Departmental Papers (Philosophy)
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
1-1-2012
Publication Source
Philosophy of Science
Volume
79
Issue
1
Start Page
38
Last Page
62
DOI
10.1086/663236
Abstract
This article examines a series of Schelling-like models of residential segregation, in which agents prefer to be in the minority. We demonstrate that as long as agents care about the characteristics of their wider community, they tend to end up in a segregated state. We then investigate the process that causes this and conclude that the result hinges on the similarity of informational states among agents of the same type. This is quite different from Schelling-like behavior and suggests (in his terms) that segregation is an instance of macrobehavior that can arise from a wide variety of micromotives.
Copyright/Permission Statement
© 2012 by Philosophy of Science Association
Recommended Citation
Muldoon, Ryan; Smith, Tony; and Weisberg, Michael, "Segregation That No One Seeks" (2012). Departmental Papers (Philosophy). 8.
https://repository.upenn.edu/philosophy_papers/8
Date Posted: 04 December 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.