Operations, Information and Decisions Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

2-2012

Publication Source

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volume

33

Issue

1

Start Page

278

Last Page

291

DOI

10.1016/j.joep.2011.10.008

Abstract

We study the framing effects of communication on payoffs in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or competition, moving parties on a path toward or away from equal-division agreements. These endogenous framing effects may outweigh any overall social utility effects due to the mere presence of communication. In two studies, we find that non-binding talk about fairness within a three-party, complete-information game leads toward off-equilibrium, equal division payoffs, while non-binding talk focusing on Competitive Reasoning moves parties away from equal divisions. Our two studies allow us to demonstrate that manipulated pre-game talk and spontaneous within-game dialogue lead to the same results.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© . This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Keywords

communication, fairness, bargaining, negotiations

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.