Operations, Information and Decisions Papers
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
8-1996
Publication Source
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volume
30
Issue
2
Start Page
197
Last Page
212
DOI
10.1016/S0167-2681(96)00857-8
Abstract
This study reports on an experiment using variations of the ultimatum game. The experiment controls the amount and type of information known to the responder in the game. In two treatments, she knows both the absolute (money) and relative (fairness) payoffs from an offer. In the other two, she knows either only the absolute or only the relative payoffs. The predictions of four models for these treatments are tested: subgame-perfection, Bolton's comparative equilibrium, Ochs and Roth's absolute threshold, and Ochs and Roth's percentage threshold hypothesis.
Copyright/Permission Statement
© . This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Keywords
experiment, ultimatum game, fairness, uncertainty, framing, contingent weighting
Recommended Citation
Croson, R. (1996). Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 30 (2), 197-212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(96)00857-8
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.