		0.125 (0.100)	0.031 (0.084)
Sex		0.089 (0.165)	-0.099 (0.138)
Education		0.199 (0.198)	0.312 (0.202)
Constant	0.179*** (0.055)	-0.312 (0.358)	0.386 (0.335)
Observations	765	194	233
R ²	0.016	0.017	0.014
Adjusted R ²	0.015	0.001	0.001
Residual Std. Error	1.061 (df = 763)	1.105 (df = 190)	1.044 (df = 229)
F Statistic	12.741*** (df = 1; 763)	1.072 (df = 3; 190)	1.070 (df = 3; 229)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 4.6

The overall findings related to this section are more difficult to concisely summarize. H₄ predicted that *among all participants there will be increasingly favorable views for government as the sector of government becomes closer to their everyday lives i.e., local government is more favorable than state government, and state government is more favorable than the federal government. This will be particularly true for those who are older and/or have lower levels of education.* It is impossible to deny that this trend was found. Local governments and state governments were consistently rated more favorably. However, no variable was found as an explanation for this trend. Party, age, sex, and education were not statistically significant, except for one case related to party. But even in this case, it was a weak significance value. This leaves the major question of what causes this trend. More research clearly needs to be done as this trend is unlikely to simply be random. There may be another demographic variable that explains it, or it could simply be that closeness to the officials explains the preference.

Electoral College

The scale for these graphs is the simplest of these categories. A 1 indicates a preference for amending the Constitution to change the Electoral College, and a 0 indicates a preference to leave the Electoral College as is. This is due to the nature of the topic. Unlike the prior topics, this question is not ranged on a Likert scale. As such, it produces binary results. Although this has the potential to exclude less extreme viewpoints, it streamlines the process of determining who wants to keep versus change the system.

Looking at a partisan division first, there is a very clear preference among Democrats for amending the Constitution and eliminating the Electoral College (Figure 5.1). With the average response exceeding 0.80, and an upper limit of 1, this shows over 80% of Democrats surveyed would prefer getting rid of the Electoral College. This is opposed to the 0.27 average for Republicans. This is also a statistically significant difference. Regression analysis for strictly the impact of party on Electoral College preference produces a statistically significant p-value that is < 0.01 , as can be seen in Figure 5.5. This indicates a very strong relationship between party identification and preference for amending the Electoral College. This provides preliminary support for H_5 . Party is shown as being a significant factor in electoral college preference. To reiterate a key point, this survey took place during the presidency of Donald Trump, a Republican who won the Electoral College but lost the popular vote by quite a large margin. This is a point that cannot be ignored when considering how Democrats versus Republicans would have been thinking of the Electoral College at the time of the survey.




Figure 5.1

When examining further demographics broken down by party, the levels of support are not massively changed from the purely partisan breakdown. Looking at educational differences and sex within each party, the graphs almost mirror the partisan breakdown (Figures 5.2 and 5.3). Regardless of education and sex, Democrats have an average response around 0.8. The only category slightly below the 0.8 mark is Democrats with less than a college degree. This indicates very high levels of support for amending the Electoral College regardless of education or sex. Similarly, Republicans have an average response between approximately 0.25 and 0.30, irrespective of education and sex. This mirrors the responses in Figure 5.1.

When regressions are run on the impact of education and sex, as seen in Figure 5.5 for neither demographic value is statistically significant for Democrats. This means that when examining only Democrats, neither education level nor sex have an impact on Electoral College preference that can definitively attributed to those variables. Education is also not statistically significant for Republicans. However, sex is mildly statistically significant, with a p-value of

0.09964 and positive coefficient of 0.101 indicating that Republican women (coded as “1”) prefer amending the Electoral College more than Republican men.




Figure 5.2




Figure 5.3

Age is the final demographic variable and demonstrates the most in-party diversity. This diversity, though, is almost entirely attributable to 18–29-year-olds, for both Democrats and Republicans. Figure 5.7 shows that for Democrats aged 18-29 there is total support for amending the Constitution while the other age categories fall closer to previously seen average response, around the 0.80 mark. However, age remains, like the other demographic variables for Democrats, not statistically significant. This means that strictly party is important for Democrats while deciding whether to support amending the Electoral College. Republicans see the same overall trend, where 18–29-year-olds have an average response of about 0.50 compared to the other age categories that fall between approximately 0.30 and 0.25. 30–49-year-old Republicans do somewhat stand out since their average response is higher than the two 50+ year-old categories that have almost identical responses. However, age is a statistically significant

demographic variable for Republicans, at a p-value of 0.00746. This shows a stronger relationship with Electoral College preference than sex, yet party is still more significant. Practically, the negative coefficient means that the younger the Republican, the more they support amending the Electoral College.




Figure 5.4

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Preference for Amending the Electoral College		
	(Partisanship Importance)	(Republicans)	(Democrats)
Party	0.553*** (0.030)		
Age		-0.099*** (0.037)	0.002 (0.027)
Sex		0.101* (0.061)	0.041 (0.045)
Education		0.041 (0.073)	-0.010 (0.066)
Constant	0.275*** (0.021)	0.257* (0.133)	0.808*** (0.110)
Observations	778	196	236
R ²	0.310	0.052	0.004
Adjusted R ²	0.309	0.037	-0.009
Residual Std. Error	0.413 (df = 776)	0.411 (df = 192)	0.345 (df = 232)
F Statistic	348.858*** (df = 1; 776)	3.481** (df = 3; 192)	0.285 (df = 3; 232)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 5.5

The final hypothesis, H₅, was generally supported (*support for the Electoral College is a purely partisan decision with no difference based on age, education, and sex across the parties*). There was a clear partisan divide in preference: generally, Democrats wanted to amend the Electoral College and Republicans wanted to keep it. This was confirmed as being influenced by party as the significance value showed a fairly strong, non-random connection. What was not foreseen, though, was the influence of age. In both parties, 18-29-year-olds had a much higher preference for amending the Electoral College than the other age groups. This was not only present, but it was statistically significant for Republicans. One could see the lack of significance of age for Democrats being a result of Democrats overall having such a high average value as is. But with young Republicans, this average value stood out against the other age categories. This is not to oversell the opinion of young Republicans; their average support for amending the Electoral College was still drastically lower than any Democrat age group. But within Republicans, their average was very high. As such, this significance of age shows that while yes, party identification is the most important, age is influence within the group of self-identified Republicans.

As for the Antifederalist context, this aligns with their perspective that the Constitution would be far too difficult to change if the circumstance arose. Within this sample alone, approximately 52.7% want the Electoral College amended compared to 44.5% that want to keep it as is. This shows that at a bare minimum, a Constitutional change should be considered. Yet, as the Antifederalists predicted, the bar is so high for change, that it is unlikely to be considered, never mind actually happen.

Limitations

No study is without limitations as they are a natural part of the research process. The most significant limitation that cannot go unmentioned is the data itself. The data is from a reliable source and provides insight into the topics of interest. It is not innately flawed in any way; however, it is always preferable to have more control over the data. Running my own survey at the scale of a Pew study would have been optimal. Questions could have been more specifically targeted at the exact Antifederalist sentiment but having such a reduced sample size would not have justified this choice. In an ideal situation, there would also have been one survey instead of two. This would have allowed for equal sample sizes, the same respondents, and therefore more consistency among the responses. As it stands, the questions related to rural versus suburban versus urban attitudes were a different sample than all of the other questions. This is not inherently an issue as both samples are reliable, yet one sample would have been ideal.

Further, with this study being historically based, there is of course going to be limits in the understanding and situating of the historical content. Beginning with the understanding aspect, any content analysis of historical documents naturally has some bias. Reading historical documents in a modern context means that the reader has a modern-day perspective on the historical issues. This is unavoidable, and even value in certain contexts, but it does mean that the reader might not grasp the full intent of the original document. A reader in the late 1700s had only their circumstances around which to consider the documents. Yet, a reader in 2022 has nearly 250 years of American history in the back of their minds while reading *The Antifederalist Papers*. Even while doing everything possible to remain objective, this history primes the reader to examine the content in certain ways.

As well, there is researcher influence. Different people reading *The Antifederalist Papers* may focus on different aspects of them. The topics of focus in this research are defensible and are objectively important parts of the *Papers*. Yet, another researcher may have seen other topics as being more important. This depends on the lens the *Papers* are read through and the *Papers* that were selected for examination. Future research directions include examining other *Papers* and seeing what other objections could be examined in a modern lens. This would help better round out the fairly narrow nature of this research.

Conclusion

Overall, it is fair to say that Antifederalist concerns still hold space in the minds of modern-day Americans. Results in four out of the five tests show that public opinion aligns with what Antifederalists were concerned about. First, nationalism attitudes do support the Antifederalist concerns about having a democratic republic govern such a large and diverse group of people. There are clear and statistically significant differences between rural community views of federal aid compared to suburban and urban communities, as shown in Figure 1.20 by the p-values all at or below 0.05. Substantively, this means that regardless of party or aid type, rural residents are more likely than suburban or urban residents to think that aid is unfairly distributed. Rural residents see their community as underfunded and suburban and urban areas as overfunded. This supports the idea of rural consciousness and the feeling among rural people that they have been left behind and are not having their needs met. It also supports most of the claim made in H₁ (*Residents of rural communities, regardless of demographics, will view rural communities as underfunded. As well, they will see suburban and urban communities as being overfunded while those residents will see the level of aid as more fair. This trend will be strengthened as age increases due to the amount of time that people have dealt with the consequences of*

over/underfunding). Age does not play as strong of a role as predicted, as it is only significant in suburban aid evaluations, but the idea of rural areas being seen as underfunded and other areas being seen as overfunded by those not living there did hold true.

There is also a clear, and statistically significant, partisan difference in the assessment of the United States when compared against other countries. Republicans tend to rank the United States as higher on the global totem pole than Democrats, as shown by the negative coefficient in Figure 2.19. On individual questions asked, Republicans rank the United States higher than Democrats on measures of the political system, science, economic health, health care, military, public education, and standard of living. These differences are quite distinct and noticeably large. The only area where Democrats have a higher average response than Republicans is in United States universities, but the difference between Democrats and Republicans is minute and almost non-existent. Education, though, is also important here with Republicans without college degrees and Democrats with college degrees both having higher assessments than other groups. Yet, partisanship is still the strongest factor in predicting attitudes. This provides support for most of H_2 (*Republicans with college or advanced degrees will have about the same, or a slightly higher, view of the United States as do Republicans with a college degree or less. For Democrats, those with less education will have a more favorable view of the United States. However, for Democrats there will also be an age factor where younger Democrats aged 18-29 will have a much lower view of the United States than any other age group.*) by emphasizing the role of education for both Democrats and Republicans. Yet, the Democrat relationship went the opposite direction than predicted and age did not play a significant role. Altogether, this shows that there is a distinct difference in how Americans view the United States and indicates that there might be deeper structural issues that prevent the effective governing of both groups with such distinct

beliefs. This is not to say that there should be a split in the United States among party lines, but it highlights the manifestation of the Antifederalist concern.

When comparing local versus state government and state versus federal government, local and state government is preferred, respectively, in the raw data. There was a lack of explanation and statistical significance found in the control variables that negates the relationship in the raw data. Partisanship was minorly significant for the state versus federal test and a positive coefficient indicates that Democrats have a stronger preference for state governments than Republicans do (Figure 4.6). But the lack of significance for age, sex, or education in either test for both parties cannot be ignored. The raw data trend is still present and aligns with Antifederalist thought about closeness to government officials being important. Further research would be able to better assess this relationship, though and see if the raw data trend was merely a fluke of this data set. *H₄ (among all participants there will be increasingly favorable views for government as the sector of government becomes closer to their everyday lives i.e., local government is more favorable than state government, and state government is more favorable than the federal government. This will be particularly true for those who are younger)* is unsubstantiated given the lack of statistical significance and therefore lack of a relationship, overall.

Lastly, the case of the Electoral College shows that there was merit to the concern over the Constitution being too difficult to amend. There is a majority of support for amending the Electoral College, among all categories of Democrats and Republicans who are young and/or female, but change is not realistically up for discussion. Partisanship is statistically significant with a positive coefficient, showing that Democrats have higher levels of support for amending the Electoral College. Democrats, though, have no significance on any other control variable,

indicating that party is most important. Republicans have significance for age and sex and the direction of the coefficients justify the claim of young and/or female Republican being more supportive of change. This is in general support of H₅ (*support for the Electoral College is a purely partisan decision with no difference based on age, education, and sex across the parties*), yet the importance of age and sex for Republicans was not predicted.

The one exception is that surrounding presidentialism. It is indisputable that presidential power has grown, like the Antifederalists were concerned about. But public opinion indicates that everybody believes that the identity of the president matters. There is variance amongst responses for the five individual questions about presidential identity, but the averaging of responses led to each group categorizing presidential identity as at least “somewhat important”. Statistical significance was found for Democrats divided by sex and both Democrats and Republicans divided by education level. The coefficients indicate that, more specifically, Republicans with no college degree and Democrats who are female and/or hold college degrees would assess presidential identity as being of greater importance than other groups. Antifederalists would have likely believed that identity would not matter as the Institution would have acquired so much power. This fails to support H₃ (*As presidential power has grown over time, the identity of the president will be seen as having less of an impact. People have likely evolved to think that the Institution of the presidency is more important than the President himself. This will be especially true for both Republicans and Democrats with less than a college degree and those who are younger.*) and in fact shows the opposite relationship.

That leaves the question of who would be considered a modern-day Antifederalist. This a complex question and the answer is somewhat reductionist. There are different characteristics that lead to different aspects of the Antifederalist identity. First is rural residency. Not all modern

Antifederalists would be rural residents, but rural residency can be considered an indicator of Antifederalist tendencies. This is also separate from different demographic characteristics, given this information comes from a separate data set. The rest of the data suggests that younger, female, Democrats with college degrees/advanced degrees would be the model when conceptualizing a modern Antifederalist. This a generalization based on the majority of the data and is not perfect. Further research would need to be done assessing more attitude types and attitude strengths to make a more substantive claim. But, given the data and the groups that tend to align the most with the Antifederalist perspective, this would be the expected make-up of an Antifederalist today.

As for future areas of research, the first step would be to replicate this study. Data collected today is likely to be different than the data used in this research. Not only because it is four years old at this point, but because Trump is no longer president and lost reelection. Given the impact his presidency had on this 2018 data, one could predict some reasonable changes in more current data. This would also allow more research into the questionable areas of data. For example, the lack of sample size for 18-29-year-old Republicans related to public education or the raw data versus controlled data trends of federal aid share. Further research could help answer these remaining questions.

Historically based research that compares the past to current politics provides insight into the deeply rooted and longly held beliefs about the United States government. It would be incorrect to assume that the feelings held both by Antifederalists and current Americans have been present throughout the entire course of American history. However, the presence of similar attitudes being present nearly 250 years later highlights the importance of these issues. Today, America is deeply divided and seen by many as being on a tipping point. The current system works for few

and is likely unsustainable without change. Regardless of party, this seems to be a core belief on both sides. Perhaps, change could start with concerns that date back to the Antifederalists.

Instead of seeing Antifederalists as the “losers” of the Constitutional debates, they need to be reframed as having valid points that were not addressed when, maybe, they should have been.

These findings contribute to the existing scholarship in important ways. The main addition is the discussion of Antifederalism in a context outside of the 1770s. Literature, with good reason, nearly always discusses Antifederalism within the context of the Constitutional ratification process. They are dropped from discussion following the ratification process. But that is not the end of their story. These people and their doubts did not disappear just because their side did not win. Frankly, treating them like this is the case discredits their work. As can be seen throughout this research, their concerns were valid. While they may have been seen as traitors, they were truly patriots trying to build the best government possible.

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