Departmental Papers (Philosophy)

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

1-1-2012

Publication Source

Philosophy of Science

Volume

79

Issue

1

Start Page

38

Last Page

62

DOI

10.1086/663236

Abstract

This article examines a series of Schelling-like models of residential segregation, in which agents prefer to be in the minority. We demonstrate that as long as agents care about the characteristics of their wider community, they tend to end up in a segregated state. We then investigate the process that causes this and conclude that the result hinges on the similarity of informational states among agents of the same type. This is quite different from Schelling-like behavior and suggests (in his terms) that segregation is an instance of macrobehavior that can arise from a wide variety of micromotives.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© 2012 by Philosophy of Science Association

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Date Posted: 04 December 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.