Date of this Version
Economics of Transition
The ability to cooperate in collective action problems – such as those relating to the use of common property resources or the provision of local public goods – is a key determinant of economic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problems in developing countries. First, which institutions discourage opportunistic behaviour and promote cooperation? Second, what are the characteristics of the individuals involved that determine the degree to which they cooperate? We first review the evidence from field studies, laboratory experiments, and cross community studies. We then present new results from an individual level panel dataset of rural workers.
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Bandiera, O., Barankay, I. and Rasul, I. (2005), Cooperation in collective action. Economics of Transition, 13: 473–498., which has been published in final form at doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00228.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html#terms.
collective action, cooperation, institutions
Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2005). Cooperation in Collective Action. Economics of Transition, 13 (3), 473-498. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00228.x
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.