PENDING: ONTOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE AND POSSIBLE METAPHYSICS OF RACE

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*(*ques Brandy song*)*

This dissertation is dedicated to all the generations that came before me and never got see: Lucy, Bobbie, Odie and John.

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To the generation that came up with me, David and the Stoop: Jared, Jordan, Mason, Nico, Peyton

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-Yosef

ABSTRACT

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This dissertation concerns the use and applicability of the tools of metaphysics that should inform our theorizing about "race". In Chapter 1, I prescribe a metaphysical methodology that I believe establishes the foundation for any form of metaphysical theorizing about "race" or analysis of how "race" is conceived of in other academic disciplines. The aim of this method is to make salient the roles the use and interpretation of metaphysical concepts, like "existence", "emergence" and "persistence" play in both philosophical and cross-disciplinary analysis of race. In Chapter 2, I implement my prescribed method to argue that more philosophers should explore the option for "race" as a Bio-Social entity. I argue that our construction of an Ontological Taxonomy, a project that aims to categorize kinds of entities according to what is metaphysically necessary for their existence, ought to include an account of Bio-Social Reality. Bio-Social Reality is a description of the part of the ontological structure of reality, whose existence allows for biological and social mechanisms to interact to generate new kinds of entities. I categorize these entities as Bio-Social entities. I then analyze a conception of "race" that neatly illustrates how entities of this kind exist. In Chapter 3, I argue that all "realist" views of "race" collapse into one version of 'realism', Bio-Social realism. I argue that both dominant realist positions in philosophy of race, ontologically depend on the existence of Bio-Social reality described in Chapter 2. I argue that 'Social Construction' and 'Biological Racial Realism' accounts of "race" are better understood as differences in terms of the "salience" that "race" has on how groups of individuals view themselves and each other. What I hope to provide with this dissertation is guidance on how to uncover the way our metaphysical analysis informs how we view the world and our place in it using categories like "race".

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> "We aim at simplicity and hope for truth."
>
> -Nelson Goodman, 1978

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1.1 The Critique Camps

There has been growing pessimism over the viability of the metaphysics of "race" as productive research program. The criticisms that have motivated this growing pessimism can be characterized as belonging to two kinds of criticisms: The Wrong Tools Critique and the Non-substantive Metaphysics Critique.

The Wrong Tools Critique (WT) holds that analytic philosophy does not have the proper tools to make significant headway about disagreements about what "race is" or if/how it exists. This critique is motivated by concerns that debates in the metaphysics of race are too deeply tied to unsettled debates over 'real'/ 'natural' kinds or debates about how to correctly determine/describe the relation between words and the various objects and entities that they intend to pick-out. The 'cost' of being tied to these contentious debates is that the broader philosophy of race literature becomes preoccupied with settling metaphysical debates that, at best, have nothing to do with the specifics of "race" and at worst, are unsolvable issues within analytic philosophy.

Representatives of the WT Critique would be Olivier Lemeire (2016) and David Ludwig (2015). Ludwig and Lemeire each present their own arguments for why the current dialectic of "realism" vs.

"anti-realism" in the race debate is doomed to indeterminacy. Both scholars agree that the formulation of realism questions about race leads to problems for making any advancement on why one should prefer one ontological stance concerning race over another.

However, Lemeire and Ludwig argue different points to motivate why this gridlock will inevitably occur. Lemeire argues that the ontological positions within the philosophy of race hinge on two specific commitments: a commitment to what the referents to race-terms are, and a commitment to a theory for determining "real" kinds. Lemeire notes that there are plenty of strong arguments for various theories of reference and metaphysical criteria for 'real' kinds. The result is that philosophers can spend all their time debating these issues before turning the focus of their analysis to the concept of race. Ludwig takes this criticism a step further by arguing that the answer to these questions of reference and the metaphysics of real kinds (as they pertain to race) are critically undetermined. I'll start with Lemeire, because his account provides a clear and accurate reconstruction of the realism debate in philosophy of race that he and Ludwig agree is problematic.

Lemeire states that the route to answer the question of "is race 'real'?" involves answering three questions:(Q1) What are race terms supposed to refer to? (Q2) What does it take to be a real kind? (Q3) Do race terms refer to real kinds? From this reconstruction one can infer that realist position can be formalized as the following:

P1: If it is the case that race-terms refer to real kinds then race is 'real'.
P2: It is the case that race-terms are 'real' kinds.
C: Therefore, race is 'real'.

The Anti-Realist position would correspondingly be:

P1: If it is the case that race is 'real' then the referents of race-terms refer to real kinds.
P2: It is not the case that the referents of race terms refer to real kinds

C: Therefore, race is **not** real.

While both questions and the arguments for each position seem clear, disagreement over the veracity of each premise, become messy. The premise causing all of the problems is P2 of both the realist and anti-realist argument. The reason this is that P2 requires theorists in both camps to make commitments to a theory of reference and a metaphysical account of "real kinds". Thus, any defense of P2, be it realist or anti-realist, will have to give both an account of what race terms refer to and what makes a real kind.

Concerning the theory of reference, philosophers of language and mind disagree concerning theories of reference and theories of meaning. Concerning theories of reference, Descriptivists argue that the referents to terms pick out particular sets of properties/characteristics that describe particular entities while Referentialists argue that the referents to terms are particular entities or kinds that are rigidly designated by the term. Concerning theories of There is also disagreement between *semantic internalism* and *semantic externalism*. Semantic internalism holds that the intentions of speakers (i.e. some share belief) is what determines the meaning of a term, while semantic externalism holds that meaning is determined by facts external to speakers' intentions.

Lemeire notes that there are deep divisions within the "real" or "genuine" kinds literature; though many philosophers of science are unified in the referent of their analysis, their disagreement is born out of what metaphysically grounds the existence of a kind. Thus, even if philosophers agreed on what the referents of "race" and "race-terms" are, there would still be substantive disagreement over what would be required for something to be a real kind. The main point is that "realism" debates about "race" have two very contentious issues to settle before we can apply any philosophical analysis to "race" itself.

Where Lemeire lacks optimism for philosophers of race to justify these two kinds of theories, Ludwig shuts the door on these inquiries having definitive answers when applied to conceptions of race. Ludwig argues that these issues are critically underdetermined. "Critically undetermined" here means that the data equally supports not just competing hypotheses about both the referents of "race" and whether said referent is genuine or natural kind, but even incompatible hypothesis.[1]

While the main concern of the WT critique is that the tools employed by analytic philosophers are insufficient for answering the ontological questions that have dominated the metaphysics of race literature. However, the issue at the heart of the Non-Substantive Metaphysics (NM) critique is that these ontological debates are not genuine metaphysical debates.

Representatives of the NM critique include scholars such as, Mallon (2006) and McPherson (2015). Neither Mallon nor McPherson gives an account of what are the necessary features of "genuine metaphysical debates". However they look at the various kinds of ontological issues and claims raised in the philosophy of race literature and determine that arguments used to defend competing ontological claims are not motivated by genuine disagreement about the various states of affairs surrounding issues of "race". That is, the diversity of ontological positions defended in the philosophy of race is not indicative of substantive disagreement about the various facts that ground ontological claims about race.

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[1] I'm understanding a competing hypothesis but compatible hypothesis as a situation where the truth of one hypothesis does not require the other hypothesis to be false. For example if hypothesis H1 argues P but H2 argues Q only if P. Given the truth conditions: Every time H1 is true and there is never a case where H2 is false but H1 is true. There is never a case whether the truth of one requires the other to be false. H2 is competing hypothesis because it entails that Q necessitates P, while H1 makes no such commitment. Incompatible hypotheses are situations where the truth of one hypothesis requires that the other one be false. H1: If P then Q while H2: If Q then P. These two hypotheses are incompatible in the sense that they are both true only under conditions where every statement is true or when every statement is false. In all other cases, their truth conditions require that if one is true the other must necessarily be false.

This kind of analysis is best illustrated by Mallon (2006). Mallon, similar to Lemeire and Ludwig, states concerns that the semantic strategy pursued by metaphysicians of race will result in a stalemate between competing semantic theories of reference, resulting in philosophers being primarily engaged in verbal dispute about "race". Thus, these debates are primarily semantic in nature. However, Mallon goes a step further stating that metaphysicians of race actually agree on all the substantive ontological questions about "race" regardless of their semantic dispute. I call these Mallon's 8-Agreements:

> 1.) Racialism is false. There are no biobehavioral racial essences.
>
> 2.) There are a variety of racial concepts in the United States that are applied to persons.
>
> 3.) Ordinary people employ criteria including skin color, body morphology, ancestry, and identification to ascribe these concepts to persons.
>
> 4.) The application of these racial concepts may causally affect persons in both superficial and profound ways.
>
> 5.) Racial classification has had profoundly oppressive effects, at least in the past.
>
> 6.) Whether or not biological populations now exhibit a significant degree of reproductive isolation, the geographic distribution of populations suggests that they once did. Such distribution is partially responsible for the geographic distribution of superficial bodily features associated with race.
>
> 7.) That is, marriage/reproductive rates between members of classified groups may be lower than marriage/reproductive rates within the same groups.
>
> 8.) If the reproductive rates between groups are low enough (and there are no bridge populations), the groups will be distinct biological populations.

Mallon concludes that what is really at issue in the "race" debate is a normative disagreement about accepting race into our ontology or what are the most morally appropriate ways to talk about "race" or "racial differences" and for what ends. McPherson (2015) follows Mallon's suggestion that debates in the metaphysics of race should abandon the semantic strategy and "deep" ontological debates about "race" and adopt a more normative focused framing, one that focuses on how the use of race concepts maps on to some phenomena that is important for addressing issues of racial justice. An example that he posits is socioancestral groups, to how people who are descendent from certain populations are viewed as belonging to part of a "race".

1.2 Unifying Concerns

Both the Wrong Tools and Non-Substantive Metaphysics critiques are motivated by two major concerns: Semantic Gridlock and Empirical/Analytical Underdetermination. The two concerns are interconnected. Semantic Gridlock prevents race theorists from determining which conception of "race" is indicative of the "true" or "dominant" meaning of "race", which in turn prevents us from investigating whether empirical analysis can vindicate or refute the "true"/"dominant" meaning of "race", as the lack of a definitive meaning for "race" means that we cannot determine which facts are pertinent to "race". In the case that we can actually arrive at a "dominant" meaning of "race" Empirical/Analytical Underdetermination makes it difficult to determine whether we or whether one empirical analysis will definitively vindicate one ontological claim over another.

The Semantic Strategy, in the eyes of the critics, leads to Semantic gridlock. This concern is generated by how metaphysical debates about race are framed. While the metaphysics of race literature is inclusive of various philosophical approaches and methodologies, many of these approaches often boil down to two steps:

> **Step 1:** Determine the meaning of "race".
>
> **Step 2:** Given the meaning of "race", determine whether an entity like race is "real" or if it "exists".

In the semantic strategy, race theorists first must define what they mean by "race". In order to complete Step 1, race theorists must first defend their definition of "race". In defending their definition, race theorists will either explicitly invoke or implicitly rely on a particular semantic theory.

The work being done by semantic theories in theories of "race" is twofold: defining "race" and explaining why the definition is a "dominant" or "true" definition of "race".

The concern of Semantic gridlock comes into view once philosophers of race dispute a race theory on the grounds that it doesn't capture the true/dominant meaning of "race". This becomes problematic once metaphysical debates about "race" become primarily focused on what people "really mean" when talking about race, which is how to correctly determine meaning in general. Thus, the concern is that metaphysics of race could be stuck in a never-ending debate over how to even properly define "race", preventing philosophers from addressing ontological questions discussed in Step 2.

This has led to frustration with scholars like McPherson and Ludwig who believe the gridlock over debates about "what do we really mean by 'race'" fail to give us insight to the political and social realities that clearly reference race (i.e. either through some form of public reason or public policy). While Lemeire and Mallon believe that these semantic disputes show no signs of resolved, and thus ontological debates about "race" cannot be sufficiently addressed.

This then leads to the second concern, Empirical/Analytical Underdetermination. The "Analytical" underdetermination refers the tools of analytic metaphysics, such as conceptual analysis. The tool that is under the most scrutiny is the development and use of a semantic theory, whose problems I examined in the previous paragraphs. The big idea behind Analytical underdetermination is that any philosophical analysis that wishes to address metaphysical questions about "race" will have to rely on tools and methods from analytic metaphysics, that are hotly debated in extant metaphysics literature. In short questions about whether "race" is "real" or exists, are underdetermined by competing theories about what the correct understanding of "existence:"

(metaontological) or what is the correct method determining what is "reality" (i.e. debate over realism, grounding etc.) The concern of empirical underdetermination comes into view once we consider that even within paradigms that are in metametaphysical agreement concerning subjects like "existence", the ability of empirical sciences to settle debates about the existence of various "kinds" of entities is underdetermined by the general underdetermination within the empirical sciences.

The two concerns are interconnected in the sense that disagreements over which semantic strategy to pursue might engender a disagreement about what empirical or analytical strategies they believe are pertinent to answering ontological questions about "race". The main idea here is that race theorists could be stuck in a vicious circle of disagreement. For example: Race theorists A and B, might agree about which semantic strategy to pursue. However, A and B both cite different empirical facts that they believe support competing ontological claims about race. Their disagreement could be rooted in classical underdetermination of empirical sciences, or it could be rooted in an analytical disagreement about whether different empirical facts align with their agreed upon on definition of race. In the "classical" case there are a bevy of debates within the philosophy of science that A and B could become entrenched in. In the "analytical" case, A and B, they can become entrenched in storied philosophical debates over how the semantics of "ordinary language" ought to be translated into the semantics of scientific theories. The trouble plaguing A and B is that their choice to use the tools of analytic philosophy to answer ontological questions about "race" are accompanied by various problems, whose solutions, in the best case, are still in the process of being resolved, or in the worst case, are unsolvable.

1.3 Summary and Diagnosis of the Problems

Given the stated concerns, it appears that philosophers of race have either exhausted the methodologies that can make progress on answering ontological questions about "race" or have reached consensus on all the substantive metaphysical questions about race. Thus, it is unclear whether the further debate over the metaphysics of race will yield any meaningful progress that will enrich future philosophical analysis of "race". Because the as the metaphysics of race literature has primarily relied on a methodology that first requires the pursuit of a semantic strategy of identifying a dominant or "true" meaning before assessing the metaphysical claims surrounding race, Semantic Gridlock and Empirical/Analytical Underdetermination become identifiable problems for any metaphysics of race research program.

It should be noted that many of the criticisms conceive of the "metaphysics of race" as being primarily an "ontological" debate about race (i.e. is "race" real/ does it exists), with further debate being had over what kind of entity race might be. This is not to say that these critics have not conceived of other kinds of metaphysical debates surrounding race, only that their criticism are specifically tailored to attack a certain kind of metaphysical debate (i.e. ontological debates) as well as the kinds of methodologies they believe are applicable to settling these kinds of debates. Most of the criticisms I have covered in this first section, tacitly or explicitly endorse some form of deflationist ontology for race, either in the form of stipulating an operational definition of "race" for the purposes of normative theorizing or arguing that ontological questions about "race" should be judged solely in terms of whether they are epistemically useful.

However, the methodologies referenced in these criticisms need not be the only way to pursue a metaphysics of race research program. In what follows, I will give my account of the

methodology that the metaphysics of race literature should adopt as its primary orthodoxy that I believe addresses many of the concerns described in the critiques covered in this section.

Part II: A Revised Methodology for Metaphysics of Race

Roadmap for Part II

In this section of the paper, I will give an account of the methodology that the metaphysics of race literature should adopt when engaging in academic philosophical discourse surrounding "race". While the critics covered in the previous section conceived of metaphysics of race as primarily an ontological debate, my conception of metaphysics of race will be inclusive of ontological inquiries but will also provide guidance on how to undertake a wider range of metaphysical inquiries surrounding "race". Thus, in describing and defending my proposed methodology, I will explain both the meta-ontological and meta-metaphysical stance that my methodology takes when philosophically investigating "race". These stances are general philosophical positions that can be defended regardless of what subfield of philosophy they are applied to. However, for the purposes of this paper, they will only be discussed and defended in terms of the intellectual aims of philosophy of race.

In the following subsection I give a step-by-step breakdown of my prescribed metaphysical methodology for philosophy of race. I follow this breakdown with an explanation of how to interpret the completion of each of the steps. The remainder of the subsections will be devoted to explaining the various influences that have shaped how I have crafted each step.

2.1 The New Methodology for Metaphysics of Race

The steps detailed in my methodology I take to be most fundamental requirements for undertaking any metaphysical analysis of "race". They are 'fundamental' in sense that they establish the basic structure for establishing any sort of metaphysical claim about "race" either as a novel thesis or as an object of analysis. This methodology, however, does not exhaust all the pertinent inquiries for metaphysical analysis of "race", as investigations into the nature of "race" inquiry could yield new questions that could require further investigation or analysis. Thus, what is established here is a foundation for undertaking metaphysical analysis that keeps track of how race-theories or other perspectives on "race" are connected to metaphysical positions that are theorized and interrogated by analytic metaphysicians.

Metametaphysical Methodology for Philosophy of Race

> *Step 1.* **Stipulate your definition/meaning of the term "race" and motivate why it is a conception of race** that we should contend with. (e.g. demonstrating the prominence of definition in a particular domain of inquiry).
>
> *Step 2.* **Explain the application conditions for "race" and "race-terms" from the definition/meaning stated in Step 1 and determine what the 'metaphysical models' that are entailed/required by the application conditions for "race".**
>
> *Step 3.* **Reflect** on the use of **metaphysical concepts/models by the scientific/empirical disciplines that are pertinent to application conditions of "race".**
>
> *Step 4.* **Determine the tenability of the metaphysical models entailed by the application conditions of "race", according to the epistemic virtues of our best empirical practices.**
>
> *Step 5.* **Render metaphysical judgement about "race".**

Step 1 sets the stage for the adoption of Semantic Pluralism as a new semantic strategy for the metaphysical analysis of "race". In Step 1 race-theorists are asked to state their definition of "race" and motivate why it is a definition/meaning worth considering. The secondary requirement to "motivate" the consideration of a definition of "race" is meant to demonstrate the salience or

pertinence the definition has to a specific domain. Pertinence/Salience can be demonstrated in multiple ways such as explaining a definition/meaning's prominence within a certain sociolinguistic context (such geographic location) or within academic literatures or public policy. Race theorists can also posit a novel definition of "race", in the mode of conceptual engineering. However, they still must motivate the acceptance of new definition by either explaining how the proposed definition more accurately accounts the phenomena targeted by previous conceptions of "race" or re-conceptualizes "race" in order to better serve some epistemic and/or normative purpose.

Steps 2 informed by combining the orthodoxies of Amie Thomasson's "Easy Ontology" and LA Paul's "Metaphysics as Modelling. This can be seen in my use of the terms "application conditions" and "metaphysical models". "Application conditions" is a term that Thomasson uses to denote a set of truth conditions that both govern a term's use as well as serve as a guide for determining whether it exists or not. Thomasson's Easy Ontology approach is the ontological orthodoxy I believe the metaphysics of race should adopt. This orthodoxy views the answer to ontological questions as following a straightforward process of conceptual analysis followed by empirical investigation/confirmation. This boils down to a simple two-step process: 1.) Determine the application conditions for some term K through conceptual analysis. 2.) Empirically investigate whether the application conditions for K to obtain. If the application conditions for obtain, then K exists. The term "metaphysical models" is borrowed from LA Paul's Metaphysics as *Metaphysics as Modelling,* which conceives of metaphysics simpliciter as being in the business of creating models of the world/reality by using concepts like 'properties', 'relations', 'nomology' and 'existence' as the basic building blocks for any form of analysis whether it be analytic or empirical.

Paul's view of how the domains of metaphysics and science intersect informs Step 3. Paul argues that basic concepts of analysis (i.e. 'properties', 'relations' etc.) are employed in the content of scientific theories and thus inform scientific theorizing and analysis of observation. Step 3 requires that theorists pay attention to the way the interpretation of metaphysical concepts, such as a particular understanding of 'persistence', informs how various scientific theories guide our interpretation of the results of empirical investigations.

Step 4 and 5 both require us to detail how particular judgements about either existence of "race" or metaphysical issues surrounding "race" are connected to more general metaphysical commitments.

The remainder of this section will be devoted to explaining in detail the rationale for adopting each step. In 2.2, I explain how my development of Step 1 is informed by my adoption of Semantic Pluralism as way of avoiding problem of Semantic Gridlock. In 2.3 I go into detail of Amie Thomasson's *Easy Ontology* approach that informs Steps 2. In this section I explain why it is the meta-ontological approach that I prescribe for philosophy of race. In 2.4 I explain how LA Paul's *Metaphysics as Modelling* view informed my development of Step 3. I close with 2.5 where I explain how to combine the methods prescribed by Thomasson and Paul and explain how this combination is particularly apt for rendering judgments detailed in Steps 4 and 5.

2.2 The "New" Semantic Strategy: Semantic Pluralism

> *Step 1.* **Stipulate your definition/meaning of the term "race" and motivate why it is a conception of race** that we should contend with. (e.g. demonstrating the prominence of definition in a particular domain of inquiry).

The directives detailed in Step 1 represent a move toward a new semantic strategy, one that is not committed to there being a singular "dominant" or "true" meaning of race. This alternative

strategy, as the title of the subsection suggests, is one that accepts semantic pluralism concerning the use of race terms. The purpose of adopting this new strategy of Semantic Pluralism is to overcome the Semantic Gridlock worry. The remainder of this section will be devoted to answering the following questions: What do I mean by Semantic Pluralism? What are the epistemic and pragmatic reasons for accepting said "Sematic Pluralism"? How does the adoption of Semantic Pluralism informs how we conceive of metaphysical debates about "race" within the philosophy of race literature?

2.2.1 What is Semantic Pluralism?

The operating background assumption for the kind of Semantic pluralism I wish to advocate for the metaphysics of race literature to adopt, is that there exist many meanings for "race" and that any given "race-theory" is always made in reference to a specific sociolinguistic context. This assumption, to some extent, has already been implicitly taken up by some scholars in the philosophy of race literature. For example, the coining of the term "the US Race Debate" was done to denote a discourse about race theories which English-speakers within United States as its sociolinguistic context for examining "race -talk". Race theorists within the "US Race Debate" claim to be debating about the ontological status of a conception of "race" that was derived from analyzing 'dominant' or 'true' meaning of "race" within the US context. The idea being that "race" and "race-terms" could have different meanings in different linguistic contexts. However, the kind of semantic pluralism I am advocating for is one that requires race-theorists to more closely consider how a set of sociolinguistic facts can give rise the existence of multiple meanings of "race".

The form of semantic pluralism is committed to the following claims: There exist many shared linguistic contexts in which "race-talk" occurs. Within these shared contexts, there exists

variation in the meanings of "race" and "race-terms", resulting in the existence of multiple meanings of "race" and "race" terms. This version of semantic pluralism is one that is pluralist solely in terms of the existence of multiple distinct meanings of "race-terms". These "multiple meanings" can manifest in a variety of ways. One example of "race" having multiple meanings can be the existence of two different sets of predicates that are identified as "race-terms" or "racial-categories" within "race-talk". Another example of "multiple meanings" could be sets of "race-terms" that are identical in terms of the predicates they use but have different definitions or referents for each of these terms.

Accepting this form of Semantic Pluralism does not commit one to pluralism with respect to the truth of general semantic theories. While it acknowledges that different meanings/definitions of "race" may be more closely aligned with referentialist or descriptivist theories of reference, it takes no stand as whether referentialism or descriptivism are equally adequate to determine the "true meaning" of race. In this sense, descriptivism and referentialism are instrumentally useful for describing how particular meanings of "race-terms" manifest in race-talk. However, Semantic Pluralism resists the proposition that there is a singular "true" definition/meaning of "race" in favor of the proposition of there being multiple meanings of "race" that are socially or operationally salient at a particular time.

By "socially salient" I mean that the meaning of a "race-term" is featured prominently in the "race-talk" of a particular linguistic context as way of describing how oneself or others stand in relation to some racial category. Here prominence is not identical to "dominance" as a particular meaning can be socially salient to a particular subgroup of people but not socially salient to others that said subgroup share a sociolinguistic context with. By "operationally salient" I mean that particular meanings of "race" that are derived with the purpose of making them complimentary to

the tools, methods and aims of a given institution. These institutions can be social/political entities in which the meaning of "race-terms" are formed in accordance to how said institution operates to complete its stated policy or informational goals. Institutions can also be conceived of in terms academic research programs/literatures, in this case, the meaning of "race-terms" are defined in terms of the extant theories and background of their respective disciplines.

Thus, a succinct summation of the claims and commitments to the Semantic Pluralism that I would prescribe for the metaphysics of race is the following: There exist multiple meanings of "race" and "race-terms" that can be observed within all the sociolinguistic contexts in which "race-talk" occurs. The existence of these different meanings can be partly attributed to the differences in the social and operational salience they hold for sociolinguistic context in which the "race-terms" are derived and employed.

2.2.2 Epistemic and Pragmatic Reasons for Accepting Semantic Pluralism

There are both epistemic and pragmatic reasons for the metaphysics of race to adopt this form of Semantic pluralism. Epistemic, in the sense that it tracks some true facts about the linguistic facts about "race-talk". Pragmatic, in the sense that it aids in providing clearer and more productive discourse about the metaphysics of race. I'll first explain the epistemic reasons for accepting this version of Semantic Pluralism. The primary epistemic reason to accept Semantic Pluralism is that it most accurately describes and accounts for the sociolinguistic data around "race-talk". The correct "description" is that there do exist multiple different meanings/definitions of "race-terms". The correct "accounting for" is that it acknowledges how variation in social/political conditions and intellectual intentions can engender different meanings, definitions, and interpretations of "race-terms".

Spencer (2019) has provided a compelling argument for the existence of Semantic Pluralism concerning "race-terms" by examining how within US race talk there are at least two distinct meanings of 'race'. The Office of Management (OMB) through directive number 15 states that there 5 racial categories: Black/African-American, Caucasian/White, Asian, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Native American/ Alaskan Native. Hispanic/Latino is considered a "ethnicity" not a race. Spencer states that while according to the 2000 US census records, using the OMB's racial category a majority of Hispanic/ Latino Americans identified as "white" a survey taken in 2002 survey found that a majority of Hispanic Americans racially self-reported as 'Hispanic' or "Latino"[2]. What this example shows is that there is an asymmetry in how people self-identify according to the OMB and how they self-identify on their own volition. Thus, OMB does not define Hispanic/Latino as a "race", but it is plausible that a majority of Hispanic/Latino American may understand their ethnic categorization (in the view the OMB) is in fact their racial categorization.

Spencer's analysis covers a kind of distinction between meanings that some in the literature have attempted to describe as a distinction between "folk" (i.e. everyday use of race-terms) and expert conceptions of "race" (i.e. technical definitions adopted by institutions and/or specialists). Many race-theorists will often indicate that their respective race-theory captures the "dominant" or "true" meaning of "race" that is at the heart of either a folk or expert conception of 'race'. While some race-theorists are divided about which conception of "race" ought to be the focus of philosophical analysis of race, they nonetheless believe that there is a univocal meaning of 'race' in either folk or expert domain. However, there is plurality of meaning of 'race' in both "expert" and "folk" linguistic domains.

[2]For more See: Brodie, Mollyann, Annie Steffenson, Jaime Valdez, Rebecca Levin, and Roberto Suro 2002: 2002 National Survey of Latinos. Washington, DC and Menlo Park, ca: Pew Hispanic Center and Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation

Even among research fields that use the OMB racial categories the interpretation of what these categories mean (i.e. what kinds of properties are indicated by these categories) varies depending on the discipline. The OMB designed its racial schema to track certain sets of historically defined groups, but which groups they historical groups they conceive of as "races" is done in accordance with how the history of a particular group aligns with histories and activities of the United States Government and it's various institutions. In other words, the meaning of "race" in the OMB definition is influenced by how the concept of "race" will be operationalized within the policy interventions that government agencies undertake when they deploy the concept. Contrasts this meaning "race" with how it is understood in some Biomedical research literature, where "race" is a self-ascribed category that represents an important ethnographic fact that is considered attempting to describe the representativeness of a sample or study. (Kaplan, Bennett 2003)

Semantic Pluralism can best explain the how these differing meanings of "race" occurs, despite both linguistic contexts sharing the same predicates for "racial categories" by examining how "race" differs in terms of the operational salience that "race" has for each of their epistemic and pragmatic aims. The OMB has a pragmatic aim of implanting public policy and has as its epistemic aim the need for demographic data, specifically historically defined groupings of people whose history is germane to the history and contemporary interests to the United States and its various institutions. Biomedical researchers have an epistemic aim to determine the efficacy of certain treatments or the effects of some disease or illness, whose credence is bolstered by results of studies that have representative samples. Demographic data, such as racial identification, being a feature of representative sampling serves a pragmatic purpose for Biomedical researchers who want to communicate their findings to diverse populations. What is operationally salient to the OMB is that certain populations may be identified with historical groups that have historical and legal

connections to the operation of US governmental institution. Such is the case with "Native American/American Indian" given the Dawes Act of 1887, as well the category "Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander" not being inclusive of descendants from the Philippines. What is operationally salient for Biomedical researchers is that certain demographic information is pertinent to obtaining a random representative sample. "Race" is self-identified category that tracks ethnographic information that is of interests to Biomedical researchers for sampling, while "Registered Political Party" may not be.[3]

While both the OMB and Biomedical researchers have a shared interest in capturing demographic information, their different understanding of what race means is generated by the difference in terms of what is operationally salient for each of their respective institutions, which is part shaped by the kinds of information they wish to get from using "race". Thus, a plurality of meaning amongst "race-terms" emerges across the different disciplines and institutions due to them each having their own unique pragmatic and epistemological aims.

Amongst folk conceptions of "race", the meaning of "race" is even more multifarious in terms of the interpretation of "race-terms". Within expert conceptions of "race" different meanings emerge as consequence of the differences in operational salience concerning the concept of race. Within folk conceptions of "race" multiple meanings emerge as a consequence of the differences in social salience. Race-theories that attempt to extract a dominant meaning from a folk conception "race" take the strategy of giving a definition of "race" that fulfills a set of necessary conditions for "race" that are presumably shared by all users of "race-talk".[4]However, the application of these

[3] This is under the assumption of random representative sample from a general population. Biomedical research that wishes to explore the health outcomes or status of particular political groups will find this information useful.

[4] One example of this strategy is the Michael Hardimon's minimalist conception of race.

necessary conditions, what I am calling the "meaning", varies according to the social conditions of speakers that contribute to larger discourse of "race-talk".

Without preemptively going in for the metaphysical view that "race" is a social construct, it is uncontroversial to conclude that linguistic practices are social practices and are shaped by the social conditions of speakers. Famed examples such as the numerous words and concepts for snow in Inuit and Yupik languages, suggests that the living conditions of people shape both the development of concepts and meaning within linguistic context they occupy.(Woodbury, 1991) (Lucy, 2001) It's not necessarily the case that Inuit and Yupik speakers observe properties of snow that others in differing linguistic contexts cannot see or observe. Rather it is the unique way in which the properties of snow have an effect on their lived experience as a formerly nomadic culture living in the Arctic, that has made various properties of snow socially salient properties.

This is important to consider, especially in the case of folk conceptions of "race", because there are numerous forms of variation in social conditions that can elicit differences in how speakers who share a sociolinguistic context interpret the meaning of "race" and "race-terms". For example: Even if we limit the scope of linguistic analysis to "English Speakers in the United States" the amount of variation in social conditions and backgrounds that exists within this group is numerous. Educational attainment, linguistic background (such as English as the sole language spoken vs English as second language), ethnicity, country of origin are among the differences in social backgrounds/conditions that exists amongst contributors to US race-talk.

Where social salience comes into the view as reason behind the multiplicity of meanings of "race", is that "race" is concept that aims to subdivide human beings and the properties of human

beings (whether they be biological or social properties) vary in terms of the social salience they have for different communities of speakers. This becomes especially evident once we consider the fact that members of this sociolinguistic context have backgrounds in which the use of race-concepts have appeared in public policy that has had varying kinds of impact on their individual lives and the communities currently they live in (or have lived in). Thus, it stands to reason that is probable that there exist multiple interpretations of what the meaning of "race" is, even when the locus of linguistic analysis on "race-talk" is restricted to English speakers in the United States.

2.2.3 Semantic Pluralism as way toward productive Metaphysical Analysis of Race

In lieu of a comprehensive accounting of the various meanings of "race" that currently exist, I argue that the best practice moving forward within the metaphysics of race is to work toward the development an account of different meanings of "race" that currently exists or possibly could exist. Semantic Pluralism allows us to undertake this project because it acknowledges that the concept of "race" can generate multiple linguistic interpretations. This is due to the diverse range of tools, methods, and aims used by everyday speakers, academic disciplines, and social/political institutions that engage in discussions or employ the concept of "race." The development of such an account will most likely require a division of epistemic labor, given the multitude of social contexts and disciplinary literatures that engage in or discuss "race-talk". However, embracing Semantic Pluralism as methodological praxis for the metaphysics of race encourages race-theorists to undertake linguistic analysis of "race" and "race-terms" in such a way that more accurately tracks the sociolinguistic facts about "race-talk".

Semantic Pluralism allows for race-theorists to posit a definition of "race" through a disciplinary or speculative lens.[5] Through such lenses, giving a definition of "race" only requires that the race-theorists give an account of the relevant sociolinguistic facts that motivates one to accept their definition of "race" as one that is either operationally or socially salient to a specific context or academic literature. It does not require them to pursue a method of "dominant" meaning, which would require race-theorists to exhaust all plausible definitions of "race". This different burden of proof makes the Semantic Pluralism pragmatically attractive for philosophers of race, as is narrows the focus of linguistic analysis to giving a descriptive account of how a set of sociolinguistic facts about "race-talk" might engender a particular definition of "race", without having to definitively determine what is the correct general semantic theory to analyze language writ large.

This focus on how particular definitions and concepts arise from sociolinguistic contexts to describe some feature about the world is a task that contemporary analytic metaphysics has been fine-tuned to explore. At least from the 20th century onward, analytic metaphysics has specifically been focused on the ways in which the concepts contained in our language inform our understanding of various theories, and from these theories some understanding/description of the world or reality. However, "analytic metaphysics" has many different competing conceptions and just as many (if not more) contentious debates about what is the correct methodology for metaphysical analysis, as there are concerning the philosophy of language. In the following section I explain the ontological orthodoxy that I would prescribe for the philosophy of race (i.e. philosophers that wish to engage an any type of philosophical analysis) but can be further developed by those who wish directly contribute to the metaphysics of "race".

[5] Speculative here refers to instance where person proposes a novel definition of "race" that they believe describes some features

2.3 Easy Ontology as Research Strategy for the Philosophy of Race

> *Step 2.* **Explain the application conditions for "race" and "race-terms" from the definition/meaning stated in Step 1 and determine what the 'metaphysical models' that are entailed/required by the application conditions for "race".**

The meta-ontological view that I will propose for the philosophy of race is a view originally given by Amy Thomasson known as Easy Ontology. Thomasson's Easy Ontology view is a meta-ontological account that seeks to describe the structure of all ontological claims and by extension the process by which ontological debates are undertaken. Thomasson's view is an example of Ontological Deflationism, in which all ontological questions are not deep metaphysical inquiries and can be straightforwardly answered by conceptual truths and empirical facts. For the purposes of this paper, I will not delve too deeply into whether easy ontology is a meta-ontological view that should be generalizable to cover all kinds of ontological debates. Instead, I will focus on explaining how the process that Thomasson describes for undertaking ontological debates is uniquely apt for ontological debates about race.

Thomasson argues that ontological debates are "easy" in that they can be straightforwardly answered by undergoing a two-step process involving conceptual analysis followed by empirical analysis/investigation. The conceptual analysis that is undertaken in the first step of this process involves examining the definition of a term, call it K, and from this definition establishing a set of "application conditions" for Ks to exist; "application conditions" is Thomasson's term for a set of truth conditions that must obtain in order for some term K to exist. Returning to the "table" example, the application condition for "tables" is "the presence of particles arranged table-wise". The motivation behind "application conditions" is that it posits a set of facts, that if true, forms the

grounds of existence claims of a particular term.[6] This then leads to the second step of the process, empirical analysis of the application conditions for the term, K. While the first step of conceptual analysis examines how term's definition determines what set of facts are required to be true in order to for said to exist, the second step of empirical analysis examines whether said facts are in fact true. Thomasson Easy ontology methodology for ontological inquiry can be succinctly described in the following:

For any term, K

K's exist iff the application conditions actually associated with K are fulfilled

Thomasson's Easy ontology method is an attractive method for philosophy of race to adopt for two reasons. The first reason is that the straightforward method of conceptual analysis of application conditions followed by empirical investigation into said application conditions, is a methodology that is accessible to non-philosophers but one that clearly spells out where philosophical analysis plays an integral role in explaining whether or not an entity like "race" does (or could) exist (i.e. determining the pertinence of certain to facts given a particular conception of race). The second reason being that Easy ontology's deflationist meta-ontology stance is a weaker metaphysical commitment for undertaking ontological debates about "race". All that one is committed to by adopting an Easy Ontology method of analysis is that existence claims are grounded by some empirically verifiable fact or facts and that our empirical sciences allow us to verify said facts. This is a metaphysical claim about "existence" that can be accepted by many

[6] "Grounds" here is being used a placeholder for a fundamental metaphysical relation that explains a basic property, in this case existence. See, Jonathan Schaffer "On What Grounds What" and Kelly Trogdon "An Introduction to Grounding" for a more comprehensive account of the use of grounds and grounding in philosophical discourse.

philosophers and non-philosophers without having to take on board too many other philosophical theses.

To be clear, Thomasson's view is an example of Ontological Deflationism, which is a substantial meta-ontological position. The main distinction between ontological realism and ontological defaltionism, is the role philosophical analysis plays in conceiving of existence. In the Easy Ontology view, philosophical analysis is limited to conceptual analysis. Thommasson argues that philosophical tools are most adept to engage in the process of conceptual engineering. The process of conceptual engineering includes articulating definitions of specific terms that then play a role in delineating necessary and sufficient conditions for various concepts. (Thomasson, 2014) Using conceptual analysis philosophers can reason within the definition of terms to understand the relationships between concepts as well as what kinds of propositions are necessary for a particular concept to be applied. However, any further understanding of the nature of "existence" is determined by empirical inquiry by our best science. Thus, "existence" just is the set of entities that are identified by our empirical sciences. For example: Atoms are a kind of physical particle that has been identified by Physics. Tables can be said to exist, provided that there is a collection of particles that are arranged "table-wise". (Thomasson, 2009) While conceptual analysis can be applied to our empirical sciences, our conceptual analysis can only provide further insight into the existence of particular entities but does not provide more insight into "existence" in and of itself.

While accepting this view as a meta-ontological stance account for ontological debates writ large would be a large philosophical background assumption, one can accept Easy Ontology as a practice for philosophy of race without committing to Easy Ontology writ large. The reason being that Thomasson's Easy Ontology approach provides a simple description of the semantic structure

of assessing existence claims and this description is compatible with more robust metaontological theories. Ontological realists do not deny that the existence of entities can be explained through conceptual analysis and empirical inquiry. However, they disagree with the notion that these processes of conceptual analysis and empirical inquiry encompass the entirety of the nature of "existence." One can accept Thomasson's method for addressing ontological debates without accepting that this methodology exhausts all meta-ontological insight.

Thus, Thomasson's Easy Ontology method offers a description of the semantic structure of how to assess ontological claims that is compatible with many meta-ontological frameworks both inside and outside of the philosophical discipline. The descriptive content of the Easy ontology methodology being compatible with a wide array of meta-ontological frameworks is important given my intention for the metaphysics of race to: a.) be applicable for interdisciplinary theorizing about race b.) be inclusive of discourse that about various metaphysical issues surrounding various conceptions of "race". More robust meta-ontological stances would commit race-theorists to a pre-empirical account of existence, that may or may not align with how other disciplines conceive of existence. The fewer meta-ontological commitments that are required to analyze the veracity of existence claim about "race" allows for broader discussion about how various disciplines conceive of "existence" and whether a particular conception of race can obtain given said disciplines standards for existence.

However, this does not mean that race-theorists are required to refrain from advocating for a particular metaphysical thesis when analyzing or prescribing a race theory. Rather the intention is for race-theorists to systematically demonstrate how a collection of tools, methods, and concepts provide a framework that accurately addresses the phenomena relevant to assessing metaphysical

questions about race. Such requirements are detailed in the latter half of Step 2 and are the primary focus of Steps 3 and 4.

2.4 Metaphysics as Modelling for the Metaphysics of Race

> *Step 3.* **Reflect** on the use of **metaphysical concepts/models by the scientific/empirical disciplines that are pertinent to application conditions of "race".**
>
> *Step 4.* **Determine the tenability of the metaphysical models entailed by the application conditions of "race", according to the epistemic virtues of our best empirical practices.**

In detailing Thomasson's Easy Ontology I mentioned that the Easy Ontology view allows was an orthodoxy that should be taken up by philosophy of race writ large. Steps 3 and 4 are more closely tailored to those that wish to metaphysically theorize about "race". Thus, in this section I identify LA Paul's *Metaphysics as Modelling* account as the Meta-metaphysical framework that metaphysics of race literature should adopt when metaphysically theorizing about "race" such that it allows for race-theorists to engage in substantive metaphysical debates that is still in conversation with the empirical sciences.

In her paper, *Metaphysics as Modelling*, LA Paul gives an account of what are the contemporary practices and research aims of analytic metaphysics. Paul is not attempting to give an account of the subject and methods of metaphysical inquiry that can equally account for Aristotelian and Kantian metaphysics, as it can for post-Quinean metaphysics. This is important to note because Paul's account is contributing to a meta-metaphysical literature that has largely been shaped by the philosophers work of philosophers in the 20th and 21st centuries. More specifically she is responding to critiques by Ladyman and Ross (2007) that metaphysical methods of 20th-century were too reliant of the intuitions and a priori reasoning of analytic philosophers such that it runs the risk of being

misaligned with our best scientific practices (i.e. the theories that we have strong epistemic credence for). Ladyman and Ross follow their critique with a recommendation that the only metaphysics be naturalized metaphysics, that is, metaphysics that is directly informed by (if not shaped by) the theories and observations that are part of our best empirical sciences.[7] Paul does not take issue with participating with naturalized metaphysics or with scholars who wish to contribute this literature. Rather Paul's critical analysis is aimed at how scholars like Ladyman and Ross characterize the relationship between metaphysics and science. Paul states her intentions for Metaphysics as Modelling account in the following:

> "…I will show how metaphysical theories are classes of models and discuss the roles of experience, common sense and thought experiments in the construction and evaluation of such models…the way these methodological points help us to understand the metaphysical project. Getting the right account of the metaphysical method allows us to better understand the relationship between science and metaphysics, to explain why doing metaphysics successfully involves having a range of different theories (instead of consensus on a single theory), to understand the role of thought experiments involving fictional worlds, and to situate metaphysical realism in a scientifically realist context." (LA Paul, 2012)

For the purposes of this paper, I will focus more on Paul's arguments delineating the relationship between scientific and metaphysical theorizing than I will on her response the naturalist metaphysical critique. My reason for doing this is that critiques levied against the metaphysics of race are not as analytically fundamental as those concerns at the heart of the naturalized/analytic (or a priori) debate. By "analytically fundamental" I mean that the criticisms of the metaphysics of race are about how specifically ontological questions about "race" cannot be resolved, regardless of what metaphysical method is employed. The purpose of introducing Paul's *Metaphysics as Modelling* account is to give a broader definition of metaphysics simpliciter, and then explain how the tools and methods described by Paul when properly contextualized to the specifics of the philosophy of race

[7] French and McKenzie present a similar challenge in their paper: Thinking Outside the (Tool)Box: Towards a More Productive Engagement Between Metaphysics and Philosophy of Physics

produce a productive and substantive metaphysics of race literature. With that being said, I will now get into the details of Paul's *Metaphysics as Modelling* account.

Paul describes the study of metaphysics as a distinct inquiry into 'fundamental natures of the world'. Key to the advancement of this inquiry is the development of metaphysical concepts. These concepts are understood to be "basic concepts of analysis" that are used to describe features of world (i.e. reality). Examples of such concepts, "properties", "relations", "composition", "existence", "persistence" etc. These concepts are "basic" in the sense that they descriptions of the most fundamental features of reality and that any description of world will invoke some conception of a metaphysical concept. Paul explains that our various accounts of metaphysical concepts function as models for features of reality. For example, an account of "persistence" is a model of how entities maintain their token identity through time. Thus, when Paul speaks of metaphysics inquiring into 'fundamental natures of the world', she means that metaphysical theorizing is attempting to give a description of fundamental concepts that most accurately model reality.

For Paul, the aim of metaphysical analysis is to develop an account of metaphysical concepts that aid in the discovery of "systemic, general truths concerning fundamental facts" about the world/reality. Other philosophers have charged that the only system of knowledge that has any claim to discover "fundamental facts" about reality/the world are the empirical sciences. While Paul does not deny that the empirical sciences grant us epistemic access to truths about the world, she does deny that science gives us fundamental truths. Paul's argument for the fundamentality of the project of metaphysics, is that the subjects at the heart of metaphysics are "ontologically prior" to project of science.

> "Metaphysics tries to tell us what laws, naturalness, properties, objects, persistence, and causal relations fundamentally are, in terms of natures, and science tries to discover which entities there are or how these natures are exemplified." (Paul, 2012)

In essence, what is being said here is that metaphysics posits various conceptions of properties, kinds of ontological categories (i.e., entities, kinds etc.) and relations that form models of a world. She describes metaphysical models in terms of a semantic approach to model construction which she describes as the following:

> "Employing the semantic approach in the service of metaphysics, a metaphysical theory can be understood as a class of models, where the models are composed logical, modal and other relations relating variables that represent n-adic properties, objects, and other entities. (We might also think of conceptual analyses in terms modeling concepts… The models we can take to be the theory are structures of abstract objects that represent activity-constituting objects standing in necessitation relations to abstract objects that represent composites or wholes of the activity-constituting objects." (Paul, 2012, pp. 12)

Put more concretely metaphysical models posit the existence of various kinds of entities, each with their respective properties and attempt to describe the various relata between these entities. These entities or objects are "abstract" in the sense that they defined purely in terms of how the existence within larger "structure" of reality. Paul continues to state that descriptions of metaphysical relations, like causation, themselves are metaphysical models.

> "For another example, consider a simple counterfactual theory of the causal relation that holds that **c** is a cause of **e**, if and only if, had c occurred, **e** would not have occurred. Models for the theory are structures that represent events standing in relations of counterfactual dependence parentheses description of these models are descriptions of the structures. If these structures are isomorphic to the actual causal relations in the world the theory represents actual causal relations and gives account of the nature of actual causation." (Paul, pp. 13)

Paul argues that we assess the viability and strength of metaphysical models/theories, the same way we assess the strength of scientific theories and models, by appeal to theoretical virtues of "elegance, simplicity and explanatory [power]".

What is important to note here is that Paul's method still requires empirical confirmation in order to determine the accuracy of the metaphysical model. A model of causation that runs counter to what we have observed in our empirical investigations is not a correct model of causation and

should not be endorsed as tenable metaphysical theory. However, Paul notes that construction of metaphysical models, is a necessary first step in any form substantive theorizing about things that are part of reality. This includes scientific theorizing. Paul explains that science through its empirical investigation, gives an answer as to which of the models proposed by metaphysics are instantiated by material systems. "Material" here means entities that constitute "the world" or "reality".

In a more concrete explanation Paul puts it this way:

> There is no way to make sense of the central concepts deployed by biological representations of the citric acid cycle without using a concept of persistence. In such cases, we start with the metaphysical concepts as the conditions under which we understand the scientific concepts. (Paul, 2012, pp. 6)

Paul's argument essentially boils down to this point: Scientific concepts and theories are built upon metaphysical concepts and theories; the work that metaphysicians do in defining and refining metaphysical concepts and theories, can be appropriated, or explored by scientists in their theorizing and experimentation.

Subject Matter

- The study of basic concepts of analysis (i.e. properties, existence, persistence, modality etc.) to construct metaphysical categories (entities, kinds, essences, laws, relations etc.)
- Metaphysicians use metaphysical categories to construct models of the world (or possible worlds). Metaphysical theorizing attempts to model how reality is constituted, detailing the various features the exist (or could exist) in the world.

Relationship with Scientific Theorizing

- Science (both physical and social) uses the basic concepts of metaphysics in crafting various theories about the world.
- The entities, kinds and laws referenced in Scientific theories are instances of Metaphysical categories that are referenced in Metaphysical theories.
- Scientific models of the world include some content of Metaphysical models via their use of metaphysical concepts.

One thing to note is that I am conceiving the relationship between science and metaphysics as a dialectic. By "dialectic" I mean that the content of their theories and the investigative aims of their academic research programs, can be read in parallel with each other. Scientists can discern whether the metaphysician's discussion of metaphysical category (such as persistence) is pertinent to their theories or is consistent with observational data. Metaphysicians will be able to tease out how a particular theory uses a conception of a metaphysical category to construct their theory. It does not take a stance on whether the subject matter of metaphysics is ontologically prior to subject matter of science.

This description of metaphysics and its relationship to scientific theorizing/models is the metaphysical framework that I would prescribe for philosophy of race. While many race theorists have focused solely on delineating their method for determining whether or not "race" is "real" or "exists" my desired trajectory for the "metaphysics of race" is for philosophers to more broadly explore the use (or misuse) of metaphysical concepts/theses in theorizing about race, both within philosophy and across other academic disciplines. What I'm pointing out in this distinction is a difference in the scope of metaphysical analysis. Traditionally the metaphysics of race has consisted of theorists using different semantic frameworks and appeals to various literatures to give their answer to ontological questions about race. The new research agenda for the metaphysics of race that I am aiming to develop, still welcomes ontological inquiries into "race" but encourages theorists to further interrogate how accounts of "race" are connected to metaphysical concepts/categories (i.e. properties, persistence, supervenience etc.) This interrogation can lead to metaphysical questions about "race" that are more than just "ontological" but can also lead to questions about how the background theories of other academic disciplines employ metaphysical theses and whether a conception of "race" is consistent with those metaphysical positions.

Thus, it is due to *Metaphysics as Modelling's* analytical aim of making clear how scientific theories adopt/employ metaphysical theses, that I believe makes it the ideal metaphysical framework for guiding metaphysical discourse surrounding race. By bringing to salience the ways in which certain metaphysical models of "reality" are taken up by various scientific disciplines, it provides a clearer connection between the analysis of done by metaphysicians and the theorizing done in other academic disciplines.This is a particularly attractive feature, especially for the metaphysics of race, given both the various scientific disciplines that have analyzed the concept of "race" and the number of times that philosophers of race have referenced the findings and theories of scientific disciplines. While it should be note that Paul's *Metaphysics as Modelling* account is primarily focused on the use of metaphysical concepts within the physical and natural sciences, there are a bevy of metaphysical concepts/categories used in the social sciences and academic literatures when they conceptualize and analyze "race". The main thesis of the Metaphysics as Modelling account is that any theory that claims to reflect some feature of the world, some form of metaphysical model of the world is assumed or employed. Since the theories of the social sciences and a handful of the humanities claim to describe features of reality, the applicability of *Metaphysics as Modelling* view to these literatures remains.

2.5 Synthesis of Easy Ontology and Metaphysics as Modelling

> *Step 2.* **Explain the application conditions for "race" and "race-terms" from the definition/meaning stated in Step 1 and determine what the 'metaphysical models' that are entailed/required by the application conditions for "race".**
>
> *Step 3.* **Reflect** on the use of **metaphysical concepts/models by the scientific/empirical disciplines that are pertinent to application conditions of "race".**
>
> *Step 4.* **Determine the tenability of the metaphysical models entailed by the application conditions of "race", according to the epistemic virtues of our best empirical practices.**

Steps 2 through 4 combines language and approaches from both Paul and Thomasson respective accounts. Theorists are asked to articulate application conditions for "race" but to do so in ways that make explicit the kinds of metaphysical concepts that are entailed by its use. Steps 3 and 4 require empirical confirmation but ask theorists to delineate the work that certain interpretation of metaphysical concepts play in our analysis of the results empirical investigation. However, one may have pause in accepting methodology that combines Thomasson's *Easy Ontology* and Paul's *Metaphysics as Modelling* approach, given that these respective theorists have opposing view of metaphysics simpliciter. Thommason, a meta-ontological deflationist is also a meta-metaphysical deflationist, believing that metaphysical questions are attempts to resolve our concepts in accordance with empirical data.

> "I call an approach to answering (a particular range of) existence questions an 'easy' approach provided it shares the following two features: 1. It relies on nothing more than empirical and conceptual work in answering existence questions that are well-formed and answerable (requiring nothing 'epistemically metaphysical')", (Thomasson, 2018)

This "epistemically metaphysical" refers to the kind of knowledge of metaphysical theories of basic concepts like "properties" or "causation". This is the exact kind of unique knowledge that Paul believes we gain from metaphysical theorizing. Thus, it appears that the Easy Ontology method and Metaphysics as Modelling are incompatible, as they are based in conflicting meta-metaphysical standpoints.

However, not all is lost. As I said before, one can adopt Thomasson's deflationist strategy as accurately describing a "subclass" of existential questions, but they do not need to believe that this method is exhaustive of all kinds of ontological questions. Thomasson herself is open to the idea that certain kinds of predicates may require more robust metaphysical theories about "properties" and "laws". When describing the applicability of realist approaches to ontology and metaphysics,

such as Ted Sider's view of metaphysics as a description of reality's fundament structure, Thomasson states:

> On Sider's view, this requires that – at least when doing ultimate metaphysics – we ask, 'which notions carve perfectly at the joints'. The goal of inquiry is not merely to state truths (which Sider admits can be stated using concepts that do not carve at the joints); it is 'to use the right concepts, so that its conceptual structure matches reality's structure...For those terms (like natural kind terms) whose function is to serve in our explanatory and predictive scientific theories, ability to track similarities and differences that figure prominently in explanation and prediction will be a crucial desideratum. Those terms that do so are those we naturally think of as picking out 'natural kinds' or as 'carving at the joints'. This enables us to distinguish terms like 'lithium' as relatively natural… (Thomasson, 2018 pp. 157-158)

This indicates that an Easy Ontology approach does not rule out there can be cases where the use of the term "exists" takes on a more substantive meaning. However, this 'substantivity' is due to the role the use of these predicates play in our best scientific theories. In reference to ordinary objects like "tables" and "chairs" a deflationist approach to ontology is appropriate as the use of these predicates because the use of these kinds of predicates refer to a class of entities that are simply used to indicate a speaker's ability to identify certain kinds of objects. However, the use of predicates that claim to be "natural kinds" indicates a more robust understanding of "existence" via its connection to the concept of 'naturalness'. However, present in both cases is the role that empirical investigation in determining whether "existence" obtains. Thus, greater attention to metaphysical concepts/theses are welcome within the Easy Ontology method provided that the greater attention to these concepts is done in the service of aiding our empirical investigations.

Given that philosophy of race is concerned with investigating and characterizing certain facts abouts human beings, an ontological account that clearly delineates a relationship between conceptual analysis and empirical investigation is an appropriate methodology for addressing ontological questions about "race". Thomasson even notes ontological debates in the philosophy of race have adopted a deflationist stance concerning whether or not "race" exists, citing an example of

how the Easy Ontology method makes sense of the debate between Appiah's Anti-Realism and Haslanger's social constructionist realism.

> "Kwame Anthony Appiah's arguments that (if we follow an ideational approach) what it would take for there to be races is for there to be 'significant correlations between the biological and the moral, literary, or psychological characters of human beings; and that these be explained by the intrinsic nature… of the members of the race'. Such arguments work as well on the deflationary approach as elsewhere. Where terms have worldly application conditions, the main way for the deflationist...to show that the corresponding entities don't exist is to argue (as Appiah does) that those conditions are not met." (Thomasson, 2018 pp. 152-153)

Thomasson explains that Haslanger engages in conceptual analysis over "race" by proposing a new conception of "race" that reconceives of "race" as a collection of racialized groups that are "socially positioned as subordinate or privileged along some dimension"[8]. This reconceiving of "race" establishes a new set of application conditions for the use of the term "race". The result of these new set of application conditions for "race":

> These criteria are met, and so we can say that there are racialized groups in this sense. Debates about the existence of races, then, can proceed in the latter vein, as we examine Haslanger's proposal and aim to determine whether we should adopt modified race concepts along these lines. (Thomasson, 2018 pp. 153)

If Thomasson's Easy Ontology neatly captures how ontological debates about race are determined, what's the point in introducing Paul's account of *Metaphysics as Modelling*? When I initially described Thomasson's Easy Ontology view, I stated that the view provides "a simple description of the semantic structure of assessing existence claims". The "semantic structure" referred to the content of how many ontological investigations boil down to a two-step process of delineating application conditions for a term and examining whether empirical investigation confirms those application conditions. While the description of this process is "straightforward" in the sense that it distills ontological debates about kinds of entities into the analysis of whether a set of conditions

[8] See Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality, op. cit. note 13, 236

prescribed by an entity's definition are confirmed by empirical investigation, confirmation via empirical investigation can be more complicated, especially when we view empirical observation through a particular theoretical framework. What Paul's *Metaphysics as Modelling* view brings to the table is that it explains the work that metaphysical theses do in interpreting the use predicates in a scientific theory.

Given that Thomasson makes room for Sider's "joint-carving" metaphysical approach for ontological debates to handle debates such as questions of 'natural kinds' due to more substantive interpretation of that "existence" has for scientific theorizing, I contend that we must employ Paul's *Metaphysics as Modelling* interpretation of metaphysics given that various metaphysical positions on "race" within the philosophy of race literature reference the empirical sciences in either explaining their view of "race" or explaining pertinence of these sciences to examining "race". We can apply the semantic structure of Thomasson's Easy Ontology to how predicates are used in scientific and metaphysical theories. Within both metaphysical and scientific theories, we establish certain terms, that our theories dictate certain application conditions for the use of those terms. Terms like "properties" and "supervenience" occupy our metaphysical theories, while terms like "atoms" and "biomes" occupy some of scientific theories. What Paul's *Metaphysics as Modelling* view brings to the table is a way explaining how metaphysical theses inform how scientific theories interpret findings of empirical investigations. How this pertains to the metaphysics of race, is that we can analyze how application conditions of various conceptions of "race" require certain kinds of metaphysical models to instantiated by systems that are studied by the empirical sciences.

The union Paul's *Metaphysics as Modelling* and Thomasson's *Easy Ontology* approach results in metaphysical framework for the metaphysics of race that is inclusive of multiple meta-ontological

stances but is metaphysically realist with respect to determining the applicability of "race-concepts" to an empirical science. The adoption of Thomasson's Easy Ontology method allows for race-theorists to consider "race" at various levels ontological significance. The existence of "race" can be viewed purely instrumentally by explaining a how a specific definition of "race" has set of application conditions that obtain in the world. In this case the "existence" of "race" simply refers to how a group of people understand and recognize a particular concept. This "group of people" could be contributors to an academic literature or an everyday speaker in the social context that the term "race" could be used. This method is also open to investigating more substantive interpretation of "existence" claims and other metaphysical theses about "race". Theorists who wish to pursue this mode of metaphysical theorizing have a soft commitment to metaphysical realism. What is involved in this commitment is simply that for any substantive metaphysical claim about "race" (i.e. "existential claims", "persistence", "group membership") they must explain how the interpretation of specific metaphysical concept shapes how they confirm or disconfirm the stated claim. This "interpretation of a specific metaphysical concept" can be done in the mode of analytic metaphysics or in naturalized metaphysics, in both modes the interpretation of the specific metaphysical concept must be spelled out. The idea here is that "substantive" metaphysical claims about "race" must be supported by tenable "substantive" metaphysical thesis.

In a nutshell this metaphysical framework is one that is constructed to accommodate semantic pluralism concerning the referents of "race" but can track which conceptions of "race" (if any) that track features of the world and if so what kinds of features. Easy Ontology allows for a variation in kinds of claims that "race" intends to make about the world the given that there may various definitions of "race". Paul's *Metaphysics as Modelling* gives a framework for assessing

metaphysical claims by or about a conception of "race" given the level of substantive metaphysical analysis a race theorist wishes to engage in.

2.6 Important Takeaways from Methodology

While my proposed methodology adopts semantic pluralism as the new semantic strategy race theorists can still pursue their preferred semantic theory for determining the meaning or definition of "race. However, in this proposed method "race-theories" do not live and die by the semantic theories they adopt for determining a definition of "race". Race-theorists are asked to situate their definition of "race" they are not tasked with their definition being exhaustive of all meanings or definitions of "race". The acceptance of Semantic Pluralism acknowledges that there exist multiple meanings, definitions and interpretations of "race" while demonstration of pertinence/salience of definition of "race" allows for researchers to determine in what ways is this definition/meaning applicable to particular domain. The extent of its applicability to other domains is an empirical matter. Thus, Step 1 allows for definitions of "race" to be purely instrumental (not fundamental) for assessing the metaphysical claims about and surrounding "race". Steps 2 through 4 then layout the necessary inquiries for making said assessment.

Step 2 asks for theorists to clearly explain application conditions be articulated in terms of the kinds of claims a conception "race" makes about the world/reality as well as the pertinent scientific and metaphysical concepts involved in confirming these claims. For example: Application conditions for the definition of "race", D1 obtains iff there exists continuity between historical groups with identifiable genetic profiles and the genetic profiles groups within the contemporary United States. In this example D1 is a definition of "race" has an explication of application conditions that invoke scientific concepts such as "genetic profile" and metaphysical concepts such

as "continuity/persistence" and "group composition". The purpose of Step 2 is to make explicit the scientific and metaphysical theses that underpin various conceptions of "race. Steps 3 and 4 then asks for the theorists to explore the relationship between metaphysical and scientific theses.

Step 3 asks for theorists to reflect on the use of metaphysical models by the empirical disciplines that are "pertinent" to application conditions for "race". The "pertinent" disciplines will often be one of the natural, physical and social sciences given that definitions of "race" will often use facts and concepts that are investigated by these sciences.[9] Step 4 then asks for theorists to further interrogate how an interpretation of a metaphysical category affects our interpretation of empirical observation.

The purpose of Step 4 is to highlight how metaphysical interpretation informs empirical analysis. Looking back at race definition (D1) example, our interpretation of the metaphysical concept "continuity" informs what kinds of gene flow patterns will satisfy the application conditions of "the existence exists continuity between historical groups with identifiable genetic profiles and the genetic profiles groups within the contemporary United States". This does not mean that empirical evidence cannot inform how we ought to interpret a particular metaphysical concept. For example, one may have strong empirical evidence for interpreting "continuity" differently across different scientific domains, in other words evidence from Biology serving as evidence for the need for multiple conceptions of continuity (i.e. physical continuity vs genetic continuity). Hence, Step 4's guidance to examine the tenability of metaphysical models according to "the epistemic virtues of our best empirical practices".

[9] Disciplines such a legal studies/law can be cited here if the scope of analytical discourse is limited to what is stipulated by law.

Step 4 is not meant to suggest that metaphysical interpretation and theorizing is more fundamental than empirical analysis. Rather Step 4's inclusion is meant to demonstrate that the adoption of some metaphysical interpretation is pertinent to any form of analysis that attempts to describe kinds or entities that are part of the world. While many philosophers and race-theorists understand this implicitly, the completion of Steps 3 and 4 require that the metaphysical theses that motivate both race and scientific theories be made explicit.

The completion of Steps 1 through 4 provides a comprehensive account for how a particular race theorist is approaching an issue either directly or indirectly related to the metaphysics of race. The completion of Steps 1 and 2 are the same for every kind of contributor to metaphysics of race. Step 1 establishes the relevant sociolinguistic context for a particular conception of "race" as well as the pertinent academic literatures that said conception of "race" is being analyzed, while Step 2 further explains the specific kinds of claims about the world that said conception of "race" is making about the world. The uniformity in completing Steps 1 and 2 allows for contributors to the metaphysics of race literature to have a shared method for framing metaphysical issues about "race" while at the same time allowing for heterogeneity both in the kinds of disciplinary analysis of "race" as well as social context in which "race" is being conceptualized. This uniformity in method and heterogeneity in the disciplinary analysis allows for metaphysics of race to be a singular literature that has multiple domains of academic engagement.

Steps 3 and 4 allow for the philosophy of race literature to have different levels of metaphysical engagement. How deeply a race theorist wishes to engage in debates over the tenability of certain interpretations of metaphysical categories and their use in scientific theorizing/analysis, can be communicated in how they complete Steps 3 and 4. Those who want to know if various

articulations of "race" are connected to well-argued and generalizable metaphysical positions that can applied to variety of scientific, can engage with/contribute to literatures in the philosophy of science and metaphysics that concern topics such as entity realism, metaphysics of groups or grounding when completing Steps 3 and 4. Others, who view the metaphysics as purely instrumental in understanding how a particular definition of "race" operates in a particular domain of inquiry will complete Step 3 and Step 4 by explaining how "race" would or should be conceptualized within the specified domain's existing ontology. This "instrumental" understanding of metaphysics still acknowledges that "metaphysical" inquiries are construction of models of reality, but focuses on a given disciplines delineation of categories, kinds and entities as the pertinent models of reality for a conception of "race", without questioning whether they are built upon generalizable metaphysical theses.

Implications for this Methodology

The aim of this proposed methodology is not to have every philosopher of race or race-theorist become prolific researchers in analytic or empirical metaphysics before contributing to the metaphysics of race literature. Rather the aim is for researchers to interrogate and disclose which fundamental concepts of analysis are informing their analysis of "race"'. Once this process is done systematically by contributors to the metaphysics of race literature a clearer taxonomy of the various kinds of metaphysical disagreements that are generating both agreement and disagreement amongst various theories of race. This in turn can provide clarity on the various conceptual and epistemic issues involving both the study of and use of "race" and "race-concepts" across different academic and social domains.

The accomplishment of such aims does not require that the study of philosophy of race or metaphysics of race be secondary to more abstract debates in analytic metaphysics. Normative Assessment and Value-Laden analysis is still welcomed, but their metaphysical commitments (and the metaphysical theses they resist or critique) must be clearly articulated. For example: An Eliminativist can advocate for an Anti-Realist account of "race" by explaining how the application conditions required for adopting a particular conception of race creates an ontological taxonomy that yields bad moral outcomes with no greater epistemic benefit. Scholars can then debate whether there could exist any conception of "race" that will yield morally beneficial ontological taxonomy. Scholars like McPherson are allowed to stipulate a definition of "race" in terms "socio-ancestry" but he must still explain the claims such a socio-ancestry view makes about the world and whether such claims are true. In both of these examples, researchers do not need to act as analytic metaphysicians first, then philosophers of race and normativity second. Rather it simply asks researchers to make salient how some metaphysical commitment is integral to their stance on the nature of "race".

The big idea being that the proposed methodology widens the scope of metaphysical analysis of "race" such that contributions to the metaphysics of race need not only include ontological theories about "race" but also can include how tools of metaphysics are pertinent to some issue involving a conception of race.

Part III: Objections and Replies

As the title of this section suggests, in this section I will offer some objections to my view and then offer replies to these objections. I will cover two kinds of objections. The first kind will be an objection that my proposed methodology does not significantly overcome the Semantic Gridlock

concern detailed in Part 1. The second kind of objection will be that Empirical and Analytical Underdetermination will still persist and thus no substantive progress can be made race.

3.1 Objection: Semantic Gridlock Persists

An objection that could be levied against my methodology is that my acceptance of semantic pluralism is insufficient in overcoming the concern that semantic gridlock poses for making headway for the metaphysics of race. The original concern over semantic gridlock was that theorists are not able to determine a definition or meaning of "race" in any social context; accepting semantic pluralism simply acknowledges there are multiple possible meanings, but our inability to discover the true or dominant meanings amongst these possible meanings remains. The charge here is that accepting Semantic Pluralism simply acknowledges that there exist multiple meanings of race, but we are still in no better a position to determine what are the set of meanings that are actually informing "race" talk.

3.1.2 Response: Semantic Theories are instrumental to Race-Theories not fundamental

My response to this objection would be to focus on the role semantic theories play in race theories. The purpose of semantic theories of reference serve for "race-theories" is that they attempt to align philosophical analysis with the intended referents for "race-talk". In other words, the veracity of the semantic theory behind a definition of "race" is meant to secure that the semantic content of the race-theory is identical to the semantic content of race talk. The pursuit of a "dominant" or "true" definition is then meant to support a race-theory's claim that it encompasses all relevant content about "race" thereby making their metaphysical analysis complete. The result being that metaphysical analysis of the "dominant" meaning of "race" is sufficient for determining

all metaphysical truths (if any) about "race". My response to the objection is that the acceptance of Semantic Pluralism repurposes the role semantic theories or semantic content of race talk has in metaphysical theorizing about "race".

The new purpose for semantic theories/content of "race-talk" is that definitions of "race" are articulated in service of metaphysical investigation. What this means is that definitions of "race" are instrumentally important for examining a range of interpretations of "race-talk". If there are two possible definitions or meanings, A or B, for "race" within a specific context's race-talk, the project of metaphysics of race is to explore what metaphysical claims follow A and which metaphysical claims follow from B. Subsequent metaphysical analysis then involves whether the claims from each of these possible meanings are true. Within this project the semantic theories of reference serve to demonstrate how one can derive a definition/meaning of "race" from analysis of "race-talk" but they do not necessarily indicate a comprehensive account of all possible contents of "race-talk" within particular social context.

This lack of comprehensiveness is unproblematic given that definitions and meanings within a social context can be varied at any given time and can change throughout time. Semantic theories of reference can capture a snapshot of the sociolinguistic facts about "race" term but their truth concerning the semantic content about "race" may be correct at time, t_1 but incorrect at time t_2 due to semantic shift. Even semantic theories that fix their analysis of to a specific social/geographic context, a diversity of kinds of communities amongst speakers in sociolinguistic context can hold different meanings of "race" and "race-terms". For example: Between 1994 and 1997 The Office of Management (OMB) and Budget in Directive 15 changed their classification of racial groups,

splitting the group “Asian/Pacific Islander” into two groups, “Asian” and “Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander.

The move to Semantic Pluralism encourages us to gain a comprehensive accounting of the various meanings, definitions and interpretations of “race” and “race-term” that exist across various sociolinguistic context in which “race” and “race-terms” are used. The development of such an account will most likely require a division of epistemic labor, given the multitude of social contexts and disciplinary literatures that engage in or discuss “race-talk”. In lieu of a comprehensive accounting of the various meanings of “race” that currently exist, I argue that the best practice moving forward within the metaphysics of race is to work toward the development an account of different meanings of “race” that currently exists or possibly could exist. Semantic Pluralism allows us to undertake this project because it acknowledges that the concept of "race" can generate multiple linguistic interpretations. This is due to the diverse range of tools, methods, and aims used by everyday speakers, academic disciplines, and social/political institutions that engage in discussions or employ the concept of "race." For example: If someone wants to use a racial classification for medicine, they can define “race” in a way that medical practice defines racial categories. They could then explain what the metaphysical concepts at play are when looking at race through the disciplinary lens of medical science. Debates over whether a particular field has descriptivist or referentialist semantics can be had, but this debate must be situated within how race-terms are used in their specified context.

The concern over Semantic Gridlock dissolves once we accept that the extent to which a meaning or definition of “race” is comprehensive is an empirical question. Semantic theories simply model how the use of a “race” predicate maps onto a collection of entities and properties that

supposedly exist in the world. They no longer carry the burden of proof to exhaust possible meanings and definitions of "race". This allows for us to straightforwardly assess race-theories and various conceptions of "race" in terms of how their respective definitions "race" make various metaphysical claims about how particular entities exists and interact in the world. This is the point of asking for theorists to communicate their definition of "race" in terms of applications conditions that describe how particular domains make use of metaphysical categories/concepts to derive "race".

Theorists then signal the domain they wish to analyze and then use their respective semantic theory to highlight how particular conception of could be conceived within a particular domain. The use of a semantic theory to derive the meaning/definition of "race" to create a set of application conditions is not the primary focus of analysis. Instead the primary focus is on whether the specific instantiation of metaphysical categories/concepts entailed by the given meaning/definition of "race" in fact obtain or could obtain. Progress is then made by using the tools of metaphysics make explicit the kinds of metaphysical frameworks being used by various disciplines and various linguistic communities to create a conception of "race", semantic theories of reference are simply instruments for organizing sociolinguistic information.

What we are aiming for in embracing semantic pluralism is to explore the various existing and possible definitions/meanings/interpretations of "race" and the explaining the various metaphysical theses that accompany these definitions/meanings/interpretations of "race". Semantic theories are instrumental to this exploration, but the lack of consensus concerning these theories are not impediments to its progress.

3.2 Objection: Empirical and Analytical Underdetermination Persists

In this subsection I will cover objections that argue that my implementation of *Easy Ontology* and *Metaphysics as Modelling* is insufficient for overcoming the concerns of empirical and analytical underdetermination. I will first address the concerns of empirical and analytical underdetermination separately and then explain how my method addresses the interaction of these two kinds of underdetermination.

3.2.1 Objection: The Prescribed Method does not Minimize Empirical Underdetermination

This concern is straightforward. The charge is that none of the tools proposed by my method mitigate the epistemological concerns posed by underdetermination within the empirical sciences. Though the problem of underdetermination exists within the empirical sciences, researchers have developed various tools and methods in order to directly address the issues posed by underdetermination. For example, statistical methods have been developed and employed during hypothesis testing to determine the probability that an observed distribution could be accounted for by a different set of proposed variables. (Rosenbaum, 2019) While no tool or method is foolproof or completely solves the epistemological issues surrounding underdetermination these tools at least try to address the problem and the development of these set tools itself is an empirically tractable and testable enterprise. However, no such tools or methods are introduced by my proposed methodology. In fact, the adoption of semantic pluralism potentially compounds the problems posed by underdetermination.

The concern over semantic pluralism is that if theorists are allowed to posit different definitions of "race", call these definitions R1 and R2. The method introduces numerous possible confounding variables (in the form of different posited entities) that empirical investigations must further account for or rule out. The problem of underdetermination arises once we have

observational data that confirms both R1 and R2 which are competing and incompatible definitions of "race". That is, we have empirical confirmation of both of their necessary conditions, but we don't have confirmation that would confirm one definition over the other. Thus, because my proposed methodology does not include any tools that aid in mitigating the epistemological problems caused by underdetermination, there is no strong epistemic standpoint by which we can choose between rival theories of "race". These problems are further compounded by the fact there are no limits place on how race-theorists can posit definitions of "race". Theorists can always posit some new definition, therefore requiring a new endeavor of empirical investigation or they can fine-tune a definition of "race" to match a set of previously observed (i.e. confirmed) facts. And this is just among competing theories of "race" that propose "race" exists in some form.

Debates between proponents of "race" existing can argue that "race" maps on to some observed set of facts, while opponents can posit a different kind of entity to account for the same observed data. Given that ontological positions about "race" are widely contested positions, including whether such a kind of entity exists, the positing of an entity other than race does not violate any theoretical virtue like parsimony. Thus, any metaphysical theses about "race" that require empirical confirmation cannot be confirmed with a strong degree of confidence as the proposed methodology lacks the tools to mitigate epistemic problems posed by underdetermination.

3.2.2 Reply: The Prescribed Method Adopts "Housekeeping" Empirical Approach to Race

I will first concede that my method does not resolve epistemic problems posed by underdetermination in the empirical sciences, nor does it propose new tools for mitigating these problems that have not already been employed by researchers in the empirical sciences. However, I will argue that that my proposed method articulates a syntactic structure for metaphysical theorizing

about "race" that allows for the work produced within the metaphysics of race to be compatible with best practices for mitigating underdetermination within the empirical sciences. As I stated in the previous paragraph, the epistemic aim for this proposed methodology for the metaphysics of race literature is to build an inventory of conceptions of "race" and explore the various metaphysical entailments that accompany these conceptions.

When I mention the "a syntactic structure for metaphysical theorizing" I am referring to how my methodology requires that the proposal of a definition to be done in the service of highlighting the pertinent metaphysical theses implicated in the use of the definition and whose empirical claims can be validated by our best science/empirical analysis. This is a long way of saying that definitions of "race" are meant to reflective of some shared interest in exploring a particular phenomenon, but the truth of these definitions are meant to be explored. Race theorists cannot give *ad hoc* definitions of "race" by choosing to a set of observed data and then labelling it "race". However, it is worth explaining how the methodology would discriminate between an ad hoc definition of "race" and a definition that re-assesses its claims in light of new evidence.

One of the constraints on the proposal of a definition of "race" is that it must be conceptually continuous with some prior instance of "race-talk". By "conceptually continuous" I am describing concepts that are related in terms of their shared interests in investigating or analyzing particular kind of phenomenon. An example of this kind of relation be seen in Isaac Newton's conception of 'matter' and Aristotle's conception of 'matter'. Newton's conception of 'matter' is conceptually continuous with Aristotle's conception, as they are both attempts to conceive of basic units of a substance. These two conceptions of matter differ greatly in terms of their fine details (i.e. Newton's atomists/corpuscular conception of matter vs. Aristotle's anti-atomist conception) but

analysis of each of their theories reveal that both of their conceptions of matter have same targeted explanandum. Thus, when we say that a proposed definition/meaning of "race" must be conceptually continuous with some past instance of "race-talk", we are determining whether said definition/meaning are using metaphysical concepts and categories to refer of describe the same kind of explanandum. Whether it be Social Constructionist, Biological Racial Realist or Anti-Realist, all race theories agree that "race" is attempting to describe or refer to, "some set of facts about the human population that further sub-divides humans into some subpopulation". Each of these various theories differ in terms of the explanans they use to describe this phenomenon as well as whether certain sets of facts obtain. Nonetheless they are united in their target explanandum.

This point of conceptual continuity is important to mention as it pertains to the housekeeping project of the metaphysics of race. We aim to gain an inventory of the various meanings, interpretations and definitions of race that exists or could exist inside race-talk in order to get of the various metaphysical implications that could accompany said meanings, interpretations and definitions. The goal of this method is not to empirically exhaust all interpretations of race. Rather the goal is to carefully organize how particular conceptions of "race" entail certain metaphysical commitments about entities of its purported kind exists. Subsequent steps then require that we assess the tenability of the metaphysical commitments made by "race". Integral to this assessment is determining whether these commitments are in concordance with observational data.

The move here is that under my methodology, metaphysics of race literature will take an inventory of the various conceptions of race that are pertinent to particular social context or academic literature and explore the various metaphysical issues that arise when considering a particular conception of race. Disagreement between metaphysical viewpoints that can equally

account for the data will be handled as they have in the past. Theorists will appeal to a set of theoretic virtues and the strength of those theoretic virtues are assessed by their empirical success. Thus, all the tools that are available to scientists and other researchers are available to us if we adopt my method. Empirical Underdetermination does not arise in any sort of special sense once we start metaphysically theorizing about "race". However, my method for metaphysical theorizing provides a way of constructing an inventory of metaphysical positions about "race" whose epistemic motivations for their metaphysical positions are clearly indicated providing greater ability for them to be rigorously tested.

3.2.3 Objection: The Prescribed Metaphysical Method Exacerbates Analytical Underdetermination

This charge is motivated by my act of choosing LA Paul's *Metaphysics and Modelling* as my representative of metaphysical theorizing. They might particularly take issue with how Paul characterizes the relationship between "scientific" theorizing and "metaphysical" theorizing. One such scholar is Katherine Brading.

The criticism that Brading brings to the table is that Paul's argument for the ontological priority of metaphysics requires a synchronic interpretation of scientific theorizing but under a diachronic interpretation, Paul's argument fails to fully vindicate her position. Brading explains that under a synchronic view of scientific theorizing, metaphysical theorizing is not at the forefront of scientific analysis, that is, scientists do not explicitly discuss the metaphysical thesis that underpin their scientific theories. (Brading, 2016) However, under a diachronic view of scientific theorizing, scientists interrogate, test, and revise the metaphysical thesis that inform their scientific theory. Braiding explains that "diachronic analysis" of scientific theorizing looks at science as a process that unfolds through time. What is uncovered from this diachronic view is that the results of empirical

investigation to scientific theories, informs how we commonly understand various metaphysical concepts.

An example that Brading uses to illustrate this point is (DiSalle, 2006) discussion of how physical theorizing has refined our understanding of space and time. Brading continues by stating that the "everyday experience" or "common sense understanding" of metaphysical concepts like "space-time" within analytic metaphysics, are not distinct phenomena from the phenomena being explored in physical theorizing. The process of "scientific theorizing" involves the use of metaphysical concepts, like "space-time", to describe certain relations and natures that exist within and amongst various entities that constitute various material systems (i.e. what physically exists within the world); scientists then through observation and experimentation rigorously test whether or not the posited metaphysical relations actually obtain in the world the way that a scientific theory purports that they do. Though the empirical methods employed by scientists to investigate spatiotemporal concepts differ from the thought experiments and conceptual analysis undertaken analytic metaphysicians (i.e. different explanans) both of these methods are aimed at analyzing the same explanandum (i.e. how space-time exists as a feature of reality).

Because of this shared explanandum, Brading argues that there is no conception of metaphysical concepts that are outside the domain of scientific empirical investigation that the metaphysician can claim to pull from. As a result, there is no epistemically privileged position concerning the nature of reality that the metaphysician can claim to have that is independent of what is being investigated by the sciences. Thus, Brading is not disputing that analytic metaphysics through its distinct methods can offers an unique potentially truth tracking insight. In fact, she acknowledges that the method of analysis done by analytic metaphysicians can be particularly helpful

spelling out the various conceptions of metaphysical concepts that are at work within various scientific theories. Rather Brading is disputing that there are strong epistemic reasons for believing that the activity of analytic metaphysics should be considered ontologically or conceptually prior to scientific theorizing. This ultimately boils down to a disagreement about what are the epistemic grounds for determining whether a metaphysical "model" is in fact isomorphic to reality. For Brading, it is the "detailed empirical success" best evidenced by scientific exploration, that epistemically grounds our belief in metaphysics' ability to create an isomorphic model of reality.

3.2.4 Reply: Epistemological Disputes over Metaphysics are Orthogonal to the issues at heart of the Metaphysics of Race

I do not take issue with Brading's description of diachronic interpretation of metaphysical and scientific theorizing. Nor do I take issue with her argument that "detailed empirical success" is the best metric for determining the accuracy and adequacy of metaphysical theses. In fact, given the nature of the metaphysical questions surrounding race and this reliance confirmation of various scientific disciplines, this metric of adequacy/accuracy would be the most appropriate. The disagreement between Paul and Brading concerns whether analytic metaphysical theorizing is epistemically justified as an independent pursuit of the knowledge of reality. For Paul, metaphysical theorizing and its methods grant its practitioners access to a way of discerning features of reality through the reflection of personal experience. Another way to put it, is that metaphysics is method that provides uncovering how our conscious experience organizes information and then generalizing what the world must be like at the very fundamental level in order for it to elicit that type of reaction

within our conscious system.[10] Brading's argument is that this method of analysis is not epistemic justified by its own merits independent of scientific analysis.

The straightforward answer to this objection is that the lack of resolution over their epistemic disagreement does not impede our ability to adopt Metaphysics as Modelling as a meta-metaphysical framework for the metaphysics of race. The reasoning being that despite the semantic disagreement about "race" there is universal agreement that is attempting to describe some feature of human beings or human populations. With concepts such as "human" and "population" being integral to "race", the most fundamental mode of metaphysical theorizing that is pertinent to analysis of race is the ability to extrapolate metaphysical thesis from philosophical and scientific theories. This is a level of metaphysical theorizing that both Paul and Brading agree that the tools and methods of analytic metaphysics (in the mode of *Metaphysics as Modelling*) are apt for handling.

The points of agreement I would like to focus on are the following: 1.) Metaphysical theories aim to create "models" of features of reality using fundamental metaphysical concepts. 2.) Scientific Theories have "embedded" Metaphysical theories. 3.) The best metaphysical theories account can account for what has been empirically observed in the world.

Paul and Brading concurrence on *Agreement 2* is uncontroversial. Regarding the relationship between metaphysical theories and scientific theories, Brading acknowledges in her explanation of the synchronic and diachronic view of scientific theorizing that the development of metaphysical theses is crucial to the advancement of scientific theories. Thus, both Paul and Brading concur that metaphysical theories are "embedded" within scientific theories, in virtue of metaphysical concepts being essential for constructing scientific theories. *Agreement 3* describes an agreement concerning

[10] Paul remarks that her view has Kantian elements of transcendental judgements, but denies that our experience of metaphysical categories are a priori intuitions.

what is a necessary condition for a metaphysical theory to be a sound theory. Both philosophers agree that a metaphysical theory that is totally incompatible with data given by the empirical sciences is not a sound metaphysical theory. Paul and Brading both acknowledge that though metaphysical and scientific theorizing may differ in terms of their methodology and subject matter, the truth conditions for a given metaphysical theory are sensitive to empirical verification or refutation. In other words, if the model of a metaphysical theory is isomorphic to features of the world, then the model proposed by said theory will be compatible with the empirical evidence about the world.

Concurrence on agreements 2 and 3 lays the foundation for their concurrence on *Agreement 1,* that Metaphysical theories aim to create "models" of features of reality using fundamental metaphysical concepts. It is within this agreement that I contend is the investigative enterprise of metaphysical theorizing: The use of metaphysical concepts to model how various entities, each possessing their own definitive properties, stand in relation to each other to compose reality. Both Paul and Brading agree that "metaphysical theorizing" is a philosophical enterprise that aims to construct models that are isomorphic to the features of reality (i.e. the world), using metaphysical relations and categories.

My methodology does not depend on whether or not the subject matter of metaphysics is ontologically prior to scientific theorizing nor the epistemic consequences of this priority or lack thereof. The reason being that at no point in my method is metaphysical theorizing entirely separate from concrete particulars that are analyzed by scientific disciplines. The purpose of introducing Paul's *Metaphysics as Modelling* account was to draw attention to the fact that our descriptions of how things exists, even when determining "existence' within the context of a scientific discipline,

substantive metaphysical theories (i.e. models) are at play and require philosophical analysis and interrogation.

Part 4: Conclusion

What I hoped to have accomplished in this chapter is sketch a view of metaphysical methodology that brings the tools and methods of metaphysics to the forefront of the metaphysics of race and does so in such a way that expands the range of metaphysical questions we can ask bout "race". My hope is that with this expanded range, more doors will open for theorists to explore the pertinence that metaphysical questions have to theorizing about "race" across academic disciplines. I've also hoped to have provided guidance on how to apply the tools of analytic metaphysics and conceptual analysis such that they can facilitate interdisciplinary research about "race".

CHAPTER 2:Two for One Kind-Bio-Social Reality and Race

> "I remember you was conflicted.
> Misusing your influence…So I went running for answers."
>
> -Kendrick Lamar, 2015

Introduction

In the philosophy of race literature there are predominantly three camps: Anti-realist, Biological Racial Realists, and Social Constructivists. Both Anti-Realists and Biological Racial Realists agree that "race" is a purported biological entity, but they disagree about whether biological conceptions of "race" exists. Biological Racial Realists and Social Constructivists agree that "race" is real/exists but disagree on the kind of entity that "race" is purported to be. Social Constructivists, like the Anti-Realists, deny that "biological" conceptions of "race" exist, however social constructivists argue that "race" is real/exists as a social entity in virtue of social construction. Acceptance of these various metaphysical views on race vary according to discipline. Biological Racial Realism has representation in the philosophy/metaphysics of race while social constructivism enjoys representation not only in the philosophy of race but also as a background assumption or an accepted fact in other disciplines like critical race theory, sociology, medicine and (in some cases) bio-medical research. What is metaphysically entailed by "race" being a social construction is not always clear across these various disciplines, but they are united in their belief that "race" refers to some state of affairs that describes some for social structure/relations that forms "race".

However, a view that is curiously not as well represented is the view that race is a Bio-Social entity, that race essentially is a union of biological and social properties. There have been scholars such as Outlaw (1996) that have advocated for a Bio-Social view of race, however the view does not enjoy widespread acceptance or acknowledgement as social constructivism. One reason for the lack of uptake for a Bio-Social conception of race is that scholars contributing to the philosophy of race, or the broader racial discourse often conceptualize how biological entities are distinct from social entities and that failure fit squarely into the "biological" fail to refer or are fundamentally "social". However, there has been less theorization about how the biological and social properties intersect to bring about features of reality that we all recognize. My intention for this paper is to give an account of how the biological and social domains of reality intersect to give rise to entities that we can conceive of as Bio-Social entities. Within this account is a description of what I call Bio-Social Reality and I explain how it could be a natural home for various conceptions/interpretations of "race". My hope is that by articulating this account more scholars can explore the ways in which race can be conceived of as a Bio-Social entity and further explore the various ways in which it shapes our thinking about race and how we ought to contribute to racial discourse.

My game plan for this paper is as follows: In Part 1, I lay out my metaphysical framework that I use to create what I call an ontological taxonomy. An "ontological taxonomy" refers to the categorization of extant entities according to their ontological character. "Ontological character" here refers to how a particular entity exists as a certain type (i.e. what types of properties and relations that obtain between entities are responsible for its existence). I explain how I use mechanistic explanation borrowed from the philosophy of science and metaphysical analysis from analytic metaphysics in order to generate an ontological taxonomy that can make sense of entities that comprise biological reality, social reality and Bio-Social Reality. In Part 2, I detail my argument

for Bio-Social Reality. In this section I characterize Bio-Social reality as the domain of reality that exists in virtue of biological and social mechanisms generatively interacting to produce Bio-Social entities. In this view I argue that the generation of entities via interaction between biological and social mechanisms is necessary and sufficient for their being Bio-Social Reality. I then give examples of entities that satisfy these conditions. In Part 3, I outline conceptions of race that adopt the position that "race" comes into existence the same way that entities that occupy Bi-Social Reality come into existence. I then close the paper with implications for this view for the philosophy of race as well as other literatures.

Part I: Mechanistic Explanation, Ontological Character and Ontological Taxonomy

1.1 Metaphysical Methodology and Mechanistic Explanation

The methodology that I use for creating an ontological taxonomy for "race concepts" combines methods of conceptual analysis from analytic metaphysics and mechanistic explanation from philosophy of science. Conceptual analysis is used to determine what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a particular conception of race. Mechanistic explanation is then used to identify what kinds of underlying mechanisms are necessary for that particular entity to exist. "Necessary" here is understood in terms of the metaphysical relation of "ontological dependence" in which one entity requires the existence of another entity in order to exist. Ontological dependence can manifest in a variety of ways. I will discuss this in more detail later in the chapter, but at this juncture it is pertinent to mention that the delineation of the kinds of mechanisms that an entity ontologically depends on, forms the basis for how to describe their ontological character. Using the descriptions of entities' ontological character, we then can construct an ontological taxonomy. Thus, "Ontological taxonomy" is a term that refers to the categorization of various entities according to

their ontological character. I use the term "ontological character" to describe the specific features of the world that bring a specific entity into existence.

Mechanistic explanation is well suited to give us an account of an entity's ontological character because mechanistic explanation seeks to explain the existence and nature of "higher order entities" in virtue of the activity of "lower-order entities". The demarcation of "higher-order" entities from "lower-order" entities is determined by explaining how the former is a product of the latter. The idea being that "lower-order" entities produce "higher-order" entities by undertaking various processes. The activity of lower-order entities undertaking various processes are referred to as "mechanisms". [11] The activity of "lower-order entities" undertaking processes to form "mechanisms" are understood to complete a certain "end"; this "end" being the emergence of some higher-order entity.

For example, take the entity "chromosome". In understanding how "chromosomes" exist we can look to the various "lower-order entities" that compose cells that undertake various processes to form the mechanisms for cellular reproduction. Lower-order entities, entities such as helicase proteins and DNA polymerase enzymes, undertake various processes during cellular reproduction that results in production of chromosomes. Thus, "chromosomes" are higher-order entities with respect to the lower-order entities (helicase proteins and DNA polymerase enzymes etc.) that undertake various processes to produce "chromosomes". Thus, our understanding of how "chromosomes" come into existence, can be done by referring to how various lower-order entities constitute and complete the mechanisms for cellular reproduction.[12, 13]

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[11] See: Craver, C.F. and L. Darden, 2013, *In Search of Mechanisms: Discoveries Across the Life Sciences*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[12] This is assuming we are analyzing "chromosomes" in the case of non-synthesized eukaryotic cells.

[13] This designation of higher-order and lower order is done with respect to their metaphysical ordering, where the lower order entities are more fundamental than the higher-order entities (chromosomes). In terms of discovery (i.e.

The metaphysical framework that is invoked by mechanistic explanation is one that posits that there exist metaphysical relations between entities that describe some ontological structure of reality**.** The relevant metaphysical concepts for mechanistic explanation are "existence" and "generation". Mechanistic explanation uses ontological categories such as "properties", "mechanisms" and "processes" to explain how entities generate the existence of both novel types and token entities. Key to such explanations is the description of various relationships that must exist between entities (i.e. "generative" "causal" "emergent"). Thus, mechanistic explanations explain ontological structures within reality that allow for new token and types of entities to come into existence. By "ontological structure of reality" I mean that it specifies the kinds of metaphysical relations that exist between various entities that are necessary for the existence of certain classes of entities. Thus, it is due to mechanistic explanation's attempt to describe a certain kind of ontological structure of reality in terms of the metaphysical relations that exist between lower-order and higher-order entities, that makes it an apt method for describing ontological character of various entities.

1.2 From Mechanisms to Ontological Dependence

Mechanistic Explanation provides a description of the ontological structure of reality by delineating how the interactions and relations between entities come together to form mechanisms. However, to get from a description of an ontological structure to categorization of types of entities we need to engage in some form of conceptual analysis. This form of conceptual analysis involves thinking about how we might categorize various entities into certain types according to kinds of mechanisms that are responsible for the existence of said entities.

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epistemic) it might be the case that our understanding of the higher order entity (i.e. the cell) helps us discover a lower level entity (i.e. chromosomes)

I advocate for using mechanistic explanation to uncover what mechanisms of are necessary for an entity's existence and then applying conceptual analysis to categorize entities according to the kind of mechanisms that are responsible for their existence. The idea being that in identifying the kind of mechanisms that are responsible for an entity's existence we are able to categorize entities as being an instantiation of a certain "type" by recognizing the kinds of entities that produced its existence.

I must pause at this juncture to take note of my language. I use the language of "types" to describe the classification of "entities" and use the language of "kinds" to determine the classification of mechanisms. There is a robust literature on the nature and status of kinds, in particular natural kinds, that is featured prominently within the philosophy of science. I do not directly engage with nor do I take a strong stance concerning the natural kinds literature in this paper. Thus, I refrain from stating how entities categorized into "kinds" and instead use the language of "types" to refer to how we can conceptually sort various entities according to how they come into existence. However, I do use the language of "kinds" when describing mechanisms. This is because it is uncontroversial that mechanisms and mechanistic explanations fulfill some explanatory role for accounting for the kind of nomological function that "kinds" are aiming to track. Thus, the variation in the "types" of entities that exist is a consequence of the variation in the kinds of mechanisms that produce said entities.

"Mechanisms" are often identified (or posited) in order to account for a particular target phenomenon that is being explored by a scientific discipline. For example, Craver (2007) appeals to mechanistic explanation in accounting for phenomena in neuroscience. The move here is because we can identify "mechanisms" and "processes" by the role they play in scientific explanations,

mechanisms can be categorized according to kinds. The kindhood of the mechanisms then becomes the basis by which we determine how higher-order entities can categorized according to types. Higher-order entities whose existence are attributable to the same kind of mechanisms would be categorized as being instances of same "type" of entity. What I am proposing here is that we can categorize various entities into types where the "type" of the entity refers to the kinds of mechanisms that are responsible for its existence.

To get clearer on how I am understanding how some entity (or collection of entities) can be "responsible for the existence" of another entity, it's worth taking a look at the metaphysical relation, ontological dependence. Correia (2008) explains that ontological dependence is a metaphysical relation that is considered to be one of the most fundamental kind of relations. Ontological dependence refers to the relation by which some objects/entities derive their existence from existence of some other entity. Correia explains further that ontological dependence is often thought of in three forms: existential dependence, essential dependence, and explanatory dependence. Existential dependence refers to a relation between entities where some entity X existentially depends on Y iff the existence of Y is required for the existence of X. (X exists only if Y exists) Essential dependence refers to the role some entity plays in fulfilling the identity conditions for some other entity. Thus, X essentially depends on Y iff X would not be the thing it is without the existence of Y. In both existential and essential dependence, Y is necessary for X. X would not exist or be the thing it is if Y did not exist or was not the kind of thing it is.

Explanatory dependence combines elements of existential and essential dependence in order to explain how various entities necessitate the existence of other entities. Here "necessitation" can be interpreted as being either *logical*, *metaphysical, conceptual* or *natural*. In the case of explanatory

dependence, X's ontological dependence on Y entails that the truth of certain facts about X necessitate certain truths about Y. In the case of logical necessitation, Y being necessary for X entails that if we have an instance for the truth of X, then Y must be true. In metaphysical necessitation, if the existence of X requires the existence of Y, instances of Xs existing entails that Ys exist. In the case of conceptual necessitation, if X conceptually requires Y, then instances of X entail an instance of Y. In the case of natural necessitation, natural laws dictate how certain events and types of entities necessitate the occurrence of another kind of event or type of entity. Explanatory dependence makes use of existential and essential dependence as explaining how either the "existence" and "essence" of entity came into being will involve some appeal to logical, metaphysical, conceptual and natural necessity.

Given mechanistic explanation's aim of uncovering various entities come into existence via particular kinds of mechanisms, mechanistic explanation can uncover both the existential and essential dependence that particular entities have on particular mechanisms. Mechanistic explanation explains how entities come into existence (existential dependence) as well as uncovers how higher-order entities may be identified by their definitive properties (i.e. their essence) that are the products of the activity of lower-order entities. (i.e. an instance of essential dependence). Thus, mechanistic explanation is a means for uncovering the explanatory dependence that certain entities have on certain kinds of mechanisms. What this means for our current endeavor is that a focus on mechanisms can give sufficient account of all three forms of ontological dependence.

Uncovering an entity's ontological dependence provides a way of describing its ontological character. Existential and essential dependence describe the kinds of mechanisms that are necessary for particular types of entities and their respective definitive properties to come into existence. While

explanatory dependence provides a comprehensive account for how we might categorize/classify entities given how the existence and essence of higher-order entities are the result of certain kinds of activities undertaken by lower-order entities. The idea is that if we uncover what kinds of mechanisms that entities ontologically depend on, we can subsequentially categorize entities by referencing the kinds of mechanisms they ontologically depend on. Thus, we use mechanistic explanation to uncover higher-order entities' ontological dependence on particular kinds of mechanisms as a way of uncovering the ontological character of said higher-order entities.

1.3 From Ontological Dependence to Ontological Character to Ontological Taxonomy

One thing to note is that the categorization of mechanisms into "kinds" and then referencing "kind" of entity to categorize various entities to types is a theory laden judgement. For example: "chromosome" is an instance of a type of biological entity as the mechanisms responsible for its existence (i.e. cellular reproduction) are categorized as being "biological" as they help complete function for living organisms. However, it is also true that chromosomes ontologically depend on the existence of "the collection of particles organized into forms of matter". This claim of ontological dependence is correct, but it is insufficient in accounting for how "chromosomes" exist and how we may identify them as particular types of entities amongst other entities that are "a collection of particles organized into forms of matter". In other words, there's more to how they came into existence (existential dependence) and how they are identified (essential dependence) that requires more specific references to entities and relationship between entities to have a more sufficient explanation (explanatory dependence). This requires us to identify mechanisms according to the kinds of processes they aid in completing. The identification of "kinds of processes" will often be viewed through the lens of some scientific discipline.

In the case of "chromosomes", while it is important that they be "physical", key to understanding how they exist and what qualities they possess that make them distinct from other "collection of particles in the form of matter", is to reference their presence within biological processes/functions. Mechanistic explanation of the existence of lower-order entities (i.e. helicase proteins and DNA polymerase) and the processes they engage in to form mechanisms for DNA replication and cellular reproduction (a biological process) to produce novel sets of "chromosomes" provides a more robust delineation of "chromosomes" existential dependence; without the existence of the aforementioned "biological processes" undertaken by lower-order entities, "chromosomes" would not exist.[14] This more robust description of existential dependence is indicative of a stronger account of chromosomes' explanatory dependence on the activity of particular kinds of entities, which in turn can be used as a means to identify "chromosomes" as an entity that has a set of definitive properties (i.e. essential dependence). From this we can see that referencing how mechanisms that complete specifically biological processes are responsible for the existence of "chromosomes" provides a more robust explanation of how existence and essence of "chromosomes" comes into being. Thus, we can characterize the ontological character of "chromosomes" as being an instance of type of biological entity. Through this mechanistic analysis of "chromosome's" existence and essence we can see how mechanistic explanation can be used as a method for giving a robust account of a particular entity's ontological character.[15]

Once we determine an entity's ontological character using this method, we can then construct an ontological taxonomy with respect to their ontological character. This ontological

[14] This a contemporary perspective of the existence of "chromosomes" in terms of their existence what the role they play in biological processing, it is not an claim about how "Chromosomes" evolved as entities. that are part of cells. For more on this see: The Origin and Evolution of Cells - The Cell - NCBI Bookshelf (nih.gov)

[15] Again, I must acknowledge that this a theory laden judgement as we must adopt the theoretical orthodoxy of biological/life sciences in order to categorize the existence and activity of various kinds of entities as instances of "biological" mechanisms. Outside of the most fundamental constituents of existence, there is no way to "bootstrap" an entity's ontological character.

taxonomy does not need to be exhaustive, meaning that we can generate different taxonomies depending on which form ontological dependence we choose to prioritize or what kinds of information we want our taxonomy to organize. For example, we could generate a taxonomy where the determination of "chromosome's" ontological character as a "material thing" is apt, if we are trying to generate an ontological taxonomy that focuses on creating a taxonomy of entities that conceptually entail (the explanatory form of "ontological" dependence) that physical things exists from those entities that don't entail that physical things exist. Given that "race" is focus our analysis and that analysis and debates over existence and essence have made appeals to philosophical, scientific disciplines(natural and social), we will aim to construct an ontological taxonomy that organizes the ontological character of entities according to their ontological dependence on the kinds of mechanisms that are identified by various scientific and academic disciplines.

1.4 Distinguishing Between Biological and Social Mechanisms

In keeping with discourse within the metaphysics of "race" literature, the kinds of mechanisms that must be articulated in order to determine the ontological character of "race" are biological and social mechanisms.

For purposes of this paper, "Biological" mechanisms will refer to mechanisms that have the physical and chemical entities within living organisms as constituents of processes that help complete certain intra-organismal functions or aid in inter-organismal biological processes (such as sexual reproduction). Paradigmatic examples of biological mechanisms are "Cellular reproduction" and physiological processes such as "thermal regulation". Both "cellular reproduction" and "thermal regulation" require specific physical and chemical processes to be completed and these processes are performed by entities that are constituents of living organisms. This is a generalized account of the kinds of entities and processes that are essential to studying "biology". I have included "chemical"

and "physical" entities and processes under this definition, because chemical and physical reactions and properties are pertinent to understand the existence and operation of mechanisms. There has been work, such as Darden (2008) that question how finely grained can our demarcations of biological mechanisms can be or how scientists discover them. However, these issues will not be discussed here as what is important for discussion of "race" is how they can be distinguished from social mechanisms.

Hedström and Swedberg (1998) use the term "situational mechanisms" to refer to, "the ways in which social structures constrain and enable individuals' opportunities for action, and how the cultural and social contexts influence individuals' goals, beliefs, habits, or cognitive frames."[16] These situational mechanisms are a key component for social theorizing and are among the many kinds of mechanisms that social scientists seek to uncover. Thus, my definition of social mechanisms will refer to both the activities and mediums for these activities that help identify or compose some situational mechanism. Given this aim, my definition of social mechanisms will focus only on activities and interaction amongst agential organisms. "Agential" here refers to organisms that possess executive cognitive functions.(Suchy, 2015) Under this understanding of agency, communities of living organisms like viruses cannot cohere to form social mechanisms. But organisms within *Kingdom Animalia* that possess executive cognitive functions and can interact and/or coordinate with each other, the mediums for their interaction and coordination form social mechanisms. Paradigmatic examples of social mechanisms include "communication" and "markets". Both "markets" and "communication" involve some kind of coordination between conscious

[16] For more see: Hedström P & Swedberg R (eds.) (1998). Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

entities (most often human and non-human animals) to achieve some sort of group goal (e.g. transmission of information or exchange of goods and services).

With this being our understanding of how to identify social and biological mechanisms, we can determine the ontological character of types of entities as being "social" or "biological" by examining which kinds of the mechanisms the proposed entities ontologically depend on.

For example, "Currency markets" and "chromosomes" both exist, but they exist as different types of entities. As was discussed in the previous subsection "chromosomes" ontologically depend on mechanisms that facilitate biological processes such as cellular reproduction. Reference to chromosomes' ontological dependence on these various biological mechanisms gives a thorough explanation of how it exists (existential dependence) and how it is identified (essential dependence) such that we can comfortably assess its ontological character as being a type of biological entity. "Currency markets" on the other hand ontologically depend on situational mechanisms, involving "communication", "norm development", "institutional arrangement" etc. Currency markets would fail to exist if human populations do not take on a specific organizational structure that engenders motivation for agents seeking mediums for the exchange of goods and services. While we can understand that currency markets ontologically depend on the existence of "matter", reference to the arrangement of atoms into different forms of matter does little to explain how "currency markets" exist as particular entity with a set of definitive properties (i.e. explain its essential and existential dependence) However, referencing the activity of various situational mechanisms provides a more thorough explanation for the existential and essential dependence of "currency markets".

1.5 Mechanisms and Ontologies of Race

The ontological divide between Social Constructivist and Biological Racial Realists accounts of race can be explained in terms of the kinds of mechanisms that they each believe are responsible for race's existence. Biological Racial Realist accounts of race explain race's existence in terms of how biological mechanisms within human beings bring into existence a higher-order kind called "race". This higher-order kind could refer to the kind of relations (ancestry), properties (phenotype possession, genetic clustering), or groupings (ancestral/breeding populations) that are 'biological' in virtue of the kinds of mechanisms that produced them. Social Constructivists argue that "race" comes into existence via social mechanisms instantiated by the activity of political institutions or powerful social agents that either label various subpopulations as being a particular race or sort various individuals into distinct racial categories.

Part II: The Argument for Bio-Social Reality and Bio-Social Entities

In the previous section I explained how mechanistic explanation is used to classify features of reality that exist in virtue of tandem efforts of biological and social mechanisms. My description of Bio-Social Reality refers to such features. In this section I give a view of Bio-Social Reality that argues that the union of biological and social mechanisms are part of the structure of reality and thus the various entities that exist in virtue of this structure are Bio-Social entities. My argument for Bio-Social Reality and the classification of entities that exist in virtue of Bio-Social Reality is the following:

P1: Bio-Social Reality exists iff there are entities whose existence require generative interactions between biological and social mechanisms.

P2: If Bio-Social Reality exists then entities within Bio-Social Reality are Bio-Social entities.

P3: There are entities whose existence require generative interactions between biological and social mechanisms.

Conclusion: Bio-Social Reality exists and entities within Bio-Social Reality are Bio-Social entities.

P1 establishes that the existence of entities that require generative interaction between biological and social mechanisms is necessary and sufficient for there being Bio-Social Reality. The idea here is that Bio-Social reality is an account of the ontological structure that allows for certain types of entities to exist; thus entities that ontologically depend on generative interactions between a biological and social mechanism entail that a Bio-Social ontological structure exists. P2 simply establishes that if Bio-Social reality is part of the ontological structure of reality then entities that exist in virtue of that structure of reality warrant the classification as a Bio-Social entity. P3 asserts that there exist such entities that have the ontological structure necessary to confirm that Bio-Social Reality exists. The rest of the section will be devoted to defending each of these premises.

2.1 Defense of P1 and P3

2.1.1 Explanation of Bio-Social Reality (P1)

In section 1.4, I distinguished biological mechanisms from social mechanisms in terms of the constituents of the processes and the ends the processes help achieve. However, it should also be noted that social processes often supervene on Biological and physical processes. Organisms that cease having physiological processes will be unable to communicate or migrate. However, my conception of Bio-Social Reality is describing something stronger than the supervenience of the social on to the biological. Rather, Bio-Social Reality refers to parts of the observable world that exist in virtue of the existence of generative interactions between operations of the biological and

social mechanisms. My account of Bio-Social Reality is a metaphysical view in that it describes the kinds of metaphysical relations that must exist amongst various entities in order for certain features of reality to exist. These certain features are higher-order entities that exist in virtue of the generative interactions between biological and social mechanisms. The phrase "exists in virtue of" is meant to indicate that these entities ontologically depend on the existence generative interactions between biological and social mechanisms. If it were the case that it was metaphysically impossible for generative interactions to exist between biological and social mechanisms, then a whole class of entities could not exist.

Figure 1: Bio-Social Entity Generation



The arrows from both "Biological Mechanism" and "Social Mechanism" represent the contribution of their respective processes to a "generative interaction". The arrow pointing from the "Generative Interaction" box toward "Entity X" represents that some entity, X exists "in virtue of" of the generative interaction between a biological mechanism and a social mechanism. Thus, in this generative model, Entity X, is a higher-order entity that comes into existence via a generative interaction between biological mechanism and a social mechanism that result. The "exists in virtue of" relation is an example of ontological dependence. Entity X existentially depends on the

interaction between biological and social mechanisms, as if this generative interaction had not or could not have occurred, X would not exist.

I've chosen the phrase "in virtue of" and characterized the interaction between social and biological mechanism as "generative" because both "in virtue of" explanations and generative relations are inclusive of 'causal' relations but references to generative relations by "in virtue of" explanation does not necessarily entail that they are causal**.** This is important as there could be information about causal powers that may not square with how Bio-Social Reality relates to biological and social mechanisms. Mirrachi (2017) describes a Generative Difference Making (GDM) account that explores the nature of generative explanation and relations, using the context for accounts of consciousness as an example. In her GDM account, she explains how generative relations might be distinct from causal relations:

> Generative relations are plausibly distinct from causal relations (at least as relevant to scientific practice), because discovering them answers a different kind of question. While causal explanations help us understand how events unfold through time, generative explanations help us understand how new kinds, with distinctive causal profiles and other explanatory properties, emerge out of the organization of other (usually simpler) objects and properties. I use the term "emerge" here without the sometimes-attendant claim that how the emergent phenomena depends on its basis cannot be explained. Rather, I use it to capture the fact that the generated phenomenon might exhibit importantly different properties from its generative basis. (Miracchi, 2017, pp. 268-69)

What is important to note about Miracchi's GDM account is that the emergent entity (i.e. the higher-order entity) can come into existence via the activity of lower-level entities, without the properties of the higher-order entity being present amongst the lower-order entities. This is important to note as Bio-Social entities may possess properties that are not present in either the biological or social mechanisms that generated their existence. Thus, my characterization of the metaphysical relations that allow for Bio-Social entities to be produced is the following: The relation

between the biological and social mechanisms that produce the higher-order Bio-Social entity is a generative relation, which may or may not include causal powers.

The important metaphysical feature of the relation that underpins the ontological dependence Bio-Social entities ontological dependence on the interaction between biological and social mechanisms, is that the relation be asymmetrical. I have described the relationship between the interaction of biological and social mechanisms as being a generative interaction because generative relations, like causal relations are asymmetrical. This means that if X generates Y or if X causes Y, it cannot be the case that Y generates X or that Y causes X. This asymmetrical relation is important as the relations between higher-order entities and lower order entities is asymmetrical in terms of ontological dependence. Only the higher-order entities ontologically depend the lower order entities. Describing the interaction between biological and social mechanisms as generative interaction is meant to indicate that the emergent entity, X stands in an asymmetric relation with the biological and social mechanisms that are responsible for its existence. While biological and social mechanisms can interact such that they cause the existence of some entity X, "generative relations" serves as a better general description of the kinds of metaphysical relations that allow for Bio-Social Reality be a feature of the world. The reason this is the case is that generative relations exhibit the kind of asymmetry that is inclusive of the asymmetry exhibited by causation and other metaphysical relations. As Miracchi (2017) again states:

> In virtue of explanations too have an asymmetry: if A obtains in virtue of B, then B does not obtain in virtue of A. Because these asymmetries in explanation extend beyond the causal case, they are plausibly better explained by appeal to the more general asymmetry inherent to difference making relationships than to the particular kind of asymmetry causation exhibits. (Miracchi-Titus, 2017, pp. 271)

At this juncture I should note that Miracchi distinguishes her view from mechanistic explanations such as Craver (2007). She explains that her GDM account explains how phenomena might stand in relation to each other, how one phenomenon obtains in virtue of another. GDM, however does not make any metaphysical commitments about "existence", "causation" or "generation", explaining that it is primarily an epistemological account. Mechanistic explanations however do make such metaphysical commitments, positing that the existence of higher-order is metaphysically dependent of some organization of lower-order entities. Mirrachi's GDM account also is crafted to address problems in consciousness. This important to mentions as her GDM account, as it pertains to consciousness, wants to distinguish between the types of entities that form the generative base, and the kind of thing that is the resultant higher-order entity (i.e. consciousness can possibly be instantiated in inorganic systems, though all of our data of the generative bases of consciousness are in living organisms).

My account of Bio-Social Reality has an interest in establishing metaphysical commitments, as it aims to describe the metaphysical relata necessary for certain classes of entities to exist. I combine Mirracchi's GDM account and mechanistic explanation by using mechanistic explanation's the ontological categories of "mechanisms", "higher-order" and "lower-order" entities to describe the existential and essential dependence a Bio-Social entity has on the biological and social mechanisms and then using Miracchi's GDM account to describe the explanatory dependence Bio-Social entities have on biological and social mechanisms, as one that is underpinned by a generative relation.

Putting it all together, Bio-Social Reality is an ontological structure in which there exists entities that ontologically depend on the generative interaction between biological and social

mechanisms. I call these kinds of entities Bio-Social entities. Mechanistic explanations describe an asymmetric metaphysical relation between lower-order and higher-order entities where the higher-order entities ontologically depend on the lower-order entities. In the case of Bio-Social entities, the Bio-Social entity is the higher-order entity, and the various biological and social mechanisms are the lower order entities. Bio-Social entities existentially and essentially depend on the generative interaction between biological and social mechanisms. The interaction between biological and social mechanism are 'generative' in the sense that their interaction stands in a generative relation with the Bio-Social entity; the existence of the higher-order entity exists in virtue of interaction between biological and social mechanisms work. This generative relation underpins the ontological dependence that Bio-Social entities have on biological and social mechanisms. Thus, if there exists an entity that either existentially or essentially depends on the generative interaction between biological and social mechanisms then it must be the case that the ontological structure described by Bio-Social Reality must exist.

2.1.2 Paradigmatic Examples of Bio-Social Existence (P3)

A paradigmatic example of Bio-Social Reality is the existence of *Families*. I specifically reference "the existence" of *Families*[17] to emphasize that *Families* existentially depend on the ontological structure of Bio-Social Reality. *Families* come into existence due to the union of biological mechanisms that underpin sexual reproduction and heredity that allows for reproduction of new organisms and social mechanisms that underpin processes such as mate-selection and inter-organismal coordination such as child-rearing.

[17] Here I am referring the Families constituted by human beings.



Figure 2: Bio-Social Reality of Families

In this case the term "families" is being understood in the sense of an ancestral network, what is colloquially called a family tree. In this case, there are numerous relations between individuals that are construed to be "biological". However, even in cases of biological construal, the existence and essence of families still ontologically depends the interaction between biological and social mechanisms. Families, strictly biologically construed, existentially depend on certain biological and social mechanisms to be instantiated amongst a collection of entities, in this case human populations. The biological mechanisms they instantiate are mechanisms that allow for them to participate in a certain mode of reproduction. Various social situational mechanisms guide processes of mate-selection, a group cohesion and the following of certain norms (i.e., parental-offspring relations). Without existence of biological mechanisms that allow for organisms to participate in a certain mode of reproduction or the existence of social mechanisms to facilitate processes that are necessary for participating a mode of reproduction, *Families* would not exist.

Under a strictly biological conception of *Families, Families* essentially depend on the interaction of biological and social mechanisms. Within a strictly biological conception of Families, a "family" would be a network of individuals linked together by combination of reproductive-partner

relation and parents-offspring relations. If this was all that was included in the essence of "families" , it's essence would still ontologically depend on the biological and social mechanisms interacting as the generation of the parent-offspring relation (a biological relation) requires that there exist reproductive-partner relations; a relation that requires that organisms instantiate both the biological and social mechanisms necessary mode of reproduction needed to produce the parent offspring relation.

Our ability to discern families' existential and essential dependence on the generative interaction between biological and social mechanism serves as an indication that there is explanatory dependence. In order to describe the existence or essences of "families", one must reference the natural laws that necessitate that a set of biological and social mechanisms must be instantiated by a set of organisms in order for families to exist as the kinds of entities that they are.

Now there is a sense in which "families" can be socially constructed, where the existence of the "familial" network is the result of individuals choosing to follow a set of social norms. In the case of socially constructed 'families' their essence is entirely social and thus they are essentially dependent on various social mechanisms that underpin norm-development/following. However, socially constructed families are explanatorily dependent on the interaction of biological and social mechanisms. To understand why, we have to explore how conceptual necessity of socially constructed families entails biological construed families. If socially constructed families require the existence of organisms to recognize and follow a set of norms to form "families", then there must have been some pre-existing social unit that were conceptually identified as "families". The idea being that there are multiple kinds of social relations/units and that the norms that form the socially construction of "families" are those norms that are observed in social units that have previously

been conceptually identified as families. The "previously conceptually identified" social unit that social constructed families adopt the norms of are Bio-Social conceptions of "families". Thus, the norms that that socially constructed families ontologically depend on, are themselves ontologically dependent on the existence of Bio-Social conceptions of families, as the set of norms that can be conceptually identified as 'familial' are the products of Bio-Social familial units.

This conceptual necessity demonstrates both the explanatory and existential dependence of socially constructed families on the interaction between biological and social mechanisms. The explanatory dependence is a product of distinguishing "familial" norms from the norms of other kinds of social units. The norms that are characteristic of "families" were developed by social units that came into existence via the interaction of biological and social mechanisms that produced the existence of the organisms that developed the social norms that would be characteristic of "families". Given that socially constructed families ontologically depend on the set of norms that were developed by Bio-Social conceptions of families, socially constructed families also existentially depend on Bio-Social conceptions of families. Thus, in the case of socially constructed families the 'familial' norms they follow existentially depend on Bio-Social relations between organisms. This existential dependence is underpinned by a generative (and not causal) relation as the interaction between biological and social mechanisms does not cause socially constructed families to exist, however the norms that socially constructed families adopt exist due to certain norms being developed by social networks that are Bio-Social in nature.

This is does not mean that Bio-Social relations between humans "families" have a greater claim to be called "families" than socially constructed families, only that that existential origins of the concept of "families" is in the interaction between biological and social mechanisms, that

produced the relevant social network (i.e. familial/ancestral relations) that developed a set of identifiable norms.

What the examples of biologically and socially construed conceptions of families, is instance of a kind of entity that ontologically depends on (the interaction of biological and social mechanisms. This ontological dependence manifests essentially (in the case of biologically construed families) as well as existential and explanatory dependence (in the cases both biologically and socially construed understanding of families). Therefore, all conceptions of *Families* exists in virtue of biological mechanisms (i.e., Physiological properties of organisms and exchange of genetic material) co-occurring with social mechanisms (inter-organismal interactions and relations). Thus, *Families* instances of type of entity whose existence ontologically depends on the interaction of biological and social mechanisms.

2.2 Defense of P2

2.2.1 Bio-Social Ontological Character

My account of Bio-Social Reality describes an ontological structure of reality that various entities derive their existence from. I've described it as an "ontological structure of reality" to indicate that because there are various instances of entities that exist in virtue of biological and social mechanisms interacting, a taxonomy of the various ways entities come into existence would be incomplete if it did not include an account of Bio-Social Reality. Thus, when P2 states that, "If Bio-Social Reality exists then entities within Bio-Social Reality are Bio-Social entities" it is suggesting that entities that ontologically depend on the generative interaction of biological and social mechanisms ought to be considered Bio-Social entity. Here the "type" of entity is understood in the sense that entities can be differentiated from other kinds of entities with respect to their ontological character.

As stated in Part I, ontological character is determined by the kinds of mechanisms that an entity is ontologically dependent on.

2.2.1 Bio-Social Ontological Character does not entail Biological Kindhood

It should be noted that my conception of Bio-Social Reality is not an attempt to necessarily expand the ontology of biological categories or properties as I do not wish for Bio-Social Reality to create spurious Natural and/or Biological categories. Rather Bio-Social Reality is meant to demonstrate that in order for certain entities to come into existence, various generative interactions between various biological and social mechanisms, must be part of the world's ontological structure.[18] Bio-Social kinds can be biological kinds but membership to Bio-Social ontological character does not entail Biological kindhood.

To better understand why Bio-Social Reality does not necessarily entail biological kind membership, consider an example of a Bio-Social entity that should not be considered a biological category: Hereditary Monarch/Monarchy. The purpose of the *Hereditary Monarchy* example is to demonstrate that my account of Bio-Social Reality does not entail that being Bio-Social entity is sufficient for being considered a biological kind or entity. Instead, Bio-Social Reality simply picks out those entities whose existence depends on the existence of generative interaction between biological and social mechanisms that are part of the world (i.e. reality). Whether some of these Bio-Social entities can be included in our biological ontology is predicated on how and why the biological and social mechanisms came to generatively interact.

[18] Ontological structure here is to be interpreted as saying all things that exist as part of reality supervene on some structure of reality.

Hereditary Monarchies are political systems that distribute political power based on ancestral relations. In a Hereditary Monarchy, social properties such as political legitimacy and legislative authority are grounded by *biological properties* underpinning an ancestral relation to the Monarch (or to a previous Monarch). Thus, Hereditary Monarchies are Bio-Social entities because they exist in virtue of biological mechanisms (i.e. reproduction and ancestral lineage) being the primary constitutive of a given social mechanism (i.e. political systems/structures). Hereditary Monarchies sufficiently satisfy being a Bio-Social entity as they existentially depend on biological mechanisms underpinning reproduction and ancestral relation generative interacting with the social mechanisms necessary for the recognition and distribution of political power. *Hereditary Monarchies* also essentially depend on generative interactions between biological and social mechanisms, as the social mechanisms for determining political legitimacy and office are determined according to biological mechanisms that underpin reproductive practices and capabilities of the agents that occupy the political system.

Though, Hereditary Monarchies organize social structures in such a way that social position ultimately reduces to biological properties (i.e. lineage) we can exclude Hereditary Monarchies from being a biological kind, because of how and why the union of biological and social mechanisms came to be. The reason that biological mechanisms underpin the social properties of political structure within *Hereditary Monarchies*, is due to the existence of a prior social structure that has prescribed that a political system be put in place that assigns political power according to a set of biological properties that are produced by their sexual reproductive capabilities (i.e. offspring-parent relation). This "social structure" is essentially dependent on situational social mechanisms that underpin people's decisions for recognizing and distributing political power. Though *Hereditary Monarchies* existentially and essentially depend on generative interactions between biological and

social mechanisms, in uncovering their explanatory dependence on these mechanisms requires us to reference how it was the action of social structures that bring about the existence of "political systems" that requires the organization of political power match the organization of biological relation.

The generative interaction of biological and social mechanisms underpinning the existence of *Families*, however, is due to a nomological necessity requiring that biological mechanisms for genetic-material exchange and reproduction of new organisms co-occur with social mechanisms that underpin processes such as the collective existence, communication, and interaction between organisms. This nomological necessity is the product of the evolutionary history of sexually reproducing organisms on planet earth. Because this nomological necessity is the result of the evolutionary history of a branch of sexually reproducing organisms, generative interaction of biological and social mechanisms in producing the existence of *Families* is that such that *Families* can be included as part of our biological ontology.

Both *Hereditary Monarchies* and *Families* both exists in virtue of the interaction between biological mechanisms that facilitate a certain mode of reproduction and various social mechanisms that facilitate inter-human coordination, communication, and interaction. Thus, it is the similarity in their ontological dependence on generative interaction between biological and social mechanisms that they both can said to Bio-Social ontological character, and thus categorized as a Bio-Social entities. However, *Hereditary Monarchies* and *Families* differ in terms of the how and why the generative interaction between their underlying biological and social mechanisms have formed. It this difference that allows for us to consider *Families* as part of our biological ontology, while excluding *Hereditary Monarchies* from our ontology of biological kinds. What this example

demonstrates is that being a Bio-Social entity is not sufficient for being a biological kind. Rather what determines whether a Bio-Social entity can be included into our biological ontology concerns whether the union of the biological and social mechanisms producing the entity is caused by some other entity or law that is captured by our biological scientific theories.

Part III: Bio-Social Reality and Race

Having explained my account of Bio-Social Reality I will now turn my attention to explaining how certain accounts of "race" ontologically depend on the generative interactions between biological and social mechanisms. Given their ontological dependence on the generative interaction between biological and social mechanisms, conceptions of "race" that share the similar ontological dependence on these kinds of mechanisms could be considered Bio-Social kinds. The view I will go into detail will be Lucius Outlaw's fittingly titled, Bio-Social Race.

3.1 Outlaw's Bio-Social conception of Race

Outlaw (1996) account of "race" aims to hone in on a definition of "race" that captures the semantic content of both "folk" and "expert" conceptions of "race". Though, Outlaw does not indicate this "folk" and "expert" distinction in his analysis of "race", the examples of the use of "race" and "race-terms" that he analyzes are pulled from both "expert" uses in the philosophy of science to everyday understanding of specific racial categories. From these various uses of "race" Outlaw's analysis of "race" results in the following:

> "Race," then, would best be understood as a cluster concept which draws together under a single word, reference to biological, cultural and geographical factors thought characteristic of a population. Accordingly, the characterization of particular races should be done as "indefinitely long disjunctive definitions" in which definitively racial features are not understood as being "severally necessary and the entire set of necessary properties… jointly sufficient". (Outlaw, pp. 20, 1996)

The first thing to note here is that "race" is disjunctive, not only referring to biological properties of a group but also social properties such as cultural practices and geography. Outlaw's comment that the definitive properties of racial groups not be considered "severally necessary and the entire set of necessary properties… jointly sufficient" is meant to indicate that membership conditions to a racial group are "definitive" in the sense that they can be distinguished from other groups of people along some socially salient metric (i.e. phenotypic profiles, cultural practices, geographic origin) but they are not necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to a racial group. Key to these membership conditions is that they be interpreted as an inclusive disjunction. To illustrate this Outlaw gives an example of what would be considered the "African" race.

> The "African" race is made-up of persons who are descended from at least one African parent; who have dark, or brown or light-colored skin; tightly-curly or straight-hair; A broad, flat or narrow nose; other physical characteristics that are such and such; Or born into and socialized into social, cultural world characteristic of African or African descendant peoples. (Outlaw, pp. 20, 1996)

In this description of the African race, Outlaw gives a long disjunctive sentence about how an individual can satisfy membership conditions of being considered part of said racial group. This disjunctive sentence lays out a long set of conditions that are sufficient for membership to the "African race", which include both biological and social facts about the individual and their familial network. However, this long disjunct is not a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but satisfying one condition is sufficient for racial group membership. For example: One could sufficiently satisfy being a member of the African race by satisfying all the conditions referenced in the long disjunctive sentence, while another person may only satisfy the condition of being "born and socialized into the social, cultural world characteristic of African or African descendant peoples". As the truth conditions for inclusive disjuncts entail, the only way that a person fails to be considered member of the "African race" is if they do not satisfy any of the disjuncts within the defined set of sufficient membership conditions. Outlaw is not necessarily confident if there could ever be hard boundary conditions on racial group membership as he says:

> "…complex interplay with complex systems of environmental, cultural, and social factors, biological factors provide not yet fully understood boundary conditions and possibilities that affect the development of the relatively distinctive gene pools of various geographically and/or socially relatively isolated self-reproducing relatively distinct cultural groups." (Outlaw, pp. 18, 1996)

However, we can still get distinctive racial groups by assigning membership conditions, that while disjunctive, all have different disjuncts comprising their membership conditions. For example: If the sufficient conditions for belonging to racial group, R1 is {A or B or C….} while the sufficient conditions for belonging to R2 is{X or Y or Z….} though I have not established necessary and sufficient conditions for group membership for R1 or R2 (and therefore have not set any hard boundary conditions) R1 and R2 are still distinct groups, as the sufficient conditions for membership to these groups do not intersect.

Given that these sufficient conditions include both biological and social information, Outlaw concludes that an appeal solely to biological properties is insufficient for capturing the essence of race, but its essence requires reference to biological and social factors.

> "Hence, race refers to heterogeneous complexes of socially normed biological and cultural characteristics. And the biological features referred to when making racial distinctions are always conscripted into projects of cultural, political, and social construction. They are never simply given." (Outlaw, pp. 21, 1996)

The ontological structure of Outlaw's conception of race mirrors the ontological structure of families that was detailed in Part 2 describing an instance of biological versus socially construed conceptions of family. In Part 2, I examined the case of Families construed *biologically* and *socially* to examine how the different forms of families all share some form of ontological dependence on some generative interaction between biological and social mechanisms. However, I use the union of biological and socially construed Families to show that the concept families however instantiated, still requires generative interaction between a biological and social mechanisms in terms of its existential and explanatory dependence. Such is the case for Outlaw's conception of race.

Though Outlaw describes the assignment of the set of biological and social factors as being socially constructed (i.e. which specific set of disjuncts are indicative of being a "race") it is their assignment as "races" that are socially constructed and the existence of both the social and biological properties referenced within the disjunctive membership conditions, exist in virtue of biological and social mechanisms generatively interacting. Given that Outlaw says that the disjuncts for racial group membership are indefinite I will not be able to adequately say that every part of the disjunct is the product of a generative interaction between biological and social mechanisms. However, I can distill the general features that frequently appear in the disjunctive sentences for racial group membership to determine that generally these features ontologically depend on the interaction of biological and social mechanisms.

One such feature is some form of ancestral relation to some morphologically and/or culturally defined group. The core of this feature is a biological relation to some pre-existing family of cultural groups. I say "family of cultural groups" as racial groups under this definition, encompasses multiple different culturally defined groups that often grouped together either by descent or from a specific geographic region. What is important to highlight here is the ontologically priority of "culturally/geographically" defined group (i.e. the identification of the relevant cultural groups exists prior to them becoming a 'race'). This is important to mention given that Outlaw describes race as "socially normed biological and cultural characteristics" as there must exist some identifiable group in order to form social norms around them. Thus, from this feature we can distill that, "culturally identified groups" and "ancestral relation" are the components to "race's" essence that we need a mechanistic explanation of.

Straightaway we can see that "ancestral relation" existentially and essentially depend on the interaction of biological and social mechanisms. The ontological structure "ancestral relations" is isomorphic to the ontological structure of *Families* (biologically construed). Social mechanisms necessary for organisms to identify and coordinate with reproductive partners must interact with biological mechanisms that allow organisms to participate in a mode of reproduction to produce novel members of a group. Thus, a network of ancestral relations is representative of both the social relations and biological relations held between various members of the network.

The ontological structure of the other component "culturally identified groups" will vary depending on how the group is formed and how they persist. In order for any group to be "culturally identified" there must have existed a collection of individuals that came together to form a set of social norms and practices that were identified as constituting a distinct "culture". Let's call these initial norm-establishing members of the culturally defined group, the "inaugural members". This cultural group could persist in a variety of ways. Members of the group could have followed a set of social norms that structured their reproductive habits such that all members of the group stand in some ancestral relation to some descendant of the inaugural members of the cultural group. In this case, the cultural group persists not only due to social mechanisms that allow for them to maintain their set of cultural norms, but also because the members of the group form continuous ancestral networks. Thus, when the collection of cultural groups of this sort are unified under one racial category, "race" would refer to a collection of extant culturally defined groups that have some level of ancestral continuity. In this "ancestral continuity" case, the existence of the cultural group existentially and essentially depends on the interaction between biological and social mechanisms in the same manner that underpins "ancestral relation".

The other way a cultural group could persist, is that there could be significant admixture of novel members to group, that become members not by birth but by socialization and acculturation within the cultural practices and norms of the group. In this case it is possible that all members of the cultural group at time, t_2 hold no ancestral relation to any descendant of the inaugural members. In this case, cultural group identity and ancestral continuity come apart. We have a continuously identified cultural group that is discontinuous in terms of the ancestral relations between past members and current members.

However, to account for this continuity of the cultural group, we have to appeal to the existence of the inaugural members and how they developed their social network to form a "cultural group". The idea here is that the development of the group into one that is socially recognized as instantiating distinct culture unfolds throughout time. During that time biological and social mechanisms are necessary for the development and maintenance of social norms and practices amongst inaugural members and their initial descendants. Future, non-related members to the cultural group become acculturated to the norms and practices that characterize the group and become full members. Here we have examples of both existential and explanatory dependence. Explanatory dependence in the respect that acculturation process for the new members has a direct causal link to development of these practices by the inaugural members, which obtained due to the tandem efforts of biological and social mechanisms. Existential dependence in the respect that definition of the culture itself requires that membership to cultural group be causally connected to the initial practices of the inaugural members and their direct descendants or social interlocutors. Two geographically and socially isolated collections of individuals that happen to exhibit the same norms and practices are not identical cultures. Thus, the identity conditions for the continuity of the "cultural group" require some form of social descent (i.e. some form of social interaction that may

or may not result in reproductive partnership) from the inaugural members. This also gives us an instance essential dependence as the identification of the cultural group is an instance of a "socially normed biological and cultural characteristic".

Thus, at every stage of analysis, Outlaw's Bio-Social races, unsurprisingly, end up having a Bio-Social ontological character. Race fails to be fundamentally "biological" as it remains to be seen if there are biological criterion that will sufficiently explain boundary conditions for racial group membership or intragroup similarity. The role social mechanisms play in identifying and recognizing social groups does most of the work in creating boundary conditions or demarcation of various social groups, but these demarcations are often drawn by or appropriated for the social purposes, sets of biological facts about human populations and their ancestral relations to socially recognized groups. These patterns of biological relations and social recognition require that world have an ontological structure where biological and social mechanisms can generatively interact to allow for sets of biological and social facts to align to produce the kinds of entities that Outlaw describes.

Conclusion

I will close this chapter by describing what I see as the potential path forward if my conception of Bio-Social reality receives some uptick in the metaphysics of race literature. Most clearly, I see that in accepting that race's ontological character includes both biological and social dimensions will encourage us to investigate the unique kinds of philosophical problems that may arise when race is invoked either the social domain or the biological domain. Or when these domains intersect. These problems may be metaphysical in nature, where we interrogate the ontological dependence that certain conceptions of "race" have on other states of affairs and how a change in the generative base of "racial" properties might yield a change in how it exists (or if it

persists). These problems may be epistemological in which we explore how the generative basis for "race" might manifest given the context in which the concept is invoked (biomedical vs. sociological). Other problems may occur at the intersection of these metaphysical and epistemological issues.

For example, reparations models that aim to target racial disparities that are connected to a past injustice such as the institution of slavery. In so far as these reparation models are race conscious/targeted it may be pertinent to explaining how biological dimensions of race versus the social dimensions of race affect how we implement the reparations model. Such investigation do not require us to settle what whether "race" is fundamentally biological or social, but it does require that we explore how the conception of "race" being used in our reparations model, track sets of biological facts, where it tracks a set of social facts and where these two sets of facts come together and come apart. Bio-Social Reality with respect to "race", offers a way of identifying the various ways to which race can operate in these two dimensions but not be fundamentally categorized as one or the other. This could be a position that is taken up as a metaphysical view or view that is simply an epistemological view about how operationalize race in certain research fields. However, both views still that we make reference to the fact that the structure of reality is such that the interaction of biological and social mechanisms plays an important role in identifying various types of entities, like "race" that we wish to investigate in the world.

CHAPTER 3: One Realism to Rule Them All

> "One day it'll all make sense."
>
> Common, 1997

Part I: The Current Ontological Taxonomy in the Philosophy of Race

1.1: Ontological Landscape of Philosophy of Race

Joshua Glasgow (2009) has provided a helpful breakdown of the various metaphysical positions within the philosophy of race (Anti-Realism, Biological Racial Realism and Social Constructivism) with how each position responds to kind of ontological question regarding race.

The first dividing question concerns whether a race theorist believes "race" exists or is real. Those who answer in the affirmative constitute the Realist camp, those who answer in the negative constitute the Anti-Realist camp. The question of "what kind of entity is race?" further subdivides realist camps into two groups: Biological Racial Realist (BRR) and Social Constructivists (SC). The metaphysical issues that precipitate the division between Biological Racial Realists and Social Constructivists will be the focus of this paper.

Biological Racial Realists (BRR) argue that "race" exists and is biological kind/ entity. The kind of biological entity varies depending on the specific view. In some BRR views "race" tracks biological properties such as morphological features or biological relations such as ancestry. In other BRR views "race" refers to genetic clusters of populations or ancestral breeding groups. And some

BRR views argue that "race" has semantic content that includes all of these properties and relations. Thus, BRR accounts of "race" argue that "race" refers to some subdivision of the human population according to some biological property. Examples of Biological Racial Realists include Spencer (2013), Hardimon (2017) and Andreasen (2000).

Social Constructivist (SC) account of race argue that "race" is a socially constructed entity. Just as with the Biological Realist, what it means for "race" to be socially constructed varies depending on the specific view. However, the general structure of SC accounts of race is that "race" exists in virtue of some social processes or social dynamic that shape people's lived experience and is therefore a social kind. Thus, "race" is a subdivision or sorting of human beings that tracks some form of social property/relation. Examples of Social Constructivists include Asta (2018), Haslanger (2000, 2019) and Jeffers (2019).

My argumentative aim in this paper is to demonstrate that Social Constructivism and Biological Racial Realism do not accurately reflect a difference in what the ontological nature of race is. That is, their respective arguments are not successful in demonstrating that "race" should be ontologically categorized as being exclusively biological or social. Thus, my thesis for this paper is that any realist conception of "race", whether it be Biological Racial Realist or Social Constructivists account is actually a Bio-Social conception of "race", because both of their respective views require the union of biological and social mechanisms.

1.2 Metaphysical Methodology

Picking back up on themes from the previous chapter, the metaphysical methodology I use in this chapter will combine mechanistic explanation as well as conceptual analysis. This method involves performing conceptual analysis on the kinds of features and properties a particular

conception of race claims to have and then subsequently engaging in mechanistic explanation to uncover the kinds of mechanisms that these features or properties ontologically depend on. I then use the conception of ontological dependence to determine where in the ontological taxonomy it should be categorized, biological entities are those who ontologically depend on biological mechanisms, while social entities are those kinds that ontological depends on social mechanisms.

Part II: A New Ontological Taxonomy for Race Realism

2.1 Argument for the New Ontological Taxonomy

> **P1: If some entity's existence ontologically depends on generative interactions between biological and social mechanisms then that entity is Bio-Social entity.**
>
> **P2: Both Biological Racial Realism and Social Constructivist conception of "race" ontologically depend on generative interactions between biological and social mechanisms.**
>
> **Conclusion: Both Biological Racial Realism and Social Constructivist conception of "race" are Bio-Social entity.**

P1 lays out the criterion for how to identify a Bio-Social kind, establishing ontological dependence on a generative interaction between biological and social mechanisms as being sufficient for being a Bio-Social kind. P2 argues that extant racial realist views ontologically depend on generative interactions between biological and social mechanism. This description of the relationship between the kinds of mechanisms that "race" ontologically depends on is primarily a conceptual analysis. What I mean by this is that I do not intend to determine whether the various definitions of "race" given in these theories actually map on to the use of "race" terms in everyday life. Rather my focus is to examine these various race theories as propositions about how a posited entity exists in

the world. I then examine what follows from these posited entities. The aim of the argument is to show that all realists positions about "race" collapse into one view, that "race" is a Bio-Social entity.

2.3 Explanation of the New Ontological Taxonomy

Understanding the ontological disagreement between Social Constructivists and Biological Racial Realists as debate over kinds of mechanisms that are responsible for race's existence (and by extension what nature of "race" is) helps clarify what each camp understands to be the most pertinent features of "race" and "racial group" membership. For Biological Racial Realists, it is biological mechanisms bringing into being high-order biological kinds that are either the referents of "race" or part of its semantic content. For Social Constructivists, the most pertinent features of race are the social agents that implement a racial schema and the various social mechanisms they employ to make said racial schema a collective social reality.

This difference in what is considered pertinent suggests a substantive philosophical disagreement about how to approach various issues concerning race, such as what kinds of knowledge one can get using race or what one can infer under a particular conception of "race". However, this disagreement about pertinence does not yield an distinction about the nature of "race". I posit that all views acknowledging that race is "real" or "exists" are committed to race being a Bio-Social entity. The main argument of this paper is that ontological taxonomy for the metaphysics of race should include only two camps: Anti-Realism and Bio-Social Realism. Views that conclude that race is solely biological or solely social, I would argue, fail to give a complete picture of what is metaphysically necessary for an entity like "race" to exist.

Given that my argumentative aim concerns Realist accounts of race, this paper will not address Anti-Realist arguments about race. I do not take a stance on whether race is "real" or "exists" in this paper. Instead, I will focus on what is ontologically necessary for realist accounts of "race" to be tenable metaphysical positions. This ultimately means understanding what each realist view of race views as the grounds for race's existence and then identifying the mechanisms that form these grounds. I argue that when this process is done with both Social Constructivist and Biological Racial Realist accounts of race, it becomes clear all the accounts require both social and biological mechanisms in order for their respective definitions of "race" to exist.

My methodology for assessing the existential claims made by social constructivists and biological realists will have the following steps:

> **Step 1.** Explain how a particular race theorist's conception of race determines the meaning of "race".
>
> **Step 2.** Determine what is the 'referent' or "essential"/"definitive" properties of the conception of "race" detailed in Step 1.
>
> **Step 3.** Analyze what mechanisms the purported "essential"/ "definitive" properties of "race" ontologically depend on.

The strategy for defending P2 is to detail how some of the preeminent racial realist views in both the Social Constructivist and Biological Realist camps define and describe "race" and demonstrate each of their conceptions of race require the co-occurrence of biological and social mechanisms in order for "race" to exist.

Defense of P1

My defense of P1 will be brief, as I have given my account of Bio-Social Reality and its relation to Bio-Social entities in Chapter 2. For the sake of brevity, I will just shortly recap that account here. P1 States that if an entity's existence ontologically depends on the generative interactions between biological and social mechanism that entity is a Bio-Social entity. This generative interaction between the biological social mechanism generates the existence of the higher order kind, Bio-Social entity. Without the existence of these generative interactions between the biological and social mechanisms, these Bio-Social kinds would not exist. Thus, Bio-Social entities are existentially dependent on a generative base of activity of biological and social mechanisms. We have reason to affirm that entities of this kind exist as entities like *Families* have an ontological dependence on a generative basis of interacting biological and social mechanisms, in which biological mechanisms that underpin sexual reproduction and parent-offspring relation interact with social mechanisms that allow organisms for coordinate with each other to form reproductive-partner relations, as well engage in acts like child-rearing and other forms of norm following.

I will now turn my attention to defending P2.

Defense of P2

> **P2: Both Biological Racial Realism and Social Constructivist conception of "race" ontologically depend on generative interactions between biological and social mechanisms.**

The strategy for defending P2 is straightforward. In the following subsections I will detail how both Biologically Racial Realist views as well as Social Constructivist views both require generative interactions of both a social mechanism and a biological mechanism. This is meant to illustrate that even under their defined conceptions of "race", conceived as either purely biological or social, the ontological character of their descriptions reveals an ontological character that is Bio-Social. This Bio-Social ontological character is revealed by the fact that they both existentially depend on generative interactions between biological and social mechanisms.

2.5 Biological Racial Realism

2.5.1 Overview of Biological Racial Realism

In this section, I will focus on Michael Hardimon's Minimalist Conception of Race (from hereon referred to as MCR). I have chosen to focus on Hardimon's MCR because it is a biologically minimalist conception of "race" and "racial groups" and that other, more robustly biological conceptions of "race" has a similar structure of claims that is posited by MCR

For example, Hardimon explains that MCR is a group concept, that is, "race" is an instantiation of a kind of group. The necessary and sufficient conditions for a group to be a "race", according to MCR are:

> C1.) A group of people distinguished from other groups by patterns of visible physical features.
>
> C2.) Linked together by common ancestry.
>
> C3.) Originating from a distinct geographic location. (Hardimon, 2017, p.31)

Almost all Biological Racial Realist accounts agree on C2 and C3. Where Hardimon's articulation of MCR differs from other more robustly biological accounts of "race" concerns how a group fulfills C1.

For example, Spencer (2019) argues that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) racial classification schema refers to continental populations that demonstrate a small level of genetic clustering. Sober (forthcoming) argues that racial groups/categories track the instances of branching of human breeding populations throughout Homo Sapiens' history. In both accounts, "distinctive visible physical features" are not the biological property that makes a group a race. Instead, in

Spencer (2019), it is genetic clustering, and with Sober (forthcoming), it's the creation of new reproductive branches.

However, what unites all Biological Racial Realist views is how the fulfillment of C1 must be causally connected to the fulfillment of C2 and C3. For Hardimon, in order for the possession of a distinctive phenotype amongst a population to be considered a racial property, the possession of said phenotype must be a heritable trait that can be traced back to a specific ancestral group (i.e., fulfilling C2). C3 then makes it a necessary condition that this common ancestral group must originate from a distinct geographic location. The OMB's racial classification scheme precisely demarcates which geographic regions a person must have an ancestral connection to belong to a specific racial group. For example: Belonging to "Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander" requires that person be a descendant from the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa or other Pacific Islands.

Thus, Biological Racial Realism can be generalized in the following way:

C1.) A group of people with some shared biological property.

C2.) That is a result of their shared common ancestry.

C3.) To an ancestral group Originating from a distinct geographic location.

Given this explanation, we can explain how Biological Racial Realist views answer Steps 1 and 2 in my process. **Answer to Step 1**: "Race" refers to the grouping of people according to common ancestry to an ancestral group of a distinct geographic origin. **Answer to Step 2:** The essential property of "racial groups" is some kind of biological property that is shared by members of the racial group, that is the result of their common ancestry. Different Biological Realist views take different stances on what this biological property is (i.e., they differ on how a group must fulfill C1).

Viewed all together: What makes MCR and other Biological Racial Realist accounts of "race" "biological" conceptions of "race" is that essential properties of race are produced by biological mechanisms. C2's common ancestry condition is underpinned by biological mechanisms that facilitate genetic transfer from parent to offspring to create discreet breeding populations. In Hardimon's account, C1 is fulfilled by the development of distinguishable phenotypes resulting from shared ancestry. In other biological realist accounts, C1 can be fulfilled by observed genetic clustering or historical branching events that track the origins of various populations' descent.

2.5.2 Social Mechanisms in Biological Racial Realism

As stated earlier, nearly all BRR views of "race" agree that "race" is a kind of grouping of people according to some common ancestry that have developed some form of biological distinction, either in the form possession of some trait (either phenotypic or genetic) or in relation to some past breeding population. The idea is that "race" tracks the development of kinds of populations/groups by tracking their relation to some ancestral group. However, how these ancestral groups are formed and whether the development of traits can be attributed to being a descendant from said ancestral group requires both the existence and persistence of social mechanism activity. This is especially true if these ancestral groups need to be of "distinctive geographic origin." In other words, whatever biological property that common ancestry is supposed to produce within a "racial group", in order for "common ancestry from distinctive geographic origin" to be possible, there must be a union of biological and social mechanisms.

What must be remarked on is the role social mechanisms play in determining what kinds of collection of people are candidates for being the ancestral groups that instantiate "common ancestry" and how ancestral group can be of "distinctive geographic origin". Fulfilling the common

ancestry condition (C2) restricts "common ancestry" to a particular subset of the human population, while fulfilling C3 uses geographic boundaries in an attempt, to make these subsets spatiotemporally discreet. By "spatiotemporally discreet", I intend to indirectly reference the fact that all human populations are of common ancestry according to contemporary evolutionary theory. (Handwerk, 2021) And since all human populations have been born on earth, under the mesosphere, it appears that Biological Racial Realist accounts of "race" want "race" and "racial groups" to make finer grained distinctions between human populations that specifically references which ancestral groups are pertinent for membership to a specific racial group. These ancestral groups are spatiotemporally distinct, in so far as they are identified by their existence within a specified geographic space over a specified period of time.

However, an ancestral group's presence in a geographic space over a specified time, is a historically contingent fact, one that requires reference to not only the existence of a group of people but also reference to the various social practices, such as mate-selection/reproductive events, migratory and settlement behavior, within a particular geographic space over a period of time. Thus, it's the necessity of ancestral groups and the need for them to be of "distinctive geographic origin" that necessarily require the generative interaction between biological and social mechanisms. To better understand why this is the case consider how Biological Racial Realist accounts determine that "Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander" is a race/racial group.

According to the OMB, "Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander", refers to individuals who are "descendant from the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa or other Pacific Islands". In order for this group to be considered a biological conception of race, they must have some share biological property that is a result of their ancestral connection to the "original peoples from Hawaii,

Guam, Samoa, or other Pacific Islands", thereby fulfilling C1, C2 and C3. However, there is nothing within the observed natural laws of biology that prohibits the same type of biological properties that have arisen within the geographically proper Pacific Islander descendant populations from arising within populations that are not descendant from original settlers of the Pacific Islanders. This means that multiple different descendant populations can have the same biological properties (e.g., similar morphological profiles, identical genetic clusters) that are possessed by Pacific Island descendant populations.

It is well within the realm of possibility within biological/evolutionary theory, that another group, call them population X, that is very closely related to the "original peoples of Pacific Islands", but did not travel to with their close relatives to eventually settle on the various Pacific Islands. If Population X maintained a set of social practices that restricted their reproductive practices to prevent genetic admixture, it is possible that could produce the same biological properties as those produced by the "original people of Pacific Islands". In this case, Population X would be biologically identical to Pacific Islanders, with respect to the biological property of that fulfills C1. Population X would also share recent common ancestry with the "original people of Pacific Islands", thereby fulfilling C2. However, Population X would fail to be Pacific Islanders because the various social practices that regulated their reproductive behaviors were spatiotemporally distinct from the reproductive behaviors of their close relatives that settled on the Pacific Islands. Though the biological products of said reproductive behavior yield the same type of biological properties, they fail to be Pacific Islanders because of some social/historical facts about their most immediate ancestors.

What this demonstrates is that if Biological Racial Realist views hold that racial group membership is done with reference to the emergence of shared biological properties that are consequences of ancestral relation to geographically distinct populations, then various social mechanisms must be referenced in order to determine how to geographically demarcate various human subpopulations as having origins in particular region.

Now the Biological Racial Realist could argue that geography, while a contingent historical fact, nonetheless plays an explanatory role in describing biological concepts such as breeding populations or evolutionary history. The idea being is that when there are breeding populations located within a specific geographic space our identifications of genetic clusters or biological properties as emerging from those places is a salient fact that explains how race comes into existence. However, group entities can satisfy all the distinctive biological properties stipulated in C1 and C2 that do not require the group to be of distinctive geographic origin.

Nomadic Population

"Nomadic" here refers to a group of people who temporarily settle in an area and may gain members as they settle and move on to new places. Under this definition of "Nomadic", the group is a composite entity whose persistence is tracked by following the members of the group throughout space and time. Essentially this means that the nomadic group's persistence is predicated on the collection of members that continue the practice of group migration.

Geographic space holds no distinction for a nomadic group. Nomadic groups can come into existence by people of various geographic origins of birth, coordinating together to live and reproduce while periodically migrating. Space is relevant for Nomadic groups only in the respect that

they remain physically close to each other to communicate, work, and sexually reproduce with each other. However, for C3 populations, the continued existence within geographic space is what holds the group together.

What the *Nomadic* example illustrates is that what ultimately distinguishes C3 populations from other kinds of populations are the social mechanisms that form and maintain the population.

In the *Nomadic population* example, there is a continuity of group members and their descendants that make a discrete set. Though Nomadic populations maintain group cohesion and lineage continuity, how this cohesion and continuity is maintained fails to fulfill the geographic demands of C3. Nomadic populations, by definition, are populations that are identified by tracking their movement through geographic space rather than being identified by a specific geographic region. As stated earlier, if the inaugural members of a nomadic population are individuals of varied geographic origins, generations that descend from the inaugural population will not have origins that converge on a single region.

What makes the nomadic population case so interesting is that it is both metaphysically and physically possible that Nomadic population descendants can fulfill conditions C1(distinguishing phenotype/genetic clustering/ancestral branching) and C2 (common ancestry). Provided that there is significant admixture of genetic material during these reproductive events, descendent generations of Nomadic populations could develop distinctive phenotypes that are consequences of being biological descendants from the inaugural ancestral group, thereby fulfilling C1 and C2 respectively. If all human sub-populations exhibited this same behavior (i.e. nomadic migration and intra-group reproduction) it is metaphysically possible that there would groups of individuals that uniquely fulfill

C1(some distinctive biological property) and C2(common ancestry) but all would fail to be of distinctive geographic origin (C3).

What this reveals, is that in order for a group to considered to be considered a "race" is that C1 and C2 be fulfilled as a result of a kind of a social process. Social processes such *Settlement* (i.e., choosing where one and one's kinship network lives) and *Herd Movement* (or lack thereof) play a causal role in determining whether a group satisfies the spatiotemporal conditions necessary for the union of biological mechanisms that facilitate reproduction and transfer/development of genetic material and the social mechanisms that facilitate social processes such as *Mate Selection*, to satisfy C3.

2.5.3 Summary of the Social Mechanisms occurring in MCR

All in all, what this shows, is that despite having strong biological criterion for group to be considered a "race", MCR requires these groups (and their ancestors) to have developed these biological properties through specific social practices. In order for the biological properties of "common ancestry" and "possession of distinctive phenotypes" to be considered "racial" properties, they must have been developed under the right kind of social processes (i.e. continuous, long-term, intragroup sexual reproduction within a specified geographic boundary).

This is not too surprising given that Hardimon acknowledges that MCR is in part an historical account of the development of races. (Hardimon, 2017) However what has been shown here is that what is necessary for the development of MCR races, is that biological mechanisms that underpin the both reproduction of human beings into population and the heritability of expressed phenotypes must co-occur with a particular set of social practices (mate-selection, settlement) within a particular geographic context. The analytical orthodoxy of theorists/researchers play a role in

establishing which kinds of social organization of biological processes (i.e. sexual reproduction within a specific geographic context) yield the kind of biological properties ("common ancestry"/"phenotype"/ "genetic clustering") that are considered racial. In short, even under MCR, "race" is not solely reducible to only biological mechanisms/properties.

2.6.1 Social Construction Accounts of Race

Observing that biological conceptions of race like MCR are not solely reducible to biological properties and may require some theory laden interpretation of biological facts, might motivate one to accept a social constructivist account of race. Most social constructivist accounts of race argue that "race" ultimately reduces to social practices/structures.[19] For this paper, I will focus on Haslanger (2000) and Asta (2018). I have chosen to focus on these two accounts because they best illustrate the ontological tensions between Biological Realists and Social Constructionists.

Concerning the Metametaphysical, both Asta and Haslanger's accounts focus on the referents for race talk and how/why they refer. Both accounts are examples of Semantic Externalism, which is a referentialist theory of meaning in the philosophy of language. Semantic externalism argues that a referent for a term just is the actual entity that exists in the world, not necessarily what speakers of the term believe it means. For example: Many people that use the term "whale" may believe they are fish and not mammals, which is in fact false. However, Semantic externalism hold that people who hold true beliefs about whales (i.e. that whales are mammals) and people who hold false beliefs about whales (i.e. that are whales are fish) refer to the same entity, because their use of the term "whale" gestures at the same entity that exists in the world.

[19] "Structure" here can refer to hierarchies (i.e. political status, social position etc.)

Semantic Externalism does not entail Social Constructivism, as there are Anti-Realist (Appiah, 1985) and Biological Realists (Spencer, 2019) that utilize Semantic Externalist theory of reference. But what is important to note is why social constructionists such as Asta and Haslanger believe semantic externalism of “race” and “race-terms” vindicates a social constructionist account of race.

Biological Realists argue that "race" and "racial groups" designate a set of biological properties/relations. Social Constructivists argue that if one tracks usage of "race" and "race-terms" their referents do not pick out biological properties, but rather they more closely track social properties/processes/values. Put in terms of our "reduction" language, if we track the use of "race-terms," the thing they in fact, pick out ultimately reduces to some social property/process, not biological properties.

This leads to the ontological tension between Biological Realists and Social Constructivists which concerns how “race” informs the creation of “racial groups”. In the Hardimon MCR account, the "race" is identified by the criterion C1-C3, which includes biological properties of "common ancestry" and "possession of phenotype", "racial groups" are then identified by how they uniquely satisfy C1-C3. Social constructionists on the other hand look at "racial groups" and then generalize about "race" in light of their analysis of “racial groups”. Social Constructionists track the use of "race-terms" to see how people are divided into racial groups. They ultimately conclude that what is grouping members of a "race" together is not distinct a set of biological properties, but rather a social position and valuation by a social system. The move here is that in observing how "race-terms" are applied to both individuals and groups of people what becomes salient is that "race"

subdivides people with respect to their social position, not the biological properties they possess. Let's look at Haslanger's account to get a concrete example of this kind of analysis.

In Haslanger's account, "race" refers to **racialized groups** of people in a specific context. A group is a racialized group iff:

> R1.) They possess bodily features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links.
>
> R2) Having (or being imagined to have) said bodily features, positions a person/group in a privileged or subordinate position.
>
> R3.) Fulfilling conditions 1 and 2, plays a systematic role in maintaining systems of privilege and subordination.
>
> (Haslanger, 2000, p.44)

What makes race qua racialized groups a social constructivist account is that racial group membership ultimately reduces to the valuative processes of social systems and the various social positions within that system. R1 details physical and biological properties of individuals that are assessed by participants within a social system. R2 details how the assessment of kinds of properties detailed in R1 form the basis for placing various individuals into positions of privilege and subordination detailed in R2. R3 describes how the presence of R1 and R2 accounts for persistence of observed systems of privilege and subordination. The referent for "race" in Haslanger's account is the systemic valuation of bodily features that places people into positions of subordination and/or privilege. Essentially what this means is "race" refers to the valuation of a social system and does not reduce to the properties they evaluate.

A helpful analogy would be to think about how Realtors determine "home-value". Houses with more bedrooms and bathrooms, large kitchens and marble countertops will often have greater value than those with fewer bedrooms and bathrooms. However, "home-value" does not ultimately reduce to the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, the size of the kitchen but rather "home-value" is function of how buyers and appraisers within the real-estate market valuate certain properties of house. While the actual properties of the house are pertinent to determining a home's value, the actual referent to "home-value" is the existence of a series of valuations of properties of a home.

How this pertains to "race" and "racialized groups" in Haslanger's account, is that the referent "race" is the valuation of human beings into racialized groups by various social systems/institutions. More specifically, race refers to the existence of social systems valuation of human bodily features possessed which determine whether a person occupies a position of privilege or subordination.

Figure 3: The Referent of "race" in Social Constructivism



In the social constructivist account, "Race" does not ultimately reduce to sets of bodily features, rather "race" reduces to process of valuation of human bodily features that is supposedly indicative of ancestral connections. The bodily features of individuals play an important role in determining which racialized group they will belong to, however mere existence or presence of a

kind of bodily features is not sufficient for belonging to racialized group, some social system must valuate said features and determine how that individual might be racialized.

This necessity of a social system to valuate a set of properties is at the heart of Asta's conferralist account of "race". In Asta's view "race", and by extension, racial group membership, is a conferred property/label. Under this conferralist account, a social group/institution, often one with some kind of authoritative status or coercive power, delineates a set of "base properties" that the institution/group then ascribes a label to. This "labelling" of "base properties" confers a kind of ontological status to the "base properties" within context of the social system they are observed. In the case of "race", social institutions such as the US government, determine the "base properties" for racial group membership. The "base properties" for "race", at least in the context of the United States, include properties such as: ancestral relation, phenotype possession, country of origin etc. In the conferralist account of race, "race" refers to the set of base properties that a social system/institution uses to subdivide people into racial groups.

Asta's and Haslanger's respective accounts can be read as being complimentary to each other, as the referent for "race" in both of their accounts are inclusive of each other. Haslanger's social construction account gives a broad strokes description of how "race" comes into being via valuation of various social systems. Asta's conferralist account provides a description of the kinds of social agents (i.e. political/authoritative institutions, groups with significant social power) that are the relevant valuators and how their valuation processes become systematized. The processes that Asta describes can be interpreted as an instance of R1 and R2 of Haslanger's account. Asta's account of conferred properties via operations of social agents explains how certain base properties, like those stipulated in R1, are then "racialized" as detailed in R2.

2.6.2 Biological Mechanisms behind Social Constructionism

The most straightforward explanation for why the occurrence of biological mechanisms is necessary for social constructivist accounts of "race" is that social constructivist accounts rely on a weak form of property realism. "Property realism" here refers to a view that "properties" exists and that if a term has a referent, that referent is instantiated by a substance that possesses the properties that form its essence. In the case the social construction of race, "race" requires the existence of properties for a social system to valuate. Both Asta's and Haslanger's account of "race" rely on accounts of 'racialization' and each of their accounts of racialization rely on the valuation of properties (i.e. bodily features and/or ancestry) which requires a form of property realism. Asta's account explicitly states that "race" is conferred on to a set of base properties, while R1 and R2 of Haslanger's account specifies the kinds of properties that are racialized, "bodily features from presumed ancestral links". It is because of the kinds of properties listed in R1 and R2 that even under a social construction account of "race", biological mechanisms are integral to race's existence.

A close reading R1 and R2 it becomes clear that the existence of observable inherited phenotypic diversity amongst human populations plays a significant role in determining how people have been, and continue to be, racialized. My choice of phrase the "existence of observable diversity" is to establish that social constructivist race theories acknowledge that "race" is in part responding to the phenomenon of varied expressed phenotypes that exists amongst individuals and populations that exists in the world. While social constructionists do not believe that "race" simply reduces down to the existence of this phenomenon, its existence is nonetheless necessary for "race" to come into being.

R1 and R2 stipulates that racialized groups are racialized according to their possession of bodily features. If there are at least two racialized groups, then in order for "race" to satisfy R1 and R2 it must be metaphysically possible for human populations to possess observable phenotypic differences. The reason is that if racialized groups are formed with respect to the characteristics of bodily features and there is more than one group then the variation in the physical characteristics of bodily features must be both possible and actual. In order for observable phenotypic differences to be metaphysically possible there must be a set of biological mechanisms that allows for different phenotypes to be expressed. Whether it's skin color, hair texture or various facial features, if there is variation in the phenotypic features amongst human populations, the activity of biological mechanisms in part accounts for the existence of the observed phenotypic diversity. The biological mechanisms that do the work of producing this diversity are those that underpin the expression of phenotypes from genotypes. Such biological mechanisms are necessary for satisfying R1 and R2 because they produce the kinds of phenotypic differences that allow for people to be racialized into various groups. If a kind of biological mechanism that allow for a certain phenotypes to develop is absent with a particular individual (or group of individuals) then this has a direct effect on how they will be racialized.

At this juncture, I must take note of Haslanger's precise wording. R1 of Haslanger's account states that bodily features are "presumed" to be due to ancestral links, meaning that possession of these bodily features does not necessarily have to have been inherited. R2 states that individuals could possess or be "imagined to have" the bodily features mentioned in R2. If interpreted as inclusive disjunction, R2 states that sometimes people are put into positions of subordination or privilege according to physical features they in fact, possess, and sometimes due to features they do not possess.

R1 and R2 could avoid all the implications of property realism and the biological mechanisms that would underpin said realism if only if either of the following were true:
R1 and R2 could avoid all the implications of property realism and the biological mechanisms that would underpin said realism if only if either of the following were true:

(A.) All individuals that have been racialized were racialized with respect to bodily features that were either product of medical and/or cosmetic interventions or were not inherited via ancestral connection.

(B.) All instances of people being put in positions of privilege and/or subordination according to their bodily features occurred in instances misperception of the bodily features.

The truth conditions of (A)and (B) may appear to be tall orders for R1 and R2 to be true without occurrence of biological mechanisms but the reason for the high bar is that Haslanger's account of "race" is trying to account for all the social processes that go into making "race" and "racial categorization" a social reality for groups of people. In order for the account to achieve this explanatory power it must be able to account for all of the observed instances of racialization. We have very strong empirical evidence, both from history and contemporarily, that a significant proportion of people have been racialized according to bodily features they have inherited or are phenotypes that are derived from their genotype.[20]

If Haslanger's account of "race" is meant to refer to how social systems categorize and shape the reality of groups of people, then it must account for instances people being racialized over bodily

[20] The relationship between phenotypes, genotypes and heritability are too complex to go into here. How to understand concepts such as 'dominance' that are hotly debated amongst biologists problematize how we think about how the expression of a phenotype is related to inheritance. For a discussion on this see: https://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/genetic-dominance-genotype-phenotype-relationships-489/

features that they have inherited or were derived from genotypes. This is the reason why (A) is worded so strongly. In order for it be the case that biological mechanisms play no role in categorizing people according to their bodily features, then all (or most) individuals would have to racialized according to the bodily features that are result of cosmetic or medical intervention, meaning these bodily features were not inherited or derived from their genotype. This leads to why (B) requires there to be systemic misperception of bodily features. In order for R2 to be true without property realism concerning bodily features, all individuals would have to be racialized according to bodily features they did not in fact possess. But as we saw with (A), we have considerable evidence that people have been racialized and thereby placed in a position of subordination and/or privilege according to bodily features they in fact possess. Thus, we very strong evidence to deny (A) and (B).

Those wishing to push back against the necessity of biological mechanisms for Haslanger's and Asta's account also might argue that the social construction account of race is attempting to demonstrate that membership conditions for belonging to a racialized group is not strictly biologically determined. Rather what binds a racialized group together is the operation of a social system powerful enough to make it a social reality for the individuals that the racial concept is applied to. The idea being that "race" is currently instantiated in a social system such that actual properties of individuals are not doing the work of racializing individuals, the perception of properties and social power to enforce the racial schema based on those perceptions is doing the work. This is similarly true for Asta's account, as the conferralist conception of "race" simply requires that an institution or some other social group have an authoritative role to confer "racial" status to a set of base properties. Nothing intrinsic to the base properties warrants the "racial" categorization or labelling. However, this is still consistent with biological mechanisms being necessary constituents of the referent of "race".

Though Haslanger and Asta's respective accounts aim to describe "race" solely in terms of social systems' ability to place people into distinct groups by shaping their social reality, their semantic externalist methodology requires that the referent of "race" and "racial groups" be inclusive of extant individuals that have been racialized and put in position of subordination or privilege due to bodily features they have inherited.

Recall that distinctions between racialized groups are formed with respect to distinctions between their bodily features and/or ancestral relations. Instances where people are placed in a position of privilege or subordination with respect to bodily features that do in fact they possess, I will call veridical racialization. Given that we know that there do in fact exist observable phenotypic differences amongst individuals, these veridical cases of 'racialization' form the basis of 'racialization' being a distinct kind of valuation process that refers to some phenomena in the world. In other words, because there exist properties by which social systems can racialize, these properties form the grounds for the entities that exist in the world that the process 'racialization' attempts to track. If every case of 'racialization' were non-veridical (i.e. racialized according to features they do not possess or did not exist), then then referent of "race" would simply be existence of subordinate and privileged groups, via the operation of social systems and the valuation processes undertaken by these social processes. In other words, in order for racialized groups to refer, there must exist bodily properties that human bodies can be differentiated accordingly.

Let's look at our 'home-value' example. It could be the case that there are various homes that have been non-veridically appraised (i.e. are valued based on imagined bedrooms, granite countertops, square footage). This means that instances of the social processes underpinning home valuation, include both veridical and non-veridical valuation of the homes, meaning that existence of

a social process aimed at valuating properties/features of homes, do not necessarily always track existence of certain properties. However, what grounds the existence of "home-value" as a social process are the veridical cases of valuation, namely that there exist properties of homes that a market has an interest in tracking and valuating.

The reason that veridically racialized and non-veridically racialized can be included as belonging to the same referent of "race" because the existence of various distinguishable expressed phenotypes form the grounds by which social systems a lot people privilege or place in subordination. The valuation processes undertaken by these social systems can render false positives (i.e. racialization according to "imagined" bodily features), but the systems that continually place people in positions of privilege or subordination, are buttressed by veridical instances of racialization. This does not mean that social constructivist accounts are committed to "race" being solely or primarily biological, but it does mean that grounds for the construction of a social system to create racialized groups are underpinned by biological mechanisms that are responsible for producing the variation of expressed phenotypes (and in some cases genotypes) observed in human populations.

2.6.3 Summary of Biological Mechanisms behind Social Construction

In this section I explained how social constructivist accounts of race rely on a weak form of property realism. Social constructivist accounts conceive of race as a function of social systems valuating various properties/features of human beings and then subdividing them into groups with respect to these properties. I then explained that in order for the valuation processes to actually refer to entities that exist, then there must be some properties of entities that are being evaluated. The generative interaction between biological and social mechanisms that generates socially constructed

race concerns the biological mechanisms that underpin the expression of phenotypes from genotypes, which produces the properties of "bodily features from presumed ancestry" that are then "racialized" by social systems determining their social position (the social mechanism). Therefore, if it is the case that these social systems/institutions valuate the various properties of human beings to shape their social reality, then the mechanisms that produce these properties are constitutive of the referent of race.

Part III: Conclusion (and its implications for Metaphysics of Race scholarship)

Conclusion: Both Biological Racial Realism and Social Constructivist conception of "race" are Bio-Social entities.

This paper has aimed to demonstrate that any realist conception of "race" requires a co-occurrence of biological and social mechanisms in order for said conception of "race" to exist. As stated earlier, my conclusion is a claim that concerns what is metaphysically necessary for race to exist. This "metaphysical necessity" refers to the various states of affairs necessary for "race" to exist. The purpose of P1 was to describe the state of affairs necessary for certain kinds of entities to exist. The specific states of affairs I have detailed were the existence of generative interaction between the underlying processes of both biological and social mechanisms. I called these states of affairs, Bio-Social Reality. I then explain how entities that derive their existence from the states of affairs that constitute Bio-Social Reality, Bio-Social entities. The purpose of P2 was to demonstrate how the essential properties of "race" in both the Social Constructivist and Biological Racial Realist accounts of race, come into being via a generative interaction between biological and social mechanisms.

The upshot of this conclusion is that debate between Social Constructivists and Biological Racial Realists is not a debate over ontological taxonomy. If the metaphysical question at hand is

over what kind of entity is "race", then the answer should be univocal, it's a Bio-Social entity. Whether it's a Biological Racial Realist account or Social Constructivist account, "race" exists in virtue of biological and social mechanisms generatively interaction. Without metaphysical possibility of generattive relations existing between biological and social processes, all conceptions of "race" are metaphysically impossible. Thus, since the existence of generative relations between biological and social mechanisms are metaphysical necessities for "race" to exist, the correct ontological taxonomic category for entity like "race" is that it is Bio-Social entity.

However, accepting that race is a Bio-Social entity does not mean that Social Constructivists and Biological Racial Realists are in complete metaphysical agreement. In parsing through Hardimon's MCR account and Haslanger's SC accounts it becomes clear that though both accounts rely on the co-occurrence of biological and social mechanisms, they disagree about which biological and social mechanisms are pertinent for explaining how race exists. Such a disagreement could be generated by disagreement over what is "dominant meaning" of race is, thereby leading to disagreement over what biological and social mechanisms are pertinent. Or the disagreement could be generated by disagreement about how to interpret scientific data in conjunction with conceptual analysis (i.e. whether certain kinds of biological data are commensurate with how race aims to subdivide people into distinct groups).

Returning to our example of *Hereditary Monarchies* and *Families,* the Social Constructivist account of "race" might argue that a proper conceptual analysis of "race" will reveal that the only way for the essential properties of race to exist, is if the union of biological and social mechanisms are formed in a way similar to how *Hereditary Monarchies* come into being, that is, a social system has stipulated that a set of biological properties are instances of "race" . Biological Racial realists on the

other hand could argue that the essential properties of race are biological properties that are the result of how biological and social mechanisms interact to within the context of evolutionary theory, similar to the way *Families* can refer to various biological and social connection between organisms.

The takeaway here is that there can still be substantive metaphysical debates within the philosophy of race. It may also be the case that within these debates, race theorists might adopt positions that closely track arguments made by either Social Constructivists or Biological Racial Realists; however, these disagreements can still be had even if the question of "what kind of entity is race?" is settled.

My intentions for this paper were to advance the position that the home for race's ontological nature resides within Bio-Social Reality and to re-structure the ontological taxonomy of Philosophy of Race. With this new ontological taxonomy of Bio-Social Realism and Anti-Realism, I hope for new kinds of metaphysical debates that attempt to tease out how our understanding of the interaction of biological and social mechanisms informs our understanding of various concepts such as "race".

“Oh, how I long to know the truth
There are times when I look back
And I am haunted by my youth

Oh, but my joy of today
Is that we can all be proud to say
"To be young, gifted and black
Is where it's at"

-Nina Simone, 1969

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