Feedback in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms: An Experiment in Team Production

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Penn collection
Operations, Information and Decisions Papers
Degree type
Discipline
Subject
Economics
Social Work
Funder
Grant number
License
Copyright date
Distributor
Related resources
Author
Croson, Rachel
Contributor
Abstract

Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) classic paper models team production as a public good. They claim detection of individual effort levels, rather than aggregate effort levels, reduces shirking (free riding). This paper experimentally tests this claim. Participants are informed either about the individual contributions of others on their team or only about their team's total contribution. Average contributions in the two treatments are the same. However, contributions under individual feedback have a significantly higher variance than those under total feedback. Implications of these results for team production are discussed.

Advisor
Date Range for Data Collection (Start Date)
Date Range for Data Collection (End Date)
Digital Object Identifier
Book title
8
Series name and number
Publication date
2001-01-01
Volume number
Issue number
Publisher
Publisher DOI
Journal Issue
Comments
Recommended citation
Collection