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Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.
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experimental economics, public goods, voluntary contribution mechanism, weakest link mechanism
Croson, R., Fatas, E., & Neugebauer, T. (2005). Reciprocity, Matching and Conditional Cooperation in Two Public Goods Games. Economics Letters, 87 (1), 95-101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.