Date of this Version
This paper examines the law and economics of informational regulation (IR) of environmental risks. Informational regulation here means regulation which provides to affected stakeholders information on the operations of regulated entities, usually with the expectation that such stakeholders will then exert pressure on these entities to comply with regulations in a manner which serves the interests of stakeholders. As such, IR reinforces and augments direct regulatory monitoring and enforcement through third-party monitoring and incentives. The paper provides two contrasting frameworks, from law and economics, to analyze the costs and benefits likely to arise from IR and concludes with a discussion of the appropriate scope of IR as a substitute for and complement of traditional environmental regulation and law.
(Postprint statement) This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Kleindorfer, P.R. & Orts, E.W. (1998), "Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks", which has been published in final form at www.dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.1998.tb00927.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving [http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html#terms].
Kleindorfer, P. R., & Orts, E. W. (1998). Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks. Risk Analysis, 18 (2), 155-170. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.1998.tb00927.x
Date Posted: 19 February 2018
This document has been peer reviewed.