Date of this Version
The Journal of Philosophy
Philosophers of science increasingly recognize the importance of idealization: the intentional introduction of distortion into scientific theories. Yet this recognition has not yielded consensus about the nature of idealization. Thee literature of the past thirty years contains disparate characterizations and justifications, but little evidence of convergence towards a common position.
This is the peer-reviewed version of the following article: Weisberg, M., Three Kinds of Idealization (2007) The Journal of Philosophy, which has been published in final form at dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20071041240. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes only
Weisberg, Michael, "Three Kinds of Idealization" (2007). Departmental Papers (Philosophy). 14.
Date Posted: 04 December 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.