•  
  •  
 

University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics

Authors

Linmin Zhang

Abstract

Natural languages generally use such patterns as ‘A is B’ or ‘A and B are the same’ to mean an identity relation. However, it remains unclear what the cognitive mechanism actually is in using these identity statements. In this study, I embed the identity statements in attitude reports and investigate possible and impossible readings for such attitude reports as ‘John thinks A is B’, ‘John thinks A and B are the same’, etc. Intriguingly, the study reveals that felicitous ‘de dicto’ identity reports have no corresponding ‘de re’ reports. To account for this effect, I propose that the identity relation between A and B as encoded in natural languages means the contextually salient properties coerced from the expression A hold in a certain world (e.g., in the belief worlds of an attitude holder) for the individual named B and vice versa. The current analysis also suggests that natural language users can have access to some expressions in two different ways simultaneously: both as descriptions to describe certain objects and as variable names to refer to certain objects.

Share

COinS
 
 

To view the content in your browser, please download Adobe Reader or, alternately,
you may Download the file to your hard drive.

NOTE: The latest versions of Adobe Reader do not support viewing PDF files within Firefox on Mac OS and if you are using a modern (Intel) Mac, there is no official plugin for viewing PDF files within the browser window.