Date of this Version
In this article we examine the effects of interest group pressure and the structure of political institutions on infrastructure deployment by state-owned electric utilities in a panel of seventy-eight countries during the period 1970–94. We consider two factors that jointly influence the rate of infrastructure deployment: (1) the extent to which the consumer base consists of industrial consumers, which are capable of exerting discipline on political actors whose competing incentives are to construct economically inefficient “white elephants” to satisfy the demands of concentrated geographic interests, labor unions, and national engineering and construction lobbies; and (2) veto points in formal policymaking structures that constrain political actors, thereby reducing these actors' sensitivity to interest group demands. A higher fraction of industrial customers provides political actors with stronger incentives for discipline, reducing the deployment of white elephants and thus the infrastructure growth rate, ceteris paribus. Veto points reduce political actors' sensitivity to interest group demands in general and thus moderate the relationship between industrial interest group pressure and the rate of infrastructure deployment.
© 2006 by The IO Foundation.
Reprinted with permission.
electricity, institutional environment, investment, regulation, interest group, state owned enterprise
Henisz, W. J., & Zelner, B. A. (2006). Interest Groups, Veto Points, and Electricity Infrastructure Deployment. International Organization, 60 (1), 263-286. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060085
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.