Management Papers
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
7-2005
Publication Source
Economics of Transition
Volume
13
Issue
3
Start Page
473
Last Page
498
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00228.x
Abstract
The ability to cooperate in collective action problems – such as those relating to the use of common property resources or the provision of local public goods – is a key determinant of economic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problems in developing countries. First, which institutions discourage opportunistic behaviour and promote cooperation? Second, what are the characteristics of the individuals involved that determine the degree to which they cooperate? We first review the evidence from field studies, laboratory experiments, and cross community studies. We then present new results from an individual level panel dataset of rural workers.
Copyright/Permission Statement
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Bandiera, O., Barankay, I. and Rasul, I. (2005), Cooperation in collective action. Economics of Transition, 13: 473–498., which has been published in final form at doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00228.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html#terms.
Keywords
collective action, cooperation, institutions
Recommended Citation
Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2005). Cooperation in Collective Action. Economics of Transition, 13 (3), 473-498. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00228.x
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.