Operations, Information and Decisions Papers
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
4-2005
Publication Source
Economics Letters
Volume
87
Issue
1
Start Page
95
Last Page
101
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007
Abstract
Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.
Copyright/Permission Statement
© . This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Keywords
experimental economics, public goods, voluntary contribution mechanism, weakest link mechanism
Recommended Citation
Croson, R., Fatas, E., & Neugebauer, T. (2005). Reciprocity, Matching and Conditional Cooperation in Two Public Goods Games. Economics Letters, 87 (1), 95-101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.