Operations, Information and Decisions Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

8-1996

Publication Source

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Volume

30

Issue

2

Start Page

197

Last Page

212

DOI

10.1016/S0167-2681(96)00857-8

Abstract

This study reports on an experiment using variations of the ultimatum game. The experiment controls the amount and type of information known to the responder in the game. In two treatments, she knows both the absolute (money) and relative (fairness) payoffs from an offer. In the other two, she knows either only the absolute or only the relative payoffs. The predictions of four models for these treatments are tested: subgame-perfection, Bolton's comparative equilibrium, Ochs and Roth's absolute threshold, and Ochs and Roth's percentage threshold hypothesis.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© . This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Keywords

experiment, ultimatum game, fairness, uncertainty, framing, contingent weighting

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.