

# Double-edged rituals and the symbolic resources of collective action: Political commemorations and the mobilization of protest in 1989

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The year 1989 was rife with resonant political anniversaries in both Eastern Europe and China — as well as being the two-hundredth anniversary of France's first great democratic revolution. Democracy and the future of socialism were on many peoples' minds. Communist elites hoped to use these anniversaries as opportunities to celebrate the triumphs of the last forty years, but dissidents found these anniversaries even more auspicious as occasions to condemn “really existing” socialism. As a result, popular revolts erupted from Beijing to Berlin.

A fascinating and generally overlooked feature of the 1989 protests is the role of political commemorations in the mobilization of protest. In both Eastern Europe and China, students and dissident groups took to the streets in connection with historical anniversaries, funerals, or memorial services and staged public expressions of discontent to which a broader, relatively unorganized, and previously uninvolved populace responded. Judged by the standards of much social movement theory, this kind of protest activity seems irregular and unconventional. Why did opposition groups rely so heavily on political commemorations? Was the appearance of protest around anniversaries and other public events nothing more than a spontaneous emotional display, a reaction to political opportunities, or simple coincidence? Do these incidents suggest certain patterns of protest characteristic of authoritarian regimes? Or do the movements of 1989 point to a set of as yet unrecognized but important sources of movement mobilization?

In this article, we consider political commemorations as ritual practices and explain why under certain conditions such practices may be used to mobilize protest in authoritarian regimes. Political rituals are important political indicators in authoritarian societies because they are public events in societies that are generally privatized and because they provide a relatively accessible indicator of social and political conflicts in societies in which repression and dissimulation often obstruct sociological research. Our argument is developed through a theoretical discussion of 1) the double-edged character of social rituals; 2) the conditions of collective action in state-socialist regimes; 3) the uses of rituals for staging protest; and 4) political commemorations as symbolic resources in collective action.

These theoretical arguments will then be applied and further developed in an analysis of the role of political commemorations in the popular protest movements in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and China in 1989. These cases are chosen precisely because they were politically hardline regimes in 1989 in which the resources and opportunities for collective action were the most circumscribed. In these cases, the factors that supply the mechanism of political opportunity in conventional accounts of the 1989 protests such as regime liberalization, easing of domestic repression, or an open split between party reformers and hardliners were either absent or so attenuated as to provide little explanatory power.<sup>1</sup> They are also useful for comparative purposes because of the variations in political culture, institutions, and the outcomes of mobilization against the state. Taken together, our theoretical and empirical arguments illustrate the ways in which collective actors exploit political commemorations to launch social protest. We try to specify the role of culture in collective action rather than simply assert it as a determining structure. Likewise, we move beyond a voluntaristic account of action, by

specifying the ways in which cultural practices enable and constrain actors in order to advance current social movement theory and generate propositions that can be employed analytically in understanding symbolic resources of collective action.

### **Double-edged rituals**

The “cultural turn” to the study of collective action entails an emphasis on cultural resources. These resources include, among others, symbolic practices such as language and imagery, cultural “tool kits” such as stories and rituals, information and codes, injustice frames, and historical events as politically defining symbols and channels of emotional expression that mobilize and sustain action.<sup>2</sup>

The focus on cultural resources of collective action gives new prominence to ritual practices, an important area of study in cultural sociology. In Durkheim’s (1915) terms, rituals are social practices that produce and reproduce symbolic goods along with moral and emotional attachments to a social order. For Durkheim, rituals are spontaneous phenomena that have the latent effect of producing functionally integrative solidarity. Some rituals, such as public holidays, produce consensus and counteract disintegrative forces in social life as latent effects of purposeful collective expression. There are also distinctly *political* rituals; social practices designed by states and political movements to reinforce social power or produce collective sentiments through honoring symbols and objects held up as sacred. Political rituals are predominantly *public* events, unlike some private religious or ethnic rituals that are performed at home, in seclusion or in sheltered spaces. Despite these differences, the elementary logic that defines things as sacred in political terms is the same as that for more general social phenomena.<sup>3</sup>

In communist societies the near deification of socialist leaders such as Lenin,

Marx, or Mao and the respect accorded the “holy” texts and ideas of the party through public statements and mass demonstrations are other examples of rituals reinforcing political power. All of this serves to sacralize the state, inspire sacrifice and loyalty on its behalf, and accord its subjects an aura of authority and respect. Thus modern societies, like traditional ones, can have a political life suffused with symbolism and ritualized action. Many of these symbols and symbolic practices are meant to establish or reinforce a collective sense of political identity, or the authority and prestige of leaders, institutions, and ideologies.

Rituals, however, are not simply top-down carriers of cultural meaning and conduits of social action. They have a double-edged character that can empower collective action. Rituals intended to preserve and strengthen the established order may unintentionally sponsor protest against it. Even in an authoritarian setting where political meanings cannot be freely contested, rituals can be redirected to express criticism of the system. Various studies have shown, for example, how rituals that publicly celebrate and reinforce social order may be carriers of social movements.<sup>4</sup> The work of Victor Turner suggests that there is something intrinsic to the structure of rituals and their experience that can threaten the established social order by removing individuals from their daily routines. Turner argues that rituals have both an integrative and anti-structural dimension, focusing particularly on how rituals have the power to inspire deviance and rebellion by temporarily rendering relations of power transparent and making the maintenance of social structure reliant on collective action.<sup>5</sup>

Drawing on Turner, Nicholas Dirks notes, “ritual constitutes a tremendously important arena for the cultural construction of authority and the dramatic display of the lineaments of power” but at the same time rituals “often occasion more

conflict than consensus, and that each consensus is provisional, as much a social moment of liminality in which all relations of power (and of powerlessness) are up for grabs.” Indeed, Dirks argues, it is partially because of the two-sided character of the ritual order that resistance to authority and unexpected rebellion may appear in spite of state repression.<sup>6</sup> In her study of the cult of leadership in Assad’s Syria, Lisa Wedeen shows how in providing a symbolic world in which relations of domination are always on display “the cult and spectacle both produce political power yet also, paradoxically, invite transgressions.”<sup>7</sup> It is in this sense that one can speak of political rituals as potential moments of vulnerability for an established political order and as symbolic resources of collective action for would-be challengers.

These reflections allow us to generate our first proposition: *Political rituals render relations of power transparent and rely on enactments of social domination. As a result, official political rituals have a double-edged character that reinforces relations of domination while simultaneously providing aggrieved actors with opportunities for dissension.*

The question for students of collective action is, “Under what conditions do rituals generate protest against domination rather than its reinforcement?” Rituals do not automatically channel collective protest. While the polysemy of a ritual or symbol, or the historical memory associated with it, may contain rich possibilities for interpretation and creative appropriation, it is up to actors to make strategic use of them. Whether and how actors make use of rituals to mount political protest cannot be understood independent of the social conditions in which the actors are situated. In the following section, we discuss the conditions of collective action in authoritarian societies with special reference to state-socialist regimes.

## **Conditions of collective action in authoritarian regimes**

Collective action in authoritarian regimes differs from that in democratic regimes in three crucial respects. In modern authoritarian regimes, most of the resources of collective action are controlled by the state; in democratic regimes, they are more diffuse. Secondly, authoritarian regimes generally seek to raise the costs of independent collective action to levels that are intolerable for most of the people most of the time through means of surveillance and repression. Finally, democratic regimes tolerate peaceful and orderly opposition emerging from an autonomously generated civil society while authoritarian regimes actively intervene in civil society and obstruct citizen mobilization. Historically, authoritarian regimes have been arrayed along a continuum between those that permit a limited degree of political pluralism and autonomous economic and cultural organization and those that enforce a nearly complete organizational monopoly in which no significant source of social, political, economic, or cultural pluralism is tolerated. In moderate forms of authoritarianism, there may be some limits on state power and sufficient space for a semi-opposition in society. In the more extreme, totalitarian forms, regimes rule without definite limits and without tolerating open opposition from any quarter.<sup>8</sup>

The Leninist regimes that control state-socialist societies combine bureaucratic authoritarianism with charismatic mobilization. The communist party is a vehicle of impersonal charisma with control over the state apparatus. These regimes maintain that a single party, empowered by a world historical theory of utopian social change, cannot tolerate ideological or political deviations that threaten social stability and long-term prospects for human development. Public institutions are fully subordinated to party control and have no identity other than party interests. There is no meaningful plurality in society because the party organization controls

the state, the economy, and every important sphere of public activity. Social mobilization behind regime goals is directed by mass organizations that are also subject to party control.<sup>9</sup> In short, Leninist societies can be understood as “impoverished” collective action regimes in which the resources of collective action are monopolized by elites, leaving potential challengers weak, marginalized and with inadequate endogenous opportunities for action.<sup>10</sup>

The differences between the conditions that obtain in authoritarian and democratic regimes have far-reaching implications for understanding collective action in socialist societies. Where resources of collective action are monopolized by the state, organized opposition groups, which by definition have to depend on material and organizational resources to exist, are difficult to form and develop. Even worse, the monopoly of resources of collective action means that any emergent form of organized opposition groups will be carefully monitored and controlled by the state apparatus. The state’s high capacity for repression makes direct challenges to state power unlikely and significantly deters even indirect challenges. Dissident groups may form despite the risk of repression, but even if they may sympathize with dissident goals, ordinary people typically stand clear of such groups, leaving them relatively isolated. With opportunities for effective independent action so constrained, most people retreat as far as possible into the private sphere.<sup>11</sup>

Without organizational and material resources, and faced with high levels of risks, how can collective protest be possible in state-socialist regimes? Social movement scholars have given much attention to this question. Two insights are particularly relevant to the issues of our concern. First, while public life is largely controlled by the party and the state in state-socialist regimes, private life and informal associa-

tions are found to provide “free spaces” for nourishing dissent, building networks of solidarity, and defining subversive identities.<sup>12</sup> Rather than organized political movements directly challenging the regime, “subcultures of opposition,” subversive communities and loosely-organized dissident groups that are hard to track are more typical forms of opposition in highly repressive regimes.<sup>13</sup> In times of crises, these informal groups may be transformed into useful organizational resources of collective action.<sup>14</sup>

A political subculture shares many of the norms, ideas, and values of the dominant society but is distinguished by a host of dissident ideologies, attitudes, and behaviors.<sup>15</sup> In authoritarian regimes, membership in dissenting political subcultures has potential consequences for the fate of the individuals involved. Yet people with dissident sentiments or ideological attachments join such groups because they provide them with perceived advantages such as the pooling of scarce information and material resources, opportunities for exchange and mutual support. Often, but not exclusively, members of the cultural intelligentsia are the foundation of political subcultures. These groups typically engage in such activities as forming informal discussion circles, writing protest letters and circulating petitions, and printing and distributing *samizdat* texts. Since heterodox ideas and values cannot be readily expressed outside of such groups and because these groups are illegal or suppressed, they tend to be informal and tightly knit. The sense of community within such groups and the resulting solidarity are generally strong because they are based on personal ties and are small enough to provide a unique identity.<sup>16</sup> Free riding is discouraged both by high initiation costs and by the informal social control provided by the regulation of intimate social networks that provide the foundation of such groups.<sup>17</sup> Even the experience of an arrest or a beating by police may establish the moral credentials of the



dissidents and reaffirm their solidarity to one another.<sup>18</sup>

In authoritarian regimes, these subcultures must worry about visibility. They will generally try to find social niches in which to operate without direct surveillance. Thus, to ordinary citizens the existence and activities of political subcultures will generally be opaque, their direct influence on public opinion limited. In more totalitarian regimes, secret police agencies generally find it relatively easy to detect these subcultures, infiltrate them, and eliminate them through arrests. Although the historical evidence suggests that totalitarian social control never managed completely to eliminate submerged opposition arising from political subcultures, totalitarian regimes can effectively neutralize the threat represented by such groups and prevent them from becoming opposition movements.<sup>19</sup>

Why do people seek out free social spaces or join political subcultures, especially in a repressive setting where such activities invite sanctions of one kind or another? All forms of governance provoke grievances and discontent. But repressive regimes by definition try to obstruct the expression of grievances or the effective use of collective action to redress them through surveillance, intimidation and coercion. Subcultures form because marginalized individuals and groups identify with heterodox ideologies and lifestyles, or find themselves defined as deviant by the dominant regime.<sup>20</sup> Some seek out free social spaces to pursue their material and ideal interests or express their preferences for alternate norms and values. The more repressive the regime becomes, the more likely that it will generate grievances, reinforce dissenting identities, and provide incentives to seek redress through available means. As a result, although the authoritarian regime may encounter few public challenges, it may confront a more diffuse opposition in submerged, discontented groups that outwardly conform to the pre-

vailing order.

The formation of political subcultures in response to grievances and constraints on public expression of discontent can be seen as an action generating mechanism in collective action.<sup>21</sup> In the political process model, political opportunities are the primary causal mechanism to account for movement emergence. In our analysis, we see political opportunities as a necessary cause of movement emergence in repressive settings, but identify a prior, necessary step in the formation of informal groups and associations bearing heterodox ideologies. However, owing to the legacy of repression and only very limited organizational preparation, these groups may be weak in terms of the endogenous resources identified by the political process model as necessary for movement emergence. Given these obstacles, symbolic resources that can be appropriated from the dominant regime or generated through the political subculture itself are developed as substitutes for the more typical material, communicative, and organizational resources employed by nascent movements in democratic polities.<sup>22</sup>

So long as repression remains continuous and effective, political subcultures cannot effectively transform themselves into social protest movements and opposition will remain submerged. Political subcultures will not be transformed into protest movements under an effective, repressive, and consolidated regime, but if social control is less than complete, members of political subcultures will seek out free social spaces. It is during such periods that ordinary citizens who have not previously been involved in dissident groups will more readily express grievances. It has been argued in the case of China that the party state's reliance on official political campaigns and mass mobilizations to deal with social, political and economic problems is itself a potential source of protest. As Xuegang Zhou

puts it, “Participating in state initiated political campaigns provides an opportunity for individuals and groups to pursue their own agendas and exploit new opportunities. State-initiated political campaigns provide opportunities for unorganized groups and individuals to act together.”<sup>23</sup>

Subcultures can be transformed into movements when opportunities for collective action and public expression of heterodox viewpoints multiply as a result of declining repression (as a result, for example, of regime liberalization or the decay of coercive capacity) and expanding spaces for independent collective action. Dissidents attempt to multiply their resources by extending existing means or devising new ones. At the same time, declining repression provides new opportunities for previously unaffiliated individuals to identify with political subcultures. In addition to their own informal groups, dissidents will attempt to expand the free social spaces at their disposal by penetrating formal state institutions if they can redirect resources to mobilizing social protest. Much has been written on how, in the context of destabilizing market reforms, Chinese students subverted the official bureaucratic institutions of the university for purposes of mobilization in 1989.<sup>24</sup>

Another example of how subcultures can expand into opposing social movements can be seen in Hank Johnston and David Snow’s analysis of the rise of nationalist movements in the Soviet Baltic, which traces the shift from popular accommodation to opposition in the context of the declining authority of the Soviet state. For most of the historical period of the Soviet occupation, the challenge to authoritarian rule was provided not by parties or movements, but by subcultures of opposition located on the margins of public life, such as within cultural associations and intellectual circles. Johnston and Snow argue that, in the context

of declining repression and broadened institutional access accompanying reform, some previously accommodating groups were radicalized into a more defiant opposition. This suggests that, given sufficient popular disaffection from the regime and declining state control, a relatively narrow opposition based in dissident subcultures can become the basis of popular mobilization against the state. In the case of the Baltic republics, as new opportunities for political expression opened up under Gorbachev, the dissidents were already armed with a rich arsenal of symbolic weapons and staged highly visible, emotionally charged demonstrations in spite of their continuing organizational weakness. These demonstrations apparently did much to generate mass support for liberalization and, later, secession from the U.S.S.R.<sup>25</sup>

Analyzing the conditions for opposition in impoverished collective action regimes allows us to generate our second proposition: *To varying degrees authoritarian regimes systematically obstruct aggrieved individuals and groups from engaging in collective action. However, if social control is less than total, small subcultures of opposition will develop in spite of the costs. Dissidents within these subcultures will seek out whatever free social spaces are available to them to mount opposition to the regime. Given adequate resources and the eroding effectiveness of repression, protest movements will develop out of political subcultures.*

We recognize that the existence of informal groups and oppositional subcultures and the possibility of using state institutions and practices for purposes of protest are crucial conditions for the rise of collective protest in state-socialist regimes. We argue, however, that the resources available to political subcultures are quite limited, as are the organizational niches from which they operate. For these actors to mount a collective challenge to state authorities, they would still need

additional resources. Where material and organizational resources are relatively lacking, symbolic resources assume great importance.

### **Using public rituals to stage protest**

Historical dates and commemorations of cultural heroes are taken as occasions to stage protests in a variety of settings, not just in authoritarian ones. In contemporary democratic societies where protest has become routine, the presence of disruptive protesters may even become part of the political ritual itself.<sup>26</sup> But in many authoritarian states, these symbolic resources may be the only significant ones that opposition movements can exploit. Given their interest in maintaining order and denying collective actors a forum from which to challenge the regime, why do state elites take the risk of building political rituals around events like historical anniversaries that might be exploited by dissidents? We think that this stems from the structure and ideology of many authoritarian regimes. Political commemorations are important elements of political cultures in which state--directed mass mobilization and large-scale cultural events are the key forums for state legitimation.

Leninist regimes may be particularly vulnerable. Even if elites recognize the inherent dangers of large-scale public events they find it difficult to eliminate them. This is because publicly staged political rituals as manifestations of party power and enactments of public acclamation are such a central element of the political culture of Marxism-Leninism. Leninist elites require occasions on which to announce new policies, glorify regime achievements and seek ritualized public affirmation. This is part of the paradox of what Ken Jowitt has called Leninism's "charismatic bureaucratism."<sup>27</sup> In Communist regimes, these heavily scripted public events are designed to display the power and unity of the party and the

broad popular support it enjoys; producing what James Scott calls “self-portraits” of elites as they would like to be seen.<sup>28</sup> Just as important as the content of the ritual itself is the fact that by taking part in the scripted events the subordination of the people to the party is confirmed. Indeed, it is compliance that such rituals demand rather than genuine conviction or emotional investment.

So even if people privately view these rituals quite cynically, by going along with them only “as if” they did believe, they help to maintain the system through enactments of subordination and conformity that signal to others that social control remains intact.<sup>29</sup> But because they provide incentives to falsify one’s true preferences and loyalties, public displays of popular unity and assent may lead elites to overestimate their own support and underestimate the submerged potential for rebellion. Time and again in 1989 this led political elites to make damaging miscalculations.<sup>30</sup> Among ordinary citizens these ritualized affirmations may actually focus discontents, as they see and hear the representatives of the regime praise and affirm policies they believe to be mistaken or false. At the same time, knowing that a crowd will be present, dissidents have a readymade occasion to stage a protest guaranteed to draw at least some public notice.

Thus, while official rituals may be important to the maintenance of political domination, under some circumstances they may also be moments of jeopardy for authoritarian regimes. Even in the absence of other dimensions of political opportunity, a number of factors may make the regime vulnerable during official commemorations: (1) their highly *symbolic importance* for elites, dissidents, and the broader citizenry; (2) the fact that they rely on *public assemblies* and gatherings that are either banned or tightly controlled under ordinary circumstances; and (3) they generate *heightened expectations* and focus discontents among citizens. That

this kind of event can unintentionally generate protest is especially likely in cases where discontents are generalized and dissenting subcultures have formed but regime surveillance and repression have prevented the formation of an opposition movement or organized parties. If a movement relies heavily on subverting official rituals, this suggests the organizational weakness of dissidents and the absence of an independent civil society from which they can operate. The fact that the movement must piggyback on official political culture suggests the inadequate capacity to communicate an alternative set of values, symbols, and ideologies.

Because of the advantages they offer, public events such as national holidays, official assemblies and rallies, political funerals, and the visits or addresses of prominent statesmen all have a tendency to become *occasions* for protest in authoritarian settings, even when the risk of retaliation for participation remains high and favorable *opportunities* to achieve a desired collective end are absent or imperceptible. This is because the capacity of political rituals to generate publicity provides a strong incentive for dissident groups to risk protest. In general, it is true that public events, particularly those covered by the mass media, have a tendency to generate spontaneous popular reactions and heightened expectations that *something could happen*.<sup>31</sup> This alone does much to increase the possibility that contentious collective action of some kind will result from large-scale public events no matter what the conditions of the political environment, even if the level of repression or facilitation will likely influence the nature of those manifestations. In short, there was often no relaxation of social control or repression and no basis for a changing calculus of perceived efficacy in many of the incidents of collective action that we have observed in the early stages of the movements of 1989. There was, however, a stable set of incentives built around political commemorations for those who wished to express and generate public manifestations of dissent. Given

the capacity of dissident groups to act collectively, they tend to respond to these incentives as long as they expect to reach an adequate audience relative to the risks that they are assuming.

This leads to our third proposition: *nascent protest movements in authoritarian regimes have few opportunities for effective action and are generally resource poor, operating chiefly within the sheltered niches provided by free social spaces. Dissidents attempt to counter this weakness by exploiting the doubled-edged character of official political rituals. Because grievances can be expected to be more widely generalized than the dissident subculture, public displays of opposition draw wider public support when opportunities for protest are provided by dissident activism.*

We expect that if an authoritarian regime obstructs movement emergence but is held in low public regard, anniversaries and similar dates with political and cultural resonance become occasions for commemoration and thereby protest in state-socialist regimes. Such dates have the advantage of drawing large numbers of people into the streets for official celebrations (such as those for May Day or the anniversary of the founding of the state) and are widely known to be politically significant without requiring publicity work by opposition groups. People with what Zhou calls “unorganized” grievances are likely to be present on such dates, or knowing the significance of the date, the discontented will turn up in some public place in the hope of encountering likeminded people. The effect of public manifestations of dissent may be electric as actors begin to realize that their grievances are shared outside of their own private circles. What gives these incidents their explosive potential is that at a large-scale event uncoordinated groups may respond at the same time, widening the protest and undermining the



authorities' attempts to suppress or disperse demonstrators. In this way, small demonstrations in repressive regimes may signal to the broader public that dissident sentiments are more widely shared than relatively isolated actors had realized. Once these signals have been communicated, small demonstrations of discontent can give rise to cascade effects and rapidly widening protest that is not easy for the authorities to suppress.<sup>32</sup>

### **Political commemorations and protest mobilization**

Politics is not merely a struggle over interests, access, and advantages, but also over meanings and communication. Official or state-sanctioned commemorations of politically significant dates include rituals surrounding national independence, the founding of the state, the end of a war, the birthday of a political leader or national hero, or the death of an exemplary leader or political martyr. Official commemorations are meant to reinforce the regime, although, as we have seen, they may unintentionally encourage dissent. Rituals may be used to stage protest and when protesters try to disrupt state rituals a struggle over symbolic goods and their content is at stake. Dissenting voices try to frustrate or undo the process by which the sacred is collectively defined and experienced. Protesters who disrupt official commemorations are attempting to deny the regime a chance to reproduce the social order and generate sacred goods needed for their legitimacy.

Part of the importance of rituals is that they help to constitute “repertoires” of collective action.<sup>33</sup> State political rituals are often designed to elaborate prescribed forms of political participation and expression. Some states even establish a “charismatic” political culture heavily reliant on public stagings of state power and enactments of sentiment and loyalty. Mabel Berezin, for example, has shown how a “repertoire of ritual” developed in Fascist Italy that shaped public events and

nourished a highly emotional political life.<sup>34</sup> The political culture of Communist states, nurtured in the same climate of inter-war mass movements and agitprop mobilization, reveals a similarly highly ritualized presentation of political issues and an attempt to generate support through spectacular displays of regime accomplishments and manifestations of the putative “unity of the people and the party.” These occasions present political subcultures with an opportunity to assemble or to stage counter-protests that are likely to attract public attention. Dissident intellectuals may try to reframe or invert the existing meaning of sacred notions or political icons that have been officially endorsed by the regime. Officially sanctioned commemorations have the advantage of being linked to public gatherings, marches, parades and the like organized by the authorities. Dissidents may initially disguise their opposition in the form of “politically correct” rhetoric or by approved historical references, and protest associated with official events are more likely to take the form of appropriation rather than outright rejection of official ideology.

It is not just the double-edged nature of official public rituals that arms dissidents with opportunities for action and symbolic resources of protest. Given adequate openings, political subcultures may develop unofficial, dissident commemorations. These rituals help to communicate dissident values and goals to the wider population and provide them with a recognizable set of claims and practices that they can adopt for themselves. Once a protest movement is forming, rituals may also be used to generate collective solidarity and a repertoire of collective action. Given sufficient protected space to organize their activities, dissidents may also succeed in creating their own opposing political rituals linked to implicit or explicit criticism of the system and try to present them before the public.

Official commemorations are external to political subcultures; they represent externally provided opportunities within the structure of regime supported political culture. Meanings are contestable, but the dates themselves are not. They belong to a recognized cycle of holidays and public events. This means that these commemorations correspond, in part, to the concept of opportunity in the social movement literature. At the same time, because there are rituals and symbolic goods associated with these commemorations, they also provide a set of symbolic resources that challengers can employ, redirect, reframe, or challenge in a public forum. These events present *both* opportunity and resources for dissident movement challengers. Official commemorations around events such as historical anniversaries can be understood both in terms of *culturally provided opportunities* for collective action and in terms of *symbolic resources* of collective action.

At official commemorations, state-sponsored rituals may be disrupted and regime sponsored meanings associated with them contested. Official commemorations of historical anniversaries, sacred events and political heroes generally involve a crowd mobilized or organized by the state to provide an audience for speeches or appeals. From the regime's standpoint, the purpose of the crowd is to provide public assent to the regime's policies and symbolic support to the regime. However, because official commemorations require a crowd assembled in a public place, dissidents may be afforded much wider access to fellow citizens than would usually be the case. In addition, such events may both heighten the effectiveness of protest activity while lowering the potential costs by making arrest more unlikely. This has to do, in part, with the advantages of anonymity in a large crowd. Moreover, public commemorations will generally attract media attention, including foreign journalists. This means not only that a wider audience can be reached, but that cost of repression for the state is raised.

In terms of symbolic resources, anniversaries and other sacred events may generate expectations of great discontent among intellectuals and ordinary people, inadvertently deepening grievances as the gap between the official rituals conducted by the regime are seen to contradict the lived reality of the regime. The language of commemoration connected with such events also provides a vocabulary of protest useful to dissidents. But official commemorations of this kind have the disadvantage of making it difficult for activists to communicate their real goals and messages. As Dingxin Zhao notes of the Chinese students, “to avoid immediate repression, students tended to hide their real demands and goals behind safer and more culturally congenial forms of action.” As a result, their opposition to the regime had a message relying much more on national traditions and socialist values than many of the democracy activists intended. This reflected the organizational weakness and lack of coordination among multiple dissident groups trying to mobilize support.<sup>35</sup>

As social movements emerge out of political subcultures, dissidents not only exploit the advantages of official commemorations, but also create their own.<sup>36</sup> Non-official, or even banned commemorations of persons and events that are ignored or repudiated by the regime may become rallying points for political subcultures, especially in the absence of effective communication networks. As Karl-Dieter Opp has observed of Eastern Europe,

Anniversaries of events, where blatant regime repression was exercised or citizen protests occurred in the past, were opportunities for many citizens to gather at central places. An example is the anniversary of Jan Palach's protest by setting himself on fire, when many people gathered at Wenzel Square in Prague. Such events generate expectations that many other people will gather at central places of a city.<sup>37</sup>

This second type of commemoration, however, may be less likely to draw wide public attention. Such dates and their significance may be well known in dissident circles, but almost unknown to ordinary citizens who rely on personal networks or the state-controlled media for information. It may be easy to rally the members of a political subculture on an anniversary that is highly salient to the group's identity, but whatever protests are staged may be largely self-referential, lack public resonance, and be much more easily detected, prevented, or suppressed by the authorities. These unofficial commemorations also require greater communication and movement framing on the part of dissident forces prior to protest actions than does disrupting existing official events. Dissident commemorations may thus require greater resources and political access than piggybacking on state rituals. As a result, such commemorations may fail to attract attention, result in ineffective protests, and invite regime repression. If there has been inadequate communication between dissident groups and the broader public, even a widely observed dissident commemoration may do no more than evoke a vague sense of historical tragedy from ordinary citizens.

Given these disadvantages, the point of dissident commemorations is less to mobilize a direct challenge to the regime so much as to generate symbolic resources of collective action. These rituals articulate a set of alternative sacred symbols and icons for use of the opposition movement itself.<sup>38</sup> Participation in

politically alternative rituals may serve purposes of “re-identification”; helping to create and renew commitment, solidarity and identity among the movement participants themselves.<sup>39</sup> Commemorations of fallen heroes, of historically resonant dates, and of regime atrocities also serve as periodic occasions for members of dissident groups to gather together and reinforce their common project.<sup>40</sup> In this way, although they typically have far less public resonance than official commemorations, protest rituals are potentially productive of a set of symbolic resources by and for the movement itself that help to sustain solidarity in the face of repression and the often highly unlikely prospect that the repressive regime will give way anytime soon.

Both types of commemorations may serve the purposes of organizational and cognitive preparation for mobilization. Friends may decide to use such an occasion, for example, to call on the government to release a political prisoner. Historians may write commemorative articles to rekindle the spirit of the heroic past. Social critics may take the occasions to analyze contemporary social problems. Secret gatherings as well as open academic conferences are held. In other words, as Opp suggests, the prospect of a coming anniversary or similar occasion may bring together people with common interests to talk about issues of common concern. Thus, in the absence of formal dissident organizations, commemorations of events like anniversaries indirectly serve the purpose of organization and consciousness raising.

Unofficial commemorations may be less auspicious for the development of a protest movement because the opportunity dimension is either weaker or absent. At the same time, however, the rituals connected with unofficial commemorations may be especially productive of symbolic goods and solidarity that directly benefits the dissident community. Unofficial commemorations are occasions that

are meaningful to movement participants and can be used to generate movement identity and solidarity. Unofficial commemorations provide for the self-representation of isolated, stigmatized and, politically heretical groups in opposition to official condemnations. These rituals tied to political commemorations help to establish a movement repertoire. Thus dissident commemorations provide resources that help to generate further resources, such as movement solidarity, political identity, and a repertoire of symbolic objects and practices connected to the movement. Even if the unofficial commemoration is disrupted or dispersed by police repression, this may still have the desired effect of strengthening internal solidarity through recommitment and establish the moral and political qualifications of the dissidents.

There are numerous historical examples of the process by which alternative publics and dissident subcultures are structured around political commemorations and their associated rituals in authoritarian regimes. One is how Poland's Solidarity activists made extensive use of commemorations in the mobilization of working class support. Despite police repression and the arrest of activists, in December 1978 and 1979, the Committee for Free Trade Unions staged commemorative services for the scores of victims of the December 16, 1970 massacre of protesting workers in Gdansk's Lenin Shipyards. As the regime began to give way to Solidarity's demands, a symbolic expression of this was made on December 16, 1980 when government representatives and Roman Catholic clergy joined Lech Walensa and union leaders at a service in memory of the 1970 strike and officially consecrated its victims as martyrs. Even after the declaration of martial law and the crackdown against Solidarity, the memory of 1970 remained fixed in the popular imagination; the experience of the joint commemorations demonstrated the enduring legitimacy of the movement.<sup>41</sup>

We are now led to our last proposition: *The importance of official (double-edged) political rituals in authoritarian regimes is that they present opportunities for collective action that can be exploited to bring dissident issues to a broader public. Unofficial commemorations arising out of political subcultures are employed by dissident groups to generate symbolic resources of collective action including movement identification, member solidarity and a repertoire of recognized practices.*

In Eastern Europe's "velvet revolutions" of 1989, ritualized commemorations provided key elements of the collective action repertoire. This repertoire included commemorative ritual elements such as candlelight processions and silent marches in memory of political prisoners or victims of repression, the signing of hymns and anthems, and gatherings outside of churches and other well-known, symbolically charged locales (e.g., cemeteries, public squares, in the shadow of national monuments). Similarly, in China during the spring of 1989, student activists employed large-character posters connected with mourning and other commemorative rituals to turn the unexpected death of a party leader to their advantage. Although officially banned commemorations may fail to achieve the same degree of public recognition as protest staged during official commemorations, they may be more important as a source of alternative symbols, practices, and collective experiences that aid movement emergence. In time, authoritarian regimes may come to expect challenges during state-sponsored rituals and in response to significant dates in the dissident calendar and increase the police presence and surveillance in response. Indeed, we see precisely such reactions by the authorities in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and China.



## **Political rituals and the 1989 protest movements**

In our analysis of the democracy movements of 1989 in China and Eastern Europe, we find that political commemorations contributed to mobilization mainly in two ways –on-the-spot mobilization in response to opportunities for protest and the organizational and ideational preparation that upcoming anniversaries occasioned within political subcultures. These events are summarized in Table 1. In the remainder of this article we provide an analysis of the role of political commemorations as symbolic resources of collection action in both Eastern Europe and China in 1989. The enumeration of these events is not meant to suggest that the contingent of anniversaries in 1989 *caused* the movement to happen. Nor do we claim that the ways these anniversaries were used in the course of the movement provided the only resources of movement mobilization. We do want to argue, however, that as symbolic resources, the historical anniversaries in 1989 provided crucial resources for mobilization in another sense. In the absence of organizational resources, they provided the necessary cultural and ideational preparation, albeit in an unintended fashion. It is important to note that the reliance on political commemorations to provide dissident rhetoric and to mobilize protest generally points to the weakness of movements in these societies and their need to piggyback on state organized events and culturally acceptable rhetoric and actions. We will then draw some conclusions concerning the structure of opposition in state-socialist regimes and suggest the ways in which greater attention to cultural processes can yield benefits for social movement analysis.

## **Eastern Europe in 1989**

In the late 1980s, socialist regimes experienced mounting economic difficulties and new sources of political vulnerability. The failure of party elites to contend with widening economic problems and popular dissatisfaction with living standards

fueled growing political unrest and eroding legitimacy even within the ranks of the ruling parties. At the same time, expanding economic and cultural contacts with Western societies and the penetration of foreign media made socialist regimes vulnerable to international public opinion. The ability of the hardline party-states to manage the crisis was further undercut by Gorbachev's advocacy of reform and political liberalization that seemed simultaneously a challenge to party authority and an encouragement to dissidents. Both those hardline regimes that endorsed market reforms (China) and those that rejected them (GDR, Czechoslovakia) experienced increasing difficulty maintaining political control and policing dissent. Given increasing popular discontent and a changing political environment -most prominently the "Gorbachev factor" □ dissidents in both Eastern Europe and China were eager to test the limits of repression and develop a new repertoire of protest tactics.<sup>42</sup>

As Przeworski has observed, by 1989 Communist ideology in Eastern Europe was becoming a threat to the system it was meant to legitimate. This was not only because Marxism-Leninism provided a ready yardstick to measure inequality and domination against the rhetoric of utopia, but because the organized public rituals that were a central feature of communist political culture began to generate more conflict than consent. The struggle around political rituals in Eastern Europe was not only one that involved conflicts over ideology, but also over the control of public spaces where political rituals are enacted. Largely excluded from the mass media and from institutions, public places such as city squares and streets were the key arena for the movement for democracy and human rights in Eastern Europe.

Public demonstrations were significant for a number of reasons. First, they took the risky step of moving outside the narrow confines of Church-supported

organizations or political subcultures and brought dissident issues before a wider public. Second, they directly challenged the party's claim to a monopoly on political expression and organization. And third, they drew international attention to internal sources of dissent that otherwise might be nearly invisible to outsiders and opaque to fellow citizens. Often, public demonstrations revolved around political commemorations of one kind or another. In some cases, state-sponsored rituals and assemblies such as May Day were disrupted by dissidents. In other cases, opposition groups organized commemorations of their own. These commemorations became not only opportunities to engage in protest, but also to raise public awareness by stirring collective memory of past crimes committed by the regime or of nationalist heroes and martyrs of the past.

### *East Germany*

In East Germany political subcultures formed under the umbrella of the church, the only autonomous institution in communist society. These subcultures took shape in the 1970s and 1980s focusing on such issues as pacifism, the environment, women's rights and, somewhat belatedly, human rights. In the late 1980s, as liberalization took hold elsewhere in the Soviet bloc and Gorbachev signaled his support for reform, East German dissidents began to organize a loose human rights movement of their own.<sup>43</sup> Despite the liberalizing international climate, however, the GDR's leadership under Erich Honecker categorically rejected emulating Soviet reforms and suppressed internal opposition.

Despite the regime's political intransigence, in January 1988 human rights activists in East Berlin tried to stage a public protest on the anniversary of the murder of the socialist martyrs Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. However, the group had

been previously infiltrated by secret police informants who reported the plans for the protest to their handlers. Police agents intercepted the dissidents on their way to the official parade commemorating the heroes and arrests were made. As a result, the protest did not take place, the human rights group that planned the event was broken up, and several dissident leaders were arrested and expelled to the West. In addition, considerable damage was done to opposition networks in the GDR. Despite their failure, word of the attempt became public knowledge once West German television — widely available in the East — reported on the arrests and expulsions.

A year later, opposition groups in Leipzig, a large industrial city in East Germany, succeeded where their Berlin counterparts had failed. On the eve of the seventieth anniversary of the murders, a coalition of activists calling itself the “Initiative for Democracy” secretly distributed hundreds of flyers around the city demanding the right to free expression, assembly, and the press and calling for a demonstration at the city’s central market square during the state Luxemburg-Liebkecht commemorations. This time, because the Leipzig group had not been infiltrated by police informants, the dissidents succeeded. On January 15, 1989 an estimated eight-hundred people assembled at the market square and listened as a dissident proclaimed, Socialism without unlimited freedom of opinion and the press is impossible. That was and remains the central message of Rosa Luxemburg.” Following this, dissident groups led the crowd on a protest march to the Karl Liebkecht memorial. They were confronted by police, who forcefully dispersed the march and made more than one hundred arrests. Several organizers were detained and threatened with lengthy imprisonment, prompting smaller demonstrations demanding their release on January 16 and January 23. The Luxemburg-Liebkecht protest was the first such event organized by Leipzig

groups that drew a larger number of participants from outside the dissident subculture than from within it.<sup>44</sup> Although the organizers of the demonstration were threatened with long imprisonments, because the protest happened at a major political event it generated publicity both within the Church-based opposition in the GDR and internationally, leading to the surprising release of the dissidents after only a week of captivity.<sup>45</sup> Their release encouraged further efforts to stage demonstrations.

Why did the relatively isolated dissident groups in Berlin and Leipzig choose this particular historical anniversary as occasions for protest? The Luxemburg–Liebknecht anniversary was one of the holiest dates in the socialist calendar of the GDR. It involved public speeches by party leaders, newspaper editorials, television coverage of marches and memorial processions, wreath-laying at monuments, and similar political rituals. Indeed, the rituals connected with the martyrdom of Luxemburg and Liebknecht linked the regime to the canonized co-founders of the German Communist Party murdered by reactionary forces after the failed “Spartacist” uprising of early 1919. The tragic figures of Luxemburg and Liebknecht still had the capacity to generate considerable sympathy as true examples of socialist conviction and revolutionary virtue, but the official commemorations had become so highly scripted as to be almost devoid of genuine commitment or enthusiasm. Party officials were instructed to round up participants and were given detailed instructions on what slogans should be shouted in the processions before the party tribunal.<sup>46</sup> Although official commemorations in the GDR had largely degenerated into a subtly coerced show of support for the regime, the anniversary of the murders remained one of the country’s holiest days. A large crowd of people including Western journalists was assured in the downtown streets of the major cities.

Dissidents seized on the Luxemburg-Liebkecht commemorations for all the practical reasons noted above, but also because they were trying to appropriate symbolically these official martyrs for their own cause. Indeed, GDR human rights activists took as their motto Luxemburg's statement that "Freedom is always the freedom of those who think differently" □ a virtual dissident manifesto declared by one of the regime's founding heroes. With tensions rising within the GDR stemming from the East German party's rejection of glasnost and perestroika, using Luxemburg to frame human rights issues had greater resonance. Taking advantage of public events centered around historical anniversaries helped to mitigate the weaknesses of the East German opposition and the disadvantages it faced in confronting the state, but this alone did not radically tip the balance of power in its favor.

The East German regime also recognized that official commemorations were a resource that opponents could exploit and tried to minimize this advantage. But as much as the regime obstructed the loose opposition groups from coming together as a cohesive movement, it could not stamp out the discontent that gave rise to protest, nor could it completely retreat from the public rituals that sustained an increasingly strained regime. Following the attempted demonstration at the Luxemburg-Liebkecht commemorations in East Berlin in January 1988, a party security analysis argued that in the future "public forums" must be denied to the opposition. An important part of this was that they should be prevented from taking advantage of important dates and public events to stage protests, concluding that: "In general, political vigilance must be increased. It must be taken more seriously that hostile forces will be taking the opportunity to misuse cultural assemblies, historical dates and social events."<sup>47</sup> This was a significant worry,

especially in light of the coming fortieth anniversary of the GDR that was being planned as a celebration of socialist triumphs and the “unity of the people and the Party.”

Unofficial commemorations also occurred during 1989, but they remained small, relatively isolated events centered on the dissident subculture. In Leipzig, dissidents held commemorative protests on at least two significant occasions prior to the revolutionary turn of events in the fall of 1989. In June, members of church-based environmental groups staged a “memorial” march to protest the destruction of the local environment. This demonstration centered on the mourning ritual to dramatize the destruction of the Pleisse River that had once flowed through the town until it grew so polluted that it had to be redirected and entombed. This time an estimated four-hundred people took part in the march, resulting in seventy-four arrests. A second wave of protest activities occurred in Berlin and Leipzig in July in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre and the GDR government’s official praise of the action. In Leipzig, church-based dissidents used the occasion of a Lutheran Church congress meeting on July 11<sup>th</sup> to commemorate the victims of repression in China. Carrying a banner that read “Minzhu-Demokratie” about two-hundred protesters condemned the party leadership for endorsing the Tiananmen crackdown and demanded the recognition of human rights in the GDR.<sup>48</sup> While both of these events had considerable local importance in the development of the Leipzig opposition movement, given the tight grip the state still maintained they failed to generate broader public participation and had limited resonance outside of dissident networks.

Official political commemorations again played a crucial role in the development

of broader popular opposition once the state faced a general political crisis that affected all GDR citizens. The expansion of protest outside of dissident subgroups was triggered by events in connection with the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the GDR in early October. During the summer of 1989 new holes in the Iron Curtain opened by the reform-minded government in Budapest provoked the GDR's highly destabilizing "exiting crisis" of tens of thousands of mostly young people fleeing westward or occupying West German embassies in neighboring socialist states.<sup>49</sup> To stem the tide of refugees, the government announced that the border with Czechoslovakia would be sealed on October 3<sup>rd</sup>. In the midst of this, the recently established New Forum opposition group used the occasion of the approaching anniversary to appeal to the party for reform and the legalization of independent citizens' movements aimed at "renewing" and "enriching" socialism.<sup>50</sup> Instead of acknowledging pressures for reform, the party organ *Neues Deutschland* infuriated many East Germans by denouncing the exiters as immoral people who had "cut themselves off from society," adding that the GDR "would not shed a single tear" for those who left.<sup>51</sup>

The timing of the exiting crisis and the state's ill-received reaction to it coincided with the long-planned, carefully orchestrated official celebrations of the GDR's anniversary. In Berlin on the evening of October 6<sup>th</sup>, a hundred thousand party members and socialist youth marched in processions celebrating forty years of victorious socialism and listened as party leader Erich Honecker boasted that the Wall could stand for another hundred years to protect this "outpost of peace and socialism in Europe." By contrast, the speech by the visiting leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, called for democratization and openness to the great



acclaim of the audience.<sup>52</sup> Encouraged by Gorbachev's visit, a small, dissident-led protest march formed parallel to the official commemorations. As the evening progressed, spectators and even participants drawn from the masses of people at the official ceremony crossed over to join them. Shouting "Gorby, Gorby," the protesters were met by troops and police forces that used batons and dogs to break up the demonstration. Now their shouts turned to "Gorby, help us!" □ a cry audible on the official podium and widely reported on in the Western media available to most East German households. Scores of people were injured and hundreds of arrests were made before order could be restored, turning the celebration of forty years of "heroic socialism" into an embarrassing fiasco that discredited Honecker and signaled the weakness of his government.

In cities outside Berlin, the regime's attempts to celebrate the successes of forty years of socialism were similarly upset. Spontaneous demonstrations of tens of thousands in Leipzig, Dresden, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Halle, and Plauen brought shared grievances and a sense of outrage into the streets where they were often magnified in confrontation with a brutal security apparatus. Uncoordinated groups of young people clashed with police and injuries were widespread. In all, the Interior Ministry reported that more than 1,500 people were arrested during the weekend of October 6-8<sup>th</sup>.<sup>53</sup> Thousands of angry, previously uninvolved citizens whose grievances had been suddenly magnified by the exiting crisis and by government brutality at the fortieth anniversary protests began to recognize the vulnerability of the regime and joined the protests. When this began to happen, the pace of popular mobilization increased dramatically and in the weeks following the anniversary, demonstrations in Leipzig and other cities swelled from a few thousand to hundreds of thousands. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November the collapse

of the regime became immanent.

The disruptive protests at the fortieth anniversary commemorations turned the political rituals associated with the anniversary upside down. Instead of being an occasion to trumpet the virtues of socialism and of the regime, it became an opportunity to criticize and attack the regime. In effect, the regime was insulted at its own birthday party by its own guests, including the guest of honor. Intended as a stabilizing display of the unity of the party and the people, the official celebrations of East Germany's birthday turned out to be a spontaneous display of popular anti-Communism. Celebrating the anniversary in a way that was oblivious to the concerns of ordinary people forced them to confront the fact that the state had persisted for decades without solving many of the country's fundamental problems and now failed to serve their interests. Once people began to turn away from prescribed participation and expression, manifestations of discontent became ever more common and Communist control over the public sphere rapidly collapsed. At this point, short of a bloody crackdown, it had become nearly impossible to reverse the eroding power of the party. A few days later on October 9, seventy-thousand people chanting "We are the people" marched through the streets of Leipzig and, unable to rally sufficient support for a crackdown within the regime, the GDR began to collapse.<sup>54</sup>

### *Czechoslovakia*

Czechoslovakia, like East Germany, went into 1989 with a highly repressive post-Stalinist regime that distanced itself from Gorbachev's reforms. There was little indication that the hardliners were giving way. Czech intellectuals had formed a number of dissident groups (most famously Charter 77) and enjoyed some support within cultural associations but they were isolated from the public. Intellectuals

like Vaclav Havel saw few prospects for a democracy movement and hoped for no more than gradual liberalization. However, as in the GDR, international events created new opportunities for small dissident groups to take action. In Czechoslovakia, like the GDR, commemorations of historical anniversaries played an important role in mobilizing protest beyond small, isolated dissident subcultures. Czechoslovak dissidents, student groups and ordinary citizens were able to make use of state-sponsored political rituals to stage protests and also developed a rich repertoire of ritual commemorations of their own devising that helped to compensate for their severe organizational weaknesses.<sup>55</sup>

Anniversaries of historically resonant dates and patriotic figures are especially significant in the Czech case. In August 1988, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion that brought the liberalizing “Prague Spring” to an end, Czechoslovakia witnessed the largest demonstration against the regime since the Dubcek era. Chanting prodemocracy and pro-Gorbachev slogans, about ten-thousand demonstrators, chiefly students and young people, filled Prague’s central Wenceslas Square demanding that the regime publically acknowledge that Warsaw-pact intervention had been a criminal act. Riot police responded to the “illegal provocation” by dispersing protesters with tear gas and batons. On October 28, 1988, the seventieth anniversary of the establishment of the first (“bourgeois”) Czechoslovak Republic, an estimated five-thousand demonstrators again filled the square chanting “Freedom! Freedom!” and “Masaryk” (the founding president of the 1<sup>st</sup> republic) and waving the national colors in defiance of the authorities. Again, the police responded with force resulting in scores of arrests and injuries. On the fortieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, an officially recognized commemoration was organized by the state to coincide with the visit of the French president. Again protest

occurred, this time when some five-thousand demonstrators hijacked the event, denouncing Communist polices. However, this time the police were shackled by the international visibility of the visit and by the official nature and topic of the event and thus held back from violent repression.

If 1988 had been inauspicious for the regime because of the anniversary of both the 1918 founding of the democratic republic and the twentieth anniversary of the 1968 invasion, 1989 was also rich with symbolic historical anniversaries. The year 1989 contained both the twentieth anniversary of the suicide protest of Jan Palach and the fiftieth anniversary of the murder of student activist Jan Opletal by Nazi occupiers.

The memory of the student activist Jan Palach was a central element of the dissident subculture in Czechoslovakia. Palach, a nationalist student, set himself on fire in Wenceslas Square to protest Soviet military intervention and the suppression of the “Prague Spring” on January 16, 1969. Three days later Palach died of his injuries. For the next several days, Palach’s death provoked demonstrations throughout Moravia and Bohemia, including by peaceful crowds at his burial in Prague on January 25. The following day, a large demonstration against Soviet intervention and the state’s new hardline course was dispersed by riot police and about two-hundred people were arrested. The following year, in January 1970, police forces raided homes and detained about fifteen-hundred people in order to break up dissident networks aimed at organizing commemorations of Jan Palach’s death. Because his suicide was associated with smashed hopes for reform and the national humiliation of foreign invasion, over the intervening years the date became an orienting point in the loosely organized dissident groups.

On January 15, 1989, demonstrators gathered to commemorate the twentieth

anniversary of Palach's death. During the commemorations, several thousand protesters clashed with the police who used beatings, tear gas, and water cannons against the demonstration. Ongoing clashes with the police led to six days of sustained protest and more than a thousand arrests. Among those arrested were Vaclav Havel and a number of leading dissidents, whose arrests disrupted organizing but proved helpful in generating national and international support for the network of opposition groups. Dissident groups circulated open letters calling for the release of Havel and the other political detainees that were eventually signed by more than two-thousand intellectuals. A shortened version of one of these letters entitled "Several Sentences" called for an end to political repression, freedom of speech and assembly, and an official reevaluation of the events of 1968. By August, about forty-thousand Czechoslovak citizens had signed the petition.

Months later at the official May Day celebrations dissident groups again organized demonstrations against the regime. After reformist regimes in Hungary and Poland expressed regret over their participation in the 1968 Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, thousands of people took to the streets to protest Communism, including delegations of Hungarian and Polish dissidents. On October 28, despite police efforts to detain potential organizers, an estimated ten-thousand people took part in unofficial commemorations of the seventy-first anniversary of the republic's independence in Wenceslas Square. In both cases, the police responded with force and dispersed the demonstrations. It was becoming clear, however, that despite ongoing repression of dissent, opposition to the regime seemed to be spilling out of the small dissident milieu into the broader ranks of citizens. The demonstrations of the previous months had helped to generate a host of new civil rights, environmental, religious, and student groups that joined in calls for reform

and denounced police brutality. Moreover, the dissident-led historical commemorations rekindled collective memories of the painful and humiliating history of the country and underscored Czechoslovakia's political and economic stagnation.

In the summer and fall of 1989 events in East Germany and elsewhere in the Eastern bloc further encouraged Czechoslovaks to keep up the pressure. With the fall of Honecker's regime in October, the Czechoslovak hardliners appeared out of step and without close allies. The fall of the Berlin Wall in early November signaled the end of the post-totalitarian era, creating widespread expectations that there had to be movement in Czechoslovakia, too. On November 17, the pace of anti-regime protest was quickened when a government sponsored commemoration of antifascist martyr Jan Opletal (killed by the Gestapo in 1939) in connection with "International Student's Day" was taken over by a parallel demonstration led by students. A new organization of independent student groups hailed Opletal as a patriotic hero who had fought foreign occupation. Holding their own ceremonies, student groups cheered speakers denouncing the government, sang the national anthem, and laid flowers at a cemetery. Soon, the demonstration grew more stridently anti-Communist with some fifty-thousand taking part in a march through the city center. Confronted by police and paratroops, the demonstration became violent and resulted in scores of injuries and arrests.

The demonstration on November 17 proved a turning point. The following day, theater workers went on strike to protest the brutal treatment of protesters. Outraged by the political immobility of the regime and the brutality of its repression, demonstrations continued to grow. On November 19, an estimated two-hundred-thousand people filled Wenceslas Square, and on November 23, three-

hundred-thousand filled the city center in Prague and seventy-thousand in Bratislava. In the midst of this, the small and fragmented opposition rapidly organized, calling for peaceful protest and a nationwide general strike to display the popular opposition to the government. During a two-hour warning strike on November 27, millions of workers joined in a stunning display of opposition to the regime. Acknowledging the regime's utter lack of support, the Communist government resigned and the new regime was sworn in on December 10. Seven days later, demonstrations commemorating the student victims of police beatings on November 17 turned into rallies calling for Havel's election to the presidency. With his election, the post-Communist history of Czechoslovakia began.

### *China in 1989*

Historical memory is of profound importance in Chinese politics. In the early days of the economic reform, at the turn of 1978 and 1979, Chinese intellectuals and ordinary citizens debated about the necessities of democratic political reform by referring both to the (largely negative) recent history of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution and to the more distant ideals of the May Fourth Movement, ideals of science and democracy that the May Fourth generation learned from European romanticism and the French Revolution.<sup>56</sup> Much of the debate took the form of historical allusions and critiques of contemporary realities, but in spirit it was future oriented. Political democratization was presented in plans and blueprints, of which Wei Jingsheng's "Fifth Modernization" is probably the most prominent example.

By 1989, ten years after China's economic reform took off, it would be about time for a historical review. Three sets of factors exacerbated the urgency of such a review. On the one hand, the economic reform seemed to be confronted with

severe difficulties. The most visible symptom in 1988 was an exorbitant inflation. On the other hand, political reform was making no progress either. The anti-spiritual pollution campaign in 1986, which cost Hu Yaobang his position as the Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party, remained fresh in the public memory, even as the cultural scene was recovering among intellectual debates about the values and shortcomings of Chinese culture and tradition.

On top of these two sets of factors loomed the imminent arrival of a whole series of big and small historical anniversaries. Mostly written into school textbooks and thus well-known to young and old, these anniversaries were often used as occasions to reinforce patriotic sentiments by the Chinese government. For many Chinese intellectuals and ordinary citizens, they were also occasions for moral and cultural reflections. This was particularly true of those with activist orientations. In 1988, these “cultural activists,” as they have been called, felt that they would face so many round numbered historical anniversaries in 1989 that it was their moral responsibility to respond to these important dates.<sup>57</sup> As Su Xiaokang, one such cultural activist, put it in an article published in May 1988:

The year 1989 is destined to be a singular memorial year which meets many historical giants: It is the bicentenary of the French Revolution; the centenary of the founding of the Second International; the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement; the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the Third International; the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China; the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Lushan Conference; the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 9<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China; the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the death of Liu Shaoqi; and so on. No one can escape these coming days of the year which may make you happy or unhappy one way or another.<sup>58</sup>

The various responses that these cultural activists were to make in 1988 and 1989 eventually turned out to be organizational and ideational preparations for the rise



of the student movement. To be sure, there were no concrete plans for starting a social movement. Nor were there explicit efforts at organizing. Yet the cultural debates that were developing in 1988 in anticipation of the arrival of 1989 not only created small islands of individuals with various kinds of informal networks among them, but also created a general cultural milieu in favor of thorough-going cultural and political critiques of Chinese reality. When the anniversary dates came one after another in 1989, they quickly activated the networks and general milieu into necessary resources for large-scale collective action. In what follows, we first review a few examples of cultural activism that took place before the democracy movement started on April 15, 1989. We then show how activists made explicit use of anniversaries during the movement. Our purpose is to show that commemorations of historical anniversaries contributed to movement mobilization both before and after the movement started.

Together with a group of other cultural activists, the abovementioned Su Xiaokang made crucial, though probably unintended, cultural preparations for the 1989 Chinese student movement through the production of the documentary TV series *River Elegy*.<sup>59</sup> First aired in June 1988, *River Elegy* depicted the tortuous process of Chinese modernity in startling images and metaphors. In contrasting a Chinese culture represented by the poverty of the yellow earth to an open and vibrant Western culture symbolized by blue seas, the authors of the series rekindled the fiery critique of traditional culture once launched by activists of the May Fourth Movement.<sup>60</sup>

The series met with unexpected success. Within two months of the first airing, *River Elegy* was aired a second time, in August 1988. By this time, Party conservatives had become aware of the critical power of the documentary. Under

the charge of propagating cultural nihilism, the documentary was finally banned. But the damage, so to speak, had been done. Nationwide debates on the weaknesses and strengths of Chinese culture spread, much as the debates on the weaknesses and strengths of Confucianism had spread in the years prior to the May Fourth Movement. These debates were not just occasions for the exchange of ideas, but also for the meeting of people and the cultivation of small social networks.<sup>61</sup>

The political calendar for the last days of 1988 and the first few months of 1989 read like a book of bad omens for China's party leaders. In early December 1988, on the decennial of the Democracy Wall Movement (1978-1979), a veteran activist of that movement, Ren Wanding addressed an open letter to several international human rights organizations requesting an investigation into the conditions of Chinese political prisoners jailed because of their involvement in the Democracy Wall Movement. Also in early December, the cultural activist Jin Guantao declared to a student symposium on the "Future of China and the World" that "the socialist experiment and its failure will be, together with the collapse of Western centrism, the two major legacies of the twentieth century to mankind."<sup>62</sup> Meanwhile at a national symposium on China's ten year reform efforts, Su Shaozhi, director of the Marxist Leninist Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, attacked the shortcomings of the socialist system.<sup>63</sup> The January 1989 issue of the popular magazine *China Youth* carried an article by the same Su Shaozhi entitled "What Will the Year 1989 Tell Us?" He concluded that "No Chinese of conscience can fail to recognize the fact that democracy and science in China today are extremely incomplete."<sup>64</sup> On December 30, 1988, a high profile conference was held in Beijing on "The Cultural Crisis and the Way Out of It." On this occasion, Le Zehou, another influential cultural activist, extended his understanding of the

cultural crisis to an impending social crisis:

Mainly the crisis is not cultural, but ... social. Aside from economic problems, there are also problems of social order and ecological problems, including water shortages, pollution, misuse of chemical fertilizers, the decline in the fertility of the soil, loss of control over population growth, and so forth. Not only are these present-day crises, but there is also turmoil hidden in the future.<sup>65</sup>

The year 1989 again opened with open letters and petitions. On January 6, Fang Lizhi wrote an open letter to Deng Xiaoping to call for the release of Wei Jingsheng, who had been jailed since the 1979 Democracy Wall Movement. Another open letter followed on February 16, this time signed by thirty-three celebrity intellectuals. The letter proposed that the Chinese government should grant special pardons to China's political prisoners on the occasion of two important anniversaries in modern Chinese history:

We are deeply concerned upon hearing of the open letter to Chairman Deng Xiaoping by Mr. Fang Lizhi on January 6, 1989. We believe that, on the occasions of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic and the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, a general pardon of political prisoners, particularly the release of political prisoners like Wei Jingsheng, will create a harmonious atmosphere favorable to the reform. It will also conform to the widespread trend of increasing respect for human rights in the world today.<sup>66</sup>

This open letter was followed by another on February 26. Signed by forty-two scientists and academic journal editors, it explicitly called for accelerated political reform. On the part of the Chinese government, no efforts were made to meet the demands for democratic reform articulated by these cultural activists. Nor was there any attempt to suppress these influential voices. The consequences were two-fold. On the one hand, the open and public form in which these cultural activists expressed their demands contributed to the influence of their ideas. On the other

hand, the state's apparent tolerance of the cultural criticisms, many of which targeted the socialist system, signaled a softened official attitude and gave rise to higher expectations. This created a situation favorable to collective action. We do not deny that complex factors might be behind the creation of such a situation. One strategically important factor, however, was that cultural activists were able to seize the moment of forthcoming historically important anniversaries to make further political demands. While cultural activists contributed to the rise of the democracy movement through cultural activities that provided organizational and ideational preparation, once the movement started, activists and movement leaders made conscious use of significant historical dates for mobilization purposes.

To begin with, the movement started in a way that confirms our view of the importance of political commemorations. It was triggered by an event with deep historical resonance and commemorative power in the minds of Chinese students. The death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989 was as unexpected to Chinese students as it was unambiguously suggestive: it was the death of a relatively open-minded and reform-oriented leader who suffered his political downfall in 1986 because of his sympathy with the student unrest in that year. Twelve years before, in 1976, the death of another popular leader Zhou Enlai had triggered the April Fifth Movement, the first major popular uprising since the heyday of the Red Guard Movement in the mid-1960s.

In 1989, students lost no time in seizing the moment to mourn the dead leader. Political commemoration in the form of ritualized mourning was a legitimate practice by official conventions and the state did not have a good excuse to ban it. Immediately after the news of Hu's death spread to the universities, wall posters mourning his death and protesting against the injustices he had suffered appeared

in large numbers on campuses in Beijing. These events quickly pushed the students out of their campus into the streets. On April 18, 1989, a group of students made their first attempt to submit a list of demands to the government, asking for the reevaluation of Hu Yaobang, among others. One of the most effective uses of official rituals by movement organizers occurred on April 22, the day officially set for Hu's funeral ceremony. Following the funeral ceremony, crowds of students gathered in front on the Tiananmen Square, in front of the Great Hall of the People, where the funeral had taken place, to demand dialogue with government officials. Three student representatives crossed the police line and knelt down on the stairs of the Great Hall to present a petition in the style of a courtier presenting a memorial to an emperor in earlier times. The meanings of this symbolically challenging and emotionally explosive gesture have been discussed elsewhere.<sup>67</sup> What is important for our immediate purpose is that this symbolic act generated an immediate emotional solidarity and commitment to the movement among those present. A student leader from Beijing University recalls:

That afternoon, as my friends made their way back from the square, they told me angrily that the representatives had knelt for forty minutes, but no one had ever come out of the Great Hall. The officials had left through a back door. One of my old roommates said through clenched teeth, "If I had a cannon, I would have blown up the Great Hall of the People." Almost everyone who had been there was as angry as he was. The students had given a reasonable and patriotic request to the government, but the Party officials had completely ignored them. I noticed that many students who had never cared about politics and protest before were now raising their fists in the air. That day was one of the turning points of the movement.<sup>68</sup>

The rest of what happened from then to June 4 is now quite well-known.<sup>69</sup> In a little less than two months, the seemingly innocent mourning activities on Beijing's university campuses evolved into a near revolutionary popular

movement. The dynamics of the movement were complex, but throughout the movement, movement organizers never failed to make use of the symbolic resources of political rituals such as commemorations and funerals to make claims, enhance publicity, and achieve mobilization. On May 1, the International Labor Day, for example, leading intellectuals issued an open letter to call on the Chinese government to recognize students' request for dialogue with Li Peng, the Premier. On May 4, crowds estimated at three-hundred-thousand gathered on Tiananmen Square to mark the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement. Fully aware of the symbolically charged event and place, students read a "New May Fourth Manifesto" outlining the historical mission of the contemporary student generation:

Today, we are assembled here, not only to commemorate that monumental day but more importantly, to carry forth the May Fourth spirit of science and democracy. Today, in front of symbol of the Chinese nation, Tiananmen, we can proudly proclaim to all the people in our nation that we are worthy of the pioneers of seventy years ago.<sup>70</sup>

Similarly, on May 16, the twenty-third anniversary of the official starting point of the Cultural Revolution, four influential writers, Ba Jin, Ai Qing, Liu Zaifu and Fan Zheng, issued a "May 16 Statement" denouncing May 16, 1966 as a symbol of autocracy and darkness and calling for democracy and the official recognition of the student movement as a patriotic movement. May 30 was the sixty-fourth anniversary of the May Thirtieth Movement. On that day in 1925, Shanghai workers and students assembled in the Shanghai International Settlement to demand the release of six Chinese students who had been arrested by the British. The British inspector ordered his men to fire, killing eleven demonstrators. The May 30 Movement had thus become another well-known student movement on the sacred calendar of the Chinese Communist Revolution. On May 30, 1989, the

Autonomous Workers' Federation was founded, signaling workers' organizational support of the student movement. On the same day, the statue of the Goddess of Liberty was unveiled on Tiananmen Square, attracting the largest crowds before military repression.

It is worth reiterating that the dates themselves had no intrinsic significance. Meanings were attached to them by movement organizers and other activists. One of the meanings of these anniversaries is that they should not be let slip by without some form of observation. For movement organizers and activists in 1989, this meant that each identifiable historical anniversary could be turned into an occasion of collective gathering and used to strengthen or create solidarity. In a drawn out movement without an effective SMO, fully exposed to unpredictable and yet powerful opponents, a strong sense of solidarity was essential for the movement to survive. The succession of historical anniversaries and dates of political commemoration provided an invaluable set of symbolic opportunities for sustaining solidarity.

Again, we do not claim that the cultural debates that raged in 1988 in anticipation of the advent of 1989 *caused* the 1989 student movement. Politically sensitive minded figures like Su Xiaokang seemed to have a feeling of foreboding about 1989. There was talk among small groups of students or public intellectuals that they needed to "do something" around May 4, 1989, in memory of that great historic movement. But there were neither concrete plans nor pre-existent movement organizations. The cultural debates in 1988 had served as loci for bringing together small groups of individuals. A sense of cultural crisis loomed heavy in the air. They were not the kind of resources that resource mobilization theorists would think of as necessary for movement mobilization. Yet viewed in

retrospect and aided with a knowledge of the historical tradition of popular protest in twentieth century China,<sup>71</sup> the torrent of cultural events in 1988 begin to assume the significance of some kind of necessary “preparatory” work for movement mobilization. In this sense, the year 1989 provided a rare historical opportunity for protest with its many important anniversaries.

## **Discussion**

Our analysis of the 1989 protest movements does not so much refute as it does complement and specify the central elements of the political process model of social movements. The model relies upon three concepts to account for social movement emergence, mobilization, and success. These are the structure of political opportunities, collective action frames, and mobilizing social networks.<sup>72</sup> Because it is axiomatic that collective actors respond to opportunities and that insufficient opportunities for mobilization will result in movement failure or collapse, the challenge becomes to specify what provides such opportunities, why actors recognize and respond to them, and the possibilities and limits such opportunities provide. In our analysis we have shown how declining repression provides opportunities for dissident groups and subcultures of opposition to form. Official commemorations and similar political rituals require public participation, providing incentives for dissident groups to protest and to appeal to crowds in mobilizing support behind their calls for change. Such protests will remain scattered so long as repression remains continuous and effective and inadequate free social spaces are available to dissidents.

The advantages of political commemorations for collective action frames are clear in our analysis. At state commemorations and during other political rituals, dissidents can attempt to discredit or recast official political frames. Given



sufficient coordination and organization, dissidents may also develop their own commemorations that draw on elements of the oppositional political subcultures. These commemorations help to provide a public identity to a nascent opposition movement as well as establishing a repertoire of symbols, practices, and frames that dissidents and their supporters can incorporate into a broader movement. The symbolic dimension of collective protest also has a double-edged character. The sight of a dissident crowd is one kind of symbol, especially in the context of the mass media; the inverted symbols of dissident intellectuals are another kind of ideal intervention; both converge in an orchestrated protest more common to the rhythms of dissent in democratic societies.

Our theory of political subcultures in movement emergence in authoritarian regimes builds on the insight that social resources such as interpersonal networks are a necessary element in organizing ongoing collective action. We have provided a theory of why individuals join subcultural groups and associate with dissident values and ideologies and under what circumstances they can grow into social movements. We have identified the ways in which political rituals help to generate the symbolic resources these networks need to build identity, solidarity, and shared injustice frames.

In all three cases that we have examined, dissidents exploited the double-edged character of rituals in official political culture. But the dissident groups in Czechoslovakia and China developed a more extensive set of oppositional political rituals. This largely reflects the greater success they had in developing a political subculture with popular resonance. The Czech dissidents redirected official state commemorations of socialist heroes into anti-Communist demonstrations as their East German counterparts did. However, the Czechoslovak opposition developed a

richer symbolic repertoire connected to commemorations of historical anniversaries. They seized upon culturally resonant dates as resources of collective action, demanding public recognition of events such as the 1968 invasion or the declaration of independence of the democratic republic of Czechoslovakia. The practices surrounding commemoration of the dissident martyr Jan Palach are an excellent example of the ritualized forms of protest that can be developed by dissident subcultures. Publically commemorating the suicide of Palach also meant engaging in a political ritual expressing opposition to the regime. Despite extraordinary government efforts to suppress the memory of Palach's sacrifice, and the demands for democratization and national autonomy that he represented, opposition groups made repeated efforts to stage political commemorations of his death. Palach became a sacred symbol of true patriotism, sacrifice and national honor in the face of Communist tyranny.

Again, in all three cases, once repeated protests got under way they quickly began to take on ritual elements of their own. Leipzig's peaceful Monday demonstrations are a well-known example of this. In all three countries protesters assembled habitually at churches or at politically significant public places, such as Leipzig's Karl Marx Square, Prague's Wenceslas Square, or Tiananmen Square, carried candles in twilight processions, laid flowers and wreaths at the graves of heroes or at sites of police violence, sang political songs and religious hymns, and in Prague they jingled their keys by the tens of thousands to create a chiming music meant to awaken their erstwhile jailers.

However, although the Czechoslovak and Chinese oppositions remained weak in comparison with the state, they made more productive use of the symbolic resources of the broader national political culture than was the case in the GDR.

They created rituals of opposition linked to historical anniversaries of important events in national history. This patriotism connected intellectuals to ordinary people, dissidents to citizens. The failure of the East German opposition to exploit national issues can be understood, in part, by reference to German history and the formation of a socialist intelligentsia in the GDR. East Germany's antifascist intellectuals avoided commemorating nationalist icons and dates because of the legacy of Nazism and German defeat in 1945, thereby impoverishing the symbolic repertoire upon which they could draw.<sup>73</sup> Building on the legacy of nationalist martyrs, the Czechoslovaks and Chinese not only challenged state sponsored rituals to express opposition, but created widely recognized political icons and symbols of their own that connected them with patriotic traditions. This populist nationalism had a broad appeal outside of dissident subcultures. In identifying culturally facilitated and constrained limits on political action we can understand why patriotic student groups and ordinary workers became enthusiastic allies of the dissidents in Czechoslovakia and China in 1989, while students in the GDR played almost no role at all in anti-Communist demonstrations and workers quickly abandoned dissident causes once the Communist party capitulated. Indeed, even the spaces where the rituals took place in China and Czechoslovakia were fraught with symbolic and emotional meaning □ Prague's Wenceslas Square and Beijing's Tiananmen Square are themselves symbols of the Czech and Chinese nations.

Repressive states, like dissidents, learn from past experience. In an official account of the events of the 1989 student movement in China, the opportunity presented by an historical anniversary for dissident organizing is acknowledged in a description of the months leading up to April 1989, "In order to stir up turmoil in China and subvert the People's Republic, a tiny handful of people engaged in

political conspiracy have for years made ideological, public opinion and organizational preparation.... They planned a large scale move on the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement.”<sup>74</sup> During the recent tenth anniversary of the crackdown against the student democracy movement in Beijing on June 4, 1999 state authorities went to great lengths to prevent the occasion from being exploited by the opposition. Citing the need for “renovations,” the authorities entirely closed off Tiananmen Square to the public for weeks before the anniversary of the violence. Discussion of the 1989 events was tightly controlled and media access to opposition groups and prominent dissidents was greatly restricted. In the days before the anniversary of the massacre, scores of dissidents, intellectuals and democracy activists were arrested or placed under surveillance. Scattered protests apparently still took place, but the opposition was denied a broad public forum on which to stage protests or make critical statements.<sup>75</sup>

## **Conclusion**

We have argued in this article that in 1989 collective actors in Eastern Europe and China made strategic use of political rituals as symbolic resources of collective action and that such uses contributed significantly to movement mobilization. In making this argument we have drawn on cultural approaches to the study of collective action to complement the usual emphasis on social resources, injustice frames, and political opportunities found in the social movement literature. Our approach links symbolic and strategic elements of collective action in accounting for the tactics of dissidents groups and their efforts to mobilize popular support. We are attentive both to the actor’s capacity for intentional action and the mediating and shaping effects of structure. We reveal not only the intentional, manifest purpose of political rituals but also their latent and unintended effects. We

have shown how political commemorations can be conceived of as symbolic resources of collective action. Collective actors may well exploit rituals linked to anniversaries and similar commemorations outside of repressive settings, but we think they acquire added importance in authoritarian regimes, and especially in Leninist societies. This is because resources are monopolized by the state while the networks, organizations, and institutions of civil society are absent or weak. Under these conditions, symbolic resources such as commemorative rituals present themselves as alternative resources for political challengers.

Although various scholars call for greater attention to cultural processes in social movements, the analytical contribution of these studies is often unclear. We have identified one set of cultural processes, political rituals, whose role in collective action has not been carefully examined but that is quite relevant to understanding protest mobilization in the 1989 democracy movements. We have identified the conditions of collective action in repressive regimes and the ways in which cultural resources like rituals can empower action in an otherwise impoverished regime. We go beyond an account of dissimulation and hidden, “everyday” forms of resistance by revealing how dissident actors in political subcultures can make active use of cultural resources in organizing collective action. Indeed, for opposition groups in state socialist contexts, anniversary celebrations and like events may be the only occasions to address large public gatherings and reach out to unorganized interests and grievances.

We have shown how a range of political rituals associated with commemorations may be of use to movements partially because of the opportunities □ especially to reach an audience and avoid repression □ these events may offer and partially because rituals of this kind can generate symbolic resources of collective action.

Public commemorations of politically sacred objects such as anniversaries, the memory of political martyrs, and national holidays are moments of vulnerability built into the structure of authoritarian regimes. Public commemorations can help challengers to overcome, even if only temporarily, some of the obstacles to mobilization.

We think that what is at stake in such protests is, in part, opportunities for mobilization. But there is also something more than this □ the effort to generate publicity through the struggle over the production and reproduction of symbolic goods associated with the politically sacred. In their desperate efforts to communicate with a broader public and destabilize the state, it was in the interest of dissidents to disrupt official political rituals. And, when given sufficient opportunity and organizational resources, dissident forces also tried to define a set of symbolic resources and repertoires of their own. In order to do so, the movements of 1989 turned to rituals linked to political commemorations. Although clever use of commemorations alone does not guarantee the success or failure of a protest movement, our analysis of the movements of 1989 suggests that attention to the role of political rituals may help to account for the timing, organization, and symbolic practices of collective action.

Political commemorations also play a role in the emergence of movements out of an alternative political culture of loosely organized dissident groups. Symbols, dates, and martyr figures charged with political meaning and emotional resonance are used by dissidents to sustain opposition in the face of overwhelmingly repression and seemingly hopeless struggles. Commemoration rituals link the political past to an imagined future. They evoke, generate, and communicate the important sense of collective memory that sustains movement participation, even

under difficult circumstances and high levels of repression. They help to marshal the past in support of present and future goals, linking collective actors to a glorious past. Marx understood this in his essay on the Eighteenth Brumaire. Just as Louis Bonaparte wore the mask of Napoleon and the revolutionaries of 1848 that of 1789, in a sense the movements of 1989 also portrayed themselves as the successors of past exemplars.<sup>76</sup> Commemorative rituals helped to establish this link. The East German dissidents walked in the path of Rosa Luxemburg, the Czechs declared themselves willing to repeat the sacrifices of Palach and Opletal, and the Beijing students of 1989 evoked the lineage of patriotic heroes dating back to the May Fourth Movement.

Ongoing repression and extensive measures to close off the symbolic resources presented by the political rituals are testimony to the fact that regime elites are generally well aware of the importance of such events to the opposition. If confronted by a high degree of repression and concerted efforts to stifle protest at widely recognized events, challengers may be able to stage effective protests when they manage to take their government by surprise. Although regimes may temporarily succeed in closing off such opportunities, the historical and cultural resonance of certain dates may always nevertheless represent moments of danger even for repressive regimes.

An authoritarian regime may secure compliance so long as its power seems unassailable, but once its control is threatened, it may suddenly experience a revolt that is a more accurate reflection of popular sentiments. The coercion, repression, and surveillance that the regime relies upon to crush challenges to its authority unintentionally promote the formation of political subcultures that seek out free social spaces where they can communicate and organize. Even if dissident groups

are incapable of directly challenging a regime, they develop an alternative political culture that sustains opposition in spite of repression. Given sufficient space to organize, these dissident groups can form movements that have the capacity to mobilize a revolt against the system once its power begins to erode.

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## Notes

1. The GDR and Czechoslovakia are widely defined as hardline post-totalitarian regimes in 1989. Both explicitly rejected Gorbachev's calls for reform in the socialist world and proclaimed their allegiance to the Leninist model. These regimes maintained extensive state security apparatuses and continued to harass, jail and exile prominent dissidents. Neither regime was split by a struggle between hardliners and reformers and neither permitted market reforms or decentralization of any kind. The case of China is somewhat more complex. Despite extensive market reforms that appear to have weakened political control at universities and other institutions, the party rejected calls for political pluralism and actively repressed dissidence. Recent documentation suggests that, beneath the surface unity of the party leadership in the People's Republic, a major split developed between advocates and opponents of liberalization. The seriousness of the division helps to account for why it took the regime so long to respond with effective repression to the student mobilization of 1989. However, as Dingxin Zhao notes, no major party leader publically encouraged or facilitated the Beijing student movement. The chief difference of opinion within the party appeared to be how the movement should be suppressed. See *The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership's Decision to Use Force Against their Own People*, compiled by Zhang Liang and edited by Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (New York: Public Affairs, 2001). Also see Dingxin Zhao, "State Society Relations and the Discourses and Activists of the 1989 Beijing Student Movement," *American Journal of Sociology* 105/6 (2000): 1592-1632.

2. For approaches to the study of culture in social movements that examine cultural "tool kits," symbolic struggle and ritual action see, among others, Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Hank Johnston and Bert Klanderman, editors, *Social Movements and Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press); Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51 (1986): 273-286 and "Cultural Power and Social Movements," 25-40 in *Social Movements and Culture*; William H. Sewell Jr., "Historical events as transformations of structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille," *Theory and Society* 25/6 (1996): 841-881; Alberto Melucci, *Challenging Codes* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Verta Taylor, "Analytical Approaches to Social Movement Culture: The Culture of the Women's

Movement,” 163-187, in *Social Movements and Culture*.

3. On the solidaristic function of rituals, see Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1915 [1912]), especially pp. 243-245. On the latent effects of intentional action, see Robert K. Merton, “Manifest and Latent Functions,” 73-138 in *On Theoretical Sociology* (New York: Free Press, 1967). On efforts to link public rituals to government authority or to political contention see Edward Shils, “Center and Periphery,” 93-109 in *The Constitution of Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Steven Lukes, “Political Ritual and Social Integration,” *Sociology* 9 (1975): 289-308; Andrew L. Roth, Men Wearing Masks: Issues of Description in the Analysis of Ritual,” *Sociological Theory* 13/3 (1995): 301-327; and Amitai Etzioni, “Toward a Theory of Public Ritual,” *Sociological Theory* 18/1 (2000): 44-59.

4. For exemplary studies of ritual elements in politics and movements, see, e.g., Mabel Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997); Mona Ozouf, *Festivals and the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Edward A. Tiryakian, “From Durkheim to Managua: Revolutions as religious revivals,” 44-63 in Jeffrey Alexander, editor, *Durkheimian Sociology* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California, 1994); and Charles Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses* (New York: Fertig, 1975).

5. On liminality in rituals and opportunities for social change, see especially Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process* (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1969), and “Betwixt and Between,” 93-111 in Turner, *The Forest of Symbols* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967). Also see the useful discussion of Turner in Roth, “Men Wearing Masks.”

6. See Nicholas B. Dirks, “Ritual and Resistance: Subversion as a Social Fact,” 483-503 in N. Dirks, G. Eley, and S. Ortner, editors, *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 487-488.

7. Lisa Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in Contemporary Syria* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 4-5.

8. See discussion in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), especially 37-54.

9. For a basic institutional analysis of state-socialist societies see Janos Kornai, *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). Ken Jowitt provides a basic account of the political culture of Leninist regimes in *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

10. Hyojoung Kim and Peter S. Bearman, "The Structure and Dynamics of Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review* 62/1 (1997): 70-93.

11. If the costs of collective action are high and the perceived efficacy of collective action is low, it follows that few people will risk it. In a social order that creates this stable set of relations we can expect most of social life to become privatized. Individuals will largely avoid collective action and pursue individual interests. In a highly repressive regime, social grievances will be submerged and true preferences falsified. See Albert O. Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), and Timur Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

12. See James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Francesca Polletta, "Free Spaces' in Collective Action," *Theory and Society* 18 (1999): 1-38; and Charles Tilly, "Spaces of Contention," *Mobilization* 5/2 (2000): 135-160.

13. For discussions of informal opposition groups and their transformation into social movements, see Guillaume Denouex, *Urban Unrest in the Middle East* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993); Hank Johnston and David A. Snow, "Subcultures and the Emergence

of the Estonian Nationalist Opposition 1945-1990,” *Sociological Perspectives* 41/3 (1998): 473-497; Hank Johnston and Aili Aareleid Tart, “Generations, Micro cohorts, and Long Term Mobilization: The Estonian National Movement, 1940-1991,” *Sociological Perspectives* 43/4 (2000) 671-698; Hank Johnston, “Mobilization and Structure of Opposition in Repressive States,” paper presented at the 1996 American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, New York; and Perry Deese, “Collective Life and Social Change in the GDR,” *Mobilization* 2/2 (1996): 207-225.

14. See Jack Goldstone, “Is Revolution Individually Rational?” *Rationality and Society* 6 (1994): 139-166; Karl-Dieter Opp and Christiane Gern, “Dissident Groups, Personal Networks and Spontaneous Cooperation: The East German Revolution of 1989”; *American Sociological Review* 58 (1993): 659-680; and Steven Pfaff, “Collective Identity and Informal Groups in Revolutionary Mobilization: East Germany in 1989,” *Social Forces* 75/1 (1996): 91-118.

15. Johnston and Snow, “Subcultures and the Emergence of the Estonian Nationalist Opposition.”

16. On the social psychology of collective identity, see Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, editors, *Social Identity Theory* (London: Springer, 1990), and Deborah Terry and Michael A. Hogg, editors, *Attitudes, Behavior, and Social Context: The Role of Norms and Group Membership* (London and Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000).

17. See Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), and Michael Hechter, *Principles of Group Solidarity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). Also see Steven Pfaff, “Intimate Networks and Emotional Management: Confronting Repression in the East German Civic Movement,” paper presented at the Conference on Collective Action and Social Movements, University of California at Davis, August 1998.

18. Shared experiences of repression following demonstrations of this kind could sometimes deepen the sense of collective solidarity among dissidents. As one of the organizers of the

Luxemburg-Liebkecht protest in Leipzig recounted after his release from police detention, "You stand in the streets again ... you see your friends again. Hugs, laughter, you look into tired, sleepless eyes. Only now you understand the degree of solidarity. These were sleepless, guarded nights and these people worked through the night on the telephone, on the typewriter, in vigils and in discussions.... A solidarity vigil was held for you, a vigil for you and the others arrested. You can't hold back the tears....They greet the arrested with a bouquet of flowers and you cry. That bouquet still lives for me today -a symbol of hope and never to be forgotten hours. quoted in Christian Dietrich and Uwe Schwabe, editors, *Freunde und Feinde: Dokumente zu den Friedensgebeten in Leipzig* (Leipzig: Evangelisch Verlagsanstalt, 1994), 408.

19. Historians and social scientists are finding strong evidence to revise the theory of totalitarianism. In practice, totalitarian regimes were apparently unable to eliminate all sources of opposition, relied largely on voluntary compliance and political denunciations, and employed terror, not so much to cement a system of total control, but rather as a desperate policy innovation in the face of eroding social control. See Steven Pfaff, "The Limits of Coercive Surveillance: Social and Penal Controlling the German Democratic Republic," forthcoming in *Punishment and Society*; also see, among other studies, Mary Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1945-1989* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Robert Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, *The Road to Terror* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999); Chris Ward, *Stalin's Russia* (London: Edwin Arnold, 1993); and Sheila Fitzpatrick, "New Perspectives on Stalinism," *The Russian Review* 45 (1986): 357-373.

20. In his reflections on the fall of Rome, Edward Gibbon observes that a tyranny generally prosecutes individuals for real virtues and imagined crimes.

21. A causal mechanism indicates a general causal relationship found in a variety of settings that operates according to the same logical principles. See discussion in Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, editors, *Social mechanisms: An analytical approach to social theory* (Cambridge: New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

22. The political process model of contentious politics relies largely on “political opportunity structures” as its key causal mechanism. By broad consensus among movement scholars, the dimensions of this concept include: a. the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; b. the stability of elite alignments that undergird a polity; c. the presence of elite allies; and d. the state’s capacity and propensity for repression. See Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald, editors, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10. Also see exemplary studies in Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Doug McAdam, *The Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); and Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1978). For a critique of the lack of specificity in the political opportunity concept and its alleged structural bias, see Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory,” *Sociological Forum* 14/1 (1999): 27-54.

23. Xuegang Zhou, “Unorganized Interests and Collective Action in Communist China,” *American Sociological Review* 58 (1993): 971-999, 61.

24. See studies in Craig Calhoun, *Neither Gods Nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Doug Guthrie, “Political Theater and Student Organizations in the 1989 Chinese Movement: A Multivariate Analysis of Tiananmen,” *Sociological Forum* 10/3 (1995): 419-454; and Dingxin Zhao, “Decline of Political Control in Chinese Universities and the Rise of the 1989 Chinese Student Movement,” *Sociological Perspectives* 40/2 (1997): 159-182.

25. In the Baltic republics, nationalist dissidents appealed to the general public largely through orchestrating commemorations of the anniversaries of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the declarations of independence of the first Baltic republics. These commemorations helped to reawaken the memory of past independence and drew attention to the criminal origins of the

Soviet regime. It was only in the context of Gorbachev's reforms, especially glasnost, that subcultures could emerge to begin organizing a nationalist movement openly. See accounts in Johnston and Snow, "Subcultures and the Emergence of the Estonian Nationalist Opposition"; Johnston and Arelaaid Tart, "The Estonian National Movement"; Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); and Levon Chorbajian, "The Nationalities question in the former Soviet Union," 227-258 in Berch Berberoglu, editor, *The National question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Self-Determination in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).

26. This is part of what it means to live in what Sidney Tarrow calls a "social movement society." See David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow, editors, *The social movement society: contentious politics for a new century* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998). That demonstrations at public events in the United States and other democracies rarely manage to create serious disruption is understandable in light of the fact that movements are part of the routine contention in democratic politics. Of course, over time rituals tend to reabsorb disruptive energies. As Franz Kafka observes in an aphorism: "Leopards break into the temple and drink to the dregs what is in the sacrificial pitchers; this is repeated over and over again; finally it can be calculated in advance and it becomes part of the ceremony."

27. See discussion in Jowitt, *New World Disorder*.

28. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 18.

29. This point has been made by Vaclav Havel in his analysis of the cynical reason of Leninism in its post charismatic phase and has been extended to a variety of other contexts where ritualized affirmation masks private withdrawal. See Vaclav Havel, *Living in Truth*, edited by Jan Vladislav (Boston: Faber, 1986); also see, for example, Lisa Wedeen, "Acting "As If": Symbolic Politics and Social Control in Syria," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40/3 (1998): 503-523.

30. This point has been nicely illustrated in the work of Timur Kuran on the social consequences

of preference falsification. See the theory in *Private Truths, Public Lies* and its application in the articles “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolutions in 1989,” *World Politics* 44/1 (1991): 7-48; and “The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary Surprises,” *American Journal of Sociology* 100/ 6 (1995): 1528-1551.

31. This tendency has been noted in the study of collective behavior, see, e.g., Neil Smelter, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1963). A pioneering study of the phenomenon whereby highly publicized events generate audience expectations that something disruptive could happen, thereby increasing the likelihood that it will, is found in Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, “The Unique Perspective of Television and Its Effect: A Pilot Study,” *American Sociological Review* 18/1 (1953): 3-12.

32. On the threshold dynamics in collective action, see, e.g., Mark Granovetter, “Threshold Models of Collective Behavior,” *American Journal of Sociology* 83/6 (1978): 1420-1423; Michael Macy, “Chains of Cooperation: Threshold Effects in Collective Action,” *American Sociological Review* 55 (1991): 809-826; Norman Braun, “Das Schwellenmodell und die Leipziger Montagsdemonstrationen,” *Kolner Zeitschrift fu r Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 46 (1994): 482-500; Susanne Lohmann, “Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991,” *World Politics* 47 (1994): 42-101; and Kim and Bearman, “The Structure and Dynamics of Movement Participation.”

33. Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, 151-167; also see essays in Mark Traugott, editor, *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).

34. Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self*.

35. Zhao, “State Society Relations,” 1592.

36. Edward Tiryakian’s Durkheimian analysis of political rituals suggests the ways in which rituals □ sometimes religiously inspired □ help people to become revolutionaries in spite of repression. What Tiryakian means by this is that revolutions occur, in part, when people with



different social backgrounds and interests unite in large-scale associations, develop a sense of solidarity and shared purpose, convince themselves of the rightness and justice of their actions, and put aside fear and hesitation to act collectively even when the odds are against them. Both the associations and the feeling of solidarity are generally short lived, but they represent a necessary moment in any large scale movement of popular protest. As the number of demonstrations, commemorations, and appearances of national heroes increases over the course of a revolutionary cycle, excitement is generated, expectations are raised, and collective effervescence is generated that help to drive events forward. See Tiryakian, "From Durkheim to Managua," 44-47, and "Collective Effervescence, Social Change and Charisma: Durkheim, Weber and 1989," *International Sociology* 10/3 (1995): 269-281.

37. Karl-Dieter Opp, Peter Voss, and Christiane Gern, *Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution: East Germany, 1989* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 45.

38. In attempting to disrupt the ritualized affirmation of party leadership dissidents are attempting to exploit the liminal potential of rituals. Often, this is done by attacking the symbolic unity of the regime with a politically sacred object, as for example when, instead of the party being allowed to portray itself as the guardian or protector of the nation, it is recast as its betrayer or defiler. This can be achieved by substituting a "true" or "genuine" defender of the nation for the party, as was done by the Czech dissidents in the veneration of President Masaryk or the Chinese students in the veneration of the May Fourth activists. Drawing on William James, Turner calls this the process of "dissociation" in which two symbolically linked objects are decoupled by reference to a third term. See Turner's discussion in "Betwixt and Between" in *The Forest of Symbols*.

39. See Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967).

40. As Merton argues, "Ceremonials may fulfill the latent function of reinforcing the group identity by providing a periodic occasion on which the scattered members of a group assemble to engage in a common activity. As Durkheim among others long since indicated, such ceremonials

are a means by which collective expression is afforded the sentiments which, in a further analysis, are found to be a basic source of group unity” (1967: 118-119).

41. There are a host of studies of Poland’s Solidarity movement. Among the most informative are David Ost, *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990); Alain Touraine, et al., *Solidarity, Poland 1980-81* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Lawrence Goodwyn, *Breaking the barrier: the rise of Solidarity in Poland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1985).

42. Among the many works on the causes of Communist decline and the upheavals of 1989 see Daniel Chirot, editor, *The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991); Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Sabrina P. Ramet, *Social currents in Eastern Europe: the sources and consequences of the great transformation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995); Andrew Walder, “The decline of communist power: Elements of a theory of institutional change,” *Theory and Society* 23/2 (1994): 297-323; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*; and Kornai, *The Socialist System*. Kornai suggests how Gorbachev’s idea of glasnost, in particular, was a dangerous shock to the Leninist system by undermining the structural secrecy on which the stability of party rule relied. Gorbachev’s opening of discussions on taboo subjects and his willingness to trade accurate information with the non-socialist world were highly destabilizing to the Soviet bloc and to individual socialist nations. Not surprisingly, Gorbachev became a patron saint to political subcultures in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and China, even though he did nothing directly to aid them or shelter them from reprisals.

43. Most studies of the East German opposition reveal its loosely organized character and its reliance on free social spaces, chiefly within the Protestant churches. See Detlef Pollack, *Politischer Protest: Politisch alternative Gruppen in der DDR* (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2000); Ehrhart Neubert, *Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR* (Berlin: Links, 1998); John C. Torpey, *Intellectuals, Socialism and Dissent: The East German Opposition and its Legacy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Christian Joppke, *East German Dissidents*

*and the Revolution of 1989* (New York: New York University Press, 1995); and Detlef Pollack and Dieter Rink, *Zwischen Verweigerung und Opposition: Politischer Protest in der DDR, 1970-1989* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1997).

44. Pfaff's interview with Leipzig democracy activist Uwe Schwabe, June 8, 1998. Also see accounts collected in Christian Dietrich and Uwe Schwabe, editors, *Freunde und Feinde*.

45. See the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi) report of the event in "MfS Information über Aktivitäten feindlich-negativer Kräfte in Leipzig im Zusammenhang mit dem 70. Jahrestag der Ermordung von Karl Liebknecht und Rosa Luxemburg," East Berlin, January 16, 1989, in Archiv Bürgerbewegung Leipzig, BA H MfS-PB Teil II.

46. A West Berlin newspaper reported, based on leaked sources, that in January 1989 local party secretaries were given instructions as to how many workers were to appear "voluntarily" and how many times specific slogans should be chanted during a march: SED-FDJ, four times; 'GDR, Our Fatherland,' three times; 'We want peace,' four times; Peace, Friendship, Solidarity, three times; 'Solidarity Forever,' three times." See "Das authentistische Zeugnis" in *Die Tageszeitung* 1/17/89.

47. See political analysis in the report "Zentralrat der FDJ: Information zur politisch-ideologischen Arbeit beim bisherigen Verlauf des 'FDJ-Angebots DDR 40.'" April 20, 1988. Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR in the German Federal Archives, SAPMO-BArch DY 30/IV 2/2.039/336.

48. See the chronology provided in Dietrich and Schwabe, *Freunde und Feinde*.

49. On the GDR's "exiting crisis" as the trigger of the 1989 protest wave, see Albert O. Hirschman, "Exit, Voice and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History," *World Politics* 45(1993): 173-202; Carol Mueller, "Escape from the GDR, 1961-1989: Hybrid Exit Repertoires in a Disintegrating Leninist Regime," *American Journal of Sociology* 105/3 (1999): 697-735; and Norman Naimark, "Ich

will hier raus: Emigration and the Collapse of the German Democratic Republic,” 72-95 in Ivo Banac, editor, *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).

50. See the appeals collected in *Die Ersten Texte des Neuen Forums*, edited by Julia Michelis (Berlin: Neues Forum Verlag, 1990).

51. Government statement printed in *Neues Deutschland*, October 2, 1989.

52. See the text of Gorbachev’s East Berlin address in Konrad H. Jarausch and Volker Gransow, editors, *Uniting Germany: Documents and Debates* (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1994), 51-55.

53. See police reports of the protest events surrounding the GDR’s fortieth anniversary celebrations in the records of the GDR Interior Ministry (*Ministerium des Innern der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*) collected in the German Federal (*Bundesarchiv*) in Berlin - Lichtenberg, files MdI B-Arch DO 1/2.3/52445 and DO 1/2.3/ 52449.

54. On the failure of repression to stem popular protest and the resulting collapse of the GDR, see Daniel V. Friedheim, “Regime Collapse in the Peaceful East German Revolution: the Role of Middle Level Officials,” *German Politics* 2/1 (1993): 97-112; M.E. Sarotte, “Elite Intransigence and the End of the Berlin Wall,” *German Politics* 2/2 (1993): 270-287; and Karl-Dieter Opp, “Repression and Revolutionary Action: East Germany in 1989,” *Rationality and Society* 6/1 (1994): 101-138.

55. For detailed accounts of the “Velvet Revolution,” see Bernard Wheaton and Zdenek Kavan, *The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988-1991* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Timothy Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ‘89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague*, second edition (New York: Vintage, 1993); and Tony Judt, “Metamorphosis: The Democratic Revolution in Czechoslovakia,” 96-116 in Ivo Banac, editors, *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992). A comparative perspective is provided by Grzegorz Ekiert, *The State Against Society*.

56. For collections of documents produced in this period, see Gregor Benton, *Wild Lilies: Poisonous Weeds: Dissident Voices from the People's Republic of China* (London: Pluto Press, 1982); David S. G. Goodman, *Beijing Street Voices: The Poetry and Politics of China's Democracy Movement* (London: Marion Boyars, 1981); James D. Seymour, *The Fifth Modernization: China's Human Rights Movement, 1978-1979* (Stanfordville, New York: Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980); and Helen F. Siu and Zelda Stern, editors, *Mao's Harvest: Voices from China's New Generation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

57. See Chen Fongching and Guantao Jin, *From Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy: The Chinese Popular Cultural Movement and Political Transformation 1979-1989* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1997).

58. Quoted in Che Muqi, *Beijing Turmoil: More Than Meets the Eye* (Beijing: Beijing Foreign Languages Press, 1990), 102.

59. For an English text and analysis of *River Elegy*, see Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang, *Deathsong of the River: A Reader's Guide to the Chinese TV Series Heshang*, introduced, translated, and annotated by Richard W. Bodman and Pin P. Wan (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1991).

60. For an analysis of the historical significance of this movement, see Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "Student Protests and the Chinese Tradition, 1919-1989," 3-24 in *The Chinese People's Movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989*, edited by Tony Saich (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1990).

61. See Chen and Jin, *From Youthful Manuscripts to River Elegy* on the various cultural circles being formed at that time.

62. See Chen and Jin, 231.

63. See document 14 in Michael Oksenberg, Lawrence R. Sullivan, and Marc Lambert, editors, *Beijing Spring, 1989: Confrontation and Conflict, The Basic Documents* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.

Sharpe, 1990).

64. See Suzanne Ogden, Kethleen Hartford, Lawrence Sullivan and David Zweig, editors, *China's Search for Democracy: The Students and the Mass Movement of 1989* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), 27.

65. See *ibid.*, 34.

66. *Ibid.*, 45-46.

67. See Guobin Yang, "Achieving Emotions in Collective Action: Emotional Processes and Movement Mobilization in the 1989 Chinese Student Movement," *Sociological Quarterly* 41/4 (2000): 593-614.

68. Tong Shen, with Marianne Yen, *Almost A Revolution* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 187.

69. Among the many general accounts of the 1989 Chinese student movement see Nan Lin, *The Struggle for Tiananmen: Anatomy of the 1989 Mass Movement* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992); Calhoun, "Neither Gods nor Emperors; Guthrie, Political Theater"; Zhao, "State Society Relations" and the "Decline of Political Control"; Yang, "Achieving Emotions"; and Jeffrey Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-century China: the view from Shanghai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

70. Wuwei Kaixi, "New May 4<sup>th</sup> Manifesto" in Minzhu Han (pseudonym), editor, *Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

71. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China*.

72. See the basic statement in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, "Introduction:

Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes □ towards a synthetic comparative perspective on social movements,” 1-22 in D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, and M. Zald, editors, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); as well as the development of the model in Tarrow, *Power in Movement*.

73. See studies of East German intellectuals and the influence of socialist antifascism in Torpey, *Intellectuals, Socialism and Dissent*; Joppke, *East German Dissidents*; Jeffrey Herf, *Divided memory: the Nazi past in the two Germanies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), and “German Communism, the Discourse of ‘Antifascist Resistance’ and the Jewish Catastrophe,” in M. Geyer and J. Boyer, *Resistance against the Third Reich 1933-1990* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994); Konrad H. Jarausch, “The Failure of East German Antifascism: Some Ironies of History as Politics,” *German Studies Review* 14 (1991): 85-96; Bernd Faulenbach, “Auf dem Weg zu einer gemeinsamen Erinnerung? Das Bild vom deutschen Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus nach den Erfahrungen von Teilung und Umbruch,” *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 42/7(1994); and J.H. Brinks, “Political Anti-Fascism in the German Democratic Republic,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 32/2 (199-): 207-217.

74. See Jian Shi et al., *The Truth About the Beijing Turmoil 1989*, edited by the Board of Truth About the Beijing Turmoil (Beijing: Beijing Publishing House, 1993), 9.

75. See coverage in Erik Eckholm, “In Beijing, Reminders of ‘89 Protest Are Few,” *New York Times*, 6/4/99, and Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Memories of June 4 Fade, Stunted by Public Silence,” *New York Times*, 6/4/99.

76. See Marx’s well-known discussion in “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” in Robert C. Tucker, editor, *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York and London: Norton 1978 [1852]).